Ask the Scholar

{
    "localId": "423870621",
    "label": "Memorandum re War in Korea",
    "core": "doc",
    "dtoType": "document",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/423870621"
}

{
    "id": "423870621",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/423870621",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Memorandum re War in Korea",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/423870621",
    "collections": [
        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Subject Files"
    ],
    "iiifBase": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750120/750120-21-001.tif",
    "thumbnailUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750120/750120-21-001.tif",
    "largeImageUrl": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750120/750120-21-001.tif",
    "imageCount": 26,
    "hasImages": true,
    "source": "import",
    "hasTranscription": false
}

{
    "url": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/423870621",
    "naId": 423870621,
    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 30,
            "logicalDate": "1950-06-30",
            "month": 6,
            "year": 1950
        }
    ],
    "recordType": "description",
    "ocrSource": "nara-archive"
}

{
    "seq": 26,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "document",
    "url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602191/750120/750120-21.pdf",
    "mediaId": "55374068fbcb4324",
    "ocrText": "SECRET\nS-1 Chinese Nationalists\nS-2 Formosa\nS-3\nChinese Communist Intervention\nS-4\nReinforcements\nS-5\nOffers of Help\nS-6\nRelease of Troops\nS-7\nApproach to the Yalu\nS-8\nHydro-Electric Facilities\nS-9\nTendencies to Panic? DELAYED\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402\nState Dept. Guideline, lune 12, 1979\n000 oin. 6-18-79\nBy NLT- HL\nNARS, Date 7-17-10\nSECRET\nSECRET\nS-1\nCHINESE NATIONALISTS\nJune 30, 1950 - CINCFE was informed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that\nany proffer of troops by Generalissmo Chiang Kai-Shek should be declined\nat present, and that if an offer were made, the matter should be referred\nto the Department of State. (Page 11, Para. 21)\nJuly 13 - At a conference with General MacArthur in Tokyo, attended\nby the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, and the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army,\nthe offer of 33,000 Chinese Nationalist troops from Formosa was discussed.\nGeneral MacArthur advised against accepting this offer. He stated that\nthese troops would be ineffective in Korea; they were infantry of unknown\nquality, no artillery, and no logistic capability. They would require ex-\ntensive support from us and in fact would be an albatross around our necks\nfor months. Furthermore, diversion to Korea of this force would leave a\ngap in Formosa which would invite attack. General MacArthur went on to\nstate when the situation became stable in Korea he proposed to go to Formosa\nand see Chiang Kai-Shek. (p. 20, Para. 21)\nJuly 27 - By this date naval units from the United Kingdom, France,\nNetherlands, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada had joined the unified\ncommand. Some of these nations had offered small ground elements but\ntheir arrival was still far in the future. Turkey, Thailand, and Nation-\nalist China had also offered gound troops. (p. 22, Para. 28)\nJuly 27 - On this date the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the Secretary\nof Defense that the naval and merchant vessels of the Chinese Nationalists\non Formosa should not be employed in support of hostilities in Korea. This\nwas based upon political considerations regarding the advisability of main-\ntaining the status quo between the Chinese Nationalists forces and Chinese\nCommunists forces. Military considerations were also involved inasmuch as\nthe vessels were required for the defense of Formosa. This decision was\nin consonance with the JCS decision of 30 June 1950 not to make use of\nChinese Nationalist ground forces in Korea. (p. 23, Para. 29)\nJuly 27 - During this time, because of the apparent ineffectiveness\nof the military forces of the Chinese Nationalist Government the JCS had\nrecommended that they be authorized to direct CINCFE to cause a survey\nto be made of the Chinese Nationalist Government's military requirements\nwhich would have to be met if the capture of Formosa was to be prevented.\nThey made the further recommendation that the State Department make the\nnecessary political arrangements for such a survey and, if the results\njustified it, that it be translated into a military assistance program.\n(p. 24, Para. 31)\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402\nJune 1979\nState OOD NARS, Date 1-18-79 7-H-HC\nBy NLT-\nSECRET\nJuly 29 - Around this time the Secretary of Defense announced the\npolicy which would au horize the Chinese Nationalist Government to pur-\nchase materiel under the control of the United States, including tanks\nand jet aircraft, provided there was no objection to such purchases by\nour military departments. (p. 25, Para 35)\nNovember 29 - CINCFE informed the JCS that the Chinese Nationalist\nthe\nArmies on Formose represented the only source of potential trained re-\ninforcements available for early commitment to the was in Kerea, and\nthat troops drawn from this source could be moved to Korea in approxi-\nmately 14 days, and much larger than had previously been offered forces\nwould undoubtedly be made available if desired. He strongly recommended\nthat he be allowed to negotiate directly with the Chinese Government for\nincorporation in the United Nations Command for such Nationalist units\nas might be available for reinforcements in Korea. On the same date the\nJCS advised CINCFE that this request of his was under consideration, but\npointed out the worldwide consequences involved in any employment of\nNationalist troops. The JCS stated that the leadership of the U.S. in\nthe United Nations was being most seriously compromised, and the utmost\ncare was necessary to avoid a disruption of the Allies. Re pointed out\nthat his proposal for use of Nationalist troops WGS considered unaccept-\nable to the Commonwealth countries. (p. 66 and 67, Para 64 and 65)\nDecember 7 - At a conference with the Chief of Staff of the Army in\nTokyo, CINCFE expressed a strong feeling that if limitations placed on\nhis command, including the prohibition of reinforcement of United Nations\nforces in Korea from Nationalist China, it would represent essentially\na surrender. He expressed the feeling that in addition to the maximum\nemployment of Chinese Nationalist forces in Korea other nationalist\ntroops should be introduced into South China, possibly through Hong\nKong. (p. 71 and 72, Para 10)\nDecember 30 - CINCFE made 8. comprehensive reply to the request for\nhis comments on the possible evacuation of United Nations armed forces\nfrom Korea. In it he pointed cut that the potential of the Chinese\nNationalists on Formosa and guerrilla action on the mainland was being\nignored. He pointed out that \"were the U.S. to make a political de-\ntermination to recognize the state of war forced upon the U.S. by China,\nthe U.S. among other things, could secure appropriate reinforcements\nfrom the Nationalist garrison