Annexes to National Security Council Report 114/2, Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on United States Programs for National Security

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GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION
GSA FORM 7122 (7.72)
GSA DC 73.495
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The President NCT(PSF/NSC)
ANNEXES TO
TOP SECRET
NSG 114/2
COPY NO. 1
State Dept. review completed
A REPORT
TO THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
by
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
on
UNITED STATES PROGRAMS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
October 12, 1951
WASHINGTON
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WARNING
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NA-
TIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF
THE ESPIONAGE ACT, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. ITS
TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MAN-
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
ANNEXES TO NSC 114/2
UNITED STATES PROGRAMS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
ANNEX NO. 1 - THE MILITARY PROGRAM
(Prepared by the Department of Dofense)
ANNEX NO. 2 - FOREIGN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
(Prepared by the Committee on International
Security Affairs.)
ANNEX NO. 3 - THE FEDERAL CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM
(Prepared by the Federal Civil Defense Administration)
ANNEX NO. 4 - THE STOCKPILING PROGRAM
(Prepared by the Department of Defense and the Office
of Defense Mobilization)
ANNEX NO. 5 - THE INFORMATION PROGRAM
(Prepared by the Department of State)
ANNEX NO. 6 - FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
(Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency with the
concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Committee)
ANNEX NO. 7 - INTERNAL SECURITY
(Prepared by the Interdepartmental Intelligence
Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on
Internal Security)
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ANNEX NO. 1. THE MILITARY PROGRAM
(Prepared by the Department of Defense)
The military annex is identical with the summary thereof
:
contained in Part II of NSC 114/2.
Annexes to
Annex No. 1
NSC 1:4/2
1. -
TOP SECRET
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Annex No. 2
FOREIGN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
(Prepared by the Committee on International Security Affairs)
I. European NAT members and Germany.
A. Objectives and minimum tasks which the program is designed to fulfill.
The basic U.S. objective in Europe which the aid program is designed
to aid in fulfilling is the creation by the NATO members of a level of de-
fensive strength which will deter Soviet aggression.
At present the level of defensive strength necessary to deter Soviet
aggression is defined from a military point of view in the Medium Term
Defense Plan. This statement of military requirements sets forth those
ground, naval and air forces which should be in the required state of readi-
ness by July 1, 1954 and 1s an aggregate defense force requirement for the
twelve NATO countries.
The purpose of the U.S. aid program 1s to provide such additional
resources, in military or economic form, as are required in order to make
possible attainment by the European NAT members and Germany of their share
of the objective set forth above, assuming a maximum feasible contribution
by them and by Canada, and the contribution by the U.S. of the forces which
it has committed itself to furnish.
B. Nature, magnitude and timing of the program.
1. Elements comprising the program.
In providing additional resources to the NATO countries, it is
envisaged that a variety of methods may be utilized. Thus a. major por-
tion of the resources to be provided will be in the form of military equip-
ment produced in the U.S. Another method to be used will be the direct
financing of general imports from the dollar area. A third method will be
the payment in dollars for military equipment produced in European countries
and turned over to those countries or to other European countries for their
use. It is important to appreciate that although the program is to be exe-
cuted through the provision of what has generally been termed "military aid"
and "economic aid" these are but different techniques for providing resources.
The choice of techniques and the proportionato ase of one as against the
other will vary by country. Decisions will be made on the basis of com-
parative effectiveness in achieving U.S. objectives. The program proposed
herein does not distinguish between that part thereof which will be supplied
in the form of military equipment and that part which will be provided in
other forms. In addition to the provision of material resources, the pro-
gram will also include the provision of training and technical assistance.
Annexes to
Annex No. 2
NSC 114/2
TOP-SECRET
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2. Assumptions and policies on which the program is based.
It is the policy of the U.S. to provide assistance to the
nations with which it is joined in the North Atlantic Treaty to enable the
U.S. and those nations to participate effectively in arrangements for in-
dividual and collective self-defense in support of the purposes and princi-
ples of the charter of the United Nations.
The program is also based on the policy that there must be main-
tained in Europe a stable economic foundation for the military strength which
11
it is our purpose to maintain and develop.
The program proposed herein 1e based on the following general
assumptions:
a. There will be no general war.
b. U.S. military forces will not be engaged in hostilities
in areas other than Korea.
C. In Korea, hostilities will either have ceased or will be
at a low level of intensity, but Korea will remain divided
and at least some UN forces will still be in Korea by the
end of FY 1953.
d. There will be no changes in the present levels of East/West
trade which increase the needs of Europe for assistance.
The program proposed herein is based on the following specific
assumptions, the validity of which is commented upon under Section C. of this
paper.
a. The military requirements are to have those forces set forth
in DC-28, as refined by the Standing Group in MRC 5/2, plus
a. German force of 10 divisions and supporting tactical air
and minor naval forces in being by July 1, 1954.
b. The European nations will be politically, economically and
financially capable of making the defense expenditures set
forth below in paragraph B-3.
C. The Congress will provide the funds requested in the
Mutual Security Program for FY 1952.
d. Military equipment procured in the U.S. will be delivered
in accord with the time phasing of the plan.
e. The requirement for assistance will not be affected by the
creation of a European Defense Force.
Annexes to
Annex No. 2
NSC 114/2
- 2 PM
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f. The admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO will not increase
the amounts of assistance which they will require.
3. Estimated cost of the program
The best present estimate, based on late 1950 prices, of the
cost of the MTDP, plus Germany and plus the non-NATO military expenditures
of the European members of NATO is 72 billion dollars.* of this amount 40
billion dollars represents costs of major materiel. This cost figure (72
billion dollars) covers the period Fiscal Year 1951 through Fiscal Year
1954.
;
For Fiscal Years 1950, 1951 and 1952, 11 billion dollars of
U.S. military aid has been programmed. In Fiscal Year 1951 European defense
expenditures equalled 6.7 billion dollars. (2 billion dollars of U.S. econ-
omic aid helped make these expenditures possible.) It 18 estimated that
these countries in Fiscal Year 1952 (assuming U.S. aid is provided in the
amounts proposed in the 1952 MSP) will spend the equivalent of 9.9 billion
dollars for defense. The total of U.S. military aid and European outlays
for defense for FY 1951 and FY 1952 18 thus estimated at 27.6 billion dollars.
/The European expenditures are made from budgets which include the counter-
part of U.S. economic assistance provided or to be provided in these fiscal
years.
If the total 1951-52 outlays against the four year cost are
subtracted therefrom there remains to be met in FY 1953 and FY 1954 a cost
of 44.4 billion dollars.
The present estimate of probable gross European expenditures
for expense for FY 1953 and FY 1954 is 24.7 billion dollars, an average of
12.3 billion dollars per year. This is an increase of 5.6 billion dollars
per year or about 84 per cent over FY 1951 and an increase of about 2.4
billion dollars or approximately 24 per cent over the estimate for FY 1952.
A large portion of this increase is included in present country plans, pri-
marily in those of the U.K. However, the gross figure of 24.7 billion
dollars (or the 22.6 billion net figure) which the European countries as a
group would have to contribute in FY 1953 and 1954 1s possible only if United
States assistance in fact 1a sufficient to cover dollar balance of payments
deficits. It also assumes that the European efforts and U.S. aid for FY 1952
are as postulated above.
The difference between this expenditure and the cost of the re-
quirement is thus calculated at 21.8 billion dollars. If a Canadian con-
tribution of 1.0 billion dollars is deducted it can be reduced to 20.8
billion dollars.
*Unofficial and not yet approved refinement of this estimate indicates a
possible upward revision thereof to 76.8 billion dollars, resulting from
later information on probably requirements for German forces.
Annexes to
Annex No. 2
NSC 114/2
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TOP-SECRET
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The foregoing in tabular form:
Financing the Total Cost of MTDP
Billions of U.S. Dollars
(1950 prices)
1. Total Cost of MIDP
72
2. Less FY 1951 and 1952 Assets
(a) Gross European defense expenditures
16.6
(b) U.S. end-item aid
11
(c) Canadian end-item aid
0.4
Total FY 1951 and 1952 Assets
28
3. MTDP Costs Not Met as of June 30, 1952
44
4. Anticipated FY 1953 and 1954 Assets
(a) Gross European Expenditures 2/
24.7
(b) Canadian end-item aid
.6
Total Anticipated FY 1953 and 1954 Assets
25.3
5. Remainder
18.7
6. U.S. Aid Assumed in Item 4(a)
2.1
7. Total Amount to be Met by U.S. Aid,
if postulated total requirements
are met
20.8
It is essential that contracts be let in FY 1953 for those
items of equipment whose required time for production 1s such that this
action is necessary to assure delivery of them in FY 1954. Consequently,
the requirement of 20.8 billion for U.S. assistance set forth above cannot
be assumed as divisible into two equal parts for appropriation in the re-
spective fiscal years. It is estimated that 14.0 billion would be required
to be obligated in FY 1953 and 6.8 billion in FY 1954. Actual expenditures
would tend to be much higher in FY 1954 than in FY 1953; thus, obligational
advance contract authority might be substituted for a considerable portion of
the FY 1953 requirement, with a correspondingly higher requirement for ap-
propriations in FY 1954.
In the light of the lead time problems, and the importance of the
timely production and delivery of equipment, it may well be necessary to seek
additional authority to obligate funds during FY 1952 in order that the letting
of contracts for production not be delayed until the second half of next year,
1/ This level of expenditure is facilitated by an assumed $3 billion in
U.S. aid which directly or indirectly makes dollars available to these
countries to finance imports.
This level of expenditure assumes about $2 billion in U.S. aid which
directly or indirectly makes dollars available to finance imports.
Annexes to
Annex No. 2
NSC 114/2
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TOP SECRET
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C. Analysis of adequacy of program in terms of national security needs
The adequacy of the program set forth above depends on the validity
of the assumptions and calculations on which it is based. It must be clearly
understood that there are serious questions on this score which make the pro-
gram a tentative one which requires further study and analysis.
There are, specifically, the following considerations:
1. The requirements
The Medium Term Defense Plan is neither a rigid nor a detailed
plan. The agreed aggregate requirements set forth in DC-28 have been studied
and commented upon by SACEUR. The Standing Group has sought national reac-
tion to its proposals for the allocation of unfilled DC-28 requirements
among the NATO nations. It 18 anticipated that by October 7, 1951 the Stand-
ing Group will make recommendations as to a revised statement of force re-
quirements which if and when approved would replace DC-28. It appears prob-
able that there will be no net reduction in force requirements, although the
composition of those forces may be altered.
It is expected that an examination to be made of the organiza-
tion and equipment of all major national military units will provide a basis
for achieving some economies in the previous estimates of equipment require-
ments for the forces which are needed. It 1e hoped that a substantial reduc-
tion in requirements will result therefrom. However, this may be offset by
increased equipment requirements resulting from possible changes in the com-
position of forces.
Even if it is assumed that this examination results in substan-
tial changes in estimates of the materiel requirements of the forces called
for under the present MTDP, the amounts and kinds of forces cannot be expected
to remain static. At this time it 1s impossible to predict whether equipment
requirements will increase or decrease.
2. The cost estimates
Obviously the estimated costs of requirements will vary as the
requirements are changed. The cost estimates set forth herein are based on
the assumption that the force requirements are those set forth in DC-28 plus
the assumed German forces, and that these force requirements will be allocated
among the countries as proposed by the Standing Group. These estimates are
based on late 1950 prices and general price levels have already substantially
increased. They do not take into account any reduction in materiel require-
ments which may result from the more stringent examination thereof envisaged
in paragraph 1 above. Nor do these estimates reflect any reductions in the
cost of production in the U.S. (Some items of equipment will have a lower
unit price than heretofore due to the fact that the cost of plant expansion
in the U.S. has been absorbed in the cost of equipment already produced).
Furthermore, these costs estimates do not reflect any reduction in price of
U.S. furnished equipment which may occur if the equipment is classified as
excess to U.S. needs.
Annexes to
Annex No. 2
NSC 114/2
5 -
TOP SECRET
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3. Estimates of European Defense Expenditures
The estimates set forth above do not take into account two 1m-
portant factors. First, the estimate of European expenditures in fiscal
year 1952 presumes United States aid at the levels proposed by the Adminis-
tration in the fiscal year 1952 Mutual Security Program, which presumption
is now doubtful.
Secondly, these estimates do not take into account certain ad-
verse economic trends in Europe which have only recently become apparent.
The economic and psychological effect of these new developments
will decrease the ability of European governments to increase defense budgets
to the degree assumed in this paper. ISAC cannot assess the offsetting impact
of other possible actions, not considered in developing the estimate, such as
off-shore procurement and broader eligibility of items for transfer as mili-
tary assistance.
On balance, it is concluded that we cannot depend upon
European expenditures being as high in fiscal years 1952, 1953 and 1954 as
estimated in this paper.
4. U.S. Deliveries
As of July 31, 1951, the U.S. had shipped to Title I countries
military materiel valued at 729.9 million dollars out of the FY 1950 program
of 1,119.9 million dollars of end item aid, and 165.2 million dollars out of
3,963.6 million dollars programmed under FY 1951 appropriations. Deliveries
of major items under the FY 1950 program have been completed, with exceptions
in certain categories, A target date for the completion of deliveries under
the FY 1951 program has been set at June 30, 1952. Deliveries for the first
seven months of 1951 were at the rate of 78 million dollars per month.
Equipment must be delivered in larger quantities and at a more rapid rate
(about 400 million dollars per month) if the program is to meet the needs
of national security.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have under consideration a revised
directive relating to allocation of United States munitions production as
between the various military programs. ISAC 1s not informed as to whether
the more rapid rate of munitions deliveries needed to attain the programs of
Title I countries, as well as continuing combat expenditures in Korea and
other world-wide commitments, can be attained by re-allocation, or whether
there must be an increased rate of production even at the cost of reducing
production for civilian uses.
5. U.S. aid in FY 1952
It 1s clear that the assumptions of Congressional approval of the
proposed amounts of aid are erroneous. The effect, as previously stated, is
to increase the costs which must be met in FY 1953 and FY 1954.
Annexes to
Annex No. 2
NSC 114/2
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CONCLUSIONS
1. On the basis of the assumptions in this report, the U.S. aid require-
ment for NATO defense purposes (including Germany) in FY 1953 and 1954 would
be 20.8 billion dollars.
2. Preliminary revisions of the estimated requirements for German forces
suggest an additional cost of perhaps 5 billion dollars.
3. The resultant figure for U.S. aid requirement is 25.8 billion
dollars. This figure cannot be considered to be accurate. On balance, the
factors discussed in this paper indicate the figure may be too low.
SPECIAL NOTE
The arrangements at Ottawa for 8. special temporary commission of the
North Atlantic Council should produce before December firmer estimates
of total requirements and the economic resources available to meet
them/.
II. Other European Countries. (Austria, Trieste, Spain and Yugoslavia)
Aid programs for these countries for FY 1953 and FY 1954 have not yet
reached the stage of development where it is possible to state with preci-
sion the answers to the points outlined in the memorandum from Mr. Lay.
It is assumed that it will suffice for the purposes of the present NSC
review to state the following general observations.
1. No funds for military assistance for Austria or Trieste will be re-
quired in FY 1953 or FY 1954.
2. $300 million dollars will probably be adequate to cover the needs of
Austria and Trieste for economic assistance in FY 1953 ($150 million) and
FY 1954 ($150 million).
3. $100 million will probably be required as a minimum to cover the
needs of Yugoslavia for economic assistance in FY 1953 ($50 million) and
FY 1954 ($50 million).
4. An unsufficient basis exists for entimating Yugoslav military assist-
ance requirements for FY 1953 and FY 1954.
5. No decisions have been reached as to whether and how much military
and/or economic ald will be necessary to attain our objectives in Spain.
6. There 1s no basis for accurately estimating the total of require-
ments of these four countries for economic and military assistance in FY 1953
and FY 1954, but it may be of the order of magnitude of $1 billion.
Annexes to
NSC 114/2
Annex - 7 No. 2
TOP-SECRET
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III. Other European Countries (Greece and Turkey)
ISAC has already furnished the NSC with estimates of the costs of mill-
tary assistance programs for Greece and Turkey in FY 1953 and FY 1954.
The best present rough estimate of the total cost of economic assistance
required for these countries for FY 1953 and FY 1954 is $700 million.
IV. Non-European Areas
Introductory Note. The development of foreign aid programs for the non-
European areas for FY 1953 will not be complete for several weeks. Accor-
dingly. at this time it is impossible to do more than summarize the objectives
of the programs and to outline in a very rough and tentative manner the ele-
ments of the proposed programs. Only overall estimates of the cost of the
various programs can be made that will be at all meaningful and these esti-
mates must be considered highly tentative. With respect to FY 1954, the
overall estimates of costs are only reasonable guesses.
In view of the foregoing, this statement is submitted by ISAC for NSC
consideration in the form of a summary covering the entire area.
A. Objectives and Minimum Tasks.
Military Aid Programs. Within the general framework of U.S. strategic
objectives, the specific objectives of the military aid programs for FY
1953 in the non-European areas (including Greece and Turkey) will include
the following:
1. To assist Japan to defend itself and to participate in the defense
of the free world.
2. To assist the ROK forces to assume the maximum possible responsibility
for the defense of South Korea.
3. To assist the Chinese Nationalist Government to achieve the capability
of repelling a Chinese Communist attack, in conjunction with the U.S.
Seventh Fleet.
4. To assist the French and Associated States forces in Indo-China to
restore and maintain internal security and to discourage Chinese Communist
aggression.
5. To assist Thailand to maintain internal security and discourage
aggression.
6. To assist the Philippine Government to restore and maintain internal
security and discourage external aggression.
7. To assist the Government of Iran to maintain internal security and
conduct a delaying action in the event of aggression.
Annexes to
Annex No. 2
NSC 114/2
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TOP_SECRET-
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8. To assist the Governments of Greece and Turkey to maintain internal
security, to discourage aggression, and, if necessary, to repel attacks by
Soviet satellites and to delay, to the maximum extent practicable, an attack
by the Soviet Union itself -- all in conformity with their obligations as
(assumed) members of NATO.
9. To orient the Arab States and Israel more firmly toward the free
world and to enable them to maintain internal security and discourage
aggression.
10. To enable certain Latin American States to undertake assigned tasks
in the defense of the hemisphere in the event of war which would otherwise
have to be undertaken by the United States.
Economic Aid Programs.
The objectives of economic aid programs for FY 1953 for the non-European
area (not including Greece and Turkey) will include the following:
1. To support the military effort, as in Formosa, Indochina and Iran.
2. To offset the impact of the military effort, including the mili-
tary aid program, as in Formosa and Indochina.
3. To strengthen support for friendly governments by assisting them
to provide more effectively for the needs of their people (applicable in
all cases).
4. To improve governmental and popular attitudes toward the free world
and the United States, as in Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Arab States and
Iran, or, where such attitudes are satisfactory, to maintain them at that
level, as in the case of the Latin American States, the independent states
of Africa, and Israel.
5. To prevent economic deterioration threatening political stability,
as in India and Iran.
6. To bring about an increase in the output and facilitate the distri-
bution of strategic materials needed for common defense, as Thailand,
Indonesia, Philippines, and Latin America, insofar as consistent with basic
political objectives.
7. To increase the capacity of the area to produce essential civilian
goods, especially foods, do as to reduce the drain on U.S. output and ship-
ping in the event of an emergency (as in Southeast Asia, South Asia, Near
East and Ethiopia, and Latin America).
8. To support the multilateral technical assistance programs of the
United Nations and the Organization of American States.
Annexes to
Annex No. 2
NSC 114/2
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TOP-SECRET
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B. Description of Programs.
1. For the reasons stated above, it is not possible at this time to
describe in any detail the various programs to be proposed for FY 1953 or
FY 1954. In general, the programs will be of the same character as those
proposed for FY 1952.
The military aid programs will consist, as in FY 1952, of the furnish-
ing of end-items and training needed to achieve certain desired capabilities.
Two principal elements will control the timing of the programs: the availa-
bility of equipment and personnel for training, and the speed with which the
governments in question can effectively absorb and utilize the equipment.
The military aid programs will of course vary in emphasis and mode of pro-
cedure. The situation in Indochina, for example, 18 unique in that it is a
combat area; so long as that situation continues, Indochina's needs will
continue to command top priority. The proposed military aid program for the
Arab States and Israel, which is not yet underway, will be peculiar in that
(a) requests for aid will have to be reviewed by a tripartite committee;
(b) the object of the program is primarily political; (o) the principle of
impartiality will have to be followed. Military aid programs for Latin
America will also be different from other programs in that equipment will
be furnished for the specific purposes of enabling states to perform hemis-
pheric defense tasks which they will have agreed to perform. Little can now
be said with respect to the aid programs which will be necessary for Japan
and Korea, but they will probably be substantial.
On the economic aid side the programs will likewise vary in emphasis and
scope. In most cases, the bulk of the program will be in the nature of
technical assistance, supplemented where necessary by supplies needed to make
such assistance effective, directed toward improvements in agriculture,
health and sanitation, public administration, education, transportation and
mineral resources development.
In some areas, such as Indochina and Iran, the economic program will have
to include a considerable component for support of military needs. In an
area such as Formosa, the program will have to be primarily a supply pro-
gram to support the military effort and offset the impact of military ex-
penditures; some industrial development will also be included, designed to
help Formosa in the direction of achieving a supporting economy. Some pro-
grams (Indochina and the Philippines, as well as Formosa) will include sub-
stantial imports of salable commodities and consumer goods for the purpose of
financing the local costs of technical assistance projects and preventing
run-away inflation.
2. The programs are based upon the fundamental policy that it 18 in the
interest of the United States to prevent further Communist encroachment upon
the free world, to maintain a Western orientation on the part of those states
now 80 oriented and to achieve a more decisive Western orientation on the
part of those states which are now seeking to pursue a neutral course.
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The main assumptions upon which the programs will be based are as
follows:
(a) There will be no general war.
(b) The aid programs for FY 1950 and 1951 will have been success-
fully completed, and the proposed FY 1952 programs will have been completed
in varying degrees.
(c) In general, the political complexion and orientation of the
various countries, the state of relations between them, and their economic
conditions will be about the same as today, except as they may be improved
by the FY 1952 program.
(d) The United States will have been successful in its efforts to
persuade aid recipients to comply with whatever standards are required with
respect to East-West trade so that the extension of aid will not be pro-
hibited.
(e) A peace treaty will have become effective between Japan and
most of the non-Communist nations formerly at war with Japan, and security
commitments will have become effective with Australia, New Zealand, the
Philippines and Japan.
(f) In Korea, hostilities will. either have ceased or will be at
a low level of intensity, but Korea will remain divided and at least some UN
forces will still be in Korea by the end of FY 1953.
(g) Communist China will not have attacked Formosa, Indochina,
Burma, or Thailand but the threat of attack will be intensified.
(h) The Chinese Communists will remain firmly aligned with Moscow
and will not have developed clearly defined Titoist tendencies.
(1) Tension between India and Pakistan will continue but without
actual hostilities.
(j) There will have been no Soviet attack upon Iran but the 011
dispute will remain unresolved until the beginning of FY 1953.
(k) A modus vivendi will have been worked out between the UK and
Egypt and a Middle East defense board will have been established and will
be making progress in securing local participation.
(1) Greece and Turkey will have been admitted to NATO.
3. The Executive Branch proposal for military aid for FY 1952 for the
non-European areas, including Greece and Turkey, amounted to just over $1
billion. At the present time, it appears that the requirements for FY 1953
will be substantially higher, with the principal increases in Japan and Korea.
Greece and Turkey, and possibly in Latin-America. It seems reasonable to
expect that the total for FY 1954 will be lower than for FY 1953.
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The present proposals compared with FY 1952 proposals to Congress are
as follows (in millions)
Area
FY 1952
FY 1953
FY 1954
Title II
$415
$596.8
$292
Title III
555
467.4
383.6
Title IV
40
340
85
Japan and Korea
0
300
200
$1010
$1704
$961
These proposals have not been reviewed in ISAC and may not be said in
any sense to have ISAC approval. Past experience with comparable pro-
posals made at the working level would indicate that reductions might be
expected. In this casey: however, even that prediction is dangerous because
of the fact that the estimates for Japan and Korea are highly tentative and
may prove to be much too low.
The total amount of economic aid requested for the non-European area
(not including Greece and Turkey) in FY 1952 amounted to 522 million dollars.
This included amounts required for multilateral technical cooperation pr
grams, and also $50 million for the solution of the Palestine refugee prob-
lem and $112,500,000 for UNKRA. It now seems likely that the FY 1953 total
will be higher, but that the requirements for FY 1954 will be lower than
FY 1953.
The proposals for economic aid are as follows (in millions):
Area
FY 1953
FY 1954
Far East
$370
$333
Near East, Africa and
South Asia
429
299
Latin America
63
63
Multilateral technical
assistance
17*
21*
$862
$695
Again, these proposals cannot be said to have ISAC approval in any
sense. Previous experience would indicate that the final Executive Branch
figures would show overall reductions.
* Included in regional figures, and therefore not added into totals.
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The following Table compares the present proposals with the proposals
made to Congress for FY 1952:
ECONOMIC AID
FY 1953
FY 1954
FY 1952
(Proposed)
(Proposed)
FAR EAST
Korea (UNKRA)
$112.5
$162.5
$162.5
Formosa
90
90
70
Indochina
29.3
40
40
Burma
14.5
20
20
Indonesia
8
10
8
Philippines
35.4
40
25
Thailand
7
7
7
297
370
333
NEAR EAST
AFRICA and
SOUTH ASIA
Iran
24
100
20
Arab States
and Israel
97
175
125
Ind. African
States
4
4
4
South Asia
78
150
150
203
429
299
LATIN AMERICA
22
63
63
MULTILATERAL
TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE
13*
17*
21*
522
862
695
C. Analysis
On the assumptions stated above, it is felt that the proposed programs
will in general meet the needs of national security and that no serious
deterioration in the present situation in the area is likely to occur.
These assumptions, however, are not forecasts and to some extent may be
unduly optimistic.
As 1s obvious from the summary of objectives in Section A of this paper,
in some cases the objective of a military aid program is to enable the
recipient country to repel external aggression, in others merely to delay
# Included in regional figures, and therefore not added into totals.
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or discourage it. Obviously a program which is designed to achieve the
more limited type of objective is less satisfactory from the national se-
curity point of view. However, it is fair to state that, in most cases
where the objective is of the limited type, the more ambitious objective --
to enable the country to resist aggression -- could not be achieved within
the foreseeable future by means of an aid program, no matter how large. In
other words, in these cases the failure fully to meet national security needs
follows inevitably from inherent weaknesses, in terms of manpower and other
resources, in the recipient countries, not from the size of the aid programs.
The principal factors limiting the proposed military aid programs are
shortages of equipment and, to a much less extent, of qualified personnel,
and the limited capabilities of certain other countries effectively to uti-
lize large amounts of equipment. In general, an attempt has been made to
prejudge possible Congressional reactions.
Insofar as economic aid is concerned, it is even more difficult to esti-
mate the degree to which the proposed programs meet the needs of national
security. About all that can be said is that these programs contribute
substantially to the national security. While in some cases much larger
programs would doubtless contribute more, no economic aid program, whatever
its size, can guarantee the achievement of the desired objective in any
given case. At best, aid programs can only influence the course of events,
they cannot control them. In determining the size of economic aid programs,
the practical possibilities, both in terms of the domestic political situa-
tion and in terms of the overall strain on U.S. resources, must be an under-
lying consideration. However, no effort will be made to adjust specific
programs to possible Congressional reaction.
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Annex No. 3
THE FEDERAL CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM
(Prepared by the Federal Civil Defense Administration)
I. OBJECTIVES
The objectives of the Federal Civil Defense Program are to minimize the
effects of enemy attacks and to insure the retention of our productive capac-
ity and will to fight, through the protection of life and property. These
objectives are being met in two phases: (1) the planning and developmental
phase which in its primary aspects is being rounded out and (2) the opera-
tional phase, which arises during a period of civil defense emergency.
II. CONCEPT OF AGENCY AUTHORITY DURING AN EMERGENCY
The policy statement in the law under which the Federal Civil Defense
Administration operates explicitly statesit to be the intent of Congress
that the responsibility for civil defense shall be vested primarily in the
several states and their political subdivisions, with necessary coordination
and guidance being provided by the Federal Government. Natural disasters and
catastrophes have shown clearly that their solution lay primerily in Federal
resources and direction. The problems inherent in the civil defense field
are of such magnitude that the civil defense organization must be prepared to
operate with a much greater degree of Federal direction than the policy state-
ment of the Congress indicates,
Certainly, under emergency conditions, when the full powers of Title III
of Public Law 920 are in force, the Administrator of Civil Defense must be
prepared to direct the civil defense forces of the country even though they
are primarily state and local forces, manned almost entirely by volunteer
workers. Accordingly, the civil defense plan contemplates mutual aid agree-
ments and the employment of mobile support forces for use across state lines
under Federal direction. This is necessary to resolve the conflicting de-
mands of prior interstate agreements, and to utilize vital resources from
sections of the country not tied to affected states by prior mutual aid
compacts.
III. SCOPE OF RESPONSIBILITIES
In order that the scope of responsibilities both in the pre-attack and
post-attack stage is thoroughly understood it is necessary to consider some
of the responsibilities assigned to the Administration. In the discharge of
his duties, the Federal Civil Defense Administrator is authorized by Public
2
Law 920, 81st Congress, to perform a variety of functions, which are sum-
marized as follows:
(a) Prepare, sponsor, and direct national plans and programs, and
tions. keep advised on the status of State Civil Defense plans and opera-
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(b) Coordinate the civil defense activities of other Federal agencies
with each other and with those of the states and neighboring
countries.
(c) Provide for necessary warning and communications systems.
(d) Study and develop physical protective facilities and other pro-
tective measures.
(e) Train civil defense officials and specialized workers.
(f) Disseminate appropriate civil defense information to the public.
(g) Assist and encourage the states in the consummation of interstate
civil defense compacts and agreements.
(h) Procure and stockpile or maintain necessary civil defense mate-
rials and facilities.
(1) Furnish financial assistance to the states, on a matching basis,
for certain civil defense purposes.
(j) Assist the states in effecting mutual civil defense aid agreements
with neighboring countries.
In addition to the above, the Administrator is vested with certain extra-
ordinary powers to be exercised only in the event of a civil defense emer-
gency proclaimed by the President or established by concurrent resolution of
the Congress. Under such conditions, the Administrator is authorized to:
(a) Procure materials and facilities needed for civil defense without
regard to the limitations of existing law.
(b) Furnish materials or services for civil defense purposes without
regard to the limitations of existing law.
(c) Coordinate and direct, for civil defense purposes, all Federal
activities for the relieff of states and localities damaged or
destroyed by attack.
(d) Reimburse states for services and materials utilized outside their
own borders for civil defense purposes.
(e) Provide temporary financial aid or relief for any civilian in-
jured or in want as the result of any attack.
(f) Incur on behalf of the United States such obligations as may be
required to meet civil defense requirements.
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During a period of civil defense emergency, the President may direct Federal
agencies to furnish personnel and facilities to the Administrator for aid to
the states, to furnish emergency shelter, and to engage in emergency repair
and restoration work. Federal personnel and facilities devoted to such work
would, of course, be those not absolutely required for military defense and {
the continuity of Government.
IV. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS
Civil defense plans and programs are being adjusted in accordance with
periodically re-evaluated planning assumptions. These are based on evaluation
of intelligence received from official sources. The timing of our programs
is predicated on the schedules used in the rest of our National Security
Program but, as pointed out later in the report, the possibility of attaining
a reasonable degree of readiness within the time schedules is very remote.
The current planning assumptions of the Administration are as follows:
Grave danger of war between the US and USSR exists now and will
continue until the US and its Allies achieve an adequate position of
strength. Such a position probably cannot be reached before 1954.
War might be initiated by a surprise attack on the Continental United
States designed to cripple US war potential.
Such an attack could strike any point in the US but would probably
be directed at (a) military installations essential for retaliation;
(b) major concentrations of population and industry; and (c) certain
AEC installations.
This attack would consist principally of atomic weapons delivered
by air introduced clandestinely into key harbors, or possibly by
guided missiles Inunched from submarines or surface ships.
Chemical and biological agents might be employed in clandestine
attacks against persons, livestock and crops. Either as a part of the
air attack or by clandestine means, nerve gas might be used against
key personnel targets. Attempts at sabotage of industry and communica-
tions would. occur either concurrently with or after the air attack.
It is assumed that the Soviet stockpile now contains about 45
plutonium bombs of some 50 kilotons equivalent. Production of a new,
composite type will begin in 1952. The estimated quantities of both
types available through 1954 is as follows:
Date
All Plut.
Composite
Total
(30-70 Kt)
(40-100 Kt)
mid-1951
45
0
45
mid-1952
80
20
100
mid-1953
125
70
195
mid-1954
150
170
320
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Comment: The table on the preceding page, taken verbatim from
a 28 July 1951 0/SI publication represents the most accurate
estimate on this subject available to CIA.
There would be little or no strategic warning, and the extent of
tactical warning cannot be predicted at present. It is assumed that less
than one hour's warning would be received and possibly none at all.
There will not be sufficient time, manpower or material for an
adequate shelter program in all target areas without major cutbacks in
civilian construction or serious interference with the production of
war materials.
?
There will be an average of 175,000 casualties per A-bomb dropped
on a critical target area in 1951; if there is no warning and no local
civil defense organization.
A proper organization of civil defense forces can reduce cas-
ualties by as much as 50%.
V. PROGRAM ELEMENTS
The elements of the Civil Defense Program are discussed below in two
major groupings, as they relate to (a) state and local programs and (b)
Federal plans and programs.
A. State and Local Programs
1. Enabling Authority. The Federal Civil Defense Administration
has encouraged and assisted state officials in the preparation of legis-
lation or Executive Orders creating civil defense organizations. As
a result, all states and territories have now set up such organizations,
either by legislative action or executive order. The degree of opera-
-1 tional readiness varies but in general the greatest progress has been
made in those states which include the most profitable targets for the
enemy. Forty states have enacted legislation authorizing mutual aid
compacts, and approximately half this total have executed such compacts
or are concluding them during the second week of September.
2. Target Areas. As a basic guide to the states, a list of 271
target areas has been determined, of which 54 areas, including 69 prin-
cipal cities, have been designated as critical target areas for atomic
attack. The designation of critical target areas reflects industrial
and metropolitan areas of such size as to offer an attractive target
for atomic attack. While it is primarily to serve these critical target
12
areas that civil defense forces are being organized, full consideration
is being given to the possibility of attacks throughout the entire
nation, including both atomic and other unconventional weapons.
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3. Organization. Organizational guidance has been furnished to
the states and localities in the form of a plan embodied in Principles
of Civil Defense Operations. The plan contemplates:
a. Individual self protection, and assumption by the individual
of an effective role in the local civil defense organization,
b. The banding together of the political entities within crit,
ical target areas by mutual aid agreements to provide im-
mediate assistance in the event of attack.
C. The organization by states cf mobile support forces outside
the critical target areas, prepared to move wherever they
are needed throughout the nation.
d. The organization by states of the resources outside the
critical target areas to furnish fixed support for casual-
ties and refugees.
Specific program guidance and assistance to the states is being furnished
by FCDA in the following areas: Engineering, facilities self-protection,
fire, health and special weapons defense police, public affairs, rescue,
shelter, supply, training and education, transportation, warden, warning
and communications and welfare. This assistance is furnished in several
ways. To supplement the outline guides furnished earlier, eleven printed
manuals have been distributed (as of August 31, 1951) and ninety-three
more are in process. Specific help is being furnished to various cities,
at the request of State Civil Defense officials, in the making of detailed
target analyses and the development of detailed civil defense plans for
each city.
4. Grants-in-Aid. Financial assistance to the states is authorized
by Public Law 920 for both organizational equipment and shelters. Plans
for matching state funds for fiscal 1952 would furnish attack warning
devices for 65% of the 69 cities in the critical target areas, radio equip-
ment for 200 control centers together with their subordinate activities,
necessary emergency fire-fighting equipment for fire and warden services
to back up the equipment now available, and special rescue vehicles de-
signed and equipped for civil defense purposes. For the total protective
facilities (shelter) program, it is estimated that there will be required
minor modifications to existing structures to provide protection to
6,000,000 people at a cost of $10 each, major modifications to protect
8,000,000 people at $40 each, and new construction to protect 15,000,000
people at $90 each. An additional 2,000,000 can be protected in existing
structures which need no modification. The total program will cost A:
$1,730,000,000, of which $865,000,000 will be the Federal share. For this
amount, shelter could be provided for the 31,000,000 people in the crit-
ical target areas during daylight hours. The program for fiscal 1952
contemplated a modest beginning, with less than one-third of the program
to be accomplished.
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Total costs of financial assistance to the states are roughly
estimated as follows:
1952
1953
1954
Organizational
Equipment
$45,255,000
$80,000,000
$21,000,000
Shelter
Program
$250,000,000
$615,000,000
-
i
The grant-in-aid program is placed in doubt, however, by the action of
the House of Representatives in reducing the total of $295,255,000 in
matching funds requested for fiscal 1952 to a total of $4,500,000. This
action, if concurred in by the Senate, would provide only for a start
on the warning device program and certain limited protective equipment.
This is despite the fact that the states have already appropriated
$72,000,000 which may be used to meet their share of the cost of the
programs.
5. Research and Development. Another important phase of assistance
to the states 18 the research and development program to develop much
needed information concerning atomic, biological, or chemical attack.
Research already undertaken has dealt primarily with shelter standards and
design, public attitudes and reactions, and both day and night population
distribution patterns in cities in critical target areas. Important sub-
jects to be dealt with in the immediate future include further shelter
research, measures designed for defense against biological and chemical
warfare, fire hazards under atomic attack and refinement of methods for
estimating casualties. The Federal Civil Defense Administration does
not conduct its own research. All such research projects are carried
out f r FCDA by the Federal agencies having a jurisdictional interest in
the subject matter to avoid duplication or overlapping of effort.
6. Volunteer Enrollment. States and localities, with the assis-
tance and guidance of the Federal Civil Defense Administration, are
proceeding with the enrollment of men and women as volunteer civil de-
fense workers. In the last analysis, the success of our Civil Defense
Program will depend on the extent to which Americans, both men and women,
can be motivated to devote their energies to this program. It is estimated
that between 15 and 17 million volunteer workers will be required. Over
a million men and women have already enrolled. Much progress is being
made within the states in disseminating to the public information de-
veloped by FCDA for individual, family, and community protection against
atomic, biological, and chemical warfare, as well as against the effects
of more conventional weapons. This is being accomplished by press, radio,
television, motion pictures, organized groups and all other available
media. Nationwide educational and recruiting drives will be carried on,
with widespread national publicity to serve as a backdrop against which
state and local recruiting drives will be conducted.
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7. Training and Education. Still another vital phase of Federal
assistance to the states is found in the development of training policies
and plans as guides to state and local civil defense authorities. In
essence, civil defense training teaches people how to perform the services
needed before, during, and after an enemy attack. To the men and women
of America, this is a relatively new problem -- even defense against con-
ventional weapons -- to say nothing of the aspects of weapons of greater
impact. The civil Defense Staff College located at Olney, Maryland, has
already furnished training to 550 key civil defense leaders. The Midwest
Technical Training School was activated during the month of August, a
similar school serving the Far West will open early in October, and a
third is planned to be operated in conjunction with the Staff College, to
serve the Eastern states. Training is conducted where possible through
practice exercises and team or group instruction, in order to bring into
sharp focus the new problems and activities involved. For example, the
functioning of mobile support groups will require the operation of civil
defense workers in a manner that is new and strange to most civilians.
It 18 the purpose of the training program to develop effective teamwork
in such operations.
B. Federal Plans and Programs
While a major part of the FCDA program during the pre-emergency
period is necessarily designed to furnish motivation, guidance, and de-
velopmental assistance to the states and localities, as indicated above,
there are certain essential activities that are purely Federal.
1. Organization and Operation. The first and basic task is the de-
velopment of 8 sound Federal Civil Defense organization, ready at a mo-
ments notice to operate during an emergency in accordance with tested
procedures and with various essential arrangements concluded in advance.
Considerable progress is being made toward this goal, but plans and
arrangements are far from being completed. Basic policy decisions in-
volving the degree of Federal direction that can be exercised are being
developed.
The organization 18 being perfected to permit an easy transition to
the emergency operational phase. Alternate top command staffs have been
designated for operation under emergency conditions, and alternate head-
quarters in secret locations have been established. Necessary communi-
cations facilities have been installed to meet minimum requirements for
emergency operation. Further work is in progress to complete the instal-
lations. The developmental phase of the project is currently being trans-
formed to the operational phase which will assure 24-hour a day readiness.
National exercises in emergency operations have been conducted for the
top command staffs and others are planned. Communications facilities pro-
(4)
vide contact with the civil defense regions and, between the regions and
the state directors, The planned civil defense communications network
linking national, regional, and state headquarters is dependent on final
action on the 1952 appropriation request now before the Congress.
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The rounding out of regional office staffs is one of the most pressing
current needs. Regional directors have been appointed, and skeleton re-
gional staffs set up. The development of a truly effective regional force
with alternate, secure command posts for emergency operation, 18 dependent,
however, on the appropriation of adequate funds for fiscal 1952. Regional
planning for civil defense purposes involves considerations peculiar to
the nature of the program. A recently approved project regrouped the
states into nine regions (as against the original 13) in order to provide
the best possible balance between population in the critical target areas
and in the support areas throughout the rest of each region.
2. Attack Warning System. An important specific responsibility of the
Federal Civil Defense Administration is to make appropriate provision for
dissemination of warnings of enemy attacks to the civilian population.
Plans are being developed in cooperation with the Air Force, Federal
Communications Commission, the radio and fixed wire communications networks,
the manufacturers of warning devices, and state and local civil defense
officials to develop an effective warning system. This too is placed in
jeopardy by the House action in approving a cut of more than 50% in the
total requested for fiscal 1952 for attack warning purposes.
3. Federal Stockpile. Certain supplies, materials and equipment
would be required under emergency conditions in quantities never approached
normally in this country. The only practical answer for such items as
drugs, medical and first-aid supplies and equipment, portable water pipe,
conversion units to adapt existing vehicles for emergency ambulance ser-
vice, etc., 1s found in the creation of Federal stockpiles of supplies,
materials, and equipment strategically located in Federal warehouses to
back up state and local resources, Arrangements have been made for the
utilization for this purpose of 35 warehouses throughout the country,
locations having been chosen with a view to balancing considerations of
security and availability to critical target areas. Standards and spec-
ifications for the items to be stockpiled have been prepared, but real
activation of the program is waiting on the sypropriation of funds by the
Congress. The recent House action on the appropriation request would
eliminate the procurement of all items except medical supplies and equip-
ment and would reduce such items to less than half the amount required for
3,000,000 casualties, an extremely low estimate of the number that would
result from an attack of proportions well within Russian capabilities.
4. Utilization of Federal Resources. Another important responsi's
bility is the development of the planned utilization in an emergency of
all resources and personnel of the Federal Government not required for
military purposes or for the continuity of government. Progress is being
made in working out agreements with other Federal agencies with respect
to the use of their personnel, materials, and facilities, under emergency
conditions. Policies and standards concerning the essentiality of Fed-
eral activities to the national security are established by the National
Security Resources Board. An executive order has been prepared and will
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shortly be recommended to the President, calling for the immediate pre-
paration of such plans by FCDA, in accordance with such NSRB standards,
and in cooperation with the several Federal departments and agencies.
It will be essential to the success of the program that it have the full
support and active backing of department and agency heads because of the
difficulty experienced by many people, including Federal officials, in
visualizing the widespread destruction that would follow an all-out attack
upon the. country. A number of briefing sessions have been arranged for
agency officials, to achieve the fullest possible understanding of the
problems and the utilization to be made of Federal personnel, materials,
and facilities during an emergency.
VI. CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM COSTS
The total cost to the Federal Government of the Civil Defense Program
during the fiscal years 1953 and 1954 is, of course, contingent on the amount
appropriated for fiscal 1952. Assuming the non-recurring items are allowed in
the 1952 appropriation, it is estimated (in advance of detailed estimates) that
approximately $915,000,000 will be required in 1953 and $35,000,000 in 1954.
The elimination, in whole or in part, of such items from the 1952 appropriation
would require the addition of up to $500,000,000 to the estimates for 1953
and/or 1954.
VII. SUMMARY
An objective appraisal of the Civil Defense Program reveals that while
substantial progress has been made in the development of the national program,
the variety and magnitude of the obstacles remaining are enormous. We believe
that existing organizations throughout the country would reduce casualties and
damage but not nearly to the degree that our survival as a nation demands.
The urgency of the present international situation requires a "peaking" of our
efforts with maximum support from the country. So far this has not been
achieved.
It may be fairly said that the initial planning phases have been sub-
stantially completed, and the developmental phase is well under way. These
two phases, which are aimed at developing both a Federal and state condition
of operational readiness, are, of course, uneven with respect to progress
in individual programs. Furthermore, the progress within the various states
is uneven. Some states have in being organizations capable, in varying de-
grees, of operating in a civil defense emergency. Other states have made little
or no progress toward operational readiness.
In the light of the present appropriation situation, it appears that cer-
tain aspects of the Federal program can shortly be expedited. For example,
it should be possible soon to move quickly in acquiring at least some of the
needed warehousing facilities, and in procuring $50,000,000 worth of medical
supplies for the stockpile. Further encouragement is found in the fact that
state and local funds available for civil defense purposes during the fiscal
1952 are slightly in excess of $200,000,000.
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The factors deterring the optimum development of the Civil Defense Pro-
gram are, however, substantial. A lack of general acceptance of the problems
and the need for civil defense is one of major importance. With long range
bombers, atomic bombs, biological warfare and chemical warfare, the tenor of
war has changed. The war of the future will be a war of attrition between the
civilian populations to an even greater extent than between the conflicting
military forces. So far this fact has not been recognized by the individual
citizen, nor has its impact on the importance to civil defense preparations
been fully recognized by the military. Notwithstanding the expressed beliefs
of our public officials that civil defense is a vital part of our common de-
fense the average man on the street and apparently the average legislator, have
failed to recognize this fact. To motivate the 15 million to 17 million vol-
unteer workers that will be needed in this program requires the constantly re-
peated, forceful expression of the vitalness to our total defense of an in-
formed and trained civil defense organization. In the past conflicting state-
ments before Congressional committees and elsewhere, have weakened the effects
of the FCDA's activities in developing this program. It is believed that this
difficulty 18 being overcome and that full support will be given in the future.
However, the problems that surround the program are legion, and there is a
vital need for this constant reiteration of the importance of civil defense in
the total national defense picture.
Another major deterrent has been the failure of the Congress to appro-
priate sorely-needed funds: Such vital programs as the provision of protective
facilities, the procurement of organizational equipment, the stockpiling of
other than medical supplies, are virtually at a standstill. A by-product of
this Congressional action, which 1s perhaps even more serious, is the impression
given the country, generally, that the Congress does not consider civil defense
important to the nation.
