Memorandum from General George C. Marshall to President Harry S. Truman
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OCR Page 1 of 2TOP OECRET
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
September 2, 1948
BRIEF FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: Difficulties Encountered in Technical
Discussions by the Military Governors
in Berlin
The Military Governors who are attempting to work out
the practical arrangements under the directive sent them by
the four governments have run into difficulties concerning the
relationship of the proposed quadripartite financial commission
and the German Bank of Emission of the Soviet Zone. Our
interpretation of the directive is that the financial commission
will have powers of supervision over that portion of the Bank's
operation dealing with the issue and circulation of currency in
the city of Berlin through the Stadtkontor and the various cre-
dit institutions. This interpretation has been specifically con-
firmed by Stalin and Molotov. Sokolovsky, however, professes
ignorance of any such confirmation by Stalin and Molotov and
contends that the directive does not expressly state this power
of the financial commission. The issue is complicated by the
fact that the German Bank of Emission of the Soviet Zone would
issue currency for the whole Soviet Zone as well as for Berlin
under the proposed arrangement. We have not contended that
the financial commission for Berlin should have control powers
over the bank in SO far as currency for the Soviet Zone is con-
cerned but only over the handling of the Soviet mark in the city
of Berlin.
Sokolovsky's attitude is characteristic of Soviet tactics,
which were fully anticipated during the Moscow discussions.
We were strongly in favor of a definite reference, in the di-
rective itself, to the powers of the financial commission over
the German bank, but we could not get the British to go along
with us. They seemed to feel, together with the French, that
the definite statements of interpretation by Molotov and Stalin
were adequate. The matter is of central importance and may
prove to be the breaking point of the discussions. We have,
DECLASSIFIED
E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
7-1575
Dept. of State letter, Aug.9,1973
By NLT. HC NARS Date 1-1176 TOP SECRET
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