on Formosa, and release existing restric-\ntions upon the Formosa garrison for diversionary action (possibly lead-\ning to counter-invasion) against vulnerable areas of the Chinese main-\nland. He was of the opinion that there was nothing that could be done\nalong these lines which would, in any event, aggravate the present\nsituation vis-a-vis China. (p. 81, Para 39)\nBECRET\nSECRET\nJanuary 9 - The JCS, with the approval of the President, informed CINCFE\nthat the retaliatory measures suggested by CINCFE had been and continued to\nbe given careful consideration. However, they pointed out that certain pre-\nmises must be accepted. Among them, was recognition that favorable action\ncould not be taken on the proposal to obtain Korean reinforcements from the\nChinese Nationalist garrison in Formosa, in view of the improbability of\ntheir decisive effect on the Korean outcome and at probable greater use-\nfullness elsewhere. (p. 84. para 42)\nFebruary 6, 1951 - At a conference between the JCS and the Department\nof State, various possible lines of action with reference to the Korean\nsituation were discussed and it was noted, among other things, that, from\n& military viewpoint, circumstances did not warrant using Chinese National-\nist forces on the mainland of Asia, and that the actions of the U.S. should\ncontinue to be based on the premise that we should do nothing to spread\nthe war beyond Korea. (p. 93, Para 17 and 20)\nFebruary 23 - CINCFE pointed out to JCS his lack of access to sources\nof information pertaining to Communist China because that area was beyond\nthe scope of the responsibility of the Far East Command. In general, he\ndid not favor the development of Chinese Nationalist guerrilla operations\nCompare\nbut favored the use of Nationalist troops against the mainland. (p. 97,\nPara 28)\nthis throstiny\nMarch 16 - After receiving the above comments from CINCFE, JCS forwarded\nto the Secretary of Defense a study of possible courses of action that could\nbe taken by anti-Communist Chinese in China and/or Korea with the assistance\nof the U.S. This study indicated that the Nationalist ground forces were\nincapable of withstanding prolonged and determined assyalt by the Chinese\nCommunists, and could execute only limited operations against the mainland,\nand that without aid and guidence given by the U.S. they would not be\ncapable of such operations without direct U.S. support, and that, even with\nU.S. air and naval support, their success against the mainland would be\nquestionable. (p. 97, Para 29)\nSEGRET\nSECRET\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402\n5-2\nDOD DIRECTIVE 6-18-79\nState Dept. Guideline, June 12. 1979\nFORMOSA\nBy NLT- HL NARS, Date 7-18-80\nJune 25, 1950 - As a result of a State-Defense Conference at which\nPresident Truman presided, the Chinese Nationalist Government was called\nupon to cease offensives against the Mainland. At the same time CINCFE\nwas directed to prevent by naval and air action, any attack on Formosa\nor any sea or air offensive from Formosa against the Mainland of China.\n(p. 8, Para.12(b))\nJune 26 - JCS furnished CINCFE instructions directing him to utilize\nthe Seventh Fleet to prevent, by naval and air action, any attack on\nFormosa or any sea or air offensive from Formosa against the Mainland\nof China. (p. 8, Para. 14)\nJune 30 - The comments and recommendations of CINCFE were requested\non a question posed by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek as to whether the\norders of the Seventh Fleet took into consideration a prevention of attacks\nagainst the small islands under the control of the Nationalists which lay\nbetween Formosa and the Mainland. (p.ll, Para. 22)\nJuly 27 - The JCS informed the Secretary of Defense that military\nvessels of the Nationalists on Formosa should not be employed in support\nof the hostilities in Korea because of the desirability of maintaining\nthe status quo between Chinese Nationalist forces and the Chinese Communist\nforces, and also because such vessels would be required for the defense of\nFormosa. (p. 23, Para. 29)\nJuly 27 - On this date the JCS pointed out to the Secretary of Defense\nthe strategic importance of Formosa to the United States and that if Formosa\nwere to fall to the Communists it would be seriously detrimental to United\nStates security. Further, they re-affirmed their view that the continued\nsucessful resistence of Chinese Nationalists in the Formosan area was in\nthe military interest of the United States and recommended that the United\nStates continue its policy of denying Formosa to Communist forces, at least\nuntil the future status of Formosa had been determined in accordance with\nthe announcement of the President on June 27, 1950. (p. 23, Para. 30)\nJuly 28 - The JCS informed CINCFE that the Chinese Communists had\nannounced their intention to capture Formosa and that such an effort could\nprobably be resisted effectively only if the Chinese Nationalists made timely\nefforts to defend that island. In addition, they informed CINCFE of their\nrecommendation to the Secretary of Defense that the Nationalist Government\nbe permitted to employ its military forces in defensive measures to prevent\nCommunist amphibious concentrations directed against Formosa or the Pescadores\neven if such measures included attacks against concentrations on the Mainland.\nSECRET\nSECRET\nCINCFE was also informed that pending action on the recommendations of\nthe JCS the existing policy toward Formosa would remain unchanged.\n(p. 24, Para. 32)\nJuly 29 - CINCFE replied to the JCS and indicated his complete con-\ncurrence with their recommendations regarding Formosa and the Chinese\nNationalists. (p. 24, Para. 33)\nAugust 3 - the JCS informed CINCFE that the President had approved\nthe granting of certain military assistance to Nationalist China and\nhad authorized and directed military survey of Nationalist China's mili-\ntary requirements. CINCFE was authorized to utilize the services of cer-\ntain governmental personnel in carrying out the survey. The purpose of\nthe survey was to determine the extent of the military assistance that\nwould be required if the Chinese Nationalists forces were to be able by\ntheir own efforts alone to prevent the capture of Formosa, or, in con-\njunction with the Seventh Fleet, to prevent the capture thereunder.\n(p. 25, Para. 36)\nAugust 3 - By this time the JCS had informed CINCFE that he was\nauthorized to conduct such reconnaissance flights along the coast of\nChina as he might consider necessary to determine the imminence of any\nattack against Formosa (p. 26, Para. 37)\nAugust 4 - The Secretary of Defense, with the approval of the Presi-\ndent and the Secretary of State, dispatched a message to CINCFE after the\nlatter's visit to Formosa, re-affirming the décision of the President\nof 27 June with respect to Formosa, and pointing out that only the Presi-\ndent has authority to order or authorize military action against concentra-\ntions on the Mainland. This message stated that it was the national in-\nterest that no action of the United States precipitated general war or\ngive excuse to others to do so. CINCFE was informed that his recommenda-\ntions as to action to be taken were desired whenever appropriate.