Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
203744962
label
Draft Review for "The Marathon Dam: Collaboration of American and Greek Engineers"
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
203744962
contentType
document
title
Draft Review for "The Marathon Dam: Collaboration of American and Greek Engineers"
citationUrl
collections
Dr. Robert Kapsch Collection
Senior Scholar Records
thumbnailUrl
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
203744962
levelOfDescription
item
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
mediaId
6d9f08841d2f766f
ocrText
Engineering History and Heritage
The Marathon Dam: Collaboration of American & Greek engineers
--Manuscript Draft--
Manuscript Number:
EHH-D-11-00033
Full Title:
The Marathon Dam: Collaboration of American & Greek engineers
Article Type:
General paper
Abstract:
Built by an American contractor, Ulen and Company, on behalf of the Greek State, the
Marathon Dam, one of the largest European constructions and the world's only marble
dam when erected in October 1929, was by no means just a US product. Greek
engineers proved to be a worthy ally to the Ulen engineering staff, unfolding specific
skills and demonstrating qualities in which their American counterparts seemed to be
lacking. By "reading" the Marathon Dam as an example of cooperation between a
technologically advanced nation and one located on what is conventionally regarded
as the edge of the developed world at the time, the authors would like to encourage
research into technological systems in the design and building of which nations and
geographical areas that historians used to "scorn" were involved. They are convinced
that new insights and substantial reappraisals will emerge once scholars take seriously
the many components of an increasingly interconnected world involved in technological
development and its heritage.
Powered by Editorial Manager® and Preprint Manager® from Aries Systems Corporation
Main Text
Click here to download Main Text: Document.doc
The Marathon Dam: Collaboration of American & Greek engineers
1
2
3
Abstract
4
5
6
7
Built by an American contractor, Ulen and Company, on behalf of the Greek State, the
8
9
Marathon Dam, one of the largest European constructions and the world's only marble dam
10
11
12
when erected in October 1929, was by no means just a US product. Greek engineers proved to
13
14
be a worthy ally to the Ulen engineering staff, unfolding specific skills and demonstrating
15
16
17
qualities in which their American counterparts seemed to be lacking. By "reading" the
18
19
Marathon Dam as an example of cooperation between a technologically advanced nation and
20
21
22
one located on what is conventionally regarded as the edge of the developed world at the time,
23
24
the authors would like to encourage research into technological systems in the design and
25
26
building of which nations and geographical areas that historians used to "scorn" were
27
28
29
involved. They are convinced that new insights and substantial reappraisals will emerge once
30
31
scholars take seriously the many components of an increasingly interconnected world involved
32
33
34
in technological development and its heritage.
35
36
37
38
39
40
Introduction
41
42
43
44
September 1922 was a dreadful month in the history of Modern Greece, a rather young
45
46
Nation, at least as measured by the standards of the Old Continent, since she gained her
47
48
49
independence as late as in 1832, after a national upheaval against the Ottoman Empire, and
50
51
the intervention of the Great Powers - Great Britain, France, and Russia - of the time (Gallant
52
53
2001). The Greek army had just experienced a series of critical defeats by the Turks led by
54
55
56
Mustapha Kemal Atatürk, the father of Modern Turkey. Smyrna was burning, and panic-
57
58
stricken mobs of people belonging to the then affluent and populous Greek community of the
59
60
1
61
62
63
64
65
city were running to the waterfront, hoping to escape violence and death by being conveyed to
1
2
one of the ships lying in the harbor. The destruction of Smyrna was the last act of a war that
3
4
5
had started ten years earlier, and was waged, apart from Greece and Turkey, by most of the
6
7
Balkan countries.
8
9
10
If the military defeat of 1922 resulted for Greece in the definitive loss of the territories that
11
12
13
her army had temporarily conquered in Asia Minor, it didn't prevent her from eventually
14
15
succeeding in doubling her population and size during the decade 1912-1922. The 1922
16
17
18
catastrophe even increased the human potentialities of the country by about 1,200,000 new
19
20
citizens, forced, following the population exchange agreement between Greece and Turkey of
21
22
23
January 30, 1923, to leave the land of their ancestors in Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace, and
24
25
to settle in within the new frontiers of the Greek State as they were redesigned according to
26
27
28
the Treaty of Lausanne signed by the two countries on July 23, 1923.