The natural result of the failure of public officials and legislators to
take a consistent affirmative stand on the vital role of civil defense in the
national defense program is apathy and confusion on the part of the average
citizen. His undertandable desire to reject the possibilities of atomic,
biological, or chemical attack, with unprecedented destruction and loss of life,
feeds eagerly on even minor indications that "it can't happen here." Over
coming that feeling of false and wishful security is a major task confronting
FCDA and one which requires the public and emphatic support of all echelons of
Government.
?
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Annex No. 4
NATIONAL STOCKPILING PROGRAM
(Prepared by the Department of Defense and the
Office of Defense Mobilization)
A. Objectives and Minimum Tasks
1. The stockpile of strategic and critical materials 1s a national
stockpile, not just a military stockpile. It is a blood bank of materials
to be called upon in a time of national emergency when the supplies of
these critical materials may be cut off at the very moment when we need them
most.
2. Unfortunately, the importance of the stockpile program to our entire
defense effort often 1s not fully recognized, nor are the implications stem-
ming from this lack of recognition always fully appreciated. Exhibit A 11-
lustrates factually the very crucial situation which exists in respect to
many materials. A careful study of this table will reveal that unless an
answer is found promptly to some of the questions which it raises, this nation
will be faced with serious production bottlenecks and imbalances in the event
of all-out war within the next two years. This is particularly true in view
of the large number of materials involved and the cumulative effect of the
shortages that would similtaneously be encountered. Further, the normal
substitutes for some stockpile items will themselves be in short supply.
3. The purpose of the program, which is authorized by Public Law 520 -
79th Congress, is to "decrease and prevent wherever possible a dangerous
and costly dependence of the United States upon foreign nations for supplies
of these (strategic and critical) materials in time of national emergency."
It hence is implicit that the stockpiles must be accumulated prior to M-Day.
Except for a few instances, such as aluminum and magnesium, the program thus
far generally has been limited to materials which come in large part or
entirely from foreign sources, as opposed to materials which can be produced
or manufactured in sufficient quantities in the United States.
4. The specific objective of the program proposed herein 1s to make the
United States self-sufficient as quickly as feasible in respect to these
critical and strategic materials by building stockpile reserves, limiting
consumption, expanding supply, and wherever possible finding satisfactory
substitutes. Even if the most optimistic acquisition targets which can
reasonably be established for the next two years are met, we will still be
inadequately prepared for all-out war unless in that interim large, new,
"safe," sources of supply have been found and exploited, or unless satis-
factory substitutes have been developed.
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B. Full Description of Program
1. Elements Comprising the Program
5. The principal planning element of the stockpile program, pursuent
to Section 2 of the Act, is the determination of the materials, quantities
and qualities to be stockpiled. The principal operating function is the
acquisition of the objective quantities in the proper qualities. Other op-
erational elements are those usually associated with acquisitions; namely,
transportation, inspection, handling, storage, security and maintenance,
as well as the processing of materials acquired in other than the desired
form or quality, the rotation (through sale and repurchase) of perishable
materials to prevent deterioration, and the disposal of materials no longer
desired in the stockpile.
6. Under the authority of the Defense Production Act, the responsi-
bility for determining current and long range requirements for strategic
and critical materials has been placed in the Defense Production Adminis-
tration. In order to perform this function properly, there was need of a.
focal point for coordination of Government policies and programs affecting
strategic and critical materials. The Vital Materials Coordinating Committee
was established under the Administrator of the Defense Production Adminis-
tration to serve this purpose. The meetings of this committee bring together
all of the interested agencies.
7. The responsibilities of the Vital Materials Coordinating Committee
in general fall into three categories: (a) expansion of supply, (b) balanced
distribution of available supply and (c) limitation of nonessential use.
The operating procedure of the committee is as follows: Recommendations of
the Programs and Requirements Office of the Defense Production Administration
are presented to the Vital Materials Coordinating Committee where they are
reviewed. If a recommendation is approved by the committee, it is then
transmitted to the Administrator of the Defense Production Administration
who issues appropriate directives to the agency or agencies having the
responsibility for carrying out the decisions. If opposing views are ex-
pressed in the Vital Materials Coordinating Committee, a. further review is
made by the agencies concerned in an attempt to secure an agreement. When
ever these agencies cannot effect an agreement, opposing views are referred
to the Administrator of the Defense Production Administration for decision
and action.
8. The stockpiling program is in itself a single project and does not
break down into separable elements except as each individual material and
the accomplishment of the objective for that material can be considered a
separate element of the program as a whole. There are seventy-three materials
for which stockpiles are currently necessary. These and their principal
*
uses and sources are shown in Exhibit B.
2. Assumptions and Policies upon which the Program is Based
9. The materials and quantities which should be stockpiled are deter-
mined by a comparison of probable national requirements and supplies in time
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of war. This is done through an interdepartmental stockpile committee on
which all interested civilian and military agencies are represented.
10. Essential industrial and civilian requirements, which in most in-
stances exceed the direct military needs, are estimated by groups of commodity
specialists in Government and industry on the basis of past use factors, pro-
jected wartime levels of general industrial activity and any other indicators
of requirements for the particular item under review.
11. Insofar as direct military requirements are concerned, these are
computed or estimated on the basis of the latest available mobilization
plan approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and translated into end-item
production schedules and materials requirements by the military departments.
12. There is some thought that the current program of building up the
military forces and their equipment should have the result of reducing future
all-out mobilization requirements--hence should reduce the need for stock-
piling. On the contrary, the increase in the existing and equipped military
forces, plus the building up of the war production potential, will have just
the opposite effect, at least for the early part of the full mobilization
and war period. After the forces are built up, and even though their initial
equipment is provided for, the existence of this force will permit prompt
participation in war on a large scale, instead of a. delaying action during
a build-up period. Hence the immediate needs for expendable supplies and for
replacements will be far higher than if that force had not existed. Further-
more, the building of a war production potential means the building of a
materials consuming potential and industry will now be in position to
promptly consume larger amounts of material for conversion to war goods as
soon as needed. Up until now, war requirements for many materials have been
limited by industry capacity to convert materials to war goods. This limita-
tion is rapidly being removed.
13. Included in the estimated wartime requirements are those for "normal"
export, but no provision has been made for possible large amounts needed by
allies for their own military and supporting programs which we might be
called upon to furnish in the absence of adequate preparation by the allied
countries. No firm basis now exists for determining such requirements and
the matter is mentioned only to record that here is a potential additional
requirement not now provided for.
14. Wartime supplies are estimated from basic commodity production and
trade studies, factored in accordance with assumptions as to the degree to
which supplies from abroad will be affected by 8 global war. These assumpt-
ions in turn are derived from Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance as to the
probable status of each producing country from the standpoint of military
accessibility (that is, whether or not the country will be enemy or enemy-
controlled), and as to the probable rates of loss in transit from overseas
sources. Further guidance as to the dependability of the accessible world
sources (political and economic) 1s obtained from the Department of State.
Pursuant to general guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, B safety factor
is inserted whenever supplies of a given item are concentrated in one or a.
few world sources.
15. The assumed duration of the war (five years) is the minimum given
in current Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance.
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3. The Primary Task and the Program Needed to Accomplish It
16. The task to be accomplished 1s to acquire the necessary stockpile
materials at the earliest possible time. Particular emphasis and resort to
forceful measures is indicated for those materials which now exhibit such a
low degree of stockpile accomplishment that total supplies available in war-
time production and imports plus current stockpile) are far short of wartime
requirements. Exhibit C shows the present and projected status of these select-
ed items. Greater sacrifices in the current economy, greater efforts to ex-
pand supply, resort to incentive purchase prices where indicated, and force-
ful use of conservation and substitution are essential to the accomplishment
of this task.
17. If the Munitions Board program set forth in Exhibit c, or if any
reasonably close approach thereto is to be accomplished, the following spec-
ific actions would have to be taken.
a. A change in the present priority position of the stockpile pro-
gram BO that allocation of materials to it are given preference over
those required to maintain an economy geared to the policy of avoiding
unemployment or idling facilities which cannot readily be absorbed in
the expanding military program. No question is raised concerning the
higher priority of military requirements.
b. The formulation and implementation of an international materials
program which will assure the United States of obtaining the materials
required to carry out its national policies, including theastockpiling
program. Such a program should be directed toward:
(1) the stabilization of world prices;
(2) assuring the United States of appropriate benefits from
increased supplies obtained through the expenditure of
United States funds both at home and abroad, whether in
the form of loans, subsidies, or guaranteed markets;
(3) the imposition of use restrictions similar to our own by
other free nations of the world;
(4) encouraging in every possible way the expansion of sup-
plies;
(5) judicious consideration of the needs of the other free
nations of the world but fully recognizing the propor-
tionate share of the defense effort being borne by the
United States and the share which the United States
will be required to bear in the event of all-out war.
C. An intensified effort to increase the procurement of strategic
F
and critical materials, both at home and abroad. This involves full
use of the Government's authority in the granting of loans, issuance of
tax amortization certificates, guaranteed markets, sound but flexible
price policies, payment where justified or premium prices and import
subsidies, allocation of equipment and materials for expansion projects
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and a broad flexible purchase and resale program which would permit the
immediate spot procurement of these materials any place in the world with-
out delay. This kind of approach is doubly significant because new sources
of supply will not only make materials available for the stockpile but, in
the case of developments areas of the world considered: "safe,"
crease the gap between estimated wartime supply and requirements, thus
permitting the lowering of the stockpile objective itself.
d. A greatly strengthened conservation and substitution program. To
be successful, this must have the full and continuous backing of both the
military and civilian agencies. There is a natural and understandable re-
luctance.:or the part of production people to change from a tried and proven
material to something new, particularly if the new material costs more than
the old." This: reluctance must be overcome by forceful measures, however,
becauseleven though dt might be. possible without serious consequences to
find substitutes for some of these materials after M-Day, there would be
serious distortions in production from the cumulative effect of having to
find substitutes for all of them after M-Day. Furthermore, in the case of
some materials current consumption equals current supply with no substan-
tial relief in sight from future new sources, and no material going into
the stockpile BO that the only possible solution is through conservation
and substitution. The most serious example of this is columbite where
the present stockpile plus all of the supplies which it is estimated would
be available during a five-year war period are equal to less than 12% of
the estimated wartime requirements with jet engines being the principal
user.
18. The Current uses of columbite already have been limited to the military,
AEC, and a few indispensable industrial fields. Development of substitutes by
the military in the immédiate future is absolutely essential because it would be
impossible to supply enough material to support a continuation of present spec-
ifications in the production of aircraft during all-out mobilization. Finding
and using substitutes at that time would be the only alternative to curtailing
aircraft production. It is obviously better in many such cases to enforce sub-
stitution now and by SO doing to make available a portion of the limited current
supply to build up a stockpile reserve which would be sufficient to support in
wartime a greatly reduced projected use.
19. There are parallel cases, such as refractory grade chromite, corundum.
and industrial diamonds where there is little or no material being siphoned
from the current supplies to go into the stockpile. Industry must not be per-
mitted stubbornly to follow the currently preferred usage of these materials
when it is realized that in time of war the losses in productivity inherent in
finding satisfactory substitutes would be far more harmful than at present. The
maximum possible employment of substitutes at this time will not only enable in-
dustry to determine and solve the resulting production problems prior to an
emergency but will permit the siphoning off of a portion of the supplies to the
stockpile so long as the supply lines remain open.
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20. The stockpile materials may be approximately divided into the following
categories as to the most promising solutions to the problem of wartime defic-
iency. Actually, many could be included in more than one category so that this
classification 1s in no sense precise.
CLASS I --Current military and AEC production uses almost the entire supply
permitting only slight additions, if any, to the national stockpile.
Most of the supply is imported. Efforts are being pressed to increase
supply but little significant additions can be expected. Substitutions
are essential in military use. Research on military substitutions
must be pushed.
Beryl
Columbite-Tantalite
Cobalt
Rare Earths
CLASS II - --Supplies are completely unpredictable as they come almost entirely
from behind the Iron Curtain. Large quantities might appear suddenly
on the market. Civilian consumption has been substantially cut back
and substitutes can be utilized in some instances if necessary.
Hog Bristles
Platinum Group Metals
Feathers & Down
Silk Waste and Noils
CLASS III--U. S. stockpiles are in reasonably good condition and the rate of
further acquisition is dependent in large part upon the U. S. desire
to avoid runaway price rises through heavy and uncoordinated buying
activities.
Cordage Fibers
Rubber
(Abaca and Sisal)
Tin
CLASS IV --Stockpile objectives are small and far from complete. However,
stockpile objectives were intended to cover only the initial deficits
before reactivation or expansion of productive capacity and such ex-
pansion and reactivation programs are currently under way, thus reduc-
ing the danger inherent in the stockpile status. Severe civilian re-
strictions. are presently in operation. Any further cut-backs would
provide relatively little to the stockpile and would cause serious
labor, small business and other dislocations excessively weakening the
basic economy of the country.
Aluminum
Magnesium
CLASS V --U. S. domestic mine production normally accounts for over half of
the total supply. However, the U. S. is dependent upon significant
imports coming largely from nations expected to be accessible in war-
time. At the present time, world price levels are higher than U. S.
ceiling prices for these materials and importation of metal at high-
er than established ceiling prices 18 forbidden. International allo- :-
cations to solve price problems and aggressive U. S. sponsored expansion
programs, both in the U. S. and abroad, afford the only solution. In
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this case also, sévére civilien restrictions are presently in opera-
tion. Any further cut-backs would provide relatively little to the
stockpile and would cause serious labor, small business and other
dislocations excessively weakening the basic economy of the country.
Copper
Zinc
Lead
CLASS VI --Stockpile objectives were only recently established and therefore It
1s too early to see significant progress.
Bauxite,
Manganese Ore,
Cotton (Extra long
Refractory Grade
Chemical Grade
Staple)
Vegetable Tannin
Fluorspar,
Chestnut - Wattle
Wool
Acid Grade
CLASS VII-World supplies of the following materials available to this country
are entirely inadequate to permit significant stockpiling even if it
were practicable to channel all imports to the stockpile. Substitu-
tions are available and must be fully exploited.
Castor Oil
Kyanite
Coconut Oil
Opium
Palm Oil
Shellac
Corundum
Talc, Steatite Block
Graphite,
Vegetable Tannin,
Crucible Grade
Quebracho
CLASS VIII--Materials are being used to meet military, AEC and essential de-
fense supporting production almost exclusively, thus only slight addi-
tions to the stockpile are possible. Restrictions of civilian con-
sumption is severe. Materials such as manganese are. necessary to main-
tain steel production or other essential segments of the economy.
Asbestos (All grades)
Mica
Jewel Bearings
Baurite,
Muscovite Block and Film
Tungsten
Metal Grade
Molybdenum
Vanadium
Chromite,
Nickel
Manganese Ore
Refractory Grade
Quartz Crystals
Metallurgical
Manganese Ore,
Diamonds, Industrial
Grade
Battery Grade
Crushing Bort
CLASS IX--Either the stockpile objective is achieved or the danger point level is
passed. Current conservation measures and programs to expand supplies
should be continued until the stockpile objectives for all are completed,
but there is no need for additional drastic action at this time.
!
Antimony
Chromite,
Graphite,
Bismuth
Metallurgical Grade
Lubricant Flake
Cadmium
Diamonds, Industrial Stones
Hyoscine
Celestite
Fluorspar,
Mercury
Chromite,
Metallurgical Grade
Pyrethrum
Chemical Grade Graphite,
Quinine-Quinidine
Amorphous Lump
Sapphire and Ruby
Mica, -Muscovise and Phlogopite Splittings
Sperm 011
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4. Estimated Cost in Fiscal Years 1953 and 1954
21. Budgetary needs of the stockpiling program must be analyzed from
two standpoints: (a) obligational authority to permit timely placement of
contracts and (b) cash to cover programmed deliveries. The recent policy
of the Bureau of the Budget and the Congress that contract authority no
longer be granted but that all obligational authority be in the form of
cash, coupled with the inherent long-lead-time nature of contracting for
stockpile materials, leads to the apparent over-appropriation of cash funds
in that substantial unspent cash balances exist at the end of each fiscal
year. Since stockpile appropriations are usable until spent, no complica-
tions arise from this so long as the situation is understood.
a. Cash Basis. As of 30 June 1951 the current market value of the
stockpile objective quantities was $8.3 billion and of the stocks on
hand and paid for $3.0 billion. Thus a. balance of $5.3 billion worth
of materials were still to be delivered and paid for to complete the
program. In addition, expenses such as storage, storage facilities
construction, rotation, maintenance, processing and administrative over-
head will involve about $100 million each year.
The unexpended cash balance as of 30 June 1951 was $2.6 billion and
the Fiscal Year 1952 appropriation is expected to be about $0.8 billion.
Available cash, therefore, is about $3. billion. This is expected to be
sufficient to cover possible deliveries to the stockpile during Fiscal
Years 1952 and 1953, plus the $0.2 billion in miscellaneous expenses for
the two years. Further cash funds will be necessary in Fiscal Year 1954
and beyond.
SUMMARY OF CASH REQUIREMENTS FOR EXPENDITURES
Amount Needed $ Billions
Fiscal Year
Other
Needed
Materials
Expenses
Total
Remarks
1952
1.9
0.1
2.0 )
Available from FY '51
1953
1.3
0.1
1.4 )
and '52
1954
1.0
0.1
1.1 )
To be appropriated
1955-59
1.1
0.5
1.6 )
Sub-total
5.3
0.8
6.1
Value on Hand
6/30/51
3.0
0.1*
3.1
Value of Completed
Stockpile
8.3
0.9
9.2
*Expenditures to 6/30/51
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b. Obligational Authority Basis. The unobligated funds as of
30 June 1951 amounted to $0.9 billion. New obligational authority
(all in cash) for FY 1952 is expected to be about $0.6 billion making
the total available for obligation in FY 1952 $1.5 billion. This is
expected to be obligated during the year, hence further obligational
authority will be needed for contracting activities in FY 1953 and 1954.
22. In addition to the $3.0 billion worth of material in the stockpile
on 30 June 1951, there were $1.9 billion worth under contract. The total of
$4.9 billion as compared to the $8.3 billion objectives leaves $3.4 billion
to be purchased as of that date. In addition, there will be obligations made
of about $100 million per year for the other expenses.
23. In order that full advantage can be taken of opportunities to obtain
material for future delivery, funds must be available for obligation at all
times. Based on recent experience, it 1s believed that the scheduled obli-
gations of $1.4 billion for materials in FY 1952 will taper off to about $1.0
billion in FY 1953 and $0.6 billion in FY 1954. One reason for this is the
fact that fewer materials each year will remain on the list still subject to
purchase. By Fiscal Year 1955 1t is expected that new commitments will be
at a low annual rate.
SUMMARY OF FUNDS REQUIRED FOR OBLIGATION
Amount Needed $ Billions
Fiscal Year
Needed
Materials
Expenses
Total
Remarks
1952
1.4
0.1
1.5
Available in FY 1952
1953
1.0
0.1
1.0
To be granted
1954
0.6
0.1
0.7
To be granted
1955-59
0.4
0.4
0.8
To be granted
Total
3.4
0.7
4.1
Value on Hand or on
Order 6/30/51
4.9
0.2*
5.1
Value of Completed
Stockpile
8.3
0.9
9.2
*Total obligations to 6/30/51
24. On the theory that contract authority will no longer be granted but
that all appropriations will be in cash, the following would be called for:
F. Y. 1952 - $800 million cash, including $200 million to liquidate
prior C/A, as presently included in the budget.
F. Y. 1953 - $1.1 billion cash for obligation.
F. Y. 1954 - $0.7 billion cash for obligation.
Annexes to
Annex No. 4
NSC 114/2
as 9 -
SECRET
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SECRET
C. Analysis of Extent to Which Program Meets Needs of National Security
25. The stockpile objective for any item represents the anticipated
deficit between wartime needs and wartime supplies. The individual deficits
vary greatly as to percentage of war requirements; thus in some instances such
as copper, lead, zinc, and wool, the anticipated deficit 1e 20 percent or less
and for others such as mercury and rubber the deficit is 80 percent or more.
Stockpile performance, as between items, hence is not properly measured by
the percentage fulfillment of individual objectives. Performance is more
properly evaluated by examining the degree to which war requirements are met
by the total of assumed wartime supplies plus the amount of stockpile acquired.
This comparison reveals the items for which national war requirements are far
from being taken care of.
26. In Exhibits A and D only those stockpile items are included for which
assumed wartime supplies plus stockpiles on hand 30 June 1951 total less than
80 percent of wartime requirements. The current preparedness status for all
items on the stockpile list ranges from 100 percent downward to 3 percent in
one case.
27. The purpose of the program proposed herein is to place emphasis on
those items currently in the most dangerous condition and which prospectively
will not greatly improve during FY 1952 and FY 1953 without extraordinary effort.
28. The recommended program of acquisition is that established by the
Munitions Board and which in itself is limited by maximum estimates of what
might be accomplished. It will be noted that the prospective 30 June 1953
status under the Munitions Board program (Column C, Exhibit A), while better
than the status arrived at by projecting either from January - June 1951'acqui-
sition rates (Column E) or from July - December 1951 programs established
by the DPA (Column D), is far from satisfactory in many instances.
29. As will be seen from Column F of Exhibit A, there are many items for
which the stockpiles will not prospectively be filled, even under this very
ambitious program, until far later than 30 June 1953. The impact of these
threatened shortages will center upon various phases of the military production
plans or the industrial economy, depending on the item.
30. For example, columbite and cobalt shortages will limit jet engine pro-
duction. Tungsten will affect armor-piercing ammunition as well as the broad
field of industrial metal cutting tools. Quartz crystals, mica, tantalite, and
talc shortages will affect electronics production. Corundum, industrial dia-
monds and refractories will affect industrial manufacturing efficiency as a.
whole, hence will affect all war and war-supporting programs. Manganese, needed
for steel, affects everything.
31. To a. degree these shortages can be absorbed by the development of
substitutes; however, this is partial relief at best, and unless the substi-
tute is developed and adopted prior to M-Day and is completely satisfactory
and readily available, would cause loss of time and efficiency, and would be
wasteful of manpower and other materials.
Annexes to
Annex No. 4
NOC 114/2
- 10 -
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5
IV
EXHIBIT "A"
COMPARISON OF PROJECTED SECURITY STATUS 30 JUNE 1953 UNDER
VARIOUS ASSUMPTIONS AS TO F.Y. 1952 and 1953 RATES OF STOCKPILE ACQUISITION
(Includes only those items for which assumed wartime supplies, plus
stocks on hand 30 June 1951, total less than 80% of assumed wartime requirements)
(A)
(B)
(c)
(D)
(E)
(F)
(G)
(H)
5-Year Wartime Supplies plus Actual or
Calendar Year during which
Projected Stocks on Hand - as Percent
Stockpile would be Completed
of 5-Year Wartime Requirements
under Assumptions (c) (D)&(E)
Projected as of 6-30-53
Actual
If DPA determi- If actual rate
MB
DPA Rate
Jan-Jun
as of
If MB
nations for
of acquisition Program
for Jul-Dec
1951 Actual
6-30-51
Program
Jul-Dec 51 are
Jan-Jun 51 is Rate
1951
Rate
Material
is met
not improved
not improved
Bristles, Hog
3.0
79.6
44.2
44.2
1954
1956
1956
Silk, Waste and Noils
5.0
96.5
39.0
25.4
1953
1957
1960
Columbite
11.7
19.9
11.7
12.7
1960/
19601
1960/
Asbestos, Crocidolite
16.4
55.3
44.6
28.4
1956
1957
1960/
Talc, Block
18.6
45.5
*
22.4
1958
*
1960/
Quinidine
20,4
77.0
100.0
43.8
1952
1952
1958
Asbestos, Amosite
23.3
45.1
27.7
23.3
1958
1960/
1960/
Opium (Morphine Content)
23.5
73.1
67.1
72.1
1954
1955
1954
Rare Earths
24.2
63.7
*
24.2
1956
*
1960/
Corundum
28.8
49.3
36.0
28.8
1958
1960/
1960/
Tantalite (Ta₂O₅)
30.2
46.6
*
30.4
1957
*
1960/
Asbestos; Chrysotile
30.4
50.4
39.6
31.0
1958
1960/
1960/
Feathers & Down, Waterfowl
36.2
74.9
*
50.6
1955
*
1960
Shellac
38.8
65.2
100.0
88.2
1955
1953
1954
Cobalt
40.2
59.9
43.0
46.2
1959
1960/
1960/
Palm Oil
44.6
70.7
100.0
70.0
1953
1953
1955
Cordage Fibers, Abaca
45.5
67.9
71.1
55.7
1955
1956
1960/
Tungsten (W Content)
45.9
65.5
*
48.5
1958
*
1960/
Quartz Crystals
46.9
68.0
53.7
49.1
1958
1960/
1960/
Graphite, Crucible Grade
48.0
71.2
*
89.4
1955
*
1954
Bauxite, Refractory Grade
49.9
64.8
49.9
49.9
1956
1960/
1960/-
Mica, Muscoviet Film
50.1
65.3
53.5
54.7
1958
1960/
1960/
Mica, Muscovite Block
55.8
69.1
57.0
58.8
1958
1960/
1960/
Annexes to
Annex No. 4
NSC 114/2
SEGRET
-11-
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No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5
SECRET
(A)
(B)
(c)
(D)
(E)
(F)
(G)
(H)
5-Year Wartime Supplies plus Actual or
Calendar Year during which
Projected Stocks on Hand - as Percent
Stockpile would be Completed
of 5-Year Wartime Requirements
under Assumptions (c) (D)&(E)
Projected as of 6-30-53
Actual
as of
If MB
If DPA determi-
If actual rate
MB
DPA Rate
Jan-Jun
6-30-51
Program
nations for
of acquisition
Program
for Jul-Dec
1951 Actual
1e met
Jul-Dec 51 are
Jan-Jun 51 is
Rate
1951
Rate
Material
not improved
not improved
Castor Oil
55.9
73.0
71.7
58.7
1957
1957
1960/
Coconut Oil
56.6
99.4
100.0
90.4
1952
1952
1954
Manganese, Battery Grade
56.6
80.3
81.4
59.2
1956
1955
1960/-
Molybdenum (Mo Content)
57.5
70.3
64.5
61.5
1958
1960/-
1960/
Cotton, Extra Long Staple
59.1
87.2
*
68.7
1954
*
1960
Diamonds, Crushing Bort
60.8
72.1
*
69.6
1958
*
1960/
Quebracho Extract
61.0
95.1
100.0
73.8
1954
1953
1957
Chromite, Chemical Grade
61.2
101.7
78.4
95.0
1952
1955
1953
Chromite, Metallurgical Grade
61.6
84.8
61.6
66.0
1955
1960/
1960/
Rubber, Natural
61.7
96.8
100.0
100.0
1952
1952
1953
Kyanite
63.2
100.0
75.8
84.8
1952
1957
1954
Beryl
64.8
96.8
*
77.6
1955
*
1957
Chestnut Extract
66.8
84.8
84.2
67.8
1955
1955
1960/
Manganese, Metallurgical Grade
67.1
85.1
72.7
72.3
1956
1960/
1960/
Chromite, Refractory Grade
69.1
100.4
70.7
69.1
1953
1960/
1960/-
Hyoscine
70.1
99.4
100.0
100.0
1952
1952
1952
Tin
70.5
100.5
*
86.7
1952
*
1955
Manganese, Chemical Grade
71.4
93.1
*
77.2
1954
*
1960/-
Wattle Extract
73.9
92.6
100.0
73.9
1954
1953
1960/-
Nickel
74.6
82.6
75.8
77.2
1959
1960/
1960/-
Sperm 011
77.8
100.0
100.0
100.0
1952
1952
1952
Platinum
77.9
92.8
*
100.0
1954
*
1953
Fluorspar, Acid Grade
78.1
95.4
85.9
84.1
1954
1957
1958
Graphite, Lubricant Grade
78.7
99.4
*
100.0
1952
*
1953
Magnesium
78.8
98.2
82.4
78.8
1954
1960/-
1960/
*
Defense Production Administration Program not yet firmed up.
Annexes to
Annex No. 4
NSC 114/2
- 12-
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5
SECRET
EXHIBIT "B"
MAJOR USES AND SOURCES OF STOCKPILE MATERIALS
Material
Major Uses
Major Sources
Aluminum
Aircraft construction
U.S., Canada
Antimony
Solder, low melting alloys, flame
U.S., Mexico, Bolivia
proofing, anti-fouling paint
Asbestos
High-temperature insulation, flame
Union of South Africa, Southern
resistant textiles, filters for
Rhodesia, Bolivia
protective devices
Bauxite
Metal
Alumina for metal, chemical industry U.S., Surinam
and rubber industry
Refractory
High temperature furnace linings
U.S., British Guiana
Beryl
Beryllium-copper for bearings,
Brazil, India
bushings, diaphragms
Bismuth
Solders, bearings, anchors for dies
U.S., Canada, Mexico, Peru
and punches, pharmaceuticals
Bristles, Hog
Textile dabbing brushes, non-spark-
China
ing industrial brushes
Cadmium
Bearings, protective coatings,
U.S., Canada, Mexico, Peru,
hardener for copper, cerium, gold
Australia
and silver
Castor Oil
Synthetic resins, lubricants, nylon,
Brazil, U.S.
brake fluid
Celestite
Signal flares, tracer ammunition,
Mexico, Spain, United Kingdom
filler for paints, rubber and
plastics
Chromite
Chemical
Sodium bichromate, tanning, plating
Union of South Africa
Metallurgical
Stainless steel, high speed cutting
Union of South Africa, U.S.S.R.,
steel
Turkey, Southern Rhodesia
Refractory
Linings and brick for metallurgical
Cuba, Philippines, Union of
furnaces
South Africa
Cobalt
High temperature alloys, tool steel,
Belgian Congo, Canada, French
magnetic alloys
Morocco
Coconut 011
Lauryl alcohol, germicides, disinfec-
Indonesia, Philippines
tants, lubricants, incendiaries
Columbite
Carbon stabilizer in steels, high
Nigeria, Belgian Congo, Brazil,
temperature alloys
India
Copper
Shell cases, rotating bands, elec-
U.S., Chile, Canada, Union of
tric conductor, foundry products
South Africa
Cordage Fibers
Abaca
Marine cordage, drill cable,
Central America, Philippines,
Sisal
wire rope centers
British E. Africa, Angola, Haiti
Corundum
Heavy duty abrasive, optical
Union of South Africa
abrasive
Cotton, Extra
High speed sewing thread, balloon
Egypt, Sudan, Peru, U.S.
Long Staple
cloth, Byrd cloth, airplane fabric
Diamonds
Grinding, polishing, drilling
Belgian Congo, Brazil, Union of
Industrial
South Africa
Feathers and Down,
Arctic sleeping bags, special
China, U.S.
Waterfowl
clothing
Fluorspar, Acid
Hydrofluoric acid, flux, ceramics
U.S., Mexico, Spain
Annex No. 4
- 13 -
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5
SECRET
Material
Major Uses
Major Sources
Fluorspar
Metallurgical
Flux in manufacture of steel, cast
U.S., Mexico, Spain
iron and ferro-alloys
Graphite
Amorphous
Carbon brushes
Ceylon
Crucible
Crucibles and stoppers
Madagascar
Lubricant
Lubricants and packing
U.S.
Hyoscine
Motion sickness remedy
Australia
Iridium
Hardener for platinum, plating
Canada, Columbia, U.S.S.R., U.S.
Jewel Bearings
Instruments, timing devices
Switzerland, U.S.
Kyanite
High temperature refractory
Kenya, India
Lead
Ammunition, batteries, solder,
U.S., Canada, Mexico, Peru,
babbitt, tetraethyl lead
Australia
Manganese
Battery
Dry cell batteries
Gold Coast, U.S.
Chemical
Oxidizer, photographic developer,
Belgian Congo, Gold Coast, Cuba,
gum inhibitor, stabilizer
U.S.S.R.
Metallurgical
Ferro-alloy for steel manufacture
U.S.S.R., Gold Coast,
India, Union of South Africa
Mercury
Explosives, chemicals, electrical
Italy, Spain, Mexico, U. S.
apparatus
Mica
Electrical insulation for radio,
India, Argentina, Brazil
radar, magnetos, motors
Canada, Mexico, Madagascar
Molybdenum
Alloying element in steel, cast
U.S., Chile
iron and non-ferrous alloys
Nickel
Alloying element in steel and non-
Canada, Cuba, lvew Caledonia,
ferrous alloys, plating.
U.S.S.R.
Opium
Narcotic drugs
Iran, Turkey, Yugoslavis, India
Palm 011
Manufacture of tin and terne plate,
Belgian Congo, Indonesia,
cold rolling of steel
Nigeria
Platinum
Electrical contact points, catalyst,
Canada, Columbia, U.S.S.R.,
electrodes, spinnerets for rayon
Switzerland, Union of South
nozzles for fiber glass
Africa, Alaska
Pyrethrum
Insecticides
Belgian Congo, British East
Africa, Brazil, Japan
Quartz Crystals
Electronic oscillators and filters,
Brazil
optical uses
Quinidine
Treatment for heart ailments
Indonesia
Quinine
Anti-malarial
Indonesia
Rare Earths
Arc cores, optical abrasive, misch
Brazil, India
metal, cerium-magnesium alloy
Rubber
Tires, tubes, clothing, insulation,
Indonesia, Malaya, Siam, Ceylon,
mechanical goods, fuel cells
Liberia
Sapphire and Ruby
Jewel bearings
Switzerland, U.S.
Shellac
Adhesive, protective
India
coatings
Silk
Powder bags for large guns
China, Japan, Korea, Iran,
Switzerland, Brazil
Sperm 011
Lubricants, metal cutting and drawing
Norway, United Kingdom
Talc
Insulators for high frequency
India, Italy
electronic circuits
Tantalite
High-temperature alloys, electronic
Brazil, Belgian Congo, Nigeria,
tubes, manufacture of synthetic
Southern Rhodesia, Uganda,
rubber
U.S.
Tin
Tinplate, solder, babbitt, bronze
Malaya, Indonesia, China, Bolivia
Belgian Congo
Annex No. 4
- 14 -
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5
SECRET
Material
Major Uses
Major Sources
Tungsten
High speed steel, high temperature
China, Korea, Australia,
alloys, electronic tubes, armor
Brazil, Bolivia, Peru, U.S.
piercing shot
Vanadium
Tool steels, alloy steels, chemical
Union of South Africa, Peru,
catalyst
U.S.
Vegetable Tannins
Chestnut
Tanning hides
U.S., Italy, France
Quebracho
Tanning hides, oil well drilling
Argentina, Paraguay
Wattle
Tanning hides
British East Africa, Union of
South Africa
Wool
Military and civilian clothing,
U.S., Australia, New Zealand,
blankets
Union of South Africa,
Argentina, Uruguay
Zinc
Galvanizing, die castings, brass
U.S., Canada, Mexico, Peru,
and bronze, bleaches, paint
Australia
smoke mixtures
Annex No. 4
- 15 -
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5
40
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5
SECRET
MUNITIONS BOARD PROGRAM FOR ACQUISITION OF STOCKPILE MATERIALS
EXHIBIT "C"
F.Y. 1952, 1953, 1954
(Excludes Items for which Stockpile 18 already Completed)
(A)
(B)
(c)
(D)
(E)
(F)
(G)
(E)
(I)
Acquisition Program by Years
Total Stockpile Inventory
During
During
During
Actual
Proposed
Material
Proposed
Proposed
Unit
F.Y. 1952
F.Y. 1953
F.Y. 1954
6-30-51
6-37-52
6-30-53
6-30-54
ALUMINUM
ST
185,951
170,036
283,263
60,750
246,701
416,737
700,000
ANTIMONY (Sb Content)
ST
2,511
0
0
18,489
21,000
21,000
21,000
ASBESTOS
Amosite
ST
4,921
4,900
4,900
1,301
6,222
11,122
Chrysotile
16,022
ST
3,013
3,000
3,000
1,992
5,005
Crocidolite
8,005
11,005
ST
1,261
800
800
139
1,400
2,200
3,000
BAUXITE
Metal Grade
LDT
779,280
999,796
0
3,220,924
4,000,204
Refractory Grade
5,000,000
5,000,000
LCT
30,000
60,000
60,000
0
30,000
90,000
150,000
BERYL
ST
5,749
4,000
4,000
5,290
11,039
15,039
19,039
BRISTLES, HOG
Lbs,
2,409,926
2,500,000a/
1,300,000a/
90,074
2,500,000
5,000,000a/
6,300,000/
CADMIUM
Lbs.
2,562,444
1,000,000
1,000,000
5,036,109
7,598,553
8,598,553
9,598,553
CASTOR OIL
Lbs.
84,270,266
100,000,000
100,000,000
27,729,734
112,000,000
212,000,000
312,000,000
CHROMITE
Chemical Grade
LDT
360,718
0
0
309,282
670,000
670,000
670,000
Metallurgical Grade
LDT
629,624
315,450
315,450
1,636,961
2,266,585
2,582,035
2,897,485
Refractory Grade
LDT
220,000
125,000
0
274,985
494,985
619,985
619,985
COBALT
Lbs.
9,337,059
9,000,000
9,000,000
15,738,739
25,075,798
34,075,798
43,075,798
COCONUT OIL
Lbs.
192,725,705
0
o
206,698,309
399,424,014
399,424,014
399,424,014
COLUMBITE
Lbs.
3,927,854
1,932,278
2,700,000
6,668,175
10,596,029
12,528,307
15,228,307
COPPER
ST
374,244
375,000
250,000
596,148
970,392
1,345,392
1,595,392
Annexes to
Annex No. 4
NSC 114/2
- 16 -
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5
*
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5
$
SECRET
(A)
(B)
(c)
EXHIBIT "C"
(D)
(E)
(F)
(G)
(H)
(I)
Acquisition Program by Years
Total Stockpile Inventory
During
During
During
Actual
Material
Proposed
Unit
Proposed
F.Y. 1952
Proposed
F.Y. 1953
F.Y. 1954
6-30-51
6-30-52
6-30-53
6-30-54
CORDAGE FIBERS
Abaca
Lbs.
55,511,268
45,000,000b/
Sisal
79,488,732
135,000,000
180,000,000
Lbs.
75,877,428
180,000,000
0
0
97,122,572
173,000,000
173,000,000
173,000,000
CORUNDUM
Lbs.
5,691,440
5,600,000
5,700,000
208,560
5,900,000
11,500,000
17,200,000
COTTON, EXTRA LONG STAPLE
Bales
138,588
125,000
125,000
11,412
150,000
275,000
400,000
DIAMONDS, INDUSTRIAL
Crushing Bort
Kts.
3,690,139
3,800,000
Stones
3,700,000
11,677,591
15,376,730
Kts.
965,258
19,167,730
619,182
22,867,730
588,815
6,126,745
7,092,003
7,711,185
8,300,000
FEATHERS AND DOWN
Lbs.
6,442,662
1,000,000
2,500,000
111,662
6,554,324
7,554,324
10,054,324
FLUORSPAR
Acid Grade
SDT
98,904
65,000
64,316
21,780
120,684
185,684
250,000
GRAPHITE
Amorphous Lump
ST
333
0
0
Crucible Grade
3,367
ST
3,700
2,061
3,700
2,687
3,700
Lubricant Flake
3,127
4,143
6,204
ST
8,891
2,322
260
12,018
0
2,818
5,140
5,400
5,400
HYOSCINE
Oz.
3,170
0
0
3,830
7,000
7,000
7,000
KYANITE
SDT
25,808
0
0
8,192
34,000
34,000
34,000
LEAD
ST
169,114
117,554
0
413,332
582,446
700,000
700,000
MAGNESIUM
ST
38,842
92,439
12,364
31,355
70,197
162,636
175,000
MANGANESE ORE
Battery Grade
LDT
36,980
36,000
Chemical Grade
20,000
48,816
85,796
LDT
121,796
7,273
141,796
7,000
Metallurgical Grade
5,000
7,727
LDT
15,000
1,176,250
22,000
400,855
27,000
300,427
2,126,480
3,302,480
3,703,335
4,003,762
Annexes to
NSC 114/2
Annex No. 4
- 17 -
SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5
SECRET
EXHIBIT "C"
(A)
(B)
(c)
(D)
(E)
(F)
(G)
(H)
(I)
Acquisition Program by Years
Total Stockpile Inventory
During
During
During
Actual
Proposed
Proposed
Material
Proposed
Unit
F.Y. 1952
F.Y. 1953
F.Y. 1954
6-30-51
6-30-52
6-30-53
6-30-54
MICA
Muscovite Block
Lbs.
801,506
800,000
800,000
1,671,527
2,473,033
3,273,033
Muscovite Film
4,073,033
Lbs.
357,844
166,000
165,000
278,298
636,142
802,142
Muscovite Splittings
967,142
Lbs.
2,199,635
0
0
30,533,674
32,733,309
32,733,309
Phlogopite Splittings
32,733,309
Lbs.
191,895
0
0
1,408,105
1,600,000
1,600,000
1,600,000
MOLYBDENUM (Metal Cont.)
Lbs.
22,564,278
21,000,000
31,000,000
20,124,904
42,792,704
63,792,704
84,792,704
NICKEL
Lbs.
75,235,770
75,553,600
74,553,600
94,707,213
169,942,983
245,496,583
320,050,183
OPIUM (Morphone Cont.)
Lbs.
69,622
70,000
70,000
66,213
135,835
205,835
275,835
PALM OIL
Lbs.
56,793,731
8,000,000
0
54,639,875
111,433,606
119,433,606
119,433,606
PLATINUM GROUP METALS
Iridium
TrOz
8,951
0
0
4,049
13,000
Platinum
13,000
13,000
TrOz
144,494
140,000
140,000
365,278
509,772
649,772
789,772
QUARTZ CRYSTALS
Lbs.
1,642,441
1,200,000
1,100,000
3,305,560
4,948,001
6,148,001
7,248,001
QUINIDINE
Oz.
1,450,000
0
0
519,938
1,969,938
1,969,938
1,969,938
RARE EARTHS
SDT
4,689
3,500
4,700
3,300
7,989
11,489
16,189
RUBBER, NATURAL
LT
342,266
150,000
0
694,239
1,036,505
1,186,505
1,186,505
SHELLAC
Lbs.
7,148,274
3,100,000
4,000,000
9,744,467
16,892,741
19,992,741
23,992,741
SILK
Lbs.
6,147,947
3,000,000
0
352,053
6,500,000
9,500,000
9,500,000
SPERM OIL
Lbs.
5,024,733
0
0
17,575,267
22,600,000
22,600,000
22,600,000
TALC, STEATITE BLOCK
ST
554
400
400
357
929
1,329
1,729
TANTALITE (Ta₂⁰₅ Cont.)
Lbs.
428,873
200,000
0
502,344
931,217
1,131,217
1,331,217
Annexes to
Annex No. 4
NSC 114/2
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16,
SECRET
EXHIBIT "C"
(A)
(B)
(c)
(D)
(E)
(F)
(G)
(H)
(I)
Acquisition Program by Years
Total Stockpile Inventory
During
During
During
Actual
Proposed
Proposed
Proposed
Material
Unit
F.Y. 1952
F.Y. 1953
F.Y. 1954
6-30-51
6-30-52
6-30-53
6-30-54
TIN
LT
97,380
14,348
94
113,178
230,558
244,906
245,000
TUNGSTEN (W Content)
Lbs.
19,092,908
17,493,705
17,346,479
43,798,760
63,238,147
80,731,852
98,078,331
VANADIUM (v Content)
Lbs
1,476,404
0
0
6,722,451
8,198,855
8,198,855
8,198,855
VEGETABLE TANNIN EXTRACT
Chestnut
LT
21,728
21,000
18,000
272
22,000
43,000
61,000
Quebracho
LT
139,240
25,000
225,000
60,760
200,000
225,000
250,000
Wattle
LT
15,000
10,000
10,000
0
15,000
25,000
35,000
ZINC
ST
125,003
21,461
12,163
581,373
706,376
727,837
740,000
FOOTNOTES:
a
Only 2,500,000 lbs, of total stockpile objective has been programmed, pending review of objective.
Procurement beyond this point contingent on whether balance of requirement can be stored and rotated.
Annexes to
Annex No. 4
NSC 114/2
- 19 - -
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PRESENT AND PROJECTED SECURITY STATUS IN STOCKPILE MATERIALS
EXHIBIT "D"
WHICH ARE CURRENTLY IN MOST CRITICAL CONDITION
PROJECTION BASED ON MUNITIONS BOARD ACQUISITION PROGRAM PER EXHIBIT "C"
(Includes only those items for which assumed wartime supplies, plus stocks
on hand 6-30-51, total less than 80% of assumed wartime requirements)
(A)
(B)
(c)
(D)
(E)
(F)
(G)
(H)
(I)
(J)
(K)
(L)
Assumed 5-Year Wartime Supplies plus
5-Year Wartime Supplies plus
Assumed 5-
Actual or Projected Stocks on Hand
Actual or Projected Stocks on
Assumed
Year Wartime
Hand - as Percent of 5-Year
5-Year
Supplies
Wartime Requirements
Wartime
excluding
As of
As of
As of
As of
As of
As of
As of
As of
Material
Unit
Requirements
Stockpile
6-30-51*
6-30-52*
6-30-53*
6-30-54*
6-32-51
6-37-52
6-30-53
6-37-54
Bristles, Hog
Lbs.
6,400,000
98,900a/
188,974
2,598,900
2,598,900
2,598,900
3.0
40.6
79.6
100.0
Silk, Waste and Noils
Lbs.
10,000,000
150,000
502,053
6,650,000
9,650,000
9,650,000
5.0
66.5
96.5
96.5
Columbite
Lbs.
72,161,000
1,799,000
8,467,175
12,395,029
14,327,307
17,027,307
11.7
17.2
19.9
23.6
Asbestos, Crocidolite
ST
5,300
731
870
2,131
2,931
3,731
16.4
40.2
55.3
70.4
Talc, Block
ST
3,550
285
660
1,214
1,614
2,014
18.6
34.2
45.5
56.7
Quinidine
Oz.
2,562,913
4,000
523,938
1,973,938
1,973,938
1,973,938
20.4
77.0
77.0
77.0
Asbestos, Amosite
ST
45,000
9,180
10,481
15,402
20,302
25,202
23.3
34.2
45.1
56.0
Opium, (Morphine Content) Lbs.
281,400
0
66,213
135,835
205,835
275,835
23.5
48.3
73.1
98.0
Rare Earths
SDT
20,700
1,700b
5,000
1
9,689
13,189
17,889
24.2
46.8
63.7
86.4
Corundum
Lbs.
55,000,000
15,606,000
15,814,560
21,506,000
27,106,000
32,806,000
28.8
39.1
49.3
59.6
Tantalite (Ta₂O₅ Cont.)
