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Middle East, 1977 [1]
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Middle East, 1977 [1]
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Office of the Chief of Staff Files
Hamilton Jordan's Confidential Files
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Middle East, 1977 (1)
Folder Citation: Collection: Office of the Chief of Staff Files; Series:
Hamilton Jordan's Confidential Files; Folder: Middle East, 1977 (1),
Container 35
To See Complete Finding Aid:
http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/library/findingaids/Chief_of St
aff.pdf
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)
FORM OF
CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
DOCUMENT
memo
H.J to JC (3 pp. ) 3 copies
12/17/77
A
memo
HJ to JC (7 PP )
12/1/77
A
memo
HJ to JC (2 pp.)
11/29/77
A
memo
HJ to JC, ZB (4 pp.) 2 copies
11/22/77
A
memo
ZB to Walter Mondale (7 pp.)
11/18/77
A
memo
ZB to JC. (2 pp.)
11/19/77
A
memo
Robert Lipshutz to ZB
11/22/77
A
speech draft
World Jewish Congress
n.d.
A
memo
Joint Soviet-U.S. Statement, on the Middle East
10/2/77
A
cable
American Embassy Tel Aviv to Sec. of State
9/12/77
A
memo
U.S.-Soviet Statement on Middle East (11 I pp.
n.d
A
memo
HJ to JC (8 pp.) 2 copies
n.d.
A
notes
U.S. /Israel relations (9 pp.)
n.d.
A
memo
HJ to JC (6 pp.) )
n.d.
A
memo
Rich Inderfurth to HJ, Landon Butler
9/28/77
A
memo
HJ to JC (2 pp.) to
10/3/77
A
memo
HJ to JC (6 pp.)*. 2<copies
7/6/77
A
deptel
TOSEC 048376
5/20/77
A
memo
HJ to JC (3 pp.)
n.d.
A
memo
HJ to JC (4 PP.) 3 copies
n.d.
A
corresp
Isam A. Sartawi to LB (7 pp.)
ca. 7/77
A
memo
.HJ to ZB, Walter Mondale
6/21/77
A
memo
Rick Inderfurth to HJ (49) pp.)
8/22/78
A
FILE LOCATION
Chief of Staff (Jordan)/Confidential File?Middle east 1977
RESTRICTION CODES
(A) Closed by Executive Order 12358 governing access to national security Information
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained'in the donor. deed of gift
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS SERVICE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)
FORM OF
CORRESPOND ENTS OR TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
DOCUMENT
memo
Mark Siegel to HJ
2/13/78
A
memo
HJ to JC (6 pp. )
n.d.
A
memo
HJ to JC (3 pp.)
12/30/77
A
memo
HJ to JC (4 pp.)
n.d
A
memo
E to HJ (7 pp..)
n.d.
A
memo
Sober and Saunders to Sec. of State (2 pp.)
10/3/77
A
memo
Atherton and Saunders to Sec. of State (9 pp.)
11/19/77
A
memo
Atherton and Saunders to Sec of State (6 pp.)
11/28/77
A
FILE LOCATION
Chief of Staff (Jordan)/Confidential File/Middle East 1977
RESTRICT ON CODES
(A) Closed by Executive Order-1 2356 governing cess toinational security information
(B) Closed by statute or by the agenc which.originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with.restr ictions.cont lined the donor's deed of:gnt:
SERVICES ADMINISTR ATYON
GSA FORM 7122 (REV. 5-82
President
S.H
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16A.ED
*modictor that betwenpest
Salled
the to wood
miles aport;
Not
FACTOR BEFORE
division
NOT BOW
Isnael at
5
NOTES ON US - SOVIET JOINT STATEMENT
1.
The US-Soviet text is not a full statement of US policy toward
the Middle East. It does not foreshadow any US - Soviet attempt
to impose a settlement. It does reflect areas of agreement between
W
3thing
the US and Soviet Union, who 2s cochairmen of the Geneva Conference
have tried to highlight issues that the parties will have to resolve
* status
through negotiations.
more was,
INFLUENCES/ORIETS
2.
The United States has not changed any of its positions on the nature
of an Arab-Israeli peace.
-Negotiations should be based on UNSC Resolutions 242-338.
No settlement should be imposed.
The parties should directly negotiate to resolve differences.
-Agreements should be embodied in peace treaties.
The Palestinian question should be resolved, and Palestinian
rights should be taken into account, but this does not imply a PLO-led
Palestinian state. Indeed, our preference UNKED is for a Palestinian
entity under moderate leadership
to Jordan.
IT is NOT UP TO US/SOVIET TO
The question of final borders has not been agreed between the
NEGOTTATE
US and Soviet Union, and the US still believes that mutually
accepted minor adjustments in borders could be negotiated.
3. The US has not accepted, and the Soviets were not able to include
in this joint statement, their previously stated positions on:
--national rights for the Palestinians, including an independent state.
the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians.
In fact, no mention is made of the PLO.
-withdrawal to the 1967 lines.
-merely terminating the state of war.
MI 2 -
4.
The Soviets have agreed to, and this marks a positive step, the following:
--normal peaceful relations
- - legal and contractual formalization of decisions reached at Geneva.
-international guarantees, if the parties to the agreement want them.
5. The joint statement draws liberally on UNSC Resolution 242,
especially on the sensitive territori- question. The Soviets wanted
to refer to "all appropriate UN resolutions;" we refused, and therefore
no mention was made of any resolutions, although all of the key
points of 242 are included.
6.
The phrase "legitimate rights of the Palestinians" has not been
defined, and the US position remains that this is an issue to be
resolved by the parties.
7. No commitments to Israel made in December 1973 or in September
1975 have been violated by the issuance of the joint statement.
NOTES ON US - SOVIET JOINT STATEMENT
1.
The US-Soviet text is not a full statement of US policy toward
the Middle East. It does not foreshadow any US - Soviet attempt
to impose a settlement. It does reflect areas of agreement between
the US and Soviet Union, who as cochairmen of the Geneva Conference
have tried to highlight issues that the parties will have to resolve
through negotiations.
2. The United States has not changed any of its positions on the nature
of an Arab-Israeli peace.
-Negotiations should be based on UNSC Resolutions 242-338.
No settlement should be imposed.
The parties should directly negotiate to resolve differences.
-Agreements should be embodied in peace treaties.
The Palestinian question should be resolved, and Palestinian
rights should be taken into account, but this does not imply a PLO-led
Palestinian state. Indeed, our preference is for a Palestinian
entity under moderate leadership with ties to Jordan.
The question of final borders has not been agreed between the
US and Soviet Union, and the US still believes that mutually
accepted minor adjustments in borders could be negotiated.
3.
The US has not accepted, and the Soviets were not able to include
in this joint statement, their previously stated positions on:
- --national rights for the Palestinians, including an independent state.
the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians.
In fact, no mention is made of the PLO.
--withdrawal to the 1967 lines.
--merely terminating the state of war.
- 2 -
4,
The Soviets have agreed to, and this marks a positive step, the following:
--normal peaceful relations
-legal and contractual formalization of decisions reached at Geneva.
-international guarantees, if the parties to the agreement want them.
5. The joint statement draws liberally on UNSC Resolution 242,
especially on the sensitive territorial question. The Soviets wanted
to refer to "all appropriate UN resolutions;" we refused, and therefore
no mention was made of any resolutions, although all of the key
points of 242 are included.
6. The phrase "legitimate rights of the Palestinians" has not been
defined, and the US position remains that this is an issue to be
resolved by the parties.
7. No commitments to Israel made in December 1973 or in September
1975 have been violated by the issuance of the joint statement.
Zbigl David Aason
October, 1977
AIPAC's critique of us-soinet statement. Boing widely
THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION AND A MIDDLE EAST PEACE
distributed m U.S.
BM
On October 1, the United States and the USSR issued a joint statement on the Middle
East. That statement has raised serious questions about the direction of American
policy and the chances for a successful Geneva Peace Conference.
The joint statement, seen in the context of
Administration actions during the last eight
THE JOINT STATEMENT
months, strongly suggests that the U.S. is
SUGGESTS THAT THE U.S.
devaluing certain principles and commitments
IS DEVALUING COMMITMENTS
which have guided U.S. Mideast policy during the
last six Administrations. This can be seen in
both the wording of the joint statement, its
omissions and new elements, and in the manner in
which the statement was promulgated:
-- Nowhere in the joint statement is there a
mention of UN Security Council Resolutions 242
NOWHERE IN THE JOINT
and 338, the only universally accepted framework
STATEMENT IS THERE A
for a Middle East peace. Past Administrations
MENTION OF UN RESOLU-
have made adherance to these resolutions the
TIONS 242 AND 338
cornerstone of American policy. This was not
accidental, for 242 calls for "a just and lasting
peace" for every state in the area, withdrawal
from territories and a simultaneous termination
of belligerency, recognition of the sovereignty
and territorial integrity of every state in the
area, and the establishment of secure and recognized
boundaries. Resolution 338 mandates that a
settlement should be achieved through direct
negotiation.
-- The joint statement fails to mention the
necessity of a peace treaty between Israel and the
THE STATEMENT FAILS TO
Arab states. Pursuit of such a treaty has been an
MENTION THE NECESSITY OF
American goal since 1948, and was identified as such
A PEACE TREATY
in memoranda of agreement between the U.S. and
Israel (September 1, 1975).
-- The joint statement asserts that recognition
must be made of the "legitimate rights of the
THE UNITED STATES HAS
Palestinians." The United States has never accepted
NEVER ACCEPTED THE
this formula before, insisting instead on assurance
FORMULA OF "LEGITIMATE
of Palestinian "interests." The distinction was
RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS"
deliberate, for "interests" included a resolution
of the refugee problem (as specified in 242), while
at the same time asserting implicitly that the core
issue of the conflict is the Arab refusal to recognize
the right of Israel to exist.
-2-
The "legitimate rights" of the Palestinians have
been used by the Arab states and the USSR as a
THE "LEGITIMATE RIGHTS"
propaganda tool to mask the open-ended demands of
MASK THE OPEN-ENDED DEMANDS
the Palestine Liberation Organization. The PLO's
OF THE PLO
1968 National Covenant asserts that Israel's
establishment is null and void, that the Jews are
not a people, that Israel must be conquered by
armed force and that the PLO seeks an Arab state
in all of pre-1947 Palestine.
Arab leaders have always refused to define the
term "legitimate rights of the Palestinians,"
THE PLO STATES IT "WILL
preferring to leave that to the PLO. Thus Pres.
SURGE FORWARD TO CONTINUE
Sadat of Egypt told Cairo Radio on February 2,
THE ARMED STRUGGLE, UNTIL
1975: "Egypt has proclaimed the following Arab
THE RACIST ZIONIST BASE
strategy: the need for the return of all the
FALLS"
occupied territory, and the realization of the
Palestinians' rights, which only the Palestinians
themselves are authorized to define." The very
same day, the PLO's official journal Falastin
al-Thawrah provided a definition: a
nationalist
base from which our revolution and people "will
surge forward to continue the war of liberation
and armed struggle, until the racist Zionist base
falls and the democratic state of Palestine is
established."
THE 1975 AMERICAN COMMITMENTS: STILL IN FORCE?
As part of the Sinai II agreement, the United
States and Israel signed a memorandum of agreement
THE U.S.-USSR JOINT
obligating both parties to certain standards in
STATEMENT REFLECTS A
their relationship and to coordination of their
DISREGARD FOR AMERICAN
diplomacy. The October 1 joint statement reflects
COMMITMENTS MADE TO
an apparent disregard for a number of American
ISRAEL
commitments made to Israel 25 months ago:
- According to the 1975 agreement, the U.S. pledged
to "concert action" with Israel to assure that the
THERE WAS NO PRE-
Geneva conference "will be conducted in a manner
CONSULTATION WITH
consonant with declared purpose of the conference."
ISRAEL ABOUT THE JOINT
But there was no preconsultation with Israel about
SOVIET-AMERICAN STATEMENT
the joint Soviet-American statement. Indeed, Israel
was not even informed of the text until the day
before its release.
-- According to the agreement, the U.S. "will
consult fully and seek to concert its position and
ISRAEL'S RIGHT OF VETO
strategy with Isracl with regard to the participation
HAS APPARENTLY BEEN
of any other additional states," and that the
DISMISSED OUT OF HAND
participation of any "additional state, group or
organization will require the agreement of all the
initial participants" at the Geneva conference.
Yet there was no consultation with Israel on the
joint statement's insistence that "representatives
of the Palestinian people" participate in the Geneva
Conference. Isracl's right of veto has apparently
been dismissed out of hand.
-- The United States committed itself to oppose
THE JOINT STATEMENT
changes in the "terms of reference of the Geneva
INDICATES THAT THE
peace conference". Yet the joint statement indicates
AMERICAN DEFINITION
that the American definition has changed: in terms
HAS CHANGED
of participants, in terms of matters to be discussed.
-- The U.S.-Israel agreement committed the U.S.
to support 242 and 338 as the basis of a final
THE JOINT STATEMENT MAKES
settlement. But the joint statement makes no
NO REFERENCE TO RESOLUTIONS
reference to those resolutions. And though the
242 AND 338
agreement states that Geneva talks should be
reconvened at a time coordinated between the U.S.
and Israel, the joint statement says "not later
than December, 1977".
In addition, recent American actions separate from
the Oct. 1 joint statement have been at variance
with commitments made to Israel as part of the
Sinai II agreement:
-- The call for a unified Arab delegation at
the Geneva conference erodes the American pledge
that "all substantive negotiations" at the Geneva
conference "will be on a bilateral basis".
- The memorandum of agreement committed the U.S.
not to deal with the PLO SO long as it "does not
CARTER AND VANCE INDICATED
recognize Israel's right to exist and does not accept
THAT CONDITIONAL ACCEPTANCE
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338". But
OF 242 BY THE PLO WOULD BE
Pres. Carter and Secretary of State Vance indicated
SUFFICIENT
recently that a conditional acceptance of 242 by the
PLO would be sufficient for the United States, and
that the U.S. would then begin contacts with the
leaders of the PLO.
The durability of America's commitments to Israel
plays a crucial role in Arab-Israel affairs. In the
THE RECENT STATEMENTS
largest sense, the U.S. has been committed since 1948
OF ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
to Israel's survival and security, and to the achieve-
HAVE DAMAGED THE CREDIBILITY
ment of reconciliation and normalized relations through
OF AMERICA'S COMMITMENTS AND
a process of direct negotiation, compromise and recogni-
ENCOURAGE ARAB MISPERCEPTION
tion. But the recent statements of Administration offi-
THAT THE U.S. CAN OR WILL
cials have damaged the creditibility of America's com-
IMPOSE A SETTLEMENT
mitments. In the short run, calls for a near-total
Israeli withdrawal and the establishment of a Palestinian
homeland can only undermine the chances for meaningful
Arab-Israel negotiations. Such pre-definitions remove
from the Arab states any incentive to bargain or com-
promise with Israel. Moreover, such statements encourage
the Arab misperception that the U.S. can or will impose
a settlement and satisfy Arab demands without insisting
on a genuine peace guaranteed by bilateral assurances
between Arabs and Israelis. In the long run, the
apparent devaluation by the United States of its past
commitments may provide a rationale to those Arabs who
would disregard any future settlement in order to war
once again on Isracl.
