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No Objection To Declassification 2007/04/27 NLT-PSF-52-7-2-7
TOP SECRET
5
19. Aside from Taiwan, the Nationalists have
commanders at all levels authority commen-
few sources of manpower at this time. Politi-
surate to their assigned responsibilities.
cal considerations probably preclude the early
transfer to Taiwan of the anti-Communist
22. The Nationalist Government has sought to
Chinese POW's in Korea or of any significant
sustain morale and give purpose to its mili-
number of the Nationalist troops in Burma.
tary programs by promising an early return
to the mainland. Continued failure of these
Nationalist efforts to effect the release of
30,000 troops interned by the French in Indo-
promises to materialize will almost certainly
china have been unsuccessful. (There is
result in widespread disappointment and dis-
some doubt concerning the usefulness or loy-
illusionment. Moreover, many responsible
alty of these internees. but once released, per-
Nationalist leaders recognize that successful
haps half of them might be salvaged for some
large-scale offensive operations in the foresee-
military use.) The overseas Chinese in Hong
able future are actually impossible without
Kong and Southeast Asia cannot be consid-
substantial outside assistance, direction, and
ered a significant source of manpower because
participation.
their loyalties are divided and their attitude
23. Communist activity on Taiwan has been
toward Peiping and Taipei is one of "wait and
effectively suppressed and is not likely seri-
see." In addition, these overseas Chinese are
ously to affect Nationalist military capabilities
largely engaged in business and have little
unless subversive actions were coordinated
desire to forsake their present relative
with a Communist invasion of Taiwan.
security. Finally, the various Southeast
Asian governments, through fear of antago-
24. The Taiwanese generally resent the pres-
nizing Communist China or lack of sympathy
ence of the Nationalists. However, although
for the present Nationalist Government,
frictions exist, antipathy has diminished and
would probably not permit overt recruiting of
is not strong at present.
resident Chinese.
20. In view of the limited manpower available
Economic Factors Affecting Nationalist
to the Nationalists and the vastly superior
Military Capabilities
manpower resources of the Chinese Commu-
25. Taiwan does not have adequate resources
nists, the Nationalists could not support sus-
to support a military force of the size of the
tained large-scale operations on the mainland
present Nationalist military establishment.
without substantial recruitments and defec-
Total annual production has recovered to
tions from among the mainland Chinese.
approximately 1940 levels, but the population
of Taiwan has increased 70 percent since that
Political Factors Affecting Nationalist
time.
Offensive Capabilities
NATIONALIST CAPABILITIES TO ENGAGE IN
21. The Chinese Nationalist political scene is
characterized by the centralization of author-
VARIOUS OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
ity in the hands of a few and of power ulti-
Raids, Feints, and Diversions against Hai-
mately in the hands of one man. The policy
nan and the Mainland
of divide-and-rule and the practice of demand-
ing unswerving loyalty to the Generalissimo
26. One Nationalist Marine battalion and
as the prime requisite for individual advance-
9,000 offshore guerrillas are now capable of
ment are the means relied upon to insure
conducting limited raiding operations against
continuance of centralized control. In the
the mainland. The Nationalist Navy does not
military sphere, these same factors have re-
now have the capability for supporting opera-
sulted in the overextension of the power and
tions against Hainan. More extensive and
authority of the political police, in the ad-
effective operations could be conducted by
vancement of military incompetents, and espe-
these forces if present deficiencies in landing
cially in the general failure to delegate to
craft, fighter aircraft, shipboard antiaircraft
IOP SECRET
No Objection To Declassification 2007/04/27 NLT-PSF-52-7-2-7
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Context sent to Scholar
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"ocrText": "No Objection To Declassification 2007/04/27 NLT-PSF-52-7-2-7\nTOP SECRET\n5\n19. Aside from Taiwan, the Nationalists have\ncommanders at all levels authority commen-\nfew sources of manpower at this time. Politi-\nsurate to their assigned responsibilities.\ncal considerations probably preclude the early\ntransfer to Taiwan of the anti-Communist\n22. The Nationalist Government has sought to\nChinese POW's in Korea or of any significant\nsustain morale and give purpose to its mili-\nnumber of the Nationalist troops in Burma.\ntary programs by promising an early return\nto the mainland. Continued failure of these\nNationalist efforts to effect the release of\n30,000 troops interned by the French in Indo-\npromises to materialize will almost certainly\nchina have been unsuccessful. (There is\nresult in widespread disappointment and dis-\nsome doubt concerning the usefulness or loy-\nillusionment. Moreover, many responsible\nalty of these internees. but once released, per-\nNationalist leaders recognize that successful\nhaps half of them might be salvaged for some\nlarge-scale offensive operations in the foresee-\nmilitary use.) The overseas Chinese in Hong\nable future are actually impossible without\nKong and Southeast Asia cannot be consid-\nsubstantial outside assistance, direction, and\nered a significant source of manpower because\nparticipation.\ntheir loyalties are divided and their attitude\n23. Communist activity on Taiwan has been\ntoward Peiping and Taipei is one of \"wait and\neffectively suppressed and is not likely seri-\nsee.\" In addition, these overseas Chinese are\nously to affect Nationalist military capabilities\nlargely engaged in business and have little\nunless subversive actions were coordinated\ndesire to forsake their present relative\nwith a Communist invasion of Taiwan.\nsecurity. Finally, the various Southeast\nAsian governments, through fear of antago-\n24. The Taiwanese generally resent the pres-\nnizing Communist China or lack of sympathy\nence of the Nationalists. However, although\nfor the present Nationalist Government,\nfrictions exist, antipathy has diminished and\nwould probably not permit overt recruiting of\nis not strong at present.\nresident Chinese.\n20. In view of the limited manpower available\nEconomic Factors Affecting Nationalist\nto the Nationalists and the vastly superior\nMilitary Capabilities\nmanpower resources of the Chinese Commu-\n25. Taiwan does not have adequate resources\nnists, the Nationalists could not support sus-\nto support a military force of the size of the\ntained large-scale operations on the mainland\npresent Nationalist military establishment.\nwithout substantial recruitments and defec-\nTotal annual production has recovered to\ntions from among the mainland Chinese.\napproximately 1940 levels, but the population\nof Taiwan has increased 70 percent since that\nPolitical Factors Affecting Nationalist\ntime.\nOffensive Capabilities\nNATIONALIST CAPABILITIES TO ENGAGE IN\n21. The Chinese Nationalist political scene is\ncharacterized by the centralization of author-\nVARIOUS OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS\nity in the hands of a few and of power ulti-\nRaids, Feints, and Diversions against Hai-\nmately in the hands of one man. The policy\nnan and the Mainland\nof divide-and-rule and the practice of demand-\ning unswerving loyalty to the Generalissimo\n26. One Nationalist Marine battalion and\nas the prime requisite for individual advance-\n9,000 offshore guerrillas are now capable of\nment are the means relied upon to insure\nconducting limited raiding operations against\ncontinuance of centralized control. In the\nthe mainland. The Nationalist Navy does not\nmilitary sphere, these same factors have re-\nnow have the capability for supporting opera-\nsulted in the overextension of the power and\ntions against Hainan. More extensive and\nauthority of the political police, in the ad-\neffective operations could be conducted by\nvancement of military incompetents, and espe-\nthese forces if present deficiencies in landing\ncially in the general failure to delegate to\ncraft, fighter aircraft, shipboard antiaircraft\nIOP SECRET\nNo Objection To Declassification 2007/04/27 NLT-PSF-52-7-2-7"
}