Lbs.
3,831,000
653,000
1,155,344
1,584,217
1,784,217
1,984,217
30.2
41.4
46.6
51.8
Asbestos, Chrysotile
ST
30,000
7,124
9,116
12,129
15,129
18,129
30.4
40.4
50.4
60.4
Feathers & Down,WaterfowlLbs.
19,195,000
6,831,000
6,942,662
13,385,324
14,385,324
16,885,324
36.2
69.7
74.9
88.0
Shellac
Lbs.
38,750,000
5,280,000
15,024,467
22,172,741
25,272,741
29,272,741
38.8
57.2
65.2
75.5
Cobalt
Lbs.
92,797,000
21,550,000
37,288,739
46,625,798
55,625,798
64,625,798
40.2
50.2
59.9
69.6
Palm Oil
Lbs.
248,000,000
56,000,000
110,639,875
167,433,606
175,433,606
175,433,606
44.6
67.5
70.7
70.7
Cordage Fibers, Abaca
Lbs.
450,000,000
125,400,000
204,888,732
260,400,000
305,400,000
305,400,000
45.5
57.9
67.9
67.9
Tungsten (w Content)
Lbs.
189,000,000
43,000,000
86,798,760
106,238,147
123,731,852
141,078,331
45.9
56.2
65.5
74.6
Quartz Crystals
Lbs.
13,500,000
3,032,000
6,337,560
7,980,001
9,180,001
10,280,001
46.9
59.1
68.0
76.1
Graphite, Crucible Grade ST
20,500
5,699
9,842
11,903
14,590
17,717
48.0
58.1
71.2
86.4
Bauxite, Refractory Gr.
LCT
603,000
300,600
300,600
330,600
390,600
450,600
49.9
54.8
64.8
74.7
Mica, Muscovite Film
Lbs.
3,450,000
1,450,000
1,728,298
2,086,142
2,252,142
2,417,142
50.1
60.5
65.3
70.1
Mica, Muscovite Block
Lbs.
12,050,000
5,050,000
6,721,527
7,523,033
8,323,033
9,123,033
55.8
62.4
69.1
75.7
Castor Oil
Lbs.
1,077,000,000
574,000,000
601,729,734
686,000,000
786,000,000
886,000,000
55.9
63.7
73.0
82.3
*
Based on Column (D) of this Exhibit, plus stock levels from columns (F)(G)(H) and (I) of Exhibit "C"
Annexes to
Annex No. 4
NSC 114/2
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SECRET
(A)
(B)
(c)
EXHIBIT "D"
(D)
(E)
(F)
(c)
(H)
(I)
(J)
(K)
(L)
Assumed 5-Year Wartime Supplies plus
5-Year Wartime Supplies plus
Assumed 5-
Actual or Projected Stocks on Hand
Actual or Projected Stocks on
Assumed
Year Wartime
Hand - as Percent of 5-Year
5-Year
Supplies
Wartime Requirements
Wartime
Excluding
As of
As of
As of
As of
As of As of
Material
As of
As of
Unit
Requirements
Stockpile
6-30-51*
6-30-52*
6-30-53*
6-30-54*
6-30-51
6-30-52'
6-30-53
6-30-54
Coconut Oil
Lbs.
450,000,000
48,000,000
254,698,309
447,424,014
447,424,014
447,424,014
56.6
99.4
99.4
Manganese, Battery Grade LDT
308,000
99.4
125,660
174,476
211,456
247,456
267,456
56.6
Molybdenum (Mo Content) Lbs
68.7
341,000,000
80.3
86.8
176,000,000
196,124,904
218,792,704
239,792,704
260,792,704
57.5
64.2
Cotton, Extra Long StapleBales
938,000
70.3
76.5
542,500
553,912
692,500
817,500
942,500
59.1
73.8
Diamonds, Crushing Bort Cts.
66,400,000
87.2
100.4
28,700,000
40,377,591
44,067,730
47,867,730
51,567,730
60.8
66.4
Quebrache, Extract
482,100
72.1
LT
77.7
233,524
294,284
433,524
458,524
483,524
61.0
Chromite, Chemical
89.9
LDT
891,530
95.1
100.3
236,250
545,532
906,250
906,250
906,250
61.2
4,083,000
101.7
Chromite, Metallurgical
101.7
LDT
878,950
101.7
2,515,911
3,145,535
3,460,985
3,776,435
61.6
77.0
84.8
Rubber, Natural
LT
1,402,000
92.5
171,000
865,239
1,207,505
1,357,505
Kyanite
1,357,505
61.7
86.1
96.8
SDT
96.8
70,000
36,024
44,216
70,024
70,024
70,024
63.2
100.0
Beryl
100.0
ST
30,466
14,440
100,0
19,730
25,479
29,479
33,479
64.8
Chestnut, Extract
83.6
96.8
LT
238,000
158,730
109.9
159,002
180,730
201,730
291,730
66.8
Manganese, Metallurgical
LDT
75.9
84.8
8,722,000
92.3
3,722,000c/
5,848,230
7,024,480
7,425,335
7,725,762
67.1
80.5
85.1
88.6
Chromite, Refractory
LDT
1,105,000
489,000
763,985
983,985
1,108,985
1,108,985
69.1
89.0
100.4
100.4
Hyoscine
Oz.
10,815
3,750
7,580
10,750
10,750
10,750
70.1
Tin
99.4
99.4
LT
99.4
372,453
129,439
262,617
359,997
374,345
374,439
70.5
96.7
Manganese, Chemical
100.5
LDT
65,750
100.5
39,218
46,945
54,218
61,218
66,218
71.4
82.5
Wattle, Extract
93.1
LT
100.7
134,000
99,090
99,09C
114,090
124,090
134,090
73.9
85.1
Nickel
92.6
100.1
Lbs.
1,888,000,000
1,314,000,000
1,408,707,213
1,483,942,9831,559,496,583
1,634,050,183
74.6
78.6
82.6
Sperm Oil
Lbs.
22,600,000
86.5
0
17,575,267
22,600,000
22,600,000
22,600,000
77.8
Platinum
100.0
100.0
100.0
TrOz
1,901,100
1,115,000
1,480,278
1,624,772
1,764,772
1,904,772
77.9
85.5
92.8
100.2
Flourspar, Acid Grade
SDT
948,700
719,000
740,780
839,684
904,684
969,000
Graphite, Lubricant Gr.
78.1
12,500
88.5
95.4
102.1
ST
7,022
9,840
12,162
12,422
12,422
Magnesium
679,000
78.7
97.3
99.4
99.4
ST
504,000
535,355
574,197
666,636
679,000
78.8
94.6
98.2
100.0
FOOTNOTES:
Computed supply and requirements cover first 2 years only on account 01 possibility of substitution thereafter.
Computed supply 10,273. Reduced to domestic supply,only.
Computed supply 6,434,720. Reduced to 3,722,000 on account of large shipping requirements and essentiality of
item. Deficit becomes 5,000,000.
Annexes to
Annex No. 4
NSC 114/2
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ANNEX NO. 5
THE INFORMATION PROGRAM
(Prepared by the Department of State)
Objectives and Minimum Taaks of the Programs
1. The objective of the international information and educational ex-
change programs is to assure that by the middle of calendar year 1953 the
United States Government is possessed of the resourses required for effective
overt psychological activities in support of and complementary to other mea-
sures designed tc further the achievement of the national objectives.
2. The general task of the international information and educational ex-
change programs in facilitating the achievement of these objectives remains as
stated in Annex V to NSC 68/3:
"The frustration of the design of the Kremlin will result primarily
from concrete decisions taken and vigorous measures executed in the po-
litical, military and economic fields by the peoples and the governments
of the free world under the leadership of the United States. The task of
the United States foreign information and educational exchange programs
is to assure that the psychological implications of those actions are,
first, fully developed and, second, effectively conveyed to the minds and
the emotions of groups and individuals who may importantly influence
governmental action and popular attitudes in other nations and among
other peoples."
3. The further statement in Annex V to NSC 68/3 likewise continues to be
applicable:
"Governmental action and popular attitudes will be influenced along
lines favorable to the achievement of United States objectives through
recognition of the interests shared by the people and the Government of
the United States and other governments and peoples
The United States and other peoples and nations share common in-
terests, which information and exchange programs can cultivate, in:
a. National freedom, including both the desire for recognized
status in international affairs and the desire to maintain char-
acteristic indigenous cultures.
b. Peace and security against external aggression.
C. Sovial advancement, economic progress and human welfare,
under governments responsive to popular aspirations.
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d. Effective international relationships to serve these ends."
4. The situation in which the general task must now be carried out is
fraught with greater danger and therefore charged with greater urgency than
existed when Annex V to NSC 68/3 was approved and than was then thought would
exist now. Moreover, nearly a year's time has been lost in acquiring important
facilities, notably powerful radio transmitters strategically placed, and the
base of program operations, particularly in the fields of information centers
and the exchange of persons, has been narrowed by congressional action. The
expansion of the program is therefore more rather phan less difficult than
it was a year ago.
5. Five specific tasks emerge as the minimum laid upon the international
information and educational exchange programs. All actions contributing to
military strength, economic stability and political cohesion in the free world
will have a psychological impact and will contribute to the successful per-
formance of these tasks, but actions of a primarily psychological character
are also called for.
6. The first task is to multiply and to intensify psychological deterrents
to aggression by Soviet Communism, whether in the form of outright action by
the armed forces of the Soviet Union, of Communist China or of the satellites
of the Soviet Union, or in the form of the subversion of existing free govern-
ments by civil forces acting on behalf of Soviet Comminism.
7. This involves psychological action along the following lines:
a. To keep the people and the leadership of nations under the
domination or the influence of the Kremlin, including the Soviet Union
itself, keenly aware of the vast potential strength of the free world,
the steady transformation of much of this strength into ready defensive
capabilities and the determination of the free world to maintain the
peace in any honorable way possible but to defend its freedom if necessary.
b. To warn the people and the leadership of such nations of the
reckless nature of the policies of the Kremlin and the possible con-
sequences thereof.
C. To open and to widen schisms between the leaders and the armed
forces, the bureaucracies, the religious groups, the peasantry, the in-
dustrial workers and youth of these nations.
d. To expose among the peoples of nations susceptible to subversive
influences the myths surrounding Soviet Communism, to recall the fate of
free peoples whose governments have attempted to cooperate with parties
and factions subservient to the Kremlin, to minimize fears as to the
strength and influence of fifth columns subservient to the Kremlin within
such nations and to nourish popular confidence in the capability of these
nations, by their own acts and as the result of strength accruing from the
gression and subversion.
cooperation of other free nations, to defend themselves against both ag-
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8. The second task is to intensify and to accelerate the growth of
confidence in and among the peoples and the governments of the free world,
especially in Western Europe, including Western Germany, in their capability
successfully to deter aggression by Soviet Communism or to defeat it should
it nonetheless occur and to inspire concrete international, national and in-
dividual action accordingly.
9. This involves psychological action along the following lines:
a. To convince the peoples and the governments of these countries
that, although Soviet Communism is intent upon bringing about the collapse
of free societies, its present intentions do not necessarily involve gen-
if eral war and that it may be deterred from general war if unified strength
is rapidly built by free nations.
b. To build confidence in the power of existing deterrents to ag-
gression and the still greater power of the deterrents now developing -
the certainty that a united, strong free world will win any war that
Soviet Communism might precipitate,
C. To develop understanding of the advantages and the necessity
of the voluntary participation, in varying degrees, of Germany, Japan,
Yugoslavia and Spain in the common defense of the free world,
d. To develop awareness and appreciation of the common interests,
loyalties, traditions and symbole shared by the peoples of the free world
and of the institutions, global and regional, that embody them.
e. To demonstrate that, although adjustments in living standards
will be called for in order to assure the defense of the free world,
they can be kept within bearable limits, both as to extent and duration,
and the military strength thus created will constitute a shield behind
which social and economic progress can later go forward in an atmosphere
relieved of tension and fear.
f. To stimulate and to maintain confidence in the leadership of the
United States, respect for its peaceful intentions and trust in its re-
liability, steadiness and moderation.
10. The third task is to combat, particularly in the Near and Middle
East and South and Southeast Asia, extremist tendencies threatening the under-
mining of the cohesion and the stability of the free world and the withdrawal
of governments and peoples into neutralism.
11. This involves psychological action along the following lines:
a. To demonstrate the interest of: the United States in and its
support for the achievement of legitimate national aspirations on terms
consistent with the stability and the cohesion of the free world.
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b. To demonstrate that those aspirations will most surely be
achieved through cooperation with the free world.
C. To indicate why, in the nature of the present struggle, neu-
tralism 1s an unreal choice and how attempting to make it is likely to
result only in becoming a subject of exploitation by Soviet Communism.
d. To recall the advantages that have accrued and are still accruing
to underdeveloped countries from their association with the free world.
e. To foster understanding of the nature and the intentions of the
people of the United States and to develop confidence in its leadership!
f. To encourage, without undermining responsible established au-
thority, all progressive forces bent on political advancement, economic
improvement and social reform.
5. To indicate how the exacerbation of national antagonisms within
an area create opportunities for aggression and subversion by Soviet
Communism and to encourage a will for peaceful settlement.
12. The fourth task is to maintain among the peoples held captive by
Soviet Communism, including the peoples of the Soviet Union, hope of ultimate
liberation and identification with the free world and to nourish, without
provoking premature action, a popular spirit disposed. to timely resistance to
regimes now in power.
13. This involves psychological action along the following lines:
a. To make continuously plain that the United States looks to the
establishment in nations dominated or heavily influenced by Soviet Com-
munism of governments commanding the confidence of their respective
peoples, freely expressed through orderly representative processes.
b. To promote faith that the present situation in the world will
not last forever and that the ultimate triumph of freedom is inevitable.
C. To keep alive national traditions and values linking to captive
peoples with the free world.
d. To keep the captive peoples accurately informed of situations
and developments in the free world as a source of hope and a guide to
timely action.
14. The fifth task is to maintain among peoples and governments tradi-
tionally linked with the United States, particularly in Latin America, a con-
tinued recognition of mutual interdependence and to promote national and in-
dividual action accordingly.
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15. This involves psychological action along the following lines:
a. To convince such peoples and governments that the United States
is sincerely sympathetic with their legitimate national aspirations, and
the rest of the free world, achievement of those aspirations is being
hastened,
b. To convince these peoples and governments that their freedon is
inextricably involved with that of other nations and peoples, is dependent
in part upon the skills and resources of other nations and peoples and
that the preoccupation of the United States with problems in other areas
is therefore justified and in their interest,
C. In Latin America, to foster conscious popular devotion to the
principle of Pan-Americanism as the concept within which the American
nations can best realize their potentialities and discharge their ob-
ligations as members of the free world.
16. The tasks are set forth in descending order of importance and are
related to specific geographic regions and countries:
a. The task of deterring aggression by Soviet Communism, paragraph
6 above, must be carried out primarily among the Soviet Union, China,
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, East Germany
and North Korea as regards open aggression by armed forces and among
France, Italy, Western Germany, Burma, Indo-China, Iran and Indonesia as
regards subversion of existing governments by civil forces acting on be-
half of Soviet Communism.
b. The task of building confidence in the capability of the free
world to maintain peace by building united strength, paragraph 8 above,
must be carried out among all nations not dominated by Soviet Communism
but especially those linked in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
and closely associated with them in defensive plans: United Kingdom,
Canada, Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, France,
Portugal, Italy, Turkey, Greece, Western German, Austria and Spain; those
linked in the Rio Treaty, especially Mexico and Brazil; and those linked
in the Pacific Alliances, including Japan and the Philippines.
C. The task of combatting extremist tendencies threatening the
cohesion and stability of the free world, paragraph 10 above, must be
carried out primarily among India, Iran, Pakistan, Indo-China, Burma,
Indonesia, Taiwan, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaya, Egypt, Labanon,
Syria, Iraq, Morocco, Guatemala, Israel, Tunisia, Jordan, Afghanistan,
Saudi Arabia.
d. The task of maintaining hope of ultimate liberation from domina-
tion by Soviet Communism, paragraph 12 above, must be carried out pri-
marily among the peoples of the nations in which the task of deterring
aggression by Soviet Communism must also be carried out.
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e, The task of maintaining a continued recognition of mutual in-
terdependence among governments and peoples traditionally linked with the
United States must be pursued especially among the nations of Latin
America and the Near and Middle East.
Description of the Program
Elements Comprising the Program
17. The elements comprising the recommended program include activities
carried out under the United States Information and Educational Exchange Pro-
gram (Public Law 402), the Public Affairs Program for Germany, the Public
Affairs Program for Austria, the Public Affairs Program for Japan, the Iranian
Student Aid Program, the Chinese Assistance Program, the Finnish Program, the
India Grain Program (pending) and the Fulbright Program (Public Law 584).
18, The latter five programs are concerned solely with the exchange of
persons. The Fulbright Program is financed in foreign currencies made avail-
able as payments on debts owed the United States by other governments; no
appropriation is required to carry it out, Although they contribute substan-
tially to the achievement of the psychological tasks set forth above, these
programs are only complementary to the major effort.
19. Successful execution of the tasks laid upon the international in-
formation and educational exchange program will depend primarily upon the
propaganda and psychological activities carried out under Public Law 402 and
the Public Affairs Programs for Germany, Austria and Japan, Responsibility
for the conduct of the latter, now that the Peace Treaty has been signed, will
pass from the Department of Defense to the Department of State. The German
and Austrian programs, already closely integrated with the global program,
will be moved into the Public Law 402 program in fiscal 1953.
20. The recommended program under Public Law 402 for FY 1953 and FY 1954
contemplates the following major activities and developments over and above
the program currently authorized.
21. Public Law 402 Program:
a. Radio Broadcasting. The rapid completion of the radio ring, in-
volving the construction of four additional megawatt shortwave transmittere
in the United States, bringing the total of super-high-powered transmitters
in this country to 6 (plus the 38 lower-powered transmitters now in use).
The origination of radio programming at Munich, for Eastern Germany,
Eastern Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary; at Salonika, for the
southern Balkans and Southeastern Russia, using splinter languages of the
region, such as Armenian, Uzbek, and Azerbaijani; and at Okinawa (or
equivalent), for China and Southeast Asia.
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The provision of low-cost receivers for distribution behind the Iron
Curtain and in other strategic areas where receiveve are generally un-
available to target groups.
The substantial step-up of the purchase of time on and the preparation
of programs for local broadcasting stations in foreign countries.
These measures are Mesigned : to assure: first, a signal strong
enough to reach all areas behind the Iron Curtain and to overcome present
jamming to the maximum extent possible; second, programs closely tailored,
to local requirements; third, a widespread
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audience; and fourth, the presentation of programs over indigenous channels
and lacking identification of the United States as the source.
If appropriations for the completion of the ring plan are made not
later than the middle of FY 1952, the facilities can be in full operation
within approximately eighteen months thereafter. The completion of the
ring plan and the execution of other measures outlined above will provide
the most effective, and indeed the only overt, means of applying psycho-
logical deterrents to aggression by Soviet Communism through open military
action. They will also provide the most effective and only overt means of
stimulating hope of ultimate liberation among the peoples held captive by
Soviet Communism.
b. Press and Publications. A heavy increase in the preparation of
material for pamphlets, posters, publications and exhibits, directed to-
ward specific target groups, to be locally adopted and produced abroad
and distributed, either by overt or covert means, without attribution to
the United States Government.
The opening of regional contracting offices to obtain the propaganda
advantages of foreign production under conditions that will assure tech-
nical excellence and economy.
An intensification of the purchase overseas of research, writing,
translation and art work from local sources, particularly where such
purchase will facilitate the utilization of the press and publication
output.
Under the appropriation for the current fiscal year, the preparation
of such materials at the level reached by the end of fiscal year 1951
must be curtailed. The recommended program would provide not simply for
maintaining production at the level reached in FY 1951 but for increasing
it to the point where maximum use can be made of the printed word and
picture as instrumentalities in: (a) creating psychological deterrents
to aggression, whether by armed force or by civil subversion; (b) in
building confidence among the peoples of the free world; (c) in combatting
extremist forces threatening stability and cohesion; and (a) in stimulating
hope of ultimate liberation.
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C. Motion Pictures, An increase of 300% in the production of docu-
mentary motion pictures and newsreels adapted to the interests of local
audiences and designed for distribution through all available channels,
including those in the commercial field.
Intensive efforts to utilize theatrical and commercial film pro-
duction, which has not been possible under a .limited budget.
Substantial overseas film production, both regional and on a country
basis, including production without attribution to the United States.
Particularly in underdeveloped countries and among audiences with
limited literacy, but also among industrial workers, farmers and youth
in more advanced countries, motion pictures are a prime instrumentality
for building confidence, exposing the threat of aggression and combatting
tendencies toward neutralism.
d. Information Centers. Increasing the number of information centers,
particularly in the Near and Middle East. There are now 109 centers in
operation, with an increase of up to 20% anticipated in the current fiscal
year. At least two hundred centers could be effectively used in the pro-
jected all-out campaign.
Increasing by ten-fold the number of United States books translated
and published in local languages, particularly in Near and Middle East,
Far East and South Asia.
These measures are designed to further, particularly among intel-
lectuals, public leaders, teachers and officials, the development of
confidence, the combatting of extremism and the cultivation of the sense
of mutual interdependence.
e. Exchange of Persons. An increase from 3900 to 10,000 in the num-
ber of public opinion leaders, trade union leaders, farm leaders and youth
leaders brought to the United States, particularly from Asia, the Near
and Middle East and Western Europe.
Improvement in the facilities for dealing with such leaders during
their visits to the United States.
Personal contact and observation is a prime means of developing con-
fidence, fostering a sense of mutual interdependence and combatting neu-
traliam. The proposed measure will significantly increase the effective-
ness of this means of affecting psychological attitudes.
f. Overseas Missions. The information program overseas missions,
attached to the United States Embassies, Legations and major consular
establishments, are the instrumentalities through which the media elements
of the psychological program are carried out. Intensification of the
media activities, therefore, although it does not mean a proportional
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increase, does require a considerable strengthening of the overseas mis-
sions - both quantitatively and qualitatively. The program outlined
above must be reflected in the field organizations in these ways:
(1) The addition. to existing public affairs staffs of media
apecialists and tecnicians to provide a balanced propaganda team.
(2) The recruitment and assignment to the field of more highly
skilled, top-level information specialists.
(3) The opening of a substantial number of "decentralized"
operations, relatively small in size, shrewdly staffed, and strate-
gically placed in the natural centers of target groups, such as in-
dustrial and agricultural centers, particularly in Western Europe,
the Middle East and South Asia.
This field program would mean an increase of about 50% in both
American and local employees, to make a total of about 1300 American
and 6500 local employees throughout the world.
22. The Public Affairs Program for Austria, During the current fiscal
year, the program now being carried on will be increased somewhat in size and
to a larger extent in emphasis, By the end of the year, the program, which
essentially involves the same media and techniques as the Public Law 402 pro-
gram in other countries, will be geared to achievement of the aims of the
United States psychological offensive in Austria and will be carried forward
at about the same rate in fiscal 1953.
23. The current change in the emphasis of the program involves particular
attention to specific priority target groups, such as labor and the so-called
"middle class" which have historically been the victime of totalitarian ideo-
logies. This involves especially the use of the United States newspaper in
Vienna, the development of a specialized news; file for Austrian newspapers, the
U.S. operated radio network, and a stepped-up pamphlet and leaflet operation.
24. The Public Affairs Program for Japan. The present Civil Information
and Education Program in Japan is conducted under SCAP, with the authority of the
Occupation directives as a basis. It is in part directed toward internal re-
form and reconstruction, and in part to Japanese acceptance of the foreign
policy goals of the United States. With the recognition of Japan as a sovereign
nation, objective. the present program is being revised to aim primarily at the latter
25. The revised public affairs program will represent about the maximum
overt operation that can be conducted profitable in Japan, and will be con-
tinued in fiscal year 1953 if funds are available. The revised program will
place particular emphasis on:
a. Maintenance of the 23 information centers established under the
Occupation as focal points for the adaptation to local needs of all in-
formation and educational exchange operations.
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b. Continuation of a large-scale exchange of persons operation.
C. Developing press materials directed specifically to target groups
within the country.
d. Establishment of a cooperative radio program using both Voice of
America broadcasts and local broadcasting arrangements made through the
Broadcasting Corporation of Japan and local commercial radio stations.
e. Widespread use of documentary films throughout all areas of
Japan.
26. The Public Affairs Program for Germany. This program, because of the
particular problems involved in the occupation of Germany, and the availability
of local currency for program purposes, is now carried on at approximately the
level required for an optimum overt information, and educational exchange pro-
gram. If this scale operation is to be continued, however, it will be necessary
to substitute for an anticipated reduction in local currency re-
sources, particularly ECA counterpart funds. Of the $44 million projected for
the current year program, only $14.5 is from appropriated dollars.
27. Changes in the content and organization of the program are planned
to adapt it to the anticipated political relationships with the German Federal
Republic. The principal changes are:
a. Extension of the program as a whole to all of Western Germany
including the British and French zones, thus reducing its concentration
in the U.S. Zone;
b. Enlistment of a greater degree of German participation in the
program and its administration including participation by German Govern-
mental and private agencies, and
C. Withdrawal from most of the activities now being carried on at
the local community level under the direct initiative of HICOG.
28. Tentative plans call for the accomplishment of these changes through
establishment of 15 regional centers, each center being the site of an infor- 172
mation center. The centers will be distributed throughout all three zones of
Western Germany. Staff based at such centers will be concerned with the ad-
ministration of the exchange program, cultural andeducation activities, film
distribution and use, servicing of press and publications, dissemination of
pamphlets and other informational materials, liaison with German radio stations,
etc.
29. Assumptions and Policies on Which the Program is Based. The projected
program can be achieved by the middle of calendar year 1953 if:
a. a supplemental appropriation for operational expansion is available
in January 1952. About $44.5 million will be required;
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b. a supplemental appropriation to complete the "ring plan" for
radio facilities within 18 months, requiring about $100 million in cash
or contract authorization, is available in January 1952.
30. It is assumed that the information program set forth in this document;
and the estimate of required funds, represents the total worldwide overt pro-
paganda program of the United States Government, and that any other public
information activities, such as those in connection with foreign economic and
military assistance, will be confined to the promotion of the limited objectives
of the respective programs under which they are authorized.
31. It is assumed that the administrator of the outlined program will
have wide operating flexibility and that funds will be available for stated
purposes without restrictive limitations.
32. Estimate of the Cost of the Program for Fiscal Year 1953. There
follows an estimate of fund requirements to attain in fiscal year 1953 the
level of operation to meet the needs of the situation as outlined above. It
will be noted that:
a. The amount provided in the estimate for activities under Public
Law 402 is substantially the same as projected in Annex V to NSC 68, pre-
pared in October 1950, with an increase of 15 percent to provide for
price rises since that time and the addition of $8 million to provide for
a program in Japan which is financed this year from appropriations to the
Department of the Army.
b. There are no significant new technical developments susceptible
of employment in the overseas information program during fiscal year 1953
which were not anticipated in Annex V of NSC 68. Opportunities for
strengthening the program in 1953 lie, therefore, in better use of known
methods rather than in new devices. Progress in technical research in-
dicates, however, that certain new developments in radio broadcasting may
be available by fiscal year 1954. Financial provision must be made for
continued research for the development of new methods in all media fields.
The sum of $10 million for this purpose and for construction necessary to
make immediate application on at least a pilot model basis of new devel-
opments has been included in the estimate.
C. Successful attainment of a maximum effort in fiscal year 1953
will require a supplemental appropriation for the current fiscal year of
$44.5 million for operating purposes and $100 for construction of radio
facilities. The operating budget must be expanded to permit the re-
cruitment of staff and the preparation of working materials to be utilized
next fiscal year. Completion of the radio facilities ring, which will re-
quire in the neighborhood of 1C months, has already been jeopardized by
the delay in enactment of appropriations for this purpose.
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Estimate of Fund Requirements for Fiscal Year 1953
Amount
Program
(Dellars)
USIE - Public Law 402
a. Operations
$226,000,000
b. Development and Capital Investment
10,000,000
$236,000,000
Public Affairs Program for Germany
44,000,000
Public Affairs Program for Austria
4,800,000 1/
Chinese Assistance Program
900,000
Fulbright Program
9,400,000
Fimilsh Program
398,000
Iranian Trust Fund Program
35,000 5/
India Grain Program (Exchange of Persons)
1,000,000 6/
Total
$296,533,000
Relationship of Recommended Program to the Needs of National Defense and Factors
which Limit the Program.
33. Relationship of Program to National Defense, The present struggle
between the forces of freedom and the forces of slavery is being prosecuted as
actively on the psychological front as on the military. The Kremlin has taken
the initiative in this matter. Communist strategy relies heavily on prop-
agenda as a device for fomenting discord and dissatisfaction, for bringing the
Communist party into power with the assistance of internal and external forces
and for retaining its hold over captive peoples who are frequently basically
hostile to the whole concept. Military preparedness alone cannot cope with the
threat of Communism. It cannot preserve the peace nor win the victory in the
event of war unless there exists the will to resist and a conviction in the
basic principles for which the free world stands.
Cross requirements. W111 be offset in part by local revenues,
Balance remaining in current appropriations,
Value of foreign currencies owed to U.S. No appropriation required.
Payment due from Finland on World War I debt. No appropriation required.
Estimated expenditure from Trust Fund.
Estimated amount to be available from interest payments by the Government of
India. No appropriation required.
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34. The U.S. position in the present crisis 1s that war is not inevitable,
that the peace can be maintained if the free nations are strong physically and
economically, if they cooperate and have the will to resist. The USIE program
seeks to make this position clear to large numbers of people on both sides of
the iron curtain. East of the curtain the expression of America's confidence
:..
that these goods are attainable serves to deter further physical aggression by
the Kremlin. West of the curtain it encourages and inspires greater effort.
35. If world war should come the USIE program provides an operation which
can quickly be transformed into a psychological warfare weapon. To the extent
that planning must prepare for this eventuality the development of an adequate
staff -- trained and equipped for the job -- 10 a must. Equally important is
the completion of the radio facilities ring to provide a communications system
which can reach around the world and overcome both artificial jamming and the
natural interference of atmospheric phenomena.
36. Analysis of Limiting Factors. Successful implementation of this pro-
gram to exert maximum overt psychological pressure on peoples overseas required
the removal of several serious obstacles:
a. Congressional leaders, particularly the appropriations committees,
must understand the relationship of this program to the defense effort and
the need for adequate appropriations. The Department alone cannot put
this message across. Endorsement and active support by appropriate
agencies in the defense field and the Bureau of the Budget is required.
b. Restrictive limitations which bind the administrator to the use
of funds for one particular media activity or which virtually prohibit the
use of funds for certain essential purposes must be eliminated from ap-
propriation acts.
C. Recognition at both Congressional and executive levels must be -
given to the fact that many overseas information activities require a
period of months to initiate and that once begun they must continue for
a period of time if they are to be effective. An annual appropriation
system which permits the amount of funds available to vary widely from
year to year is not conducive to good management or successful operation.
Moreover, the delays in enacting annual appropriations make it very dif-
ficult to plan effectively.
d. Greater attention must be given to the overseas propaganda im-
plications of public pronouncements by public officials in all branches of
government. There is a positive as well as a negative side to this problem.
Much can be done to strengthen U.S. foreign policy by an appropriate speech
at the proper time. USIE is limited in its basic charter and appropriation
aclely to overseas activities and must rely on the public relations staffs
of the executive departments to prepare. materials for domestic use.
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37. Although a year's time has been lost in implementing the program
first set forth in Annex V to NSC 68/3, the program can still be highly ef-
fective in promoting the achievement of the national objectives, if prompt
legislative action is taken. If's supplemental appropriation is voted shortly
after January 1, 1952, for the radio ring, it can be in full operation within
approximately eightenn months. If another supplemental for the program operations
is voted at approximately the same time, the effect of the current appropriation
in narrowing the base of program operation other than radio broadcasting can
be offset and overcome. The expectation is justified that, given those ap-
propriations, the expanded program can go forward in FY 1953 with hardly a break
in tempo and reach a performance peak by the end of FY 1953. If the supple-
mentals are not voted, the reductions necessitated by the current appropriation
will make impossible the achievement of effectiveness before the end of FY 1954,
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Annex No. 6
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
(Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency with the
Concurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Committee)
1. The peculiar nature of intelligence operations makes it difficult
to project national intelligence planning in terms comparable to those em-
ployed in a program aimed at the attainment of manpower or production goals.
While intelligence must intensify its activities if it would audit the Soviet
world's growth in strength and estimate its intentions, expansion in itself
offers no guarantee of improved intelligence. Improvement in the intelligence
product is dependent not only upon increased collection of reliable foreign
intelligence but upon the skill with which it is evaluated and assembled in
the form of estimates. Thus the root problem of intelligence is obtaining
personnel skilled in collection and evaluation.
25X1
4. To improve the over-all value of their intelligence product, the
national intelligence agencies must focus added emphasis upon three essen-
tial parts of their program:
First, they must make certain that substantive objectives in field
activity, research, and estimates are properly related to the political and
military problems confronting members of the National Security Council.
Second, the activities of the intelligence agencies of the government
must be so synchronized that the resources of each provide maximum support
for the attainment of these objectives.
Third, they must constantly re-assess and strengthen their capabilities
and resources.
5. It is especially important that collection facilities of the national
intelligence agencies be improved. Efforts are being made to establish
accurate priorities of essential elements of information. This requirement
is especially important in the field of clandestine collection where extraor-
dinary difficulties are encountered.
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6. Establishment of a coordinated program for systematic analysis of
the Soviet and satellite economies should provide a better appraisal of the
capabilities and long-range intentions of the USSR. It should likewise
suggest possible avenues of U. S. counteraction by exposing the vulnera-
bilities of the USSR and its satellites.
7. Progress has been made in the collection of intelligence by scien-
tific means (as distinct from the collection of scientific intelligence itself),
but much remains to be accomplished in this field, especially in view of the
difficulties encountered in "conventional" clandestine activities.
8. In the coordination of foreign intelligence among national intelli-
gence agencies, the Director on Central Intelligence is required by law to
correlate the intelligence produced by each in order to ensure that no gaps
are left uncovered between agencies. At the same time by recommendation to
the National Security Council, he can initiate action to prevent duplication
of effort or over-lapping of one agency upon the field of action or functions
of another. The Central Intelligence Agency is likewise charged with respon-
sibility for services of common concern which can most advantageously be
performed centrally. While progress has been made in this process of coordi-
nation, there is still need for improvement.
9. The Intelligence Advisory Committee with representation from each
of the departmental intelligence agencies has been increasingly helpful in
facilitating consultation and the exchange of cpinion among intelligence
chiefs. The IAC provides a means whereby the chief of intelligence of each
agency of government can comment upon, concur in, or object to recommenda-
tions, proposals, or conclusions regarding problems of national intelligence
concern.
10. To provide rapid dissemination of information on significant military
or political events, there has been created an interdepartmental Watch
Committee whose responsibility it is to review systematically all incoming
reports and to be alert for indications of critical moves. Facilities for
prompt transmission. and for evaluation of these indications are constantly
being improved.
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b. In overt intelligence programs output varies almost directly
with the allocation of personnel and facilities. Present limitations
operate to the effect that a. minimum program to meet fixed commitments
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can be met only with the greatest difficulty with no margin for satisfying
increasing demands resulting from the deteriorating world situation,
In the opinion of the Intelligence Advisory Committee representatives..
of the Armed Forces, presently directed personnel cuts will make it
impossible to maintain even this minimum program. The Department of
State indicates difficulty in obtaining budgetary provision for adequate
personnel expansion.
12. a. In summary, the sharpened intensity of U.S.-Soviet relationships
emphasizes the immediate need for intensification of intelligence and
related activities.
25X1
b. At the same time, the intelligence services, currently taxed
with expanded requirements, must adequately prepare for vast expansion
in the event of the spread c:P. hostilities. If the intelligence ser-
vices are to prepare for these wartime operations while undertaking
commitments that currently strain their present capacilities, it is
imperative that they obtain sufficient personnel and the logistical
support required for the execution of these tasks.
Annexes to
Annex No. 6
NSC 114/2
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Annex No. 7
THE INTERNAL SECURITY PRO GRAM
(Joint Report of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Confer-
ence and the Interdepar tmental Committee on Internal Security)
A. A statement of the objectives and minimum tasks which
the internal security program is designed to fulfill.
The objective and minimum task of the internal security
program is to provide an internally secure United States, free
from the over-all threat of the Communist, or other subversive movement,
and more particularly free from the dangers of espionage, sabotage, and
other disruptive tactics generally employed by such subversive movements
and other enemies of our country.
B. Description of the nature, magnitude, and timing of the
internal security program designed to meet the above
objectives and tasks.
Protection of the nation's internal security is an
integral and vital element of our security as a nation. Accordingly,
the plans and programs for protecting our internal security must
be maintained and increased in direct relation to the maintenance
or acceleration of our national security program. Substantial progress
has been made in the efforts of the Executive Branch of the Government
to attain adequate internal security. This progress has been the
result of the combined and continuing efforts of the Interdepartmental
Intelligence Conference (IIC) and the Interdepartmental Committee on
Internal Security (ICIS), which were established by the President
under the National Security Council.
1. Elements compromising the program:
(a) The continuing coordination of the broad field
of internal security.
(b) The additional expansion of domestic intelligence
and counter-intelligence coverage.
(c) The provision of an adequate legal basis for
insuring the nation's internal security through
additional statutory and regulatory means.
(d) The investigation, apprehension, prosecution,
and detention of persons who may be involved in
subversive activities, including the violation
of laws relating to treason, sedition,
espionage, sabotage, etc.
Annexes to
Annex No. 7
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(e) The protection of critical governmental,
industrial, and other installations and
facilities, including telecommunications,
airports, ports, harbors, etc.
(f) The maintenance of an adequate program to
insure the loyalty and security of personnel
employed in the Executive Branch.
(g) The establishment of minimum standards for
security clearance for access to classified
data on the part of personnel in the Executive
Branch.
(h) The readying of measures to be employed, when
appropriate, with respect to foreign official
and diplomatic personnel.
(i) The establishment of effective controls over
the entry or departure from the United States
of persons potentially dangerous to the
internal security, and over the importation
and exportation of materials, the entry or
exit of which would endanger the national
security.
(j) The institution of procedures to protect
classified security information in the Executive
Branch and to determine the eligibility of
representatives of foreign governments to
receive such classified security information.
(k) The development of: (1) Procedures for the
voluntary restriction of the dissemination of
unclassified strategic information affecting
the national security; (2) Appropriate pre-
publication screening procedures relating to
strategic information in the Executive Branch
affecting the national security, and (3) A
censorship plan for implementation if and when
required.
(1) The establishment of measures designed to
defend against the introduction and use of
unconventional attack media.
(m) The increasing of the timely collection and
distribution of foreign intelligence as it
relates to internal security.
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Annex No. 7
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2. Assumptions and policies upon which the program
is based.
(a) A nationally secure United States presupposes
an internally secure United States.
(b) The subversive forces of Communism and other
agents of the Soviet Union and Soviet bloc
nations constitute the major threat to the in-
ternal security and are a very serious, sub-
stantial and present danger.
(c) The United States is in a period of acute danger
which will continue until an adequate position of
strength is achieved.
(d) The internal security program contemplates a con-
dition of immediate danger short of a declared war.
3. Estimate of cost of the program for Fiscal Year 1953
and Fiscal Year 1954.
INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE
Department of the Army (G-2):
Fiscal Year 1953
-
$31,339,166.99
Fiscal Year 1954
I
$31,407,590.05
NOTE: An additional amount of $56,811,138.00
will be required to implement the Nat-
ional Censorship Program if and when
directives are issued for the implemen-
tation of that Program.
Department of the Navy (ONI):
Fiscal Year 1953
-
$10,314,800.00
Fiscal Year 1954
-
$10,314,800.00
Department of the Air Force (OSI):
Fiscal Year 1953
-
$20,558,271.00
Fiscal Year 1954
-
$20,126,180.00
NOTE: These estimated figures for G-2, ONI,
and OSI. include only those expenditures
necessary for the operation of the pro-
gram in the United States.
Annexes to
Annex No. 7
NSC 114/2
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Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI):
Fiscal Year 1953
-
$21,956,774.00
Fiscal Year 1954
-
$22,493,243.00
NOTE: These estimated figures contemplate the
continuance of the Bureau's present
accelerated internal security program
and do not include any costs of new
programs incidental to national defense
that may arise. The amount shown for
Fiscal Year 1953 is presently in the
FBI budget for 1953, and the amount
shown for Fiscal Year 1954 is the amount
which will be requested for the accel-
erated portion of the internal security
program for that year. The figures
represent only the acceleration of the
internal security program inasmuch as
the operational procedures of the FBI
are such as to make it virtually im-
possible to divide the internal security
portion of the work from the other work
and thereby arrive at an over-all lump
sum figure for the internal security
program.
INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY
FISCAL YEAR
FISCAL YEAR
1953
1954
Department of State
$ 5,014,234
$
5,014,234
Department of the
Treasury
23,800,000
23,800,000
Department of Defense
206,029,284
200,776,734
Department of Justice
23,543,559
23,543,559
Department of Commerce
926,074
926,575
General Services
Administration
670,000
645,000
Subversive Activities
Control Board
452,425
452,425
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FISCAL YEAR
FISCAL YEAR
1953
1954
Federal Communications
Commission
$
155,600
$
131,000
Federal Security Agency
(Public Health Service)
5,172,690
5,172,690
Industrial Security
Program
171,400,000
171,400,000
NOTE: Where possible a departmental breakdown
of estimates relating to internal security
has been obtained. In the case of the
industrial security program it has not
been possible at this time to estimate
the impact of industrial security measures
upon the affected departments and agencies.
It has been impossible to estimate possible
budgetary implications which may result
from the study of procedures and statutes
to assure uniform administration of
provisions relating to security risks in
the Executive Branch, or of the imposition
of minimum standards for the handling and
transmission of classified security data,
or for the program establishing minimum
standards for security clearance for
access to classified data. Many programs
in the Executive Branch relate indirectly
or incidentally to internal security al-
though primarily designed to achieve other
objectives and are thus not considered in
these cost estimates. Each department or
agency which maintains a security division
necessarily expends a certain amount which
contributes to the internal security; such
figures are also not represented inthese estimates.
C. An analysis of the extent to which the recommended
internal security program will meet the needs of national
security, including a statement of limiting factors.
The internal security program set forth herein will, if
implemented, contribute substantially to the attainment of the
objective outlined in A. above.
The basic limiting factors affecting the attainment of this
internal security program would include lack of funds and manpower, lack
of adequate foreign intelligence relating to internal security, and lack
of adequate legislation.
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Annox No. 7
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Tab A of Annex No. 7
TOP SECRET
September 1, 1951
THE INTERNAL SECURITY PROGRAM
(Prepared by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference)
A. A statement of the objectives and minimum tasks which the internal
security program is designed to fulfill.
The objective and minimum task of the internal security program is to
provide an internally secure United States, free from the over-all threat of
the Communist, or other subversive movement and more particularly free from
the dangers of espionage, sabotage, and other disruptive tactics generally
employed by such subversive movements and other enemies of our country.
B. Description of the nature, magnitude, and timing of the internal
security program designed to meet the above objectives and tasks.
As sabotage, espionage, and subversion within the United States can
cause the loss of American lives and the loss of battles anywhere in the
world, the internal security of the United States is an integral and vital
element of our security as a nation. Accordingly, the plans for our national
security must include plans for maintaining and increasing as needed the
domestic forces safeguarding our internal security.
The program for defending our internal security is a continuing one and
the necessity for intensification and acceleration will not be lessened by
any factors in the foresseable future. The program envisioned is predicated
on a continuation of the present international situation creating an emergency
situation domestically which will not be changed by a successful conclusion of
peace negotiations in Korea. The program is not timed or predicated on
possible general hostilities, but such would, of course, materially change
the activities designed to effect a secure United States internally. The
program outlined to meet the above-described objectives is as follows:
1. Elements comprising the program.
a. Bomestic intelligence and counterintelligence coverage - The
combatting of the Communist and related programs within the United States
necessitates extensive coverage of the activities of individuals and
organizations whose aims are to further the interests of Communism and
of Soviet Russia and its satellites. Eue to the underground-type opera-
tion presently used by the Communist Party in the United States and the
increased security measures, as well as greater precautions, taken by
the Soviet espionage organization, its diplomats, and other representa-
tives, the maintenance of this coverage 1s becoming increasingly diffi-
cult and requires the expenditure of additional manpower and effort.
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Annex No. 7
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In addition to the coverage maintained, established and contemplated on
actual Communist and Communist front organizations and other organizations
active on behalf of Soviet Russia, a program has been instituted for the
development of confidential plant informants for the purpose of insuring
prompt receipt of information pertaining to espionage, sabotage, or subversive
activities in certain types of facilities connected with the national defense
and economy. These informants have been developed in the following types of
facilities:
(1) Vital facilities designated by the Secretary of Defense
88 of great importance to the defense effort and which are operated
by civilians. Those plants have been designated which are absolutely
necessary to the conduct of a war even though not all presently
are engaged in defense work. All individuals listed in the
Security Index of the FBI who are employed in these facilities
?
have been identified, and all interested agencies have been
advised of the employment of these individuals in the various
facilities.
(11) Facilities holding classified contracts awarded by the
Army, Navy, Air Force and other Government agencies in connection
with the defense effort.
(111) Facilities designated by the Atomic Energy Commission.
These facilities are in three categories, according to priority
and importance. Class "A" facilities include such sites as Los
Alamos, New Mexico; Oak Ridge, Tennessee; and Hanford, Washington.
The most important are given close attention by the FBI. The
facilities labeled Class "B" and Class "C" are of lesser impor-
tance and although given lower priority ratings by the Atomic
Energy Commission, informants also are developed in these facili-
ties by the FBI.
(iv) The bases of the Strategic Air Command, at the specific
request of the Air Force, are given special consideration in con-
nection with this program. Confidential informants are being
developed by the FBI among civilian personnel residing off of these
bases, in order to insure prompt receipt of information relating
to possible riots and disturbances, as well as espionage, sabotage
and subversive activities in connection with them. This is in
addition to, and supplements the informant coverage normally
maintained by the Office of Special Investigations, Department of
the Air Force.
(v) Since August, 1950, American Legion national and depart-
mental officers and members throughout the country have been
contacted for the purpose of soliciting their assistance by fur-
nishing information pertaining to espionage, sabotage and sub-
versive activity, especially those members employed in vital in-
dustry and acquainted in foreign language groups.
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b. Investigations, prosecutions, and related programs - Prosecu-
tions based on the information obtained through investigations in the
internal security field have been vigorous and successful. The con-
viction in New York of the eleven Communist Party members for advocat-
ing the overthrow of the United States Government by force and violence
and for conspiracy to overthrow the government of the United States has
made possible the prosecution of other important Communist Party offi-
cials. Extended investigations have been necessary and will be neces-
sary in the future to prepare these cases for successful prosecution.