-4-
A SOVIET ROLE?
No single act is more likely to damage the chances
for a lasting settlement than the sudden inclusion of
THE INCLUSION OF THE
the USSR in the peace process. For many years, American
USSR IS LIKELY TO DAMAGE
diplomacy in the region has been designed to minimize
THE CHANCES FOR A LASTING
Soviet influence, and thus lessen the chance for Soviet
SETTLEMENT
disruption of the peace process. Indeed, the physical
presence and political influence of the USSR has recently
shrunk to its lowest level in years.
Both Arabs and Israelis appreciate that the Soviet
Union has never had a national interest in the
establishment of a lasting Arab-Israel peace. The
Soviet record makes this clear:
-- The USSR began the arms race in the region by a
massive deal to Egypt in 1955. It provided the armaments
THE USSR BEGAN THE ARMS
for Egypt, Syria and Iraq in the last three wars, and
RACE IN THE REGION
remains the largest arms supplier in the Middle East.
Continued tensions allow the Soviet to sell more arms
and generate more badly-needed hard currency.
-- The USSR actively conspired with Egypt and Syria in
THE USSR CONSPIRED IN THE
the planning of the 1973 Yom Kippur attack on Israel --
1973 ATTACK ON ISRAEL
a direct violation of the Soviet Union's own commit-
ments to the U.S.
-- The USSR encouraged the quadrupling of oil prices
THE USSR ENCOURAGED
by OPEC and the embargoing of oil by the Arab oil states
QUADRUPLING OF OIL PRICES
against the U.S. The USSR moved quickly to exploit the
economic and political chaos in the West caused by eco-
nomic salients of the 1973 War.
THE USSR HAS BEEN THE
-- The USSR has been the major supporter of the PLO,
MAJOR SUPPORTER OF THE
arming and training its constituent groups and provid-
PLO
ing diplomatic shelter for its terrorist acts.
-- The USSR has no relations with Israel, and has
THE USSR HAS NO RELATIONS
backed the claims of the PLO to achievement of the
WITH ISRAEL
"legitimate rights of the Palestinians".
--- The USSR backed the odious UN General Assembly
THE USSR BACKED THE UN
resolution which asserted that Zionism is a form of
RESOLUTION WHICH ASSERTED
racism. In international organizations, the USSR has
THAT ZIONISM IS RACISM
joined with the Arab bloc to condemn and isolate Israel
from the world community.
- Though a co-chairman of the Geneva Conference, the
THE USSR HAS BACKED ARAB
USSR has backed Arab demands to the limit, refusing to
DEMANDS
perceive the Geneva talks as anything except as a means
to achieve total withdrawal and flimsy guarantees which
Israel would be forced to accept.
- 5 -
Despite claims to the contrary, the USSR did not
substantively compromise on any issue by its accept-
ance of the October 1 joint statement. The claim
that the USSR has now embraced the necessity of a
THE INCLUSION OF THE USSR WILL
genuine peace for the first time can not be sus-
BE INTERPRETED BY THE ARABS THAT
tained for as co-sponsor of resolution 242 in
AN IMPOSED SETTLEMENT MAY NOW
1967, the Soviets committed themselves to the "need
BE IN STORE
to work for" and the "establishment of" a "just and
lasting peace". The very inclusion of the USSR at
a time when the U.S. appears to be exerting strong
leverage against Israel must be interpreted by the
Arabs as a signal that an imposed settlement may
now be in store.
The U.S.-Soviet Joint Agreement is only the latest in a series of one-sided pressures
exerted recently against Israel by the Administration. In recent weeks, there have been
numerous Administration press leaks, condemnations, and negative statements against
Israel. These acts sometimes threatening - spell real danger for the national inter-
ests which the U.S. and Israel have long shared: a lasting negotiated peace in the Middle
East.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
October 3, 1977
MEMORANDUM TO HAMILTON JORDAN
have
FROM:
MARK SIEGEL
SUBJECT:
MIDDLE EAST
The joint communique from the United States and the Soviet Union
on the Middle East Conference at Geneva has had a devastating
effect in the American Jewish community. It was an effect that
could have been anticipated. It was an effect that could have
been partially muted if we had been given adequate notice. The
communique, coming on the back of the ambiguous U.S. statements
on PLO - Palestinian representation at Geneva, have driven
Jimmy Carter's stock in the American Jewish community substantially
below any U.S. President since the creation of the State of
Israel, and I'm including in that statement Eisenhower's stock
after he forced Israel to withdraw from Sinai in 1956.
I'm used to the role of loyal soldier, and will continue to
speak out in support of the President in the American Jewish
community, despite what it has done, and will continue to do,
to my personal reputation. But even a good soldier can tell
his general what is on his mind. At the very least, a good
soldier can expect to see the battle plan before he is sent out
as cannon fodder.
My problems with out policy can be broken down into two parts:
(1) procedural, the lack of forewarning, the lack of opportunity
to input into decisions, the lack of strategy or plan to put
the President in his best light, and (2) substantive, the actual
nature of the policy.
First, let me address the procedural problem. It is a matter
between you and the President the degree to which you will be
involved in foreign policy matters, especially that have a
direct domestic political impact. You know my view on this
subject -- that you should be in the Middle East decision
making loop. It would be useful on two accounts: (1) you will
2
be able to anticipate consequences, and as such, inform the
President of implications of policy decisions, and (2) your
political judgment could be used to properly package and
publicly tailor decisions once those decisions have been agreed
to.
Let me elaborate on the second point stated above. The Geneva
formula and the joint Russian-American communique could have
been presented to the American people in the best possible
light. That is, a statement of how much we have moved other
parties, especially the Soviet Union and the Arabs, from hard
and entrenched positions. We could have stressed the "normaliza-
tion" aspects of the joint communique. We could have reiterated
that 242 and 338 still are the foundationson which subsequent
settlements must be built. This would not necessarily have
convinced American Jewry that we were on the right track. But
I'm sure it could have taken much of the sting out of the announce-
ments, and somewhat tempered the harsh reaction. What I think
I'm suggesting, in other words, is that this aspect of our
foreign policy has not been handled "diplomatically," in the lay
sense of the word. Tough decisions must be gracefully surfaced.
The President must always be put in the best light. This has
not been done.
Now to my substantive problems. I will not minimize them --
they are major. I think back to the President's speech in
Elizabeth, New Jersey, in June of 1976. This is the statement
that captured the imagination of American Jews toward Jimmy
Carter. It was interpreted as a pact between the future President
and an important block of his future constituents. It was
a strong statement, a powerful statement. And above all, it was
a moral statement. Let me recall for you some of the President's
commitments: "Those terrorists who wage war and deny the very
concept of Israeli nationhood only undermine their own people's
best interest. We must make it clear to the world that there
can be no reward for terrorism
I do not believe the road
to peace can be found by U.S. -Soviet imposition of a settlement
For 2000 years, the Jewish people in century after century,
in country after country, have faced propaganda, attempts at
forced conversion, discrimination, pogroms, and death, until
the ultimate horrow of the holocaust. Surely, the Jewish
people are entitled to one place on this earth where they can
have their own state on soil given them by God from time
immemorial
I want to say that there have been far too
many secret undertakings, overt assurances, contradictory
promises, and diplomatic sleights of hand. Maneuvers of this
3
kind are bound to produce, as they have produced, both failure
in negotiations and suspicion among the participants.
American
policy toward the Middle East and toward every other part of
the world should be shaped with the knowledge of the congress
from the outset.
Public understanding and support today
are as vital to successful foreign policiesa as they are to
any domestic policies.
I think back to the 75% of the Jewish vote that we received in
the presidential election and why we received that kind of a
mandate from American Jewry. I think back to the states that
we won because of the strength of the Jewish support.
I think back to the President's statements on July 6 to the
Jewish Presidents in the Cabinet Room: "I want to reiterate my
unanswering commitment to the State of Israel
We don't have
a settlement to impose, we will not impose, we will not force
Israel to do anything that they believe is not in their best
interests
Our commitment to Israel is part of our national
consciousness, part of my per sonal religious beliefs, part of
my responsibility as President of the United States. My
commitment is shared by Congress and the American people. I
campaigned for two years for the Presidency, and I traveled
around the country all during that time and not once did I
hear a voice that asked that we lessen our commitment to
Israel. Israel is part of the totality of American life
I
would never repreat what Sec. Kissinger and President Ford did
by withholding support at times of crisis. I commit to you, on
my word and honor as a man, that this will never happen as long
as I am President of the United States
There is no question
that we can't impose a settlement of these problems. I think
a separate Palestinian nation would be a direct threat to the
peace of the Middle East, and could as a constant source of
turmoil, violence, terrorism and ultimately war
I don't
have any specific goals in the Middle East, no borders, no
Palestine, only the specifics concern the definition of genuine
peace.
In light of all of this, I am somewhat baffled by our latest
substantive moves. The Geneva formula that we now are asking
Israel to accept is very different from the formula that Dayan
sent back to the Cabinet, and which they accepted very reluctantly.
Our new presentation strengthens the claims of the PLO as the
only legitimate representatives of Palestinian nationalism.
And most dangerously, our new initiatives severely decrease the
likelihood of bilateral agreements between Israel and Egypt, and
Israel and Jordan, which many have always thought was the only
way to insure a bilateral agreement between Israel and Syria.
4
The American-Russian comminque is equally baffling to many,
in that it reintroduces the Soviets into the situation in a very
major way, and it fails to address 242 and 338 in a meaningful
way. It also adopts a statement of "legitimate Palestinian
rights" which goes far beyond anything our government has every
said before. I don't understand this new policy; I don't under-
stand why it was necessary; I don't understand what ends it
accomplishes. And of course, I don't understand or appreciate
the secret way it was agreed to, and dropped on the American
people without warning.
The talk in the American Jewish community is getting very ugly.
The word "betrayal" is being used more and more. I don't believe
this for a second. I don't believe Jimmy Carter has lessend his
commitment to the security of Israel. But I am confudsed by the
policy, and certainly thinks we can do better in selling it
to the American people. I am way out front in the Jewish
community on all of this, and would thus appreciate some serious
time to discuss the detiorating situation.
SENATE ASSESSMENT ON MIDDLE EAST
Hard Support/
Very
Questionable
Negative
Leadership Role
Sympathetic
Anderson
Allen
Bartlett
Abourezk
Bayh
Baker
Bellmon
McClure
Brooke
Biden
Burdick
Hatfield
Bentsen
Byrd, H.
Eastland
Case
Byrd, R.
Garn
Church
Bumpers
Goldwater
Cranston
Cannon
Griffin
Danforth
Chafee
Hansen
DeConcini
Chiles
Hatch
Dole
Clark
Helms
Eagleton
Culver
Hollings
Glenn
Curtis
Long
Heinz
Domenici
McClellan
Humphrey
Durkin
McGovern
Inouye
Ford
Melcher
Jackson
Gravel
Metcalf
Javits
Hart
Schmidt
McIntyre
Haskell
Scott
Matsunaga
Hathaway
Stennis
Metzenbaum
Hayakawa
Sparkman
Moynihan
Huddleston
Thurmond
Morgan
Johnston
Wallop
Packwood
Kennedy
Young
Ribicoff
Laxalt
Hatfield
Riegle
Leahy
Sarbanes
Lugar
Schweiker
Magnuson
Stone
Mathias
Williams
Muskie
Zorinsky
Nelson
Nunn
Pearson
Pell
Percy
Proxmire
Randolph
Roth
Sasser
Stafford
Stevens
Talmadge
Tower
Weicker
30
43
24
3
-2-
CONGRESSIONAL ASSESSMENT (continued)
--Frank Moore reports that a number of Senators privately
have told him that "the time has come to stand with
the President on the Middle East."
The American-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) can
translate Jewish leadership consensus into an immediate
major campaign of telegrams, telephone calls, and letters.
MIDDLE EAST CALENDAR
June 27-30
Possible Arab Summit to coordinate
strategy.
July 5-7
Begin visits Washington.
Mid-July
OPEC Conference on oil prices
in Stockholm.
July 18-22
Vance visits Middle East.
August
Possible pre-Geneva consultations
in Washington or elsewhere.
Late September
UN General Assembly - Vance will
meet Foreign Ministers of Middle
East countries.
In addition, there may be an Arab move to call for a United
Nations Security Council debate on the Middle East in July.
POLITICAL AND PUBLIC EDUCATION PLAN
A clear political and public education strategy will probably
not be discernible until after Begin's visit to the United
States. In the interim, we should have the following two objectives:
--The President and Vice President should remain in
constant personal contact with key Senators: Humphrey,
Jackson, Muskie, Ribicoff, Case, Javits, Church and
Stone.
1
-3-
POLITICAL AND PUBLIC EDUCATION PLAN (continued)
--A program of extensive consultation with Jewish leadership
should be begun.
These objectives are discussed in more detail below.
Personal Contact with Key Senators
These meetings and discussions are underway.
Responsibility: Jordan
Consultation with Jewish Leadership
Begin the Middle East Policy Consultation Program,
which is attached.
Responsibility: Siegel
President's Decision:
Schedule Time as Shown
Other:
Send Administration spokesperson to meetings shown on
the attached Calendar of Jewish Events.
Responsibility: Siegel
Centralize Jewish schedule requests and meeting
assignments.
Responsibility: Siegel
Brief the Jewish press periodically.
Responsibility: Wurfel
Monitor coverage of Administration policy in the Jewish
press, and respond to inaccurate coverage.
Responsibility: Wurfel, Siegel
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
NOVEMBER 2, 1977
OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
THE WHITE HOUSE
REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT
AT
WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS
THE CAPITOL/HTLTON-HOTEL
8:45 P.M. EDT
Thank you very much.
Chairman Phil Klutznick and President Nahum
Goldmann, members of the World Jewish Congress: As
my friend Phil Klutznick pointed out, sometimes praise
is not forthcoming for a Democratic President, and I want
to thank you especially for that warm welcoms, which I
haven't heard in quite a long time. Thank you very, very
much for it. (Applause)
I am deeply honored to receive this medal. I
accept it with a sense of gratitude because of the organization
from which it comes and because of the man for whom it is
named. For more than half a century Dr. Nahum Goldmann
has been a scholar and political leader and a fighter
for the rights of all people. His career is proof that a
man who is outspoken and sometimes controversial can
still be a brilliant and an effective statesman. As the
head of this organization and many others, he has played a
more significant role in world affairs than have many heads of
state.
He is stepping down now as President of the
World Jewish Congress, but his presence will remain,
'for he is the kind of man whose moral authority transcends
any title or any office. The World Jewish Congress has
always sought to promote human rights in a universal way.
In this, it is faithful to the ethical traditions from
which it springs, for Jewish teaching has helped to shape
the consciousness of human rights that is, I believe, now
growing throughout the world.