\n(p. 27, Para. 40)\nAugust 5 - CINCFE replied to the message of the Secretary of Defense\nof the day before that he was operating meticulously in accordance with\nthe President's decision of 27 June which he fully understood. He stated\nthat under no circumstances would he extend the limitations of his authority\nas Theatre Commander and expressed the hope that neither the President nor\nthe Secretary of Defense had been mislead by false or speculative reports\nfrom any source. (p. 27, Para. 41)\nAugust 7 - CINCFE reported to the JCS the result of his conferences\nwith Chiang Kai-Shek on Formosa. He indicated that there was a real potential\nin the armed forces on Formosa but that certain improvements in equipment,\norganization, communications, training and command organizations would be\nnecessary. (p.27, par. 43)\nSECRET\nSECRET\nAugust 14 - JCS informed CINCFE, with the approval of the President,\nthat the intent of the directive to defend Formosa was to limit United\nStates action and to such support operations as would be practicable with-\nout committing any force to the Island itself. CINCFE was directed to\nmake no commitment to the Nationalist Government of the basing of fighter\nsquadrons on Formosa, and that no squadrons or other United States forces\nwere to be based ashore on Formosa except with the specific approval of\nthe JCS. (p. 28, Para. 44)\nAugust 29 - The President dispatched a personal message to General\nMacArthur in which he made clear the official position which the United\nStates Government had taken with reference to certain aspects of the\nKorean situation. This message referred to letters addressed to Ambassador\nAustin and one from Ambassador Austin to Secretary General Trygve Lie.\nBoth of these letters pointed out that the action of the United States\nwith reference to Formosa was an impartial and neutral action addressed\nboth to the forces in Formosa and those on the Mainland and that the\nUnited States would welcome consideration by the United Nations of the\ncase of Formosa. (p. 35, Para. 20)\nSeptember 1 - There was published in the \"United States News and\nWorld Report\" a speech which General MacArthur had prepared for the Veterans\nof Foreign Wars Convention in Chicago. This prepared speech had been sent\nby a cover letter of 21 August to be read at the convention of the V.F.W.\nIn the paper General MacArthur had placed much emphasis on the strategic\naspect of Formosa and its importance to American security. When the Presi-\ndent came into possession of a copy of this proposed speech he instructed\nthe Secretary of Defense to direct the General to withdraw his statement\nin order to avoid confusion as to the position of the United States with\nrespect to Formosa. Although General MacArthur complied immediately with\nthis directive, the statement was published in the magazine referred above.\n(p. 37, Para. 21)\nSeptember 1 - In a radio speech delivered by President Truman on the\nKorean situation he made it clear that the United States did not want\nFormosa or any part of Asia for itself. (p.37, par.24)\nNovember 21 - JCS advised the Secretary of Defense that, from the\nmilitary point of view, the proposed draft resolution before the U. N.\ngetchaft?\nGeneral Assembly on the problem of Formosa, was unacceptable because,\nif passed, it would neutralize Formosa strategically and thus permit the\nChinese Reds to build up elsewhere. They suggested that if political\nconsiderations were over-riding and that action had to be taken in the\nU. N., the resolution should be modified to allow the necessary freedom\nof military action by the United States. (p. 63, Para. 57)\nSECRET\nSECRET\nDecember 6 - The Secretary of State issued & statement for guidance\nof high-level United States officials which he pointed out that if a\ncease-fire order were to be brought about, it should not be purchased\nby the delivery to the Chinese Communists of either Formosa or a seat\nin the U. \". (p. 70, Para. 8)\nDecember 8 - In the final communique reporting the results of con-\nversations between Prime Minister Attlee and President Truman, among\nother things, that the United States and the United Kingdom were not too\nprepared to pay for a peaceful solution at the price of Formosa, and that\nthe issue of Formosa should be settled by peaceful means. (p. 73, Para. 12)\nJanuary 2, 1951 - JCS advised the Secretary of Defense that they had\nreviewed their previous estimates of the strategic importance of Formosa.\nIt was their opinion that the neutralization of Formosa would not meet\nUnited States military strategic needs since it would improve the strategic\nposition of the Communists by releasing their forces for build-up, and would\nreduce the strategic position of the United States and restrict freedom of\naction in the event the military situation required an armed attack against\nthe Chinese Communists on the Mainland. (p. 78, Para. 28)\nJenuary 30 - At a meeting between the JCS and State Department repre-\nsentatives the subject of Formosa was discussed and it was felt that our\nobjective should be to deny Formosa to a hostile government. The JCS be-\nlieved that the Seventh Fleet could prevent the capture of Formosa pro-\nvided there were no serious defectives among the Nationalists. In the\nlatter event, however, the United States would not be responsible for\nfurther action to prevent its capture or to recapture it for, although\nthe island was of strategic importance, the use of United States ground\nforces for such further action would not be warranted. (p. 91, Fara 14)\nFebruary 24 - CINCFE specifically requested information from the JCS\nas to whether, in the event of a Communist attack against Formosa, the\nNationalists would be authorized to retaliate and he reco mended that in\ncase of Communist air or sea attacks against Formosa or United States\nforces outside Korea, he be authorized to retaliate immediately on the\nChinese Mainland. (p. 95, Para. 25)\nFebruary 28 - The JCS, with the approval of the President, replied to\nthe above request that there would be no objection to retaliation by the\nNationalists against targets on the Mainland in the event of a clearly\nidentified Chinese Communists air or sea attack against Formosa or the\nPescedores. Moreover, in the event of Communist air or sea attack against\nUnited States forces outside Korea the principal of immediate retaliation\nagainst targets on the Chinese Mainland was approved. JCS requested that\nECRE\nSECRET\nCINCFE, subject to the right of immediate solf-defense, inform the JCS\nconcerning any Communist attack and receive approval of proposed retali-\natory action prior to attacking targets on the Mainland. With respect\nto action by United States forces in the event of Communist air or sea\nattack against Formosa, JCS instructed that their previous instructions\nwere still applicable. (p. 96, Para. 26)\nSECRE\nS-3\nSECRET\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402\nState Dept. Guideline, June 12. 