Investigations of an espionage character have already resulted in suc-
cessful prosecutions and exposure of Soviet espionage efforts. Notable
among these cases was the Dr. Emil Klaus Fuchs case, which revealed that
Fuchs, a British scientist, had given atomic secrets of this country to
Russia. As an outgrowth of this case, a number of other successful
prosecutions have resulted. Confidential information indicates, however,
$
that the Soviet Intelligence Services feel that counterespionage has im-
proved in the United States and consequently added security measures are
being taken by the Soviet Intelligence Services in their operations in
the United States. The Communist Party has, in large part, gone under-
ground principally due to these successful prosecutions. Investigations
have necessarily become more complex and further intensification of in-
vestigative efforts are necessary in view of the security measures in-
voked by the Communist Party and the Soviet Espionage Service.
A further prosecutive program has developed as an outgrowth of the
Loyalty of Government Employees Program, the extensive hearings conducted
by the various federal legislative committees, and the prosecution of the
Communist Party leaders. There are an increasing number of prosecutions for
such subsidiary violations as Fraud Against the Government, Perjury, and
Citations for Contempt. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Im-
migration and Naturalization Service are collaborating on cases involving
the deportation of subversive aliens and denaturalization and deportation
of naturalized citizens who fraudulently procured their citizenship by
denying their subversive affiliations. The registration provisions passed
with the Internal Security Act of 1950, and which in effect compel the
public registration of those who have knowledge of or have received instruc-
tion or assignment in espionage or sabotage for a foreign government should
also result in increased exposure and prosecutions.
Security indices listing persons considered dangerous to the national
defense and public safety have been established by member agencies of the
Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference. These indices are designed to
permit action in the event of war or other emergencies indicating the
necessity for such. The FBI security indices would make possible the ap-
prehension and detention of individuals considered dangerous. These indices
would also enable military agencies to detain, discharge, or transfer to
non-critical positions the persons considered dangerous within the Military
Establishment. Extensive, continuous, and vigorous investigations are
necessary to keep these indices in a current condition ready for instant
use. The problem of keeping tab on the whereabouts of these individuals has
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been tremendously enhanced by the Communist Party going underground and the
security measures which the Communist Party - USA has invoked to conceal its
operations.
The Loyalty of Government Employees Program and various personnel security
measures are designed to eliminate from governmental employment or to prevent
access to classified information of persons who are disloyal or are security
risks for other reasons. Extensive investigations are being performed in carry-
ing out the responsibilities of the member agencies of the Interdepartmental
Intelligence Conference in the field of loyalty and security of governmental
employees. Also, name checks of the indices of the investigative agencies in-
volve a tremendous volume of work. For instance, the Federal Bureau of Invest-
igation 1s presently making checks of its indices in connection with such mat-
ters at the rate of well over two million per year. Similarly, background in-
vestigations required in connection with employment in various phases of
1
national defense efforts require an expenditure of tremendous investigative
effort. The investigations required of the Federal Bureau of Investigation by
statute in connection with employment on the Atomic Energy Program are being
handled at the rate of over ninety thousand per year. A streamlined program is
being maintained within the military defense agencies for the acceleration of
the personnel security program, including standardization of investigative
and clearance procedures in order to assure protection from subversive infil-
tration.
C. The Coordination of Internal Security Matters - On March 23, 1949,
the National Security Council and the President approved NSC, 17/4 which
established the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS),
composed of representatives from the Departments of State, Treasury, and
Justice and the National Military Establishment under the National Secur-
ity Council. The same directive formally reconstituted under the National
Security Council the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC), com-
posed of the Directors of the Intelligence Division of the Army, Office
of Naval Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Office of
Special Investigations of the Air Force. This marks the first time that
the responsibility for the coordination for the entire and complex field
of internal security has been definitely fixed and as now operating these
two committees are jointly responsible for coordinating this complex field.
IIC 1s responsible for Coordination of all investigation of domestic espi-
onage, counterespionage, sabotage, subversion, and other related intelli-
gence matters affecting internal security. Coordination of all other
matters in the internal security field 1s the responsibility of ICIS.
In order to assure proper coordination between internal security and
domestic and foreign intelligence, a representative of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation was designated a member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee
on July 7, 1949, which is concerned principally with foreign intelligence.
Annexes to
Annex No. 7
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A further step in the coordination of internal security matters was
taken on March 21, 1950, on which date the Federal Bureau of Investigation
was made a member of the U. S. Communications Intelligence Board, thereby
assuring the coordination of internal security matters in the highly im-
portant field of communications intelligence.
d. Miscellaneous elements - An adequate internal security pro-
gram will necessitate action in addition to that already being taken
by the member agencies of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference.
A need for an increased internal security program will increase in
proportion to the increased intensification of the urgent emergency
situation prevailing under cold war conditions and under the steps
taken to accelerate other vital programs necessary to achieve United
States objectives. Among the important elements affecting the in-
ternal security program which require action outside the Interdepart-
mental Intelligence Conference are those which follow:
(1) An adequate legal basis for insuring the nation's
internal security should be provided through both statutory
and regulatory means.
(i1) The internal security of the nation is, at least in
large part, dependent upon the amount of manpower available to
the agencies charged with the responsibility for internal security.
(111) The acceleration of the development and distribution
of foreign intelligence as it relates to the internal security of
the United States is of vital importance to an adequate internal
security program. The Communist conspiracy is directed from
abroad and the best sources concerning its plans are outside the
United States. Experiences during World War II demonstrated that
saboteurs and espionage agents were sent to this country and the
Internal Security Agencies had no advance notice. Only through
an adequate foreign coverage will the Internal Security Agencies
be able to discharge their responsibilities to the maximum degree.
2. Assumptions and policies upon which the program is based.
The Communist forces exist in substantial numbers in the United States
and are actively promoting the aims and objectives of Soviet Russia to the
detriment of our internal security. They have available not only the members
of the Communist Party, but also a substantial force composed of the members
of front organizations, sympathizers, and followers of the Communist Party
line. They have trained espionage and sabotage forces already existing for
future potential use, and have penetrated vital industry.
The International Communist movement through the journal of the Communist
Information Bureau proclaims the world is divided into two irreconcilable
camps; one led by the U.S.S.R. as the Communist fatherland, the other led by
the United States as a bulwark of "imperialistic capitalism." World Communism
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is organized to subvert all non-Communist social orders and the powers of
its apparatus - both open and secret - are directed to that end. The United
States long has been considered the principal stronghold of Democracy to be
overthrown before world domination by Communism can be achieved. William
Z. Foster, National Chairman, and Eugene Dennis, General Secretary of the
Communist Party - USA, as early as March 2, 1949, declared that in the
event of war between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Communist
Party would take immediate steps to bring such a war to a speedy conclusion.
The major threat today to the internal security of the United States is that
of sabotage, espionage, and subversion by the Communist Apparatus in this
country. Every loyal Communist Party member and sympathizer in the United
States is a potential saboteur. This potential sabotage force is spear-
headed by graduates of the Lenin School in Moscow, Veterans of the Abraham
Lincoln Brigade, which fought in Spain, Communist veterans of World Wars I
and II and other individuals who have received guerrilla or other specialized
training.
Communist subversive elements have penetrated the United States indus-
tries, key targets being such basic industries as electrical, steel, fuel,
chemical, transport, maritime, automotive, aviation, and communications.
There are an estimated 37,000 registered Communist Party members in the
United States at the present time. Also there are an estimated 1,000 mem-
bers of the Socialist Workers Party and the Independent Socialist League,
Trotskyite splinter groups. The strength of the movement cannot be judged
by actual membership, however, as a few Communists can dominate and direct
a Moscow-inspired Communist "front" organization, thus utilizing a large
number of people to further Communist aims. Hundreds of mass and "paper-
type front" organizations have been utilized by the Communist Party of the
United States in an effort to influence its foreign and domestic policies,
weaken its military capabilities and undermine its economy. Large numbers
of deceived citizens have joined these "fronts" and their energy has been
used to subvert their own government. In addition, for every Communist
member there are a number of sympathizers who are not Party members but who
can be depended upon to further Communist aims.
Membership in Communist "front" organizations ranges from 162,000 in
the International Workers Order to no actual membership at all in the
"paper-type" organizations which consist solely of a few executive officers
and serve as propaganda outléts, leading campaigns in matters of interest
to the Communist Party.
The Communist Party - USA and its numerous "front" organizations today
turn out mass propaganda in books, pamphlets, magazines, newspapers, bulletins,
fliers, plays, motion pictures, radio and television programs and formal
school courses, as well as organize mass rallies and make public speeches.
For example, the New Century Publishers, a Communist publishing house, claims
to have published in 1948, thirty pamphlets in editions totalling more than
three million pieces of which two million were distributed free.
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Annex No. 7
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It has been reliably reported that the Soviet Intelligence Services
are considering expanding and reorganizing their operations in the United
States. This would appear to be based partly on the fact that recent
prosecutions have disrupted operating networks. It may also be based on
the Soviet plans for operations in the event of hostilities. It is estimated
that the soviets have plans on an expanding scale to utilize "illegal net-
works" in conjunction with their operations at the present through Soviet and
satellite diplomatic establishments.
Because of the recent Supreme Court decision upholding the conviction of
the eleven national Communist Party leaders, the enactment of the Internal
Security Act of 1950, and the arrests of Communist Party leaders in New York,
=
Maryland, California, Hawaii and Pennsylvania for violation of the Smith Act,
a large number of Party members have gone underground and the Party has taken
stringent security measures, such as destroying records, meeting only in
2
small groups, if at all, and ceasing open activities. In addition, the Party
has ceased recruiting almost entirely and has screened its membership for
"loyalty."
As a result of the above, the investigation of Communist activities has
been made increasingly difficult, as has the development of confidential in-
formants within the Communist Party to take the place of those uncovered in
the Communist trials and those detected by the Party.
Due to the loss of confidential informants as a result of the trials
previously mentioned, because the Party has ceased recruiting, and because
of the urgent necessity for greatly increasing the number of informants
within the Party due to its underground status and its increased security
measures, greatly increased manpower must be assigned to the development
of new informants and the supervision of those in operation.
3. Estimated costs of the program.
For the Department of the Army (G-2)
Fiscal Year 1953 - $31,339,166.99
Fiscal Year 1954 - $31,407,590.05
This estimated cost includes:
a. All administrative costs in connection with security pro-
gram throughout Zone of Interior Armies to include posts, camps
and stations.
b. Pay and allowances to support a Counter Intelligence
Corps of 2946 spaces for 1953 and 3093 spaces for 1954.
C. Permanent Change of Station travel.
d. Operational expenses.
Annexes to
Annex No. 7
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e. Logistical support.
NOTE: An additional amount of $56,811,138.00 will be required
for the National Censorship Program if, and when, direc-
tives are issued to implement that program.
For the Department of the Navy (ONI)
Fiscal Year 1953 - $10,314,800.00
Fiscal Year 1954 - $10,314,800.00
This estimated cost includes the estimated salaries of officer,
enlisted, professional and clerical personnel working full time on
counterintelligence projects, training costs, costs of equipment,
communications and travel.
For the Department of the Air Force (OSI)
Fiscal Year 1953 - $20,558,271.00
Fiscal Year 1954 - $20,126,180.00
This estimated cost includes pay and allowances, travel, movement
of household goods, operational expenses and equipment.
These estimated figures for G-2, ONI and OSI include only those ex-
penditures necessary for the operation of the program within the United
States.
For the Federal Bureau of Investigation
Fiscal Year 1953 - $21,956,774.00
Fiscal Year 1954 - $22,493,243.00
These estimated figures contemplate the continuance of the Bureau's
present accelerated internal security program and do not include any
costs of new programs incidental to national defense that may arise.
The amount shown for Fiscal Year 1953 18 presently in the FBI budget
for 1953, and the amount shown for Fiscal Year 1954 is the amount which
will be requested for the accelerated portion of the internal security
program for that year. The figures represent only the acceleration
of the internal security program inasmuch as the operational procedures
of the FBI are such as to make it virtually impossible to divide the
internal security portion of the work from the other work and thereby
arrive at an over-all lump sum figure for the internal security program.
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C. An analysis of the extent to which the recommended internal security
program meets the needs of national security, including a statement
of any factors which may have limited the recommended program.
The elements of the program outlined will at its maximum peak of ef-
fectiveness meet the needs of national security. There are, however, as
noted in the program, certain factors outside the control of the IIC, such
as adequate legislation, foreign intelligence and supply of manpower, which
will affect reaching maximum effectiveness.
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September 10, 1951
THE INTERNAL SECURITY PROGRAM
(Prepared by the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security)
A. Objectives and Minimum Tasks of the Internal Security Program.
1. The objectives of the internal security program are to neutralize
the threat to the internal security of the United States which is presented:
(1) through the existence of a Communist Party completely subservient to and
dominated by the USSR and of that segment of our population which, although
not deliberately subversive, contributes to the effectiveness of the
Communist program as a result of exploitation of Communist doctrines and
ideologies; (2) through the action within the United States of other agents
of the Soviet Union and Soviet Bloc nations who, working either independently
of or in conjunction with the Communists, can be expected to use every means
of sabotage, espionage and subversion either of a direct or indirect nature,
including unconventional methods of attack; and (3) through the actions of
other totalitarian groups which seek to overthrow democratic processes and
institutions.
2. The minimum tasks which the internal security program is designed to
fulfill are to furnish the means by which the activities of agents of the
Soviet Union and Soviet Bloc nations, including the Communist Party and its
subservient elements, can be neutralized and to furnish the means by which
the United States can counter or reduce the damage which these Soviet
agents can cause through subversive operations, sabotage and civil disturbances
B. The Nature, Magnitude and Timing of the Internal Security Program to
Meet these Objectives and Tasks.
1, Elements Comprising the Program.
a. The prosecution and detention of persons guilty of violations
of laws against treason, espionage, sabotage, subversion and subversive
activities in general.
b. The establishment of minimum standards for security clearance
for access to classified data of personnel in the executive departments
and agencies of the Federal Government.
C. The study of procedures and standards to assure uniform admin-
istration of provisions relating to persons under question as security
risks.
d. Protection of critical governmental, industrial, and other
installations and facilities, including telecommunications, airports,
ports and harbors; security clearance of management and employees of
private industry engaged in defense production.
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e. Measures designed to afford preventive security against uncon-
ventional attack including atomic, chemical, biological and radiological.
f. Measures to implement appropriate action with respect to foreign
official and diplomatic personnel in the event of conditions so requir-
ing.
g. More effective controls to prevent the entry or departure from
the United States of persons potentially dangerous to the internal
security; more effective controls over the importation and exportation of
materials, the entry or exit of which would endanger the national security
h. Procedures designed to protect classified government informa-
tion and for determining the eligibility of representatives of foreign
governments to receive United States classified data.
1. Procedures for the voluntary restriction of the dissemination
within the United States of unclassified technological information,
the release of which may endanger the national security, and for
adequate screening prior to publication of unclassified government
information, including statistics of possible strategic intelligence
value in government publications; and planning for censorship in the
event of war.
J. Evaluating the responsibilities of various departments and
agencies for specific internal security measures; coordinating, planning
and reviewing progress thereunder and resolving differences between such
agencies in the interest of preventing duplication of effort and lack
of coverage.
k. Coordinating the provisions of projected emergency legislation
and regulations pertaining to internal security matters.
2. Assumptions and Policies Upon Which the Internal Security Program
is Based.
a. A nationally secure United States presupposses an internally
secure United States.
b. The subversive forces of Communism and other agents of the
Soviet Union and Soviet Bloc nations constitute. the major threat to
the internal security.
C. The continuing aggravated world situation indicates that the
acute threat of Soviet aggression may reach its maximum peak as early
as 1953.
d. The internal security program contemplates a condition of
immediate danger short of a declared war.
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3. Estimate of the Cost of the Programs for Fiscal Year 1953 and
Fiscal Year 1954.
The Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security and the Inter-
departmental Intelligence Conference are the two coordinating committees
of the National Security Council in the field of internal security. Through
this NSC mechanism the activities of the agencies responsible for carrying
out internal security measures have been coordinated in an effort to effect
a state of internal security adequate to meet the danger of Soviet aggression.
The ICIS and the IIC operate with the support of existing agencies and do
not have independent appropriations. The cost estimates presented herein
are, therefore, the estimates for the departments and agencies of the
Federal Government or their appropriate subdivisions operating in the field
of internal security.
The cost estimates presented herein are, wherever, possible, represented
departmentally. In the case of certain programs, however, a departmental
breakdown at the present time is not possible and, accordingly, the esti-
mates appear programwise. In certain other instances the impact of added
internal security measures upon the budgete of the various departments
and agencies cannot be estimated with sufficient precision to warrant their
inclusion herein. It must be pointed out further that several programs
in the executive branch of the Federal Government, while not primarily
directed toward strengthening the internal security of the Nation, have an
incidental effect thereon. Other programs, while relating to the national
security, do thereby strengthen the internal security. The Department of
State advises, for example, that 1t cannot at this time estimate the ad-
ditional budgetary requirements of the Passport and Visa Divisions, the
objectives of which include the national security but which are also taking
certain measures directly related to the internal security.
Furthermore, each department and agency which maintains a security
division necessarily expends a certain amount which contributes to the
internal security. Such figures are not represented in these estimates.
a. The prosecution and detention of subversives. The responsi-
bility for the enforcement of the laws against treason, espionage,
sabotage, sedition, and, in general, all laws relating to subversive
activities, the criminal provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, the
Neutrality Act, the Selective Service Act, and the registration pro-
visions of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, the Emer-
gency Detention Act, and the Foreign Agents Registration Act, 1e
lodged in the Internal Security Seation of the Criminal Division of
the Department of Justice. The program for the detention of subver-
sives in accordance with the Emergency Detention Act is also a
responsibility of the Bureau of Prisons of the Department of Justice.
The Subversive Activities Control Board was created by the Internal
Security Act of 1950 to hear and rule on petitions of the Attorney
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General for the registration of Communist organizations. The cost
estimates of these three agencies are:
FY 1953
FY 1954
Department of Justice
Internal Security Section
$996,559.20
$996,559.20
Bureau of Prisons
$510,000.00
$510,000.00
Subversive Activities Control
Board
$452,425.00
$452,425.00
b. Protection of critical installations and facilities. This
element of the internal security program is subdivided into many
component parts.
(1) Protection of governmental installations and facilities.
In this category are the expenditures of the General Services
Administration which proposes to expend certain additional sums
in fiscal years 1953 and 1954 directly related to the internal
security in addition to its regular expenditures for the protec-
tion of governmental installations and facilities:
FY 1953
FY 1954
General Services Administration
$670,000
$645,000
The Department of Defense in protecting its posts, camps, and
stations, proposes the following as the internal security ele-
ment of its protective programs
FY 1953
FY 1954
Department of Defense
$206,029,284
$200,776,734
(2) Industrual security. Consequent upon detailed study
by ICIS there were established by action of the National Security
Council and direction of the President the Industry Evaluation
Board and the Facilities Protection Board on January 6, 1951, and
May 4, 1951, respectively. The former is responsible to the
Secretary of Commerce and the latter, though situated in and
administered by the Department of Commerce, is responsible to
the ICIS. The Industry Evaluation Board, an interdepartmental
group, is undertaking the screening of industry and the support-
ing economic resources in order to identify those elements vital
to defense and 1s responsible for selecting the critical points,
rating each as to its relative importance to the other, communi-
cating such determinations to the agencies concerned, reviewing
such determinations periodically, and, for the purpose of security
guidance or supervision, assigning each such critical facility to
the Federal agency having paramount interest. The Facilities
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Protection Board 1s charged with developing or giving central
direction to the establishment of definitions, policies, criteria,
and maximum and minimum standards for protective programs of
facilities rated by the Industry Evaluation Board and, in like
manner, to develop or give central direction to the establishment
of protective programs for those segments of essential industry
not rated by the Industry Evaluation Board; the Facilities Pro-
tection Board is also charged with evaluating vital protective
programs now in existence or to be developed, for the purpose
of determining their adequacy and the elimination of inconsis-
tencies, duplications, and non-essential features.
The estimate of the Federal cost of the industrial security
program as prepared by these two boards and designed to protect
American industry against internal security hazards is limited to
those industrial facilities rated or to be rated by the Industry
Evaluation Board and does not include the hidden or indirect costs
of industrial security measures undertaken in facilities not SO
rated but which may call for internal security measures to meet
with the requirements of contractual agreements. It is estimated
that the Industry Evaluation Board will rate approximately 5,000
manufacturing and 4,000 non-manufacturing facilities. The Industry
Evaluation and the Facilities Protection Boards estimate that the
cost to the Federal Government of the industrial security program
for fiscal years 1953 and 1954 will be $171,400,000.
(3) Security of ports and harbors. Pursuant to Public Law
679, 81st Congress, and Executive Order 10173 of October 18, 1950,
the Coast Guard is engaged in a limited program to safeguard vessels,
harbors, ports, and waterfront facilities against destruction, loss,
or injury from sabotage or other subversive acts, accidents, or
other causes of similar nature. The cost estimates for Coast Guard
administration of the program for fiscal years 1953 and 1954 is:
FY 1953
FY 1954
Department of the Treasury
Coast Guard
$ 23,500,000
$ 23,500,000
This figure assumes implementation of a port security study now
before the National Security Council and presupposes certain
acquisitions which it is expected will be made in fiscal year 1952.
Should these acquisitions not be made until fiscal year 1953 the
estimate for that year might be increased to $35,100,000.
(4) Security of airports. In accordance with the Act of Congrest
of September 9, 1950, (49. USC 701ff), the President has been given
the authority in the interest of national security to direct the
Secretary of Commerce to establish zones or areas in the air spaces
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Protection Board 1s charged with developing or giving central
direction to the establishment of definitions, policies, criteria,
and maximum and minimum standards for protective programs of
facilities rated by the Industry Evaluation Board and, in like
manner, to develop or give central direction to the establishment
of protective programs for those segments of essential industry
not rated by the Industry Evaluation Board; the Facilities Pro-
tection Board is also charged with evaluating vital protective
programs now in existence or to be developed, for the purpose
of determining their adequacy and the elimination of inconsis-
tencies, duplications, and non-essential features.
The estimate of the Federal cost of the industrial security
program as prepared by these two boards and designed to protect
American industry against internal security hazards is limited to
those industrial facilities rated or to be rated by the Industry
Evaluation Board and does not include the hidden or indirect costs
of industrial security measures undertaken in facilities not SO
rated but which may call for internal security measures to meet
with the requirements of contractual agreements. It is estimated
that the Industry Evaluation Board will rate approximately 5,000
manufacturing and 4,000 non-manufacturing facilities. The Industry
Evaluation and the Facilities Protection Boards estimate that the
cost to the Federal Government of the industrial security program
for fiscal years 1953 and 1954 will be $171,400,000.
(3) Security of ports and harbors. Pursuant to Public Law
679, 81st Congress, and Executive Order 10173 of October 18, 1950,
the Coast Guard is engaged in a limited program to safeguard vessels,
harbors, ports, and waterfront facilities against destruction, loss,
or injury from sabotage or other subversive acts, accidents, or
other causes of similar nature. The cost estimates for Coast Guard
administration of the program for fiscal years 1953 and 1954 1s:
FY 1953
FY 1954
Department of the Treasury
Coast Guard
$ 23,500,000
$ 23,500,000
This figure assumes implementation of a port security study now
before the National Security Council and presupposes certain
acquisitions which it is expected will be made in fiscal year 1952.
Should these acquisitions not be made until fiscal year 1953 the
estimate for that year might be increased to $35,100,000.
(4) Security of airports. In accordance with the Act of Congress
of September 9, 1950, (49. USC 70lff), the President has been given
the authority in the interest of national security to direct the
Secretary of Commerce to establish zones or areas in the air spaces
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above the United States and to promulgate rules and regulations
restricting the flights of aircraft in certain circumstances in
the interest of national security. For the administration of
its airport security program the Department of Commerce estimates
that in fiscal years 1953 and 1954 it will seek $907,600.
(5) Telecommunications security. The Federal Communications
Commission will request in its 1953 budget the addition of personnel
for the purpose of its Field Engineering and Monitoring Division
in the interest of internal security and, more specifically, to
provide for improved coverage for the immediate apprehension of
clandestine stations engaged in subversive activities. In order
to effect this monitoring service an increased fund will be
requested for the modernization of direction finders and other
equipment used in monitoring stations. The modernization program
will occur chiefly in fiscal year 1953, thus accounting for the
decrease of the FCC request in fiscal year 1954.
FY 1953
e FY 1954
Federal Communications
Commission
$155,600
$131,000
C. Procedures for adequate screening of technical data and for the
voluntary restriction of the dissemination of technological information.
In pursuing a policy of denying to Communist countries, as far as pos-
sible, any technical data that would be useful to them for war production
or indirectly increase their military potential by contributing to the
more efficient operation of any important industry, the United States has
been mindful of the importance of insuring the exchange of information
among free nations to serve the needs of scientific and industrial progress
and of mutual defense. Consistent with this policy a program has been
established whereby industry and the public may obtain advisory opinions
from the Department of Commerce as to the desirability of publishing un-
classified information and as to the distribution such information should
be given, thus assisting publishers, editors and the public to guard vol-
untarily against the harmful publication or disclosure of technical in-
formation even though such data are not subject to formal security restric-
ions. The following are the cost estimates for the administration of
this program:
FY 1953
FY 1954
Department of Commerce
Office of Technical Service
$18,474
$18,975
A statistical control program has been established under the Bureau of
the Budget to review governmental statistical information and avoid pub-
lication of strategic statistical data when such action is deemed to be in
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the national interest. This program is carried on by an interdepartmen-:
tal advisory group, the Committee on Statistical Security, under the
chairmanship of the Bureau of the Budget. By authority of the Export
Control Act of 1949 the Secretary of Commerce has jurisdiction over all
exports from the United States, including industrial and other technolog-
ical information. Pursuant to this authority a general license for the
export of unclassified technical data does not affect the existing pro-
hibition of the export to the Soviet Bloc of technical data not generally
available to the public. The ICIS is at the present time conducting a
detailed study of this matter.
d. In carrying out all of its functions relating to internal secur-
ity, including the Visa and Passport Divisions, and the Foreign Service,
the Department of State estimates that its costs chargeable to internal
security for fiscal year 1953 and fiscal year 1954 will be $5,014,234.
0. Procedures and statutes to assure uniform administration of pro-
visions relating to security risks. Pursuant to the directions of the
National Security Council in accordance with the request of the President
of July 14, 1951, there was established an Ad Hoc Group in the ICIS to
investigate the administration of the provisions of existing law which
authorizes the heads of the various departments and agencies to discharge
government employees or to refuse government employment to applicants on
the ground that they are poor security risks and to recommend changes in
the program which, as a result of its investigation, the Group believes to
be required. Although the Group is meeting regularly and conducting ex-
tensive investigation into the problem, it is impossible for it to fore-
cast its recommendations at this time and, therefore, impossible to esti-
mate the possible budgetary implications of any recommendations which it
may make.
f. Procedures to protect classified government information. An
Executive Order promulgating regulations establishing minimum standards
for the classifying, handling and transmission of official information
relating to the security of the nation was prepared by ICIS and has been
approved by the National Security Council and on July 12, 1951, by the
President at whose direction it was transmitted to the Bureau of the
Budget for issuance. The promulgation of this Executive Order will neces-
sarily require increased expenditures by those agencies whose present
security regulations do not fulfill the minimum requirements set forth in
the Executive Order. It has been impossible to estimate the number of
agencies BO affected or the increased costs which may be attributed by
those agencies as incident to the requirements of the Executive Order.
A draft of the proposed set of regulations establishing, and procedures
for determining, eligibility of certain representatives of foreign govern-
ments to receive U.S. classified data within the United States has been
recommended by the ICIS and is under consideration by the National Securit
Council. The timing of the promulgation of these regulations is predi-
cated upon negotiations currently in progress looking toward the adoption
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of somewhat similar regulations in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
so as not to prejudice their consummation. It can be anticipated that
these regulations will be in effect by fiscal year 1953 but it is impos-
sible to estimate the possible implications of these regulations upon the
cost estimates of such departments and agencies as may be affected by it.
The total budgetary implications of the adoption of regulations
establishing minimum standards for the handling and transmission of classi
fied government data and for establishing eligibility of representatives
of foreign governments to receive classified data will in any event un-
doubtedly be relatively negligible items in the budgets of the departments
and agencies affected.
8. Minimum standards for security clearance for access to classi-
fied data. The draft Executive Order promulgating regulations to estab-
lish minimum standards for security clearance of personnel in the executiv
departments and agencies for access to classified security information
has been approved by the National Security Council and by the President
on July 12, 1951, and at the President's direction was transmitted to the
Bureau of the Budget for issuance. The budgetary implications of this
program will vary from department to department depending upon the stand-
ards now in effect for security clearance for access to classified data.
Any estimate of the effect of this program in all of the executive depart-
ments and agencies cannot be made at this time with any reliability.
h. Measures controlling the entry and exit of persons and materials.
Increased security measures have been taken in this field consequent upon
studies made by ICIS. These measures include sponsoring of legislation to
prevent illegal entry of aliens; to control the discharge of alien seamen
in U.S. ports and to extend the statute of limitations relating to pass-
port frauds; the abolition of crew list visas; reexamination of the pro-
posed boundaries of the Headquarters Site Agreement with the United Nation
Organization; revision of Regulations governing the control of persons
entering and leaving the United States in wartime; and the establishing
of a system whereby government agencies will furnish the Passport Division
of the State Department information appropriate to its activities. The
normal functions of the Passport and Visa Divisions of the Department of
State, of the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of
Justice, and of the Bureau of Customs of the Department of the Treasury,
contribute, of course, to the national security.
The Department of State advises that it cannot at this time allocate
any portion of its estimated internal security figure directly to internal
security programs of the Passport and Visa Divisions.
The Treasury Department has estimated that in fiscal year 1953 and
1954 it will request approximately $300,000 for each year for activities
related directly to internal security in the Bureau of Customs.
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In accordance with ICIS recommendations the number of patrol in-
spectors of the Immigration and Naturalization Service has been augmented
along the principal seaports to guard against the landing of stowaways
and crew members denied shore leave and along the land borders and gulf
coasts to prevent illegal entry of aliens. In addition, the Immigration
and Naturalization Service has had additional internal security responsi-
bilities assigned to it by the Internal Security Act of 1950 and in
accordance therewith has requested a supplemental appropriation of five
million dollars. The Immigration and Naturalization Service has estimated
that of its total budget the portion which can be said to bear upon
internal security can be broken down as follows:
FY 1953
FY 1954
*Border patrol
$ 6,589,000
$ 6,589,000
*Immigration inspection
10,127,000
10,127,000
*Investigation and
Deportation of Subversives
321,000
321,000
Internal Security Act of 1950
5,000,000
5,000,000
Total
22,037,000
22,037,000
1. Preventive security against unconventional attack. The ICIS,
through its Subcommittee on Defense Against Unconventional Attack, has
stimulated the study of areas of vulnerability and appropriate counter-
measures against other than military introduction of atomic, biological
and chemical media as well as sabotage. Studies have been completed
or are in varying stages of development by appropriate agencies of the
government which have led or are to continue to lead to appropriate
counter-measures being taken or planned for implementation as needed.
Most of the cost estimates in this field of activity are reflected in
budget estimates of the various departments and agencies concerned.
Thus, for example, planning being done in the Department of Defense in
relation to the introduction of atomic, biological, and chemical media
is reflected in the military program although it bears upon internal
security and civil defense, Similarly, studies are being conducted under
the sponsorship of the General Services Administration to effectuate a
system for the physical security and protection of government buildings,
records, and personnel against unconventional attack. The Federal Com-
munications Commission is leading a study in the field of telecommunica*
tions, including the effect of the dissemination of false information,
the transmission of coded or hidden information, and the like. The
Department of Agriculture is conducting studies affecting the impairment
of the Nation's food supplies or of fires in forest and range lands which
might result from sabotage or the introduction of unconventional attack
media. The Department of Agriculture advises that it 18 impossible to
* These estimates, of course, are only a portion of the total budget requests
in each of these three categories.
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estimate the portions of its budgetary requests in the Bureau of Animal
Industry, the Bureau of Plant Industry, Soils, and Agricultural Engi-
neering, the Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine, the Forest
Service, and the Production and Marketing Administration, which can be
allocated with any reliability to the internal security aspects of its
program although estimates of additional amounts required to provide
for internal security aspects have been made but cannot be submitted
because of budgetary ceilings.
The Public Health Service of the Federal Security Agency is studying
the unconventional attack phases of the introduction and dissemination
of human diseases; introduction of contaminants into bilolgics, vaccines,
plasma, etc.; the destruction of vaccine and biological manufacturing
installations and supplies; impairment and contamination of water supply;
and methods of detecting biological agents and research on protective
measures against attacks through the means of biological agents. In an
effort to allocate its estimates for 1953 to matters primarily devoted to
internal security, the Public Health Service estimates that it will seek
budget allocations in the amount of $5,172,690.
1. Recapitulation:
FY 1953
FY 1954
Department of State
$ 5,014,234
$ 5,014,234
Department of the Treasury
23,800,000
23,800,000
Department of Defense
206,029,284
200,776,734
Department of Justice
23,543,559
23,543,559
Department of Commerce
926,074
926,575
General Services
Administration
670,000
645,000
Subversive Activities Control
Board
452,425
452,425
Federal Communications
Commission
155,600
131,000
Federal Security Agency
(Public Health Service)
5,172,690
5,172,690
Industrial Security Program
171,400,000
171,400,000
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C.
Analysis of the Extent to Which the Recommended Internal Security Program
meets with the Needs of National Security, Including a Statement of
Limiting Factors.
1. The internal security program set forth herein will, if implemented,
contribute substantially toward achieving its objectives of neutralizing the
threat to the internal security presented through the Communist movement with-
in the United States and the activities of agents of Soviet Bloc nations and
of agents of other totalitarian groups against the security of the Nation by
accomplishing the following:
a. Neutralizing the activities of subversive groups and individuals
through their prosecution and the detention of persons found guilty of
violating Federal statutes relating to subversive activities.
b. Increasing the protection afforded to the government with re-
spect to personnel, records, and installations.
C. Affording greater protection to the Nation's strategic, indus-
trial plants, airports and harbors, and related fields against sabotage,
espionage, and other subversive missions.
d. Controlling the entry into and departure from the United States
of persons in order to prevent subversive agents from executing esplonage
and sabotage missions.
e. Minimizing the possibility of clandestine introduction of uncon-
ventional attack media and the exportation of strategic materials and in-
formation.
f. Generally impeding the individual and collective will of sub-
versive agents to act to the detriment of national security by increasing
the physical hazards and the legal obstacles and penalties incident to the
commission of such acts.
