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of strengthening his own hand vis-à-vis the
PRN, and should conservative anti-administra-
popular Colonel Arana, who enjoyed wide army
tion elements add their support to Giordani,
support. Moreover, since Arana's assassina-
he might be able to win over Arbenz in a fair
tion, he has gained effective army support by
election. However, pro-Arbenz groups should
arranging the removal of some officers and the
be in a position to control the electoral ma-
financial rewarding of others. If elected, it is
chinery. and this control, coupled with the
likely that Arbenz will establish an adminis-
aggressiveness of the leftists, will go far to
tration (more conventional by Central Ameri-
assure an Arbenz victory.
can standards) in which graft, privilege, and
2. Subversive.
arbitrary repressive measures are used to a
greater degree than at present. In view of
It is believed that the tolerant policies of the
his background and his private remarks (both
Arévalo administration, which have permitted
official and otherwise), Arbenz appears to be
Communists and Communist sympathizers to
willing to grant favorable terms to business at
operate within and without the government,
the expense of labor. He has indicated that
will be continued as long as Arévalo remains
he is favorably disposed toward US interests in
President. The activities of such persons rep-
Guatemala, and, despite the anti-imperialism
resent a continuing threat to US security. It
of his present campaign supporters, it is be-
is probable, however, that Communist influ-
lieved that personal characteristics and possi-
ence on Guatemalan government policies, par-
ble governmental financial difficulties would
ticularly domestic policies, will diminish in the
lead him, as President, to welcome foreign in-
future. This estimate is based on the follow-
vestments and possibly foreign loans. If
ing considerations: (1) Since about 1948, there
elected, he will probably distribute favors for
has been a slight trend away from the left.
personal profit, will seek to subvert army and
Oppositionists have emerged and have won
labor leaders who oppose him, and will take
seats in Congress; the FPL (largest of the
rigorous action against those whom he cannot
Arevalista parties) has moved away from the
control. In contrast to Arévalo, Arbenz ap-
leftist parties; the agrarian reform program
pears to place a higher value on material than
has not advanced, agitation by union organ-
on social progress, and there is evidence that
izers among coffee plantation workers has
he plans, if elected, to initiate various con-
diminished, the nationalized plantations have
struction projects. It is likely that he will
been put under a more business-minded ad-
permit the labor organizations, established un-
ministration which has opposed the labor
der the Arévalo administration, to continue
unions and the Ministry of Labor; the Produc-
their activities, and that he will seek to use
tion Development Institute (INFOP) has done
labor as a personal political weapon, thereby
much to promote and finance private agricul-
establishing himself as an indispensable arbi-
tural projects; labor problems have been more
ter between labor, business, the army, and
easily solved since mid-1949. (2) It is felt
other factions.
that the moderate and anti-Communist ele-
In general, an Arbenz administration would
ment in Guatemala, including the army, is
probably be more conventional and more con-
more adequately led and has greater repre-
servative in actual practice than the present
sentation and influence in government than
administration. Should he be assassinated, it
the extreme leftist element associated with the
is likely that the leftist labor forces now sup-
PAR and the labor unions. (3) The Guate-
porting him would be opposed by the army as
malan labor movement is young and poten-
well as the popular majority and could neither
tially weakened by an absence of capable labor
seize nor maintain control of the government.
