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{
    "localId": "225248232",
    "label": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 55, The Consequences of the Partition of Palestine",
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    "id": "225248232",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Reports and Estimates Report, Number 55, The Consequences of the Partition of Palestine",
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        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
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    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 28,
            "logicalDate": "1947-11-28",
            "month": 11,
            "year": 1947
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{
    "seq": 13,
    "pageIndex": 0,
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    "ocrText": "SECRET\nThey are expected to come to the aid of the Palestinian Arabs as soon as hostilities break\nout, and additional men may be expected to swell the total Arab force as time goes on.\nTheir service will probably be sporadic; but other tribesmen will replace any who drop\nout of the fighting so that the total Arab strength will undoubtedly be maintained.\nThe ground forces of the Arab League states (Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon,\nSaudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan, and Yemen) total about 223,000 men, including\ngendarmes, security troops, and police forces. Besides these ground forces, Egypt has\na small navy, and several of the states have infant air forces and commercial planes.\nAlthough the Arab armies are not expected to be officially committed to the fighting,\nthey will supply leadership to the fighters. These armies may also be asked by the new\nArab state to enter Arab Palestine to maintain order.\n(3) Matériel.\nThe Arab governments may be expected covertly to furnish arms and\nammunition as well as trained military leadership to the guerrillas. Even before\nWorld War II, the Arab states had adequate supplies of weapons suitable for guerrilla\nfighting. These have been supplemented with arms taken from both Axis and Anglo-\nAmerican dumps following the campaigns in the Near East and North Africa, and with\npurchase of matériel and equipment from US and UK surplus stocks. Negotiations\nfor the purchase of Czech arms have been reported. The Arabs will, for the most part,\nrely on small arms rather than the elaborate matériel of modern warfare, though they\nmay be expected to make use of armored trucks and tractors for attacking Jewish\nsettlements. It is also probable that some light tanks and a few planes which can be\nused for strafing and bombing will find their way into Arab hands.\nSupply constitutes no serious problem for the Arabs. Each fighter will\ncarry his own equipment and will be supplied with funds for buying food from sympa-\nthetic villagers. The tribesmen, in particular, are hardy and well accustomed to bare\nsubsistence rations and life in the open. Since they will be moving toward Palestine\nthrough Arab territory, they will have no difficulty gaining access to the water holes.\n(4) Incentive.\nThe chief incentive to many of the leaders of this struggle will be oppor-\ntunism, coupled with nationalist aspirations and religious fervor. The leaders, in turn,\nwill appeal to the newly awakened nationalism as a strong incentive to many Arabs,\nparticularly the better educated townsmen. Volunteers deserting from the armies of\nthe Arab states probably will not incur the disfavor of their governments, and many will\neven receive secret encouragement from them. The proclamation of a Jihad will also\nbe employed to secure volunteers although such a proclamation is not expected to kindle\na mass uprising. The current drought in the northeastern Arabian desert will make\nthe tribesmen restless, and the promise of loot from Jewish settlements will be attractive\nto many.\n(5) Organization.\nThe Arab forces are expected to vary from relatively well-controlled\nquasi-military bands to the loose tribal organization of the Beduin, led by their sheikhs.\nSingleness of purpose will be the main unifying force. Extensive guerrilla warfare in\nPalestine will give great power to opportunistic, aggressive, extreme nationalist leaders,\n11\nSECRET"
}