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Report, Analysis of the Soviet Union

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Secret USSR DECLASSIFIED By NLT ste Secret STATES OF UNITED MERICA DEPARTMENT INTERNAL OF Analysis of Soviet Union February.1951 Chart1 1 Restricted GEOGRAPHY AND POPULATION The USSR, which occupies one sixth of the earth's sur- face, is hermetically sealed by satellite buffer states except along its southwestern border. This gives it a strategic advantage almost without parallel. Soviet industry is widely Chart I dispersed and difficult to attack, although the European region, including the Ural mountains area, comprises over two million square miles and contains about three-quarters of Soviet industrial and agricultural production. WHY DO THE RUSSIANS ACT THE WAY THEY DO? The population is large (200 million), youthful (in 1939 The entire power system of the USSR impels itto engage more than half born since 1917), and accustomed to discipline. in a struggle with the US. There is consequently no prospect However, with over 40% of the population non-Russian, that the USSR will abandon the struggle on its own volition. separatism is potentially troublesome. In World War II a number of minority groups, including large elements among As the successor to the Russian Empire, the USSR the Ukrainians, were not reliable. inherits a tradition of expansionism. As a totalitarian dictatorship, it is ever driven to new conquests, internal and The USSR is closely tied up with the world Communist external. As the center of the world Communist movement, movement that the Kremlin cannot permit either a weakening it is irrevocably identified with an increasing struggle for of world Communism or a relaxation of its own control world revolution. The USSR thus joins together a national without an adverse effect on its power position. Since center of state power with an international crusade. Communism above all is a militant ideology, any subduing of the class struggle serves to soften the rank and file of Because Soviet leaders believe the fall of capitalism foreign Communists and to breed restlessness over the and the triumph of Communism are inevitable, it cannot be Kremlin's control. assumed that they regard their role as a passive one. Soviet leaders believe that these events are inevitable because of Only through permanent conflict can Moscow retain a what humans do, not irrespective of what they do. Thus, militant foreign organization. A temporary rapprochement Communists have no choice but to seek power militantly. would weaken the movement and reduce the effectiveness of Moscow's control. A genuine reconciliation between the Stalin has always looked on the USSR as the base of USSR and the capitalist powers would completely disrupt, world revolution. While the solidification of Communist if not disintegrate, world Communism. To avoid this sacri- rule at the base was an immediate goal, he always insisted fice the Kremlin must remain involved in a perpetual process that victory could be effected only as the remainder of the of generating friction with non-Communists, thereby inten- world was brought under proletarian rule. Thus "quietism" sifying non-Communist counteraction, which in turn creates and "passivity" are automatically rejected. a greater urgency for increased Communist militancy. Restricted RESTRICTED Russian AREA: 8,412,345 SQ.MI. Imperialism 1/6 of earth's land surface 1939-1950 USSR INTERNAL ADDITIONS 1939 W.Ukraine Latvia W.Byelorussia Lithuania Moldavia East Prussia Karelian Terr. Sakhalin Bessarabia Kurile Islands Ruthenia Petsamo Tannu Tuva POPULATION : Estonia 200 MILLION EXTERNAL ADDITIONS TARTAR Russians CONTROL Poland Rumania 58% Czech. Albania 1480. Bulgaria China over 100 Hungary N.Korea 17% others 2.5% PERIOD E.Germany Tartars Ukranians OF CZARS 3% Uzbeks 3% Byelonussians REVOLUTION DEATH OF U.S. RECOG- USSR/GERMAN USSR LENIN NITION PACT ATTACKED BY GERMANY CIVIL WAR 1917 1921 1924 1933 /939 1940 RESTRICTED Chart2 Restricted Chart2 GROWTH OF COMMUNIST PARTIES Today, the largest membership in the history of the world Com- munistmovement is at the disposal of Moscow for the achievement of its objectives. This membership numbers about 15 1/2 million distributed among 71 parties (the Communist claim is 18 million). Of these, 12 million, or over 3/4 of the total, are in the Communist-controlled areas from eastern Germany to North Korea. In addition, there are almost three million in the western countries, and almost 3/4 million in the colonial and underdeveloped lands of Asia, Africa and Latin America. During the 1920's the international Communist movement was little more than a pawn in the factional struggle for power within the USSR. Efforts to bring about or lead national revolutions in several countries, including Germany and China, failed. Even in 1934 after the great depression had shaken world capitalism, the world Communist move- ment outside the Soviet Union claimed a total membership of only 860,000 members. At this point the Popular Front tactic was used to secure all possible allies for the defense of the Soviet Union and "other democracies" against the menace of Fascism and Japanese imperialism, enabling the Communist movement to increase its membership to 1,200,000 by 1939. It was during World War II and after that the great opportunity for growth came to the World Communist movement. During this period the Communist leaders made the best of many factors, including the prom- inent role of Communists in underground movements; well-organized utilization of the vacuum left by the defeat of Fascism; loss of faith in traditional moderate political parties; and above all the Soviet military occupation of the eastern European nations. By 1946, the membership had passed the 12 1/2 million mark, with at least five parties (China, France, Italy, Czechoslovakia, and eastern Germany) claiming over a million each. Restricted Restricted GROWTH OF COMMUNIST PARTIES S.Asia &Pacific USSR 21,696,050 Countries Underdeveloped & NON-USSR Colonial(other than S.Asia 8 Pacific) 18,526,000 3,617,050 Westem Countries (U.S. Canada Spain 8 ERP Nations) Satellites 12,500,000 12,079,000 (Europe 8Asia) 