leaders. The effectiveness of the present
Of Arbenz' opponents, Dr. Victor M. Giordani,
leadership, which is strongly influenced by
candidate of the moderate leftist FPL (Frente
Communism, is not SO much a measure of
Popular Libertador) is the strongest competi-
labor's coercive power as it is a measure of the
tor for the presidency. The strength of the
administration's desire to establish a labor
FPL in Congress slightly surpasses the com-
movement. Should a relatively few labor
bined strength of the pro-Arbenz PAR and
leaders be removed, their replacement would
SECRET
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"ocrText": "46\nSECRET\nof strengthening his own hand vis-à-vis the\nPRN, and should conservative anti-administra-\npopular Colonel Arana, who enjoyed wide army\ntion elements add their support to Giordani,\nsupport. Moreover, since Arana's assassina-\nhe might be able to win over Arbenz in a fair\ntion, he has gained effective army support by\nelection. However, pro-Arbenz groups should\narranging the removal of some officers and the\nbe in a position to control the electoral ma-\nfinancial rewarding of others. If elected, it is\nchinery. and this control, coupled with the\nlikely that Arbenz will establish an adminis-\naggressiveness of the leftists, will go far to\ntration (more conventional by Central Ameri-\nassure an Arbenz victory.\ncan standards) in which graft, privilege, and\n2. Subversive.\narbitrary repressive measures are used to a\ngreater degree than at present. In view of\nIt is believed that the tolerant policies of the\nhis background and his private remarks (both\nArévalo administration, which have permitted\nofficial and otherwise), Arbenz appears to be\nCommunists and Communist sympathizers to\nwilling to grant favorable terms to business at\noperate within and without the government,\nthe expense of labor. He has indicated that\nwill be continued as long as Arévalo remains\nhe is favorably disposed toward US interests in\nPresident. The activities of such persons rep-\nGuatemala, and, despite the anti-imperialism\nresent a continuing threat to US security. It\nof his present campaign supporters, it is be-\nis probable, however, that Communist influ-\nlieved that personal characteristics and possi-\nence on Guatemalan government policies, par-\nble governmental financial difficulties would\nticularly domestic policies, will diminish in the\nlead him, as President, to welcome foreign in-\nfuture. This estimate is based on the follow-\nvestments and possibly foreign loans. If\ning considerations: (1) Since about 1948, there\nelected, he will probably distribute favors for\nhas been a slight trend away from the left.\npersonal profit, will seek to subvert army and\nOppositionists have emerged and have won\nlabor leaders who oppose him, and will take\nseats in Congress; the FPL (largest of the\nrigorous action against those whom he cannot\nArevalista parties) has moved away from the\ncontrol. In contrast to Arévalo, Arbenz ap-\nleftist parties; the agrarian reform program\npears to place a higher value on material than\nhas not advanced, agitation by union organ-\non social progress, and there is evidence that\nizers among coffee plantation workers has\nhe plans, if elected, to initiate various con-\ndiminished, the nationalized plantations have\nstruction projects. It is likely that he will\nbeen put under a more business-minded ad-\npermit the labor organizations, established un-\nministration which has opposed the labor\nder the Arévalo administration, to continue\nunions and the Ministry of Labor; the Produc-\ntheir activities, and that he will seek to use\ntion Development Institute (INFOP) has done\nlabor as a personal political weapon, thereby\nmuch to promote and finance private agricul-\nestablishing himself as an indispensable arbi-\ntural projects; labor problems have been more\nter between labor, business, the army, and\neasily solved since mid-1949. (2) It is felt\nother factions.\nthat the moderate and anti-Communist ele-\nIn general, an Arbenz administration would\nment in Guatemala, including the army, is\nprobably be more conventional and more con-\nmore adequately led and has greater repre-\nservative in actual practice than the present\nsentation and influence in government than\nadministration. Should he be assassinated, it\nthe extreme leftist element associated with the\nis likely that the leftist labor forces now sup-\nPAR and the labor unions. (3) The Guate-\nporting him would be opposed by the army as\nmalan labor movement is young and poten-\nwell as the popular majority and could neither\ntially weakened by an absence of capable labor\nseize nor maintain control of the government.\nleaders. The effectiveness of the present\nOf Arbenz' opponents, Dr. Victor M. Giordani,\nleadership, which is strongly influenced by\ncandidate of the moderate leftist FPL (Frente\nCommunism, is not SO much a measure of\nPopular Libertador) is the strongest competi-\nlabor's coercive power as it is a measure of the\ntor for the presidency. The strength of the\nadministration's desire to establish a labor\nFPL in Congress slightly surpasses the com-\nmovement. Should a relatively few labor\nbined strength of the pro-Arbenz PAR and\nleaders be removed, their replacement would\nSECRET"
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