2. The basic limiting factor affecting the attainment of these objectives
tasks. is the availability of funds and manpower necessary to implement the minimum
Annexes to
Annex No. 7
NSC 114/2
- 25 -
TOP SECRET
No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5

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    "ocrText": "NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE\nWITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)\nFORM OF\nCORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE\nDATE\nRESTRICTION\nDOCUMENT\nReport\nTo the N.S.C. re U.S. Programs for National Security\n(NSC 174/3) DECLASSIFIED 4-17-79\n6-5-52\nA\nMemo\nFor the N.S.C. from James S. Lay, Jr. re the DECLARIFIED 10-23-11\nNational Security\n9-25-51\nA\nReport\nTo the N.S.C. re U.S. Programs for National Security\n(NSC 114/2) DECLASSIFIED 4-17-79\n10-12-51\nA\nREPORT\nReport\nTo the N.S.C. (Annexes to NSC 114/2) PROXECT NLT 79-23\nTO THE NSC (ANNEYES TO NSC 114/2 SANITIZED\n10-12-51\nA\nMomo\nFor the N.S.C. from S. Everett Gleason re NSC 114\n(attached is C.I.A. Report SE 13 re Probable\nDECLASTIFIED 10.23.fl\nDeve Lopments in the World Situation Through Mid 1953\n10-12-51\nA\nAgenda\nFor the N.S.C. Meeting 10 17-51 DECLARTIFIED 3-14-A3 10-12-51\nA\nMemo\nFor the N.S.C. from S. Everett Gleason ro U.S. DECLANIFIED 3-31-41\nPrograms for National Security (attachments)\n10 15-51 15\nA\nAgenda\nFor the N.S.C. Meeting 10-17-51 DECLARIFIED\n10-15-51 15 51\nA\n3.14-43\nReport\nN.S.C. Status of Projects as of 10-15-51 DECLASIIP 50, 6/11\nA\nMomo\nFor the N.S.C. from James S. Lay, Jr. no NSC 114/2\n10-16-51\n$\nDECLANIFIED\n3-31-AM\nMomo\nor \"If is S sawe WO JJ 0.0 at OF\nOBCLASSIFIED\n7-24-20\nImplications of the Security Program (attachments)\n10-16-51\nA\nMemo\nFor the N.S.C. no NSC 114/2\n10-16-51\nDECLANSIBIED\n3-31-81\nMinutes\nor the N.O.C. Meeting 10-17 17 51 DECLAMIRIED 3.14.13\nA\nMomo\nFor the N.S.C. from James S. Kay, Jr. re NSC 114/2\n10-18-51\nA\nMemo\nFor the President from James S. Lay, Jr. re NSC 114/2\n10-18-51\nMemo\nFor the N.S.C. from James S. lay, Jr. re NSC 114/2\n10-18-51 51\n-DECLASTIFIED\nMemo\nFor the N.S.C. from James S. lay, Jr. ro NSC 174/2\n10-22-51\n3-31-61\nA\nMomo\nFor the N.S.C. from James S. lay, Jr. re NSC 114/2\n10 25-51\nA\nFILE LOCATION\nTRUMAN PAPERS - P.S.F. - SUBJECT FILE\nN.S.C. - MEETINGS\nFOLDER: MEETING NO. 105 10-17-51\n[Bey 215]\nRESTRICTION CODES\n(A) Closed by Executive Order 11652 governing access to national security information.\n(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.\n(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.\nGENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION\nGSA FORM 7122 (7.72)\nGSA DC 73.495\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nThe President NCT(PSF/NSC)\nANNEXES TO\nTOP SECRET\nNSG 114/2\nCOPY NO. 1\nState Dept. review completed\nA REPORT\nTO THE\nNATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL\nby\nTHE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY\non\nUNITED STATES PROGRAMS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY\nOctober 12, 1951\nWASHINGTON\nDECLASSIFIED\nTOP SECRET\nE.O. 13526\nAuthority NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNANA CS lime 2/29/24\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nWARNING\nTHIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NA-\nTIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF\nTHE ESPIONAGE ACT, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. ITS\nTRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MAN-\nNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\nTABLE OF CONTENTS\nANNEXES TO NSC 114/2\nUNITED STATES PROGRAMS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY\nANNEX NO. 1 - THE MILITARY PROGRAM\n(Prepared by the Department of Dofense)\nANNEX NO. 2 - FOREIGN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM\n(Prepared by the Committee on International\nSecurity Affairs.)\nANNEX NO. 3 - THE FEDERAL CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM\n(Prepared by the Federal Civil Defense Administration)\nANNEX NO. 4 - THE STOCKPILING PROGRAM\n(Prepared by the Department of Defense and the Office\nof Defense Mobilization)\nANNEX NO. 5 - THE INFORMATION PROGRAM\n(Prepared by the Department of State)\nANNEX NO. 6 - FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES\n(Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency with the\nconcurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Committee)\nANNEX NO. 7 - INTERNAL SECURITY\n(Prepared by the Interdepartmental Intelligence\nConference and the Interdepartmental Committee on\nInternal Security)\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\nANNEX NO. 1. THE MILITARY PROGRAM\n(Prepared by the Department of Defense)\nThe military annex is identical with the summary thereof\n:\ncontained in Part II of NSC 114/2.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 1\nNSC 1:4/2\n1. -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\nAnnex No. 2\nFOREIGN ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM\n(Prepared by the Committee on International Security Affairs)\nI. European NAT members and Germany.\nA. Objectives and minimum tasks which the program is designed to fulfill.\nThe basic U.S. objective in Europe which the aid program is designed\nto aid in fulfilling is the creation by the NATO members of a level of de-\nfensive strength which will deter Soviet aggression.\nAt present the level of defensive strength necessary to deter Soviet\naggression is defined from a military point of view in the Medium Term\nDefense Plan. This statement of military requirements sets forth those\nground, naval and air forces which should be in the required state of readi-\nness by July 1, 1954 and 1s an aggregate defense force requirement for the\ntwelve NATO countries.\nThe purpose of the U.S. aid program 1s to provide such additional\nresources, in military or economic form, as are required in order to make\npossible attainment by the European NAT members and Germany of their share\nof the objective set forth above, assuming a maximum feasible contribution\nby them and by Canada, and the contribution by the U.S. of the forces which\nit has committed itself to furnish.\nB. Nature, magnitude and timing of the program.\n1. Elements comprising the program.\nIn providing additional resources to the NATO countries, it is\nenvisaged that a variety of methods may be utilized. Thus a. major por-\ntion of the resources to be provided will be in the form of military equip-\nment produced in the U.S. Another method to be used will be the direct\nfinancing of general imports from the dollar area. A third method will be\nthe payment in dollars for military equipment produced in European countries\nand turned over to those countries or to other European countries for their\nuse. It is important to appreciate that although the program is to be exe-\ncuted through the provision of what has generally been termed \"military aid\"\nand \"economic aid\" these are but different techniques for providing resources.\nThe choice of techniques and the proportionato ase of one as against the\nother will vary by country. Decisions will be made on the basis of com-\nparative effectiveness in achieving U.S. objectives. The program proposed\nherein does not distinguish between that part thereof which will be supplied\nin the form of military equipment and that part which will be provided in\nother forms. In addition to the provision of material resources, the pro-\ngram will also include the provision of training and technical assistance.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 2\nNSC 114/2\nTOP-SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\n2. Assumptions and policies on which the program is based.\nIt is the policy of the U.S. to provide assistance to the\nnations with which it is joined in the North Atlantic Treaty to enable the\nU.S. and those nations to participate effectively in arrangements for in-\ndividual and collective self-defense in support of the purposes and princi-\nples of the charter of the United Nations.\nThe program is also based on the policy that there must be main-\ntained in Europe a stable economic foundation for the military strength which\n11\nit is our purpose to maintain and develop.\nThe program proposed herein 1e based on the following general\nassumptions:\na. There will be no general war.\nb. U.S. military forces will not be engaged in hostilities\nin areas other than Korea.\nC. In Korea, hostilities will either have ceased or will be\nat a low level of intensity, but Korea will remain divided\nand at least some UN forces will still be in Korea by the\nend of FY 1953.\nd. There will be no changes in the present levels of East/West\ntrade which increase the needs of Europe for assistance.\nThe program proposed herein is based on the following specific\nassumptions, the validity of which is commented upon under Section C. of this\npaper.\na. The military requirements are to have those forces set forth\nin DC-28, as refined by the Standing Group in MRC 5/2, plus\na. German force of 10 divisions and supporting tactical air\nand minor naval forces in being by July 1, 1954.\nb. The European nations will be politically, economically and\nfinancially capable of making the defense expenditures set\nforth below in paragraph B-3.\nC. The Congress will provide the funds requested in the\nMutual Security Program for FY 1952.\nd. Military equipment procured in the U.S. will be delivered\nin accord with the time phasing of the plan.\ne. The requirement for assistance will not be affected by the\ncreation of a European Defense Force.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 2\nNSC 114/2\n- 2 PM\nTOP-SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\nf. The admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO will not increase\nthe amounts of assistance which they will require.\n3. Estimated cost of the program\nThe best present estimate, based on late 1950 prices, of the\ncost of the MTDP, plus Germany and plus the non-NATO military expenditures\nof the European members of NATO is 72 billion dollars.* of this amount 40\nbillion dollars represents costs of major materiel. This cost figure (72\nbillion dollars) covers the period Fiscal Year 1951 through Fiscal Year\n1954.\n;\nFor Fiscal Years 1950, 1951 and 1952, 11 billion dollars of\nU.S. military aid has been programmed. In Fiscal Year 1951 European defense\nexpenditures equalled 6.7 billion dollars. (2 billion dollars of U.S. econ-\nomic aid helped make these expenditures possible.) It 18 estimated that\nthese countries in Fiscal Year 1952 (assuming U.S. aid is provided in the\namounts proposed in the 1952 MSP) will spend the equivalent of 9.9 billion\ndollars for defense. The total of U.S. military aid and European outlays\nfor defense for FY 1951 and FY 1952 18 thus estimated at 27.6 billion dollars.\n/The European expenditures are made from budgets which include the counter-\npart of U.S. economic assistance provided or to be provided in these fiscal\nyears.\nIf the total 1951-52 outlays against the four year cost are\nsubtracted therefrom there remains to be met in FY 1953 and FY 1954 a cost\nof 44.4 billion dollars.\nThe present estimate of probable gross European expenditures\nfor expense for FY 1953 and FY 1954 is 24.7 billion dollars, an average of\n12.3 billion dollars per year. This is an increase of 5.6 billion dollars\nper year or about 84 per cent over FY 1951 and an increase of about 2.4\nbillion dollars or approximately 24 per cent over the estimate for FY 1952.\nA large portion of this increase is included in present country plans, pri-\nmarily in those of the U.K. However, the gross figure of 24.7 billion\ndollars (or the 22.6 billion net figure) which the European countries as a\ngroup would have to contribute in FY 1953 and 1954 1s possible only if United\nStates assistance in fact 1a sufficient to cover dollar balance of payments\ndeficits. It also assumes that the European efforts and U.S. aid for FY 1952\nare as postulated above.\nThe difference between this expenditure and the cost of the re-\nquirement is thus calculated at 21.8 billion dollars. If a Canadian con-\ntribution of 1.0 billion dollars is deducted it can be reduced to 20.8\nbillion dollars.\n*Unofficial and not yet approved refinement of this estimate indicates a\npossible upward revision thereof to 76.8 billion dollars, resulting from\nlater information on probably requirements for German forces.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 2\nNSC 114/2\n- 3 -\nTOP-SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\nThe foregoing in tabular form:\nFinancing the Total Cost of MTDP\nBillions of U.S. Dollars\n(1950 prices)\n1. Total Cost of MIDP\n72\n2. Less FY 1951 and 1952 Assets\n(a) Gross European defense expenditures\n16.6\n(b) U.S. end-item aid\n11\n(c) Canadian end-item aid\n0.4\nTotal FY 1951 and 1952 Assets\n28\n3. MTDP Costs Not Met as of June 30, 1952\n44\n4. Anticipated FY 1953 and 1954 Assets\n(a) Gross European Expenditures 2/\n24.7\n(b) Canadian end-item aid\n.6\nTotal Anticipated FY 1953 and 1954 Assets\n25.3\n5. Remainder\n18.7\n6. U.S. Aid Assumed in Item 4(a)\n2.1\n7. Total Amount to be Met by U.S. Aid,\nif postulated total requirements\nare met\n20.8\nIt is essential that contracts be let in FY 1953 for those\nitems of equipment whose required time for production 1s such that this\naction is necessary to assure delivery of them in FY 1954. Consequently,\nthe requirement of 20.8 billion for U.S. assistance set forth above cannot\nbe assumed as divisible into two equal parts for appropriation in the re-\nspective fiscal years. It is estimated that 14.0 billion would be required\nto be obligated in FY 1953 and 6.8 billion in FY 1954. Actual expenditures\nwould tend to be much higher in FY 1954 than in FY 1953; thus, obligational\nadvance contract authority might be substituted for a considerable portion of\nthe FY 1953 requirement, with a correspondingly higher requirement for ap-\npropriations in FY 1954.\nIn the light of the lead time problems, and the importance of the\ntimely production and delivery of equipment, it may well be necessary to seek\nadditional authority to obligate funds during FY 1952 in order that the letting\nof contracts for production not be delayed until the second half of next year,\n1/ This level of expenditure is facilitated by an assumed $3 billion in\nU.S. aid which directly or indirectly makes dollars available to these\ncountries to finance imports.\nThis level of expenditure assumes about $2 billion in U.S. aid which\ndirectly or indirectly makes dollars available to finance imports.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 2\nNSC 114/2\n- 4 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP-SECRET\nC. Analysis of adequacy of program in terms of national security needs\nThe adequacy of the program set forth above depends on the validity\nof the assumptions and calculations on which it is based. It must be clearly\nunderstood that there are serious questions on this score which make the pro-\ngram a tentative one which requires further study and analysis.\nThere are, specifically, the following considerations:\n1. The requirements\nThe Medium Term Defense Plan is neither a rigid nor a detailed\nplan. The agreed aggregate requirements set forth in DC-28 have been studied\nand commented upon by SACEUR. The Standing Group has sought national reac-\ntion to its proposals for the allocation of unfilled DC-28 requirements\namong the NATO nations. It 18 anticipated that by October 7, 1951 the Stand-\ning Group will make recommendations as to a revised statement of force re-\nquirements which if and when approved would replace DC-28. It appears prob-\nable that there will be no net reduction in force requirements, although the\ncomposition of those forces may be altered.\nIt is expected that an examination to be made of the organiza-\ntion and equipment of all major national military units will provide a basis\nfor achieving some economies in the previous estimates of equipment require-\nments for the forces which are needed. It 1e hoped that a substantial reduc-\ntion in requirements will result therefrom. However, this may be offset by\nincreased equipment requirements resulting from possible changes in the com-\nposition of forces.\nEven if it is assumed that this examination results in substan-\ntial changes in estimates of the materiel requirements of the forces called\nfor under the present MTDP, the amounts and kinds of forces cannot be expected\nto remain static. At this time it 1s impossible to predict whether equipment\nrequirements will increase or decrease.\n2. The cost estimates\nObviously the estimated costs of requirements will vary as the\nrequirements are changed. The cost estimates set forth herein are based on\nthe assumption that the force requirements are those set forth in DC-28 plus\nthe assumed German forces, and that these force requirements will be allocated\namong the countries as proposed by the Standing Group. These estimates are\nbased on late 1950 prices and general price levels have already substantially\nincreased. They do not take into account any reduction in materiel require-\nments which may result from the more stringent examination thereof envisaged\nin paragraph 1 above. Nor do these estimates reflect any reductions in the\ncost of production in the U.S. (Some items of equipment will have a lower\nunit price than heretofore due to the fact that the cost of plant expansion\nin the U.S. has been absorbed in the cost of equipment already produced).\nFurthermore, these costs estimates do not reflect any reduction in price of\nU.S. furnished equipment which may occur if the equipment is classified as\nexcess to U.S. needs.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 2\nNSC 114/2\n5 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\n3. Estimates of European Defense Expenditures\nThe estimates set forth above do not take into account two 1m-\nportant factors. First, the estimate of European expenditures in fiscal\nyear 1952 presumes United States aid at the levels proposed by the Adminis-\ntration in the fiscal year 1952 Mutual Security Program, which presumption\nis now doubtful.\nSecondly, these estimates do not take into account certain ad-\nverse economic trends in Europe which have only recently become apparent.\nThe economic and psychological effect of these new developments\nwill decrease the ability of European governments to increase defense budgets\nto the degree assumed in this paper. ISAC cannot assess the offsetting impact\nof other possible actions, not considered in developing the estimate, such as\noff-shore procurement and broader eligibility of items for transfer as mili-\ntary assistance.\nOn balance, it is concluded that we cannot depend upon\nEuropean expenditures being as high in fiscal years 1952, 1953 and 1954 as\nestimated in this paper.\n4. U.S. Deliveries\nAs of July 31, 1951, the U.S. had shipped to Title I countries\nmilitary materiel valued at 729.9 million dollars out of the FY 1950 program\nof 1,119.9 million dollars of end item aid, and 165.2 million dollars out of\n3,963.6 million dollars programmed under FY 1951 appropriations. Deliveries\nof major items under the FY 1950 program have been completed, with exceptions\nin certain categories, A target date for the completion of deliveries under\nthe FY 1951 program has been set at June 30, 1952. Deliveries for the first\nseven months of 1951 were at the rate of 78 million dollars per month.\nEquipment must be delivered in larger quantities and at a more rapid rate\n(about 400 million dollars per month) if the program is to meet the needs\nof national security.\nThe Joint Chiefs of Staff have under consideration a revised\ndirective relating to allocation of United States munitions production as\nbetween the various military programs. ISAC 1s not informed as to whether\nthe more rapid rate of munitions deliveries needed to attain the programs of\nTitle I countries, as well as continuing combat expenditures in Korea and\nother world-wide commitments, can be attained by re-allocation, or whether\nthere must be an increased rate of production even at the cost of reducing\nproduction for civilian uses.\n5. U.S. aid in FY 1952\nIt 1s clear that the assumptions of Congressional approval of the\nproposed amounts of aid are erroneous. The effect, as previously stated, is\nto increase the costs which must be met in FY 1953 and FY 1954.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 2\nNSC 114/2\n- 6 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP-SECRET\nCONCLUSIONS\n1. On the basis of the assumptions in this report, the U.S. aid require-\nment for NATO defense purposes (including Germany) in FY 1953 and 1954 would\nbe 20.8 billion dollars.\n2. Preliminary revisions of the estimated requirements for German forces\nsuggest an additional cost of perhaps 5 billion dollars.\n3. The resultant figure for U.S. aid requirement is 25.8 billion\ndollars. This figure cannot be considered to be accurate. On balance, the\nfactors discussed in this paper indicate the figure may be too low.\nSPECIAL NOTE\nThe arrangements at Ottawa for 8. special temporary commission of the\nNorth Atlantic Council should produce before December firmer estimates\nof total requirements and the economic resources available to meet\nthem/.\nII. Other European Countries. (Austria, Trieste, Spain and Yugoslavia)\nAid programs for these countries for FY 1953 and FY 1954 have not yet\nreached the stage of development where it is possible to state with preci-\nsion the answers to the points outlined in the memorandum from Mr. Lay.\nIt is assumed that it will suffice for the purposes of the present NSC\nreview to state the following general observations.\n1. No funds for military assistance for Austria or Trieste will be re-\nquired in FY 1953 or FY 1954.\n2. $300 million dollars will probably be adequate to cover the needs of\nAustria and Trieste for economic assistance in FY 1953 ($150 million) and\nFY 1954 ($150 million).\n3. $100 million will probably be required as a minimum to cover the\nneeds of Yugoslavia for economic assistance in FY 1953 ($50 million) and\nFY 1954 ($50 million).\n4. An unsufficient basis exists for entimating Yugoslav military assist-\nance requirements for FY 1953 and FY 1954.\n5. No decisions have been reached as to whether and how much military\nand/or economic ald will be necessary to attain our objectives in Spain.\n6. There 1s no basis for accurately estimating the total of require-\nments of these four countries for economic and military assistance in FY 1953\nand FY 1954, but it may be of the order of magnitude of $1 billion.\nAnnexes to\nNSC 114/2\nAnnex - 7 No. 2\nTOP-SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\nIII. Other European Countries (Greece and Turkey)\nISAC has already furnished the NSC with estimates of the costs of mill-\ntary assistance programs for Greece and Turkey in FY 1953 and FY 1954.\nThe best present rough estimate of the total cost of economic assistance\nrequired for these countries for FY 1953 and FY 1954 is $700 million.\nIV. Non-European Areas\nIntroductory Note. The development of foreign aid programs for the non-\nEuropean areas for FY 1953 will not be complete for several weeks. Accor-\ndingly. at this time it is impossible to do more than summarize the objectives\nof the programs and to outline in a very rough and tentative manner the ele-\nments of the proposed programs. Only overall estimates of the cost of the\nvarious programs can be made that will be at all meaningful and these esti-\nmates must be considered highly tentative. With respect to FY 1954, the\noverall estimates of costs are only reasonable guesses.\nIn view of the foregoing, this statement is submitted by ISAC for NSC\nconsideration in the form of a summary covering the entire area.\nA. Objectives and Minimum Tasks.\nMilitary Aid Programs. Within the general framework of U.S. strategic\nobjectives, the specific objectives of the military aid programs for FY\n1953 in the non-European areas (including Greece and Turkey) will include\nthe following:\n1. To assist Japan to defend itself and to participate in the defense\nof the free world.\n2. To assist the ROK forces to assume the maximum possible responsibility\nfor the defense of South Korea.\n3. To assist the Chinese Nationalist Government to achieve the capability\nof repelling a Chinese Communist attack, in conjunction with the U.S.\nSeventh Fleet.\n4. To assist the French and Associated States forces in Indo-China to\nrestore and maintain internal security and to discourage Chinese Communist\naggression.\n5. To assist Thailand to maintain internal security and discourage\naggression.\n6. To assist the Philippine Government to restore and maintain internal\nsecurity and discourage external aggression.\n7. To assist the Government of Iran to maintain internal security and\nconduct a delaying action in the event of aggression.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 2\nNSC 114/2\n- 8 -\nTOP_SECRET-\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\n8. To assist the Governments of Greece and Turkey to maintain internal\nsecurity, to discourage aggression, and, if necessary, to repel attacks by\nSoviet satellites and to delay, to the maximum extent practicable, an attack\nby the Soviet Union itself -- all in conformity with their obligations as\n(assumed) members of NATO.\n9. To orient the Arab States and Israel more firmly toward the free\nworld and to enable them to maintain internal security and discourage\naggression.\n10. To enable certain Latin American States to undertake assigned tasks\nin the defense of the hemisphere in the event of war which would otherwise\nhave to be undertaken by the United States.\nEconomic Aid Programs.\nThe objectives of economic aid programs for FY 1953 for the non-European\narea (not including Greece and Turkey) will include the following:\n1. To support the military effort, as in Formosa, Indochina and Iran.\n2. To offset the impact of the military effort, including the mili-\ntary aid program, as in Formosa and Indochina.\n3. To strengthen support for friendly governments by assisting them\nto provide more effectively for the needs of their people (applicable in\nall cases).\n4. To improve governmental and popular attitudes toward the free world\nand the United States, as in Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Arab States and\nIran, or, where such attitudes are satisfactory, to maintain them at that\nlevel, as in the case of the Latin American States, the independent states\nof Africa, and Israel.\n5. To prevent economic deterioration threatening political stability,\nas in India and Iran.\n6. To bring about an increase in the output and facilitate the distri-\nbution of strategic materials needed for common defense, as Thailand,\nIndonesia, Philippines, and Latin America, insofar as consistent with basic\npolitical objectives.\n7. To increase the capacity of the area to produce essential civilian\ngoods, especially foods, do as to reduce the drain on U.S. output and ship-\nping in the event of an emergency (as in Southeast Asia, South Asia, Near\nEast and Ethiopia, and Latin America).\n8. To support the multilateral technical assistance programs of the\nUnited Nations and the Organization of American States.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 2\nNSC 114/2\n- 9 -\nTOP-SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP-SECRET\nB. Description of Programs.\n1. For the reasons stated above, it is not possible at this time to\ndescribe in any detail the various programs to be proposed for FY 1953 or\nFY 1954. In general, the programs will be of the same character as those\nproposed for FY 1952.\nThe military aid programs will consist, as in FY 1952, of the furnish-\ning of end-items and training needed to achieve certain desired capabilities.\nTwo principal elements will control the timing of the programs: the availa-\nbility of equipment and personnel for training, and the speed with which the\ngovernments in question can effectively absorb and utilize the equipment.\nThe military aid programs will of course vary in emphasis and mode of pro-\ncedure. The situation in Indochina, for example, 18 unique in that it is a\ncombat area; so long as that situation continues, Indochina's needs will\ncontinue to command top priority. The proposed military aid program for the\nArab States and Israel, which is not yet underway, will be peculiar in that\n(a) requests for aid will have to be reviewed by a tripartite committee;\n(b) the object of the program is primarily political; (o) the principle of\nimpartiality will have to be followed. Military aid programs for Latin\nAmerica will also be different from other programs in that equipment will\nbe furnished for the specific purposes of enabling states to perform hemis-\npheric defense tasks which they will have agreed to perform. Little can now\nbe said with respect to the aid programs which will be necessary for Japan\nand Korea, but they will probably be substantial.\nOn the economic aid side the programs will likewise vary in emphasis and\nscope. In most cases, the bulk of the program will be in the nature of\ntechnical assistance, supplemented where necessary by supplies needed to make\nsuch assistance effective, directed toward improvements in agriculture,\nhealth and sanitation, public administration, education, transportation and\nmineral resources development.\nIn some areas, such as Indochina and Iran, the economic program will have\nto include a considerable component for support of military needs. In an\narea such as Formosa, the program will have to be primarily a supply pro-\ngram to support the military effort and offset the impact of military ex-\npenditures; some industrial development will also be included, designed to\nhelp Formosa in the direction of achieving a supporting economy. Some pro-\ngrams (Indochina and the Philippines, as well as Formosa) will include sub-\nstantial imports of salable commodities and consumer goods for the purpose of\nfinancing the local costs of technical assistance projects and preventing\nrun-away inflation.\n2. The programs are based upon the fundamental policy that it 18 in the\ninterest of the United States to prevent further Communist encroachment upon\nthe free world, to maintain a Western orientation on the part of those states\nnow 80 oriented and to achieve a more decisive Western orientation on the\npart of those states which are now seeking to pursue a neutral course.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 2\nNSC 114/2\n- 10 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\nThe main assumptions upon which the programs will be based are as\nfollows:\n(a) There will be no general war.\n(b) The aid programs for FY 1950 and 1951 will have been success-\nfully completed, and the proposed FY 1952 programs will have been completed\nin varying degrees.\n(c) In general, the political complexion and orientation of the\nvarious countries, the state of relations between them, and their economic\nconditions will be about the same as today, except as they may be improved\nby the FY 1952 program.\n(d) The United States will have been successful in its efforts to\npersuade aid recipients to comply with whatever standards are required with\nrespect to East-West trade so that the extension of aid will not be pro-\nhibited.\n(e) A peace treaty will have become effective between Japan and\nmost of the non-Communist nations formerly at war with Japan, and security\ncommitments will have become effective with Australia, New Zealand, the\nPhilippines and Japan.\n(f) In Korea, hostilities will. either have ceased or will be at\na low level of intensity, but Korea will remain divided and at least some UN\nforces will still be in Korea by the end of FY 1953.\n(g) Communist China will not have attacked Formosa, Indochina,\nBurma, or Thailand but the threat of attack will be intensified.\n(h) The Chinese Communists will remain firmly aligned with Moscow\nand will not have developed clearly defined Titoist tendencies.\n(1) Tension between India and Pakistan will continue but without\nactual hostilities.\n(j) There will have been no Soviet attack upon Iran but the 011\ndispute will remain unresolved until the beginning of FY 1953.\n(k) A modus vivendi will have been worked out between the UK and\nEgypt and a Middle East defense board will have been established and will\nbe making progress in securing local participation.\n(1) Greece and Turkey will have been admitted to NATO.\n3. The Executive Branch proposal for military aid for FY 1952 for the\nnon-European areas, including Greece and Turkey, amounted to just over $1\nbillion. At the present time, it appears that the requirements for FY 1953\nwill be substantially higher, with the principal increases in Japan and Korea.\nGreece and Turkey, and possibly in Latin-America. It seems reasonable to\nexpect that the total for FY 1954 will be lower than for FY 1953.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 2\nNSC 114/2\n- 11 -\n-TOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\n-TOP SECRET-\nThe present proposals compared with FY 1952 proposals to Congress are\nas follows (in millions)\nArea\nFY 1952\nFY 1953\nFY 1954\nTitle II\n$415\n$596.8\n$292\nTitle III\n555\n467.4\n383.6\nTitle IV\n40\n340\n85\nJapan and Korea\n0\n300\n200\n$1010\n$1704\n$961\nThese proposals have not been reviewed in ISAC and may not be said in\nany sense to have ISAC approval. Past experience with comparable pro-\nposals made at the working level would indicate that reductions might be\nexpected. In this casey: however, even that prediction is dangerous because\nof the fact that the estimates for Japan and Korea are highly tentative and\nmay prove to be much too low.\nThe total amount of economic aid requested for the non-European area\n(not including Greece and Turkey) in FY 1952 amounted to 522 million dollars.\nThis included amounts required for multilateral technical cooperation pr\ngrams, and also $50 million for the solution of the Palestine refugee prob-\nlem and $112,500,000 for UNKRA. It now seems likely that the FY 1953 total\nwill be higher, but that the requirements for FY 1954 will be lower than\nFY 1953.\nThe proposals for economic aid are as follows (in millions):\nArea\nFY 1953\nFY 1954\nFar East\n$370\n$333\nNear East, Africa and\nSouth Asia\n429\n299\nLatin America\n63\n63\nMultilateral technical\nassistance\n17*\n21*\n$862\n$695\nAgain, these proposals cannot be said to have ISAC approval in any\nsense. Previous experience would indicate that the final Executive Branch\nfigures would show overall reductions.\n* Included in regional figures, and therefore not added into totals.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 2\nNSC 114/2\n- 12 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\nThe following Table compares the present proposals with the proposals\nmade to Congress for FY 1952:\nECONOMIC AID\nFY 1953\nFY 1954\nFY 1952\n(Proposed)\n(Proposed)\nFAR EAST\nKorea (UNKRA)\n$112.5\n$162.5\n$162.5\nFormosa\n90\n90\n70\nIndochina\n29.3\n40\n40\nBurma\n14.5\n20\n20\nIndonesia\n8\n10\n8\nPhilippines\n35.4\n40\n25\nThailand\n7\n7\n7\n297\n370\n333\nNEAR EAST\nAFRICA and\nSOUTH ASIA\nIran\n24\n100\n20\nArab States\nand Israel\n97\n175\n125\nInd. African\nStates\n4\n4\n4\nSouth Asia\n78\n150\n150\n203\n429\n299\nLATIN AMERICA\n22\n63\n63\nMULTILATERAL\nTECHNICAL\nASSISTANCE\n13*\n17*\n21*\n522\n862\n695\nC. Analysis\nOn the assumptions stated above, it is felt that the proposed programs\nwill in general meet the needs of national security and that no serious\ndeterioration in the present situation in the area is likely to occur.\nThese assumptions, however, are not forecasts and to some extent may be\nunduly optimistic.\nAs 1s obvious from the summary of objectives in Section A of this paper,\nin some cases the objective of a military aid program is to enable the\nrecipient country to repel external aggression, in others merely to delay\n# Included in regional figures, and therefore not added into totals.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 2\nNSC 114/2\n- 13 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP-SECRET\nor discourage it. Obviously a program which is designed to achieve the\nmore limited type of objective is less satisfactory from the national se-\ncurity point of view. However, it is fair to state that, in most cases\nwhere the objective is of the limited type, the more ambitious objective --\nto enable the country to resist aggression -- could not be achieved within\nthe foreseeable future by means of an aid program, no matter how large. In\nother words, in these cases the failure fully to meet national security needs\nfollows inevitably from inherent weaknesses, in terms of manpower and other\nresources, in the recipient countries, not from the size of the aid programs.\nThe principal factors limiting the proposed military aid programs are\nshortages of equipment and, to a much less extent, of qualified personnel,\nand the limited capabilities of certain other countries effectively to uti-\nlize large amounts of equipment. In general, an attempt has been made to\nprejudge possible Congressional reactions.\nInsofar as economic aid is concerned, it is even more difficult to esti-\nmate the degree to which the proposed programs meet the needs of national\nsecurity. About all that can be said is that these programs contribute\nsubstantially to the national security. While in some cases much larger\nprograms would doubtless contribute more, no economic aid program, whatever\nits size, can guarantee the achievement of the desired objective in any\ngiven case. At best, aid programs can only influence the course of events,\nthey cannot control them. In determining the size of economic aid programs,\nthe practical possibilities, both in terms of the domestic political situa-\ntion and in terms of the overall strain on U.S. resources, must be an under-\nlying consideration. However, no effort will be made to adjust specific\nprograms to possible Congressional reaction.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 2\nNSC 114/2\n- 14 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\nAnnex No. 3\nTHE FEDERAL CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM\n(Prepared by the Federal Civil Defense Administration)\nI. OBJECTIVES\nThe objectives of the Federal Civil Defense Program are to minimize the\neffects of enemy attacks and to insure the retention of our productive capac-\nity and will to fight, through the protection of life and property. These\nobjectives are being met in two phases: (1) the planning and developmental\nphase which in its primary aspects is being rounded out and (2) the opera-\ntional phase, which arises during a period of civil defense emergency.\nII. CONCEPT OF AGENCY AUTHORITY DURING AN EMERGENCY\nThe policy statement in the law under which the Federal Civil Defense\nAdministration operates explicitly statesit to be the intent of Congress\nthat the responsibility for civil defense shall be vested primarily in the\nseveral states and their political subdivisions, with necessary coordination\nand guidance being provided by the Federal Government. Natural disasters and\ncatastrophes have shown clearly that their solution lay primerily in Federal\nresources and direction. The problems inherent in the civil defense field\nare of such magnitude that the civil defense organization must be prepared to\noperate with a much greater degree of Federal direction than the policy state-\nment of the Congress indicates,\nCertainly, under emergency conditions, when the full powers of Title III\nof Public Law 920 are in force, the Administrator of Civil Defense must be\nprepared to direct the civil defense forces of the country even though they\nare primarily state and local forces, manned almost entirely by volunteer\nworkers. Accordingly, the civil defense plan contemplates mutual aid agree-\nments and the employment of mobile support forces for use across state lines\nunder Federal direction. This is necessary to resolve the conflicting de-\nmands of prior interstate agreements, and to utilize vital resources from\nsections of the country not tied to affected states by prior mutual aid\ncompacts.\nIII. SCOPE OF RESPONSIBILITIES\nIn order that the scope of responsibilities both in the pre-attack and\npost-attack stage is thoroughly understood it is necessary to consider some\nof the responsibilities assigned to the Administration. In the discharge of\nhis duties, the Federal Civil Defense Administrator is authorized by Public\n2\nLaw 920, 81st Congress, to perform a variety of functions, which are sum-\nmarized as follows:\n(a) Prepare, sponsor, and direct national plans and programs, and\ntions. keep advised on the status of State Civil Defense plans and opera-\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 3\nNSC 114/2\n- 1 -\nTOP-SECRET-\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\n(b) Coordinate the civil defense activities of other Federal agencies\nwith each other and with those of the states and neighboring\ncountries.\n(c) Provide for necessary warning and communications systems.\n(d) Study and develop physical protective facilities and other pro-\ntective measures.\n(e) Train civil defense officials and specialized workers.\n(f) Disseminate appropriate civil defense information to the public.\n(g) Assist and encourage the states in the consummation of interstate\ncivil defense compacts and agreements.\n(h) Procure and stockpile or maintain necessary civil defense mate-\nrials and facilities.\n(1) Furnish financial assistance to the states, on a matching basis,\nfor certain civil defense purposes.\n(j) Assist the states in effecting mutual civil defense aid agreements\nwith neighboring countries.\nIn addition to the above, the Administrator is vested with certain extra-\nordinary powers to be exercised only in the event of a civil defense emer-\ngency proclaimed by the President or established by concurrent resolution of\nthe Congress. Under such conditions, the Administrator is authorized to:\n(a) Procure materials and facilities needed for civil defense without\nregard to the limitations of existing law.\n(b) Furnish materials or services for civil defense purposes without\nregard to the limitations of existing law.\n(c) Coordinate and direct, for civil defense purposes, all Federal\nactivities for the relieff of states and localities damaged or\ndestroyed by attack.\n(d) Reimburse states for services and materials utilized outside their\nown borders for civil defense purposes.\n(e) Provide temporary financial aid or relief for any civilian in-\njured or in want as the result of any attack.\n(f) Incur on behalf of the United States such obligations as may be\nrequired to meet civil defense requirements.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 3\nNSC 114/2\n- 2 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\nDuring a period of civil defense emergency, the President may direct Federal\nagencies to furnish personnel and facilities to the Administrator for aid to\nthe states, to furnish emergency shelter, and to engage in emergency repair\nand restoration work. Federal personnel and facilities devoted to such work\nwould, of course, be those not absolutely required for military defense and {\nthe continuity of Government.\nIV. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS\nCivil defense plans and programs are being adjusted in accordance with\nperiodically re-evaluated planning assumptions. These are based on evaluation\nof intelligence received from official sources. The timing of our programs\nis predicated on the schedules used in the rest of our National Security\nProgram but, as pointed out later in the report, the possibility of attaining\na reasonable degree of readiness within the time schedules is very remote.\nThe current planning assumptions of the Administration are as follows:\nGrave danger of war between the US and USSR exists now and will\ncontinue until the US and its Allies achieve an adequate position of\nstrength. Such a position probably cannot be reached before 1954.\nWar might be initiated by a surprise attack on the Continental United\nStates designed to cripple US war potential.\nSuch an attack could strike any point in the US but would probably\nbe directed at (a) military installations essential for retaliation;\n(b) major concentrations of population and industry; and (c) certain\nAEC installations.\nThis attack would consist principally of atomic weapons delivered\nby air introduced clandestinely into key harbors, or possibly by\nguided missiles Inunched from submarines or surface ships.\nChemical and biological agents might be employed in clandestine\nattacks against persons, livestock and crops. Either as a part of the\nair attack or by clandestine means, nerve gas might be used against\nkey personnel targets. Attempts at sabotage of industry and communica-\ntions would. occur either concurrently with or after the air attack.\nIt is assumed that the Soviet stockpile now contains about 45\nplutonium bombs of some 50 kilotons equivalent. Production of a new,\ncomposite type will begin in 1952. The estimated quantities of both\ntypes available through 1954 is as follows:\nDate\nAll Plut.\nComposite\nTotal\n(30-70 Kt)\n(40-100 Kt)\nmid-1951\n45\n0\n45\nmid-1952\n80\n20\n100\nmid-1953\n125\n70\n195\nmid-1954\n150\n170\n320\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 3\nNSC 114/2\n- 3 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\nComment: The table on the preceding page, taken verbatim from\na 28 July 1951 0/SI publication represents the most accurate\nestimate on this subject available to CIA.\nThere would be little or no strategic warning, and the extent of\ntactical warning cannot be predicted at present. It is assumed that less\nthan one hour's warning would be received and possibly none at all.\nThere will not be sufficient time, manpower or material for an\nadequate shelter program in all target areas without major cutbacks in\ncivilian construction or serious interference with the production of\nwar materials.\n?\nThere will be an average of 175,000 casualties per A-bomb dropped\non a critical target area in 1951; if there is no warning and no local\ncivil defense organization.\nA proper organization of civil defense forces can reduce cas-\nualties by as much as 50%.\nV. PROGRAM ELEMENTS\nThe elements of the Civil Defense Program are discussed below in two\nmajor groupings, as they relate to (a) state and local programs and (b)\nFederal plans and programs.\nA. State and Local Programs\n1. Enabling Authority. The Federal Civil Defense Administration\nhas encouraged and assisted state officials in the preparation of legis-\nlation or Executive Orders creating civil defense organizations. As\na result, all states and territories have now set up such organizations,\neither by legislative action or executive order. The degree of opera-\n-1 tional readiness varies but in general the greatest progress has been\nmade in those states which include the most profitable targets for the\nenemy. Forty states have enacted legislation authorizing mutual aid\ncompacts, and approximately half this total have executed such compacts\nor are concluding them during the second week of September.\n2. Target Areas. As a basic guide to the states, a list of 271\ntarget areas has been determined, of which 54 areas, including 69 prin-\ncipal cities, have been designated as critical target areas for atomic\nattack. The designation of critical target areas reflects industrial\nand metropolitan areas of such size as to offer an attractive target\nfor atomic attack. While it is primarily to serve these critical target\n12\nareas that civil defense forces are being organized, full consideration\nis being given to the possibility of attacks throughout the entire\nnation, including both atomic and other unconventional weapons.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 3\nNSC 114/2\n- 4 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\n3. Organization. Organizational guidance has been furnished to\nthe states and localities in the form of a plan embodied in Principles\nof Civil Defense Operations. The plan contemplates:\na. Individual self protection, and assumption by the individual\nof an effective role in the local civil defense organization,\nb. The banding together of the political entities within crit,\nical target areas by mutual aid agreements to provide im-\nmediate assistance in the event of attack.\nC. The organization by states cf mobile support forces outside\nthe critical target areas, prepared to move wherever they\nare needed throughout the nation.\nd. The organization by states of the resources outside the\ncritical target areas to furnish fixed support for casual-\nties and refugees.\nSpecific program guidance and assistance to the states is being furnished\nby FCDA in the following areas: Engineering, facilities self-protection,\nfire, health and special weapons defense police, public affairs, rescue,\nshelter, supply, training and education, transportation, warden, warning\nand communications and welfare. This assistance is furnished in several\nways. To supplement the outline guides furnished earlier, eleven printed\nmanuals have been distributed (as of August 31, 1951) and ninety-three\nmore are in process. Specific help is being furnished to various cities,\nat the request of State Civil Defense officials, in the making of detailed\ntarget analyses and the development of detailed civil defense plans for\neach city.\n4. Grants-in-Aid. Financial assistance to the states is authorized\nby Public Law 920 for both organizational equipment and shelters. Plans\nfor matching state funds for fiscal 1952 would furnish attack warning\ndevices for 65% of the 69 cities in the critical target areas, radio equip-\nment for 200 control centers together with their subordinate activities,\nnecessary emergency fire-fighting equipment for fire and warden services\nto back up the equipment now available, and special rescue vehicles de-\nsigned and equipped for civil defense purposes. For the total protective\nfacilities (shelter) program, it is estimated that there will be required\nminor modifications to existing structures to provide protection to\n6,000,000 people at a cost of $10 each, major modifications to protect\n8,000,000 people at $40 each, and new construction to protect 15,000,000\npeople at $90 each. An additional 2,000,000 can be protected in existing\nstructures which need no modification. The total program will cost A:\n$1,730,000,000, of which $865,000,000 will be the Federal share. For this\namount, shelter could be provided for the 31,000,000 people in the crit-\nical target areas during daylight hours. The program for fiscal 1952\ncontemplated a modest beginning, with less than one-third of the program\nto be accomplished.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 3\nNSC 114/2\n- 5 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET-\nTotal costs of financial assistance to the states are roughly\nestimated as follows:\n1952\n1953\n1954\nOrganizational\nEquipment\n$45,255,000\n$80,000,000\n$21,000,000\nShelter\nProgram\n$250,000,000\n$615,000,000\n-\ni\nThe grant-in-aid program is placed in doubt, however, by the action of\nthe House of Representatives in reducing the total of $295,255,000 in\nmatching funds requested for fiscal 1952 to a total of $4,500,000. This\naction, if concurred in by the Senate, would provide only for a start\non the warning device program and certain limited protective equipment.\nThis is despite the fact that the states have already appropriated\n$72,000,000 which may be used to meet their share of the cost of the\nprograms.\n5. Research and Development. Another important phase of assistance\nto the states 18 the research and development program to develop much\nneeded information concerning atomic, biological, or chemical attack.\nResearch already undertaken has dealt primarily with shelter standards and\ndesign, public attitudes and reactions, and both day and night population\ndistribution patterns in cities in critical target areas. Important sub-\njects to be dealt with in the immediate future include further shelter\nresearch, measures designed for defense against biological and chemical\nwarfare, fire hazards under atomic attack and refinement of methods for\nestimating casualties. The Federal Civil Defense Administration does\nnot conduct its own research. All such research projects are carried\nout f r FCDA by the Federal agencies having a jurisdictional interest in\nthe subject matter to avoid duplication or overlapping of effort.\n6. Volunteer Enrollment. States and localities, with the assis-\ntance and guidance of the Federal Civil Defense Administration, are\nproceeding with the enrollment of men and women as volunteer civil de-\nfense workers. In the last analysis, the success of our Civil Defense\nProgram will depend on the extent to which Americans, both men and women,\ncan be motivated to devote their energies to this program. It is estimated\nthat between 15 and 17 million volunteer workers will be required. Over\na million men and women have already enrolled. Much progress is being\nmade within the states in disseminating to the public information de-\nveloped by FCDA for individual, family, and community protection against\natomic, biological, and chemical warfare, as well as against the effects\nof more conventional weapons. This is being accomplished by press, radio,\ntelevision, motion pictures, organized groups and all other available\nmedia. Nationwide educational and recruiting drives will be carried on,\nwith widespread national publicity to serve as a backdrop against which\nstate and local recruiting drives will be conducted.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 3\nNSC 114/2\n- 6 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\n7. Training and Education. Still another vital phase of Federal\nassistance to the states is found in the development of training policies\nand plans as guides to state and local civil defense authorities. In\nessence, civil defense training teaches people how to perform the services\nneeded before, during, and after an enemy attack. To the men and women\nof America, this is a relatively new problem -- even defense against con-\nventional weapons -- to say nothing of the aspects of weapons of greater\nimpact. The civil Defense Staff College located at Olney, Maryland, has\nalready furnished training to 550 key civil defense leaders. The Midwest\nTechnical Training School was activated during the month of August, a\nsimilar school serving the Far West will open early in October, and a\nthird is planned to be operated in conjunction with the Staff College, to\nserve the Eastern states. Training is conducted where possible through\npractice exercises and team or group instruction, in order to bring into\nsharp focus the new problems and activities involved. For example, the\nfunctioning of mobile support groups will require the operation of civil\ndefense workers in a manner that is new and strange to most civilians.\nIt 18 the purpose of the training program to develop effective teamwork\nin such operations.\nB. Federal Plans and Programs\nWhile a major part of the FCDA program during the pre-emergency\nperiod is necessarily designed to furnish motivation, guidance, and de-\nvelopmental assistance to the states and localities, as indicated above,\nthere are certain essential activities that are purely Federal.\n1. Organization and Operation. The first and basic task is the de-\nvelopment of 8 sound Federal Civil Defense organization, ready at a mo-\nments notice to operate during an emergency in accordance with tested\nprocedures and with various essential arrangements concluded in advance.\nConsiderable progress is being made toward this goal, but plans and\narrangements are far from being completed. Basic policy decisions in-\nvolving the degree of Federal direction that can be exercised are being\ndeveloped.\nThe organization 18 being perfected to permit an easy transition to\nthe emergency operational phase. Alternate top command staffs have been\ndesignated for operation under emergency conditions, and alternate head-\nquarters in secret locations have been established. Necessary communi-\ncations facilities have been installed to meet minimum requirements for\nemergency operation. Further work is in progress to complete the instal-\nlations. The developmental phase of the project is currently being trans-\nformed to the operational phase which will assure 24-hour a day readiness.