Telegram from Henry Grady to Secretary of State Dean Acheson

INCOMING TELEGRAM Department of State HARRY S. TRUMAN LIBRARY TELEGRAPH BRANCH 11 H X SECRET A Action Control: 75 Rec'd: July 1, 1951 NEA FROM:Tehran 10:29 a.m. Info SS TO: Secretary of State 315 G EUR NO: 6, July 1, 2 p.m. DECLASSIFIED DCR E.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402 PRIORITY State Dept. Guidelines, March 6, 1982 By Dess NLT, Date 10-22-85 EYES ONLY FOR SECRETARY ACHESON I wish to make a strong personal appeal to you and to the President if you care to discuss the matter with him. All last fall and winter we endeavored to get the AIOC to change its policy in the interest of the over-all objectives of the British and ourselves vis-a-vis Russia. I talked with Shepherd a number of times, with Furlonge when he was here last November and again with Ambassador Franks in Washington last December. My pleas were in addition to the many efforts made by the Department through the London Embassy and particularly the efforts of McGhee in London last September. All that time it was impossible to get the Foreign Office to influence the oil company to carry out our strong recommendations with regard to some non-monetary concessions which would enable Razmara to get the supplemental agreements through the Majlis and incidentally to strengthen him to get through various reforms he was seeking to effect. The same intransigence on the part of the British that thwarted us last fall and into the spring seems again to be manifesting itself. The British, led by Mr. Morrison, seem to be determined to follow the old tactics of getting the government out with which it has difficulties. You will find in recent cables from London some evidences of this and I am sure it is the view of many of the oil officials. (I do not include Jackson as having this view) Mosadeq has the backing of 95 to 98 percent of the people of this country. It is utter folly to try to push him out. If he falls of his own weight, that is another matter. When I got him to make the concession of promising to withdraw the anti- sabotage law, it was interpreted by Mr. Morrison as a mani- festation of weakening on Mosadeq's part and a justification for stiffening on the part of the British. This is not the spirit in which to approach the problem here. Since the Foreign Office is prepared (London telegram 6943 June 30) to allow me to endeavor to get Mosadeq to accept endorsement on receipts for tanker shipments which I proposed (EMBTEL repeated SECRET REPRODUCTION OF THIS MESSAGE IS PROHIBITED