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results. None of the Dominions acceded to
isolationist
French-Canadians
reluctantly
the Locarno Treaties of 1925, thereby empha-
concurred.
sizing their right not to join in British com-
mitments where their national interests were
2. Foreign Policy Since World War II.
not concerned. By 1928 no one was disposed
By the end of World War II Canada may
to dispute Canadian claims to complete au-
be said to have come of age in its status
tonomy, either domestic or foreign. Canada
among foreign nations; today it ranks among
was a recognized member of the League of
the foremost of the middle group of world
Nations and after 1926 began opening Lega-
powers. The emphasis of the inter-war years
tions in various capitals.
on cautious isolationism and on the extension
During the inter-war years Canadian ambi-
and completion of Canadian autonomy in for-
tions in foreign affairs were primarily to
eign affairs has been replaced by a positive
secure recognition of an independent position
policy. This is a significant departure from
within the British Commonwealth of Nations
the tradition of holding aloof from commit-
and of sovereign status among the nations of
ments and the formulation of Canadian for-
the world. Canadian foreign policy was one
eign policy is not always an easy matter, since
of friendship and peace. As a member of the
it necessitates the satisfying of such diverse
League of Nations and International Labor
elements as the Ontario imperialists and the
Organization, Canada had the opportunity to
Quebec French-Canadian nationalists. To
take its first major steps in the international
maintain national unity must be a basic prin-
arena, but its action proved to be indecisive
ciple of Canadian political leadership.
and not particularly constructive. This
In line with expanded international rela-
stemmed from a divided opinion at home, a
tionships Canada has strengthened its Exter-
lack of feeling of urgency regarding security
nal Affairs Department; there are now
and a reluctance to take on commitments in
twenty-nine diplomatic missions abroad,
the League of Nations which might involve
eleven consular officers, four special missions
conflicts of interest with the US. Further-
(the Permanent Delegation to the UN and to
more, Canadians felt the necessity to exercise
the Atomic Energy Commission, Permanent
caution during the formative period of their
Representation at the European Office of the
foreign policy. Public opinion at home on
UN in Geneva, the Military Mission in Ger-
foreign policy ran from the jingoistic imperi-
many, and the Liaison Mission in Japan), and
alism of many English-speaking Canadians to
planning groups under the North Atlantic
the extremes of isolationism of French-
Treaty. Whereas until the recent World War
Canadians, with many gradations in between,
the Prime Minister always held the portfolio
but on the whole Canadians were still provin-
of External Affairs, this post now is consid-
cial in their outlook. When the dangerous
ered of such importance that in 1946 a sep-
problems of the Spanish Civil War presented
arate Minister, Louis St. Laurent, was ap-
themselves, Prime Minister Mackenzie King
pointed. L. B. Pearson, widely experienced
steered a characteristically middle course of
in international affairs and conferences, suc-
non-intervention and appeasement, in order
ceeded St. Laurent in the autumn of 1948
to avoid within Canada a deep division of race
when the latter replaced Mackenzie King as
and religion on the issue. But when Ger-
Prime Minister.
many invaded Poland in 1939 there was no
The bases of present Canadian foreign
doubt. Canada declared war on Germany on
policy are: (a) membership in the British
10 September independently of Britain and
Commonwealth of Nations; (b) strong sup-
seven days after the latter's declaration.
