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MUGLAS
TOP SECRET
23
the Soviets had lost territory in which a con-
would undergo a shift of emphasis from a situ-
siderable part of their railroad network was
ation of peacetime conditions over to definite
located. In a breakdown of the percentages
wartime footing. It is believed, however, that
of total fuel used by Transportation Rail in
allocation of petroleum products to industry
1944, compared with 1940, Soviet statistics
could be dropped back to the 1940 level with-
show that the percentage of oil to the total
out endangering the economy of the Soviet
was reduced by approximately 4 percent in
Union.
1944. The percentage of coal was also re-
In the event of war, home use would re-
duced, the slack being taken up by the uti-
ceive the first and most drastic cut-back in the
lizing of wood as fuel.
allocation of petroleum products, quite likely
It is possible that this performance in case
to the extent of some 50 percent. Such a dras-
of war could be repeated in 1949 without too
tic cut would still leave the home use con-
great a loss in operating efficiency in certain
sumer group with a supply double to that
areas. If this is the case, it is possible that
available to the Soviets during World War II.
POL consumption by Transportation Rail
The military consumer group would un-
might be reduced about 3 percent without ma-
doubtedly receive the highest priority in meet-
terially affecting the efficiency of the Soviet
ing its POL requirements in the event of war.
railroad system. Therefore, POL consumption
To meet the increased requirements of petro-
would be 3 million metric tons of refined prod-
leum products for military consumption, allo-
ucts in 1949 (war).
cations to the non-military segment of the
It is believed that in a war the Soviets would
Soviet economy would receive a cut-back of
reduce the products consumption of Trans-
the amount ordinarily available under peace-
portation Motor some 20 percent without
time conditions. Such an attempt was made
seriously affecting their ability to meet mini-
in this study in estimating how much POL
mum needs of industry. In fact, this amount
could be taken from the non-military con-
may be easily accounted for through requisi-
sumers and given to the military without
tion by the military of motor equipment.
effectively impairing the Soviet industrial
It is not expected that industry would re-
economy.
ceive a POL cut-back in the event of war.
Tables XII, XIII, and XV show the data
Rather, it would be more likely that industry
relative to requirements and availability of
TABLE XI
1949 PEACE
(Millions of Metric Tons)
Available
Synthetic
a an
Indigenous
Requirements
Deficit
Imports
1
Production
Surplus
dim
Supply
Gasoline
7.1
7.5
.4
1.0
.6
1.2
Kerosene
5.3
5.5
.2
.3
.2
.3
Diesel Oil
4.7
4.9
.2
.3
.1
.2
Lubricating Oil
1.8
1.9
.1
.1
.1
.1
Residual Fuel Oil
9.7
10.1
.4
.6
.2
28.6
29.9
1.3
2.3
1.0
2.0
1 References:
a. R-185-48, 29 March 1949, JANA cumania-"Petroleum Production in Rumania."
b. St. Rpt. #11, 31 January 1949, Legation Vienna- "Austrian Oil Production."
c. St. Rpt. #140, 27 September 1949, Legation Budapest-"Economio Report First Six Months 1948."
d. St. Rpt. #155, 12 November 1947, Legation Budapest-"Hungary's Oil Position."
e. R-105-48, 20 March 1947, S-2 Berlin Command-"POL Situation in Soviet Zone."
f. St. Desp. 3237, 24 February 1949, Berlin-"Chemical Production in 1948 and Production Plan in Sov-
zone Germany."
TORESECRED
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"ocrText": "MUGLAS\nTOP SECRET\n23\nthe Soviets had lost territory in which a con-\nwould undergo a shift of emphasis from a situ-\nsiderable part of their railroad network was\nation of peacetime conditions over to definite\nlocated. In a breakdown of the percentages\nwartime footing. It is believed, however, that\nof total fuel used by Transportation Rail in\nallocation of petroleum products to industry\n1944, compared with 1940, Soviet statistics\ncould be dropped back to the 1940 level with-\nshow that the percentage of oil to the total\nout endangering the economy of the Soviet\nwas reduced by approximately 4 percent in\nUnion.\n1944. The percentage of coal was also re-\nIn the event of war, home use would re-\nduced, the slack being taken up by the uti-\nceive the first and most drastic cut-back in the\nlizing of wood as fuel.\nallocation of petroleum products, quite likely\nIt is possible that this performance in case\nto the extent of some 50 percent. Such a dras-\nof war could be repeated in 1949 without too\ntic cut would still leave the home use con-\ngreat a loss in operating efficiency in certain\nsumer group with a supply double to that\nareas. If this is the case, it is possible that\navailable to the Soviets during World War II.\nPOL consumption by Transportation Rail\nThe military consumer group would un-\nmight be reduced about 3 percent without ma-\ndoubtedly receive the highest priority in meet-\nterially affecting the efficiency of the Soviet\ning its POL requirements in the event of war.\nrailroad system. Therefore, POL consumption\nTo meet the increased requirements of petro-\nwould be 3 million metric tons of refined prod-\nleum products for military consumption, allo-\nucts in 1949 (war).\ncations to the non-military segment of the\nIt is believed that in a war the Soviets would\nSoviet economy would receive a cut-back of\nreduce the products consumption of Trans-\nthe amount ordinarily available under peace-\nportation Motor some 20 percent without\ntime conditions. Such an attempt was made\nseriously affecting their ability to meet mini-\nin this study in estimating how much POL\nmum needs of industry. In fact, this amount\ncould be taken from the non-military con-\nmay be easily accounted for through requisi-\nsumers and given to the military without\ntion by the military of motor equipment.\neffectively impairing the Soviet industrial\nIt is not expected that industry would re-\neconomy.\nceive a POL cut-back in the event of war.\nTables XII, XIII, and XV show the data\nRather, it would be more likely that industry\nrelative to requirements and availability of\nTABLE XI\n1949 PEACE\n(Millions of Metric Tons)\nAvailable\nSynthetic\na an\nIndigenous\nRequirements\nDeficit\nImports\n1\nProduction\nSurplus\ndim\nSupply\nGasoline\n7.1\n7.5\n.4\n1.0\n.6\n1.2\nKerosene\n5.3\n5.5\n.2\n.3\n.2\n.3\nDiesel Oil\n4.7\n4.9\n.2\n.3\n.1\n.2\nLubricating Oil\n1.8\n1.9\n.1\n.1\n.1\n.1\nResidual Fuel Oil\n9.7\n10.1\n.4\n.6\n.2\n28.6\n29.9\n1.3\n2.3\n1.0\n2.0\n1 References:\na. R-185-48, 29 March 1949, JANA cumania-\"Petroleum Production in Rumania.\"\nb. St. Rpt. #11, 31 January 1949, Legation Vienna- \"Austrian Oil Production.\"\nc. St. Rpt. #140, 27 September 1949, Legation Budapest-\"Economio Report First Six Months 1948.\"\nd. St. Rpt. #155, 12 November 1947, Legation Budapest-\"Hungary's Oil Position.\"\ne. R-105-48, 20 March 1947, S-2 Berlin Command-\"POL Situation in Soviet Zone.\"\nf. St. Desp. 3237, 24 February 1949, Berlin-\"Chemical Production in 1948 and Production Plan in Sov-\nzone Germany.\"\nTORESECRED"
}