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(7) Home Use.
Soviet economic activity in the event of war
In estimating postwar consumption of kero-
will be significantly greater than under peace
sene for fuel oil for home use, it was assumed
conditions, especially in the output of arma-
that domestic burning of light oil was used
ments such as tanks, ammunition, guns, and
primarily by the urban population for heat-
planes, and in the basic industries of steel,
ing purposes and that kerosene is used chiefly
petroleum, coal, and non-ferrous metals. To
by the rural population for lighting and cook-
increase further their economic strength the
ing purposes. The increased rate of use of
Soviets will undoubtedly curtail the civilian
domestic burner oil over kerosene, as well as
economy to make possible the maximum uti-
increased rural electrification, and use of
lization of economic potential for war. Never-
natural gas for cooking, points toward in-
theless, there probably will not be any drastic
creased urbanization in the USSR. This, to-
change in the present consumption pattern
gether with increased demands for kerosene
of petroleum products, except Home Use, since
as jet fuel, or as a component thereof, would
such a policy would seriously deteriorate the
indicate a decreasing use of kerosene. The in-
Soviet position in food and manpower, indus-
creasing tempo of "cold war" conditions would
try, and transportation, and thereby adversely
also be felt in restrictions of consumption of
affect Soviet economic and war potential.
petroleum products for home use; and on this
It is not expected that there will be any
basis, it has been assumed that the consump-
serious curtailment in agricultural activity,
tion in 1949 would be no greater than that
and thereby a cut-back in its present estimated
allocated in 1940.
allocation. The industrial war output would
(8) Military Requirements.
be affected at least to the extent that inade-
Military requirements for refined petroleum
quate nourishment would prevent as large an
products for the year 1949 have been prepared
increase in production as might have been pos-
by the Department of the Navy, ONI, the War
sible if there were ample food for all. It is
Department General Staff, ID, and by the Air
possible, however, for the agricultural con-
Force and Air Intelligence. These data are in-
sumption of petroleum products in 1949 to
cluded in the report and are shown in detail
drop to the 1940 level without seriously im-
as part of the Appendix.
pairing the food supply of the USSR.
(9) Tables.
Transportation, in the past, the weakest
All the estimates based upon the above con-
link in the Soviet economy, will have to cope
sideration shown in detail in the Appendix
with additional pressure in supplying the front
were combined with military requirements,
with men and materials, of serving the in-
production and imports, and are shown in
dustrial war economy and, of less importance,
Tables VI to VIII inclusive. Table V showing
maintaining a reduced economy.
estimates for 1940 is included for comparison.
If the USSR has full use of its railroad net-
Percentage allocations are calculated on the
work in a future war, it is believed that there
basis of tonnage estimates. In general, the
will be no substantial reduction of POL. There
consumption pattern for 1949 so derived does
may be some curtailment in the use of rail-
not differ much from the base year 1940. The
roads for civilian purposes, but the Soviets will
principal difference reflects recent Soviet em-
wish to utilize any such capacity for the in-
phasis on gas and Diesel fuel. Kerosene con-
dustrial war effort. Unless war production is
stituted the bulk of Soviet production before
reduced by enemy action or the "scorched-
the war. This would indicate that a change
earth" policy is once again applied by the
in the pattern of petroleum consumption in
Soviets, the consumption of POL will not be
the USSR is somewhat similar to changes
reduced by any significant amount. Military
which occurred in the US some years ago,
requirements will, of course, be met at all costs.
namely, shifting from a kerosene economy to
It has been estimated that during World War
a gasoline and Diesel oil economy.
II, the consumption of refined products by the
d. Requirements and Consumption of Re-
Soviet Union was less in 1944 than in 1940.
fined Products, 1949, War.
