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11 TOP-SECRET 4. Covert Landing of the Paramilitary Forces: Careful study has been given to the possibility of infiltrating the paramilitary forces in a night amphibious landing, using man-portable equipment and weapons and taking ashore only such supplies as can be carried by the troops. The force would move immediately in-land to the mountains and commence operations as a powerful guerrilla force relying entirely upon continuing air logistical support. Shipping would retire from the coast before dawn and no tactical air operations would be conducted. Unfortunately, it is believed that such an operation would involve unacceptable military risks. a. The paramilitary force would run the risk of becoming completely disorganized and scattered in a night landing. (Such an operation is very difficult for even highly trained forces experienced in amphibious operations.) b. The force would not have motor transport, heavy mortar, 75 mm recoiling rifles, heavy machine guns, nor tanks. Initial ammunition and food supplies would be limited and it would be wholly c dependent on air logistical support. If the rainy season commences in April, overcast conditions could prevent effective support. Casualities could not be evacuated. TOP SECRET - 7 -

Document source description

Supplemental material used in Maxwell Taylor's report on the Bay of Pigs operation.

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    "ocrText": "11\nTOP-SECRET\n4. Covert Landing of the Paramilitary Forces: Careful study\nhas been given to the possibility of infiltrating the paramilitary forces in\na night amphibious landing, using man-portable equipment and weapons\nand taking ashore only such supplies as can be carried by the troops.\nThe force would move immediately in-land to the mountains and commence\noperations as a powerful guerrilla force relying entirely upon continuing\nair logistical support. Shipping would retire from the coast before dawn\nand no tactical air operations would be conducted. Unfortunately, it is\nbelieved that such an operation would involve unacceptable military risks.\na. The paramilitary force would run the risk of becoming\ncompletely disorganized and scattered in a night landing. (Such an\noperation is very difficult for even highly trained forces experienced\nin amphibious operations.)\nb. The force would not have motor transport, heavy mortar,\n75 mm recoiling rifles, heavy machine guns, nor tanks. Initial\nammunition and food supplies would be limited and it would be wholly\nc\ndependent on air logistical support. If the rainy season commences in\nApril, overcast conditions could prevent effective support. Casualities\ncould not be evacuated.\nTOP SECRET\n- 7 -"
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