1979\n000 DIRECTIVE 6-1.6.79\nBy NLT- HL\nNARS, Date 7.16.10\nCHINESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION\n9 July - CINCFE suggested North Korean aggression was under Soviet\nleadership and technical guidance and encompassed Chinese ground\nelements. (18)\nIn the first days of September, there were indications of air and\nground build-up by communist forces in Korea although it was not known\nwhether the build-up was for offensive or defensive purposes. There\nwere numerous unconfirmed reports of the movement of a substantial\nportion of the 4th Chinese communist field army into Manchuria. The\n40th army, estimated at 22,000 men, was believed included in the move-\nment. (34)\n15 September - CINCFE was informed that the President had approved\nposition that final U.S. position would be deferred because course of\naction best advancing U.S. national interest must be determined in\nlight of action by Soviet Union and Chinese communists; that operations\nnorth of the 38th parallel would be undertaken if there was no entry\ninto North Korea of major Soviet or Chinese communist forces and no\nannouncement of intended entry; that certain actions were being pre-\nscribed in event of employment of Chinese units south of the 38th\nparallel. (41, 42)\n27 September - JCS directive to MacArthur established the latter's\nauthority to conduct military operations north of the 38th parallel\nagainst North Korean forces and as further expanded on 9 October against\nChinese communist forces. The directive also instructed him to continue\nto make special efforts to determine whether there was a Chinese\ncommunist or Soviet threat to the attainment of his objective. (42, 43)\nAs noted in the preceding, on 9 October JCS amplified CINCFE\ndirective to include provision that in event of employment in Korea\nof major Chinese communist units without prior announcement, CINCFE\nshould continue action as long as in his judgment his forces had a\nreasonable chance of success. (46)\nNOTE:\nAll of the above preseded the meeting at Wake Island on 15 October,\nwhich was the time of the reported assurance that the Chinese communists\nwould not intervene. These should be taken in context with the state-\nment made to the press by Major General Courtney Whitney at the\nWaldorf-Astoria on 21 April that it was not MacArthur's job, nor did he\nhave the facilities as field commander, to ascertain the possibilities\nof Chinese communist intervention. Be this as it may, the foregoing\nshows that at least he had a directive to do so and the record does not\ndisclose that he objected to the issuance of this directive or claimed any\nlack of ability to ascertain Chinese communist intentions.\nSECRET\nChinese Communist Intervention\n26 October 1950\nNo reliable indication of Sovieb or Chinese Communist\nintervention in Korea. (Page 52)\nChinese Communist forces first encountered in combat\nnear Unsan. CinCFE reported captured Chinese wore\nNorth Korean uniforms and may have been \"volunteers\",\nand that there Vas no positive evidence Chinese Com-\nmunist units as such had entered Korea, although\nincomplete interrogation of PON's indicated that\npossibility. (Page 53)\n28 October 1950\nCinCFE reported six unwarranted attacks by Chinese\nCommunists' anti-aircraft on UN aircraft. This report\nforwarded to UN. (Page 54)\n31 October 1950\nCinCFE confirmed identification of Chinese POW's cap-\ntured 26 October. Information from these priseners\nindicated their unit crossed the Yalu on or about 16\nOctober. (Page 54)\n3 November 1950\nSome Chinese Communist \"Peace Preservation Troops\" were\nknown to be participating in Koreen fighting. Two com-\nposite units were known at this time to be made up of\nelements from divisions of 5 to 6 Chinese armies. (Page 55)\nJCS requested CinclE's interin appreciation of the situa-\ntion and its implications in the light of what appeared\nto be overt intervention in Korea by Chinese Communist\nunits. (Page 55)\n4 November 1950\nIn reply. CinCFE pointed out impossibility of appraising\nauthoritatively the actualities of Chinese intervention.\nCinCFE noted following possibilities, based on battle\nintelligence from the front: (a) full potential military\nintervention, (b) covert military assistance, (e) move-\nment of more or less voluntary personnel into Korea to\nstrengthen North Korean remnants, and (a) an attempt to\nsalvage something from the vrecimge in the belief that\nonly South Korean forces would be committed in the extreme\nnorthern regions of Korea. CinCFE stated that (a) would\nrepresent a momentous decision of the gravest international\nimportance and, while it is a distinct possibility, there\nare many fundamental logistic reasons against it and\nsufficient evidence is not at hand to warrant its immedi-\nate acceptance. CinCFE felt that these courses of action,\nor combinations thereof, were most likely conditioned at\nthe time. He recommended against hasty conclusions which\nmight be premature, and believed that a final appraisal\nshould await more complete accumulation of military facts.\n(Pages 55-56)\nSECREI\nSECRET\n6 November 1950 JCS informed CinCFE consideration was being urgently\ngiven to the Korean situation at the governmental\nlevel, and urgently requested his estimate of the\nsituation. (Page 57)\nCinCFE replied that men and material in large force\nwere pouring across all the bridges over the Yalu\nfrom Manchuria which jeopardized and threatened the\nultimate destruction of UN forces in Korea. These\nforces could be deployed against UN forces without\nbeing subjected to air interdiction: the only way\nto stop this movement was destruction, by air attack,\nof the bridges and installations in North Korea. Under\ngravest protest CinCFE could make, air operations were\nmy\nsuspended and he recomended matter be brought to\nPresident's attention since JCS instructions not to\nbomb bridges could result in calamity of major propor-\ntion for which he could not accept responsibility. (Page 57)\nJCS, in view of alarming situation which CinCFE had\nreported, authorised him to undertake the planned\nbombing provided he still considered it essential to\nthe safety of his forces. JCS further pointed out\nthat it was essential they be kept informed of 1m-\nportant changes in the situation and requested CinCFE\nto submit the estimate which had previously been called\nfor as soon as possible. (Page 58)\nIn the meantime, General MacArthur issued a communique\non Chinese Communist intervention. (Page 58)\n7 November 1950\nCinCFE reported hostile planes, operating from bases\nwest of the Yalu River, were appearing in increasing\nnumbers and requested instructions. (Page 59)\nIn an estimate of the Korean situation CinCFE stated\nthat unquestionably organized units of Chinese Com-\nmunist forces were being utilised. The strength of\nthese forces was impossible to determine accurately\nbut was sufficient to seize the initiative in the west\nsector. (Page 60)\n8 November 1950 JCS advised CinCFE that, because of the intervention of\nthe Chinese Communists, it would seem that his mission\n1 should be re-examined. (Page 60)\n- a -\nSECRET\nSECRET\n9 November 1950\nI\nCinCFE replied that he did not agree that a re-examination\nof the mission of the UN Command vas necessary. He felt\nthat the United States should press for a resolution in\nthe UN condemning the Chinese Communists and calling\nupon them to withdraw forthwith. (Page 61)\n18 November 1950 CinCFE inf orned the JOS that the tentative date for the\nattack of the 8th Army to discover the strength of the\nChinese Communists had been set for 24 November. (Page 63)\n22 November 1950 By this date, Chinese Communist activity in North Korea\nand Manchuria indicated support of extended long-term\noperations in Korea. (Pages 63 and 64)\n24 November 1950 A general attack was launched by all available UN forces.