port of the UN and its specialized agencies;
During this intervening period Canada was
(c) close friendship and defensive ties with
recognized by the US as possessing neutral
the US; (d) support of the North Atlantic
status. There was little jingoism and neither
Treaty, of which Canada was a leading pro-
jubilation nor active protest; public opinion
moter in its conception and preparation; and
saw the necessity to stem the Nazi tide and
(e) international cooperation for peace. Can-
SECRET
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"ocrText": "40\nSECRET\nresults. None of the Dominions acceded to\nisolationist\nFrench-Canadians\nreluctantly\nthe Locarno Treaties of 1925, thereby empha-\nconcurred.\nsizing their right not to join in British com-\nmitments where their national interests were\n2. Foreign Policy Since World War II.\nnot concerned. By 1928 no one was disposed\nBy the end of World War II Canada may\nto dispute Canadian claims to complete au-\nbe said to have come of age in its status\ntonomy, either domestic or foreign. Canada\namong foreign nations; today it ranks among\nwas a recognized member of the League of\nthe foremost of the middle group of world\nNations and after 1926 began opening Lega-\npowers. The emphasis of the inter-war years\ntions in various capitals.\non cautious isolationism and on the extension\nDuring the inter-war years Canadian ambi-\nand completion of Canadian autonomy in for-\ntions in foreign affairs were primarily to\neign affairs has been replaced by a positive\nsecure recognition of an independent position\npolicy. This is a significant departure from\nwithin the British Commonwealth of Nations\nthe tradition of holding aloof from commit-\nand of sovereign status among the nations of\nments and the formulation of Canadian for-\nthe world. Canadian foreign policy was one\neign policy is not always an easy matter, since\nof friendship and peace. As a member of the\nit necessitates the satisfying of such diverse\nLeague of Nations and International Labor\nelements as the Ontario imperialists and the\nOrganization, Canada had the opportunity to\nQuebec French-Canadian nationalists. To\ntake its first major steps in the international\nmaintain national unity must be a basic prin-\narena, but its action proved to be indecisive\nciple of Canadian political leadership.\nand not particularly constructive. This\nIn line with expanded international rela-\nstemmed from a divided opinion at home, a\ntionships Canada has strengthened its Exter-\nlack of feeling of urgency regarding security\nnal Affairs Department; there are now\nand a reluctance to take on commitments in\ntwenty-nine diplomatic missions abroad,\nthe League of Nations which might involve\neleven consular officers, four special missions\nconflicts of interest with the US. Further-\n(the Permanent Delegation to the UN and to\nmore, Canadians felt the necessity to exercise\nthe Atomic Energy Commission, Permanent\ncaution during the formative period of their\nRepresentation at the European Office of the\nforeign policy. Public opinion at home on\nUN in Geneva, the Military Mission in Ger-\nforeign policy ran from the jingoistic imperi-\nmany, and the Liaison Mission in Japan), and\nalism of many English-speaking Canadians to\nplanning groups under the North Atlantic\nthe extremes of isolationism of French-\nTreaty. Whereas until the recent World War\nCanadians, with many gradations in between,\nthe Prime Minister always held the portfolio\nbut on the whole Canadians were still provin-\nof External Affairs, this post now is consid-\ncial in their outlook. When the dangerous\nered of such importance that in 1946 a sep-\nproblems of the Spanish Civil War presented\narate Minister, Louis St. Laurent, was ap-\nthemselves, Prime Minister Mackenzie King\npointed. L. B. Pearson, widely experienced\nsteered a characteristically middle course of\nin international affairs and conferences, suc-\nnon-intervention and appeasement, in order\nceeded St. Laurent in the autumn of 1948\nto avoid within Canada a deep division of race\nwhen the latter replaced Mackenzie King as\nand religion on the issue. But when Ger-\nPrime Minister.\nmany invaded Poland in 1939 there was no\nThe bases of present Canadian foreign\ndoubt. Canada declared war on Germany on\npolicy are: (a) membership in the British\n10 September independently of Britain and\nCommonwealth of Nations; (b) strong sup-\nseven days after the latter's declaration.\nport of the UN and its specialized agencies;\nDuring this intervening period Canada was\n(c) close friendship and defensive ties with\nrecognized by the US as possessing neutral\nthe US; (d) support of the North Atlantic\nstatus. There was little jingoism and neither\nTreaty, of which Canada was a leading pro-\njubilation nor active protest; public opinion\nmoter in its conception and preparation; and\nsaw the necessity to stem the Nazi tide and\n(e) international cooperation for peace. Can-\nSECRET"
}