29
30
31
Most of these new Greeks were installed in regions that had belonged to the Ottoman Empire
32
33
before the 1912-1922 war. But some other territories that had been part of the Greek State
34
35
36
since its creation in 1832 were also deeply affected by the influx of so many people in such a
37
38
short span of time. Between 1923 and 1928, the population of Athens and its environs, the
39
40
41
city of Piraeus included, critically surged after the arrival of around 300,000 new people
42
43
(Geniki Statistiki Ypiresia Ellados, 1931, p. 48-49). This sudden increase in the number of
44
45
inhabitants of the two cities led to a dramatic deterioration of their urban landscape. The
46
47
48
existing infrastructures now proved to be totally inadequate for serving the needs of the
49
50
inhabitants, old and new. Especially, water consumption literally collapsed. In 1920, the
51
52
53
available (average) quantity of water in Athens was equal to thirty liters per day per inhabitant
54
55
(Istoriko Archeio Dimou Athinaion, 1921), needless to say a poor achievement for a European
56
57
58
capital in the early decades of the 20th century. But the worst was still to come. In the years
59
60
2
61
62
63
64
65
following the arrival and settlement of Greeks expelled from Turkey, water consumption
1
2
dropped to 10 liters per day per inhabitant (Gausmann, 1932), that is the average amount a
3
4
5
Parisian was provided by his municipality on a daily basis around 1800 (Bocquet et al., 2008, p.
6
7
1824). Obviously, new public works were necessary in order to supply the region of Athens
8
9
10
with a decent quantity of the "precious liquid".
11
12
13
On December 22, 1924, the Greek government signed a contract with the American
14
15
engineering corporation Ulen & Company, and its economic ally in Greece, the "Bank of
16
17
18
Athens" (Eleftheron Vima, 1924). Some months later, on April 4, 1925, and after a series of
19
20
discussions within the National Parliament and the public sphere, the agreement became a law
21
22
23
of the Greek State (Efimeris Kyverniseos, 1925). Among the key components, and probably
24
25
the most important one, of the projected water supply system was a dam located near the
26
27
28
historic Marathon battlefield (Figure 1). It was not by chance that among the different options
29
30
for supplying Athens and its environs with water: ---i.e., carry water into the city from remote
31
32
springs, create a water storage system nearby the dam solution was eventually adopted.
33
34
35
Indeed, in the 1920s, all conditions were ripe for the construction of a water storage system at
36
37
the site of Marathon.
38
39
40
41
[INSERT FIGURE1]
42
43
44
The long path to the Marathon Dam
45
46
47
In 1834, the year it became the capital of the newly founded Greek Kingdom, Athens was a
48
49
50
small town of 14,000-odd inhabitants, completely devoid of any modern infrastructure. At the
51
52
time, Athens dwellers got their water from the handful public fountains and the numerous
53
54
55
private wells in the city (Chatzis, 2007; Chatzis and Mavrogonatou, 2010; Chatzis and
56
57
Mavrogonatou, forthcoming). For many years, serious shortage of the "precious liquid" was a
58
59
60
3
61
62
63
64
65
permanent feature of everyday life in the Greek capital. In the second half of the 1840s, the
1
2
(re)discovery of the aqueduct built by the Roman Emperor Hadrian (76-138) and his
3
4
5
successor (Leigh, 1999), and the subsequent works carried out by the municipality, in a rather
6
7
piecemeal and intermittent way as they solely depended on the limited financial resources of
8
9
10
the city, significantly upgraded the water supply conditions of Athens, especially during the
11
12
1870-1890 period. But despite this improvement, at the end of the 19th century the "water
13
14
issue" was still to be resolved for the inhabitants of Athens. Given the chronic paucity of
15
16
17
municipality's financial inputs, the central state decided to interfere in local affairs. Charilaos
18
19
Trikoupis (1832-1896), the modernizing Prime Minister who dominated the political stage of
20
21
22
his country over the 1880-1895 period, turned to Edouard-Marie Quellennec (1856-1927), a
23
24
French State engineer and a member of the famous "Ponts et Chaussées" corps (Bridge and
25
26
27
Roads Corps) (Chatzis, 2009), and asked him to deal with the water question. Quellennec was
28
29
at that time in Greece along with a team of French engineers and other technicians as a
30
31
32
technical expert invited by the national government to help it with the design and the
33
34
implementation of the most ambitious program of Public Works the Greek state had ever
35
36
envisioned, and partially implemented, since its foundation (Chatzis, 2004). Indeed, in 1889,
37
38
39
Quellennec produced a draft in which he proposed to carry into the region of Athens water
40
41
from the springs of Stymphale located in Peloponnese. Based on this first comprehensive
42
43
44
treatment of the water issue, the government of Trikoupis prepared a bill in May 1890. While
45
46
the latter didn't succeed in becoming a law of the State, it nevertheless launched a series of
47
48
49
debates within the engineering community, and stimulated it to seek ways for ameliorating
50
51
Quellennec's work on the one hand, to devise alternative solutions to the water problem of
52
53
Athens and its surroundings, on the other hand.