In large measure, the beginnings of the modern
concept of human rights go back to the laws and the
prophetsof the Judeo-Christian traditions. I have been
steeped in the Bible since early childhood and I believe
that anyone who reads the ancient words of the Cld Testament with
both sensitivity and care will find there the idea of
government as something based on a voluntary covenant
rather than force. The idea of equality before the law and
the supremacy of law over the whims of any ruler;
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Page 2
the idea of the dignity of the individual human
being and also of the individual conscience, the idea of
service to the poor and to the oppressed; the idea of
self-government and tolerance and of nations living
together in peace, despite differences of belief. I know
also the memory of Jewish persecution and especially
of the holocaust lends a special quality and a heart
lending sensitivity to your own commitments to human rights.
This organization has made a major contribution
to ensuring that human rights became part of the
charter of the United Nations as one of its three basic
purposes along with the preservation of peace and social
and economic progress. The principal authors of universal
covernant on human rights were Eleanor Roosevelt, an
American Protestant; Charles Malik, a Lebanese
Catholic; and Rene. Cassin, a French Jew. Because of
their work and the work of others, no government can now
pretend that its mistreatment of its own citizens is
merely an internal affair. These accomplishments have helped
start a process by which governments can be moved forward,
exemplifying the ideals which they publicly profess. Our own
actions in the field of human rights must vary according to
the appropriateness and effectiveness of one kind or another,
but our judgments must be made according to a single
standard. For oppression is reprehensible, whether its
victims are blacks in South Africa or American Indians in
the Western Hemisphere or Jews in the Soviet Union or
political dissidents in Chile or Czechoslovakia.
The public demonstration of our own government's
commitment to human rights is one of the major goals
that my Administration has set for United States foreign
policy. The emphasis on human rights has raised the level
of consciousness around the world and is already beginning
to help overcome the crisis of spirit which recently has
afflicted the nations of the West. (Applause)
We are also trying to build a more cooperative
international system. We are consulting more closely with
our own allies, and we place special emphasis on better
relations with people in South America and in Asia and in
Africa. And we are searching for new areas of cooperation
with the Soviet Union, especially in the area which we and
the Soviet most intensely compete, the race for nuclear
weapons.
We must halt that race. In the last few months,
we have tried to work closely with the Soviets to
eliminate the testing of peaceful nuclear explosives. And
just in the last 24 hours, Mr. Brezhnev, President Brezhnev,
has announced the Soviets are finally coming to agreement with
us.
And we have good hopes that we might without too
much de:a/ reach a comprehensive test ban that will
eliminate nuclear weapons from the earth. We hope so.
(Applause)
But at the same time we seek cooperation, we
recognize that competition is also part of international
life and we will always remain capable of defending the
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Page 3
legitimate interests of our people. We are addressing other
global problems which threaten the well-being and the
security of people everywhere. They include nuclear
proliferation, the excessive sales of conventional arms,
food supplies and energy and the quality of the environment.
These things affect all nations of the world. And we are
also seeking solutions to regional conflicts that could do
incalculable damage, if not resolved.
Our efforts toward a new treaty with Panama
are one example. Bringing about peaceful change in
Africa is another. But none is more important than finding
peace in the Middle East. (Applause)
Sixty years ago today, November 2, 1917, the
greatest Foreign Secretary Lord Balfour --
(At this point the President was interrupted)
One of the basic human rights that we cherish
in our country is the right to speak, and I have no
objection to it.
As I was saying, exactly 60 years ago today,
November 2, 1917, the British Foreign Secretary, Lord
Balfour, informed Lord Rothschild of his government's
support for the establishment of a national home
for the Jewish people in Palestine. (Applause)
At that time the idea seemed visionary
and few dared to believe that it could be translated
into reality. But today Israel is a vital force,
an independent and Democratic state whose national
existence is accepted and whose security is stronger
today than ever before. (Applause)
We are proud to be Israel's firm friend and
closest partner. We shall stand by Israel always.
(Applause)
I doubt that anyone in the history of our
country has traveled more than I have in my campaign for
President, nor talked to more groups, nor listened to
more questions nor heard more comments. And when I say
we will always stand with Israel, I speak not only for
myself as President, not only for our government, all three
of its branches, but I speak not just for American Jews,
but for all Americans.
This is one of our deepest-felt commitments, and
I have no doubt I speak accurately for the overwhelming
portion of the American people now and forever. (Applause)
Despite its great accomplishments, however,
Israel has yet to realize the cherished goal of living
in peace with its neighbors. Some would say that peace can-
not be achieved because of the accummulated mistrust
and the deep emotions which divide Israelis from Arabs.
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Page 4
Some will say we must realistically resign ourselves
to the prospect of unending struggle and conflict in the
Middle East. With such an attitude of resignation, Israel
would never have been created. And with such an attitude
now, peace will never be achieved. What is needed is both
vision and realism so that strong leadership can
transform the hostility of the past into a peaceful and
constructive future.
This was a vision of the Zionist movement
in the first generation after the Balfour declaration,
and it can be the achievement of Israel in its second
generation as an independent state. (Applause)
Since becoming President I have spent much
of my time in trying to promote a peace settlement between
Israel and her Arab neighbors. All Americans know that peace
in the Middle East is of vital concern to our own country. We
cannot merely be idle bystanders. Our friendships and
our interests require that we continue to devote ourselves
to the cause of peace in this most dangerous region of
the world.
Earlier this year I outlined the elements of a
comprehensive peace--not in order to impose our views on
the parties concerned, but rather as a way of defining
some of the elements of an overall settlement which would
have to be achieved through detailed negotiations.
I continue to believe that the three key issues
are, first, the obligations of real peace, including the
full normalization of political, economic and cultural
relations; second, the establishment of effective security
measures, coupled to Israeli withdrawal from occupied
territories and agreement on final, recognized and secure
borders; and third, the resolution of the Palestinian question.
These issues are interrelated in complex ways.
And for peace to be achieved that is permanent and real,
all of them will have to be resolved. Recently our
diplomatic efforts have focused on establishing a framework
for negotiations so that the parties themselves will become
engaged in the resolution of the many substantive issues
that have divided them so long. We can offer our good
offices as mediators. We can make suggestions, but we
cannot do the negotiating.
For serious peace talks to begin, a
reconvening of the Geneva Conference has become essential.
All the parties have accepted the idea of comprehensive
negotiations at Geneva. An agreement has already been
reached on several of the important procedural arrangements.
Israel has accepted for Geneva the idea of a unified Arab
delegation, which will include Palestinians, and has agreed
to discuss the future of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
with Jordan, Egypt and with Palestinian Arabs. This can
provide the opportunity for a Palestinian voice to be heard
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Page 5
in the shaping of a Middle Fastern peace and this
represents a positive and a very constructive step.
Israel has also repeated its willingness to
negotiate without preconditions and has stressed that
all issues are negotiable. This is an attitude that others
must accept, if peace talks are to succeed.
For their part, the Arab states have accepted
Israel's status as a nation. They are increasingly willing
to work toward peace treaties and to form individual working
groups to negotiate settlement of border issues and other
disputes. No longer do they refuse to sit down at the
negotiating table with Israel, nor do they dispute Israel's
right to live within secure and recognized borders.
That must be taken as a measure of how far we
have come from the intransigent positions of the past. The
procedureal arrangements hammered out at the 1973
Geneva Conference can provide a good basis for a reconvened
conference. Even a year ago--just think back -- the notion
of Israelis and Arabs engaging in face-to-face negotiations
about real peace, a peace embodied in signed, binding
treaties, seemed like an illusion, Yet, today, such
negotiations are within reach and I am proud of the progress
that has been achieved by all nations concerned to make
this dream at least possible.
But to improve the atmosphere for serious
negotiations, mutual suspicions must be further reduced.
One source of Arab concern about Israeli
intentions has been the establishment of civilian settle-
ments of territories currently under occupation, which we
consider to be a_violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
On the Arab side, much still needs to be done to remove
the suspicion in Israel about Arab intentions. It was not
so long ago, after all, that Arab demands were often
expressed in extreme and sometimes violent ways. Israel's
existence was constantly called into question. The
continuing refusal of the Palestinian Liberation Organization
to accept United Nations Resolution 242 and Israel's right
to exist, along with the resort to violence and terror
by some groups, provides Israelis with tangible evidence
that their worst fears may in fact be justified.
Differences naturally exist, not only between
Arabs and Israelis, but among the Arab parties themselves.
And we are actively engaged in an effort, a very difficult
effort to narrow these differences so that Geneva can be
reconvened. And we have called on the other cochairman of
the Geneva Conference, the Soviet Union, to use its
influence constructively.
We will continue to encourage a solution to the
Palestinian question in a framework which does not threaten
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Page 6
the interests of any of the concerned parties, yet respects
the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. The nations
involved must negotiate the settlement, but we ourselves
do not prefer an independent Palestinian state
on the West Bank. (Applause)
Negotiations will no doubt be prolonged and
often very difficult. But we are in this to stay. I will
personally be prepared to use the influence of the United
States to help the negotiations succeed. We will not impose
our will on any party, but we will constantly encourage
and try to assist the process of conciliation. Our
relations with Israel will remain strong. Since the war in
1973, we have provided $10 billion in military and
economic aid to Israel, about two-thirds of which was
direct grants or concessional loans. The magnitude of
this assistance is unprecedented in history. It has greatly
enhanced Israel's economic and military strength. Our aid
will continue. (Applause)
As difficult as peace through negotiations will
be in the Middle East, the alternative of stalemate
and war is infinitely worse. The cost of another war would
be staggering in both human and economic terms. Peace,
by contrast, offers great hopes to the people of the Middle
East who have already contributed so much to civilization.
Peace, which must include a permanent and
secure Jewish state of Israel, has a compelling logic for
the Middle East. It would begin to bring Arabs and Israelis
together in creative ways to create a prosperous and stable
region.
And a prospect of coexistence and cooperation
would revive the spirits of those who for so long
thought only of violence and of struggle for survival itself.
Peace would lift some of the enormous
burden of defense and uplift the people's quality of
life. The idea of peace in the Middle East today is nomore
of a dream than was the idea of a national home for the
Jews in 1917. But it will require the same dedication
that made Israel a reality and has permitted it to grow
and to prosper.
We may be facing now the best opportunity
for a permanent Middle East peace settlement in our
lifetime. We must not let it slip away. Well-meaning
leaders in Israel and in the Arab nations -- African,
European, South American, North American, all over the
world -- are making an unprecedented and concerted effort
to resolve the deep-seated differences in the Middle East.
This is not a time for intemperance or partisan-
ship. It is a time for strong and responsible leadership
and a willingness to explore carefully, perhaps for the
first time, the intentions of others. It is a time to
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Page 7
use the mutual strength and the unique friendship and partner-
ship between Israel and the United States and the influence
of you and others who have a deep interest and concern to
guarantee a strong and permanently free and secure Israel,
at peace with her neighbors, and able to contribute her
tremendous human resources toward the realization of
human rights and a better and more peaceful life throughout
the world.
The Old Testament offers a vision of what that kind
of peace might mean in its deepest sense. I leave you with these
lines of the Prophet Micah, who is still one of my favorites,
lines and words which no summary or paraphrase could possibly
do justice. It is from the Fourth Chapter, and the first
five verses:
"But in the last days, it shall come to pass, that
the mountain of the house of the Lord shall be established
in the top of the mountains, and it shall be exalted above
the hills; and people shall flow unto it.
"And many nations shall come, and say, Come,
and let us go up to the mountain of the Lord, and to the
house of the God of Jacob; and he will teach us of his
ways, and we will walk in his paths; for the law shall go
forth of Zion, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem.
"And he shall judge among many people, and rebuke
strong nations afar off; and they shall beat their swords
into plowshares, and their spears into pruninghooks;
nation shall not lift up a sword against nation, neither
shall they learn war anymore.
"But they shall sit every man under his vine
and under his fig tree; and none shall make them afraid:
for the mouth of the Lord of hosts hath spoken it.
"For all people will walk, everyone in the name of
his God, and we will walk in the name of the Lord our God
forever and ever."
However, we may falter -- however difficult the
path -- it is our duty to walk together toward the fulfillment
of this magestic prophesy.
Thank you very much.
END
(AT 9:20 P.M. EST)
FBIS 45
ISRAEL: RABIN REACTION TO U.S.-SOVIET STATEMENT
NC320850Y JERUSALEM DOMESTIC SERVICE IN HEBREW 0500 GMT 2 OCT 77 NC
(FROM THE MORNING NEWSREEL)
(TEXT) (ANNOUNCER) WE SHALL NOW
HEAR THE REACTION OF THE OPPOSITION (TO THE U.S.-SOVIET
JOINT STATEMENT-- FBIS). ON THE OTHER END OF THE TELEPHONE
LINE IS KNESSET MEMBER YIZHAQ RABIN: (BEGIN LIVE INTERVIEW)
(QUESTION GOOD MORNING TO YOU, SIR.
(ANSWER) GOOD MORNING.
(QUESTION MR RABIN, HOW DO YOU VIEW THIS STATEMENT?
(ANSWER) I WANT FIRST OF ALL TO STRESS TAAT THIS IS MY
PERSONAL OPINION. HAD MR BEGIN NOT BEEN IN THE HOSPITAL,
I WOULD HAVE PERHAPS USED SHARPER EXPRESSIONS. I THINK
THAT THIS IS THE GRAVEST JOINT SOVIET- AMERICAN STATEMENT
THAT HAS BEEN PUBLISHED SINCE THE END OF THE 6- DAY WAR.
I THINK IT REFLECTS A SERIOUS SAIFT IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL-- A SHIFT WITH A GRAVITY WE
HAVE NOT EXPERIENCED SINCE THE END OF THE 6- DAY WAR. THE
GRAVE THING IN THE STATEMENT IS IN THE APPROACH AND THE
CONTENTS. FROM THE STANDPOINT OF APPROACH, THIS MARKS THE
BEGINNING OF A PROCESS AIMED AT A POLITICAL SOLUTIO N IMPOSED
BY THE TWO POWERS, WITH ThE COERCION DIRECTED PRIMARILY
AGAINST ISRAEL. AS FOR THE CONTENTS. THIS IS THE FIRST
TIME THE UNITED STATES HAS DISREGARDED THE TERM "PEACE".