\nNational exercises in emergency operations have been conducted for the\ntop command staffs and others are planned. Communications facilities pro-\n(4)\nvide contact with the civil defense regions and, between the regions and\nthe state directors, The planned civil defense communications network\nlinking national, regional, and state headquarters is dependent on final\naction on the 1952 appropriation request now before the Congress.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 3\nNSC 114/2\n- 7\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\nThe rounding out of regional office staffs is one of the most pressing\ncurrent needs. Regional directors have been appointed, and skeleton re-\ngional staffs set up. The development of a truly effective regional force\nwith alternate, secure command posts for emergency operation, 18 dependent,\nhowever, on the appropriation of adequate funds for fiscal 1952. Regional\nplanning for civil defense purposes involves considerations peculiar to\nthe nature of the program. A recently approved project regrouped the\nstates into nine regions (as against the original 13) in order to provide\nthe best possible balance between population in the critical target areas\nand in the support areas throughout the rest of each region.\n2. Attack Warning System. An important specific responsibility of the\nFederal Civil Defense Administration is to make appropriate provision for\ndissemination of warnings of enemy attacks to the civilian population.\nPlans are being developed in cooperation with the Air Force, Federal\nCommunications Commission, the radio and fixed wire communications networks,\nthe manufacturers of warning devices, and state and local civil defense\nofficials to develop an effective warning system. This too is placed in\njeopardy by the House action in approving a cut of more than 50% in the\ntotal requested for fiscal 1952 for attack warning purposes.\n3. Federal Stockpile. Certain supplies, materials and equipment\nwould be required under emergency conditions in quantities never approached\nnormally in this country. The only practical answer for such items as\ndrugs, medical and first-aid supplies and equipment, portable water pipe,\nconversion units to adapt existing vehicles for emergency ambulance ser-\nvice, etc., 1s found in the creation of Federal stockpiles of supplies,\nmaterials, and equipment strategically located in Federal warehouses to\nback up state and local resources, Arrangements have been made for the\nutilization for this purpose of 35 warehouses throughout the country,\nlocations having been chosen with a view to balancing considerations of\nsecurity and availability to critical target areas. Standards and spec-\nifications for the items to be stockpiled have been prepared, but real\nactivation of the program is waiting on the sypropriation of funds by the\nCongress. The recent House action on the appropriation request would\neliminate the procurement of all items except medical supplies and equip-\nment and would reduce such items to less than half the amount required for\n3,000,000 casualties, an extremely low estimate of the number that would\nresult from an attack of proportions well within Russian capabilities.\n4. Utilization of Federal Resources. Another important responsi's\nbility is the development of the planned utilization in an emergency of\nall resources and personnel of the Federal Government not required for\nmilitary purposes or for the continuity of government. Progress is being\nmade in working out agreements with other Federal agencies with respect\nto the use of their personnel, materials, and facilities, under emergency\nconditions. Policies and standards concerning the essentiality of Fed-\neral activities to the national security are established by the National\nSecurity Resources Board. An executive order has been prepared and will\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 3\nNSC 114/2\nto 8 &\nTOP-SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\nshortly be recommended to the President, calling for the immediate pre-\nparation of such plans by FCDA, in accordance with such NSRB standards,\nand in cooperation with the several Federal departments and agencies.\nIt will be essential to the success of the program that it have the full\nsupport and active backing of department and agency heads because of the\ndifficulty experienced by many people, including Federal officials, in\nvisualizing the widespread destruction that would follow an all-out attack\nupon the. country. A number of briefing sessions have been arranged for\nagency officials, to achieve the fullest possible understanding of the\nproblems and the utilization to be made of Federal personnel, materials,\nand facilities during an emergency.\nVI. CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAM COSTS\nThe total cost to the Federal Government of the Civil Defense Program\nduring the fiscal years 1953 and 1954 is, of course, contingent on the amount\nappropriated for fiscal 1952. Assuming the non-recurring items are allowed in\nthe 1952 appropriation, it is estimated (in advance of detailed estimates) that\napproximately $915,000,000 will be required in 1953 and $35,000,000 in 1954.\nThe elimination, in whole or in part, of such items from the 1952 appropriation\nwould require the addition of up to $500,000,000 to the estimates for 1953\nand/or 1954.\nVII. SUMMARY\nAn objective appraisal of the Civil Defense Program reveals that while\nsubstantial progress has been made in the development of the national program,\nthe variety and magnitude of the obstacles remaining are enormous. We believe\nthat existing organizations throughout the country would reduce casualties and\ndamage but not nearly to the degree that our survival as a nation demands.\nThe urgency of the present international situation requires a \"peaking\" of our\nefforts with maximum support from the country. So far this has not been\nachieved.\nIt may be fairly said that the initial planning phases have been sub-\nstantially completed, and the developmental phase is well under way. These\ntwo phases, which are aimed at developing both a Federal and state condition\nof operational readiness, are, of course, uneven with respect to progress\nin individual programs. Furthermore, the progress within the various states\nis uneven. Some states have in being organizations capable, in varying de-\ngrees, of operating in a civil defense emergency. Other states have made little\nor no progress toward operational readiness.\nIn the light of the present appropriation situation, it appears that cer-\ntain aspects of the Federal program can shortly be expedited. For example,\nit should be possible soon to move quickly in acquiring at least some of the\nneeded warehousing facilities, and in procuring $50,000,000 worth of medical\nsupplies for the stockpile. Further encouragement is found in the fact that\nstate and local funds available for civil defense purposes during the fiscal\n1952 are slightly in excess of $200,000,000.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 3\nNSC 114/2\n- 9 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\nThe factors deterring the optimum development of the Civil Defense Pro-\ngram are, however, substantial. A lack of general acceptance of the problems\nand the need for civil defense is one of major importance. With long range\nbombers, atomic bombs, biological warfare and chemical warfare, the tenor of\nwar has changed. The war of the future will be a war of attrition between the\ncivilian populations to an even greater extent than between the conflicting\nmilitary forces. So far this fact has not been recognized by the individual\ncitizen, nor has its impact on the importance to civil defense preparations\nbeen fully recognized by the military. Notwithstanding the expressed beliefs\nof our public officials that civil defense is a vital part of our common de-\nfense the average man on the street and apparently the average legislator, have\nfailed to recognize this fact. To motivate the 15 million to 17 million vol-\nunteer workers that will be needed in this program requires the constantly re-\npeated, forceful expression of the vitalness to our total defense of an in-\nformed and trained civil defense organization. In the past conflicting state-\nments before Congressional committees and elsewhere, have weakened the effects\nof the FCDA's activities in developing this program. It is believed that this\ndifficulty 18 being overcome and that full support will be given in the future.\nHowever, the problems that surround the program are legion, and there is a\nvital need for this constant reiteration of the importance of civil defense in\nthe total national defense picture.\nAnother major deterrent has been the failure of the Congress to appro-\npriate sorely-needed funds: Such vital programs as the provision of protective\nfacilities, the procurement of organizational equipment, the stockpiling of\nother than medical supplies, are virtually at a standstill. A by-product of\nthis Congressional action, which 1s perhaps even more serious, is the impression\ngiven the country, generally, that the Congress does not consider civil defense\nimportant to the nation.\nThe natural result of the failure of public officials and legislators to\ntake a consistent affirmative stand on the vital role of civil defense in the\nnational defense program is apathy and confusion on the part of the average\ncitizen. His undertandable desire to reject the possibilities of atomic,\nbiological, or chemical attack, with unprecedented destruction and loss of life,\nfeeds eagerly on even minor indications that \"it can't happen here.\" Over\ncoming that feeling of false and wishful security is a major task confronting\nFCDA and one which requires the public and emphatic support of all echelons of\nGovernment.\n?\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 3\nNSC 114/2\n- 10 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nSECRET\nAnnex No. 4\nNATIONAL STOCKPILING PROGRAM\n(Prepared by the Department of Defense and the\nOffice of Defense Mobilization)\nA. Objectives and Minimum Tasks\n1. The stockpile of strategic and critical materials 1s a national\nstockpile, not just a military stockpile. It is a blood bank of materials\nto be called upon in a time of national emergency when the supplies of\nthese critical materials may be cut off at the very moment when we need them\nmost.\n2. Unfortunately, the importance of the stockpile program to our entire\ndefense effort often 1s not fully recognized, nor are the implications stem-\nming from this lack of recognition always fully appreciated. Exhibit A 11-\nlustrates factually the very crucial situation which exists in respect to\nmany materials. A careful study of this table will reveal that unless an\nanswer is found promptly to some of the questions which it raises, this nation\nwill be faced with serious production bottlenecks and imbalances in the event\nof all-out war within the next two years. This is particularly true in view\nof the large number of materials involved and the cumulative effect of the\nshortages that would similtaneously be encountered. Further, the normal\nsubstitutes for some stockpile items will themselves be in short supply.\n3. The purpose of the program, which is authorized by Public Law 520 -\n79th Congress, is to \"decrease and prevent wherever possible a dangerous\nand costly dependence of the United States upon foreign nations for supplies\nof these (strategic and critical) materials in time of national emergency.\"\nIt hence is implicit that the stockpiles must be accumulated prior to M-Day.\nExcept for a few instances, such as aluminum and magnesium, the program thus\nfar generally has been limited to materials which come in large part or\nentirely from foreign sources, as opposed to materials which can be produced\nor manufactured in sufficient quantities in the United States.\n4. The specific objective of the program proposed herein 1s to make the\nUnited States self-sufficient as quickly as feasible in respect to these\ncritical and strategic materials by building stockpile reserves, limiting\nconsumption, expanding supply, and wherever possible finding satisfactory\nsubstitutes. Even if the most optimistic acquisition targets which can\nreasonably be established for the next two years are met, we will still be\ninadequately prepared for all-out war unless in that interim large, new,\n\"safe,\" sources of supply have been found and exploited, or unless satis-\nfactory substitutes have been developed.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 4\nNSC 114/2\nSECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nSECRET\nB. Full Description of Program\n1. Elements Comprising the Program\n5. The principal planning element of the stockpile program, pursuent\nto Section 2 of the Act, is the determination of the materials, quantities\nand qualities to be stockpiled. The principal operating function is the\nacquisition of the objective quantities in the proper qualities. Other op-\nerational elements are those usually associated with acquisitions; namely,\ntransportation, inspection, handling, storage, security and maintenance,\nas well as the processing of materials acquired in other than the desired\nform or quality, the rotation (through sale and repurchase) of perishable\nmaterials to prevent deterioration, and the disposal of materials no longer\ndesired in the stockpile.\n6. Under the authority of the Defense Production Act, the responsi-\nbility for determining current and long range requirements for strategic\nand critical materials has been placed in the Defense Production Adminis-\ntration. In order to perform this function properly, there was need of a.\nfocal point for coordination of Government policies and programs affecting\nstrategic and critical materials. The Vital Materials Coordinating Committee\nwas established under the Administrator of the Defense Production Adminis-\ntration to serve this purpose. The meetings of this committee bring together\nall of the interested agencies.\n7. The responsibilities of the Vital Materials Coordinating Committee\nin general fall into three categories: (a) expansion of supply, (b) balanced\ndistribution of available supply and (c) limitation of nonessential use.\nThe operating procedure of the committee is as follows: Recommendations of\nthe Programs and Requirements Office of the Defense Production Administration\nare presented to the Vital Materials Coordinating Committee where they are\nreviewed. If a recommendation is approved by the committee, it is then\ntransmitted to the Administrator of the Defense Production Administration\nwho issues appropriate directives to the agency or agencies having the\nresponsibility for carrying out the decisions. If opposing views are ex-\npressed in the Vital Materials Coordinating Committee, a. further review is\nmade by the agencies concerned in an attempt to secure an agreement. When\never these agencies cannot effect an agreement, opposing views are referred\nto the Administrator of the Defense Production Administration for decision\nand action.\n8. The stockpiling program is in itself a single project and does not\nbreak down into separable elements except as each individual material and\nthe accomplishment of the objective for that material can be considered a\nseparate element of the program as a whole. There are seventy-three materials\nfor which stockpiles are currently necessary. These and their principal\n*\nuses and sources are shown in Exhibit B.\n2. Assumptions and Policies upon which the Program is Based\n9. The materials and quantities which should be stockpiled are deter-\nmined by a comparison of probable national requirements and supplies in time\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 4\nNSC 114/2\n-2-\nSECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nSECRET\nof war. This is done through an interdepartmental stockpile committee on\nwhich all interested civilian and military agencies are represented.\n10. Essential industrial and civilian requirements, which in most in-\nstances exceed the direct military needs, are estimated by groups of commodity\nspecialists in Government and industry on the basis of past use factors, pro-\njected wartime levels of general industrial activity and any other indicators\nof requirements for the particular item under review.\n11. Insofar as direct military requirements are concerned, these are\ncomputed or estimated on the basis of the latest available mobilization\nplan approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and translated into end-item\nproduction schedules and materials requirements by the military departments.\n12. There is some thought that the current program of building up the\nmilitary forces and their equipment should have the result of reducing future\nall-out mobilization requirements--hence should reduce the need for stock-\npiling. On the contrary, the increase in the existing and equipped military\nforces, plus the building up of the war production potential, will have just\nthe opposite effect, at least for the early part of the full mobilization\nand war period. After the forces are built up, and even though their initial\nequipment is provided for, the existence of this force will permit prompt\nparticipation in war on a large scale, instead of a. delaying action during\na build-up period. Hence the immediate needs for expendable supplies and for\nreplacements will be far higher than if that force had not existed. Further-\nmore, the building of a war production potential means the building of a\nmaterials consuming potential and industry will now be in position to\npromptly consume larger amounts of material for conversion to war goods as\nsoon as needed. Up until now, war requirements for many materials have been\nlimited by industry capacity to convert materials to war goods. This limita-\ntion is rapidly being removed.\n13. Included in the estimated wartime requirements are those for \"normal\"\nexport, but no provision has been made for possible large amounts needed by\nallies for their own military and supporting programs which we might be\ncalled upon to furnish in the absence of adequate preparation by the allied\ncountries. No firm basis now exists for determining such requirements and\nthe matter is mentioned only to record that here is a potential additional\nrequirement not now provided for.\n14. Wartime supplies are estimated from basic commodity production and\ntrade studies, factored in accordance with assumptions as to the degree to\nwhich supplies from abroad will be affected by 8 global war. These assumpt-\nions in turn are derived from Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance as to the\nprobable status of each producing country from the standpoint of military\naccessibility (that is, whether or not the country will be enemy or enemy-\ncontrolled), and as to the probable rates of loss in transit from overseas\nsources. Further guidance as to the dependability of the accessible world\nsources (political and economic) 1s obtained from the Department of State.\nPursuant to general guidance from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, B safety factor\nis inserted whenever supplies of a given item are concentrated in one or a.\nfew world sources.\n15. The assumed duration of the war (five years) is the minimum given\nin current Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 4\nNSC 114/2\n-3-\nSECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nSECRET\n3. The Primary Task and the Program Needed to Accomplish It\n16. The task to be accomplished 1s to acquire the necessary stockpile\nmaterials at the earliest possible time. Particular emphasis and resort to\nforceful measures is indicated for those materials which now exhibit such a\nlow degree of stockpile accomplishment that total supplies available in war-\ntime production and imports plus current stockpile) are far short of wartime\nrequirements. Exhibit C shows the present and projected status of these select-\ned items. Greater sacrifices in the current economy, greater efforts to ex-\npand supply, resort to incentive purchase prices where indicated, and force-\nful use of conservation and substitution are essential to the accomplishment\nof this task.\n17. If the Munitions Board program set forth in Exhibit c, or if any\nreasonably close approach thereto is to be accomplished, the following spec-\nific actions would have to be taken.\na. A change in the present priority position of the stockpile pro-\ngram BO that allocation of materials to it are given preference over\nthose required to maintain an economy geared to the policy of avoiding\nunemployment or idling facilities which cannot readily be absorbed in\nthe expanding military program. No question is raised concerning the\nhigher priority of military requirements.\nb. The formulation and implementation of an international materials\nprogram which will assure the United States of obtaining the materials\nrequired to carry out its national policies, including theastockpiling\nprogram. Such a program should be directed toward:\n(1) the stabilization of world prices;\n(2) assuring the United States of appropriate benefits from\nincreased supplies obtained through the expenditure of\nUnited States funds both at home and abroad, whether in\nthe form of loans, subsidies, or guaranteed markets;\n(3) the imposition of use restrictions similar to our own by\nother free nations of the world;\n(4) encouraging in every possible way the expansion of sup-\nplies;\n(5) judicious consideration of the needs of the other free\nnations of the world but fully recognizing the propor-\ntionate share of the defense effort being borne by the\nUnited States and the share which the United States\nwill be required to bear in the event of all-out war.\nC. An intensified effort to increase the procurement of strategic\nF\nand critical materials, both at home and abroad. This involves full\nuse of the Government's authority in the granting of loans, issuance of\ntax amortization certificates, guaranteed markets, sound but flexible\nprice policies, payment where justified or premium prices and import\nsubsidies, allocation of equipment and materials for expansion projects\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 4\nNSC 114/2\nSECRET\n-\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nSECRET\nand a broad flexible purchase and resale program which would permit the\nimmediate spot procurement of these materials any place in the world with-\nout delay. This kind of approach is doubly significant because new sources\nof supply will not only make materials available for the stockpile but, in\nthe case of developments areas of the world considered: \"safe,\"\ncrease the gap between estimated wartime supply and requirements, thus\npermitting the lowering of the stockpile objective itself.\nd. A greatly strengthened conservation and substitution program. To\nbe successful, this must have the full and continuous backing of both the\nmilitary and civilian agencies. There is a natural and understandable re-\nluctance.:or the part of production people to change from a tried and proven\nmaterial to something new, particularly if the new material costs more than\nthe old.\" This: reluctance must be overcome by forceful measures, however,\nbecauseleven though dt might be. possible without serious consequences to\nfind substitutes for some of these materials after M-Day, there would be\nserious distortions in production from the cumulative effect of having to\nfind substitutes for all of them after M-Day. Furthermore, in the case of\nsome materials current consumption equals current supply with no substan-\ntial relief in sight from future new sources, and no material going into\nthe stockpile BO that the only possible solution is through conservation\nand substitution. The most serious example of this is columbite where\nthe present stockpile plus all of the supplies which it is estimated would\nbe available during a five-year war period are equal to less than 12% of\nthe estimated wartime requirements with jet engines being the principal\nuser.\n18. The Current uses of columbite already have been limited to the military,\nAEC, and a few indispensable industrial fields. Development of substitutes by\nthe military in the immédiate future is absolutely essential because it would be\nimpossible to supply enough material to support a continuation of present spec-\nifications in the production of aircraft during all-out mobilization. Finding\nand using substitutes at that time would be the only alternative to curtailing\naircraft production. It is obviously better in many such cases to enforce sub-\nstitution now and by SO doing to make available a portion of the limited current\nsupply to build up a stockpile reserve which would be sufficient to support in\nwartime a greatly reduced projected use.\n19. There are parallel cases, such as refractory grade chromite, corundum.\nand industrial diamonds where there is little or no material being siphoned\nfrom the current supplies to go into the stockpile. Industry must not be per-\nmitted stubbornly to follow the currently preferred usage of these materials\nwhen it is realized that in time of war the losses in productivity inherent in\nfinding satisfactory substitutes would be far more harmful than at present. The\nmaximum possible employment of substitutes at this time will not only enable in-\ndustry to determine and solve the resulting production problems prior to an\nemergency but will permit the siphoning off of a portion of the supplies to the\nstockpile so long as the supply lines remain open.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 4\nSECRET\nNSC 114/2\n- 5 -\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nSECRET\n20. The stockpile materials may be approximately divided into the following\ncategories as to the most promising solutions to the problem of wartime defic-\niency. Actually, many could be included in more than one category so that this\nclassification 1s in no sense precise.\nCLASS I --Current military and AEC production uses almost the entire supply\npermitting only slight additions, if any, to the national stockpile.\nMost of the supply is imported. Efforts are being pressed to increase\nsupply but little significant additions can be expected. Substitutions\nare essential in military use. Research on military substitutions\nmust be pushed.\nBeryl\nColumbite-Tantalite\nCobalt\nRare Earths\nCLASS II - --Supplies are completely unpredictable as they come almost entirely\nfrom behind the Iron Curtain. Large quantities might appear suddenly\non the market. Civilian consumption has been substantially cut back\nand substitutes can be utilized in some instances if necessary.\nHog Bristles\nPlatinum Group Metals\nFeathers & Down\nSilk Waste and Noils\nCLASS III--U. S. stockpiles are in reasonably good condition and the rate of\nfurther acquisition is dependent in large part upon the U. S. desire\nto avoid runaway price rises through heavy and uncoordinated buying\nactivities.\nCordage Fibers\nRubber\n(Abaca and Sisal)\nTin\nCLASS IV --Stockpile objectives are small and far from complete. However,\nstockpile objectives were intended to cover only the initial deficits\nbefore reactivation or expansion of productive capacity and such ex-\npansion and reactivation programs are currently under way, thus reduc-\ning the danger inherent in the stockpile status. Severe civilian re-\nstrictions. are presently in operation. Any further cut-backs would\nprovide relatively little to the stockpile and would cause serious\nlabor, small business and other dislocations excessively weakening the\nbasic economy of the country.\nAluminum\nMagnesium\nCLASS V --U. S. domestic mine production normally accounts for over half of\nthe total supply. However, the U. S. is dependent upon significant\nimports coming largely from nations expected to be accessible in war-\ntime. At the present time, world price levels are higher than U. S.\nceiling prices for these materials and importation of metal at high-\ner than established ceiling prices 18 forbidden. International allo- :-\ncations to solve price problems and aggressive U. S. sponsored expansion\nprograms, both in the U. S. and abroad, afford the only solution. In\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 4\nSECRET\nNSC 114/2\n- 6 -\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nSECRET\nthis case also, sévére civilien restrictions are presently in opera-\ntion. Any further cut-backs would provide relatively little to the\nstockpile and would cause serious labor, small business and other\ndislocations excessively weakening the basic economy of the country.\nCopper\nZinc\nLead\nCLASS VI --Stockpile objectives were only recently established and therefore It\n1s too early to see significant progress.\nBauxite,\nManganese Ore,\nCotton (Extra long\nRefractory Grade\nChemical Grade\nStaple)\nVegetable Tannin\nFluorspar,\nChestnut - Wattle\nWool\nAcid Grade\nCLASS VII-World supplies of the following materials available to this country\nare entirely inadequate to permit significant stockpiling even if it\nwere practicable to channel all imports to the stockpile. Substitu-\ntions are available and must be fully exploited.\nCastor Oil\nKyanite\nCoconut Oil\nOpium\nPalm Oil\nShellac\nCorundum\nTalc, Steatite Block\nGraphite,\nVegetable Tannin,\nCrucible Grade\nQuebracho\nCLASS VIII--Materials are being used to meet military, AEC and essential de-\nfense supporting production almost exclusively, thus only slight addi-\ntions to the stockpile are possible. Restrictions of civilian con-\nsumption is severe. Materials such as manganese are. necessary to main-\ntain steel production or other essential segments of the economy.\nAsbestos (All grades)\nMica\nJewel Bearings\nBaurite,\nMuscovite Block and Film\nTungsten\nMetal Grade\nMolybdenum\nVanadium\nChromite,\nNickel\nManganese Ore\nRefractory Grade\nQuartz Crystals\nMetallurgical\nManganese Ore,\nDiamonds, Industrial\nGrade\nBattery Grade\nCrushing Bort\nCLASS IX--Either the stockpile objective is achieved or the danger point level is\npassed. Current conservation measures and programs to expand supplies\nshould be continued until the stockpile objectives for all are completed,\nbut there is no need for additional drastic action at this time.\n!\nAntimony\nChromite,\nGraphite,\nBismuth\nMetallurgical Grade\nLubricant Flake\nCadmium\nDiamonds, Industrial Stones\nHyoscine\nCelestite\nFluorspar,\nMercury\nChromite,\nMetallurgical Grade\nPyrethrum\nChemical Grade Graphite,\nQuinine-Quinidine\nAmorphous Lump\nSapphire and Ruby\nMica, -Muscovise and Phlogopite Splittings\nSperm 011\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 4\nSECRET\nNSC 114/2\n- 7 -\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nSECRET\n4. Estimated Cost in Fiscal Years 1953 and 1954\n21. Budgetary needs of the stockpiling program must be analyzed from\ntwo standpoints: (a) obligational authority to permit timely placement of\ncontracts and (b) cash to cover programmed deliveries. The recent policy\nof the Bureau of the Budget and the Congress that contract authority no\nlonger be granted but that all obligational authority be in the form of\ncash, coupled with the inherent long-lead-time nature of contracting for\nstockpile materials, leads to the apparent over-appropriation of cash funds\nin that substantial unspent cash balances exist at the end of each fiscal\nyear. Since stockpile appropriations are usable until spent, no complica-\ntions arise from this so long as the situation is understood.\na. Cash Basis. As of 30 June 1951 the current market value of the\nstockpile objective quantities was $8.3 billion and of the stocks on\nhand and paid for $3.0 billion. Thus a. balance of $5.3 billion worth\nof materials were still to be delivered and paid for to complete the\nprogram. In addition, expenses such as storage, storage facilities\nconstruction, rotation, maintenance, processing and administrative over-\nhead will involve about $100 million each year.\nThe unexpended cash balance as of 30 June 1951 was $2.6 billion and\nthe Fiscal Year 1952 appropriation is expected to be about $0.8 billion.\nAvailable cash, therefore, is about $3. billion. This is expected to be\nsufficient to cover possible deliveries to the stockpile during Fiscal\nYears 1952 and 1953, plus the $0.2 billion in miscellaneous expenses for\nthe two years. Further cash funds will be necessary in Fiscal Year 1954\nand beyond.\nSUMMARY OF CASH REQUIREMENTS FOR EXPENDITURES\nAmount Needed $ Billions\nFiscal Year\nOther\nNeeded\nMaterials\nExpenses\nTotal\nRemarks\n1952\n1.9\n0.1\n2.0 )\nAvailable from FY '51\n1953\n1.3\n0.1\n1.4 )\nand '52\n1954\n1.0\n0.1\n1.1 )\nTo be appropriated\n1955-59\n1.1\n0.5\n1.6 )\nSub-total\n5.3\n0.8\n6.1\nValue on Hand\n6/30/51\n3.0\n0.1*\n3.1\nValue of Completed\nStockpile\n8.3\n0.9\n9.2\n*Expenditures to 6/30/51\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 4\nNSC 114/2\n-8-\nSECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nSECRET\nb. Obligational Authority Basis. The unobligated funds as of\n30 June 1951 amounted to $0.9 billion. New obligational authority\n(all in cash) for FY 1952 is expected to be about $0.6 billion making\nthe total available for obligation in FY 1952 $1.5 billion. This is\nexpected to be obligated during the year, hence further obligational\nauthority will be needed for contracting activities in FY 1953 and 1954.\n22. In addition to the $3.0 billion worth of material in the stockpile\non 30 June 1951, there were $1.9 billion worth under contract. The total of\n$4.9 billion as compared to the $8.3 billion objectives leaves $3.4 billion\nto be purchased as of that date. In addition, there will be obligations made\nof about $100 million per year for the other expenses.\n23. In order that full advantage can be taken of opportunities to obtain\nmaterial for future delivery, funds must be available for obligation at all\ntimes. Based on recent experience, it 1s believed that the scheduled obli-\ngations of $1.4 billion for materials in FY 1952 will taper off to about $1.0\nbillion in FY 1953 and $0.6 billion in FY 1954. One reason for this is the\nfact that fewer materials each year will remain on the list still subject to\npurchase. By Fiscal Year 1955 1t is expected that new commitments will be\nat a low annual rate.\nSUMMARY OF FUNDS REQUIRED FOR OBLIGATION\nAmount Needed $ Billions\nFiscal Year\nNeeded\nMaterials\nExpenses\nTotal\nRemarks\n1952\n1.4\n0.1\n1.5\nAvailable in FY 1952\n1953\n1.0\n0.1\n1.0\nTo be granted\n1954\n0.6\n0.1\n0.7\nTo be granted\n1955-59\n0.4\n0.4\n0.8\nTo be granted\nTotal\n3.4\n0.7\n4.1\nValue on Hand or on\nOrder 6/30/51\n4.9\n0.2*\n5.1\nValue of Completed\nStockpile\n8.3\n0.9\n9.2\n*Total obligations to 6/30/51\n24. On the theory that contract authority will no longer be granted but\nthat all appropriations will be in cash, the following would be called for:\nF. Y. 1952 - $800 million cash, including $200 million to liquidate\nprior C/A, as presently included in the budget.\nF. Y. 1953 - $1.1 billion cash for obligation.\nF. Y. 1954 - $0.7 billion cash for obligation.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 4\nNSC 114/2\nas 9 -\nSECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nSECRET\nC. Analysis of Extent to Which Program Meets Needs of National Security\n25. The stockpile objective for any item represents the anticipated\ndeficit between wartime needs and wartime supplies. The individual deficits\nvary greatly as to percentage of war requirements; thus in some instances such\nas copper, lead, zinc, and wool, the anticipated deficit 1e 20 percent or less\nand for others such as mercury and rubber the deficit is 80 percent or more.\nStockpile performance, as between items, hence is not properly measured by\nthe percentage fulfillment of individual objectives. Performance is more\nproperly evaluated by examining the degree to which war requirements are met\nby the total of assumed wartime supplies plus the amount of stockpile acquired.\nThis comparison reveals the items for which national war requirements are far\nfrom being taken care of.\n26. In Exhibits A and D only those stockpile items are included for which\nassumed wartime supplies plus stockpiles on hand 30 June 1951 total less than\n80 percent of wartime requirements. The current preparedness status for all\nitems on the stockpile list ranges from 100 percent downward to 3 percent in\none case.\n27. The purpose of the program proposed herein is to place emphasis on\nthose items currently in the most dangerous condition and which prospectively\nwill not greatly improve during FY 1952 and FY 1953 without extraordinary effort.\n28. The recommended program of acquisition is that established by the\nMunitions Board and which in itself is limited by maximum estimates of what\nmight be accomplished. It will be noted that the prospective 30 June 1953\nstatus under the Munitions Board program (Column C, Exhibit A), while better\nthan the status arrived at by projecting either from January - June 1951'acqui-\nsition rates (Column E) or from July - December 1951 programs established\nby the DPA (Column D), is far from satisfactory in many instances.\n29. As will be seen from Column F of Exhibit A, there are many items for\nwhich the stockpiles will not prospectively be filled, even under this very\nambitious program, until far later than 30 June 1953. The impact of these\nthreatened shortages will center upon various phases of the military production\nplans or the industrial economy, depending on the item.\n30. For example, columbite and cobalt shortages will limit jet engine pro-\nduction. Tungsten will affect armor-piercing ammunition as well as the broad\nfield of industrial metal cutting tools. Quartz crystals, mica, tantalite, and\ntalc shortages will affect electronics production. Corundum, industrial dia-\nmonds and refractories will affect industrial manufacturing efficiency as a.\nwhole, hence will affect all war and war-supporting programs. Manganese, needed\nfor steel, affects everything.\n31. To a. degree these shortages can be absorbed by the development of\nsubstitutes; however, this is partial relief at best, and unless the substi-\ntute is developed and adopted prior to M-Day and is completely satisfactory\nand readily available, would cause loss of time and efficiency, and would be\nwasteful of manpower and other materials.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 4\nNOC 114/2\n- 10 -\nSECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nIV\nEXHIBIT \"A\"\nCOMPARISON OF PROJECTED SECURITY STATUS 30 JUNE 1953 UNDER\nVARIOUS ASSUMPTIONS AS TO F.Y. 1952 and 1953 RATES OF STOCKPILE ACQUISITION\n(Includes only those items for which assumed wartime supplies, plus\nstocks on hand 30 June 1951, total less than 80% of assumed wartime requirements)\n(A)\n(B)\n(c)\n(D)\n(E)\n(F)\n(G)\n(H)\n5-Year Wartime Supplies plus Actual or\nCalendar Year during which\nProjected Stocks on Hand - as Percent\nStockpile would be Completed\nof 5-Year Wartime Requirements\nunder Assumptions (c) (D)&(E)\nProjected as of 6-30-53\nActual\nIf DPA determi- If actual rate\nMB\nDPA Rate\nJan-Jun\nas of\nIf MB\nnations for\nof acquisition Program\nfor Jul-Dec\n1951 Actual\n6-30-51\nProgram\nJul-Dec 51 are\nJan-Jun 51 is Rate\n1951\nRate\nMaterial\nis met\nnot improved\nnot improved\nBristles, Hog\n3.0\n79.6\n44.2\n44.2\n1954\n1956\n1956\nSilk, Waste and Noils\n5.0\n96.5\n39.0\n25.4\n1953\n1957\n1960\nColumbite\n11.7\n19.9\n11.7\n12.7\n1960/\n19601\n1960/\nAsbestos, Crocidolite\n16.4\n55.3\n44.6\n28.4\n1956\n1957\n1960/\nTalc, Block\n18.6\n45.5\n*\n22.4\n1958\n*\n1960/\nQuinidine\n20,4\n77.0\n100.0\n43.8\n1952\n1952\n1958\nAsbestos, Amosite\n23.3\n45.1\n27.7\n23.3\n1958\n1960/\n1960/\nOpium (Morphine Content)\n23.5\n73.1\n67.1\n72.1\n1954\n1955\n1954\nRare Earths\n24.2\n63.7\n*\n24.2\n1956\n*\n1960/\nCorundum\n28.8\n49.3\n36.0\n28.8\n1958\n1960/\n1960/\nTantalite (Ta₂O₅)\n30.2\n46.6\n*\n30.4\n1957\n*\n1960/\nAsbestos; Chrysotile\n30.4\n50.4\n39.6\n31.0\n1958\n1960/\n1960/\nFeathers & Down, Waterfowl\n36.2\n74.9\n*\n50.6\n1955\n*\n1960\nShellac\n38.8\n65.2\n100.0\n88.2\n1955\n1953\n1954\nCobalt\n40.2\n59.9\n43.0\n46.2\n1959\n1960/\n1960/\nPalm Oil\n44.6\n70.7\n100.0\n70.0\n1953\n1953\n1955\nCordage Fibers, Abaca\n45.5\n67.9\n71.1\n55.7\n1955\n1956\n1960/\nTungsten (W Content)\n45.9\n65.5\n*\n48.5\n1958\n*\n1960/\nQuartz Crystals\n46.9\n68.0\n53.7\n49.1\n1958\n1960/\n1960/\nGraphite, Crucible Grade\n48.0\n71.2\n*\n89.4\n1955\n*\n1954\nBauxite, Refractory Grade\n49.9\n64.8\n49.9\n49.9\n1956\n1960/\n1960/-\nMica, Muscoviet Film\n50.1\n65.3\n53.5\n54.7\n1958\n1960/\n1960/\nMica, Muscovite Block\n55.8\n69.1\n57.0\n58.8\n1958\n1960/\n1960/\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 4\nNSC 114/2\nSEGRET\n-11-\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nSECRET\n(A)\n(B)\n(c)\n(D)\n(E)\n(F)\n(G)\n(H)\n5-Year Wartime Supplies plus Actual or\nCalendar Year during which\nProjected Stocks on Hand - as Percent\nStockpile would be Completed\nof 5-Year Wartime Requirements\nunder Assumptions (c) (D)&(E)\nProjected as of 6-30-53\nActual\nas of\nIf MB\nIf DPA determi-\nIf actual rate\nMB\nDPA Rate\nJan-Jun\n6-30-51\nProgram\nnations for\nof acquisition\nProgram\nfor Jul-Dec\n1951 Actual\n1e met\nJul-Dec 51 are\nJan-Jun 51 is\nRate\n1951\nRate\nMaterial\nnot improved\nnot improved\nCastor Oil\n55.9\n73.0\n71.7\n58.7\n1957\n1957\n1960/\nCoconut Oil\n56.6\n99.4\n100.0\n90.4\n1952\n1952\n1954\nManganese, Battery Grade\n56.6\n80.3\n81.4\n59.2\n1956\n1955\n1960/-\nMolybdenum (Mo Content)\n57.5\n70.3\n64.5\n61.5\n1958\n1960/-\n1960/\nCotton, Extra Long Staple\n59.1\n87.2\n*\n68.7\n1954\n*\n1960\nDiamonds, Crushing Bort\n60.8\n72.1\n*\n69.6\n1958\n*\n1960/\nQuebracho Extract\n61.0\n95.1\n100.0\n73.8\n1954\n1953\n1957\nChromite, Chemical Grade\n61.2\n101.7\n78.4\n95.0\n1952\n1955\n1953\nChromite, Metallurgical Grade\n61.6\n84.8\n61.6\n66.0\n1955\n1960/\n1960/\nRubber, Natural\n61.7\n96.8\n100.0\n100.0\n1952\n1952\n1953\nKyanite\n63.2\n100.0\n75.8\n84.8\n1952\n1957\n1954\nBeryl\n64.8\n96.8\n*\n77.6\n1955\n*\n1957\nChestnut Extract\n66.8\n84.8\n84.2\n67.8\n1955\n1955\n1960/\nManganese, Metallurgical Grade\n67.1\n85.1\n72.7\n72.3\n1956\n1960/\n1960/\nChromite, Refractory Grade\n69.1\n100.4\n70.7\n69.1\n1953\n1960/\n1960/-\nHyoscine\n70.1\n99.4\n100.0\n100.0\n1952\n1952\n1952\nTin\n70.5\n100.5\n*\n86.7\n1952\n*\n1955\nManganese, Chemical Grade\n71.4\n93.1\n*\n77.2\n1954\n*\n1960/-\nWattle Extract\n73.9\n92.6\n100.0\n73.9\n1954\n1953\n1960/-\nNickel\n74.6\n82.6\n75.8\n77.2\n1959\n1960/\n1960/-\nSperm 011\n77.8\n100.0\n100.0\n100.0\n1952\n1952\n1952\nPlatinum\n77.9\n92.8\n*\n100.0\n1954\n*\n1953\nFluorspar, Acid Grade\n78.1\n95.4\n85.9\n84.1\n1954\n1957\n1958\nGraphite, Lubricant Grade\n78.7\n99.4\n*\n100.0\n1952\n*\n1953\nMagnesium\n78.8\n98.2\n82.4\n78.8\n1954\n1960/-\n1960/\n*\nDefense Production Administration Program not yet firmed up.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 4\nNSC 114/2\n- 12-\nSECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nSECRET\nEXHIBIT \"B\"\nMAJOR USES AND SOURCES OF STOCKPILE MATERIALS\nMaterial\nMajor Uses\nMajor Sources\nAluminum\nAircraft construction\nU.S., Canada\nAntimony\nSolder, low melting alloys, flame\nU.S., Mexico, Bolivia\nproofing, anti-fouling paint\nAsbestos\nHigh-temperature insulation, flame\nUnion of South Africa, Southern\nresistant textiles, filters for\nRhodesia, Bolivia\nprotective devices\nBauxite\nMetal\nAlumina for metal, chemical industry U.S., Surinam\nand rubber industry\nRefractory\nHigh temperature furnace linings\nU.S., British Guiana\nBeryl\nBeryllium-copper for bearings,\nBrazil, India\nbushings, diaphragms\nBismuth\nSolders, bearings, anchors for dies\nU.S., Canada, Mexico, Peru\nand punches, pharmaceuticals\nBristles, Hog\nTextile dabbing brushes, non-spark-\nChina\ning industrial brushes\nCadmium\nBearings, protective coatings,\nU.S., Canada, Mexico, Peru,\nhardener for copper, cerium, gold\nAustralia\nand silver\nCastor Oil\nSynthetic resins, lubricants, nylon,\nBrazil, U.S.\nbrake fluid\nCelestite\nSignal flares, tracer ammunition,\nMexico, Spain, United Kingdom\nfiller for paints, rubber and\nplastics\nChromite\nChemical\nSodium bichromate, tanning, plating\nUnion of South Africa\nMetallurgical\nStainless steel, high speed cutting\nUnion of South Africa, U.S.S.R.,\nsteel\nTurkey, Southern Rhodesia\nRefractory\nLinings and brick for metallurgical\nCuba, Philippines, Union of\nfurnaces\nSouth Africa\nCobalt\nHigh temperature alloys, tool steel,\nBelgian Congo, Canada, French\nmagnetic alloys\nMorocco\nCoconut 011\nLauryl alcohol, germicides, disinfec-\nIndonesia, Philippines\ntants, lubricants, incendiaries\nColumbite\nCarbon stabilizer in steels, high\nNigeria, Belgian Congo, Brazil,\ntemperature alloys\nIndia\nCopper\nShell cases, rotating bands, elec-\nU.S., Chile, Canada, Union of\ntric conductor, foundry products\nSouth Africa\nCordage Fibers\nAbaca\nMarine cordage, drill cable,\nCentral America, Philippines,\nSisal\nwire rope centers\nBritish E. Africa, Angola, Haiti\nCorundum\nHeavy duty abrasive, optical\nUnion of South Africa\nabrasive\nCotton, Extra\nHigh speed sewing thread, balloon\nEgypt, Sudan, Peru, U.S.\nLong Staple\ncloth, Byrd cloth, airplane fabric\nDiamonds\nGrinding, polishing, drilling\nBelgian Congo, Brazil, Union of\nIndustrial\nSouth Africa\nFeathers and Down,\nArctic sleeping bags, special\nChina, U.S.\nWaterfowl\nclothing\nFluorspar, Acid\nHydrofluoric acid, flux, ceramics\nU.S., Mexico, Spain\nAnnex No. 4\n- 13 -\nSECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nSECRET\nMaterial\nMajor Uses\nMajor Sources\nFluorspar\nMetallurgical\nFlux in manufacture of steel, cast\nU.S., Mexico, Spain\niron and ferro-alloys\nGraphite\nAmorphous\nCarbon brushes\nCeylon\nCrucible\nCrucibles and stoppers\nMadagascar\nLubricant\nLubricants and packing\nU.S.\nHyoscine\nMotion sickness remedy\nAustralia\nIridium\nHardener for platinum, plating\nCanada, Columbia, U.S.S.R., U.S.\nJewel Bearings\nInstruments, timing devices\nSwitzerland, U.S.\nKyanite\nHigh temperature refractory\nKenya, India\nLead\nAmmunition, batteries, solder,\nU.S., Canada, Mexico, Peru,\nbabbitt, tetraethyl lead\nAustralia\nManganese\nBattery\nDry cell batteries\nGold Coast, U.S.\nChemical\nOxidizer, photographic developer,\nBelgian Congo, Gold Coast, Cuba,\ngum inhibitor, stabilizer\nU.S.S.R.\nMetallurgical\nFerro-alloy for steel manufacture\nU.S.S.R., Gold Coast,\nIndia, Union of South Africa\nMercury\nExplosives, chemicals, electrical\nItaly, Spain, Mexico, U. S.\napparatus\nMica\nElectrical insulation for radio,\nIndia, Argentina, Brazil\nradar, magnetos, motors\nCanada, Mexico, Madagascar\nMolybdenum\nAlloying element in steel, cast\nU.S., Chile\niron and non-ferrous alloys\nNickel\nAlloying element in steel and non-\nCanada, Cuba, lvew Caledonia,\nferrous alloys, plating.\nU.S.S.R.\nOpium\nNarcotic drugs\nIran, Turkey, Yugoslavis, India\nPalm 011\nManufacture of tin and terne plate,\nBelgian Congo, Indonesia,\ncold rolling of steel\nNigeria\nPlatinum\nElectrical contact points, catalyst,\nCanada, Columbia, U.S.S.R.,\nelectrodes, spinnerets for rayon\nSwitzerland, Union of South\nnozzles for fiber glass\nAfrica, Alaska\nPyrethrum\nInsecticides\nBelgian Congo, British East\nAfrica, Brazil, Japan\nQuartz Crystals\nElectronic oscillators and filters,\nBrazil\noptical uses\nQuinidine\nTreatment for heart ailments\nIndonesia\nQuinine\nAnti-malarial\nIndonesia\nRare Earths\nArc cores, optical abrasive, misch\nBrazil, India\nmetal, cerium-magnesium alloy\nRubber\nTires, tubes, clothing, insulation,\nIndonesia, Malaya, Siam, Ceylon,\nmechanical goods, fuel cells\nLiberia\nSapphire and Ruby\nJewel bearings\nSwitzerland, U.S.\nShellac\nAdhesive, protective\nIndia\ncoatings\nSilk\nPowder bags for large guns\nChina, Japan, Korea, Iran,\nSwitzerland, Brazil\nSperm 011\nLubricants, metal cutting and drawing\nNorway, United Kingdom\nTalc\nInsulators for high frequency\nIndia, Italy\nelectronic circuits\nTantalite\nHigh-temperature alloys, electronic\nBrazil, Belgian Congo, Nigeria,\ntubes, manufacture of synthetic\nSouthern Rhodesia, Uganda,\nrubber\nU.S.\nTin\nTinplate, solder, babbitt, bronze\nMalaya, Indonesia, China, Bolivia\nBelgian Congo\nAnnex No. 4\n- 14 -\nSECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nSECRET\nMaterial\nMajor Uses\nMajor Sources\nTungsten\nHigh speed steel, high temperature\nChina, Korea, Australia,\nalloys, electronic tubes, armor\nBrazil, Bolivia, Peru, U.S.\npiercing shot\nVanadium\nTool steels, alloy steels, chemical\nUnion of South Africa, Peru,\ncatalyst\nU.S.\nVegetable Tannins\nChestnut\nTanning hides\nU.S., Italy, France\nQuebracho\nTanning hides, oil well drilling\nArgentina, Paraguay\nWattle\nTanning hides\nBritish East Africa, Union of\nSouth Africa\nWool\nMilitary and civilian clothing,\nU.S., Australia, New Zealand,\nblankets\nUnion of South Africa,\nArgentina, Uruguay\nZinc\nGalvanizing, die castings, brass\nU.S., Canada, Mexico, Peru,\nand bronze, bleaches, paint\nAustralia\nsmoke mixtures\nAnnex No. 4\n- 15 -\nSECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\n40\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nSECRET\nMUNITIONS BOARD PROGRAM FOR ACQUISITION OF STOCKPILE MATERIALS\nEXHIBIT \"C\"\nF.Y. 1952, 1953, 1954\n(Excludes Items for which Stockpile 18 already Completed)\n(A)\n(B)\n(c)\n(D)\n(E)\n(F)\n(G)\n(E)\n(I)\nAcquisition Program by Years\nTotal Stockpile Inventory\nDuring\nDuring\nDuring\nActual\nProposed\nMaterial\nProposed\nProposed\nUnit\nF.Y. 1952\nF.Y. 1953\nF.Y. 1954\n6-30-51\n6-37-52\n6-30-53\n6-30-54\nALUMINUM\nST\n185,951\n170,036\n283,263\n60,750\n246,701\n416,737\n700,000\nANTIMONY (Sb Content)\nST\n2,511\n0\n0\n18,489\n21,000\n21,000\n21,000\nASBESTOS\nAmosite\nST\n4,921\n4,900\n4,900\n1,301\n6,222\n11,122\nChrysotile\n16,022\nST\n3,013\n3,000\n3,000\n1,992\n5,005\nCrocidolite\n8,005\n11,005\nST\n1,261\n800\n800\n139\n1,400\n2,200\n3,000\nBAUXITE\nMetal Grade\nLDT\n779,280\n999,796\n0\n3,220,924\n4,000,204\nRefractory Grade\n5,000,000\n5,000,000\nLCT\n30,000\n60,000\n60,000\n0\n30,000\n90,000\n150,000\nBERYL\nST\n5,749\n4,000\n4,000\n5,290\n11,039\n15,039\n19,039\nBRISTLES, HOG\nLbs,\n2,409,926\n2,500,000a/\n1,300,000a/\n90,074\n2,500,000\n5,000,000a/\n6,300,000/\nCADMIUM\nLbs.\n2,562,444\n1,000,000\n1,000,000\n5,036,109\n7,598,553\n8,598,553\n9,598,553\nCASTOR OIL\nLbs.\n84,270,266\n100,000,000\n100,000,000\n27,729,734\n112,000,000\n212,000,000\n312,000,000\nCHROMITE\nChemical Grade\nLDT\n360,718\n0\n0\n309,282\n670,000\n670,000\n670,000\nMetallurgical Grade\nLDT\n629,624\n315,450\n315,450\n1,636,961\n2,266,585\n2,582,035\n2,897,485\nRefractory Grade\nLDT\n220,000\n125,000\n0\n274,985\n494,985\n619,985\n619,985\nCOBALT\nLbs.\n9,337,059\n9,000,000\n9,000,000\n15,738,739\n25,075,798\n34,075,798\n43,075,798\nCOCONUT OIL\nLbs.\n192,725,705\n0\no\n206,698,309\n399,424,014\n399,424,014\n399,424,014\nCOLUMBITE\nLbs.\n3,927,854\n1,932,278\n2,700,000\n6,668,175\n10,596,029\n12,528,307\n15,228,307\nCOPPER\nST\n374,244\n375,000\n250,000\n596,148\n970,392\n1,345,392\n1,595,392\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 4\nNSC 114/2\n- 16 -\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\n*\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\n$\nSECRET\n(A)\n(B)\n(c)\nEXHIBIT \"C\"\n(D)\n(E)\n(F)\n(G)\n(H)\n(I)\nAcquisition Program by Years\nTotal Stockpile Inventory\nDuring\nDuring\nDuring\nActual\nMaterial\nProposed\nUnit\nProposed\nF.Y. 1952\nProposed\nF.Y. 1953\nF.Y. 1954\n6-30-51\n6-30-52\n6-30-53\n6-30-54\nCORDAGE FIBERS\nAbaca\nLbs.\n55,511,268\n45,000,000b/\nSisal\n79,488,732\n135,000,000\n180,000,000\nLbs.\n75,877,428\n180,000,000\n0\n0\n97,122,572\n173,000,000\n173,000,000\n173,000,000\nCORUNDUM\nLbs.\n5,691,440\n5,600,000\n5,700,000\n208,560\n5,900,000\n11,500,000\n17,200,000\nCOTTON, EXTRA LONG STAPLE\nBales\n138,588\n125,000\n125,000\n11,412\n150,000\n275,000\n400,000\nDIAMONDS, INDUSTRIAL\nCrushing Bort\nKts.\n3,690,139\n3,800,000\nStones\n3,700,000\n11,677,591\n15,376,730\nKts.\n965,258\n19,167,730\n619,182\n22,867,730\n588,815\n6,126,745\n7,092,003\n7,711,185\n8,300,000\nFEATHERS AND DOWN\nLbs.\n6,442,662\n1,000,000\n2,500,000\n111,662\n6,554,324\n7,554,324\n10,054,324\nFLUORSPAR\nAcid Grade\nSDT\n98,904\n65,000\n64,316\n21,780\n120,684\n185,684\n250,000\nGRAPHITE\nAmorphous Lump\nST\n333\n0\n0\nCrucible Grade\n3,367\nST\n3,700\n2,061\n3,700\n2,687\n3,700\nLubricant Flake\n3,127\n4,143\n6,204\nST\n8,891\n2,322\n260\n12,018\n0\n2,818\n5,140\n5,400\n5,400\nHYOSCINE\nOz.\n3,170\n0\n0\n3,830\n7,000\n7,000\n7,000\nKYANITE\nSDT\n25,808\n0\n0\n8,192\n34,000\n34,000\n34,000\nLEAD\nST\n169,114\n117,554\n0\n413,332\n582,446\n700,000\n700,000\nMAGNESIUM\nST\n38,842\n92,439\n12,364\n31,355\n70,197\n162,636\n175,000\nMANGANESE ORE\nBattery Grade\nLDT\n36,980\n36,000\nChemical Grade\n20,000\n48,816\n85,796\nLDT\n121,796\n7,273\n141,796\n7,000\nMetallurgical Grade\n5,000\n7,727\nLDT\n15,000\n1,176,250\n22,000\n400,855\n27,000\n300,427\n2,126,480\n3,302,480\n3,703,335\n4,003,762\nAnnexes to\nNSC 114/2\nAnnex No. 4\n- 17 -\nSECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nSECRET\nEXHIBIT \"C\"\n(A)\n(B)\n(c)\n(D)\n(E)\n(F)\n(G)\n(H)\n(I)\nAcquisition Program by Years\nTotal Stockpile Inventory\nDuring\nDuring\nDuring\nActual\nProposed\nProposed\nMaterial\nProposed\nUnit\nF.Y. 1952\nF.Y. 1953\nF.Y. 1954\n6-30-51\n6-30-52\n6-30-53\n6-30-54\nMICA\nMuscovite Block\nLbs.\n801,506\n800,000\n800,000\n1,671,527\n2,473,033\n3,273,033\nMuscovite Film\n4,073,033\nLbs.\n357,844\n166,000\n165,000\n278,298\n636,142\n802,142\nMuscovite Splittings\n967,142\nLbs.\n2,199,635\n0\n0\n30,533,674\n32,733,309\n32,733,309\nPhlogopite Splittings\n32,733,309\nLbs.\n191,895\n0\n0\n1,408,105\n1,600,000\n1,600,000\n1,600,000\nMOLYBDENUM (Metal Cont.)\nLbs.\n22,564,278\n21,000,000\n31,000,000\n20,124,904\n42,792,704\n63,792,704\n84,792,704\nNICKEL\nLbs.\n75,235,770\n75,553,600\n74,553,600\n94,707,213\n169,942,983\n245,496,583\n320,050,183\nOPIUM (Morphone Cont.)\nLbs.\n69,622\n70,000\n70,000\n66,213\n135,835\n205,835\n275,835\nPALM OIL\nLbs.\n56,793,731\n8,000,000\n0\n54,639,875\n111,433,606\n119,433,606\n119,433,606\nPLATINUM GROUP METALS\nIridium\nTrOz\n8,951\n0\n0\n4,049\n13,000\nPlatinum\n13,000\n13,000\nTrOz\n144,494\n140,000\n140,000\n365,278\n509,772\n649,772\n789,772\nQUARTZ CRYSTALS\nLbs.\n1,642,441\n1,200,000\n1,100,000\n3,305,560\n4,948,001\n6,148,001\n7,248,001\nQUINIDINE\nOz.\n1,450,000\n0\n0\n519,938\n1,969,938\n1,969,938\n1,969,938\nRARE EARTHS\nSDT\n4,689\n3,500\n4,700\n3,300\n7,989\n11,489\n16,189\nRUBBER, NATURAL\nLT\n342,266\n150,000\n0\n694,239\n1,036,505\n1,186,505\n1,186,505\nSHELLAC\nLbs.\n7,148,274\n3,100,000\n4,000,000\n9,744,467\n16,892,741\n19,992,741\n23,992,741\nSILK\nLbs.\n6,147,947\n3,000,000\n0\n352,053\n6,500,000\n9,500,000\n9,500,000\nSPERM OIL\nLbs.\n5,024,733\n0\n0\n17,575,267\n22,600,000\n22,600,000\n22,600,000\nTALC, STEATITE BLOCK\nST\n554\n400\n400\n357\n929\n1,329\n1,729\nTANTALITE (Ta₂⁰₅ Cont.)\nLbs.\n428,873\n200,000\n0\n502,344\n931,217\n1,131,217\n1,331,217\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 4\nNSC 114/2\n- 18 -\nSECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\n16,\nSECRET\nEXHIBIT \"C\"\n(A)\n(B)\n(c)\n(D)\n(E)\n(F)\n(G)\n(H)\n(I)\nAcquisition Program by Years\nTotal Stockpile Inventory\nDuring\nDuring\nDuring\nActual\nProposed\nProposed\nProposed\nMaterial\nUnit\nF.Y. 1952\nF.Y. 1953\nF.Y. 1954\n6-30-51\n6-30-52\n6-30-53\n6-30-54\nTIN\nLT\n97,380\n14,348\n94\n113,178\n230,558\n244,906\n245,000\nTUNGSTEN (W Content)\nLbs.\n19,092,908\n17,493,705\n17,346,479\n43,798,760\n63,238,147\n80,731,852\n98,078,331\nVANADIUM (v Content)\nLbs\n1,476,404\n0\n0\n6,722,451\n8,198,855\n8,198,855\n8,198,855\nVEGETABLE TANNIN EXTRACT\nChestnut\nLT\n21,728\n21,000\n18,000\n272\n22,000\n43,000\n61,000\nQuebracho\nLT\n139,240\n25,000\n225,000\n60,760\n200,000\n225,000\n250,000\nWattle\nLT\n15,000\n10,000\n10,000\n0\n15,000\n25,000\n35,000\nZINC\nST\n125,003\n21,461\n12,163\n581,373\n706,376\n727,837\n740,000\nFOOTNOTES:\na\nOnly 2,500,000 lbs, of total stockpile objective has been programmed, pending review of objective.\nProcurement beyond this point contingent on whether balance of requirement can be stored and rotated.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 4\nNSC 114/2\n- 19 - -\nSECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nSECRET\nPRESENT AND PROJECTED SECURITY STATUS IN STOCKPILE MATERIALS\nEXHIBIT \"D\"\nWHICH ARE CURRENTLY IN MOST CRITICAL CONDITION\nPROJECTION BASED ON MUNITIONS BOARD ACQUISITION PROGRAM PER EXHIBIT \"C\"\n(Includes only those items for which assumed wartime supplies, plus stocks\non hand 6-30-51, total less than 80% of assumed wartime requirements)\n(A)\n(B)\n(c)\n(D)\n(E)\n(F)\n(G)\n(H)\n(I)\n(J)\n(K)\n(L)\nAssumed 5-Year Wartime Supplies plus\n5-Year Wartime Supplies plus\nAssumed 5-\nActual or Projected Stocks on Hand\nActual or Projected Stocks on\nAssumed\nYear Wartime\nHand - as Percent of 5-Year\n5-Year\nSupplies\nWartime Requirements\nWartime\nexcluding\nAs of\nAs of\nAs of\nAs of\nAs of\nAs of\nAs of\nAs of\nMaterial\nUnit\nRequirements\nStockpile\n6-30-51*\n6-30-52*\n6-30-53*\n6-30-54*\n6-32-51\n6-37-52\n6-30-53\n6-37-54\nBristles, Hog\nLbs.