Summary Record of NSC Executive Committee Meeting No. 5, October 25, 1962, 5:00 PM

SANITIZED COPY 15 TOP SECRET SENSITIVE Summary Record of NSC Executive Committee Meeting No. 5, October 25, 1962, 5:00 PM Director McCone gave an intelligence briefing which contained no major new information. He listed fifteen ships en route to Cuba, among them the Graznyy, which is one of three oil tankers with deck tanks probably containing ammonia. Mr. McCone noted that a Bloc ship would be entering the Panama Canal on November 2. It would be searched, as have Bloc ships transiting the Canal during the past seven years. Mr. McCone said he had no information of any unusual developments in Europe. Secretary Dillon noted that there had been a run on gold in Germany and to a lesser extent in London. His conclusion was that these gold purchases reflected the fear of the buyers. Secretary McNamara said that the East German passenger ship Voelker Freundschaft was at the Cuban barrier. It is a fairly large ship, 525 feet long, and has been ordered to report its position every four hours. He said we faced a decision as to whether or not to stop it. leased as a result of this review. Additional material has been re- Secretary McNamara reported that the Lebanese ship which was to have been boarded had turned back before crossing the barrier. Late informa- tion on the Graznyy revealed that it was lying dead in the water. The result is that to date no ship has yet been boarded. Secretary Rusk reported on diplomatic developments. He said the ques- tion was whether we can get Soviet strategic missiles out of Cuba or at least under UN control. He added that if there was any prospect of suc- By cess in following a political track, we would have to keep heavy pressure VOL on the Russians. He reported that Soviet representative Zorin in New X York was furious about U Thant's proposals for U.S./USSR talks under PUBLISHED IN FRUS 1961-63 UN sponsorship in New York, but that Khrushchev had agreed to such NARA, Date 12/18/97 SANITIZED talks. Our position would be that during these next two days of prelim- inary discussions we must somehow stop the missile buildup in Cuba. # DOC We must know what is going on at the IRBM sites in Cuba and we need to know whether warheads have actually been delivered to Cuba. Shortly 73 we must decide if the Soviet signals which they are sending us mean they are getting ready to talk or whether they are getting ready to attack us. TOP SECRET SENSITIVE