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{
    "localId": "193369",
    "label": "Summary Record of NSC Executive Committee Meeting No. 7 October 27, 1962, 10:00 AM",
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}

{
    "id": "193369",
    "sourceUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/193369",
    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Summary Record of NSC Executive Committee Meeting No. 7 October 27, 1962, 10:00 AM",
    "description": "Includes discussion on where to draw the blockade line, and the proposed removal of U.S. missile bases in Turkey.",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/193369",
    "collections": [
        "Papers of John F. Kennedy: Presidential Papers: National Security Files",
        "Meeting Records and Memoranda"
    ],
    "subjects": [
        "Bundy, McGeorge, 1919-1996",
        "Summaries"
    ],
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            "logicalDate": "1962-10-27",
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{
    "seq": 5,
    "pageIndex": 0,
    "type": "photo",
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    "ocrText": "TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE\n- 5 -\nagainst Cuba because many would think that we would make a good\ntrade if we offered to take the missiles out of Turkey in the event the\nRussians would agree to remove the missiles from Cuba. We are in\na bad position if we appear to be attacking Cuba for the purpose of\nkeeping useless missiles in Turkey. We cannot propose to withdraw\nthe missiles from Turkey, but the Turks could offer to do so. The\nTurks must be informed of the great danger in which they will live\nduring the next week and we have to face up to the possibility of some\nkind of a trade over missiles.\nThe President left the meeting to meet the State Governors who had\nbeen waiting for one-half hour to see him.\nThe discussion continued in the President's absence. It was not pos-\nsible to say with certainty whether the Soviet public offer included all\nNATO bases or referred specifically to Turkey.\nThe Attorney General expressed his concern as to what our position\nwould be if we talked to the Russians for sixty days and then the Cubans\nrefused to permit UN inspectors to continue to ensure that missiles in\nCuba were inoperable. The reply was that we could then decide to\nattack the bases by air.\nThere was discussion of a second statement to be put out but this pro-\nposal was later abandoned.\nA draft message to Khrushchev, which had been prepared by Ambassador\nThompson, was read and a final version was to be completed for the\nPresident's consideration later in the day. The group agreed to meet\nat the State Department without the President at 2:30 PM and meet with\nthe President again at 4:00 PM.\n(Note: At the meeting at the State Department, the Attorney General\nrepeated his view that we should keep the focus on the missile bases.\nHe preferred to let the Soviet tankers through the quarantine line in\norder to avoid a confrontation with the Soviets over one of their ships.\nHe said if we attack a Soviet tanker, the balloon would go up. He urged\nthat we buy time now in order to launch an air attack Monday or Tuesday.\nSecretary McNamara expressed his view that before we attack Cuba we\nmust notify the Cubans.\nBromley Smith\nTOP SECRET - SENSITIVE"
}