AND CHANGED THE TERMS USED IN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION
242, TO THE EFFECT THAT THE AIM IS TO ACHIEVE A JUST AND LASTING
PEACE, TO READ JUST AND LASTING SETTLEMENT." THERE IS ALSO
A CHANGE WITH REGARD TO THE ORDER OF PRIORITIES OF THE KEY
ISSUE MENTIONED IN THE RESOLUTION. THE STATEMENT STARTS
WITH THE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN 1967
IT IS KNOWN TODAY THAT THE SOVIET AND AMERICAN POSITIONS
ARE IDENTITICAL, THAT IS, WITHDRAWAL TO THE LINES OF
4 JUNE 1967.
(QUESTION) MR RABIN, WHAT WILL HAPPEN, IN YOUR OPPINION,
AS A RESULT OF THIS STATEMENT. YOUR REMARKS INDICATE THE
POSSIBILITY OF AN IMPOSED SOLUTION. YOU SAID THAT THE STATEMENT
MARKS THE BEGINNING OF A PROCESS OF COERCION, DO YOU MEAN
AN IMPOSED SOLUTION
(ANSWER) I MEAN WHAT I SAID. I SAID THE BEGINNING
OF A PROCESS AIMED AT BRINGING ABOUT SOLUTION IMPOSED BY THE
GREAT POWERS. I WANT TO ADD, WITHOUT GOING INTO THE OTHER
DETAILS OF THE JOINT STATEMENT, THAT THIS IS THE RESULT
OF THE POLICY OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION. THE CARTER
ADMINISTRATION CHANGED THE U.S. POLICY WHICH MOST OF
THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATIONS HAD FOLLOWED SINCE THE END OF
THE 6-DAY WAR. THIS IS THE RESULT OF THE ABORTIVE AND MISERABLE
POLICY OF THE LIKUD GOVERNMENT. DURING THE 3 MONTHS IT HAS
BEEN IN OFFICE WITH ITS POLICY THE GOVERNMENT MANAGED TO DESTROY
ALL THAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED IN 10 YEARS OF EFFORTS TO
NURTURE U.S. - ISRAELI RELATIONS. THE CONCLUSION, IN MY
OPINION, IS THAT TODAY, BEFORE WE FALL INTO THE TRAPS BEING
SET FOR US BY THE TWO POWERS, WE MUST FIRST GET UP AND SAY:
ON THE BASIS OF THIS STATEMENT, ISRAELI WILL NOT GO TO GENEVA.
THERE IS NO SENSE IN ARGUING ABOUT PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS TODAY
WHEN THE SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEM IS DEFINED IN A CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL
MANNER. THE SECOND THING IS THAT ISRAEL MUST LAUNCH A
COMPREHENSIVE INFORMATION CAMPAIGN DEPLORING THE POLICY OF THE
CARTER ADMINISTRATION AND EXPLAINING THE SERIOUS CHANGES
THIS ADMINISTRATION HAS MADE IN THE U.S. POSITION TOWARD ISRAEL.
(QUESTION MR RABIN, IT IS ACCEPTABLE IN SERIOUS MOMENTS
LIKE THIS-- I ASSUME I AM NOT EXAGGERATING WHEN I SAY THIS IS
A SERIOUS MOMENT-- THAT THERE SHOULD BE UNITY BETWEEN THE
COALITION AND OPPOSITION PARTIES FOR A JOINT ACTION. DO YOU
THINK THAT THIS WILL HAPPEN NOW?
(ANSWER) THE QUESTION IS WHAT THE POLICY
OF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT WILL BE. IF THE GOVERNMENT MAINTAINS ITS
PRESENT POLICY, DISREGARDING POLITICAL REALITY, ARGUING
ABOUT PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS, SEATING ARRANGEMENT AND THE
OPENING CEREMONIES OF THE CONFERENCE, INSTEAD OF SEEING THE
SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS, WHAT CAN BE ACHIEVED AND WHAT CANNOT
BE ACHIEVED- - ONLY THEN IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO DECIDE WHETHER
IT IS POSSIBLE TO SUPPORT THE POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT.
(QUESTION MR RABIN, THANK YOU VERY MUCH. (END LIVE
INTERVIEW.
2 OCT 1014Z MJ0/MC
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 5, 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR:
HAMILTON JORDAN
FROM:
ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI
20.
SUBJECT:
Tomorrow's Meeting with Jewish Leaders
As I understand it, the format will be as follows:
The Vice President, the Secretary of State, and I will open with brief
five-minute statements each, covering the following:
1. The Vice President - the general approach, its philosophy,
our commitment to Israel, etc.;
2. The Secretary of State - the negotiating process: procedures and
central issues (including the three key ones);
3. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs -
the international context: stalemate vs settlement.
The foregoing will be followed by the President's appearance. It is
expected the President will speak for about 5-10 minutes, then listen
to comments and questions for 10-15 minutes, and then make a
generalized concluding statement.
In relationship to the foregoing, I wish to flag the following points which
he may wish to keep in mind:
1. The Palestinian homeland: the word "homeland" is a red flag,
because of its association with the Balfour Declaration. It might
be better if the President referred to a home for the Palestinians,
noting that we would prefer it to be linked with Jordan. It can
even be described as a political home, though avoiding the impli-
cation that we have in mind a PLO-controlled independent state.
-2-
2. It would be good if the President stressed our determination to
obtain for Israel secure borders, which can be made defensible
through a variety of additional arrangements. However, the
phrase "defensible borders" is a code-phrase, anathema to the
Arabs because it does imply incorporation of most of the pre-
sently occupied territory. This is why it would be wise to avoid
using the latter phrase, while stressing that the borders which
we hope to accomplish for Israel would be mutually recognized,
and thereby made more secure through such recognition, in addi-
tion to further security arrangements.
3. It would be useful for the President to stress that our flexible
framework for negotiating the settlement, which the President
has shaped through his public statements, implies major con-
cessions by the Arabs themselves, I showed the President an
article by Terrence Smith which appeared in this Sunday's New
York Times; it makes that case very well, by stressing that
every one of the three key propositions (on peace, on territory/
security, and on the Palestinians) implies major concessions by
the Arabs.
4, In speaking of minor modifications in the 167 lines, it might be
useful for the President to emphasize that "major" changes are
unlikely to be accepted as the basis for negotiations by the Arabs.
The actual scope of what is "minor" is left to negotiations and,
given the size of the territory, it is still likely to prove a very
difficult issue to negotiate. Nonetheless, advance understanding
that the changes are likely to be minor will facilitate these nego-
tiations but without prejudicing their actual outcome on the terri-
torial issue,
5. The President might be asked why not "direct negotiations without
preconditions"? Our position is that such negotiations ar e likely
to break down and this is why some prior understanding concerning
the underlying principles for a settlement is needed. Our hope is
to stimulate some sort of an informal process, designed to obtain
some mutual understanding, prior to the convening of the Geneva
conference itself. Indeed, this spring has already involved a search
for such mutually shared understanding and the present discussion
in that respect has in fact proven quite useful.
-3-
6. It might be useful for the President to add that we do not take the
Arabs at face value, that we concede that some of them may be
entertaining dreams of "a second stage, 11 but we hope to help
shape a peace which will make the attainment of that second stage
impossible. This is why we put so much emphasis not only on a
comprehensive peace but also on a peace that is reinforced by
needed security arrangements.
Please add to the foregoing the text of the Clinton speech and of last
year's New Jersey speech (April).
Stu hn them.
(c
Telegram
FROM: Stu
FYI 68am77
For Immediate Action
Recent Carter Administration pronouncements on US-Middle East
policy are cause for increasing concern and represent a
drift in US-Middle East policy.
President Carter has repeated his call for creation of
a Palestinian "homeland" advocated only "minor adjustments"
in 1967 borders and more recently discussed "compensation"
for Arab refugees.
These statements: 1) undermine goal of direct Arab-Israeli
negotiations 2) obscure the basic Middle East problem --
lack of Arab acceptance of the state of Israel and 3) run
counter to UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 which
call for secure and recognized boundaries and direct
negotiations between Arabs and Israelis.
Important that White House receive letters and telegrams
asking Presidents to uphold his earlier call for a
full peace based on normalized relations.
Lawrence WEinberg, President
Morris J. Amitay, Executive Director
2 Jun 77
FILE
6/25/77
WORK PLAN: MIDDLE EAST
GENERAL POLITICAL ASSUMPTIONS
The President's public position on the Middle East
contains elements which previously had been discussed
only privately.
Until the Vice President spoke in San Francisco, the
President had been out front alone on the Middle East
issue.
There is widespread concern in the American Jewish
community over the President's positions on Israel.
For many intellectual, financial, and political reasons,
the Jewish community enjoys a special position of
influence and respect in the American political system.
The "Jewish lobby" has unsurpassed ability in Congress,
and has no political counterforce.
Our political position in relation to the American Jewish
community and the Israeli government is now fluid (some
say turbulent); it is likely to remain that way until
Begin's visit here, probably in mid-July.
We should not expect the American Jewish community to
urge the Begin government to moderate its positions.
An "unreasonable" Begin government could jeopardize
public support for Isreal.
CONGRESSIONAL ASSESSMENT
Mark Siegel's assessment of the Senate attitudes is
shown on the following page. The assessment shows:
Hard Support/Leadership
Role
30
Very Sympathetic
43
Questionable
24
Negative
3
Electrostatic Copy Made
for Preservation Purposes
TH WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
E HOUSE
Sorry- Ham given
NGTON
Mr. President:
werre dear to and
On that morning, your sched-
2, 1977
ule is as follows:
8:15 -- Brzezinski
J.C.
8:45 -- Moore
8:55
-- photo session with Bob
"pt T
Bergland and Senator
dan 7.9.
Huddleston
9:30
-- Califano meeting, for
cember 6, we are meeting for
40 minutes on elemen-
itstanding professors whose
tary and secondary re-
ating to the Middle East.
authorization decisions
of them.
you are free for lunch, altho
you have McIntyre from 1:30
bout three or four hours
till 5:00.
TKTK
them and also with the former
Israel, Walworth Barbour,
extremely meaningful and
Stu Eizenstat also met with
them. In addition, Chip dropped by the office and sat in
on a good bit of the discussion.
We asked for this follow-up meeting, which will be attended
by the three of us, as well as Bill Quandt of the National
Security Council.
If you have an opportunity to meet with us, at least for
part of the time, we believe that you will find it to be
time well-spent. We are having breakfast in the staff
mess at 8:00 a.m. and probably will be there until 9:00
or 9:30 a.m.
We also have invited the Vice President to attend.
These GOD two stimulating pagele -porticularly
Gutthail on Ands attitudes orl economic
conditions. you stand one do this if 60
want to be exposs to some more ideas and
perspectives.
NI
\
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
HJ:
I gave a copy of this
to Brzezinski.
E.
7/13
ST POLICY CONSULTATION
Surrogate
Vice-
Secretary
Secretary
NSC
President
President
of State
of Defense
Adviser
Working session
Briefing
with key members
Same as
for House
Week 1
of the United
President
Committee
1
States Senate
on Intern-
(1 hour)
ational
Relations
Briefing #1 for
Working
Coordinates
leaders of nat-
session
President's
Week 2
ional Jewish
with key
briefing
organizations
members of
(1 hour)
the House
2
Briefing #1 for
Briefing #2
key members of
for leaders
Briefing
Coordinates
Briefing
Week 3
the Jewish
of national
New York
briefings
Miami - I
press
Jewish
City
and Eizer
(1 hour)
organizations
Drop-in
Briefing #2
meeting with
for key mem-
Coordinates
Week 4
lay leaders
7
bers of the
Briefing
briefings
Group #1
Jewish press
Los Angeles
(30 minutes)
1 Jackson, Humphrey, Ribicoff, Javits, etc.
2 Jewish members of the House and members with sizable Jowish constituencies
DEAST POLICY CONSULTATION
Surre
Vice-
Secretary
Secretary
NSC
President
President
of State
of Defense
Advisor
Drop-in
meeting with
Briefing
Week 5
lay leaders
Briefing
-
Coordinates
Baltimor
Group #2
Boston
briefing
Lipshutz
(30 minutes)
Eizensta
Drop-in
Week 6
-
meeting
Briefing
-
Coordinates
I
with lay
Chicago
briefing
leaders
Group #3
Drop-in
Week 7
meeting with
Briefing
Coordinates
Briefing
lay leaders
1
Detroit
briefing
Philadel
Group #4
(30 minutes)
Weck 8
1
Briefing
I
I
Briefing
Cleveland
Washington
28.AAR.IND.LL
ZB.AAR.
FBIS 54
ISRAEL: ALLON SAYS U. S. SOVIET STATEMENT MAY UNDERMINE GENEVA
NC021112Y JERUSALEM DOMESTIC SERVICE IN HEBREW 1100 GMT 2 OCT 77 NC
THE OPINION THAT THE SOVIET- U.S. STATEMENT IS SUPERFLUOUS AND
(TEXT) FORMER FOREIGN MINISTER YIGAL ALLON HAS EXPRESSED
IS LIKELY TO UNDERMINE THE POSSIBILITY OF CONVENING THE GENEVA
CONFERENCE. IN AN INTERVIEW WITH THE CORRESPINDENT OF THE
ENGLISH- LANGUAGE PROGRAM, ANDREW MEISELS, ALLON SAID THAT
THE STATEMENT DOES NOT MENTION AT ALL UN RESOLUTIONS 242
AND 333 WHICH ALSO COMMITTED THE ARABS TO REACHING A PEACE
TREATY WITH ISRAEL.
KNESSET MEMBER ALLON LEFT THIS MORNING ON A LECTURE TOUR
OF BRITAIN, THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA ON BEHALF OF THE
ZIONIST LABOR MOVEMENT, THE UNITED JEWISH APPEAL AND THE
BONDS ORGANIZATION.
2 OCT 1224Z RSS/GS
FBIS 67
ISRAEL: PERES SCORES SOVIET- U.S. COMMUNIQUE
TA021353Y JERUSALEM DOMESTIC SERVICE IN HEBREW 1300 GMT 2 OCT 77 TA
(TEXT) LABOR PARTY LEADER SHIM ON PERES SAID THAT AFTER
THE PUBLICATION OF THE JOINT SOVIET COMMUNIQUE, ISRAEL FINDS
ITSELF IN UNPRECEDENTED ISOLATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA.
PERES REMARKED THAT THE (? WORDING) OF THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE GOES
AGAINST ALL RULES OF THE GAME AND AGAINST UN RESOLUTIONS 242 AND
338. THESE RESOLUTIONS NOT ONLY DO NOT CALL FOR THE PALESTINIANS
TO BE REPRESENTED AT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE BUT SURELY DO NOT TALK
OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINIAN STATE; NOR HAS THE UNITED
NATIONS EVER AUTHORIZED THE SUPERPOWERS TO CHANGE THEM. PERES
ADDED THAT THE UNITED STATES VIOLATED A COMMITMENT TO THE EFFECT
THAT THE STRATEGY REGARDING PLO PARTICIPATION IN THE GENEVA
CONFERENCE WILL NOT RUN COUNTER TO ISRAEL'S OPINION.
MR PERES SPOKE AT THE MOSHAVIM COUNCIL OF THE LABOR PARTY.
2 OCT 1421Z RSS/KK
FBIS 110
WAFA POSITIVELY VIEWS U.S.-USSR STATEMENT
NC022053Y CAIRO MENA IN ARABIC 1935 GMT 2 OCT 77 NC
(TEXT) DAMASCUS, 2 OCTOBER-- THE PLO HAS ANNOUNCED THAT THE
SOVIET- U.S. STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST ISSUE CONSTITUTES A
POSITIVE STEP FORWARD ON THE PATH OF FINDING A JUST AND LASTING
SOLUTION IN THE AREA.