3,667,000 3,688,000 1,680,854 860,000 1,200,000 6,026,000 6,000,000 375,000 1,305,854 2,807,000 2,488,000 1928 1934 1939 1946 1950 Restricted Chart3 Restricted Chart3 WORLD COMMUNIST STRENGTH Today, the Bolshevik leaders in the Kremlin form one of the most influential bodies of men in the world drawing their support from a net- work of Communist parties in more than sixty countries. These Com- munist parties control, or participate in the control of, governments ruling one-fifth of the world's population and take an active part in the political life of many others. Certain factual data concerning each of the Communist parties have been brought together and the current status of world Communism by country is indicated on the map opposite. This map is not intended to cover all aspects of world Communism, such as the manifold forms of Soviet action or the Communist position in the many private international organizations. It is concerned solely with the position of the Communist party in each country. Although the map is a measure of Communist parties, it should be noted that in many countries, for one reason or another, a different name is used. The Albanian Communists for example, call themselves the Workers Party; the German Communists, who have been trying to secure the support of the Social Democrats, use the title of the Socialist Unity Party; the Canadian Communists, after their party was outlawed during the war, formed the Labor-Progressive Party and now openly refer to it as their political organization for Canada. Restricted Restricted WORLD STRENGTH OF COMMUNIST PARTIES The Communist Party in complete control as major political party as active but not major political organization of minor importance activity not organized The Communist/Party X illegal engaged in guerrilla activity Restricted ChartA Chart4 Restricted SOVIET MISSIONS The immediate danger to the western world lies in the fact that world Communism is no longer an indigenous movement deriving its basic dynamism from the revolutionary efforts of the working class in the leading industrialized countries. It is rather a vast political, econ- omic and military system, principally outside the capitalist world, with its central power and direction located in the USSR, which is seeking to destroy the capitalist system. The immediate tasks which Moscow has assigned to the national Communist parties vary with the degree of Communist strength in the different areas of the world and in existing local situations. SATELLITES In those countries where the Communist regime is already estab- lished, the objective is the development of agricultural, military and industrial potentials within the framework of a nationalized economy under totalitarian Communist control and the gearing of the economy to the needs of the Soviet Union. ASIA In the colonial and underdeveloped areas in Asia with Communist bases, the objective is the use of violence, including military action, in an effort to capture leadership of the struggle for national independence and/or social reform. UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS Elsewhere in the underdeveloped areas of Africa and the East, the objective is the capture of leadership through the propaganda for social reform in the struggle for national development. WESTERN WORLD In the advanced countries of the western world where Communist parties are strong, the objective is disruption of the economy through strikes and mass demonstrations; exploitation of parliamentary insta- bility; and where possible the establishment of governments of demo- cratic union including the Communists. Inall western countries, intensive propaganda operations are encouraged. Restricted Restricted COMMUNIST MISSIONS in satellites in Asia EXPLOITATION VIOLENCE in underdeveloped areas in Western Europe INCITEMENT OBSTRUCTION LAND STRIKE Restricted Chart5 Secret Chart5 ECONOMIC CAPABILITIES The over-all economic capabilities of the Soviet Union for the achieve- ment of its ultimate aim of bringing about the defeat or capitulation of the US and its allies appear on the surface to be shockingly inadequate. For example, the total productive strength of the USSR in the four key commodities illustrated on the chart opposite--granting optimistic Soviet reports of production--compares with that of the US in a ratio of one to four. However, the present ability of the USSR to achieve success in its struggle with the non-Communist world cannot be determined from this comparison alone. Actual Soviet capabilities far exceed apparent capabilities because of the Kremlin's ability to bring to bear on a particu- lar effort a very large share of its total strength. Since the Soviet econ- omy has not been developed to serve consumers' needs, an unusually large proportion of its industrial production can be devoted to extra- ordinary purposes. Consequently, the USSR with its existing economic strength can sustain a mammoth war effort for a prolonged period. For instance, it prosecuted the last war with an annual steel availability of less than 10 million tons--one half of its present capacity. There is little doubt, therefore, that it could successfully equip and supply the maximum number of men it could put into the field with a total steel production appreciably less than the present rate. The same is generally true of other commodities, except fissionable materials about which the situation is not known. Secret Secret TOTAL ECONOMIC CAPABILITIES CONSUMPTION DISTRIBUTION OF GROSS AVAILABILITIES - 1949 MILITARY USE GROSS INVESTMENT 13.6% 6.5% 20.4% 22% 25.4% 4.8% 4% 60.8% 74% 13.8% 74.8% 79.9% BILLIONS $ 250 98 25 65 U.S. OTHER NAP COUNTRIES SOVIET ORBIT USSR WEST EAST Secret Chart6 Secret Chart6 GROSS AVAILABILITIES A comparison of the 1949 gross national incomes of the USSR and the US leaves the same impression of Soviet disadvantage that the first comparison of productive capacities left. The ratio of one to four is roughly the same--the United States with a gross national income of about 250 billion and the USSR with about 65 billion. However, again the strength of the USSR vis a vis the US cannot be adequately gauged by this simple comparison of national incomes. Several factors modify