Memorandum from Stansfield Turner to President Carter Regarding US-Iranian Negotiations
This document is a December 1, 1980 Director of Central Intelligence memorandum from Stansfield Turner to President Carter regarding US-Iranian Negotiations. It was originally attached to a December 2, 1980 White House memorandum from Zbigniew Brzezinski to President Carter .
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OCR Page 1 of 3NOFORN
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington DO 20505
4A
1 December 1980
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: US-Iranian Negotiations (C/NF)
I believe that the present detailed negotiations with Iran over the
hostages offer little prospect of success and, accordingly, urge that we
carefully reexamine whether we should continue the current "haggling"
with the Iranians if Deputy Secretary Christopher's current trip does
not result in a quick resolution to the impasse. (8/NF)
On 6 November I sent to Secretary Muskie our intelligence judgment
that a detailed response to the Majlis' four points would likely be
unproductive because:
- It would require a protracted time to work out, during which
developments in Iran could undermine the current fragile
consensus that led to the Majlis' decision.
- The US would be subjected to the possibility of the piecemeal
release of the hostages.
- A detailed approach would bog us down in a "bazaar" type
negotiation, largely on their terms.
-
A detailed legalistic approach would inevitably fail to
satisfy the Iranians and would clearly identify areas where
we could not meet the Majlis' terms.
- It would shift focus from illegal seizure of hostages to
haggling over the terms, a situation in which the Iranians
could position themselves as the aggrieved party.
Events appear to have borne out this judgment. (8/NF)
Accordingly, I believe the time is propitious to reconsider our
tactics and, specifically, whether we should go to the Iranians with the
following message:
- The present course of discussions seems unlikely to bear
fruit in the foreseeable future.
DECLASSIFIED
Per; Rac Project
CL BY SIGNER
ESDN; NLC-15-77-8-3-0
RVW ON 1 DEC 1986
BY.
B NARA.DAIE 5/19/2015
SECRET NOFORN