THIS WAS SAID IN AN ARTICLE BY THE POLITICAL EDITOR OF THE
PALESTINE NEWS AGENCY, WAFA, WHO USUALLY REFLECTS PLO VIEWS.
THE EDITOR SAID THE STATEMENT TOUCHED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON
A NUMBER OF FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES CONNECTED WITH THE CURRENT
CONFLICT IN THE AREA. THIS LEADS TO THE BELIEF THAT A CLEARER
MOMENTUM TOWARD THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACE HAS
BEGUN AND THAT CONSTRUCTIVE EFFORTS ARE BEING EXERTED IN THIS
RESPECT BY THE TWO SUPERPOWERS.
THE EDITOR LISTED THE POSITIVE POINTS IN THE STATEMENT.
HE POINTED OUT THAT THE STATEMENT REFERRED TO THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS
OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, CONSIDERING THEM AS FUNDAMENTAL FOR
SOLVING THE MIDDLE EAST ISSUE. HE SAID THAT THIS UNDOUBTEDLY
RELECTS A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF OUR PEOPLE' S CAUSE AND THEIR
RIGHT TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FATE.
THE EDITOR SAID THAT THE STATEMENT CONTAINED A CLEAR AND
OPEN RECOGNITION OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. HE EXPLAINED THAT
THIS RECOGNITION, WHICH IS A FIRST FOR THE UNITED STATES, HAS
DELETED FROM THE DICTIONARY OF THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION THE
TERM PALESTINIAN REFUGEES.
THE EDITOR POINTED OUT THAT THE STATEMENT S ASSERTION OF
THE NEED FOR THE PARTICIPATION OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PALESTINIAN
PEOPLE IN ANY CONFERENCES OR EFFORTS FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A JUST
SOLUTION IN THE AREA AS A BASIC CONDITION REFLECTS A STEP FORWARD
WHICH WILL INEVITABLY LEAD TO EXPLICIT RECOGNITION OF THE PLO AS
THE SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE.
THE EDITOR EMPHASIZED THAT THE REAL MEANING OF THE LEGITIMATE
RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE IS THE DEFINITION WHICH HAS
BEEN APPROVED AND EMPHASIZED BY THE UNITED NATIONS, PARTICULARLY
IN CONNECTION WITH THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE S RIGHT TO ESTABLISH
THEIR OWN INDEPENDENT STATE, TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMELAND AND TO
DETERMINE THEIR OWN FATE UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE PLO,
WHICH IS THEIR SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE.
THE EDITOR REFERRED TO SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREY
GROMYKO S STATEMENTS DURING THE PAST 24 HOURS IN WHICH HE DECLARED
HIS COUNTRY S INSISTENCE THAT THE PLO ATTEND THE GENEVA CONFERENCE
AS THE SCLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE,
WITH AN INDEPENDENT DELEGATION AND ON AN EQUAL FOOTING. HE
ALSO REFERRED TO GROMYKO' S ASSERTION THAT THE (SOVIET UNION-FBIS)
WILL NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE GENEVA CONFERENCE IF THE PLO DOES
NOT PARTICIPATE IN IT.
THE EDITOR SAID THE STATEMENT AFFIRMS THE CORRECT LINE THE
PLO HAS BEEN FOLLOWING IN ITS INTERNATIONAL DEALINGS AND IS THE
FRUIT OF OUR PALESTINIAN PEOPLE' $ UNRELENTING STRUGGLE AT HOME
AND ABROAD.
2 OCT 21572 RLL/GFE
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
C
MR. PRESIDENT-
AN INTERESTING ARTICLE
AND ANALYSIS. DONT KNOW IF
You SAW IT OR NOT.
H.J.
By Joseph Lelyveld
Z IN 'THE MOUNTAINS'
atz was on his 11th
hat state of mind,
he Mountains." As
te passed the bill-
in one that wasn't
ny, "Keep Israel
y "the Mountains"
id been on his first
nonth before Israel
dent state. Then he
rgun, the force of
10 were commonly
orists. That very
8 condemned-not
Red Cruss but by
rabbi-for the de-
Yassin, where 250
ded, were killed in
riated South Afri-
gh command.
gain an emissary
Shmuel Katz, right, with Israel's Chief Rabbi Schlomo Goren at a Salute to Israel parade in New York.
nant figure in the
ael's Prime Minis-
erican misgivings
it permissable to discuss their doubts openly? Or
But the question remained-who would decide
vish misgivings-
were those who did so putting themselves in league
when it became necessary, Israel or the American
alistic excavations
with the P.L.O.?
Jews? The next morning, in the rear acreage of
as well as by the
The questions aren't new, but with Jimmy Carter
Grossinger's vast dining room, a group of rabbis lis-
tween the new Ad-
pressing for a bargain that would end Israeli occupa-
tened intently as a visiting scholar voiced thoughts
he newer adminis-
tion of the West Bank of the Jordan River-where the
that had been unspoken, that Shmuel Katz would
x-Day War in 1967,
population is 99.7 percent Arab-and Menahem
consider unspeakable. His emotional conflict was ob-
TI part of the usage
Begin proclaiming the West Bank to be "liberated"
vious, but his points were bluntly made: that Ameri-
Middle East but,
Israeli territory, the questions are being asked by
can Jews had a responsibility to assess for them-
was applied exclu-
American Jews with an urgency they haven't had for
selves Menahem Begin's past and present views as
tlestine Liberation
20 years. The desire to shield and preserve Israel
well as the Carter proposals and that "after 29 years
raeli Prime Minis-
from outside pressure is as strong as ever, but it con-
of yes-manship," they were failing to do so. He him-
oral equation that
flicts with the fear that intransigence could prove as
self, the scholar said, believed the Carter approach
d diction who, like
inept and indefensible a policy for Israelis as it has
to be reasonable, and that American Jews had to find
un-had now to re-
been, all these years, for Arabs; that the time to ac-
a way to say this to the Israelis. However, he wasn't
knowledge the existence of the claim ol Palestine
prepared to say it publicly, not yet. A senior rabbi
et "terrorist" did-
Arabs is at hand, or overdue. One troubled rabbi
then rose to rebuke him gently for voicing such
n it had romantic
quoted scripture: "You know the heart of a stranger,
thoughts even in private, even if he was right.
novements of the
for you were strangers in the land of Egypt."
Shmuel Katz's assessment had evidently been ac-
1 memoir entitled
That wasn't Shmuel Katz's text, however. Facing
curate: that the misgivings of American Jews would
e thought that was
the rabbis, he expressed a gentlemanly revulsion
not soon amount to much, that those who could not
: epithet no longer
over characterizations in the American press of
the indiscriminate
support Israeli positions would mostly keep their
Begin as a former terrorist-"lurid attacks" he
ans that has made
called them. The claims of Palestine Arabs were "a
doubts to themselves, counting on Menahem Begin to
ing phenomenon.
resolve them. The appearance, If not the reality,
hoax," he said; the Carter Administration's emerg-
would still be a near-solid support.
he Irgun with pas-
ing proposals, "recipes for war," It was a hard-line
per it wasn't a fact
speech, but it didn't rule out territorial concessions-
Thus some Jews who six months ago would have
ilians at a time of
didn't really sound so different from what the rabbis
shuddered at the thought of Menahem Begin as Is-
he 30's, he replied
were used to hearing from Israelt spokesmen-so
rael's Prime Minister will welcome him to America
in't here to justify
most of them were able to leave with the thought that
next week in the hope that he'll break the impasse
Menahem Begin as
maybe nothing much had changed. The possibility
with the Arabs the way de Gaulle did in Algeria. Like
reason, to demand
that they might be shifting to a harder line them-
Nixon in his opening to China, they are saying, he est-
pport that Israeli
selves in order to find some accommodation with the
joys a freedom of action his more moderate
to receive from
new Israeli reality was not, for the moment, ac-
predecessors lacked. I tried that line on his emis-
ve way, therefore,
knowledged.
sary. "I know," Shmuel Katz replied sarcastically,
id been a terrorist
Katz was pleased, even amused, by the failure of
"de Gaulle made peace in Algeria, Nixon went to
ed It.
rabbis of dovish views to challenge his positions di-
China, SO Begin is the man to commit suicide-he'll
le ship, Katz faced
rectly. "I was told I would have a rough time with
give the country away. Never!"
0 were eager as a
them," he said, "But, you see, they're just weak."
"Never" is also when the Arabs will accept Israel.
but who were torn
By this time, he was at a kosher hostelry in Falls-
The flirusy hope is that these "nevers" can begin to
rivate, the rabbis
burgh, preparing to address a gathering of Orthodox
cancel out, but that hope begs numberless questions:
main the relations
rabbis among whom no doves were likely to appear.
among them, whether Menahem Begin, in a life-
they influence
Is
And, indeed, he was met with applause when he de-
time's devotion to militant principle, has allowed
salistic or danger-
clared: "We are confident that the Jewish com-
himself any vision of peace. Those supporters of Is-
be borne by Israe-
munity in America will stand out courageously and
rael who ask that question are more worried than
ed and failed, was
charlenge its Government if it becomes necessary."
they admit, for they have no answer.
The New York Times Magazine/July 10, 1977
@
IN AMERICA
KATZ IN 'THE MOUNTAI
GROSSINGER, N.Y. Shmuel Katz was on his 11th
visit to America but his first to that state of mind,
rather than nature, known as "the Mountains." As
the car from the Israell Consulate passed the bill-
boards on Route 17, his eye fell on one that wasn't
pressing an Invitation to gluttony. "Keep Israel
Strung," it urged. Enemy territory "the Mountains"
weren't.
Katz was on a mission, as he had been on his first
American visit back In 1948, the month before Israel
came into existence as an independent state. Then he
was trying to buy arms for the Irgun, the force of
Jewish irregulars in Palestine who were commonly
described in those days as terrorists. That very
month, April 1948, they were being condemned-not
only by the Arabs, British and Red Cross but by
David Ben-Gurion and the chief rabbi-for the de-
struction of a village called Delr Yassin, where 250
Arabs, women and children included, were killed in
an Irgun assault. Katz, an expatriated South Afri-
can, was a member of the Irgun high command.
Half a lifetime later, he was again an emissary
Shmuel Katz, right, with Isruel's Chief Rabbi Schlomo Goren at a Salute to Isro
from Menahem Begin, the dominant figure in the
Irgun, and now unexpectedly. Israel's Prime Minis-
ter. Katz's mission was to ease American misgivings
it permissable to discuss their doubts openly? Or
But the question rem
-in particular, American Jewish misgivings-
were those who did so putting themselves tn league
when it became necessa
which had been aroused by journalistic excavations
with the P.L.O.?
Jews? The next mornin
from Begin's underground past as well as by the
The questions aren't new, but with Jimmy Carter
Grossinger's vast dining
prospect of a diplomatic clash between the new Ad-
pressing for a bargain that would end Israeli occupa-
tened intently as a visiti
ministration in Washington and the newer adminis-
tion of the West Bank of the Jordan River-where the
that had been unspoken
tration in Jerusalem. Since the Six-Day War in 1967,
population is 99.7 percent Arab-and Menahem
consider unspeakable. Hi
the word "terrorist" has again been part of the usage
Begin proclaiming the West Bank to be "liberated"
vious, but his points were
and gruesome experience of the Middle East but,
Israeli territory, the questions are being asked by
can Jews had a respons
until the Israeli election, the term was applied exclu-
American Jews with an urgency they haven't had for
selves Menahem Begin's
sively to Yassir Arafat and the Palestine Liberation
20 years. The desire to shield and preserve Israel
well as the Carter propos
Organization. Sticking it on an Israeli Prime Minis-
from outside pressure is as strong as ever, but it con-
of yes-manship," they WE
ter seemed to imply a rough moral equation that
flicts with the fear that intransigence could prove as
self, the scholar said, bei
Katz-a man of scholarly mien and diction who, like
inept and indefensible a policy for Israelis as It has
to be reasonable, and that
Begin, never personally used a gun-had now to re-
been, all these years, for Arabs; that the time to ac-
a way to say this to the Is
fute.
knowledge the existence of the claim of Palestine
prepared to say it public
There was a time when the epithet "terrorist" did-
Arabs is at hand, or overdue. One troubled rabbi
then rose to rebuke hin
n't bother the Irgun veteran. Then it had romantic
quoted scripture: "You know the heart of a stranger,
thoughts even In private,
associations to East European movements of the
for you were strangers in the land of Egypt."
Shmuel Katz's assessm
19th century. Katz's wife wrote a memoir entitled
That wasn't Shmuel Katz's text, however. Facing
curate: that the misgivin
"The Lady Was a Terrorist." ("We thought that was
the rabbis, he expressed a gentlemanly revulsion
not soon amount to much
rather piquant," he said.) But the epithet no longer
over characterizations in the American press of
support Israelt positions
flatters, not with the P.L.O. and the indiscriminate
Begin as a former terrorist-"lurid attacks" he
doubts to themselves, cou
hostage taking and killing of civilians that has made
called them. The claims of Palestine Arabs were "a
resolve them. The appe
terrorism an evermore sickening phenomenon.
hoax," he said; the Carter Administration's emerg-
would still be a near-antid
Shmuel Katz was ready to defend the Irgun with pas-
Ing proposals, "recipes for war." It was a hard-line
sion and pride. When I asked whether it wasn't a fact
speech, but it didn't rule out territorial concessions-
Thus some Jews who 8
that it retaliated against Arab civilians at a time of
didn't really sound so different from what the rabbis
shuddered at the though
random violence against Jews in the 30's, he replied
were used to hearing from Israeli spokesmen-so
rael's Prime Minister wi
tartly: "Not enough." But he wasn't here to justify
most of them were able to leave with the thought that
next week in the hope th
the past. He was here to present Menahem Begin as
maybe nothing much had changed. The possibility
with the Arabs the way de
a man of humane principle and reason, to demand
that they might be shifting to a harder line them-
Nixon in his opening to a
for him the same unswerving support that Israell
selves in order to find some accommodation with the
joys a freedom of ac
leaders have been accustomed to receive from
new Israell reality was not, for the moment, ac-
predecessors lacked. I 81
American Jews. The most effective way, therefore,
knowledged.
sary. "I know," Shmuel
to deal with the idea that Begin had been a terrorist
Katz was pleased, even amused, by the failure of
"de Gaulle made peace
was to denounce those who purveyed it.
rabbis of dovish views to challenge his positions dl-
China, 50 Begin is the m
At Grossinger's, a roadside cruise ship, Katz faced
rectly. "I was told I would have a rough time with
give the country away. Ne
an audience of Reform rabbis who were eager as a
them," he said. "But, you see, they're just weak."