However, it must be remembered that by 1944,
the st and
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"ocrText": "22\nTOP SECRET\n(7) Home Use.\nSoviet economic activity in the event of war\nIn estimating postwar consumption of kero-\nwill be significantly greater than under peace\nsene for fuel oil for home use, it was assumed\nconditions, especially in the output of arma-\nthat domestic burning of light oil was used\nments such as tanks, ammunition, guns, and\nprimarily by the urban population for heat-\nplanes, and in the basic industries of steel,\ning purposes and that kerosene is used chiefly\npetroleum, coal, and non-ferrous metals. To\nby the rural population for lighting and cook-\nincrease further their economic strength the\ning purposes. The increased rate of use of\nSoviets will undoubtedly curtail the civilian\ndomestic burner oil over kerosene, as well as\neconomy to make possible the maximum uti-\nincreased rural electrification, and use of\nlization of economic potential for war. Never-\nnatural gas for cooking, points toward in-\ntheless, there probably will not be any drastic\ncreased urbanization in the USSR. This, to-\nchange in the present consumption pattern\ngether with increased demands for kerosene\nof petroleum products, except Home Use, since\nas jet fuel, or as a component thereof, would\nsuch a policy would seriously deteriorate the\nindicate a decreasing use of kerosene. The in-\nSoviet position in food and manpower, indus-\ncreasing tempo of \"cold war\" conditions would\ntry, and transportation, and thereby adversely\nalso be felt in restrictions of consumption of\naffect Soviet economic and war potential.\npetroleum products for home use; and on this\nIt is not expected that there will be any\nbasis, it has been assumed that the consump-\nserious curtailment in agricultural activity,\ntion in 1949 would be no greater than that\nand thereby a cut-back in its present estimated\nallocated in 1940.\nallocation. The industrial war output would\n(8) Military Requirements.\nbe affected at least to the extent that inade-\nMilitary requirements for refined petroleum\nquate nourishment would prevent as large an\nproducts for the year 1949 have been prepared\nincrease in production as might have been pos-\nby the Department of the Navy, ONI, the War\nsible if there were ample food for all. It is\nDepartment General Staff, ID, and by the Air\npossible, however, for the agricultural con-\nForce and Air Intelligence. These data are in-\nsumption of petroleum products in 1949 to\ncluded in the report and are shown in detail\ndrop to the 1940 level without seriously im-\nas part of the Appendix.\npairing the food supply of the USSR.\n(9) Tables.\nTransportation, in the past, the weakest\nAll the estimates based upon the above con-\nlink in the Soviet economy, will have to cope\nsideration shown in detail in the Appendix\nwith additional pressure in supplying the front\nwere combined with military requirements,\nwith men and materials, of serving the in-\nproduction and imports, and are shown in\ndustrial war economy and, of less importance,\nTables VI to VIII inclusive. Table V showing\nmaintaining a reduced economy.\nestimates for 1940 is included for comparison.\nIf the USSR has full use of its railroad net-\nPercentage allocations are calculated on the\nwork in a future war, it is believed that there\nbasis of tonnage estimates. In general, the\nwill be no substantial reduction of POL. There\nconsumption pattern for 1949 so derived does\nmay be some curtailment in the use of rail-\nnot differ much from the base year 1940. The\nroads for civilian purposes, but the Soviets will\nprincipal difference reflects recent Soviet em-\nwish to utilize any such capacity for the in-\nphasis on gas and Diesel fuel. Kerosene con-\ndustrial war effort. Unless war production is\nstituted the bulk of Soviet production before\nreduced by enemy action or the \"scorched-\nthe war. This would indicate that a change\nearth\" policy is once again applied by the\nin the pattern of petroleum consumption in\nSoviets, the consumption of POL will not be\nthe USSR is somewhat similar to changes\nreduced by any significant amount. Military\nwhich occurred in the US some years ago,\nrequirements will, of course, be met at all costs.\nnamely, shifting from a kerosene economy to\nIt has been estimated that during World War\na gasoline and Diesel oil economy.\nII, the consumption of refined products by the\nd. Requirements and Consumption of Re-\nSoviet Union was less in 1944 than in 1940.\nfined Products, 1949, War.\nHowever, it must be remembered that by 1944,\nthe st and\nTOP SECRET"
}