\n6,400,000\n98,900a/\n188,974\n2,598,900\n2,598,900\n2,598,900\n3.0\n40.6\n79.6\n100.0\nSilk, Waste and Noils\nLbs.\n10,000,000\n150,000\n502,053\n6,650,000\n9,650,000\n9,650,000\n5.0\n66.5\n96.5\n96.5\nColumbite\nLbs.\n72,161,000\n1,799,000\n8,467,175\n12,395,029\n14,327,307\n17,027,307\n11.7\n17.2\n19.9\n23.6\nAsbestos, Crocidolite\nST\n5,300\n731\n870\n2,131\n2,931\n3,731\n16.4\n40.2\n55.3\n70.4\nTalc, Block\nST\n3,550\n285\n660\n1,214\n1,614\n2,014\n18.6\n34.2\n45.5\n56.7\nQuinidine\nOz.\n2,562,913\n4,000\n523,938\n1,973,938\n1,973,938\n1,973,938\n20.4\n77.0\n77.0\n77.0\nAsbestos, Amosite\nST\n45,000\n9,180\n10,481\n15,402\n20,302\n25,202\n23.3\n34.2\n45.1\n56.0\nOpium, (Morphine Content) Lbs.\n281,400\n0\n66,213\n135,835\n205,835\n275,835\n23.5\n48.3\n73.1\n98.0\nRare Earths\nSDT\n20,700\n1,700b\n5,000\n1\n9,689\n13,189\n17,889\n24.2\n46.8\n63.7\n86.4\nCorundum\nLbs.\n55,000,000\n15,606,000\n15,814,560\n21,506,000\n27,106,000\n32,806,000\n28.8\n39.1\n49.3\n59.6\nTantalite (Ta₂O₅ Cont.)\nLbs.\n3,831,000\n653,000\n1,155,344\n1,584,217\n1,784,217\n1,984,217\n30.2\n41.4\n46.6\n51.8\nAsbestos, Chrysotile\nST\n30,000\n7,124\n9,116\n12,129\n15,129\n18,129\n30.4\n40.4\n50.4\n60.4\nFeathers & Down,WaterfowlLbs.\n19,195,000\n6,831,000\n6,942,662\n13,385,324\n14,385,324\n16,885,324\n36.2\n69.7\n74.9\n88.0\nShellac\nLbs.\n38,750,000\n5,280,000\n15,024,467\n22,172,741\n25,272,741\n29,272,741\n38.8\n57.2\n65.2\n75.5\nCobalt\nLbs.\n92,797,000\n21,550,000\n37,288,739\n46,625,798\n55,625,798\n64,625,798\n40.2\n50.2\n59.9\n69.6\nPalm Oil\nLbs.\n248,000,000\n56,000,000\n110,639,875\n167,433,606\n175,433,606\n175,433,606\n44.6\n67.5\n70.7\n70.7\nCordage Fibers, Abaca\nLbs.\n450,000,000\n125,400,000\n204,888,732\n260,400,000\n305,400,000\n305,400,000\n45.5\n57.9\n67.9\n67.9\nTungsten (w Content)\nLbs.\n189,000,000\n43,000,000\n86,798,760\n106,238,147\n123,731,852\n141,078,331\n45.9\n56.2\n65.5\n74.6\nQuartz Crystals\nLbs.\n13,500,000\n3,032,000\n6,337,560\n7,980,001\n9,180,001\n10,280,001\n46.9\n59.1\n68.0\n76.1\nGraphite, Crucible Grade ST\n20,500\n5,699\n9,842\n11,903\n14,590\n17,717\n48.0\n58.1\n71.2\n86.4\nBauxite, Refractory Gr.\nLCT\n603,000\n300,600\n300,600\n330,600\n390,600\n450,600\n49.9\n54.8\n64.8\n74.7\nMica, Muscovite Film\nLbs.\n3,450,000\n1,450,000\n1,728,298\n2,086,142\n2,252,142\n2,417,142\n50.1\n60.5\n65.3\n70.1\nMica, Muscovite Block\nLbs.\n12,050,000\n5,050,000\n6,721,527\n7,523,033\n8,323,033\n9,123,033\n55.8\n62.4\n69.1\n75.7\nCastor Oil\nLbs.\n1,077,000,000\n574,000,000\n601,729,734\n686,000,000\n786,000,000\n886,000,000\n55.9\n63.7\n73.0\n82.3\n*\nBased on Column (D) of this Exhibit, plus stock levels from columns (F)(G)(H) and (I) of Exhibit \"C\"\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 4\nNSC 114/2\n- 20 -\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nSECRET\n(A)\n(B)\n(c)\nEXHIBIT \"D\"\n(D)\n(E)\n(F)\n(c)\n(H)\n(I)\n(J)\n(K)\n(L)\nAssumed 5-Year Wartime Supplies plus\n5-Year Wartime Supplies plus\nAssumed 5-\nActual or Projected Stocks on Hand\nActual or Projected Stocks on\nAssumed\nYear Wartime\nHand - as Percent of 5-Year\n5-Year\nSupplies\nWartime Requirements\nWartime\nExcluding\nAs of\nAs of\nAs of\nAs of\nAs of As of\nMaterial\nAs of\nAs of\nUnit\nRequirements\nStockpile\n6-30-51*\n6-30-52*\n6-30-53*\n6-30-54*\n6-30-51\n6-30-52'\n6-30-53\n6-30-54\nCoconut Oil\nLbs.\n450,000,000\n48,000,000\n254,698,309\n447,424,014\n447,424,014\n447,424,014\n56.6\n99.4\n99.4\nManganese, Battery Grade LDT\n308,000\n99.4\n125,660\n174,476\n211,456\n247,456\n267,456\n56.6\nMolybdenum (Mo Content) Lbs\n68.7\n341,000,000\n80.3\n86.8\n176,000,000\n196,124,904\n218,792,704\n239,792,704\n260,792,704\n57.5\n64.2\nCotton, Extra Long StapleBales\n938,000\n70.3\n76.5\n542,500\n553,912\n692,500\n817,500\n942,500\n59.1\n73.8\nDiamonds, Crushing Bort Cts.\n66,400,000\n87.2\n100.4\n28,700,000\n40,377,591\n44,067,730\n47,867,730\n51,567,730\n60.8\n66.4\nQuebrache, Extract\n482,100\n72.1\nLT\n77.7\n233,524\n294,284\n433,524\n458,524\n483,524\n61.0\nChromite, Chemical\n89.9\nLDT\n891,530\n95.1\n100.3\n236,250\n545,532\n906,250\n906,250\n906,250\n61.2\n4,083,000\n101.7\nChromite, Metallurgical\n101.7\nLDT\n878,950\n101.7\n2,515,911\n3,145,535\n3,460,985\n3,776,435\n61.6\n77.0\n84.8\nRubber, Natural\nLT\n1,402,000\n92.5\n171,000\n865,239\n1,207,505\n1,357,505\nKyanite\n1,357,505\n61.7\n86.1\n96.8\nSDT\n96.8\n70,000\n36,024\n44,216\n70,024\n70,024\n70,024\n63.2\n100.0\nBeryl\n100.0\nST\n30,466\n14,440\n100,0\n19,730\n25,479\n29,479\n33,479\n64.8\nChestnut, Extract\n83.6\n96.8\nLT\n238,000\n158,730\n109.9\n159,002\n180,730\n201,730\n291,730\n66.8\nManganese, Metallurgical\nLDT\n75.9\n84.8\n8,722,000\n92.3\n3,722,000c/\n5,848,230\n7,024,480\n7,425,335\n7,725,762\n67.1\n80.5\n85.1\n88.6\nChromite, Refractory\nLDT\n1,105,000\n489,000\n763,985\n983,985\n1,108,985\n1,108,985\n69.1\n89.0\n100.4\n100.4\nHyoscine\nOz.\n10,815\n3,750\n7,580\n10,750\n10,750\n10,750\n70.1\nTin\n99.4\n99.4\nLT\n99.4\n372,453\n129,439\n262,617\n359,997\n374,345\n374,439\n70.5\n96.7\nManganese, Chemical\n100.5\nLDT\n65,750\n100.5\n39,218\n46,945\n54,218\n61,218\n66,218\n71.4\n82.5\nWattle, Extract\n93.1\nLT\n100.7\n134,000\n99,090\n99,09C\n114,090\n124,090\n134,090\n73.9\n85.1\nNickel\n92.6\n100.1\nLbs.\n1,888,000,000\n1,314,000,000\n1,408,707,213\n1,483,942,9831,559,496,583\n1,634,050,183\n74.6\n78.6\n82.6\nSperm Oil\nLbs.\n22,600,000\n86.5\n0\n17,575,267\n22,600,000\n22,600,000\n22,600,000\n77.8\nPlatinum\n100.0\n100.0\n100.0\nTrOz\n1,901,100\n1,115,000\n1,480,278\n1,624,772\n1,764,772\n1,904,772\n77.9\n85.5\n92.8\n100.2\nFlourspar, Acid Grade\nSDT\n948,700\n719,000\n740,780\n839,684\n904,684\n969,000\nGraphite, Lubricant Gr.\n78.1\n12,500\n88.5\n95.4\n102.1\nST\n7,022\n9,840\n12,162\n12,422\n12,422\nMagnesium\n679,000\n78.7\n97.3\n99.4\n99.4\nST\n504,000\n535,355\n574,197\n666,636\n679,000\n78.8\n94.6\n98.2\n100.0\nFOOTNOTES:\nComputed supply and requirements cover first 2 years only on account 01 possibility of substitution thereafter.\nComputed supply 10,273. Reduced to domestic supply,only.\nComputed supply 6,434,720. Reduced to 3,722,000 on account of large shipping requirements and essentiality of\nitem. Deficit becomes 5,000,000.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 4\nNSC 114/2\n- 21 -\nSECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nSECRET\nANNEX NO. 5\nTHE INFORMATION PROGRAM\n(Prepared by the Department of State)\nObjectives and Minimum Taaks of the Programs\n1. The objective of the international information and educational ex-\nchange programs is to assure that by the middle of calendar year 1953 the\nUnited States Government is possessed of the resourses required for effective\novert psychological activities in support of and complementary to other mea-\nsures designed tc further the achievement of the national objectives.\n2. The general task of the international information and educational ex-\nchange programs in facilitating the achievement of these objectives remains as\nstated in Annex V to NSC 68/3:\n\"The frustration of the design of the Kremlin will result primarily\nfrom concrete decisions taken and vigorous measures executed in the po-\nlitical, military and economic fields by the peoples and the governments\nof the free world under the leadership of the United States. The task of\nthe United States foreign information and educational exchange programs\nis to assure that the psychological implications of those actions are,\nfirst, fully developed and, second, effectively conveyed to the minds and\nthe emotions of groups and individuals who may importantly influence\ngovernmental action and popular attitudes in other nations and among\nother peoples.\"\n3. The further statement in Annex V to NSC 68/3 likewise continues to be\napplicable:\n\"Governmental action and popular attitudes will be influenced along\nlines favorable to the achievement of United States objectives through\nrecognition of the interests shared by the people and the Government of\nthe United States and other governments and peoples\nThe United States and other peoples and nations share common in-\nterests, which information and exchange programs can cultivate, in:\na. National freedom, including both the desire for recognized\nstatus in international affairs and the desire to maintain char-\nacteristic indigenous cultures.\nb. Peace and security against external aggression.\nC. Sovial advancement, economic progress and human welfare,\nunder governments responsive to popular aspirations.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 5\nNSC 114/2\nSECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nSECRET\nd. Effective international relationships to serve these ends.\"\n4. The situation in which the general task must now be carried out is\nfraught with greater danger and therefore charged with greater urgency than\nexisted when Annex V to NSC 68/3 was approved and than was then thought would\nexist now. Moreover, nearly a year's time has been lost in acquiring important\nfacilities, notably powerful radio transmitters strategically placed, and the\nbase of program operations, particularly in the fields of information centers\nand the exchange of persons, has been narrowed by congressional action. The\nexpansion of the program is therefore more rather phan less difficult than\nit was a year ago.\n5. Five specific tasks emerge as the minimum laid upon the international\ninformation and educational exchange programs. All actions contributing to\nmilitary strength, economic stability and political cohesion in the free world\nwill have a psychological impact and will contribute to the successful per-\nformance of these tasks, but actions of a primarily psychological character\nare also called for.\n6. The first task is to multiply and to intensify psychological deterrents\nto aggression by Soviet Communism, whether in the form of outright action by\nthe armed forces of the Soviet Union, of Communist China or of the satellites\nof the Soviet Union, or in the form of the subversion of existing free govern-\nments by civil forces acting on behalf of Soviet Comminism.\n7. This involves psychological action along the following lines:\na. To keep the people and the leadership of nations under the\ndomination or the influence of the Kremlin, including the Soviet Union\nitself, keenly aware of the vast potential strength of the free world,\nthe steady transformation of much of this strength into ready defensive\ncapabilities and the determination of the free world to maintain the\npeace in any honorable way possible but to defend its freedom if necessary.\nb. To warn the people and the leadership of such nations of the\nreckless nature of the policies of the Kremlin and the possible con-\nsequences thereof.\nC. To open and to widen schisms between the leaders and the armed\nforces, the bureaucracies, the religious groups, the peasantry, the in-\ndustrial workers and youth of these nations.\nd. To expose among the peoples of nations susceptible to subversive\ninfluences the myths surrounding Soviet Communism, to recall the fate of\nfree peoples whose governments have attempted to cooperate with parties\nand factions subservient to the Kremlin, to minimize fears as to the\nstrength and influence of fifth columns subservient to the Kremlin within\nsuch nations and to nourish popular confidence in the capability of these\nnations, by their own acts and as the result of strength accruing from the\ngression and subversion.\ncooperation of other free nations, to defend themselves against both ag-\nAnnexes to\nNSC 114/2\nAnnex No. 5\n- 2 -\nSECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nSECRET\n8. The second task is to intensify and to accelerate the growth of\nconfidence in and among the peoples and the governments of the free world,\nespecially in Western Europe, including Western Germany, in their capability\nsuccessfully to deter aggression by Soviet Communism or to defeat it should\nit nonetheless occur and to inspire concrete international, national and in-\ndividual action accordingly.\n9. This involves psychological action along the following lines:\na. To convince the peoples and the governments of these countries\nthat, although Soviet Communism is intent upon bringing about the collapse\nof free societies, its present intentions do not necessarily involve gen-\nif eral war and that it may be deterred from general war if unified strength\nis rapidly built by free nations.\nb. To build confidence in the power of existing deterrents to ag-\ngression and the still greater power of the deterrents now developing -\nthe certainty that a united, strong free world will win any war that\nSoviet Communism might precipitate,\nC. To develop understanding of the advantages and the necessity\nof the voluntary participation, in varying degrees, of Germany, Japan,\nYugoslavia and Spain in the common defense of the free world,\nd. To develop awareness and appreciation of the common interests,\nloyalties, traditions and symbole shared by the peoples of the free world\nand of the institutions, global and regional, that embody them.\ne. To demonstrate that, although adjustments in living standards\nwill be called for in order to assure the defense of the free world,\nthey can be kept within bearable limits, both as to extent and duration,\nand the military strength thus created will constitute a shield behind\nwhich social and economic progress can later go forward in an atmosphere\nrelieved of tension and fear.\nf. To stimulate and to maintain confidence in the leadership of the\nUnited States, respect for its peaceful intentions and trust in its re-\nliability, steadiness and moderation.\n10. The third task is to combat, particularly in the Near and Middle\nEast and South and Southeast Asia, extremist tendencies threatening the under-\nmining of the cohesion and the stability of the free world and the withdrawal\nof governments and peoples into neutralism.\n11. This involves psychological action along the following lines:\na. To demonstrate the interest of: the United States in and its\nsupport for the achievement of legitimate national aspirations on terms\nconsistent with the stability and the cohesion of the free world.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 5\nNSC 114/2\n- 3 $\nSECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nSECRET\nb. To demonstrate that those aspirations will most surely be\nachieved through cooperation with the free world.\nC. To indicate why, in the nature of the present struggle, neu-\ntralism 1s an unreal choice and how attempting to make it is likely to\nresult only in becoming a subject of exploitation by Soviet Communism.\nd. To recall the advantages that have accrued and are still accruing\nto underdeveloped countries from their association with the free world.\ne. To foster understanding of the nature and the intentions of the\npeople of the United States and to develop confidence in its leadership!\nf. To encourage, without undermining responsible established au-\nthority, all progressive forces bent on political advancement, economic\nimprovement and social reform.\n5. To indicate how the exacerbation of national antagonisms within\nan area create opportunities for aggression and subversion by Soviet\nCommunism and to encourage a will for peaceful settlement.\n12. The fourth task is to maintain among the peoples held captive by\nSoviet Communism, including the peoples of the Soviet Union, hope of ultimate\nliberation and identification with the free world and to nourish, without\nprovoking premature action, a popular spirit disposed. to timely resistance to\nregimes now in power.\n13. This involves psychological action along the following lines:\na. To make continuously plain that the United States looks to the\nestablishment in nations dominated or heavily influenced by Soviet Com-\nmunism of governments commanding the confidence of their respective\npeoples, freely expressed through orderly representative processes.\nb. To promote faith that the present situation in the world will\nnot last forever and that the ultimate triumph of freedom is inevitable.\nC. To keep alive national traditions and values linking to captive\npeoples with the free world.\nd. To keep the captive peoples accurately informed of situations\nand developments in the free world as a source of hope and a guide to\ntimely action.\n14. The fifth task is to maintain among peoples and governments tradi-\ntionally linked with the United States, particularly in Latin America, a con-\ntinued recognition of mutual interdependence and to promote national and in-\ndividual action accordingly.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 5\nNSC 114/2\n- 4 -\nSECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nSECRET\n15. This involves psychological action along the following lines:\na. To convince such peoples and governments that the United States\nis sincerely sympathetic with their legitimate national aspirations, and\nthe rest of the free world, achievement of those aspirations is being\nhastened,\nb. To convince these peoples and governments that their freedon is\ninextricably involved with that of other nations and peoples, is dependent\nin part upon the skills and resources of other nations and peoples and\nthat the preoccupation of the United States with problems in other areas\nis therefore justified and in their interest,\nC. In Latin America, to foster conscious popular devotion to the\nprinciple of Pan-Americanism as the concept within which the American\nnations can best realize their potentialities and discharge their ob-\nligations as members of the free world.\n16. The tasks are set forth in descending order of importance and are\nrelated to specific geographic regions and countries:\na. The task of deterring aggression by Soviet Communism, paragraph\n6 above, must be carried out primarily among the Soviet Union, China,\nPoland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, East Germany\nand North Korea as regards open aggression by armed forces and among\nFrance, Italy, Western Germany, Burma, Indo-China, Iran and Indonesia as\nregards subversion of existing governments by civil forces acting on be-\nhalf of Soviet Communism.\nb. The task of building confidence in the capability of the free\nworld to maintain peace by building united strength, paragraph 8 above,\nmust be carried out among all nations not dominated by Soviet Communism\nbut especially those linked in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation\nand closely associated with them in defensive plans: United Kingdom,\nCanada, Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, France,\nPortugal, Italy, Turkey, Greece, Western German, Austria and Spain; those\nlinked in the Rio Treaty, especially Mexico and Brazil; and those linked\nin the Pacific Alliances, including Japan and the Philippines.\nC. The task of combatting extremist tendencies threatening the\ncohesion and stability of the free world, paragraph 10 above, must be\ncarried out primarily among India, Iran, Pakistan, Indo-China, Burma,\nIndonesia, Taiwan, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaya, Egypt, Labanon,\nSyria, Iraq, Morocco, Guatemala, Israel, Tunisia, Jordan, Afghanistan,\nSaudi Arabia.\nd. The task of maintaining hope of ultimate liberation from domina-\ntion by Soviet Communism, paragraph 12 above, must be carried out pri-\nmarily among the peoples of the nations in which the task of deterring\naggression by Soviet Communism must also be carried out.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 5\nNSC 114/2\n- 5 -\nSECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nSECRET\ne, The task of maintaining a continued recognition of mutual in-\nterdependence among governments and peoples traditionally linked with the\nUnited States must be pursued especially among the nations of Latin\nAmerica and the Near and Middle East.\nDescription of the Program\nElements Comprising the Program\n17. The elements comprising the recommended program include activities\ncarried out under the United States Information and Educational Exchange Pro-\ngram (Public Law 402), the Public Affairs Program for Germany, the Public\nAffairs Program for Austria, the Public Affairs Program for Japan, the Iranian\nStudent Aid Program, the Chinese Assistance Program, the Finnish Program, the\nIndia Grain Program (pending) and the Fulbright Program (Public Law 584).\n18, The latter five programs are concerned solely with the exchange of\npersons. The Fulbright Program is financed in foreign currencies made avail-\nable as payments on debts owed the United States by other governments; no\nappropriation is required to carry it out, Although they contribute substan-\ntially to the achievement of the psychological tasks set forth above, these\nprograms are only complementary to the major effort.\n19. Successful execution of the tasks laid upon the international in-\nformation and educational exchange program will depend primarily upon the\npropaganda and psychological activities carried out under Public Law 402 and\nthe Public Affairs Programs for Germany, Austria and Japan, Responsibility\nfor the conduct of the latter, now that the Peace Treaty has been signed, will\npass from the Department of Defense to the Department of State. The German\nand Austrian programs, already closely integrated with the global program,\nwill be moved into the Public Law 402 program in fiscal 1953.\n20. The recommended program under Public Law 402 for FY 1953 and FY 1954\ncontemplates the following major activities and developments over and above\nthe program currently authorized.\n21. Public Law 402 Program:\na. Radio Broadcasting. The rapid completion of the radio ring, in-\nvolving the construction of four additional megawatt shortwave transmittere\nin the United States, bringing the total of super-high-powered transmitters\nin this country to 6 (plus the 38 lower-powered transmitters now in use).\nThe origination of radio programming at Munich, for Eastern Germany,\nEastern Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary; at Salonika, for the\nsouthern Balkans and Southeastern Russia, using splinter languages of the\nregion, such as Armenian, Uzbek, and Azerbaijani; and at Okinawa (or\nequivalent), for China and Southeast Asia.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 5\nNSC 114/2\n- 6 -\nSECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nSECRET\nThe provision of low-cost receivers for distribution behind the Iron\nCurtain and in other strategic areas where receiveve are generally un-\navailable to target groups.\nThe substantial step-up of the purchase of time on and the preparation\nof programs for local broadcasting stations in foreign countries.\nThese measures are Mesigned : to assure: first, a signal strong\nenough to reach all areas behind the Iron Curtain and to overcome present\njamming to the maximum extent possible; second, programs closely tailored,\nto local requirements; third, a widespread\n25X1\naudience; and fourth, the presentation of programs over indigenous channels\nand lacking identification of the United States as the source.\nIf appropriations for the completion of the ring plan are made not\nlater than the middle of FY 1952, the facilities can be in full operation\nwithin approximately eighteen months thereafter. The completion of the\nring plan and the execution of other measures outlined above will provide\nthe most effective, and indeed the only overt, means of applying psycho-\nlogical deterrents to aggression by Soviet Communism through open military\naction. They will also provide the most effective and only overt means of\nstimulating hope of ultimate liberation among the peoples held captive by\nSoviet Communism.\nb. Press and Publications. A heavy increase in the preparation of\nmaterial for pamphlets, posters, publications and exhibits, directed to-\nward specific target groups, to be locally adopted and produced abroad\nand distributed, either by overt or covert means, without attribution to\nthe United States Government.\nThe opening of regional contracting offices to obtain the propaganda\nadvantages of foreign production under conditions that will assure tech-\nnical excellence and economy.\nAn intensification of the purchase overseas of research, writing,\ntranslation and art work from local sources, particularly where such\npurchase will facilitate the utilization of the press and publication\noutput.\nUnder the appropriation for the current fiscal year, the preparation\nof such materials at the level reached by the end of fiscal year 1951\nmust be curtailed. The recommended program would provide not simply for\nmaintaining production at the level reached in FY 1951 but for increasing\nit to the point where maximum use can be made of the printed word and\npicture as instrumentalities in: (a) creating psychological deterrents\nto aggression, whether by armed force or by civil subversion; (b) in\nbuilding confidence among the peoples of the free world; (c) in combatting\nextremist forces threatening stability and cohesion; and (a) in stimulating\nhope of ultimate liberation.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 5\nNSC 114/2\n7 -\nSECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nSECRET\nC. Motion Pictures, An increase of 300% in the production of docu-\nmentary motion pictures and newsreels adapted to the interests of local\naudiences and designed for distribution through all available channels,\nincluding those in the commercial field.\nIntensive efforts to utilize theatrical and commercial film pro-\nduction, which has not been possible under a .limited budget.\nSubstantial overseas film production, both regional and on a country\nbasis, including production without attribution to the United States.\nParticularly in underdeveloped countries and among audiences with\nlimited literacy, but also among industrial workers, farmers and youth\nin more advanced countries, motion pictures are a prime instrumentality\nfor building confidence, exposing the threat of aggression and combatting\ntendencies toward neutralism.\nd. Information Centers. Increasing the number of information centers,\nparticularly in the Near and Middle East. There are now 109 centers in\noperation, with an increase of up to 20% anticipated in the current fiscal\nyear. At least two hundred centers could be effectively used in the pro-\njected all-out campaign.\nIncreasing by ten-fold the number of United States books translated\nand published in local languages, particularly in Near and Middle East,\nFar East and South Asia.\nThese measures are designed to further, particularly among intel-\nlectuals, public leaders, teachers and officials, the development of\nconfidence, the combatting of extremism and the cultivation of the sense\nof mutual interdependence.\ne. Exchange of Persons. An increase from 3900 to 10,000 in the num-\nber of public opinion leaders, trade union leaders, farm leaders and youth\nleaders brought to the United States, particularly from Asia, the Near\nand Middle East and Western Europe.\nImprovement in the facilities for dealing with such leaders during\ntheir visits to the United States.\nPersonal contact and observation is a prime means of developing con-\nfidence, fostering a sense of mutual interdependence and combatting neu-\ntraliam. The proposed measure will significantly increase the effective-\nness of this means of affecting psychological attitudes.\nf. Overseas Missions. The information program overseas missions,\nattached to the United States Embassies, Legations and major consular\nestablishments, are the instrumentalities through which the media elements\nof the psychological program are carried out. Intensification of the\nmedia activities, therefore, although it does not mean a proportional\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 5\nNSC 114/2\n- 8 *\nSECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nSECRET\nincrease, does require a considerable strengthening of the overseas mis-\nsions - both quantitatively and qualitatively. The program outlined\nabove must be reflected in the field organizations in these ways:\n(1) The addition. to existing public affairs staffs of media\napecialists and tecnicians to provide a balanced propaganda team.\n(2) The recruitment and assignment to the field of more highly\nskilled, top-level information specialists.\n(3) The opening of a substantial number of \"decentralized\"\noperations, relatively small in size, shrewdly staffed, and strate-\ngically placed in the natural centers of target groups, such as in-\ndustrial and agricultural centers, particularly in Western Europe,\nthe Middle East and South Asia.\nThis field program would mean an increase of about 50% in both\nAmerican and local employees, to make a total of about 1300 American\nand 6500 local employees throughout the world.\n22. The Public Affairs Program for Austria, During the current fiscal\nyear, the program now being carried on will be increased somewhat in size and\nto a larger extent in emphasis, By the end of the year, the program, which\nessentially involves the same media and techniques as the Public Law 402 pro-\ngram in other countries, will be geared to achievement of the aims of the\nUnited States psychological offensive in Austria and will be carried forward\nat about the same rate in fiscal 1953.\n23. The current change in the emphasis of the program involves particular\nattention to specific priority target groups, such as labor and the so-called\n\"middle class\" which have historically been the victime of totalitarian ideo-\nlogies. This involves especially the use of the United States newspaper in\nVienna, the development of a specialized news; file for Austrian newspapers, the\nU.S. operated radio network, and a stepped-up pamphlet and leaflet operation.\n24. The Public Affairs Program for Japan. The present Civil Information\nand Education Program in Japan is conducted under SCAP, with the authority of the\nOccupation directives as a basis. It is in part directed toward internal re-\nform and reconstruction, and in part to Japanese acceptance of the foreign\npolicy goals of the United States. With the recognition of Japan as a sovereign\nnation, objective. the present program is being revised to aim primarily at the latter\n25. The revised public affairs program will represent about the maximum\novert operation that can be conducted profitable in Japan, and will be con-\ntinued in fiscal year 1953 if funds are available. The revised program will\nplace particular emphasis on:\na. Maintenance of the 23 information centers established under the\nOccupation as focal points for the adaptation to local needs of all in-\nformation and educational exchange operations.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 5\nNSC 114/2\n- 9 -\nSECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nSECRET\nb. Continuation of a large-scale exchange of persons operation.\nC. Developing press materials directed specifically to target groups\nwithin the country.\nd. Establishment of a cooperative radio program using both Voice of\nAmerica broadcasts and local broadcasting arrangements made through the\nBroadcasting Corporation of Japan and local commercial radio stations.\ne. Widespread use of documentary films throughout all areas of\nJapan.\n26. The Public Affairs Program for Germany. This program, because of the\nparticular problems involved in the occupation of Germany, and the availability\nof local currency for program purposes, is now carried on at approximately the\nlevel required for an optimum overt information, and educational exchange pro-\ngram. If this scale operation is to be continued, however, it will be necessary\nto substitute for an anticipated reduction in local currency re-\nsources, particularly ECA counterpart funds. Of the $44 million projected for\nthe current year program, only $14.5 is from appropriated dollars.\n27. Changes in the content and organization of the program are planned\nto adapt it to the anticipated political relationships with the German Federal\nRepublic. The principal changes are:\na. Extension of the program as a whole to all of Western Germany\nincluding the British and French zones, thus reducing its concentration\nin the U.S. Zone;\nb. Enlistment of a greater degree of German participation in the\nprogram and its administration including participation by German Govern-\nmental and private agencies, and\nC. Withdrawal from most of the activities now being carried on at\nthe local community level under the direct initiative of HICOG.\n28. Tentative plans call for the accomplishment of these changes through\nestablishment of 15 regional centers, each center being the site of an infor- 172\nmation center. The centers will be distributed throughout all three zones of\nWestern Germany. Staff based at such centers will be concerned with the ad-\nministration of the exchange program, cultural andeducation activities, film\ndistribution and use, servicing of press and publications, dissemination of\npamphlets and other informational materials, liaison with German radio stations,\netc.\n29. Assumptions and Policies on Which the Program is Based. The projected\nprogram can be achieved by the middle of calendar year 1953 if:\na. a supplemental appropriation for operational expansion is available\nin January 1952. About $44.5 million will be required;\nAnnexes to\nAnthex No. 5\nNSC 144/2\n- 10 -\nSECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nSECRET\nb. a supplemental appropriation to complete the \"ring plan\" for\nradio facilities within 18 months, requiring about $100 million in cash\nor contract authorization, is available in January 1952.\n30. It is assumed that the information program set forth in this document;\nand the estimate of required funds, represents the total worldwide overt pro-\npaganda program of the United States Government, and that any other public\ninformation activities, such as those in connection with foreign economic and\nmilitary assistance, will be confined to the promotion of the limited objectives\nof the respective programs under which they are authorized.\n31. It is assumed that the administrator of the outlined program will\nhave wide operating flexibility and that funds will be available for stated\npurposes without restrictive limitations.\n32. Estimate of the Cost of the Program for Fiscal Year 1953. There\nfollows an estimate of fund requirements to attain in fiscal year 1953 the\nlevel of operation to meet the needs of the situation as outlined above. It\nwill be noted that:\na. The amount provided in the estimate for activities under Public\nLaw 402 is substantially the same as projected in Annex V to NSC 68, pre-\npared in October 1950, with an increase of 15 percent to provide for\nprice rises since that time and the addition of $8 million to provide for\na program in Japan which is financed this year from appropriations to the\nDepartment of the Army.\nb. There are no significant new technical developments susceptible\nof employment in the overseas information program during fiscal year 1953\nwhich were not anticipated in Annex V of NSC 68. Opportunities for\nstrengthening the program in 1953 lie, therefore, in better use of known\nmethods rather than in new devices. Progress in technical research in-\ndicates, however, that certain new developments in radio broadcasting may\nbe available by fiscal year 1954. Financial provision must be made for\ncontinued research for the development of new methods in all media fields.\nThe sum of $10 million for this purpose and for construction necessary to\nmake immediate application on at least a pilot model basis of new devel-\nopments has been included in the estimate.\nC. Successful attainment of a maximum effort in fiscal year 1953\nwill require a supplemental appropriation for the current fiscal year of\n$44.5 million for operating purposes and $100 for construction of radio\nfacilities. The operating budget must be expanded to permit the re-\ncruitment of staff and the preparation of working materials to be utilized\nnext fiscal year. Completion of the radio facilities ring, which will re-\nquire in the neighborhood of 1C months, has already been jeopardized by\nthe delay in enactment of appropriations for this purpose.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 5\nNSC 114/2\n- 11 -\nSECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nSECRET\nEstimate of Fund Requirements for Fiscal Year 1953\nAmount\nProgram\n(Dellars)\nUSIE - Public Law 402\na. Operations\n$226,000,000\nb. Development and Capital Investment\n10,000,000\n$236,000,000\nPublic Affairs Program for Germany\n44,000,000\nPublic Affairs Program for Austria\n4,800,000 1/\nChinese Assistance Program\n900,000\nFulbright Program\n9,400,000\nFimilsh Program\n398,000\nIranian Trust Fund Program\n35,000 5/\nIndia Grain Program (Exchange of Persons)\n1,000,000 6/\nTotal\n$296,533,000\nRelationship of Recommended Program to the Needs of National Defense and Factors\nwhich Limit the Program.\n33. Relationship of Program to National Defense, The present struggle\nbetween the forces of freedom and the forces of slavery is being prosecuted as\nactively on the psychological front as on the military. The Kremlin has taken\nthe initiative in this matter. Communist strategy relies heavily on prop-\nagenda as a device for fomenting discord and dissatisfaction, for bringing the\nCommunist party into power with the assistance of internal and external forces\nand for retaining its hold over captive peoples who are frequently basically\nhostile to the whole concept. Military preparedness alone cannot cope with the\nthreat of Communism. It cannot preserve the peace nor win the victory in the\nevent of war unless there exists the will to resist and a conviction in the\nbasic principles for which the free world stands.\nCross requirements. W111 be offset in part by local revenues,\nBalance remaining in current appropriations,\nValue of foreign currencies owed to U.S. No appropriation required.\nPayment due from Finland on World War I debt. No appropriation required.\nEstimated expenditure from Trust Fund.\nEstimated amount to be available from interest payments by the Government of\nIndia. No appropriation required.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 5\nNSC 114/2\n- 12 -\nSECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nSECRET\n34. The U.S. position in the present crisis 1s that war is not inevitable,\nthat the peace can be maintained if the free nations are strong physically and\neconomically, if they cooperate and have the will to resist. The USIE program\nseeks to make this position clear to large numbers of people on both sides of\nthe iron curtain. East of the curtain the expression of America's confidence\n:..\nthat these goods are attainable serves to deter further physical aggression by\nthe Kremlin. West of the curtain it encourages and inspires greater effort.\n35. If world war should come the USIE program provides an operation which\ncan quickly be transformed into a psychological warfare weapon. To the extent\nthat planning must prepare for this eventuality the development of an adequate\nstaff -- trained and equipped for the job -- 10 a must. Equally important is\nthe completion of the radio facilities ring to provide a communications system\nwhich can reach around the world and overcome both artificial jamming and the\nnatural interference of atmospheric phenomena.\n36. Analysis of Limiting Factors. Successful implementation of this pro-\ngram to exert maximum overt psychological pressure on peoples overseas required\nthe removal of several serious obstacles:\na. Congressional leaders, particularly the appropriations committees,\nmust understand the relationship of this program to the defense effort and\nthe need for adequate appropriations. The Department alone cannot put\nthis message across. Endorsement and active support by appropriate\nagencies in the defense field and the Bureau of the Budget is required.\nb. Restrictive limitations which bind the administrator to the use\nof funds for one particular media activity or which virtually prohibit the\nuse of funds for certain essential purposes must be eliminated from ap-\npropriation acts.\nC. Recognition at both Congressional and executive levels must be -\ngiven to the fact that many overseas information activities require a\nperiod of months to initiate and that once begun they must continue for\na period of time if they are to be effective. An annual appropriation\nsystem which permits the amount of funds available to vary widely from\nyear to year is not conducive to good management or successful operation.\nMoreover, the delays in enacting annual appropriations make it very dif-\nficult to plan effectively.\nd. Greater attention must be given to the overseas propaganda im-\nplications of public pronouncements by public officials in all branches of\ngovernment. There is a positive as well as a negative side to this problem.\nMuch can be done to strengthen U.S. foreign policy by an appropriate speech\nat the proper time. USIE is limited in its basic charter and appropriation\naclely to overseas activities and must rely on the public relations staffs\nof the executive departments to prepare. materials for domestic use.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 5\nNSC 114/2\n- 13 -\nSECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nSECRET\n37. Although a year's time has been lost in implementing the program\nfirst set forth in Annex V to NSC 68/3, the program can still be highly ef-\nfective in promoting the achievement of the national objectives, if prompt\nlegislative action is taken. If's supplemental appropriation is voted shortly\nafter January 1, 1952, for the radio ring, it can be in full operation within\napproximately eightenn months. If another supplemental for the program operations\nis voted at approximately the same time, the effect of the current appropriation\nin narrowing the base of program operation other than radio broadcasting can\nbe offset and overcome. The expectation is justified that, given those ap-\npropriations, the expanded program can go forward in FY 1953 with hardly a break\nin tempo and reach a performance peak by the end of FY 1953. If the supple-\nmentals are not voted, the reductions necessitated by the current appropriation\nwill make impossible the achievement of effectiveness before the end of FY 1954,\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 5\nNSC 114/2\n- 14 -\nSECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\nAnnex No. 6\nFOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES\n(Prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency with the\nConcurrence of the Intelligence Advisory Committee)\n1. The peculiar nature of intelligence operations makes it difficult\nto project national intelligence planning in terms comparable to those em-\nployed in a program aimed at the attainment of manpower or production goals.\nWhile intelligence must intensify its activities if it would audit the Soviet\nworld's growth in strength and estimate its intentions, expansion in itself\noffers no guarantee of improved intelligence. Improvement in the intelligence\nproduct is dependent not only upon increased collection of reliable foreign\nintelligence but upon the skill with which it is evaluated and assembled in\nthe form of estimates. Thus the root problem of intelligence is obtaining\npersonnel skilled in collection and evaluation.\n25X1\n4. To improve the over-all value of their intelligence product, the\nnational intelligence agencies must focus added emphasis upon three essen-\ntial parts of their program:\nFirst, they must make certain that substantive objectives in field\nactivity, research, and estimates are properly related to the political and\nmilitary problems confronting members of the National Security Council.\nSecond, the activities of the intelligence agencies of the government\nmust be so synchronized that the resources of each provide maximum support\nfor the attainment of these objectives.\nThird, they must constantly re-assess and strengthen their capabilities\nand resources.\n5. It is especially important that collection facilities of the national\nintelligence agencies be improved. Efforts are being made to establish\naccurate priorities of essential elements of information. This requirement\nis especially important in the field of clandestine collection where extraor-\ndinary difficulties are encountered.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 6\nNSC 114/2\n-1-\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\n6. Establishment of a coordinated program for systematic analysis of\nthe Soviet and satellite economies should provide a better appraisal of the\ncapabilities and long-range intentions of the USSR. It should likewise\nsuggest possible avenues of U. S. counteraction by exposing the vulnera-\nbilities of the USSR and its satellites.\n7. Progress has been made in the collection of intelligence by scien-\ntific means (as distinct from the collection of scientific intelligence itself),\nbut much remains to be accomplished in this field, especially in view of the\ndifficulties encountered in \"conventional\" clandestine activities.\n8. In the coordination of foreign intelligence among national intelli-\ngence agencies, the Director on Central Intelligence is required by law to\ncorrelate the intelligence produced by each in order to ensure that no gaps\nare left uncovered between agencies. At the same time by recommendation to\nthe National Security Council, he can initiate action to prevent duplication\nof effort or over-lapping of one agency upon the field of action or functions\nof another. The Central Intelligence Agency is likewise charged with respon-\nsibility for services of common concern which can most advantageously be\nperformed centrally. While progress has been made in this process of coordi-\nnation, there is still need for improvement.\n9. The Intelligence Advisory Committee with representation from each\nof the departmental intelligence agencies has been increasingly helpful in\nfacilitating consultation and the exchange of cpinion among intelligence\nchiefs. The IAC provides a means whereby the chief of intelligence of each\nagency of government can comment upon, concur in, or object to recommenda-\ntions, proposals, or conclusions regarding problems of national intelligence\nconcern.\n10. To provide rapid dissemination of information on significant military\nor political events, there has been created an interdepartmental Watch\nCommittee whose responsibility it is to review systematically all incoming\nreports and to be alert for indications of critical moves. Facilities for\nprompt transmission. and for evaluation of these indications are constantly\nbeing improved.\n25X1\nb. In overt intelligence programs output varies almost directly\nwith the allocation of personnel and facilities. Present limitations\noperate to the effect that a. minimum program to meet fixed commitments\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 6\nNSC 114/2\n-2-\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\ncan be met only with the greatest difficulty with no margin for satisfying\nincreasing demands resulting from the deteriorating world situation,\nIn the opinion of the Intelligence Advisory Committee representatives..\nof the Armed Forces, presently directed personnel cuts will make it\nimpossible to maintain even this minimum program. The Department of\nState indicates difficulty in obtaining budgetary provision for adequate\npersonnel expansion.\n12. a. In summary, the sharpened intensity of U.S.-Soviet relationships\nemphasizes the immediate need for intensification of intelligence and\nrelated activities.\n25X1\nb. At the same time, the intelligence services, currently taxed\nwith expanded requirements, must adequately prepare for vast expansion\nin the event of the spread c:P. hostilities. If the intelligence ser-\nvices are to prepare for these wartime operations while undertaking\ncommitments that currently strain their present capacilities, it is\nimperative that they obtain sufficient personnel and the logistical\nsupport required for the execution of these tasks.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 6\nNSC 114/2\n-3-\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\nAnnex No. 7\nTHE INTERNAL SECURITY PRO GRAM\n(Joint Report of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Confer-\nence and the Interdepar tmental Committee on Internal Security)\nA. A statement of the objectives and minimum tasks which\nthe internal security program is designed to fulfill.\nThe objective and minimum task of the internal security\nprogram is to provide an internally secure United States, free\nfrom the over-all threat of the Communist, or other subversive movement,\nand more particularly free from the dangers of espionage, sabotage, and\nother disruptive tactics generally employed by such subversive movements\nand other enemies of our country.\nB. Description of the nature, magnitude, and timing of the\ninternal security program designed to meet the above\nobjectives and tasks.\nProtection of the nation's internal security is an\nintegral and vital element of our security as a nation. Accordingly,\nthe plans and programs for protecting our internal security must\nbe maintained and increased in direct relation to the maintenance\nor acceleration of our national security program. Substantial progress\nhas been made in the efforts of the Executive Branch of the Government\nto attain adequate internal security. This progress has been the\nresult of the combined and continuing efforts of the Interdepartmental\nIntelligence Conference (IIC) and the Interdepartmental Committee on\nInternal Security (ICIS), which were established by the President\nunder the National Security Council.\n1. Elements compromising the program:\n(a) The continuing coordination of the broad field\nof internal security.\n(b) The additional expansion of domestic intelligence\nand counter-intelligence coverage.\n(c) The provision of an adequate legal basis for\ninsuring the nation's internal security through\nadditional statutory and regulatory means.\n(d) The investigation, apprehension, prosecution,\nand detention of persons who may be involved in\nsubversive activities, including the violation\nof laws relating to treason, sedition,\nespionage, sabotage, etc.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 7\nNSC 114/2\n- 1\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\n(e) The protection of critical governmental,\nindustrial, and other installations and\nfacilities, including telecommunications,\nairports, ports, harbors, etc.\n(f) The maintenance of an adequate program to\ninsure the loyalty and security of personnel\nemployed in the Executive Branch.\n(g) The establishment of minimum standards for\nsecurity clearance for access to classified\ndata on the part of personnel in the Executive\nBranch.\n(h) The readying of measures to be employed, when\nappropriate, with respect to foreign official\nand diplomatic personnel.\n(i) The establishment of effective controls over\nthe entry or departure from the United States\nof persons potentially dangerous to the\ninternal security, and over the importation\nand exportation of materials, the entry or\nexit of which would endanger the national\nsecurity.\n(j) The institution of procedures to protect\nclassified security information in the Executive\nBranch and to determine the eligibility of\nrepresentatives of foreign governments to\nreceive such classified security information.\n(k) The development of: (1) Procedures for the\nvoluntary restriction of the dissemination of\nunclassified strategic information affecting\nthe national security; (2) Appropriate pre-\npublication screening procedures relating to\nstrategic information in the Executive Branch\naffecting the national security, and (3) A\ncensorship plan for implementation if and when\nrequired.\n(1) The establishment of measures designed to\ndefend against the introduction and use of\nunconventional attack media.\n(m) The increasing of the timely collection and\ndistribution of foreign intelligence as it\nrelates to internal security.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 7\nNSC 114/2\n- 2 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\n2. Assumptions and policies upon which the program\nis based.\n(a) A nationally secure United States presupposes\nan internally secure United States.\n(b) The subversive forces of Communism and other\nagents of the Soviet Union and Soviet bloc\nnations constitute the major threat to the in-\nternal security and are a very serious, sub-\nstantial and present danger.\n(c) The United States is in a period of acute danger\nwhich will continue until an adequate position of\nstrength is achieved.\n(d) The internal security program contemplates a con-\ndition of immediate danger short of a declared war.\n3. Estimate of cost of the program for Fiscal Year 1953\nand Fiscal Year 1954.\nINTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE\nDepartment of the Army (G-2):\nFiscal Year 1953\n-\n$31,339,166.99\nFiscal Year 1954\nI\n$31,407,590.05\nNOTE: An additional amount of $56,811,138.00\nwill be required to implement the Nat-\nional Censorship Program if and when\ndirectives are issued for the implemen-\ntation of that Program.\nDepartment of the Navy (ONI):\nFiscal Year 1953\n-\n$10,314,800.00\nFiscal Year 1954\n-\n$10,314,800.00\nDepartment of the Air Force (OSI):\nFiscal Year 1953\n-\n$20,558,271.00\nFiscal Year 1954\n-\n$20,126,180.00\nNOTE: These estimated figures for G-2, ONI,\nand OSI. include only those expenditures\nnecessary for the operation of the pro-\ngram in the United States.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 7\nNSC 114/2\nTOP SECRET\n- 3 -\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\nFederal Bureau of Investigation (FBI):\nFiscal Year 1953\n-\n$21,956,774.00\nFiscal Year 1954\n-\n$22,493,243.00\nNOTE: These estimated figures contemplate the\ncontinuance of the Bureau's present\naccelerated internal security program\nand do not include any costs of new\nprograms incidental to national defense\nthat may arise. The amount shown for\nFiscal Year 1953 is presently in the\nFBI budget for 1953, and the amount\nshown for Fiscal Year 1954 is the amount\nwhich will be requested for the accel-\nerated portion of the internal security\nprogram for that year. The figures\nrepresent only the acceleration of the\ninternal security program inasmuch as\nthe operational procedures of the FBI\nare such as to make it virtually im-\npossible to divide the internal security\nportion of the work from the other work\nand thereby arrive at an over-all lump\nsum figure for the internal security\nprogram.\nINTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY\nFISCAL YEAR\nFISCAL YEAR\n1953\n1954\nDepartment of State\n$ 5,014,234\n$\n5,014,234\nDepartment of the\nTreasury\n23,800,000\n23,800,000\nDepartment of Defense\n206,029,284\n200,776,734\nDepartment of Justice\n23,543,559\n23,543,559\nDepartment of Commerce\n926,074\n926,575\nGeneral Services\nAdministration\n670,000\n645,000\nSubversive Activities\nControl Board\n452,425\n452,425\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 7\nNSC 114/2\n- 4 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\nFISCAL YEAR\nFISCAL YEAR\n1953\n1954\nFederal Communications\nCommission\n$\n155,600\n$\n131,000\nFederal Security Agency\n(Public Health Service)\n5,172,690\n5,172,690\nIndustrial Security\nProgram\n171,400,000\n171,400,000\nNOTE: Where possible a departmental breakdown\nof estimates relating to internal security\nhas been obtained. In the case of the\nindustrial security program it has not\nbeen possible at this time to estimate\nthe impact of industrial security measures\nupon the affected departments and agencies.\nIt has been impossible to estimate possible\nbudgetary implications which may result\nfrom the study of procedures and statutes\nto assure uniform administration of\nprovisions relating to security risks in\nthe Executive Branch, or of the imposition\nof minimum standards for the handling and\ntransmission of classified security data,\nor for the program establishing minimum\nstandards for security clearance for\naccess to classified data. Many programs\nin the Executive Branch relate indirectly\nor incidentally to internal security al-\nthough primarily designed to achieve other\nobjectives and are thus not considered in\nthese cost estimates. Each department or\nagency which maintains a security division\nnecessarily expends a certain amount which\ncontributes to the internal security; such\nfigures are also not represented inthese estimates.