"Never" is also when d
group to be rallied and reassured but who were torn
By this time, he was at a kosher hostelry in Falls-
The flirasy hope is that d
and troubled as Individuals. In private, the rabbis
burgh, preparing to address a gathering of Orthodox
cancel out, but that hope 1
agonized over fundamental questions in the relations
rabbis among whom no doves were likely to appear.
among them, whether
of American Jews to Israel. Could they influence Is
And, indeed, he was met with applause when he de-
time's devotion to millt
raeli policy If they thought it unrealistic or danger-
clared: "We are confident that the Jewish com-
himself any vision of per
ous? Or, since the dangers had to be borne by Israe-
munity in America will stand out courageously and
rael who ask that questi
lis, should they even try? If they tried and failed, was
challenge its Government if it becomes necessary."
they admit, for they have
The New York Times I
Jackson
UP-014
(MIDEAST)
WASHINGTON (UPI) - THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S DECISION TO INVOLVE
THE SOVIET UNION IN MIDDLE EAST PEACE EFFORTS WAS CRITICIZED SUNDAY
BY TWO KEY SENATORS.
"THE FOX IS BACK IN THE CHICKEN COOP," SEN. HENRY JACKSON,
D-WASH., SAID WHEN ASKED ABOUT THE U.S. -SOVIET ANNOUNCEMENT OF JOINT
OBJECTIVES FOR A FULL ARAB-ISHAELI PEACE PACT. "THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
MUST CERTAINLY RAISE THE QUESTION OF WHY BRING THE RUSSIANS IN AT A
TIME WHEN THE EGYPTIANS HAVE BEEN THROWING THEM OUT."
SEN. ROBERT DOLE, R-KAN., DESCRIBED THE MOVE AS "FRAUGHT WITH
DANGER."
"IN THE FIRST PLACE, IT IS AN ABDICATION OF MIDEAST LEADERSHIP BY
PRESIDENT CARTER, SAID THE 1976 REPUBLICAN VICE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEE
IN A PREPARED STATEMENT.
"SECONDLY IT IS ANOTHER UNWISE EFFORT TO FORCE ISRAEL TO RECOGNIZE
THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION. IT APPEARS PRESIDENT CARTER IS
SO DETERMINED TO HOLD A GENEVA CONFERENCE IN 1977 THAT ME WILL RISK
PERMANENT RUPTURED RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL TO ACHIEVE IT."
JACKSON WAS INTERVIEWED ON NBC'S MEET THE PRESS. HE SAID RUSSIAN
INVOLVEMENT IN MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS WILL NOT "SIT WELL WITH
EGYPT," A COUNTRY WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS A "KEY FACTOR" IN ANY MIDDLE
EAST SETTLEMENT.
"IT SEEMS TO ME WE HAVE ELEVATED THE RUSSIANS INTO A POSTURE THEY
HADN'T DREAMED OF BEING PLACED IN," HE ADDED.
UPI 10-03 09:17 AED
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
OCTOBER 5, 1977
OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
New York, New York
THE WHITE HOUSE
BBRIEFING BY
MOSHE DAYAN
ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER
PRESS FILING CENTER
UN PLAZA HOTEL
2:05 AM EDT
MR. POWELL: I have a brief joint statement to
read for you this evening, and then Foreign Minister Dayan will
have some comments for you and be available to respond to some
of your questions.
Q
Can we file before the end?
MR. POWELL: No, I think this will not take long
and I think we will keep the normal briefing rules in force.
The United States and Israel agree that Security
Council Resolutions 242 and 338 remain the agreed basis
for the resumption of the Geneva Peace Conference and that
all understandings and agreements between them on this
subject remain in force.
Proposals for removing remaining obstacles
to reconvening the Geneva Conference were developed. Foreign
Minister Dayan will consult his government on the results
of these discussions. Secretary Vance will discuss these
proposals with the other parties.
Acceptance of the joint United States -- excuse
me. Secretary Vance will discuss these proposals with the
other parties to the Geneva Conference.
Acceptance of the joint United States-USSR statement
of October 1, 1977, by the parties is not a prerequisite for
the reconvening and conduct of the Geneva Conference.
I will make copies of this available to you by the
end of the briefing.
Q
Mr. Minister, what does that mean, acceptance
of the U.S.-Soviet agreement by the parties? Has Israel
accepted the agreement?
MINISTER DAYAN: No, on the contrary. We explained
our reservation about this statement and we are assured by
the President that this should not be, and this is not the
basis for the participation or for the conduct of the
Geneva Peace Conference. That is to say that the Arab
Government does not accept and reject this statement.
MORE
- 2 -
We can still go to Geneva because the sole
basis for the Geneva Peace Conference is the 338 Resolution
and 242, and all the other elements of the agreement.
Q
What have you agreed to that is new in the
meeting tonight? Have you agreed to anything new?
MINISTER DAYAN: Yes. We have agreed about the
working paper that I will send, not only tonight; I have
to sum up what I have been doing for two weeks or SO. So
at this hour, I can say positively that we have reached
an agreement about the kind of working paper that has just
been described or defined here by the spokesman
and that I will sign this working paper for the Israeli
government and recommend them to approve it and that the
Secretary of State will deal with that with the other
parties at the Geneva Peace Conference.
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- 3 -
Q
What is in the working paper?
MINISTER AYAN: Well, that is not for you.
(Laughter)
No, we did not come here to say what is in the
working paper. We have agreed that we should not release
to you the working paper. Otherwise, I would have read the
working paper.
Q
Ho', would you have to characterize the
progress that you made this evening?
MINIST IR DAYAN: I should say on two levels.
The first is abr ut the issues of principle that were
mentioned in the release just made by the joint state-
ment, about the basic policy of the Geneva Peace Conference
and about the oint statement.
This is an agreement and understanding about
some of the m :rger principles. I appreciate it very much.
The other part is the working paper that you must
have a start and a great working paper with one of the
parties in o :der to go on with the other parties and
finally to reach an agreement about the procedure of the
Geneva Peace Conference -- not the substance but the procedure
in order to start a Geneva Peace Conference.
If eventually this paper, after -- would be that
it would be discussed and probably will be changed, too, but
-- we have reached the end of the discussions with all the
parties, would' become the final and agreed one, then we
would have the agreed procedure for the Geneva Peace
Conference. I think from that point of view the Geneva
Peace Conference can be convened.
2
What is your agreement with the United
States on the participation by the Palestinians?
MINISTER DAYAN: I said I shall not go into the
working paper. I can repeat not about the agreement with
the United States -- and I am sorry, but I have to make
it clear, ladies and gentlemen, I am not going to say --
0 fir. Foreign Minister, --
MINISTER DAYAN: Wait a minute. I haven't
answered yet. I am sorry. I will not leave this room
before we agree that I have -- Now, what I want to tell
you, sir -- I am sorry, but we have agreed, and I think it
is correct that I shall not go and release what is in the
paper. Therefore, I shall not say what has been agreed.
But I want to tell you about the Israeli
position about it. That is, the Israeli position is
that We shall not negotiate and have in Geneva the PLO.
I am not talking about the agreement; I am talking about the
Israeli position. And we shall not negotiate for a
Palestinian state. Whatever conclusion you can draw from
that, you would be correct.
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- 4 -
Q
Mr. Minister, 242 and 338 refer to the
Palestinians solely as a refugee problem. Mr. Powell
said that the United States and Israel agree that 242 and
338 is the only basis for Geneva. Does that mean that the
United States now agrees with Israel that the Palestinians
are entirely a refugee problem and nothing more?
-
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- 5 -
MR. DAYAN: Whatever you have to ask about the
United States position, it is better that you ask then. I want to
say that we don't say that the Palestinian problem is only
the problem of refugees. We don't say that. But if your
question is about the American position, you better refer
it to them.
Q
Mr. Foreign Minister, the U. S.-Soviet
joint statement seems to have been shelved for the moment
at least until you get to Geneva. Would it be accurate to
infer that it has not been put out of the way altogether,
that perhaps you might come back to that joint statement
at Geneva?
MINISTER DAYAN: No, I don't think SO. I think
what can be said about this joint statement is that we
criticize and we do not accept many of its provisions and it
has been agreed, as was stated here, that this is not binding.
This is not the base to the Geneva Peace
Conference or in other words, a party like Israel who does
not accept this joint statement can go to Geneva without
any reference to this joint statement.
Q
Mr. Foreign Minister, if in fact one party
to the negotiations does not accept this joint statement,
in effect it has been scrapped, has it not?
MINISTER DAYAN: We are going to Geneva on the
basis of 338, 242 and not on the basis of the joint
statement. That has been accepted by the United States
of America.
Q
Would you then say in your negotiations with
President Carter that you won your point today by having
this scrapped? Do you regard it as a victory for your
country?
MINISTER DAYAN: You never win with the President.
Q
On the working paper that you are talking
about, is this a working paper that was drafted tonight
or is this one given to you a few days ago?
MINISTER DAYAN: It is something we have been
working on for a long time, and not only between the
United States and us, but I suppose between the Administration
and the Arab parties to the Geneva Peace Conference. After
two weeks or so we reached this point of agreement that
was described by the spokesman.
Q
Do I understand you correctly as saying
that you are going to Geneva but not on the basis of the
Soviet American statement, but you are going on the basis
of 242 and 338?
MINISTER DAYAN: Yes. But let me divide the
question and answer into two parts.
We are not really requested to accept the joint
statement in order to go to Geneva. It is not anything
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- 6 -
that must be accepted by all the parties. We do not accept
it and we are still asked without it to go to Geneva.
When we do go to Geneva--we want to go to Geneva--we want
to go to Geneva on the basis of 338, 242 and all the others,
but not the joint statement.
Q Tonight in these discussions did you agree with
the American side that you will go to Geneva?
MINISTER DAYAN: We have to refer this so-called
working paper to our government. They have either to
accept it or to reject it. If they accept it, then as
far as we are concerned, we are going to Geneva on the
agreed procedure, but I want to make that clear, that has
to be discussed with the Arab parties to the Geneva Peace
Conference and maybe we will have to go and deal with it
again.
But as far as we are concerned, once Israel
will approve it, we are ready to go to Geneva.
Q What is the length of time that it will
take Israel and the Arab governments?
MINISTER DAYAN: About the Arab government,
I really don't know. Just a moment. I don't think
the Israeli government will take too long to discuss it
and to come to a decision whether they accept it, whether
they demand or request some changes in it.
Q
Is it possible in your view that the conference
can begin within President Carter's time frame of December
of this year?
MINISTER DAYAN: I don't know. I would like
it to happen. As far as I personally am concerned, I
am all for an immediate, early opening of the Geneva Peace
Conference. If all the other parties would accept its
working paper this way, or with some changes, and all the
governments will approve it, then I can see no reason
why it shouldn't.
Q
Would you expect the Arab countries to go
to Geneva if you don't suport the joint Soviet-U.S.
statement ?
MINISTER DAYAN: How can I say anything about it?
But I do believe that everybody, absolutely everybody
realizes that when we talk about the resumption of a
Geneva Peace Conference, it must be on the basis of
338 and 242 and nothing else. Anything else can be
included there provided it is accepted and agreed to by all
the parties. For instance, if Lebanon were asked to come in,
we shall not object to it. We shall agree to it. This
might be a new addition because Lebanon was not a
participant in the Geneva Peace Conference in Paris.
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-7-
But just such issues and provisionsor whatever they are
that would be agreed by all the parties can be concluded
there. Or otherwise, it would be the 242 and the 338.
2
Were you in contact with your government
tonight?
MINISTER DAYAN: Beg pardon?
0
Were you in contact with your government
tonight?
MINISTER DAYAN: No. And in Israel now, what
time is it now? No.
Q
Mr. Minister, you said you excluded the
possibility of negotiating about a Palestinian state at
Geneva. Do you also exclude the possibility of negotiating
about a Palestinian entity?
MINISTER DAYAN: I wish I knew what that is.
What is entity?
0
You know what an entity is in a discussion.
MINISTER DAYAN: No. I know what we wouldn't
do. We wouldn't negotiate over a Palestinian state.
Q
You have already said that in the first day
of the Geneva Conference an all-Arab delegation could
include Palestinians in the first day and then you would
like to divide up, negotiate only with states.
My question is, have you found some way where in the
negotiations after the first day's ceremony, the Palestinians
might also be included?
MINISTER DAYAN: I can say we have reached an
agreement, a tentative agreement, a provisional agreement,
a draft agreement with you people about this question, too,
provided that the Arab parties for the Geneva Peace
Conference and the Israeli government will enforce it.
Q
Is it the position of Israel now that you
are willing to negotiate a number of subjects on a multilateral
basis or do you still feel that it all should be on a
bilateral basis with individual Arab states?
MINISTER DAYAN: This is the position of our
government.
Q I am sorry, which is the position?
MINISTER DAYAN: That we should negotiate peace
treaties on a bilateral level, one between us and Egypt
and the other one between us and Syria and Jordan and Lebanon.
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- 8 -
2 Are there now some questions you would
negotiate on a multilateral level?
MINISTER DAYAN: I wouldn't go into that. What
I am saying is what the position of our government is, and
that is about the main really this is the main issue to
get peace treaties with the Arab countries.
I should say this is the main issue and this is
the position of our government.
with President Q Carter and what he was able to tell you about
Mr. Minister, on the basis of your talks
the Arab positions, do you feel that both sides now are
closer to reconvening the Geneva Conference?
MINISTER DAYAN: I don't know. President Carter
really didn't tell me much about the Arab countries'
position. He didn't.
?
Did you feel that you were pressured into
accepting the agreement that you say you agreed to?
MINISTER DAYAN: No, not at all.
Q Not at all?
MINISTER DAYAN: No, not at all. You mean the
joint statement?
I
Yes, the statement that you have just made
with the United States.
MINISTER DAYAN: The one that was read here?
Q Yes.
MINISTER DAYAN: No. I don't think that we agreed
to it due to any pressure put on us. But I wanted to tell you
this agreement still has to be confirmed by the Israeli
Cabinet.
Q
Mr. Minister, you have frankly left us very
much in the dark as to whether Israel and the United States
have actually narrrowed their positions at all here. Can
you possibly clarify that basic point for us?
MINISTER DAYAN: No. I don't think you are in the
dark. We have reached an agreement about this working paper
and the way, or the exact wording that was expressed by the
spokesman.
Q
You had an agreement two weeks ago on a working
paper, also.
MINISTER DAYAN: No, we had not. I wish we had. We
had not. No, this is the first time -- I am sorry about the
situation, but this is the first time on the same subject or
a similar one in a Geneva Peace Conference, at this hour, 2:00
o'clock in the morning that we could have come out with a joint
statment in the words that were expressed here; but never before.
I wish we got such an agreement before. Maybe by now we would
have had a further progress.
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- 9 -
2
Mr. Minister, was the joint statement in any
sense an obstacle to reaching an agreement?
HINISTER DAYAN: Once we agreed that as far as
the Geneva Peace Conference was concerned this joint
statement is not binding, then we could have our criticism
about it. But it is not an obstacle as far as the
Geneva Peace Conference is concerned.
Q
Is it an obstacle in any sense?
MINISTER DAYAN: I think politically it still will
have its impact, still will have its impact. There are
many provisions there that we think they are wrong. We are
not happy about the actual fact there is such a joint
statement by your government and the Soviet Russia. But I
suppose that the Israeli Government's attitude and position
about it was expressed by our Prime Minister and published,
so I don't really have to go much into that.