this comparison. For instance, with respect to military expenditures the money spent in the USSR goes much further than in the US. The use of slave labor, the low pay scale in the Soviet armed forces, and state control of the means of production enable the defense dollar to stretch much further in the Soviet Union than in the United States. It is also true that the United States actually leads the Soviet Union in capital investments even though the percentage of national income is less. However, in the United States the consumer economy determines that the predominant amount of investment be channeled back into con- sumer's industries. In the Soviet Union the major share of this capital investment is put into heavy industries geared to a war economy. The exact figures for this capital investment are difficult to determine. OTHER FIELDS In other fields--scientific development, general technological com- petence, skilled labor resources, productivity of labor force, etc.--the gap between the USSR and the US roughly corresponds to the gap in pro- duction indicated on the previous chart (No. 5). Secret Secret INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT - SELECTED INDUSTRIES, 1949 ELECTRIC POWER CRUDE OIL BILLIONS OF KWH MILLIONS OF METRIC TONS 345 U.S. 35.7 WEST 263 U.S. GERMANY 83.8 OTHER N.A.P. 50 U.K. .8 W. GERMANY 74 U.S.S.R OTHER NAP .9 AUSTRIA 46.7 CANADA 41 ORBIT 7 33.3 U.S.S.R 3 CANADA 5 ORBIT WEST PRIMARY STEEL 29 GERMANY ALUMINUM MILLIONS OF METRIC TONS OTHER 119.7 THOUSANDS OF METRIC TONS N.A.P. 80.4* U.S. 30.8 U.K. (1948) 9 WEST 547 U.S. GERMANY 19.4 OTHER N.A.P. 333 CANADA 15.8 U.K. 21.6 U.S.S.R. 130 U.S.S.R. 6.5 ORBIT 10 2.9 CANADA HUNGARY * 71.6 in 1949 due to steel strike Secret Chart 7 Chart7 TOTAL HUMAN MOBILIZATION Operating as it does under a totalitarian government, the Soviet Union has a definite advantage over democratic governments in that it can arbitrarily concentrate national capabilities without reference to the general public opinion or special interests groups. For instance, the Soviet Union possesses an almost complete mono- poly on influencing the thinking of their peoples. All domestic information media and educational systems are Communist-controlled. Soviet citizens are forbidden to travel abroad and only selected foreigners are permitted to enter. In this manner, the Soviet Government has virtually a free hand to mold for its people the picture of the world that it wants them to have. Similarly it can perpetrate its myth of a Communist Utopia by preventing a first-hand comparison between Soviet claims and reality. At the same time these tactics make the efforts of other nations to obtain information concerning the USSR an increasingly critical problem. Foreign press correspondents are refused admission to the Soviet orbit; western diplomatic missions are restricted in their operations; US information services within the orbit are severely circumscribed or pro- hibited; and Bulgaria's actions leading to a break in US-Bulgarian rela- tions marked an extreme point in the systematic campaign to nullify western diplomatic representation in the satellites. Police surveillance and extensive state secret laws further curtail contact between Soviet citizens and westerners. This complete internal control of the Soviet and satellite peoples by a small dictatorial clique plus the lack of regard for ethical values and accepted international norms frees the Soviet Union to choose its tactics in the struggle with the free world and allows it to resort to any approach that appears potentially effective. SOVIET ADVANTAGE ) POLITBURO TOTAL HUMAN MOBILIZATION PROPAGANDA SECRET POLICE AGITATION EDUCATIONAL CONTROL SLAVE LABOR Chart8 Chart8 COMMUNIST NETWORK The USSR enjoys further unique capabilities as a result of its identification with the Communist ideology. Soviet interests benefit from the mere existence of the ideal of Communism; producing a splitting effect on Western society and attracting foreign support to the USSR as the citadel of this secular faith. Communism's emphasis on inflaming resentment among the under- privileged is designed not only to facilitate the building of Communist parties as instruments of Soviet power, butto set class against class and country against country, to create confusion, and to cast doubts on the validity of the very principles that underlie the non-Communist way of life. In its organizational aspect, Communism has led to the creation of mass political parties and underground organizations (in some countries it is restricted to underground activities) with an estimated total mem- bership of some 15 1/2 million persons. These parties by their influence in both the political and economic life of foreign countries cause division and operate as open pressure groups in support of Soviet policy. In addition, the hard core of the Communist parties is available as a disci- plined and fanatic force for strike action, espionage, sabotage and sub- version on behalf of the USSR. Parallel with the Communist parties, a variety of national and inter- national Communist-front organizations serve to rally foreign sympathy for Soviet policy or at least to create doubts and fears over US policy. Similarly, Communist infiltration of national liberal and labor groups has often served to divide and discredit the non-Communist left. Thus, the Soviet Union, inits struggle with the non-Communist world, is aided and abetted by a vast world Communist network--a network un- limited in its choice of tactics; a network that resorts to any approach thatappears potentially effective in weakening the free world and advanc- ing Soviet domination. The chart opposite graphically summarizes the techniques of the Communist network. SOVIET ADVANTAGE WORLD COMMUNIST NETWORK POLITBURO ESPIONAGE CIVIL WAR STRIKES POLITICAL rr INFILTRATION PROPAGANDA PRESSURE Chart9 Restricted Chart9 SOVIET VULNERABILITIES Soviet capability to prosecute successfully its struggle against the US contains a number of vulnerabilities. The USSR is immediately most vulnerable in its control over its expanding empire; opposition of the subject state, as a state, to the master state; opposition of peoples against unrepresentative and alien