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OCR
LORET
WINE
wash
and
4.8
(3) UN forces within the beachhead would be subjected
to constant attrition (and in the event of overt Soviet
intervention, danger of annihilation).
(4) The continued deployment of the Army forces of the
Far East command in Korea would leave Japan more
vulnerable to hostile invasion.
(5) The US would be required to continue its support of
several million Korean refugees.
2. A UN beachhead would have the following short-term inter-
national political and psychological effects:
a. There would be an avoidance of the great loss of prestige
to the UN and the diminution of confidence in the US that would
follow a withdrawal.
b. The maintenance of a beachhead would place stresses on
the UN coalition stemming from increased fear of general war,
provide continued Communist propaganda opportunities arising
from a conflict between the West and Asiatics, and continue
European concern over the diversion of major US military
strength to the Far East.
C. The Chinese Communists would be prevented from achiev-
ing complete success in Korea and the beachhead would provide
a continued symbol of UN determination to resist aggression.
d. Most Far Eastern countries would react favorably to the
maintenance of a UN beachhead® In Japan, maintenance of a beach-
head would be particularly advantageous with respect to negotiations
leading toward a Japanese peace treaty. Those countries in South -
east Asia vulnerable to an early Chinese Communist attack, however,
would be apprehensive about the possibility of a general war with
China while UN forces were involved in Korea, and Indonesia and
Burma particularly would favor a withdrawal.
- 3 -
SECRET
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