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north of the 38th Parallel represented the
most favorable terms on which the Korean
war could be brought to a close.
(ii) It would enable the Chinese Communists to
avoid formal renunciation of any of their
original demands (withdrawal of UN forces,
control over Formosa, and a seat in the
UN) and the consequent loss of face.
(iii) It might subject UN troops in the field to
a debilitating and demoralizing period of
inaction and create official and popular
pressures on the part of the UN belligerents
to withdraw their forces from Korea in the
face of a requirement to keep these forces
AND
in Korea for an indefinite period.
(iv) It might slow down the rate of mobilization
and rearmament of the free world.
(v) It would give the Communists time to in-
crease the combat effectiveness of forces
in training, including such elite forces as
may be training with modern Soviet weapons
in Manchuria.
(vi) It would provide the Chinese Communists
with an extended respite which they could
use to further consolidate their control
within China.
- 10 -
SECRET
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"ocrText": "north of the 38th Parallel represented the\nmost favorable terms on which the Korean\nwar could be brought to a close.\n(ii) It would enable the Chinese Communists to\navoid formal renunciation of any of their\noriginal demands (withdrawal of UN forces,\ncontrol over Formosa, and a seat in the\nUN) and the consequent loss of face.\n(iii) It might subject UN troops in the field to\na debilitating and demoralizing period of\ninaction and create official and popular\npressures on the part of the UN belligerents\nto withdraw their forces from Korea in the\nface of a requirement to keep these forces\nAND\nin Korea for an indefinite period.\n(iv) It might slow down the rate of mobilization\nand rearmament of the free world.\n(v) It would give the Communists time to in-\ncrease the combat effectiveness of forces\nin training, including such elite forces as\nmay be training with modern Soviet weapons\nin Manchuria.\n(vi) It would provide the Chinese Communists\nwith an extended respite which they could\nuse to further consolidate their control\nwithin China.\n- 10 -\nSECRET"
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