satellite governments; conflict within the national Communist parties; and possible satellite party deviations. Internally the Soviet Union must guard against popular dissatisfaction caused by such things as the low standard of living, harsh labor laws, repressive administrative measures, and police brutality. The persist- ent desire of the peasant to own his own land and his discontent with collectivization are another major source of unrest. Further, the lack of freedom for intellectuals and the basic antagonism of minority groups (40%) are potentially troublesome, as are individual and factional strug- gles within the Communist hierarchy. Finally, the discrepency between Soviet myths of a Communist Utopia and Soviet reality threatens the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda. Revelations of Soviet escapees and disillusioned foreign Communists, and the exposure of Soviet methods by Marshal Tito indicate that inten- sified efforts on the part of the US might produce further effects. The Soviet Union, however, has shown acute awareness of these vulnerabilities and has taken necessary precautions. These vulnerabili- ties cannot be expected spontaneously to produce results. They are, however, of such nature as to suggest that systematic exploitation through external pressure might bring about a weakening in the Soviet power position and possibly a reversal in Soviet policies. Restricted Restricted SOVIET VULNERABILITIES IIIIIY RIGID CONTROLS GAP BETWEEN SOVIET MYTH EMPIRE ECONOMIC PEOPLE AND VULNERABILITIES INTELLECTUALS SOVIET REALITY PEASANTS WORKERS MINORITIES PARTIES Restricted Chart10 Chart10 ECONOMIC WEAKNESSES The magnitude of the economic task which the USSR has assumed in the creation of its Eurasian empire cannot help but cause considerable difficulties. Although the USSR is still in the early stages of industriali- zation and faces severe limitations on its ability to accelerate its devel- opment, it has, nevertheless, taken on partial responsibility for large areas and populations that are poor in resources, backward in develop- ment, and no longer free to benefit from normal economic ties with western countries. It has thus created an economic vacuum which, with a per capita consumption of $200 per year, it is powerless to fill. Apart from its general economic deficiencies, the Soviet Union faces a number of particular shortages which, if exploited through such devices as export controls, might interfere with even the maintenance of present levels of production in important sectors of the economy. Among raw materials in short supply, the most important are tin, crude rubber, and certain nonferrous metals. Among industrial items are spare parts for the large quantities of machinery and equipment secured from the west, precision instruments, complex machine tools, special purpose bearings, and electrical equipment. Slowness of mechanization, farmer opposition to collectivization and general dissatisfaction among the peasants also indicate a certain agricultural vulnerability. It cannot be stressed too strongly that these potential weaknesses in the Soviet economic system cannot be counted on to produce results in the absence of a major upset to Soviet equilibrium through counterpres- sures by the US and the rest of the free world. ECONOMIC WEAKNESS $1338 $833 $550 $518 $502 $413 USSR lowest standard of living $200 US Canada Den. UK Bel-Lux France rigidity of planned system technological backwardness ? slow development of agriculture bottlenecks and shortages responsibility for large backward areas Chart11 Chart11 POTENTIAL FOR COMMUNIST DEVIATION FROM SOVIET CONTROL Inherent in the structure of international Communism are certain vulnerabilities that contain a potential for deviation from Soviet control. Among these are the contradictions of Moscow's demands of the national Communist Party; disillusionment when members realize the truth about Communist objectives and methods; personal rivalries among the leaders; and the contradiction of national leaders adulated by their followers but treated as lackeys by Moscow. The majority of the people in the satellites are intensely national- istic and resent the domination of the Kremlin and the Communist Governments. Although this is a potential weakness, there is no evidence that it would give rise to further successful nationalist deviations on Titoist lines, nor would it produce effective resistance to a Soviet war effort unless the war were going badly for the Soviet Union and the dis- affected elements were given guidance and support from the West. In the long run the Tito heresy makes it easier for dissident party elements in other countries to question the Kremlin's leadership. How- ever, outside Yugoslavia, the conditions necessary for successful defec- tion (a Communist apparatus relatively free from physical Soviet control and accessible to western powers) exist only in China, Albania, and perhaps Indochina. Unfortunately, in the case of the Red Army-"liberated" European satellites, where revolts might be most dangerous, direct Soviet Control is most complete. Moscow may also face possible revolts in some parties of the non- Communist world, but it can always create a "loyalist" group to compete with the rebels. The possibility that revolts might simultaneously gain mass support in several countries, and begin to snowball throughout the Communist world is slight. In sum, Moscow's over-all control of international Communism has not been impaired by the Tito revolt, and, for the foreseeable future, there is little prospect that it will be impaired. PHILIPPINES MALAYA POTENTIAL FOR VIETNAM COMMUNIST FINLAND DEVIATION BURMA FROM SOVIET FRANCE CONTROL POLAND I a I / HUNGARY / BULGARIA ALBANIA I I 1. CZECHO- USSR GERMANY / / / CHINA Red N-KOREA I RUMANIA MANCHURIA ITALY INDIA Party in Power "Liberated" Mass Following Other Non-Communist Countries YUGOSLAVIA

