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(CFM No.9)
2
TREHAR
Extreme anti-Soviet and anti-Communist sentiments are still
ARCHIVES AND
s. "NATIONAL RECORDS
a SERVICE'"
prevalent in the bulk of the German population in Northeastern
Germany. Withdrawal of Red Army forces would jeopardize German
Communist control in Eastern Germany as well as Soviet procurement of
reparations from German current production.
Although consequently thers would be a certain risk for the
Soviets to propose total withdrawal, it is possible that the Soviets
may make this proposal confident in the conviction that the Western
powers at any rate will be forced to reject it and that the fact of
its proposal might enhance the Soviet psychologica] position among the
Germans. If the Soviets make this proposal for total withdrawal, it is
likely that they will present it, as in the Korean cass, aa a condi-
tion for the establishment by the Germans of a Central Government.
It is assumed that the United States cannot accept any simple
proposal for the total withdrawal at this time of occupation forcee
from Germany. Both from e political and economic standpoint Germany
is not ready for such withdrewal. Premature withdrawal would jeopardize
accomplishment of US objectives of establishing a sound democratic
regime and normel economic life in Germany. It is accordingly necessary
to devise a US position which while rejecting the Soviet proposal will
deprive it of its propagenda value,
1
C. Recommendatione
The following two alternative methods of rejecting the Soviet
proposal are submitted:
ALTERNATIVE 1.
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"ocrText": "(CFM No.9)\n2\nTREHAR\nExtreme anti-Soviet and anti-Communist sentiments are still\nARCHIVES AND\ns. \"NATIONAL RECORDS\na SERVICE'\"\nprevalent in the bulk of the German population in Northeastern\nGermany. Withdrawal of Red Army forces would jeopardize German\nCommunist control in Eastern Germany as well as Soviet procurement of\nreparations from German current production.\nAlthough consequently thers would be a certain risk for the\nSoviets to propose total withdrawal, it is possible that the Soviets\nmay make this proposal confident in the conviction that the Western\npowers at any rate will be forced to reject it and that the fact of\nits proposal might enhance the Soviet psychologica] position among the\nGermans. If the Soviets make this proposal for total withdrawal, it is\nlikely that they will present it, as in the Korean cass, aa a condi-\ntion for the establishment by the Germans of a Central Government.\nIt is assumed that the United States cannot accept any simple\nproposal for the total withdrawal at this time of occupation forcee\nfrom Germany. Both from e political and economic standpoint Germany\nis not ready for such withdrewal. Premature withdrawal would jeopardize\naccomplishment of US objectives of establishing a sound democratic\nregime and normel economic life in Germany. It is accordingly necessary\nto devise a US position which while rejecting the Soviet proposal will\ndeprive it of its propagenda value,\n1\nC. Recommendatione\nThe following two alternative methods of rejecting the Soviet\nproposal are submitted:\nALTERNATIVE 1."
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