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{
    "localId": "486501643",
    "label": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Present and Potential Offensive Capabilities of the Chinese Nationalists, and Probable Reactions to an Identifiable United States Program of Preparing the Nationalists for Offensive Operations Against the Chinese Communists, Special Estimate 29",
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    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501643"
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    "id": "486501643",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501643",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Report, Central Intelligence Agency, Present and Potential Offensive Capabilities of the Chinese Nationalists, and Probable Reactions to an Identifiable United States Program of Preparing the Nationalists for Offensive Operations Against the Chinese Communists, Special Estimate 29",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/486501643",
    "collections": [
        "President's Secretary's Files (Truman Administration)",
        "Intelligence Files"
    ],
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    "naId": 486501643,
    "levelOfDescription": "item",
    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 18,
            "logicalDate": "1952-06-18",
            "month": 6,
            "year": 1952
        }
    ],
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{
    "seq": 6,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
    "url": "https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/NARAprodstorage/lz/presidential-libraries/truman/hst-psf/602196/875520/875520-07-006.tif",
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    "ocrText": "No Objection To Declassification 2007/04/27 NLT-PSF-52-7-2-7\nSECRET\n2\nably deter the Chinese Communists from\nUS decision as a commitment that US\ndiverting for operations elsewhere any\nforces would participate in a future Na-\nimportant part of the estimated 400,000\ntionalist invasion of the mainland. Feel-\nChinese Communist troops now deployed\ning confident that the US could not back\nin the coastal area from Canton to\ndown once SO committed, the Nationalist\nShanghai.\nleadership might embark on independent\noperations regardless of US directives or\n4. After the required advisory and logistic\nthe prospects of success.\nsupport had been received from the US,\n21 reorganized Nationalist divisions could\n8. Although the Nationalist leadership\nbe made effective for offensive operations.\nwould almost certainly prefer to use Na-\nThese troops, except for the 25,000 men\ntionalist forces for an invasion of main-\nmentioned above, would require about 12\nland China, it would probably renew its\nmonths training for each division. This\noffer to make forces available in Korea if\ntime estimate does not include the period\ngiven any encouragement to do SO. The\nrequired for amphibious training. These\nNationalist leadership might also be will-\ndivisions would be of an average size of\ning to participate in a UN force com-\n10,000 men. The time required for ready-\nmitted for the defense of Southeast Asia.\ning the total 21 divisions would depend\nHowever, prior to the release of forces for\non the availability of training facilities\nuse in Southeast Asia, or forces for use\nand on the necessity of maintaining some\nin Korea beyond those previously offered,\ndivisions in defensive positions on Tai-\nthe Nationalist Government would almost\nwan.\ncertainly seek additional US commit-\nments.\n5. With US air, naval, and logistic sup-\nport and US over-all direction, this force\n9. Communist reaction to a program of\nwould be capable of undertaking major\npreparing the Nationalists for offensive\noperations on the mainland. A US com-\noperations, in addition to an intensifica-\nmitment to guarantee the security of Tai-\ntion of anti-US propaganda, would prob-\nwan would be a continuing requirement.\nably include: (a) an increase in the\ncapabilities of the Chinese Communists\n6. In view of the limited manpower avail-\nto counter the growing Nationalist\nable to the Nationalists on Taiwan (see\nthreat; (b) seizure of the offshore Nation-\nparagraph 18) and the vastly superior\nalist islands; and possibly (c) air attacks\nmanpower resources of the Chinese Com-\non Taiwan. If the Chinese Communists\nmunists, the Nationalists could not sup-\nassessed that Taiwan was to become a\nport sustained large-scale operations on\nthe mainland without substantial recruit-\nbase of US-supported Nationalist strength\nments and defections from the main-\nfrom which the mainland would one day\nland.\nbe invaded, they might feel compelled to\nmake extensive increases in existing\n7. A US program of preparing the Chi-\ncoastal defense forces, at the expense of\nnese Nationalists for offensive operations\ntheir military establishment elsewhere.\nwould boost the morale of the National-\nOnce committed to such a defensive mili-\nists. It would also encourage the Na-\ntary posture, their calculations with re-\ntionalist leadership to interpret such a\nspect to present and future military\nSECRET\nNo Objection To Declassification 2007/04/27 NLT-PSF-52-7-2-7"
}