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    "ocrText": "Secret\nUSSR\nDECLASSIFIED\nBy NLT ste\nSecret\nSTATES OF UNITED MERICA DEPARTMENT INTERNAL OF\nAnalysis of Soviet Union\nFebruary.1951\nChart1\n1\nRestricted\nGEOGRAPHY AND POPULATION\nThe USSR, which occupies one sixth of the earth's sur-\nface, is hermetically sealed by satellite buffer states except\nalong its southwestern border. This gives it a strategic\nadvantage almost without parallel. Soviet industry is widely\nChart I\ndispersed and difficult to attack, although the European\nregion, including the Ural mountains area, comprises over\ntwo million square miles and contains about three-quarters\nof Soviet industrial and agricultural production.\nWHY DO THE RUSSIANS ACT THE WAY THEY DO?\nThe population is large (200 million), youthful (in 1939\nThe entire power system of the USSR impels itto engage\nmore than half born since 1917), and accustomed to discipline.\nin a struggle with the US. There is consequently no prospect\nHowever, with over 40% of the population non-Russian,\nthat the USSR will abandon the struggle on its own volition.\nseparatism is potentially troublesome. In World War II a\nnumber of minority groups, including large elements among\nAs the successor to the Russian Empire, the USSR\nthe Ukrainians, were not reliable.\ninherits a tradition of expansionism. As a totalitarian\ndictatorship, it is ever driven to new conquests, internal and\nThe USSR is closely tied up with the world Communist\nexternal. As the center of the world Communist movement,\nmovement that the Kremlin cannot permit either a weakening\nit is irrevocably identified with an increasing struggle for\nof world Communism or a relaxation of its own control\nworld revolution. The USSR thus joins together a national\nwithout an adverse effect on its power position. Since\ncenter of state power with an international crusade.\nCommunism above all is a militant ideology, any subduing\nof the class struggle serves to soften the rank and file of\nBecause Soviet leaders believe the fall of capitalism\nforeign Communists and to breed restlessness over the\nand the triumph of Communism are inevitable, it cannot be\nKremlin's control.\nassumed that they regard their role as a passive one. Soviet\nleaders believe that these events are inevitable because of\nOnly through permanent conflict can Moscow retain a\nwhat humans do, not irrespective of what they do. Thus,\nmilitant foreign organization. A temporary rapprochement\nCommunists have no choice but to seek power militantly.\nwould weaken the movement and reduce the effectiveness of\nMoscow's control. A genuine reconciliation between the\nStalin has always looked on the USSR as the base of\nUSSR and the capitalist powers would completely disrupt,\nworld revolution. While the solidification of Communist\nif not disintegrate, world Communism. To avoid this sacri-\nrule at the base was an immediate goal, he always insisted\nfice the Kremlin must remain involved in a perpetual process\nthat victory could be effected only as the remainder of the\nof generating friction with non-Communists, thereby inten-\nworld was brought under proletarian rule. Thus \"quietism\"\nsifying non-Communist counteraction, which in turn creates\nand \"passivity\" are automatically rejected.\na greater urgency for increased Communist militancy.\nRestricted\nRESTRICTED\nRussian\nAREA:\n8,412,345 SQ.MI.\nImperialism\n1/6 of earth's land surface\n1939-1950\nUSSR\nINTERNAL ADDITIONS\n1939\nW.Ukraine\nLatvia\nW.Byelorussia\nLithuania\nMoldavia\nEast Prussia\nKarelian Terr.\nSakhalin\nBessarabia\nKurile Islands\nRuthenia\nPetsamo\nTannu Tuva\nPOPULATION :\nEstonia\n200 MILLION\nEXTERNAL ADDITIONS\nTARTAR\nRussians\nCONTROL\nPoland\nRumania\n58%\nCzech.\nAlbania\n1480.\nBulgaria\nChina\nover 100\nHungary\nN.Korea\n17%\nothers\n2.5%\nPERIOD\nE.Germany\nTartars\nUkranians\nOF CZARS\n3%\nUzbeks\n3%\nByelonussians\nREVOLUTION\nDEATH OF\nU.S. RECOG-\nUSSR/GERMAN\nUSSR\nLENIN\nNITION\nPACT\nATTACKED\nBY\nGERMANY\nCIVIL WAR\n1917\n1921\n1924\n1933\n/939 1940\nRESTRICTED\nChart2\nRestricted\nChart2\nGROWTH OF COMMUNIST PARTIES\nToday, the largest membership in the history of the world Com-\nmunistmovement is at the disposal of Moscow for the achievement of its\nobjectives. This membership numbers about 15 1/2 million distributed\namong 71 parties (the Communist claim is 18 million). Of these, 12\nmillion, or over 3/4 of the total, are in the Communist-controlled areas\nfrom eastern Germany to North Korea. In addition, there are almost\nthree million in the western countries, and almost 3/4 million in the\ncolonial and underdeveloped lands of Asia, Africa and Latin America.\nDuring the 1920's the international Communist movement was little\nmore than a pawn in the factional struggle for power within the USSR.\nEfforts to bring about or lead national revolutions in several countries,\nincluding Germany and China, failed. Even in 1934 after the great\ndepression had shaken world capitalism, the world Communist move-\nment outside the Soviet Union claimed a total membership of only\n860,000 members. At this point the Popular Front tactic was used to\nsecure all possible allies for the defense of the Soviet Union and \"other\ndemocracies\" against the menace of Fascism and Japanese imperialism,\nenabling the Communist movement to increase its membership to\n1,200,000 by 1939.\nIt was during World War II and after that the great opportunity for\ngrowth came to the World Communist movement. During this period the\nCommunist leaders made the best of many factors, including the prom-\ninent role of Communists in underground movements; well-organized\nutilization of the vacuum left by the defeat of Fascism; loss of faith in\ntraditional moderate political parties; and above all the Soviet military\noccupation of the eastern European nations. By 1946, the membership\nhad passed the 12 1/2 million mark, with at least five parties (China,\nFrance, Italy, Czechoslovakia, and eastern Germany) claiming over a\nmillion each.\nRestricted\nRestricted\nGROWTH OF COMMUNIST PARTIES\nS.Asia &Pacific\nUSSR\n21,696,050\nCountries\nUnderdeveloped &\nNON-USSR\nColonial(other than\nS.Asia 8 Pacific)\n18,526,000\n3,617,050\nWestem Countries\n(U.S. Canada Spain\n8 ERP Nations)\nSatellites\n12,500,000\n12,079,000\n(Europe 8Asia)\n3,667,000\n3,688,000\n1,680,854\n860,000\n1,200,000\n6,026,000\n6,000,000\n375,000\n1,305,854\n2,807,000\n2,488,000\n1928\n1934\n1939\n1946\n1950\nRestricted\nChart3\nRestricted\nChart3\nWORLD COMMUNIST STRENGTH\nToday, the Bolshevik leaders in the Kremlin form one of the most\ninfluential bodies of men in the world drawing their support from a net-\nwork of Communist parties in more than sixty countries. These Com-\nmunist parties control, or participate in the control of, governments\nruling one-fifth of the world's population and take an active part in the\npolitical life of many others.