\n(Page 65)\n28 November 1950 By this date 10 vas apparent that the 8th Army had ad-\nvanced against vastly superior Chinese Communist forces\nwhich, in turn, were launching a strong offensive.\nCinCFE estimated their strength in North Korea at\n200,000 and the North Koreans at approximately 50,000.\nHe reported that his own forces were not sufficient\nto meet this situation. and that his plan was to pass\nfrom the offensive to the defensive. (Page 66)\n- 3 -\nDECLASSIFIED\nSECRET\nE.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402\nState Dept. Guideline, June 12, 1979\nDOD DIRECTIVE HC 6-14-79\nBy NLT-\nNARS,\nDate\n7.17.10\nREINFORCEMENTS\nJune 26: Seventh Fleet assigned to operational control of CINCFE.\nCINCPAC and CINCPACFLT directed to support and reinforce CINCFE. (P. 8,\npar. 12b.)\nJune 26: CNO directed CINCPACFLT to dispatch a Carrier Task Group,\ntogether with submarines and necessary train, to Sasebo to reinforce the\nNaval elements of CINCFE. In addition, CINCPACFLT was directed to assemble\nat Pearl Harbor another carrier task group with supporting units. (P. 8,\npar. 13)\nJune 30: The Secretary of Defense announced to the JCS that he had\nauthority to send two divisions to Korea. (P. 12, par. 25)\nJuly 2: CINCFE made urgent requests upon the JCS for reinforcements,\nfrom outside sources as follows:\na. One Marine RCT with comparable Marine Air Units.\nb. New Air Force elements together with crews and airplanes\nto bring his presently assigned units to war strength,\ntotalling approximately 700 planes.\no. Augmentation of the Seventh Fleet, previously reinforced\nby one Carrier Task Group. (P. 14, par. 2)\nJuly 3: The JCS informed CINCFE of their approval of sending, from\nthe United States, one Marine RCT and its supporting aircraft and two\ngroups of B-29's (approximately 60 planes), 22 B-26's and 150 F-51's.\n(P. 14, par. 3)\nJuly 5: CINCFE requested the earliest movement from the United States\nto Korea of certain Army troops which had been previously indicated as\npossibly available to him. (P. 15, par. 7)\nJuly 6: The JCS informed CINCFE of the difficulties in meeting his\nrequests for additional reinforcements from the U.S. CINCFE was assured,\nhowever, that every effort was being made to furnish the support required.\n(P. 16, par. 8)\nJuly 7: CINCFE advised the JCS that he estimated his needs in Korea\nfor ground forces to be: the equivalent of not less than four to four-and-\none-half full strength Infantry divisions; an airborne RCT complete with\nlift; an armored group of three medium tank battalions; and appropriate\nreinforcing artillery and service elements. He stated that the naval and\nair force reinforcements already provided were adequate for the time being\nbut that forward planning would anticipate a probable additional requirement\nfor fighters and light bombers, as well as for another Fast Carrier Task\nForce. (P. 16, par. 9)\nSECRET\nSECRET\nJuly 9: CINCEE reported the situation in Korea as critical. He\nurged that his ground forces be increased by an Army of at least four\ndivisions. At the same time CINCPACFLT recommended that immediate steps\nbe taken to increase the ground and tactical Air Force provided to CINCFE;\nthat the Marine RCT in Korea be raised to full division strength; that\nlarge numbers of additional amphibious and other shipping be activated\nto carry and to supply those forces; and that large numbers of additional\ncombat ships and aircraft of all categories be activated and dispatched\nto provide adequate naval support. (P. 18, par. 15)\nJuly 10: CINCFE again drew attention to the urgency of the situation\nin Korea and requested augmentation of units in FEC from reduced peace\nstrengths to full war strength as well as new reinforcements in ground\nforces and Marine tactical air forces. (P. 18, par. 16)\nJuly 10: CINCFE was informed that the Chiefs of Staff of the Army\nand Air Force would immediately proceed by air to visit his headquarters.\nIt was becoming clear that the operations in Korea would require a major\nmilitary effort on the part of the U.S. (P. 19, par. 17)\nJuly 13: General MacArthur advised against accepting the offer of\n33,000 Chinese Nationalist troops from Formosa. (P. 20, par. 21)\nJuly 18: The magnitude of the reinforcements being sent to CINCFE\nby this time required a further increase in the over-all strength of\nU.S. armed forces. On this date the JCS forwarded to the Secretary of\nDefense a new memorandum setting forth their requirements with regard\nto the minimum force requirements for our national security. Further,\nthe JCS pointed out that events might make necessary an early revision\nof those force requirements. (P. 20, par. 22)\nJuly 19: CINCFE urgently requested that the First Marine Division\nand the First Marine Air Wing which were under consideration for shipment\nto FECOM be at war strength in the Far East by September 10. The JCS on\nJuly 23 agreed to meet the requirements set forth by CINCFE with respect\nto the Marine units. This was eventually done by reducing temporarily\nthe Marine Security Force and by transferring the Marine Battalion with\nthe Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean Area to the Far East. (P. 21, par.24)\nJuly 19: CINCFE also pressed for early arrival of the other reinforce-\nments he had requested, again urging the early arrival of troop carrier\nunits and elements of the 82nd Airborne Division. On July 26 he urged the\nactivation and intensive training of Army artillery reinforcements and\nindicated that his estimated needs for additional Infantry divisions neces-\nsary for the destruction of the North Korean forces had been raised from\nfour to six U.S. divisions in addition to the Republic of Korea ground\nforces. (P. 21, par. 25)\nSECRET\nSECRET\nJuly 27: By this time naval units from the United Kingdom, France,\nThe Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand and Canada had joined the Unified\nCommand. Some of these nations had offered small ground elements but\ntheir arrival was still far in the future. Turkey, Thailand and National-\nist China had also offered ground troops. (P. 22, par. 28)\nJuly 27: The JCS informed the Secretary of Defense that naval and\nmerchant vessels of the Chinese Nationalists on Formosa should not be em-\nployed in support of hostilities in Korea. This was based upon political\nconsiderations regarding the advisability of maintaining the status quo\nbetween the Chinese Nationalist forces and Chinese Communist forces. Mili-\ntary considerations were also involved inasmuch as the vessels were required\nfor the defense of Formosa. This decision was in consonance with the JCS\ndecision of June 30 not to make use of Chinese Nationalist ground forces\nin Korea. (P. 23, par. 29)\nJuly 31: The JCS recommended to the Secretary of Defense that the\nArmy be augmented by four National Guard divisions and two National Guard\nregimental combat teams with necessary support. On August 18 the JCS\nrecommended the call to active duty of four fighter bomber groups, two\nfighter bomber squadrons and one light bomber squadron from the Air Na-\ntional Guard to provide tactical air support for these National Guard\ntroops. (P. 22, par. 26)\nJuly 31: The JCS informed CINCFE that they would make available to\nhim two additional medium bomber groups for the destruction of certain\nmilitary targets. (P. 26, par. 38)\nAugust 4: The Provisional Marine Brigade, authorized to CINCFE ar-\nrived in Korea. On August 7 major elements of the 2nd Infantry Division\nwhich had been authorized to CINCFE arrived in Korea from the U. S.