Memorandum from Secretary of State Dean Acheson to President Harry S. Truman

TO2 SECRET long the any DEPARTMENT OF STATE the WASHINGTON MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT Subject: Importance of Egypt to the Middle East Command Structure You are aware that informal politico-military talks were held September 5 - 7 with representatives of the British Government in Washington with a view to aligning US - UK policies towards Egypt in preparation for US talks with Messrs. Morrison and Schuman, and as a foundation for the establishment of a Supreme Allied Commander, Middle East, in whose headquarters American, UK, French, and, it is hoped, Turkish and Egyptian officers will participate. A prerequisite to an approach to Egypt on this question is an invitation to Turkey to join NATO. If all goes well, an approach to Egypt by the US, UK, France (and, we hope, Turkey) will take place during the last week in September. In order to assure the continued availability to the West of the vital British Base in the Suez Canal area and, at the same time, to meet the strongly-voiced demands of Egyptian nationalists for "evacuation" and "unity of the Nile Valley" (the Sudan Problem), the UK, in conjunction with the US and France, will propose to Egypt that the Suez base be transferred from UK auspices to the multilateral auspices of a Supreme Allied Commander, Middle East (SACME). To make the proposed new arrange- ment acceptable to the Egyptian Government will require that a number of concessions and incentives be given Egypt. While these will come pri- marily from the UK, the US share of the effort will be arms procurement and training assistance, grant arms aid and very limited economic aid, all under MSP. The Defense Department considers that there is no adequate substitute for the Egyptian base; consequently, provided Egypt is willing to cooperate with SACME, it will be necessary to give Egypt preferred treatment in arms and other ways as the price of securing our objectives. If Egypt does not elect to cooperate with SACME, we will go through with the establishment of the Middle East Allied Command (with headquarters elsewhere than in Egypt) but at the same time we will wish to withhold favors from Egypt. The singling out of Egypt for preferred treatment in exchange for its cooperation is likely to cause certain other Arab States to seek DECLASSIFIED comparable Authority NLT- 82-11 STATE DEPT. LTR. 1.3133 By NL NLT Date 371133 TOP SECRET