Extracted text

OCR Page 1 of 2
NLT (Naval Aide) 123 2 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE WASHINGTON E.O. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 12065, November 24, 1950 State By Dept. DEB NLT, Date 6-12-85 TOP E c R E T SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS KOREA Embassy London has been informed that in response to our representations, the UK agrees not to present its proposal for a demilitarized zone in north Korea before the arrival in Lake Success of the Chinese Communist delegation, it being under - stood that the sixepower resolution will not be voted upon before that time. Aside from this agreement, Foreign Minister Bevin's ideas expressed in his proposal still stand. In the meantime, Ambassador Austin has discussed this matter with Jebb, UK delegate to the UN, and received assurances from Jebb that he would under no circumstances raise the question in the Security Council without prior notice to our delegation and an opportunity for discussion. Jebb indicated his personal interest, and probably that of Bevin, in the desirability of introducing, in a suitable manner, the question of a demilitarized zone at some appropriate stage in the Council proceedings. Since Austin received the impression that the UK views of what is appropriate and suitable in this connection may differ from our views, he stressed the necessity of maintaining the highest degree of coordination in this matter. USSR We have informed our missions concerned of our present thinking on the problem of making a further reply to the Soviet proposal for a Council of Foreign Ministers meeting. Although we believe that we should not count on anything substantive emerging from discussions with the Soviets at this juncture, we believe that in light of all pertinent factors, an outright refusal of the Soviet proposal would be disadvantageous from a propaganda point of view. It is our tentative view that there are two principal alternative replies which could be made to the Soviet note of November 3: 1) a note which in effect rejects the specific Soviet proposal but leaves clear our willing- ness to discuss at any time the Austrian and other issues on a reasonable basis--without, - however, our making any counter-proposal or suggestion; and 2) a note rejecting the narrow basis of the Soviet proposal by making a counter - -suggestion that if the Soviet Government really desires conversa- tions, the four powers could designate representatives to conduct exploratory talks, as called for by the Iragi-Syrian resolution adopted by