\nC. An analysis of the extent to which the recommended\ninternal security program will meet the needs of national\nsecurity, including a statement of limiting factors.\nThe internal security program set forth herein will, if\nimplemented, contribute substantially to the attainment of the\nobjective outlined in A. above.\nThe basic limiting factors affecting the attainment of this\ninternal security program would include lack of funds and manpower, lack\nof adequate foreign intelligence relating to internal security, and lack\nof adequate legislation.\nAnnexes to\nAnnox No. 7\nNSC 114/2\n- 5 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTab A of Annex No. 7\nTOP SECRET\nSeptember 1, 1951\nTHE INTERNAL SECURITY PROGRAM\n(Prepared by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference)\nA. A statement of the objectives and minimum tasks which the internal\nsecurity program is designed to fulfill.\nThe objective and minimum task of the internal security program is to\nprovide an internally secure United States, free from the over-all threat of\nthe Communist, or other subversive movement and more particularly free from\nthe dangers of espionage, sabotage, and other disruptive tactics generally\nemployed by such subversive movements and other enemies of our country.\nB. Description of the nature, magnitude, and timing of the internal\nsecurity program designed to meet the above objectives and tasks.\nAs sabotage, espionage, and subversion within the United States can\ncause the loss of American lives and the loss of battles anywhere in the\nworld, the internal security of the United States is an integral and vital\nelement of our security as a nation. Accordingly, the plans for our national\nsecurity must include plans for maintaining and increasing as needed the\ndomestic forces safeguarding our internal security.\nThe program for defending our internal security is a continuing one and\nthe necessity for intensification and acceleration will not be lessened by\nany factors in the foresseable future. The program envisioned is predicated\non a continuation of the present international situation creating an emergency\nsituation domestically which will not be changed by a successful conclusion of\npeace negotiations in Korea. The program is not timed or predicated on\npossible general hostilities, but such would, of course, materially change\nthe activities designed to effect a secure United States internally. The\nprogram outlined to meet the above-described objectives is as follows:\n1. Elements comprising the program.\na. Bomestic intelligence and counterintelligence coverage - The\ncombatting of the Communist and related programs within the United States\nnecessitates extensive coverage of the activities of individuals and\norganizations whose aims are to further the interests of Communism and\nof Soviet Russia and its satellites. Eue to the underground-type opera-\ntion presently used by the Communist Party in the United States and the\nincreased security measures, as well as greater precautions, taken by\nthe Soviet espionage organization, its diplomats, and other representa-\ntives, the maintenance of this coverage 1s becoming increasingly diffi-\ncult and requires the expenditure of additional manpower and effort.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 7\nNSC 114/2\n- 6 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\nIn addition to the coverage maintained, established and contemplated on\nactual Communist and Communist front organizations and other organizations\nactive on behalf of Soviet Russia, a program has been instituted for the\ndevelopment of confidential plant informants for the purpose of insuring\nprompt receipt of information pertaining to espionage, sabotage, or subversive\nactivities in certain types of facilities connected with the national defense\nand economy. These informants have been developed in the following types of\nfacilities:\n(1) Vital facilities designated by the Secretary of Defense\n88 of great importance to the defense effort and which are operated\nby civilians. Those plants have been designated which are absolutely\nnecessary to the conduct of a war even though not all presently\nare engaged in defense work. All individuals listed in the\nSecurity Index of the FBI who are employed in these facilities\n?\nhave been identified, and all interested agencies have been\nadvised of the employment of these individuals in the various\nfacilities.\n(11) Facilities holding classified contracts awarded by the\nArmy, Navy, Air Force and other Government agencies in connection\nwith the defense effort.\n(111) Facilities designated by the Atomic Energy Commission.\nThese facilities are in three categories, according to priority\nand importance. Class \"A\" facilities include such sites as Los\nAlamos, New Mexico; Oak Ridge, Tennessee; and Hanford, Washington.\nThe most important are given close attention by the FBI. The\nfacilities labeled Class \"B\" and Class \"C\" are of lesser impor-\ntance and although given lower priority ratings by the Atomic\nEnergy Commission, informants also are developed in these facili-\nties by the FBI.\n(iv) The bases of the Strategic Air Command, at the specific\nrequest of the Air Force, are given special consideration in con-\nnection with this program. Confidential informants are being\ndeveloped by the FBI among civilian personnel residing off of these\nbases, in order to insure prompt receipt of information relating\nto possible riots and disturbances, as well as espionage, sabotage\nand subversive activities in connection with them. This is in\naddition to, and supplements the informant coverage normally\nmaintained by the Office of Special Investigations, Department of\nthe Air Force.\n(v) Since August, 1950, American Legion national and depart-\nmental officers and members throughout the country have been\ncontacted for the purpose of soliciting their assistance by fur-\nnishing information pertaining to espionage, sabotage and sub-\nversive activity, especially those members employed in vital in-\ndustry and acquainted in foreign language groups.\nAnnexes to\nNSC 114/2\nAnnex No. 7\n- 7 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\nb. Investigations, prosecutions, and related programs - Prosecu-\ntions based on the information obtained through investigations in the\ninternal security field have been vigorous and successful. The con-\nviction in New York of the eleven Communist Party members for advocat-\ning the overthrow of the United States Government by force and violence\nand for conspiracy to overthrow the government of the United States has\nmade possible the prosecution of other important Communist Party offi-\ncials. Extended investigations have been necessary and will be neces-\nsary in the future to prepare these cases for successful prosecution.\nInvestigations of an espionage character have already resulted in suc-\ncessful prosecutions and exposure of Soviet espionage efforts. Notable\namong these cases was the Dr. Emil Klaus Fuchs case, which revealed that\nFuchs, a British scientist, had given atomic secrets of this country to\nRussia. As an outgrowth of this case, a number of other successful\nprosecutions have resulted. Confidential information indicates, however,\n$\nthat the Soviet Intelligence Services feel that counterespionage has im-\nproved in the United States and consequently added security measures are\nbeing taken by the Soviet Intelligence Services in their operations in\nthe United States. The Communist Party has, in large part, gone under-\nground principally due to these successful prosecutions. Investigations\nhave necessarily become more complex and further intensification of in-\nvestigative efforts are necessary in view of the security measures in-\nvoked by the Communist Party and the Soviet Espionage Service.\nA further prosecutive program has developed as an outgrowth of the\nLoyalty of Government Employees Program, the extensive hearings conducted\nby the various federal legislative committees, and the prosecution of the\nCommunist Party leaders. There are an increasing number of prosecutions for\nsuch subsidiary violations as Fraud Against the Government, Perjury, and\nCitations for Contempt. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Im-\nmigration and Naturalization Service are collaborating on cases involving\nthe deportation of subversive aliens and denaturalization and deportation\nof naturalized citizens who fraudulently procured their citizenship by\ndenying their subversive affiliations. The registration provisions passed\nwith the Internal Security Act of 1950, and which in effect compel the\npublic registration of those who have knowledge of or have received instruc-\ntion or assignment in espionage or sabotage for a foreign government should\nalso result in increased exposure and prosecutions.\nSecurity indices listing persons considered dangerous to the national\ndefense and public safety have been established by member agencies of the\nInterdepartmental Intelligence Conference. These indices are designed to\npermit action in the event of war or other emergencies indicating the\nnecessity for such. The FBI security indices would make possible the ap-\nprehension and detention of individuals considered dangerous. These indices\nwould also enable military agencies to detain, discharge, or transfer to\nnon-critical positions the persons considered dangerous within the Military\nEstablishment. Extensive, continuous, and vigorous investigations are\nnecessary to keep these indices in a current condition ready for instant\nuse. The problem of keeping tab on the whereabouts of these individuals has\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 7\nNSC 114/2\n- 8 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\nbeen tremendously enhanced by the Communist Party going underground and the\nsecurity measures which the Communist Party - USA has invoked to conceal its\noperations.\nThe Loyalty of Government Employees Program and various personnel security\nmeasures are designed to eliminate from governmental employment or to prevent\naccess to classified information of persons who are disloyal or are security\nrisks for other reasons. Extensive investigations are being performed in carry-\ning out the responsibilities of the member agencies of the Interdepartmental\nIntelligence Conference in the field of loyalty and security of governmental\nemployees. Also, name checks of the indices of the investigative agencies in-\nvolve a tremendous volume of work. For instance, the Federal Bureau of Invest-\nigation 1s presently making checks of its indices in connection with such mat-\nters at the rate of well over two million per year. Similarly, background in-\nvestigations required in connection with employment in various phases of\n1\nnational defense efforts require an expenditure of tremendous investigative\neffort. The investigations required of the Federal Bureau of Investigation by\nstatute in connection with employment on the Atomic Energy Program are being\nhandled at the rate of over ninety thousand per year. A streamlined program is\nbeing maintained within the military defense agencies for the acceleration of\nthe personnel security program, including standardization of investigative\nand clearance procedures in order to assure protection from subversive infil-\ntration.\nC. The Coordination of Internal Security Matters - On March 23, 1949,\nthe National Security Council and the President approved NSC, 17/4 which\nestablished the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security (ICIS),\ncomposed of representatives from the Departments of State, Treasury, and\nJustice and the National Military Establishment under the National Secur-\nity Council. The same directive formally reconstituted under the National\nSecurity Council the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC), com-\nposed of the Directors of the Intelligence Division of the Army, Office\nof Naval Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Office of\nSpecial Investigations of the Air Force. This marks the first time that\nthe responsibility for the coordination for the entire and complex field\nof internal security has been definitely fixed and as now operating these\ntwo committees are jointly responsible for coordinating this complex field.\nIIC 1s responsible for Coordination of all investigation of domestic espi-\nonage, counterespionage, sabotage, subversion, and other related intelli-\ngence matters affecting internal security. Coordination of all other\nmatters in the internal security field 1s the responsibility of ICIS.\nIn order to assure proper coordination between internal security and\ndomestic and foreign intelligence, a representative of the Federal Bureau of\nInvestigation was designated a member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee\non July 7, 1949, which is concerned principally with foreign intelligence.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 7\nTOP SECRET\nNSC 114/2\n- 9 -\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\nA further step in the coordination of internal security matters was\ntaken on March 21, 1950, on which date the Federal Bureau of Investigation\nwas made a member of the U. S. Communications Intelligence Board, thereby\nassuring the coordination of internal security matters in the highly im-\nportant field of communications intelligence.\nd. Miscellaneous elements - An adequate internal security pro-\ngram will necessitate action in addition to that already being taken\nby the member agencies of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference.\nA need for an increased internal security program will increase in\nproportion to the increased intensification of the urgent emergency\nsituation prevailing under cold war conditions and under the steps\ntaken to accelerate other vital programs necessary to achieve United\nStates objectives. Among the important elements affecting the in-\nternal security program which require action outside the Interdepart-\nmental Intelligence Conference are those which follow:\n(1) An adequate legal basis for insuring the nation's\ninternal security should be provided through both statutory\nand regulatory means.\n(i1) The internal security of the nation is, at least in\nlarge part, dependent upon the amount of manpower available to\nthe agencies charged with the responsibility for internal security.\n(111) The acceleration of the development and distribution\nof foreign intelligence as it relates to the internal security of\nthe United States is of vital importance to an adequate internal\nsecurity program. The Communist conspiracy is directed from\nabroad and the best sources concerning its plans are outside the\nUnited States. Experiences during World War II demonstrated that\nsaboteurs and espionage agents were sent to this country and the\nInternal Security Agencies had no advance notice. Only through\nan adequate foreign coverage will the Internal Security Agencies\nbe able to discharge their responsibilities to the maximum degree.\n2. Assumptions and policies upon which the program is based.\nThe Communist forces exist in substantial numbers in the United States\nand are actively promoting the aims and objectives of Soviet Russia to the\ndetriment of our internal security. They have available not only the members\nof the Communist Party, but also a substantial force composed of the members\nof front organizations, sympathizers, and followers of the Communist Party\nline. They have trained espionage and sabotage forces already existing for\nfuture potential use, and have penetrated vital industry.\nThe International Communist movement through the journal of the Communist\nInformation Bureau proclaims the world is divided into two irreconcilable\ncamps; one led by the U.S.S.R. as the Communist fatherland, the other led by\nthe United States as a bulwark of \"imperialistic capitalism.\" World Communism\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 7\nNSC 114/2\n- 10 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\nis organized to subvert all non-Communist social orders and the powers of\nits apparatus - both open and secret - are directed to that end. The United\nStates long has been considered the principal stronghold of Democracy to be\noverthrown before world domination by Communism can be achieved. William\nZ. Foster, National Chairman, and Eugene Dennis, General Secretary of the\nCommunist Party - USA, as early as March 2, 1949, declared that in the\nevent of war between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Communist\nParty would take immediate steps to bring such a war to a speedy conclusion.\nThe major threat today to the internal security of the United States is that\nof sabotage, espionage, and subversion by the Communist Apparatus in this\ncountry. Every loyal Communist Party member and sympathizer in the United\nStates is a potential saboteur. This potential sabotage force is spear-\nheaded by graduates of the Lenin School in Moscow, Veterans of the Abraham\nLincoln Brigade, which fought in Spain, Communist veterans of World Wars I\nand II and other individuals who have received guerrilla or other specialized\ntraining.\nCommunist subversive elements have penetrated the United States indus-\ntries, key targets being such basic industries as electrical, steel, fuel,\nchemical, transport, maritime, automotive, aviation, and communications.\nThere are an estimated 37,000 registered Communist Party members in the\nUnited States at the present time. Also there are an estimated 1,000 mem-\nbers of the Socialist Workers Party and the Independent Socialist League,\nTrotskyite splinter groups. The strength of the movement cannot be judged\nby actual membership, however, as a few Communists can dominate and direct\na Moscow-inspired Communist \"front\" organization, thus utilizing a large\nnumber of people to further Communist aims. Hundreds of mass and \"paper-\ntype front\" organizations have been utilized by the Communist Party of the\nUnited States in an effort to influence its foreign and domestic policies,\nweaken its military capabilities and undermine its economy. Large numbers\nof deceived citizens have joined these \"fronts\" and their energy has been\nused to subvert their own government. In addition, for every Communist\nmember there are a number of sympathizers who are not Party members but who\ncan be depended upon to further Communist aims.\nMembership in Communist \"front\" organizations ranges from 162,000 in\nthe International Workers Order to no actual membership at all in the\n\"paper-type\" organizations which consist solely of a few executive officers\nand serve as propaganda outléts, leading campaigns in matters of interest\nto the Communist Party.\nThe Communist Party - USA and its numerous \"front\" organizations today\nturn out mass propaganda in books, pamphlets, magazines, newspapers, bulletins,\nfliers, plays, motion pictures, radio and television programs and formal\nschool courses, as well as organize mass rallies and make public speeches.\nFor example, the New Century Publishers, a Communist publishing house, claims\nto have published in 1948, thirty pamphlets in editions totalling more than\nthree million pieces of which two million were distributed free.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 7\nNSC 114/2\n- 11 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\nIt has been reliably reported that the Soviet Intelligence Services\nare considering expanding and reorganizing their operations in the United\nStates. This would appear to be based partly on the fact that recent\nprosecutions have disrupted operating networks. It may also be based on\nthe Soviet plans for operations in the event of hostilities. It is estimated\nthat the soviets have plans on an expanding scale to utilize \"illegal net-\nworks\" in conjunction with their operations at the present through Soviet and\nsatellite diplomatic establishments.\nBecause of the recent Supreme Court decision upholding the conviction of\nthe eleven national Communist Party leaders, the enactment of the Internal\nSecurity Act of 1950, and the arrests of Communist Party leaders in New York,\n=\nMaryland, California, Hawaii and Pennsylvania for violation of the Smith Act,\na large number of Party members have gone underground and the Party has taken\nstringent security measures, such as destroying records, meeting only in\n2\nsmall groups, if at all, and ceasing open activities. In addition, the Party\nhas ceased recruiting almost entirely and has screened its membership for\n\"loyalty.\"\nAs a result of the above, the investigation of Communist activities has\nbeen made increasingly difficult, as has the development of confidential in-\nformants within the Communist Party to take the place of those uncovered in\nthe Communist trials and those detected by the Party.\nDue to the loss of confidential informants as a result of the trials\npreviously mentioned, because the Party has ceased recruiting, and because\nof the urgent necessity for greatly increasing the number of informants\nwithin the Party due to its underground status and its increased security\nmeasures, greatly increased manpower must be assigned to the development\nof new informants and the supervision of those in operation.\n3. Estimated costs of the program.\nFor the Department of the Army (G-2)\nFiscal Year 1953 - $31,339,166.99\nFiscal Year 1954 - $31,407,590.05\nThis estimated cost includes:\na. All administrative costs in connection with security pro-\ngram throughout Zone of Interior Armies to include posts, camps\nand stations.\nb. Pay and allowances to support a Counter Intelligence\nCorps of 2946 spaces for 1953 and 3093 spaces for 1954.\nC. Permanent Change of Station travel.\nd. Operational expenses.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 7\nNSC 114/2\n- 12 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\ne. Logistical support.\nNOTE: An additional amount of $56,811,138.00 will be required\nfor the National Censorship Program if, and when, direc-\ntives are issued to implement that program.\nFor the Department of the Navy (ONI)\nFiscal Year 1953 - $10,314,800.00\nFiscal Year 1954 - $10,314,800.00\nThis estimated cost includes the estimated salaries of officer,\nenlisted, professional and clerical personnel working full time on\ncounterintelligence projects, training costs, costs of equipment,\ncommunications and travel.\nFor the Department of the Air Force (OSI)\nFiscal Year 1953 - $20,558,271.00\nFiscal Year 1954 - $20,126,180.00\nThis estimated cost includes pay and allowances, travel, movement\nof household goods, operational expenses and equipment.\nThese estimated figures for G-2, ONI and OSI include only those ex-\npenditures necessary for the operation of the program within the United\nStates.\nFor the Federal Bureau of Investigation\nFiscal Year 1953 - $21,956,774.00\nFiscal Year 1954 - $22,493,243.00\nThese estimated figures contemplate the continuance of the Bureau's\npresent accelerated internal security program and do not include any\ncosts of new programs incidental to national defense that may arise.\nThe amount shown for Fiscal Year 1953 18 presently in the FBI budget\nfor 1953, and the amount shown for Fiscal Year 1954 is the amount which\nwill be requested for the accelerated portion of the internal security\nprogram for that year. The figures represent only the acceleration\nof the internal security program inasmuch as the operational procedures\nof the FBI are such as to make it virtually impossible to divide the\ninternal security portion of the work from the other work and thereby\narrive at an over-all lump sum figure for the internal security program.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 7\nNSC 114/2\n- 13 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\nC. An analysis of the extent to which the recommended internal security\nprogram meets the needs of national security, including a statement\nof any factors which may have limited the recommended program.\nThe elements of the program outlined will at its maximum peak of ef-\nfectiveness meet the needs of national security. There are, however, as\nnoted in the program, certain factors outside the control of the IIC, such\nas adequate legislation, foreign intelligence and supply of manpower, which\nwill affect reaching maximum effectiveness.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 7\nNSC 114/2\n- 14 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTab B of Annex No. 7\nTOP SECRET\nSeptember 10, 1951\nTHE INTERNAL SECURITY PROGRAM\n(Prepared by the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security)\nA. Objectives and Minimum Tasks of the Internal Security Program.\n1. The objectives of the internal security program are to neutralize\nthe threat to the internal security of the United States which is presented:\n(1) through the existence of a Communist Party completely subservient to and\ndominated by the USSR and of that segment of our population which, although\nnot deliberately subversive, contributes to the effectiveness of the\nCommunist program as a result of exploitation of Communist doctrines and\nideologies; (2) through the action within the United States of other agents\nof the Soviet Union and Soviet Bloc nations who, working either independently\nof or in conjunction with the Communists, can be expected to use every means\nof sabotage, espionage and subversion either of a direct or indirect nature,\nincluding unconventional methods of attack; and (3) through the actions of\nother totalitarian groups which seek to overthrow democratic processes and\ninstitutions.\n2. The minimum tasks which the internal security program is designed to\nfulfill are to furnish the means by which the activities of agents of the\nSoviet Union and Soviet Bloc nations, including the Communist Party and its\nsubservient elements, can be neutralized and to furnish the means by which\nthe United States can counter or reduce the damage which these Soviet\nagents can cause through subversive operations, sabotage and civil disturbances\nB. The Nature, Magnitude and Timing of the Internal Security Program to\nMeet these Objectives and Tasks.\n1, Elements Comprising the Program.\na. The prosecution and detention of persons guilty of violations\nof laws against treason, espionage, sabotage, subversion and subversive\nactivities in general.\nb. The establishment of minimum standards for security clearance\nfor access to classified data of personnel in the executive departments\nand agencies of the Federal Government.\nC. The study of procedures and standards to assure uniform admin-\nistration of provisions relating to persons under question as security\nrisks.\nd. Protection of critical governmental, industrial, and other\ninstallations and facilities, including telecommunications, airports,\nports and harbors; security clearance of management and employees of\nprivate industry engaged in defense production.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 7\nNSC 114/2\n- 15 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\ne. Measures designed to afford preventive security against uncon-\nventional attack including atomic, chemical, biological and radiological.\nf. Measures to implement appropriate action with respect to foreign\nofficial and diplomatic personnel in the event of conditions so requir-\ning.\ng. More effective controls to prevent the entry or departure from\nthe United States of persons potentially dangerous to the internal\nsecurity; more effective controls over the importation and exportation of\nmaterials, the entry or exit of which would endanger the national security\nh. Procedures designed to protect classified government informa-\ntion and for determining the eligibility of representatives of foreign\ngovernments to receive United States classified data.\n1. Procedures for the voluntary restriction of the dissemination\nwithin the United States of unclassified technological information,\nthe release of which may endanger the national security, and for\nadequate screening prior to publication of unclassified government\ninformation, including statistics of possible strategic intelligence\nvalue in government publications; and planning for censorship in the\nevent of war.\nJ. Evaluating the responsibilities of various departments and\nagencies for specific internal security measures; coordinating, planning\nand reviewing progress thereunder and resolving differences between such\nagencies in the interest of preventing duplication of effort and lack\nof coverage.\nk. Coordinating the provisions of projected emergency legislation\nand regulations pertaining to internal security matters.\n2. Assumptions and Policies Upon Which the Internal Security Program\nis Based.\na. A nationally secure United States presupposses an internally\nsecure United States.\nb. The subversive forces of Communism and other agents of the\nSoviet Union and Soviet Bloc nations constitute. the major threat to\nthe internal security.\nC. The continuing aggravated world situation indicates that the\nacute threat of Soviet aggression may reach its maximum peak as early\nas 1953.\nd. The internal security program contemplates a condition of\nimmediate danger short of a declared war.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 7\n- 16 -\nNSC 114/2\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\n3. Estimate of the Cost of the Programs for Fiscal Year 1953 and\nFiscal Year 1954.\nThe Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security and the Inter-\ndepartmental Intelligence Conference are the two coordinating committees\nof the National Security Council in the field of internal security. Through\nthis NSC mechanism the activities of the agencies responsible for carrying\nout internal security measures have been coordinated in an effort to effect\na state of internal security adequate to meet the danger of Soviet aggression.\nThe ICIS and the IIC operate with the support of existing agencies and do\nnot have independent appropriations. The cost estimates presented herein\nare, therefore, the estimates for the departments and agencies of the\nFederal Government or their appropriate subdivisions operating in the field\nof internal security.\nThe cost estimates presented herein are, wherever, possible, represented\ndepartmentally. In the case of certain programs, however, a departmental\nbreakdown at the present time is not possible and, accordingly, the esti-\nmates appear programwise. In certain other instances the impact of added\ninternal security measures upon the budgete of the various departments\nand agencies cannot be estimated with sufficient precision to warrant their\ninclusion herein. It must be pointed out further that several programs\nin the executive branch of the Federal Government, while not primarily\ndirected toward strengthening the internal security of the Nation, have an\nincidental effect thereon. Other programs, while relating to the national\nsecurity, do thereby strengthen the internal security. The Department of\nState advises, for example, that 1t cannot at this time estimate the ad-\nditional budgetary requirements of the Passport and Visa Divisions, the\nobjectives of which include the national security but which are also taking\ncertain measures directly related to the internal security.\nFurthermore, each department and agency which maintains a security\ndivision necessarily expends a certain amount which contributes to the\ninternal security. Such figures are not represented in these estimates.\na. The prosecution and detention of subversives. The responsi-\nbility for the enforcement of the laws against treason, espionage,\nsabotage, sedition, and, in general, all laws relating to subversive\nactivities, the criminal provisions of the Atomic Energy Act, the\nNeutrality Act, the Selective Service Act, and the registration pro-\nvisions of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, the Emer-\ngency Detention Act, and the Foreign Agents Registration Act, 1e\nlodged in the Internal Security Seation of the Criminal Division of\nthe Department of Justice. The program for the detention of subver-\nsives in accordance with the Emergency Detention Act is also a\nresponsibility of the Bureau of Prisons of the Department of Justice.\nThe Subversive Activities Control Board was created by the Internal\nSecurity Act of 1950 to hear and rule on petitions of the Attorney\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 7\nNSC 114/2\n- 17 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\nGeneral for the registration of Communist organizations. The cost\nestimates of these three agencies are:\nFY 1953\nFY 1954\nDepartment of Justice\nInternal Security Section\n$996,559.20\n$996,559.20\nBureau of Prisons\n$510,000.00\n$510,000.00\nSubversive Activities Control\nBoard\n$452,425.00\n$452,425.00\nb. Protection of critical installations and facilities. This\nelement of the internal security program is subdivided into many\ncomponent parts.\n(1) Protection of governmental installations and facilities.\nIn this category are the expenditures of the General Services\nAdministration which proposes to expend certain additional sums\nin fiscal years 1953 and 1954 directly related to the internal\nsecurity in addition to its regular expenditures for the protec-\ntion of governmental installations and facilities:\nFY 1953\nFY 1954\nGeneral Services Administration\n$670,000\n$645,000\nThe Department of Defense in protecting its posts, camps, and\nstations, proposes the following as the internal security ele-\nment of its protective programs\nFY 1953\nFY 1954\nDepartment of Defense\n$206,029,284\n$200,776,734\n(2) Industrual security. Consequent upon detailed study\nby ICIS there were established by action of the National Security\nCouncil and direction of the President the Industry Evaluation\nBoard and the Facilities Protection Board on January 6, 1951, and\nMay 4, 1951, respectively. The former is responsible to the\nSecretary of Commerce and the latter, though situated in and\nadministered by the Department of Commerce, is responsible to\nthe ICIS. The Industry Evaluation Board, an interdepartmental\ngroup, is undertaking the screening of industry and the support-\ning economic resources in order to identify those elements vital\nto defense and 1s responsible for selecting the critical points,\nrating each as to its relative importance to the other, communi-\ncating such determinations to the agencies concerned, reviewing\nsuch determinations periodically, and, for the purpose of security\nguidance or supervision, assigning each such critical facility to\nthe Federal agency having paramount interest. The Facilities\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 7\nNSC 114/2\n- 18 -\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\nProtection Board 1s charged with developing or giving central\ndirection to the establishment of definitions, policies, criteria,\nand maximum and minimum standards for protective programs of\nfacilities rated by the Industry Evaluation Board and, in like\nmanner, to develop or give central direction to the establishment\nof protective programs for those segments of essential industry\nnot rated by the Industry Evaluation Board; the Facilities Pro-\ntection Board is also charged with evaluating vital protective\nprograms now in existence or to be developed, for the purpose\nof determining their adequacy and the elimination of inconsis-\ntencies, duplications, and non-essential features.\nThe estimate of the Federal cost of the industrial security\nprogram as prepared by these two boards and designed to protect\nAmerican industry against internal security hazards is limited to\nthose industrial facilities rated or to be rated by the Industry\nEvaluation Board and does not include the hidden or indirect costs\nof industrial security measures undertaken in facilities not SO\nrated but which may call for internal security measures to meet\nwith the requirements of contractual agreements. It is estimated\nthat the Industry Evaluation Board will rate approximately 5,000\nmanufacturing and 4,000 non-manufacturing facilities. The Industry\nEvaluation and the Facilities Protection Boards estimate that the\ncost to the Federal Government of the industrial security program\nfor fiscal years 1953 and 1954 will be $171,400,000.\n(3) Security of ports and harbors. Pursuant to Public Law\n679, 81st Congress, and Executive Order 10173 of October 18, 1950,\nthe Coast Guard is engaged in a limited program to safeguard vessels,\nharbors, ports, and waterfront facilities against destruction, loss,\nor injury from sabotage or other subversive acts, accidents, or\nother causes of similar nature. The cost estimates for Coast Guard\nadministration of the program for fiscal years 1953 and 1954 is:\nFY 1953\nFY 1954\nDepartment of the Treasury\nCoast Guard\n$ 23,500,000\n$ 23,500,000\nThis figure assumes implementation of a port security study now\nbefore the National Security Council and presupposes certain\nacquisitions which it is expected will be made in fiscal year 1952.\nShould these acquisitions not be made until fiscal year 1953 the\nestimate for that year might be increased to $35,100,000.\n(4) Security of airports. In accordance with the Act of Congrest\nof September 9, 1950, (49. USC 701ff), the President has been given\nthe authority in the interest of national security to direct the\nSecretary of Commerce to establish zones or areas in the air spaces\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 7\nNSC 114/2\n- 19 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\nProtection Board 1s charged with developing or giving central\ndirection to the establishment of definitions, policies, criteria,\nand maximum and minimum standards for protective programs of\nfacilities rated by the Industry Evaluation Board and, in like\nmanner, to develop or give central direction to the establishment\nof protective programs for those segments of essential industry\nnot rated by the Industry Evaluation Board; the Facilities Pro-\ntection Board is also charged with evaluating vital protective\nprograms now in existence or to be developed, for the purpose\nof determining their adequacy and the elimination of inconsis-\ntencies, duplications, and non-essential features.\nThe estimate of the Federal cost of the industrial security\nprogram as prepared by these two boards and designed to protect\nAmerican industry against internal security hazards is limited to\nthose industrial facilities rated or to be rated by the Industry\nEvaluation Board and does not include the hidden or indirect costs\nof industrial security measures undertaken in facilities not SO\nrated but which may call for internal security measures to meet\nwith the requirements of contractual agreements. It is estimated\nthat the Industry Evaluation Board will rate approximately 5,000\nmanufacturing and 4,000 non-manufacturing facilities. The Industry\nEvaluation and the Facilities Protection Boards estimate that the\ncost to the Federal Government of the industrial security program\nfor fiscal years 1953 and 1954 will be $171,400,000.\n(3) Security of ports and harbors. Pursuant to Public Law\n679, 81st Congress, and Executive Order 10173 of October 18, 1950,\nthe Coast Guard is engaged in a limited program to safeguard vessels,\nharbors, ports, and waterfront facilities against destruction, loss,\nor injury from sabotage or other subversive acts, accidents, or\nother causes of similar nature. The cost estimates for Coast Guard\nadministration of the program for fiscal years 1953 and 1954 1s:\nFY 1953\nFY 1954\nDepartment of the Treasury\nCoast Guard\n$ 23,500,000\n$ 23,500,000\nThis figure assumes implementation of a port security study now\nbefore the National Security Council and presupposes certain\nacquisitions which it is expected will be made in fiscal year 1952.\nShould these acquisitions not be made until fiscal year 1953 the\nestimate for that year might be increased to $35,100,000.\n(4) Security of airports. In accordance with the Act of Congress\nof September 9, 1950, (49. USC 70lff), the President has been given\nthe authority in the interest of national security to direct the\nSecretary of Commerce to establish zones or areas in the air spaces\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 7\nNSC 114/2\n- 19 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\nabove the United States and to promulgate rules and regulations\nrestricting the flights of aircraft in certain circumstances in\nthe interest of national security. For the administration of\nits airport security program the Department of Commerce estimates\nthat in fiscal years 1953 and 1954 it will seek $907,600.\n(5) Telecommunications security. The Federal Communications\nCommission will request in its 1953 budget the addition of personnel\nfor the purpose of its Field Engineering and Monitoring Division\nin the interest of internal security and, more specifically, to\nprovide for improved coverage for the immediate apprehension of\nclandestine stations engaged in subversive activities. In order\nto effect this monitoring service an increased fund will be\nrequested for the modernization of direction finders and other\nequipment used in monitoring stations. The modernization program\nwill occur chiefly in fiscal year 1953, thus accounting for the\ndecrease of the FCC request in fiscal year 1954.\nFY 1953\ne FY 1954\nFederal Communications\nCommission\n$155,600\n$131,000\nC. Procedures for adequate screening of technical data and for the\nvoluntary restriction of the dissemination of technological information.\nIn pursuing a policy of denying to Communist countries, as far as pos-\nsible, any technical data that would be useful to them for war production\nor indirectly increase their military potential by contributing to the\nmore efficient operation of any important industry, the United States has\nbeen mindful of the importance of insuring the exchange of information\namong free nations to serve the needs of scientific and industrial progress\nand of mutual defense. Consistent with this policy a program has been\nestablished whereby industry and the public may obtain advisory opinions\nfrom the Department of Commerce as to the desirability of publishing un-\nclassified information and as to the distribution such information should\nbe given, thus assisting publishers, editors and the public to guard vol-\nuntarily against the harmful publication or disclosure of technical in-\nformation even though such data are not subject to formal security restric-\nions. The following are the cost estimates for the administration of\nthis program:\nFY 1953\nFY 1954\nDepartment of Commerce\nOffice of Technical Service\n$18,474\n$18,975\nA statistical control program has been established under the Bureau of\nthe Budget to review governmental statistical information and avoid pub-\nlication of strategic statistical data when such action is deemed to be in\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 7\nNSC 114/2\n- 20 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\nthe national interest. This program is carried on by an interdepartmen-:\ntal advisory group, the Committee on Statistical Security, under the\nchairmanship of the Bureau of the Budget. By authority of the Export\nControl Act of 1949 the Secretary of Commerce has jurisdiction over all\nexports from the United States, including industrial and other technolog-\nical information. Pursuant to this authority a general license for the\nexport of unclassified technical data does not affect the existing pro-\nhibition of the export to the Soviet Bloc of technical data not generally\navailable to the public. The ICIS is at the present time conducting a\ndetailed study of this matter.\nd. In carrying out all of its functions relating to internal secur-\nity, including the Visa and Passport Divisions, and the Foreign Service,\nthe Department of State estimates that its costs chargeable to internal\nsecurity for fiscal year 1953 and fiscal year 1954 will be $5,014,234.\n0. Procedures and statutes to assure uniform administration of pro-\nvisions relating to security risks. Pursuant to the directions of the\nNational Security Council in accordance with the request of the President\nof July 14, 1951, there was established an Ad Hoc Group in the ICIS to\ninvestigate the administration of the provisions of existing law which\nauthorizes the heads of the various departments and agencies to discharge\ngovernment employees or to refuse government employment to applicants on\nthe ground that they are poor security risks and to recommend changes in\nthe program which, as a result of its investigation, the Group believes to\nbe required. Although the Group is meeting regularly and conducting ex-\ntensive investigation into the problem, it is impossible for it to fore-\ncast its recommendations at this time and, therefore, impossible to esti-\nmate the possible budgetary implications of any recommendations which it\nmay make.\nf. Procedures to protect classified government information. An\nExecutive Order promulgating regulations establishing minimum standards\nfor the classifying, handling and transmission of official information\nrelating to the security of the nation was prepared by ICIS and has been\napproved by the National Security Council and on July 12, 1951, by the\nPresident at whose direction it was transmitted to the Bureau of the\nBudget for issuance. The promulgation of this Executive Order will neces-\nsarily require increased expenditures by those agencies whose present\nsecurity regulations do not fulfill the minimum requirements set forth in\nthe Executive Order. It has been impossible to estimate the number of\nagencies BO affected or the increased costs which may be attributed by\nthose agencies as incident to the requirements of the Executive Order.\nA draft of the proposed set of regulations establishing, and procedures\nfor determining, eligibility of certain representatives of foreign govern-\nments to receive U.S. classified data within the United States has been\nrecommended by the ICIS and is under consideration by the National Securit\nCouncil. The timing of the promulgation of these regulations is predi-\ncated upon negotiations currently in progress looking toward the adoption\nAnnexes to\nAnnez No. 7\nNSC 114/2\n- 21 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\nof somewhat similar regulations in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization\nso as not to prejudice their consummation. It can be anticipated that\nthese regulations will be in effect by fiscal year 1953 but it is impos-\nsible to estimate the possible implications of these regulations upon the\ncost estimates of such departments and agencies as may be affected by it.\nThe total budgetary implications of the adoption of regulations\nestablishing minimum standards for the handling and transmission of classi\nfied government data and for establishing eligibility of representatives\nof foreign governments to receive classified data will in any event un-\ndoubtedly be relatively negligible items in the budgets of the departments\nand agencies affected.\n8. Minimum standards for security clearance for access to classi-\nfied data. The draft Executive Order promulgating regulations to estab-\nlish minimum standards for security clearance of personnel in the executiv\ndepartments and agencies for access to classified security information\nhas been approved by the National Security Council and by the President\non July 12, 1951, and at the President's direction was transmitted to the\nBureau of the Budget for issuance. The budgetary implications of this\nprogram will vary from department to department depending upon the stand-\nards now in effect for security clearance for access to classified data.\nAny estimate of the effect of this program in all of the executive depart-\nments and agencies cannot be made at this time with any reliability.\nh. Measures controlling the entry and exit of persons and materials.\nIncreased security measures have been taken in this field consequent upon\nstudies made by ICIS. These measures include sponsoring of legislation to\nprevent illegal entry of aliens; to control the discharge of alien seamen\nin U.S. ports and to extend the statute of limitations relating to pass-\nport frauds; the abolition of crew list visas; reexamination of the pro-\nposed boundaries of the Headquarters Site Agreement with the United Nation\nOrganization; revision of Regulations governing the control of persons\nentering and leaving the United States in wartime; and the establishing\nof a system whereby government agencies will furnish the Passport Division\nof the State Department information appropriate to its activities. The\nnormal functions of the Passport and Visa Divisions of the Department of\nState, of the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of\nJustice, and of the Bureau of Customs of the Department of the Treasury,\ncontribute, of course, to the national security.\nThe Department of State advises that it cannot at this time allocate\nany portion of its estimated internal security figure directly to internal\nsecurity programs of the Passport and Visa Divisions.\nThe Treasury Department has estimated that in fiscal year 1953 and\n1954 it will request approximately $300,000 for each year for activities\nrelated directly to internal security in the Bureau of Customs.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 7\nNSC 114/2\n- 22 -\nLTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\nIn accordance with ICIS recommendations the number of patrol in-\nspectors of the Immigration and Naturalization Service has been augmented\nalong the principal seaports to guard against the landing of stowaways\nand crew members denied shore leave and along the land borders and gulf\ncoasts to prevent illegal entry of aliens. In addition, the Immigration\nand Naturalization Service has had additional internal security responsi-\nbilities assigned to it by the Internal Security Act of 1950 and in\naccordance therewith has requested a supplemental appropriation of five\nmillion dollars. The Immigration and Naturalization Service has estimated\nthat of its total budget the portion which can be said to bear upon\ninternal security can be broken down as follows:\nFY 1953\nFY 1954\n*Border patrol\n$ 6,589,000\n$ 6,589,000\n*Immigration inspection\n10,127,000\n10,127,000\n*Investigation and\nDeportation of Subversives\n321,000\n321,000\nInternal Security Act of 1950\n5,000,000\n5,000,000\nTotal\n22,037,000\n22,037,000\n1. Preventive security against unconventional attack. The ICIS,\nthrough its Subcommittee on Defense Against Unconventional Attack, has\nstimulated the study of areas of vulnerability and appropriate counter-\nmeasures against other than military introduction of atomic, biological\nand chemical media as well as sabotage. Studies have been completed\nor are in varying stages of development by appropriate agencies of the\ngovernment which have led or are to continue to lead to appropriate\ncounter-measures being taken or planned for implementation as needed.\nMost of the cost estimates in this field of activity are reflected in\nbudget estimates of the various departments and agencies concerned.\nThus, for example, planning being done in the Department of Defense in\nrelation to the introduction of atomic, biological, and chemical media\nis reflected in the military program although it bears upon internal\nsecurity and civil defense, Similarly, studies are being conducted under\nthe sponsorship of the General Services Administration to effectuate a\nsystem for the physical security and protection of government buildings,\nrecords, and personnel against unconventional attack. The Federal Com-\nmunications Commission is leading a study in the field of telecommunica*\ntions, including the effect of the dissemination of false information,\nthe transmission of coded or hidden information, and the like. The\nDepartment of Agriculture is conducting studies affecting the impairment\nof the Nation's food supplies or of fires in forest and range lands which\nmight result from sabotage or the introduction of unconventional attack\nmedia. The Department of Agriculture advises that it 18 impossible to\n* These estimates, of course, are only a portion of the total budget requests\nin each of these three categories.\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 7\nNSC 114/2\n- 23 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\nestimate the portions of its budgetary requests in the Bureau of Animal\nIndustry, the Bureau of Plant Industry, Soils, and Agricultural Engi-\nneering, the Bureau of Entomology and Plant Quarantine, the Forest\nService, and the Production and Marketing Administration, which can be\nallocated with any reliability to the internal security aspects of its\nprogram although estimates of additional amounts required to provide\nfor internal security aspects have been made but cannot be submitted\nbecause of budgetary ceilings.\nThe Public Health Service of the Federal Security Agency is studying\nthe unconventional attack phases of the introduction and dissemination\nof human diseases; introduction of contaminants into bilolgics, vaccines,\nplasma, etc.; the destruction of vaccine and biological manufacturing\ninstallations and supplies; impairment and contamination of water supply;\nand methods of detecting biological agents and research on protective\nmeasures against attacks through the means of biological agents. In an\neffort to allocate its estimates for 1953 to matters primarily devoted to\ninternal security, the Public Health Service estimates that it will seek\nbudget allocations in the amount of $5,172,690.\n1. Recapitulation:\nFY 1953\nFY 1954\nDepartment of State\n$ 5,014,234\n$ 5,014,234\nDepartment of the Treasury\n23,800,000\n23,800,000\nDepartment of Defense\n206,029,284\n200,776,734\nDepartment of Justice\n23,543,559\n23,543,559\nDepartment of Commerce\n926,074\n926,575\nGeneral Services\nAdministration\n670,000\n645,000\nSubversive Activities Control\nBoard\n452,425\n452,425\nFederal Communications\nCommission\n155,600\n131,000\nFederal Security Agency\n(Public Health Service)\n5,172,690\n5,172,690\nIndustrial Security Program\n171,400,000\n171,400,000\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 7\nNSC 114/2\n- 24 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 : NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5\nTOP SECRET\nC.\nAnalysis of the Extent to Which the Recommended Internal Security Program\nmeets with the Needs of National Security, Including a Statement of\nLimiting Factors.\n1. The internal security program set forth herein will, if implemented,\ncontribute substantially toward achieving its objectives of neutralizing the\nthreat to the internal security presented through the Communist movement with-\nin the United States and the activities of agents of Soviet Bloc nations and\nof agents of other totalitarian groups against the security of the Nation by\naccomplishing the following:\na. Neutralizing the activities of subversive groups and individuals\nthrough their prosecution and the detention of persons found guilty of\nviolating Federal statutes relating to subversive activities.\nb. Increasing the protection afforded to the government with re-\nspect to personnel, records, and installations.\nC. Affording greater protection to the Nation's strategic, indus-\ntrial plants, airports and harbors, and related fields against sabotage,\nespionage, and other subversive missions.\nd. Controlling the entry into and departure from the United States\nof persons in order to prevent subversive agents from executing esplonage\nand sabotage missions.\ne. Minimizing the possibility of clandestine introduction of uncon-\nventional attack media and the exportation of strategic materials and in-\nformation.\nf. Generally impeding the individual and collective will of sub-\nversive agents to act to the detriment of national security by increasing\nthe physical hazards and the legal obstacles and penalties incident to the\ncommission of such acts.\n2. The basic limiting factor affecting the attainment of these objectives\ntasks. is the availability of funds and manpower necessary to implement the minimum\nAnnexes to\nAnnex No. 7\nNSC 114/2\n- 25 -\nTOP SECRET\nNo Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/03/19 NLT-PSF-45-8-1-5"
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