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clearly developed in the Foreign Minister's speech at the end of December, where the
USSR policy for dealing with the "imperialistic" West was defined as Yugoslav policy
also, patently undercuts any satisfactory trade negotiations with the US.
The most that can be said at this time is that Tito is coming steadily nearer to the
point at which he must make fundamental choices. In this sense, the situation is
becoming more fluid and hence more susceptible to US influence and manipulation.
It has not, however, reached the point where a firm US decision about a course of action
can yet be made. A careful loosening of export controls might now serve a useful
political end if it enabled Tito to keep his head above water month after month, but did
not commit the US to saving him. It is possible that need and circumstances will force
Tito tacitly to modify his adherence to a Soviet policy line in international relations.
There are signs of softening in connection with his current negotiations with Italy. A
more important test will come in connection with the Austrian treaty; and opportunities
to moderate his position are always available in connection with Trieste and the sup-
port of the Greek guerrillas. But, until inescapable economic necessity has forced Tito
definitely to show his hand, the proper basis for a US decision does not exist.
6. LATIN AMERICA.
Two important developments have taken place in connection with broad problems
in the relations of the states of the inter-American system. First, three recent military
coups have raised doubts of the policy, stated in Resolution XXXV of the 1948 Confer-
ence at Bogota, governing the recognition of new governments. Second, the machinery
of the Organization of American States (OAS), established by the Rio Treaty of 1947,
has been quickly set in motion to resolve differences between two members of the
Organization.
Recognition of Revolutionary Governments
The general problem of the recognition of governments established by force has a
long history in inter-American relations. One of several possible solutions was approved
by the Bogota Conference in Resolution XXXV. This Resolution was generally under-
stood at the time to define a policy of "automatic recognition." It seems, however, to
have been considered by the Latin American states rather as a formal US commitment
not to use or to withhold recognition as an instrument of influence and control, than as
a limitation on their own policies. Latin American countries have generally indicated
that they, as a group, will not grant any inter-American organization broad authority
to sit in judgment upon the propriety, legitimacy, or democracy of new governments
that may emerge on the Latin American scene. A series of military coups has reopened
the general question of recognition. The matter has not come formally before the
Council of OAS, but it has been made the subject of extensive consultation between the
US and Latin American chancelleries.
Some governments deplore the prompt and general recognition-in accordance
with Resolution XXXV-which was given the Peruvian military government and wish
some special method to be devised for use against the successful military leaders of
DECLASSIFIED
B. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
SECRET
C.I.A.
9
OSD letter, 3-31-77
By NLT-NC NARS Date 4.1fm
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"ocrText": "SECRET\nclearly developed in the Foreign Minister's speech at the end of December, where the\nUSSR policy for dealing with the \"imperialistic\" West was defined as Yugoslav policy\nalso, patently undercuts any satisfactory trade negotiations with the US.\nThe most that can be said at this time is that Tito is coming steadily nearer to the\npoint at which he must make fundamental choices. In this sense, the situation is\nbecoming more fluid and hence more susceptible to US influence and manipulation.\nIt has not, however, reached the point where a firm US decision about a course of action\ncan yet be made. A careful loosening of export controls might now serve a useful\npolitical end if it enabled Tito to keep his head above water month after month, but did\nnot commit the US to saving him. It is possible that need and circumstances will force\nTito tacitly to modify his adherence to a Soviet policy line in international relations.\nThere are signs of softening in connection with his current negotiations with Italy. A\nmore important test will come in connection with the Austrian treaty; and opportunities\nto moderate his position are always available in connection with Trieste and the sup-\nport of the Greek guerrillas. But, until inescapable economic necessity has forced Tito\ndefinitely to show his hand, the proper basis for a US decision does not exist.\n6. LATIN AMERICA.\nTwo important developments have taken place in connection with broad problems\nin the relations of the states of the inter-American system. First, three recent military\ncoups have raised doubts of the policy, stated in Resolution XXXV of the 1948 Confer-\nence at Bogota, governing the recognition of new governments. Second, the machinery\nof the Organization of American States (OAS), established by the Rio Treaty of 1947,\nhas been quickly set in motion to resolve differences between two members of the\nOrganization.\nRecognition of Revolutionary Governments\nThe general problem of the recognition of governments established by force has a\nlong history in inter-American relations. One of several possible solutions was approved\nby the Bogota Conference in Resolution XXXV. This Resolution was generally under-\nstood at the time to define a policy of \"automatic recognition.\" It seems, however, to\nhave been considered by the Latin American states rather as a formal US commitment\nnot to use or to withhold recognition as an instrument of influence and control, than as\na limitation on their own policies. Latin American countries have generally indicated\nthat they, as a group, will not grant any inter-American organization broad authority\nto sit in judgment upon the propriety, legitimacy, or democracy of new governments\nthat may emerge on the Latin American scene. A series of military coups has reopened\nthe general question of recognition. The matter has not come formally before the\nCouncil of OAS, but it has been made the subject of extensive consultation between the\nUS and Latin American chancelleries.\nSome governments deplore the prompt and general recognition-in accordance\nwith Resolution XXXV-which was given the Peruvian military government and wish\nsome special method to be devised for use against the successful military leaders of\nDECLASSIFIED\nB. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)\nSECRET\nC.I.A.\n9\nOSD letter, 3-31-77\nBy NLT-NC NARS Date 4.1fm"
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