Q
Is it correct to say that Israel and the United
States reached agreement tonight on how to go to Geneva --
simply that?
MINISTER DAYAII: This is too simple to be
correct.
?
There is nothing simple in this world,
but I mean --
MINISTER DAYAII: No, I won't say, alter any
words. Do you want to read again the sophisticated
whatever was said about it?
We worked hard on this formulation. I wouldn't
have tried to simplify it. Really, if you are not clear
about it, can we hear it again?
2
Has the United States and Israel agreed on a
formulation --
HR. DAYAN. Here is the spokesman for the
United States of America.
MR. POWELL: We have agreed upon what I said we
agreed upon, which you will have in writing in your own
little hands as soon as the Foreign Minister gets a
thank you. That in fact is what we have agreed upon.
MINISTER DAYAN: Don't look that disappointed.
Let me tell you in basic English,
The fact that I am sending this working paper to
the Israeli Government and asking or commanding them to
approve it means that I think that the Israeli Government
should go along with this paper.
On the other hand, the Secretary of State is
going to take this working paper and deal with it with
the Arab parties participating in the Geneva Peace
Conference. That, I think, is clear enough.
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- 10 -
0
Is that a procedural paper for going to
Geneva? Can you at least say that?
MINISTER DAYAN: That is correct. That was the
best question I was asked. (Laughter)
0
In view of reassurances that President
Carter gave you this evening, is it possible your government
overreacted to that joint U. S.-Soviet statement, given
the assurances you got this evening?
MINISTER DAYAN: No. I still, after all of the
explanation and clarification and justification that I heard
about the joint statement, I still think that the Israeli
government's reaction and statement about this joint session
and criticism is correct.
0
Mr. Minister, is there any problem with Israel
not having diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union; is
that any problem at all with the Geneva Conference?
MINISTER DAYAN: There are problems but not in this
concern. I don't think this will be an obstacle or a special
obstacle for participating in the Geneva Peace Conference.
We would have been better off having a diplomatic relationship
with Soviet Russia. But just the way that we participated
in Geneva in the past, we shall go on and do it this time, too.
0
Mr. Foreign Minister, in your view does the
American statement that was read by Jody Powell a few minutes
ago mean that the United States will oppose any effort by the
UN Security Council or any other UN body to in any way affirm
the rights of the Palestinian people as a supplement to 242
and 338? Is that your understanding that the United States
will oppose any such effort?
MINISTER DAYAN: No, not at all. My understanding is
that it is up to all of the parties participating in Geneva,
including Israel to agree to anything which would be new to the
Geneval Peace Conference, the way it was conducted in the past.
That is to say that if a new participant would be
asked to come into Geneva, they would have and everybody
would have to get the agreement of all the parties including
Israel. Then unless we agree to that they just can't come.
THE PRESS: Thank you.
MINISTER DAYAN: Thank you very much.
MR. POWELL: Let me deal with one clarification as
Helen points out it might be necessary. There were several
questions asked with regard to the scrapping of the joint
U.S.-U.S.S.R. statement.
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- 11 -
I believe if you read the joint statement, which
I read and by the way, with regard -- the question was
asked here -- it was not an American statement, it was
a joint statement. But I believe if you refer to that
statement it will be clear that this U.S.-U.S.S.R.
statement was not intended as a statement that had to be
or was expected to be accepted or agreed to in full
by all of the parties to the Conference as a pre-condition
for the convening of the conference.
It was and is a statement reflecting the views
of the United States and the Soviet Union with regard to
the core issues.
Do I need to go further, or have I made myself
clear?
D
Therefore it still stands. does it not?
it not?
MR. POWELL:
It does indeed still stand.
But I think what was done tonight is to make clear that
it is not a statement to which we would expect that
Israel or indeed other parties would necessarily agree to,
certainly in toto -- and it is not a pre-condition and such
agreement is not a pre-condition for the convening of
this conference.
As you well know, other parties in addition to
Israel have already expressed agreement or disagreement
to a greater or lesser extent with certain provisions of
this statement.
Q
How about this working paper? I am asking
does the U. S. Government have to take further action
on the working paper or have they okayed it?
MR. POWELL:
I think the statement I read
speaks for itself. I am not going to get into a question
and answer session this evening. We will have to deal with
any additional questions from the United States side tomorrow.
Q
Thank you, Jody.
MR. POWELL:
But I did want to clarify that
point.
END
(AT 2:30 A.M. EDT)
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
OCTOBER 5, 1977
Office of the White House Press Secretary
(New York, New York)
THE WHITE HOUSE
JOINT STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL
The U. S. and Israel agree that Security Council Resolutions 242
and 338 remain the agreed basis for the resumption of the Geneva
Peace Conference and that all the understandings and agreements
between them on this subject remain in force.
Proposals for removing remaining obstacles to reconvening the
Geneva Conference were developed. Foreign Minister Dayan will
consult his Government on the results of these discussions.
Secretary Vance will discuss these proposals with the other
parties to the Geneva Conference.
Acceptance of the Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Statement of October 1,
1977, by the parties is not a prerequisite for the reconvening
and conduct of the Geneva Conference.
# # #
FBIS 29
DAVAR COMMENTS ON GROWING CRISIS IN U.S. ISRAELI RELATIONS
TA2217171 TEL AVIV DAVAR IN HEBREW 2 OCT 77 P 7 TA
(EDITORIAL: "RED LIGHT IN RELATIONS WITH WASHINGTON")
(TEXT) THE DIFFERENCES OF OPINION OVER THE AMERICAN
PROPOSAL ON THE PROCEDURAL QUESTION OF CONVENING
GENEVA- A PROPOSAL WHICH HAS BEEN ACCEPTED BY ISRAEL-- ARE
VERY DISTRESSING. IT APPEARS THAT, AT LEAST, IT HAS
RECEIVED CLUMSY TREATMENT BY ISRAEL, SOMETHING WHICH
CERTAINLY DID NOT CONTRIBUTE TOWARD OUR CREDIBILITY IN
THE EYES OF OUR FRIENDS. WE SHOULD BE NO LESS
DISTRESSED BY THE WAY IN WHICH THE CABINET HAS, AT
LEAST PARTLY, BOWED TO THE GUSH EMUNIM DEMANDS: ALL
THESE COMPROMISES IN CARRYING OUT SETTLEMENT IN THE
HEART OF THE TERRITORIES AND THE UNAVOIDABLE PUBLICITY
AROUND THEM, CAUSE US UNIMAGINABLE HARM IN INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC OPINION. THE DECISION BY THE NONALINED NATIONS
WHO CALLED FOR A HALT OF ALL POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND
MILITARY AID TO ISRAEL AND A BAN ON IMMIGRATION BECAUSE
OF "BAD USE OF THE TERRITORIES," HINTS AT WHAT WE CAN
EXPECT AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY. IN BOTH THE
EUROPEAN AND THE AMERICAN PRESS A SEVERELY CRITICAL NOTE
IS HEARD ABOUT SETTLEMENT, WHICH IS BEING INTERPRETED
AS CREEPING ANNEXATION, AND ALL THESE HAVE A DECIDEDLY
POLITICAL INFLUENCE WHICH IT IS DOUBTFUL ISRAEL CAN
PERMIT.
HOWEVER, BEYOND ALL THE MISTAKES WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE
BY THE ISRAELI CABINET, THE MAIN RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE
DEADEND ALLEYS INTO WHICH, FOR THE MOMENT, THE ATTEMPTS
TO INITIATE THE GENEVA CONFERENCE HAVE GOTTEN STUCK, FALLS
ON THE ADMINISTRATION IN WASHINGTON AND ON THE
PRESIDENT HIMSELF, WHO HAS GONE A FAIR WAY TOWARD RECOGNITION
OF THE PLO AS THE MOST AUTHROIZED REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE PALESTINIANS. THIS COULD EVEN BE INTERPRETED AS
ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF AN INDEPENDENT PALESTINIAN
STATE ON THE WEST BANK AND THE GAZA STRIP--AND NOT
ONLY AS A VAGUE CONCEPT OF AN ENTITY OR A HOMELAND.
THERE IS NO ARGUMENT OVER THE FACT THAT THINGS OF
THIS TYPE HARDEN THE POSITIONS OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES,
EVEN IF THEY ARE NOT UNITED AMONG THEMSELVES AS TO THE
NATURE AND THE LEADERSHIP OF THE PALESTINIAN STATE.
IT IS PRECISELY THE ISOLATION OF ISRAEL FOLLOWING THE
RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE ARAB
COUNTRIES, AND EVEN WITH THE USSR, WHICH MAKES IT
DIFFICULT FOR US TO AGREE TO THE PROCEDURAL COMPROMISE
PROPOSALS, WHICH ARE LIKELY TO LEAD TO SEVERE COMPLICATIONS
FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES AS WELL.
IT IS IN THE NATURE OF THINGS THAT ISRAEL IS NOW FACING
AN URGENT TASK, THAT OF EXPLAINING ITS POSITION TO
AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION AND, FIRST AND FOREMOST, TO ITS
JEWISH AND NON- JEWISH FRIENDS. EVEN IF THIS IS NOT AN
EASY TASK, IT IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE BECAUSE OF THE BASIC
FRIENDSHIP AND UNDERSIANDING FOR US AMONG THE MASSES OF
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, IN SPITE OF ALL THE EROSION.
PERHAPS IT IS NOT TOO LATE EITHER TO GO BACK AND TRY TO
INFLUENCE THE PRESIDENT TO RECONSIDER HIS APPROACH, WHICH
IS LIKELY TO ENDANGER TH CONVENING OF THE GENEVA
CONFERENCE OR RUN IT ONTO A SANDBANK IF IT IS INDEED
CONVENED WITH THE AID OF A SHORT-TERM PROCEDURAL
COMPROMISE.
IT IS CERTAIN THAT SUCH AN ATTEMPT ALSO DEMANDS OF US
POLITICAL REALISM AND WILLINGNESS FOR CONCESSIONS IN
SPHERES WHICH DO NOT INVOLVE THE MOST IMPORTANT
PRINCIPLES. A "RED LIGHT" IS NOW BLINKING IN OUR
RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED ST*TES AND IT WOULD BE BEST
TO SEE IT IN TIME.
3 OCT 09152 MJO/TM
This endorsement was the result of a ballot of its
10,000 convention delegates. Jimmy Carter received
81% of the delegate votes and Gerald Ford 19% of the
delegate votes. Your commitment to support a separate
department of education was a major factor in the
decision of many delegates to support your candidacy.
3. The teachers groups - particularly the NEA - was
one of the most active and effective groups in the
general election. A post-election ballot showed that
over 88% of the membership of the NEA voted.
4. Establishing the department is one of the few things
that we can do for the teachers' organizations in the
next few years as additional funds for education will be
difficult with our goal of balancing the budget. If we
renege on our campaign promise to establish a separate
Department of Education and fail to give them the
additional monies that they will inevitably want, I
would predict that they will oppose us on other legis-
lative programs where their support is critical.
The following are excerpts from an interview by Mr. Moshe Dayan,
Israeli Foreign Minister, with journalists in Brussels on Sept. 15th
"The borders on which we will reach an agreement with the Arab
states are those which will decide the future and fate of the
settlements, and it is not the settlements which will determine
where the borders will be drawn. If the borders decided upon
cut off Jewish settlements from Israel, the Government of Israel
will have to decide whether to dismantle them or let them remain
on the other side of the border, which will be based on treaties
with the neighboring states."
READY
"The U.S. is nowvto agree to PLO participation in Geneva, following
their acceptance of Resolution 242. The presence of the PLO in
Geneva means Israel's acceptance of a Palestinian state and the
U.S. wants Israel to recognize the principle of this state.
Israel objects and will not agree to the establishment of a
Palestinian state, because such a state will endanger its very
existence."
Dayan mentioned that in talks with the Arab states Israel is
ready to discuss the partition of the West Bank, but the Arabs
demand that Israel give up all the territories to the Palestinian
state and this cannot be considered. Israel prefers to object to a
Palestinian state and risk a war now, rather than to accept a
Palestinian state and risk a war in ten years when security
conditions would be worse.
FBIS 47
ISRAELI SPOKESMAN' $ REACTION TO U.S. - SOVIET STATEMENT
NC020858Y JERUSALEM DOMESTIC SERVICE IN HEBREW 500 GMT 2 OCT 77 NC
(FROM THE MORNING NEWSREEL)
(TEXT) (ANNOUNCER) WITH ME IN THE STUDIO IS OUR POLITICAL
CORRESPONDENT, SHALOM CITAL, WHO HAS THE GOVERNMENT S REACTION
AS ISSUED BY THE GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN.
(QITAL) BEFORE GOING OVER THE OFFICIAL STATEMENT,
I HAVE AN UNOFFICIAL REACTION FROM AN AUTHORITIATIVE SOURCE
IN JERUSALEM. THE SOURCE TOLD ME, OVER I HOUR AGO, THAT
THE U.S.-SOVIET STATEMENT IS A MAJOR DEPARTURE FROM ALL THAT
THE UNITED STATES PROMISED US. THE MOST IMPORTANT POINT
IS THE ONE CALLING FOR THE PARTICIPATION OF THE PALESTINIAN
PEOPLES' REPRESENTATIVES IN GENEVA WITHOUT THE UNITED STATES
OBTAINING ISRAEL'S CONSENT FOR THIS. THIS COMES
AFTER THE UNITED STATES PROMISED US THAT IF ANY CHANGE
OCCURS IN THE ORIGINAL COMPOSITION OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN
THE GENEVA CONFERENCE, AND THE ORIGINAL PARTICIPANTS WERE
STATES, THEN THIS WOULD BE DONE WITH THE APPROVAL OF ALL
PARTIES, INCLUDING ISRAEL. AT PRESENT, FEELINGS IN JERUSALEM
ARE GRAVE, EVEN THOUGH WE HAD RECEIVED THE CONTENTS OF THE
STATEMENT SEVERAL HOURS BEFORE ITS PUBLICATION.
PRIME MINISTER MENAHEM BEGIN, WHO IS IN THE IKHILOV HOSPITAL,
PARTICIPATED IN FORMULATING ISRAEL' S REACTION AND IN THE
CONSULTATIONS. AT THE END OF THESE CONSULTATIONS, THE REACTION
WAS GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER' S SPOKESMAN. IT CONSISTS
OF FIVE CLAUSES:
1. THE SOVIET UNION S DEMAND FOR ISRAEL' WITHDRAWAL
TO THE LINES OF 4 JUNE 1967, WHICH CONTRADICTS THE REAL
MEANING OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242, IS KNOWN TO ALL,
SAYS THE STATEMENT.
2. ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL
AGREED DURING PRIME MINISTER BEGIN S VISIT TO THE UNITED
STATES IN JULY OF THIS YEAR THAT THE PURPOSE OF THE
NEGOTIATIONS AT GENEVA IS AN OVERALL PEACE SETTLEMENT WHICH
WOULD BE EXPRESSED IN A PEACE TREATY, THE EXPRESSION
"PEACE TREATY IS NOT MENTIONED AT ALL IN THE SOVIET- AMERICAN
STATEMENT.