\n(P. 17, par. 12)\nAugust 10: Early in August the major units of U.S. ground forces\nwhich had been committed to action in Korea included four Infantry divisions\nand one Provisional Marine Brigade, or a total U.S. ground strength of\n65,000. The arrival of additional reinforcements was anticipated. On\nAugust 10 the JCS informed the Secretary of Defense of plans to send new\nreinforcements to Korea by September 25 consisting of an Army division,\na Marine RCT, an Army regiment of Puerto Ricans, together with the neces-\nsary shipping for a one-division lift and one carrier and one battle ship.\nDuring this time there had been a steady build-up of naval forces to provide\nadditional naval and naval air support of combat lift to CINCFE. The build-\nup and the operations of the Air Force had also increased during this\nperiod. The FEAF Combat Cargo Command was also expanded and its operations\ncontributed greatly to the support of ground and other air units in Korea.\nBy this time, enemy air operations were in effect nonexistent.\nSECRET\nSECRET\nDuring this period the Department of Defense made a major effort\nto build up U.S. forces in Korea. Although there were some deficiencies,\nthe requirements of CINCFE were met to the extent it was within the power\nof the Department of Defense to do so, but with due regard to U.S. mili-\ntary commitments and requirements elsewhere. All of the forces which the\nDepartment of Defense agreed to provide were either present or were scheduled\nto arrive in the area in time to take part in the proposed offensive. The\n1st Marine Division, assembled from the east and west coasts and the Medi-\nterranean would be ready. Army units had been moved faster than anticipated.\nThis was accomplished by the use of air lift from the U.S. as well as by use\nof the shipping of the greatly expanded Military Sea Transport Service.\nNaval combatant forces had been heavily reinforced by the arrival of car-\nriers and several cruisers and destroyers - several of the latter from the\nMediterranean. Certain increases had been made in air force units in the\nFEAF. The medium bombardment groups of the Strategic Air Force which had\nbeen deployed to the Far East early in August, had been directed to remain\nin the Far East at least until October. All three services had very greatly\nexpanded their logistics installations and organizations. (PP 28-30, par.\n45-48)\nSeptember 7: The JCS reminded General MacArthur that all available\ntrained Army units in the United States with the exception of the 82nd\nAirborne Division had already been allocated to him. The JCS stated that\na minimum of four months time would elapse before the first of several\npartially trained National Guard divisions could reach Korea. (P. 33, par. 13)\nOctober 2: The Secretary of Defense in accordance with the recommenda-\ntion of the JCS informed the Secretary of State of the acceptance of Canada's\noffer of an Army Special Force for service in Korea. (P. 45, par. 7)\nOctober 13: The JCS recommended to the Secretary of Defense that the\noffer by the Thai Government of two corvettes and two transports for service\nin Korean waters be accepted. (P. 47, par. 14)\nOctober 22: One Thailand Infantry battalion sailed on this date from\nBangkok for Korea. (P. 61, par. 51)\nOctober 23: The JCS advised CINCFE of their recommendation to the\nSecretary of Defense that the services of the French battalion scheduled\nto sail for Korea on October 25 would be no longer required. (P. 50, par. 26)\nOctober 24: The JCS recommended to the Secretary of Defense that the\nforce to be deployed from Greece to Korea should be reduced from a brigade\nto one battalion with service components. On the same day the JCS agreed to\nmake certain other reductions in U.S. ground forces in Korea in order to re-\nduce the logistic burden on the U.S. (P. 50, par. 27)\nNovember 6: The JCS advised the Secretary of Defense that action\npreviously recommended regarding a cut-back in deployment of troops to\nKorea would be held in abeyance until further recommendations were submitted.\n(P. 58, par. 45)\nSECRET\nSECRET\nNovember 7: CINCFE informed the JCS that, because of the introduction\nof Chinese Communist Forces in strength into the Korean campaign, all pre-\nvious plans for the provision of essential U.S. ground, sea, and air forces\nmust, as a minimum requirement, now be immediately and fully employed. He\nfurther stated that the status of Army replacements was unsatisfactory and\nthat the replacement flow should be immediately resumed. In addition, he\nrequested that action be taken to forward to his command those air units\nwhich were previously requested or scheduled but which had not yet arrived\nin the area. He also stated that, as a minimum, the currently available\nnaval and air forces must be retained and maintained in the Far East Command\nat their authorized strength and that preparatory steps should be taken to\naugment these forces promptly on call, if the necessity arose. He was unable\nto determine whether or not additional units would be required but the full\nrequirement for balanced forces, as stated during the earlier phases of the\ncampaign, must now be met with possible appreciable augmentation thereof.\n(P. 59, par. 47)\nNovember 14: The JCS noted that the CNO was deploying an additional\nMarine jet fighter squadron to the Far East Command, departing from the U.S.\non this date. The U.S. Army also was to deploy one additional anti-aircraft\nartillery automatic weapons battalion. (P. 62, par. 54)\nNovember 21: The JCS advised CINCFE that three jet aircraft fighter\nunits would reinforce his command during the month of November. (P. 63,\npar. 58)\nNovember 29: CINCFE recommended to the JCS that he be authorized to\nnegotiate directly with the Chinese Nationalist Government for incorporation\nin the United Nations Command of such Chinese units as might be available and\ndesirable for the reinforcing of our position in Korea. (P. 66, par. 64)\nNovember 29: The JCS advised CINCFE that his request for the employment\nof Chinese Nationalist troops in Korea was under consideration. They stated\nthat such employment of Chinese Nationalist troops involved world-wide con-\nsequences. (P. 67, par. 65)\nDecember 1: The JCS inquired whether CINCFE needed additional air\nreinforcements above those already on schedule for movement. On December 5\nCINCFE requested strong additional air reinforcements. It proved impossible\nto grant CINCFE's request in full because certain types of units were not\navailable. On December 10 CINCFE withdrew his request for the deployment of\ntwo medium bomb groups to the Far East. (P. 68, par. 2)\nDecember 18: CINCUNC requested that the four National Guard divisions\nrecently called to active service be moved to Japan at once in view of the\napprehension of the Japanese people as to their security. On December 22 the\nJCS informed CINCFE that no additional divisions would be deployed to the Far\nEast pending Governmental decision as to future courses of action in Korea.