\nCertain factual data concerning each of the Communist parties have\nbeen brought together and the current status of world Communism by\ncountry is indicated on the map opposite. This map is not intended to\ncover all aspects of world Communism, such as the manifold forms of\nSoviet action or the Communist position in the many private international\norganizations. It is concerned solely with the position of the Communist\nparty in each country.\nAlthough the map is a measure of Communist parties, it should be\nnoted that in many countries, for one reason or another, a different name\nis used. The Albanian Communists for example, call themselves the\nWorkers Party; the German Communists, who have been trying to secure\nthe support of the Social Democrats, use the title of the Socialist Unity\nParty; the Canadian Communists, after their party was outlawed during\nthe war, formed the Labor-Progressive Party and now openly refer to it\nas their political organization for Canada.\nRestricted\nRestricted\nWORLD STRENGTH OF COMMUNIST PARTIES\nThe Communist Party\nin complete control\nas major political party\nas active but not major\npolitical organization\nof minor importance\nactivity not organized\nThe Communist/Party\nX illegal\nengaged in guerrilla activity\nRestricted\nChartA\nChart4\nRestricted\nSOVIET MISSIONS\nThe immediate danger to the western world lies in the fact that\nworld Communism is no longer an indigenous movement deriving its\nbasic dynamism from the revolutionary efforts of the working class in\nthe leading industrialized countries. It is rather a vast political, econ-\nomic and military system, principally outside the capitalist world, with\nits central power and direction located in the USSR, which is seeking to\ndestroy the capitalist system. The immediate tasks which Moscow has\nassigned to the national Communist parties vary with the degree of\nCommunist strength in the different areas of the world and in existing\nlocal situations.\nSATELLITES\nIn those countries where the Communist regime is already estab-\nlished, the objective is the development of agricultural, military and\nindustrial potentials within the framework of a nationalized economy\nunder totalitarian Communist control and the gearing of the economy to\nthe needs of the Soviet Union.\nASIA\nIn the colonial and underdeveloped areas in Asia with Communist\nbases, the objective is the use of violence, including military action, in\nan effort to capture leadership of the struggle for national independence\nand/or social reform.\nUNDERDEVELOPED AREAS\nElsewhere in the underdeveloped areas of Africa and the East, the\nobjective is the capture of leadership through the propaganda for social\nreform in the struggle for national development.\nWESTERN WORLD\nIn the advanced countries of the western world where Communist\nparties are strong, the objective is disruption of the economy through\nstrikes and mass demonstrations; exploitation of parliamentary insta-\nbility; and where possible the establishment of governments of demo-\ncratic union including the Communists. Inall western countries, intensive\npropaganda operations are encouraged.\nRestricted\nRestricted\nCOMMUNIST MISSIONS\nin satellites\nin Asia\nEXPLOITATION\nVIOLENCE\nin underdeveloped areas\nin Western Europe\nINCITEMENT\nOBSTRUCTION\nLAND\nSTRIKE\nRestricted\nChart5\nSecret\nChart5\nECONOMIC CAPABILITIES\nThe over-all economic capabilities of the Soviet Union for the achieve-\nment of its ultimate aim of bringing about the defeat or capitulation of\nthe US and its allies appear on the surface to be shockingly inadequate.\nFor example, the total productive strength of the USSR in the four key\ncommodities illustrated on the chart opposite--granting optimistic Soviet\nreports of production--compares with that of the US in a ratio of one to\nfour.\nHowever, the present ability of the USSR to achieve success in its\nstruggle with the non-Communist world cannot be determined from this\ncomparison alone. Actual Soviet capabilities far exceed apparent\ncapabilities because of the Kremlin's ability to bring to bear on a particu-\nlar effort a very large share of its total strength. Since the Soviet econ-\nomy has not been developed to serve consumers' needs, an unusually\nlarge proportion of its industrial production can be devoted to extra-\nordinary purposes. Consequently, the USSR with its existing economic\nstrength can sustain a mammoth war effort for a prolonged period. For\ninstance, it prosecuted the last war with an annual steel availability of\nless than 10 million tons--one half of its present capacity. There is\nlittle doubt, therefore, that it could successfully equip and supply the\nmaximum number of men it could put into the field with a total steel\nproduction appreciably less than the present rate. The same is generally\ntrue of other commodities, except fissionable materials about which the\nsituation is not known.\nSecret\nSecret\nTOTAL ECONOMIC CAPABILITIES\nCONSUMPTION\nDISTRIBUTION OF GROSS AVAILABILITIES - 1949\nMILITARY USE\nGROSS INVESTMENT\n13.6%\n6.5%\n20.4%\n22%\n25.4%\n4.8%\n4%\n60.8%\n74%\n13.8%\n74.8%\n79.9%\nBILLIONS $ 250\n98\n25\n65\nU.S.\nOTHER NAP COUNTRIES\nSOVIET ORBIT\nUSSR\nWEST\nEAST\nSecret\nChart6\nSecret\nChart6\nGROSS AVAILABILITIES\nA comparison of the 1949 gross national incomes of the USSR and\nthe US leaves the same impression of Soviet disadvantage that the first\ncomparison of productive capacities left. The ratio of one to four is\nroughly the same--the United States with a gross national income of about\n250 billion and the USSR with about 65 billion.\nHowever, again the strength of the USSR vis a vis the US cannot be\nadequately gauged by this simple comparison of national incomes.