3. THERE IS NO REFERENCE IN THE STATEMENT TO RESOLUTIONS
242 AND 338, ALTHOUGH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS REPEATEDLY
STATED UNTIL NOW THAT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 242 AND
338 CONSTITUTE THE SOLE BASIS FOR RECONVENING THE GENEVA
CONFERENCE.
4.
THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAI THIS STATEMENT, ISSUED
AT A TIME WHEN CONSULTATIONS ARE BEING HELD FOR CONVENING
ANOTHER SESSION OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE, CAN ONLY
HARDEN STILL FURTHER THE ARAB STATES' STANDS AND MAKE THE
ATTAINMENT OF PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST STILL MORE DIFFICULT.
5. AS THE PRIME MINISTER STATED, ISRAEL WILL
CONTINUE TO ASPIRE TO PEACE AND FREE NEGOTIATIONS WITH
HER NEIGHBORS TO SIGN PEACE TREATIES WITH THEM.
AND SO, THE STATEMENT SPEAKS FOR ITSELF. NATURALLY,
ISRAEL REJECTS THE U.S.-SOVIET STATEMENT AND THIS WILL
COME OUT IN THE WEEKLY CABINET MEETING TODAY.
2 OCT 1041Z MJO/MC
R439R I5346) IUIVZYRIYC
MIDEAST - NIGHTLEAD AMERICAN
79 AAR,IND,LL
BY PETER GREGSON
WASHINGTON, OCT 2, REUTER - LARGE AND INFLUENTIAL AMERICAN
JEWISH GROUPS REACTED ANGRILY TODAY TO A JOINT SOVIET-AMEMICAN
ATTEMPT TO PUSH ISRAEL AND THE ARABS TOWARDS A MIDDLE EAST
PEACE SETTLEMENT.
YESTERDAY, THE Two SUPERPOWERS ISSUED A STATEMENT
SIMULTANEOUSLY IN MOSCOW AND AT THE UNITED NATIONS CALLING FOR
PEACE TALKS IN GENEVA BY DECEMBER AT THE LATEST TO BRING ABOUT
A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM.
WHAT ANGERED THE POWERFUL JEWISH LOBBY WAS THE UNITED
STATES FIRST FORMAL COMMITMENT IN THE STATEMENT THAT SUCH A
SETTLEMENT MUST INSURE ""THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE
PALESTINIAN PEOPLE."
THE PRESIDENTS OF 32 MAJOR JEWISH ORGANIZATIONS, AMONG THEM
THE AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS AND B"NAI BRITH, FIRED OFF A
TELEGRAM TO SECRETARY OF STATE CYRUS VANCE EXPRESSING PROFOUND
DISTURBANCE AT THE STATEMENT WHICH ON ITS FACE REPRESENTS AN
ABANDONMENT OF AMERICA'S HISTORIC COMMITMENTS TO THE SECURITY
AND SURVIVAL OF ISRAEL.
MORE 1211
MIDEASI NIGHTLEAD AMERICAN 2 WASHINGTON
THE TELEGRAM WENT ON TO CALL THE STATEMENT ""A SHOCKING
ABOUT-FACE"" OF PRESIDENT CARTER"S PUBLIC PLEDGES OF SUPPORT FOR
ISRAEL.
THE UNITED STATES HAD NEVER BEFORE SPOKEN OF THE
LEGITIMATE RIGHTS"" OF THE PALESTINIANS, ONLY OF "LEGITIMATE
INTERESTS. BUT THE STATEMENT DID IN FACT ONLY CONFIRM WHAT HAS
BEEN THE U.S. POSITION FOR SOME MONTHS -- THAT THE PALESTINIAN
QBLION HAS TO BE FACED UP TO AND THAT THE PALESTINIANS HAVE
TO HAVE SOME FORM OF HOMELAND OF THEIR OWN.
THAT THE TWO SUPERPOWERS SHOULD GET TOGETHER IN THIS WAY,
WHILE STILL INTENSE RIVALS FOR INFLUENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND
FAR FROM AGREEMENT BETWEEN THEMSELVES ON WHAT FORM A SETTLEMENT
SHOULD ULTIMATELY TAKE, WAS PROBABLY THE MOST SURPRISING FACET
OF THE STATEMENT.
THE TWO COUNTRIES ARE CO-CHAIRMEN OF THE GENEVA MIDDLE EAST
PEACE CONFERENCE, WHICH MET BRIEFLY IN DECEMBER OF 1973.
THE INTENTION OF THE STATEMENT WAS TO GET MOVEMENT FROM
BOTH SIDES TOWARDS A COMPROMISE -- FROM ISRAEL THROUGH PRESSURE
FROM WASHINGTON AND FROM THE SOVIET UNION'S ARAB FRIENDS
THROUGH PRESSURE FROM MOSCOW.
MORE 1216
R442R A6358)LUIVUIVBYL
MIDEAST - NIGHTLEAD AMERICAN 3 WASHINGTON
AS WELL AS THE CONCESSION FROM THE UNITED STATES ON THE
REFERENCE TO THE PALESTINIANS, THE STATEMENT ALSO INCLUDED A
CONCESSION FROM MOSCOW -- CALLING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
NORMAL PEACEFUL RELATIONS" BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ITS ARAB
NEIGHBORS AFTER THE TERMINATION OF "THE STATE OF WAR.
IT WAS THE FIRST TIME THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD COMMITTED
ITSELF TO SUCH A CONDITION.
BUT WHETHER OR NOT THE STATEMENT WILL PRODUCE MOVEMENT OR
REMAIN JUST ANOTHER EXHORTATION IN A LONG SERIES OF EFFORTS BY
OTUSIDE MEDIATORS TO END THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT REMAINS TO
BE SEEN.
REACHING THE DECEMBER DEADLINE FOR GENEVA TALKS WILL
REQUIRE SHIFTS IN ATTITUDE MORE SIGNIFICANT THAN HAVE BEEN
SEEN so FAR THIS YEAR.
THE MAJOR STICKING POINT IS THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE
PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) WILL TAKE PART, AS
MOST ARAB STATES INSIST. ISRAEL REFUSES TO NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY
WITH THE PLO AND HOPES FOR SOME OTHER FORM OF PALESTINIAN
REPRESENTATION.
REUTER 1218
BB
3-16-83
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
6/13
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
June 13, 1977
Dear Harold:
The President wanted you to see the
attached. It is politically sensitive.
The President has asked that no copies
be made and that only four people read
it.
I'd appreciate it if you would call my
office when you have finished reading it,
and we'll arrange to pick it up.
Best regards,
Sincerely,
Hanta
Hamilton Jordan
Assistant to the President
The Honorable Harold Brown
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D. C.
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
TO BE BB AN ADMINISTRATIVE
3-16-83
UNING BY
June 10, 1977
Dear ey:
The President wanted you to see the
attached. It is politically sensitive.
The President has asked that no copies
be made and that only four people read
it.
I'd appreciate it if you would call my
office when you have finished reading
it, and we'll arrange to pick it up.
Best regards,
Sincerely,
Hamilton Jordan
Assistant to the President
The Honorable Cyrus Vance
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.
ARCHIVISTS MEMO OF MARCH 16, 1983
FROM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON. D.C.
HAMILTON JORDAN
The Honorable Harold Brown
"Electrostatic reproduction made for
Secretary of Defense
Room 3E880, The Pentagon
purposes."
Washington, D.C.
BY MESSENGER
ATTENTION: NANCY BRADY
Personal and Confidential
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
November 14, 1977
Dear Dr. Kissinger:
Thank you for your thoughtfulness in
sending me a copy of the remarks you
delivered before the American Jewish
Congress in New York. I had seen
reports in the media of your talk and
found the exerpts they reported of
great interest. A reading of the
full text certainly confirms that
impression.
On a more personal note, I am sorry
I missed your call the other day.
As my office informed yours, I was
out of the city. I hope one of these
days we will have the opportunity to
discuss matters of mutual interest.
With best wishes,
Sincerely,
Hamilton Jordan
Assistant to the President
The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
1800 K Street, N. W.
Suice 520
Washington, D. C. 20006
HENRY A. KISSINGER
November 14, 1977
Dear Mr. Jordan:
Enclosed is a copy of the remarks I
delivered in New York on Sunday evening,
which I thought you might be interested
in seeing.
Best regards,
Henry A. Kissinger
The Honorable
Hamilton Jordan
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Extracts From Remarks Delivered by
Henry A. Kissinger
at the
American Jewish Congress
Presentation of the Stephen S. Wise Award to
Golda Meir
Sunday, November 13, 1977
We meet in the midst of another debate about peace
in the Middle East. Given my own involvement in the conduct
of foreign policy over eight years, I have thought it
inappropriate since January to participate in a discussion of
day-to-day tactics. But I would like to use this occasion
to articulate a few general principles.
First, the desirability of peace can never be at issue.
No people has suffered more from the absence of peace than
the people of Israel, every square mile of whose country is
drenched with the blood of its pioneers and whose existence
has never been recognized by any of its neighbors. No people
can be more aware of how fragile, and how precious, are the
restraints that make men and nations civilized.
No people knows more vividly that morality must be
more than a theory -- it must be a constant in human conduct.
And no group of men and women understands more acutely that
peace depends ultimately not on political arrangements but on
the conscience of mankind. History is often cruel, and rarely
logical and yet the wisest of realists are those who recognize
that fate can indeed be shaped by human faith and courage.
These qualities are what brought the state of Israel into being.
-2-
This spirit and pride must be nurtured by all friends of
Israel for they are the ultimate guarantee of Israel's future.
But faith and courage are not enough. The people of
Israel have seen too much of the transitoriness of human
intentions to entrust the destiny of their nation entirely
to professions and reassurances however sincere and honestly
intended. A peace to be lasting must be founded on the self-
interest of all the parties and for peace to be secure it must
leave Israel strong enough to protect its future by its Own
efforts.
Second, the intentions or purposes of the government
of the United States cannot be at issue. No President would
knowingly risk the future of Israel. Nor would he make a
deal to undermine Israel' future for some global considerations.
My own acquaintance with President Carter, Secretary Vance
and their senior advisors convinces me that this Administration
would not deliberately put Israel's security at risk. But
there is always the danger 'that actions undertaken in good
faith may inadvertently produce unforeseen consequences. If
such a miscalculation took place either Israel would become
totally isolated or diplomacy would become abruptly deadlocked.
The art of diplomacy is to move events carefully and shape
them toward achievable ends 50 that neither the United States
nor Israel ever face such a stark, impossible choice. A
coordination of policies between Israel and the United States
is therefore imperative.
Third, the perspective of a superpower and those of
a small country may occasionally differ. The United States
has enormous strength; Israel has a much narrower margin of
safety. The United States can survive trial-and-error
diplomacy, because we can always rectify mistakes by redoubling
our efforts. But Israeli leaders cannot experiment; they have
only one try. If they guess wrong they risk the survival of
the nation. We therefore owe the people of Israel an under-
standing of its special circumstances -- all the more so as the
country has known only war or the threat of war since its
founding. At the same time, Israelis must understand the
importance of Middle East peace to the global concerns of
the United States and the Western world, which are indeed the
essential underpinning of Israel's own security.
Fourth, an over-all solution is of course the ultimate
prize. But realism forces us to recognize that to achieve
it involves issues of enormous complexity and parties with
an unequal commitment to peace. It also requires a process
that is bound to be protracted. Thus while striving for an
over-all settlement, we must take care not to foreclose other
-3-
opportunities that may arise to ease tensions and to enable
the peoples of the area to build confidence. We must
not give a veto to the most intransigent elements within
the area. We must not permit outside powers to emerge as
the advocates for a point of view that penalizes moderation.
Fifth, some structures develop their own momentum
that cannot be judged by formal declarations or abstract
blueprints. A Palestinian state on the West Bank is bound
to be an element of instability both for Jordan and for Israel;
it will compound the crisis not solve it. Such a state
whatever the professions or guarantees -- must have objectives
that cannot be compatible with the tranquility of the Middle
East. It cannot be an accident that no attempt to create
such a state was ever made during the twenty years of Arab
rule in that territory.
Sixth, any peace settlement must of necessity involve
guarantees. But they must be worked out with great care and
with a sense for their limits. History should teach us that
guarantees by themselves are not a substitute for security.
No nation should be asked to abdicate its judgment of the
requirements of its survival. Care must be taken that
guarantees do not provide a pretext for an outside power to
intervene constantly in the affairs of the area. With
respect to bilateral US-Israeli treaty arrangements there
is the danger that the ratification process may produce a
debate that paradoxically hazards the friendship and close
cooperation which has served so well for a generation. In
short, guarantees require the most careful reflection and
study; at best they reinforce, they can not bring about
security.
Seventh, whatever the views about the desirability of
beginning the process of negotiations with a Geneva confer-
ence, so much effort has been invested in it that it has
become the touchstone of the prospects of peace. All parties
therefore have a stake in bringing such a conference into
being. At the same time we must recognize that when it is
finally assembled Geneva will be an important achievement, but
its primary significance will be procedural. Ahead of us
will be complex negotiations about frontiers, commitments
to peace, security arrangements, and other issues which will
test the wisdom and commitment of the parties.
-4-
These issues cannot be left to the pressures of a
conference; it is not too soon to explore them actively with
the parties. We cannot wait for Geneva to resolve all the
complexities that range from the relations of sub-groups
to the main conference to the concrete outlines of a definition
of peace. Especially as far as Israel is concerned it is
incompatible with our historic relationship to deal with
issues of such gravity in an atmosphere of self-imposed
deadlines. And it does not help those Arab leaders who have
had the wisdom and the courage to begin the journey towards
peace to raise expectations that cannot be fulfilled.
Geneva will be successful to the extent that Israel
and the United States end the cycle of fear and reassurance,
of outraged protest and soothing generalities and turn to the
elaboration of a common concrete approach. This requires
a willingness on one side to give the benefit of the doubt
and a readiness on the other to understand the anguish of
a people whose historic suffering precludes the abdication
of its own judgment, but whose martyrs guarantee that
the search for peace, while painful, will be dedicated and
committed.
I am convinced that the problems that form the head-
lines of the day are soluble. In all my efforts in the
Middle East, whatever the temporary disagreements, we never
failed to develop a common position with our friends in Israel.
It was during Golda's term as Prime Minister and that of her
distinguished successor, that the steps were taken that give
us hope for even greater progress now. I have every confidence
that the present Israeli government will do no less. And
in my experience, at the end of the day, Israel has never
rejected a chance to make progress towards a settlement, or
to run risks for peace. I have no doubt that we will find a
willing -- if complicated -- partner in a dialogue that
emphasizes substance not procedure and in a quest that defines
specific objectives, not theoretical blueprints. The Jewish
people has not survived through the millenia by being found
wanting of vision in its hours of need. And the American
people have not been the hope of mankind through their history
by subordinating moral values to tactical expedience.