\n(P. 76, par. 22)\nSECRET\nSECRET\nJanuary 3: The JCS noted that the desirability of increasing ground\nforces in Korea and also noted that the problem of increasing ROK forces\nwas largely one of equipment. On January 4 they requested CINCFE to com-\nment on arming additional ROK manpower, suggesting the possibility that ROK\nforces could be increased from 200,000 to 300,000 men armed with hand\nweapons. (P. 77, par. 26)\nJanuary 6: CINCFE in commenting on proposal to arm additional ROK\nmanpower suggested that the type and quantity of weapons suggested by the\nJCS as being available could be used to equip the National Police Reserve\nof Japan and that it was possible that the over-all interests of the U.S.\nwould be better served by making those weapons available to increase the secur-\nity of Japan rather than to arm additional ROK forces. (P. 77, par. 27)\nJanuary 9: The JCS informed CINCFE that the retaliatory measures\nsuggested by CINCFE had been and continued to be given careful consideration.\nBased on over-all consideration, however, the following must be accepted:\nd. Favorable action cannot be taken on the proposal to\nobtain Korean reinforcements from the Chinese Nationalist\ngarrison in Formosa, in view of the improbability of their\ndecisive effect on the Korean outcome and their probable\ngreater usefulness elsewhere.\ne. If our position in Korea could be stabilized with forces\nnow committed, two partly trained National Guard divisions\ncould be deployed to Japan in order to increase the security\nof Japan. If our Korean position cannot be stabilized, this\npurpose would have to be served by part of the troops evacu-\nated from Korea. (P. 84, par. 42)\nJanuary 15-18: Generals Vandenberg and Collins held conferences in\nTokyo with General MacArthur. General Collins stated that it would be ad-\nvisable to dispatch two additional divisions from the U.S. to Japan as soon\nas practicable to cover Northern Japan during the remainder of the Korean\noperation. General MacArthur indicated he would be satisfied with two\nNational Guard divisions since he was proceding with the development of the\nJapanese police forces. (P. 89, par. 7)\nJanuary 24: The JCS recommended that the Secretary of Defense urge the\nSecretary of State to press the non-Communist members of the United Nations\nfor additional ground forces for use in Korea. (P. 90, par. 12)\nMarch 31: The Secretary of Defense requested the Secretary of State\nto renew efforts to obtain additional assistance for operations in Korea\nfrom those countries which seemed able to provide contingents of worth-while\nsize and to furnish those contingents a reasonable share of equipment and\nsupport required for service in Korea. (P. 105, par. 52)\nSECRET\nSECRET\nJanuary 3: The JCS noted that the desirability of increasing ground\nforces in Korea and also noted that the problem of increasing ROK forces\nwas largely one of equipment. On January 4 they requested CINCFE to com-\nment on arming additional ROK manpower, suggesting the possibility that ROK\nforces could be increased from 200,000 to 300,000 men armed with hand\nweapons. (P. 77, par. 26)\nJanuary 6: CINCFE in commenting on proposal to arm additional ROK\nmanpower suggested that the type and quantity of weapons suggested by the\nJCS as being available could be used to equip the National Police Reserve\nof Japan and that it was possible that the over-all interests of the U.S.\nwould be better served by making those weapons available to increase the secur-\nity of Japan rather than to arm additional ROK forces. (P. 77, par. 27)\nJanuary 9: The JCS informed CINCFE that the retaliatory measures\nsuggested by CINCFE had been and continued to be given careful consideration.\nBased on over-all consideration, however, the following must be accepted:\nd. Favorable action cannot be taken on the proposal to\nobtain Korean reinforcements from the Chinese Nationalist\ngarrison in Formosa, in view of the improbability of their\ndecisive effect on the Korean outcome and their probable\ngreater usefulness elsewhere.\ne. If our position in Korea could be stabilized with forces\nnow committed, two partly trained National Guard divisions\ncould be deployed to Japan in order to increase the security\nof Japan. If our Korean position cannot be stabilized, this\npurpose would have to be served by part of the troops evacu-\nated from Korea. (P. 84, par. 42)\nJanuary 15-18: Generals Vandenberg and Collins held conferences in\nTokyo with General MacArthur. General Collins stated that it would be ad-\nvisable to dispatch two additional divisions from the U.S. to Japan as soon\nas practicable to cover Northern Japan during the remainder of the Korean\noperation. General MacArthur indicated he would be satisfied with two\nNational Guard divisions since he was proceding with the development of the\nJapanese police forces. (P. 89, par. 7)\nJanuary 24: The JCS recommended that the Secretary of Defense urge the\nSecretary of State to press the non-Communist members of the United Nations\nfor additional ground forces for use in Korea. (P. 90, par. 12)\nMarch 31: The Secretary of Defense requested the Secretary of State\nto renew efforts to obtain additional assistance for operations in Korea\nfrom those countries which seemed able to provide contingents of worth-while\nsize and to furnish those contingents a reasonable share of equipment and\nsupport required for service in Korea. (P. 105, par. 52)\nSECRET\nDECLASSIFIED\nSECRET\nE.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402\nState Dept. Guideline, June 12, 1979\nDOD DIRECTIVE 6-18-79\nOFFERS OF HELP\nBy NLT- HC NARS, Date 7-18-60\nJune 27: The UN Security Council called upon the members of\nthe United Nations to furnish such assistance to the Republic of\nKorea as might be necessary to repel armed attack. (P. 9, par. 16)\nJune 30: The JCS accepted the offer of the United Kingdom\nof a naval force to operate in support of South Korea. (P. 11, par. 20)\nJuly 3: The JCS received the first of many offers from foreign\nnations to furnish ground forces to the Republic of Korea in accordance\nwith the Security Council resolution of June 27. The first two of\nthese offers were initiated on this date by the Government of the\nRepublic of China and by Canada. (P. 15, par. 6)\nJuly 13: At a conference with General MacArthur in Tokyo,\nattended by the Chiefs of Staff of the United States Army and the\nUnited States Air Force the offer of 33,000 Chinese Nationalist\ntroops from Formosa was discussed. General MacArthur advised\nagainst accepting this offer. (P. 20, par. 21)\nJuly 14: Numerous offers of assistance had been received\nfrom various members of the United Nations but, in general, these\noffers were not considered adequate. On this date, therefore, the\nJCS requested the comments of CINCFE as to the United States\nsoliciting contributions from the other United Nations. In reply,\nCINCFE stated that he understood the political reasons for such\nforces and was in complete sympathy with the concept of an inter-\nnational force. (P. 19, par. 20)\nJuly 27: By this date naval units from the United Kingdom,\nFrance, the