Memorandum, State Department Summary of Telegrams

NLT (Navel Add 115 OFFICE OF DECLASSIFIED, 12065, Sec. 3-402 THE SECRETARY OF STATE they E.O. Guidelines, March 6-18-B1 6, 1982 WASHINGTON State By Dept. DEB NLT, Date December 14, 1950 IOPSECRT SUMMARY OF TELEGRAMS WESTERN EUROPE In referring to previous indications that the French might at some point seek postpone- - ment of action on German rearmament on the grounds that it might impair prospects for negotiations or a possible "settlement" with the USSR, our North Atlantic Council deputy has reported that French Foreign Minister Schuman expressed considerable preoccupation over relationship of a North Atlantic Council decision on Germany to peace talks with the Russians to the Norwegian Ambassador in Paris. Also the French Deputy on the North Atlantic Council has talked in the same vein with the Dutch Deputy. In the meantime we have given our Deputy a preliminary estimate of possible Soviet reactions to an announcement of agreement on the utilization of German forces in western European defense. Our preliminary views are that: 1) such an announcement has probably been discounted already by Moscow and the USSR has already inaugurated most of the counter measures on which it will probably rely at this stage; 2) Soviet reaction will probably not deviate from the present tactical pattern. UNITED NATIONS We have informed our UN delegation of our preliminary views on the question of negotia- tions with the Chinese Communists for guidance in its discussions with other delegations. In general our position is that: 1) we are always ready to seek an end to hostilities by means of negotiation and that every effort must be made to achieve the purposes of the UN in Korea by peaceful means and to find a solution of the Korean problem on the basis of a free and independent Korea; 2) we are prepared to take part in negotiations respecting Korea with interested governments and authorities, including representatives of the Peiping regime, either inside or outside the UN; however, this does not imply any change in our attitude with regard to the recognition of, or UN representation for, the Chinese Communists; 3) any negotiations which are held should deal first with the question of Korea and we should attempt to confine any agenda to a Korean settlement. While we would not reject the inclusion of other questions in the negotiations, we would reject linking up of such questions with a Korean settlement. TOP SECRET