\nSeveral factors modify this comparison. For instance, with respect to\nmilitary expenditures the money spent in the USSR goes much further\nthan in the US. The use of slave labor, the low pay scale in the Soviet\narmed forces, and state control of the means of production enable the\ndefense dollar to stretch much further in the Soviet Union than in the\nUnited States.\nIt is also true that the United States actually leads the Soviet Union\nin capital investments even though the percentage of national income is\nless. However, in the United States the consumer economy determines\nthat the predominant amount of investment be channeled back into con-\nsumer's industries. In the Soviet Union the major share of this capital\ninvestment is put into heavy industries geared to a war economy. The\nexact figures for this capital investment are difficult to determine.\nOTHER FIELDS\nIn other fields--scientific development, general technological com-\npetence, skilled labor resources, productivity of labor force, etc.--the\ngap between the USSR and the US roughly corresponds to the gap in pro-\nduction indicated on the previous chart (No. 5).\nSecret\nSecret\nINDUSTRIAL OUTPUT - SELECTED INDUSTRIES, 1949\nELECTRIC POWER\nCRUDE OIL\nBILLIONS OF KWH\nMILLIONS OF METRIC TONS\n345\nU.S.\n35.7\nWEST\n263\nU.S.\nGERMANY\n83.8\nOTHER\nN.A.P.\n50\nU.K.\n.8\nW. GERMANY\n74\nU.S.S.R\nOTHER NAP\n.9 AUSTRIA\n46.7\nCANADA\n41\nORBIT\n7\n33.3\nU.S.S.R\n3 CANADA\n5 ORBIT\nWEST\nPRIMARY\nSTEEL\n29\nGERMANY\nALUMINUM\nMILLIONS OF METRIC TONS\nOTHER\n119.7\nTHOUSANDS OF METRIC TONS\nN.A.P.\n80.4*\nU.S.\n30.8\nU.K.\n(1948)\n9\nWEST\n547\nU.S.\nGERMANY\n19.4\nOTHER\nN.A.P.\n333\nCANADA\n15.8\nU.K.\n21.6\nU.S.S.R.\n130\nU.S.S.R.\n6.5\nORBIT\n10\n2.9\nCANADA\nHUNGARY\n*\n71.6 in 1949\ndue to steel strike\nSecret\nChart 7\nChart7\nTOTAL HUMAN MOBILIZATION\nOperating as it does under a totalitarian government, the Soviet\nUnion has a definite advantage over democratic governments in that it\ncan arbitrarily concentrate national capabilities without reference to the\ngeneral public opinion or special interests groups.\nFor instance, the Soviet Union possesses an almost complete mono-\npoly on influencing the thinking of their peoples. All domestic information\nmedia and educational systems are Communist-controlled. Soviet citizens\nare forbidden to travel abroad and only selected foreigners are permitted\nto enter. In this manner, the Soviet Government has virtually a free hand\nto mold for its people the picture of the world that it wants them to have.\nSimilarly it can perpetrate its myth of a Communist Utopia by preventing\na first-hand comparison between Soviet claims and reality.\nAt the same time these tactics make the efforts of other nations to\nobtain information concerning the USSR an increasingly critical problem.\nForeign press correspondents are refused admission to the Soviet orbit;\nwestern diplomatic missions are restricted in their operations; US\ninformation services within the orbit are severely circumscribed or pro-\nhibited; and Bulgaria's actions leading to a break in US-Bulgarian rela-\ntions marked an extreme point in the systematic campaign to nullify\nwestern diplomatic representation in the satellites. Police surveillance\nand extensive state secret laws further curtail contact between Soviet\ncitizens and westerners.\nThis complete internal control of the Soviet and satellite peoples by\na small dictatorial clique plus the lack of regard for ethical values and\naccepted international norms frees the Soviet Union to choose its tactics\nin the struggle with the free world and allows it to resort to any approach\nthat appears potentially effective.\nSOVIET ADVANTAGE\n)\nPOLITBURO\nTOTAL HUMAN MOBILIZATION\nPROPAGANDA\nSECRET POLICE\nAGITATION\nEDUCATIONAL CONTROL\nSLAVE LABOR\nChart8\nChart8\nCOMMUNIST NETWORK\nThe USSR enjoys further unique capabilities as a result of its\nidentification with the Communist ideology. Soviet interests benefit from\nthe mere existence of the ideal of Communism; producing a splitting\neffect on Western society and attracting foreign support to the USSR as\nthe citadel of this secular faith.\nCommunism's emphasis on inflaming resentment among the under-\nprivileged is designed not only to facilitate the building of Communist\nparties as instruments of Soviet power, butto set class against class and\ncountry against country, to create confusion, and to cast doubts on the\nvalidity of the very principles that underlie the non-Communist way of\nlife.\nIn its organizational aspect, Communism has led to the creation of\nmass political parties and underground organizations (in some countries\nit is restricted to underground activities) with an estimated total mem-\nbership of some 15 1/2 million persons. These parties by their influence\nin both the political and economic life of foreign countries cause division\nand operate as open pressure groups in support of Soviet policy. In\naddition, the hard core of the Communist parties is available as a disci-\nplined and fanatic force for strike action, espionage, sabotage and sub-\nversion on behalf of the USSR.\nParallel with the Communist parties, a variety of national and inter-\nnational Communist-front organizations serve to rally foreign sympathy\nfor Soviet policy or at least to create doubts and fears over US policy.\nSimilarly, Communist infiltration of national liberal and labor groups\nhas often served to divide and discredit the non-Communist left.\nThus, the Soviet Union, inits struggle with the non-Communist world,\nis aided and abetted by a vast world Communist network--a network un-\nlimited in its choice of tactics; a network that resorts to any approach\nthatappears potentially effective in weakening the free world and advanc-\ning Soviet domination. The chart opposite graphically summarizes the\ntechniques of the Communist network.\nSOVIET ADVANTAGE\nWORLD COMMUNIST NETWORK\nPOLITBURO\nESPIONAGE\nCIVIL WAR\nSTRIKES\nPOLITICAL\nrr\nINFILTRATION\nPROPAGANDA\nPRESSURE\nChart9\nRestricted\nChart9\nSOVIET VULNERABILITIES\nSoviet capability to prosecute successfully its struggle against the\nUS contains a number of vulnerabilities.