Netherlands, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, had\njoined the unified command. Some of these nations had offered\nsmall ground elements but their arrival was still far in the\nfuture. Turkey, Thailand and Nationalist China had also offered\nground troops. (P. 22, par. 28)\nOctober 3: The Secretary of Defense, in accordance with the\nrecommendation of the JCS informed the Secretary of State of the\nacceptance of Canada's offer of an Army Special Force for service\nin Korea. (P. 45, par. 7)\nOctober 13: The JCS recommended to the Secretary of Defense\nthat the offer by the Thailand Government of two corvettes and\ntwo transports for service in Korean waters be accepted. (P. 47,par.14)\nOctober 22: On this date, one Thailand infantry battalion sailed\nfrom Bangkok for Korea. (P. 61, par. 51)\nSECRET\nSECRET\nOctober 23: The JCS advised CINCFE of their recommendation\nto the Secretary of Defense that the services of the French\nbattalion scheduled to sail for Korea on October 25 would be no\nlonger required. (P. 50, par. 26)\nDecember 15: Ground combat forces of the United Nations\nCommand in Korea comprised representation from Australia, France,\nGreece, Republic of Korea, the Netherlands, the Philippines,\nThailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the U. S. (P. 79, par. 32)\nJanuary 24, 1951: The JCS recommended that the Secretary of\nDefense urge the Secretary of State to press the non-communist\nmembers of the UN for additional ground forces for use in Korea. (P. 90, par. 12)\nMarch 31: The Secretary of Defense requested the Secretary\nof State to renew efforts to obtain additional assistance for\noperations in Korea from those countries which seemed able to\nprovide contingents of worthwhile size and to furnish those con-\ntingents a reasonable share of equipment and support required for\nservice in Korea. (P. 105, par. 33)\nSECRET\n5-6\nSECRET\nDECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402\nState Dept. Guideline, June 12, 1979\n000 DIRECTIVE 6-18-79\nRELEASE OF TROOPS\nBy NLT- HC NARS, Date 7.18.10\nOctober 20: The JCS advised CINCFE that requirements elsewhere\nin the world called for the redeployment of the 2d and 3d Divisions from\nthe Far East as soon as military operations permitted. It was particu-\nlarly desired that the 2d Division be redeployed to the European\nCommand by the end of the present calendar year. CINCFE comments were\nrequested. (P. 48, par. 22)\nOctober 21: CINCFE replied to the JCS message of 20 October\nregarding the redeployment of the 2d and 3d Divisions. He stated that\nthis matter had been discussed with the President at Wake Island. He\nbelieved that upon the close of hostilities the 8th Army should be\nwithdrawn to Japan and the 2d Division would be made available for\nreturn to the Zone of Interior. The 3d Division would be required in\nKorea for 6 months after cessation of hostilities after which time it\nwould be returned to the Zone of Interior. (P. 49, par. 24)\nOctober 23: The JCS advised CINCFE of their recommendations to\nthe Secretary of Defense that the services of the French battalion\nscheduled to sail for Korea on October 25 would be no longer required.\n(P. 50, par. 26)\nOctober 24: The JCS recommended to the Secretary of Defense that\nthe force to be deployed from Greece to Korea should be reduced from a\nbrigade to one battalion with service components. On the same day the\nJCS agreed to make certain other reductions in United States ground\nforces in Korea in order to reduce the logistic burden on the United\nStates. Sufficient UN ground forces would, however, be retained in\norder to derive the political advantages of multi-national UN repre-\nsentation in Korea. (P. 50, par. 27)\nNovember 6: The JCS advised the Secretary of Defense that action\npreviously recommended regarding out-back in deployment of troops to\nKorea should be held in abeyanoe until further recommendations were\nsubmitted by the JCS. This action was based on the increased scale\nof the Chinese Communist intervention in Korea. (P. 58, par. 45)\nNovember 25: CINCFE in message to JCS stated that his plan was to\nconsolidate positions along the Yalu River and then to replace, as far\nas possible, American forces with those of the Republic of Korea. He\nwould then announce his plans which would include the return of the\nAmerican forces to Japan. (P. 65, par. 61)\nSECRET\n5-7\nSECRET\nAPPROACH TO YALU RIVER\nNovember 24: JCS advised CINCFE of concern over general conflict\nif UN forces advanced and seized entire North Korean area at the\nboundary; suggested consideration the CINCFE hold his forces on\nterrain dominating the approaches to the valley of the Yalu and that\nthese forces be principally ROK troops. (P. 64, par. 60, 60a)\nNovember 25: CINCFE replied it would be impossible for UN\nforces to stop on the commanding terrain south of the Yalu; he\nplanned to consolidate positions along the Yalu River as soon as\npossible and then to replace American troops with ROK troops. (P.65, par.61)\nSECRET\nDECLASSIFIED\nSECRET\nE.O. 12065, Sec. 3-402\nState Dept. Guideline, June 12, 1979\nDOD DIRECTIVE 6-12-20\nBy NLT- HC NARS, Date 7.18.80\nHYDRO-ELECTRIC FACILITIES\nOctober 21: JCS on request of State advised CINCFE that\nspecial report on unified commanders intent regarding Suiho\nhydro-electric power plant near Sinuiju be made to Security\nCouncil. (P. 49, par. 25)\nOctober 22: CINCFE advised JCS he did not believe it advisable\nto issue statement with respect to Suiho hydromelectric power plant\nnear Sinuiju until after it had come under his control. He indicated\nthat if it were being utilized for hostile military purposes serious\ndoubts would arise as to any justification for maintaining the\nstatus quo. (P. 50, par. 25)\nNovember 6: JCS advised CINCFE not authorized to bomb any\ndams or power plants on the Yalu River. (P. 58, par. 43)\nNovember 7: CINCFE advised JCS destruction of hyrdo-electric\ninstallations had never been contemplated. (P. 60, par. 49)\nNovember 24: JCS advised CINCFE regarding United Nations\nforces efforts to spare the hydro-electric installations in North\nKorea. (P. 64, par. 60b)\nNovember 25: CINCFE to JCS stating that he felt that the\nmatter of hydro-electric power would not be a major factor either\nto the Chinese Communists or to the Soviets. (P. 65, par. 61)\nApproximately December 29: JCS requested opinion of CINCFE\nas to the desirability of destroying by air power installations on the\nKorean side of the Yalu River in the event Chinese attack acrosss38th\nparallel. CINCFE stated that the preservation or destruction of power\ninstallations was predominantly a political rather than a military\nmatter and that he had been strictly informed to abstain from their\ndestruction. In view of public announcements on the matter he\nrecommended against reversal of that decision which transcended the\nimmediate technical campaign in Korea. (P. 80, par. 38)\nFebruary 26, 1951: CINCFE requested instructions as to his\nauthority to authorize air attacks against the North Korean electrical\npower complex on the Yalu River, in view of the possibility that earlier\npolitical considerations may have changed. On 1 March 1951 the JCS\ndisapproved the request in view of the continued validity of their\nearlier comments. (P. 96, par. 27)\nSECRET"
}