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OCR Page 1 of 2NLT (Naval Aide) 123
2
OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
E.O. Guidelines, March 6, 1982
12065,
November 24, 1950
State By Dept. DEB NLT, Date 6-12-85
TOP E c R E T
SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS
KOREA
Embassy London has been informed that in response
to our representations, the UK agrees not to present
its proposal for a demilitarized zone in north Korea before the arrival
in Lake Success of the Chinese Communist delegation, it being under -
stood that the sixepower resolution will not be voted upon before that
time. Aside from this agreement, Foreign Minister Bevin's ideas
expressed in his proposal still stand. In the meantime, Ambassador
Austin has discussed this matter with Jebb, UK delegate to the UN, and
received assurances from Jebb that he would under no circumstances
raise the question in the Security Council without prior notice to our
delegation and an opportunity for discussion. Jebb indicated his personal
interest, and probably that of Bevin, in the desirability of introducing,
in a suitable manner, the question of a demilitarized zone at some
appropriate stage in the Council proceedings. Since Austin received the
impression that the UK views of what is appropriate and suitable in this
connection may differ from our views, he stressed the necessity of
maintaining the highest degree of coordination in this matter.
USSR
We have informed our missions concerned of our
present thinking on the problem of making a further
reply to the Soviet proposal for a Council of Foreign Ministers meeting.
Although we believe that we should not count on anything substantive
emerging from discussions with the Soviets at this juncture, we believe
that in light of all pertinent factors, an outright refusal of the Soviet
proposal would be disadvantageous from a propaganda point of view. It
is our tentative view that there are two principal alternative replies
which could be made to the Soviet note of November 3: 1) a note which
in effect rejects the specific Soviet proposal but leaves clear our willing-
ness to discuss at any time the Austrian and other issues on a reasonable
basis--without, - however, our making any counter-proposal or suggestion;
and 2) a note rejecting the narrow basis of the Soviet proposal by making
a counter - -suggestion that if the Soviet Government really desires conversa-
tions, the four powers could designate representatives to conduct
exploratory talks, as called for by the Iragi-Syrian resolution adopted by