\nThe USSR is immediately most vulnerable in its control over its\nexpanding empire; opposition of the subject state, as a state, to the\nmaster state; opposition of peoples against unrepresentative and alien\nsatellite governments; conflict within the national Communist parties;\nand possible satellite party deviations.\nInternally the Soviet Union must guard against popular dissatisfaction\ncaused by such things as the low standard of living, harsh labor laws,\nrepressive administrative measures, and police brutality. The persist-\nent desire of the peasant to own his own land and his discontent with\ncollectivization are another major source of unrest. Further, the lack\nof freedom for intellectuals and the basic antagonism of minority groups\n(40%) are potentially troublesome, as are individual and factional strug-\ngles within the Communist hierarchy.\nFinally, the discrepency between Soviet myths of a Communist\nUtopia and Soviet reality threatens the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda.\nRevelations of Soviet escapees and disillusioned foreign Communists,\nand the exposure of Soviet methods by Marshal Tito indicate that inten-\nsified efforts on the part of the US might produce further effects.\nThe Soviet Union, however, has shown acute awareness of these\nvulnerabilities and has taken necessary precautions. These vulnerabili-\nties cannot be expected spontaneously to produce results. They are,\nhowever, of such nature as to suggest that systematic exploitation through\nexternal pressure might bring about a weakening in the Soviet power\nposition and possibly a reversal in Soviet policies.\nRestricted\nRestricted\nSOVIET VULNERABILITIES\nIIIIIY\nRIGID CONTROLS\nGAP BETWEEN\nSOVIET MYTH\nEMPIRE\nECONOMIC\nPEOPLE\nAND\nVULNERABILITIES\nINTELLECTUALS\nSOVIET REALITY\nPEASANTS\nWORKERS\nMINORITIES\nPARTIES\nRestricted\nChart10\nChart10\nECONOMIC WEAKNESSES\nThe magnitude of the economic task which the USSR has assumed in\nthe creation of its Eurasian empire cannot help but cause considerable\ndifficulties. Although the USSR is still in the early stages of industriali-\nzation and faces severe limitations on its ability to accelerate its devel-\nopment, it has, nevertheless, taken on partial responsibility for large\nareas and populations that are poor in resources, backward in develop-\nment, and no longer free to benefit from normal economic ties with\nwestern countries. It has thus created an economic vacuum which, with\na per capita consumption of $200 per year, it is powerless to fill.\nApart from its general economic deficiencies, the Soviet Union faces\na number of particular shortages which, if exploited through such devices\nas export controls, might interfere with even the maintenance of present\nlevels of production in important sectors of the economy. Among raw\nmaterials in short supply, the most important are tin, crude rubber, and\ncertain nonferrous metals. Among industrial items are spare parts for\nthe large quantities of machinery and equipment secured from the west,\nprecision instruments, complex machine tools, special purpose bearings,\nand electrical equipment. Slowness of mechanization, farmer opposition\nto collectivization and general dissatisfaction among the peasants also\nindicate a certain agricultural vulnerability.\nIt cannot be stressed too strongly that these potential weaknesses in\nthe Soviet economic system cannot be counted on to produce results in\nthe absence of a major upset to Soviet equilibrium through counterpres-\nsures by the US and the rest of the free world.\nECONOMIC WEAKNESS\n$1338\n$833\n$550\n$518\n$502\n$413\nUSSR\nlowest standard of living\n$200\nUS Canada Den. UK Bel-Lux France\nrigidity of planned system\ntechnological backwardness\n?\nslow development of agriculture\nbottlenecks and shortages\nresponsibility for large backward areas\nChart11\nChart11\nPOTENTIAL FOR COMMUNIST DEVIATION FROM SOVIET CONTROL\nInherent in the structure of international Communism are certain\nvulnerabilities that contain a potential for deviation from Soviet control.\nAmong these are the contradictions of Moscow's demands of the national\nCommunist Party; disillusionment when members realize the truth about\nCommunist objectives and methods; personal rivalries among the leaders;\nand the contradiction of national leaders adulated by their followers but\ntreated as lackeys by Moscow.\nThe majority of the people in the satellites are intensely national-\nistic and resent the domination of the Kremlin and the Communist\nGovernments. Although this is a potential weakness, there is no evidence\nthat it would give rise to further successful nationalist deviations on\nTitoist lines, nor would it produce effective resistance to a Soviet war\neffort unless the war were going badly for the Soviet Union and the dis-\naffected elements were given guidance and support from the West.\nIn the long run the Tito heresy makes it easier for dissident party\nelements in other countries to question the Kremlin's leadership. How-\never, outside Yugoslavia, the conditions necessary for successful defec-\ntion (a Communist apparatus relatively free from physical Soviet control\nand accessible to western powers) exist only in China, Albania, and\nperhaps Indochina. Unfortunately, in the case of the Red Army-\"liberated\"\nEuropean satellites, where revolts might be most dangerous, direct\nSoviet Control is most complete.\nMoscow may also face possible revolts in some parties of the non-\nCommunist world, but it can always create a \"loyalist\" group to compete\nwith the rebels. The possibility that revolts might simultaneously gain\nmass support in several countries, and begin to snowball throughout the\nCommunist world is slight.\nIn sum, Moscow's over-all control of international Communism has\nnot been impaired by the Tito revolt, and, for the foreseeable future,\nthere is little prospect that it will be impaired.\nPHILIPPINES\nMALAYA\nPOTENTIAL FOR\nVIETNAM\nCOMMUNIST\nFINLAND\nDEVIATION\nBURMA\nFROM SOVIET\nFRANCE\nCONTROL\nPOLAND I a I /\nHUNGARY /\nBULGARIA\nALBANIA\nI\nI\n1.\nCZECHO-\nUSSR\nGERMANY\n/\n/\n/\nCHINA\nRed\nN-KOREA\nI\nRUMANIA\nMANCHURIA\nITALY\nINDIA\nParty in Power \"Liberated\"\nMass Following\nOther Non-Communist Countries\nYUGOSLAVIA"
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