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defences should be completed and mechanics etc. got into place. The aeroplanes
themselves would only arrive in the last twenty-four hours of this phase.
President Roosevelt's second phase would overlap the first. It
was what he would call the co-operative period, during which he regarded as
an real necessity the establishment of a small Anglo-Turkish-American Mil-
itary Committee of three. General Wilson would be the obvious British rep-
resentative and with him would be some American general and a high Turkish
officer, probably an air officer. This Committee would take care of many
military developments for the next three, four or five months. They would
know all that was going on as regards military plans and activities, e.g. as
regards Crete, Rhodes, etc.
Then, according to President Roosevelt, there was the third phase -
political. It was not very necessary to have full conversations with the
Americans or the British. But it was very necessary with the Russians. The
President thought it would be a mistake to defer the political phase until
everything else had been tied up. The Russians were now in a good mood and
now was the time to talk. President Roosevelt doubted whether dates would be
fixed for these stages.
President Inonu remarked that the practical side must be envisaged.
If the Russians continued to insist on dates Turkey would be in the war in
four or five weeks. It was not practical for Turkey to come into the war
and for discussions then to start. He very much regretted that the Russians
were not at the Conference. The Soviet Ambassador was helpless and it would
have been most useful if the Russians could have been there so that they could
realise that everybody was trying to help but that the method of fixed dates
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Context sent to Scholar
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"ocrText": "- 2 -\ndefences should be completed and mechanics etc. got into place. The aeroplanes\nthemselves would only arrive in the last twenty-four hours of this phase.\nPresident Roosevelt's second phase would overlap the first. It\nwas what he would call the co-operative period, during which he regarded as\nan real necessity the establishment of a small Anglo-Turkish-American Mil-\nitary Committee of three. General Wilson would be the obvious British rep-\nresentative and with him would be some American general and a high Turkish\nofficer, probably an air officer. This Committee would take care of many\nmilitary developments for the next three, four or five months. They would\nknow all that was going on as regards military plans and activities, e.g. as\nregards Crete, Rhodes, etc.\nThen, according to President Roosevelt, there was the third phase -\npolitical. It was not very necessary to have full conversations with the\nAmericans or the British. But it was very necessary with the Russians. The\nPresident thought it would be a mistake to defer the political phase until\neverything else had been tied up. The Russians were now in a good mood and\nnow was the time to talk. President Roosevelt doubted whether dates would be\nfixed for these stages.\nPresident Inonu remarked that the practical side must be envisaged.\nIf the Russians continued to insist on dates Turkey would be in the war in\nfour or five weeks. It was not practical for Turkey to come into the war\nand for discussions then to start. He very much regretted that the Russians\nwere not at the Conference. The Soviet Ambassador was helpless and it would\nhave been most useful if the Russians could have been there so that they could\nrealise that everybody was trying to help but that the method of fixed dates"
}