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
4
61
62
63
64
65
The dam solution loomed on Athens' horizon a short time after Quellennec's study first
1
2
appeared. In the late 1890s, Rosseels, the then Belgian Consul General in the Greek Capital,
3
4
5
drew up a proposal in which the first reference to a (future) dam at the site of Marathon can be
6
7
found (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, 1900). But during the 1890s and the first decade of the
8
9
10
20th century, the water storage option was given a cold welcome in Greece. Quellennec
11
12
himself wasn't favorable to Rosseel's proposal (Quellennec 1899). Georges Bechmann (1848-
13
14
1927), a fellow of Quellennec who had gained a worldwide reputation as chief engineer of
15
16
17
the Paris Water Department, when invited by the Greek government as a technical adviser,
18
19
also opposed the project in 1900 (Bechmann, 1900, p. 64-65). Twelve years later, another
20
21
22
European engineer, K. Kinzer from Austria, also working on behalf of the Greek State,
23
24
expressed in his turn the same aversion to the dam solution (Kinzer, 1912, p. 4-6). Several
25
26
27
eminent and highly influential members of the Greek engineering community of the day also
28
29
criticized the water storage solution, which was now put forward, especially during the 1902-
30
31
32
1906 period, by an increasing number of engineers and engineering firms as the cheapest
33
34
solution to the "water problem" for Athens (Kalantzopoulos, 1964, p. 23-31). Thus, in 1899,
35
36
Petros Protopapadakis (1858-1922), a former student of the "Ecole Polytechnique" and
37
38
39
"Ecole des Mines" in Paris, in a conference organized by the Greek Polytechnical Association
40
41
- i.e., the first professional organization of Greek engineers -, pleaded the case for spring
42
43
44
waters, and expressed strong doubts about dams, the construction of which was, in his
45
46
opinion, subjected to many technical problems (Protopapadakis, 1899). In 1907, in a paper
47
48
49
published in the Greek engineering journal "Archimidis", Anastasios Soulis (1836-1918), a
50
51
graduate of the French "Ecole des Ponts et Chaussées" and a Professor at the Polytechnic
52
53
School of Athens, also gave a negative assessment to the water storage solution (Soulis,
54
55
56
1907). It is worth noting that it was Soulis who, in his 1884 manual entitled "Hydraulics"
57
58
produced the first lengthy presentation of the "state-of-the practice" in the domain of water
59
60
5
61
62
63
64
65
storage techniques in Greek (Soulis, 1884, p. 356-395). Obviously, as most of the 19th century
1
2
Greek engineers were steeped in the French engineering tradition (Assimacopoulou et al., 2009;
3
4
5
Assimacopoulou and Chatzis, 2003), they were following their counterparts in France in their
6
7
predominant preference for spring waters as the best way for providing cities with the
8
9
10
"precious liquid". This option was especially illustrated by "Hausmannian" Paris (Bocquet et
11
12
al., 2008), which by the end of the 19th century had been transformed into an icon of the
13
14
modern city, and was enjoying the status of a template concerning urban infrastructures
15
16
17
(Harvey, 2003).
18
19
20
But the future is not necessarily a repetition of the past. From the 1910s on, Greek engineers
21
22
23
started modifying their views on the respective pros and cons of remote spring waters and
24
25
water storage systems for providing cities with water. As a result, the "dam solution" was
26
27
28
gaining more and more adherents among them. This shift in attitude didn't happen
29
30
haphazardly. Indeed, from the late 19th century on, a steadily increasing number of
31
32
practitioners throughout the world resorted to storage techniques for supplying cities with
33
34
35
water. Without a doubt, the US was in the vanguard of the movement, especially thanks to the
36
37
foundation of two institutions: the Bureau of Reclamation (1902) and the Tennessee Valley
38
39
40
Authority (1933). After importing to their fatherland the groundbreaking work by French
41
42
"Ponts et Chaussées" engineers Joseph-Augustin Torterue de Sazilly (1812-1852) and Emile
43
44
45
Delocre (1828-1909), who developed mathematically based methods of gravity dam design in
46
47
the 1850s, American engineers, from the 1880s on, cultivated extensively the art of this kind
48
49
of structures (Billington et al. 2005; Smith, 1971; Schnitter, 1994; Kollgaard and Chadwick, 1988).
50
51
52
In 1888, Edward Wegmann published "The design and construction of masonry dams", one of
53
54
the first, and extremely popular, manuals entirely dedicated to this kind of structure
55
56
57
worldwide (Wegmann, 1888; 1918). At the turn of the century one of the highest dams of the
58
59
60
6
61
62
63
64
65
time, the "New Croton" Dam (built in 1898-1906, 91 m high) was erected near New York,
1
2
and within the years following its completion, two other dams symbolized the preeminence of
3
4
5
the New Continent in this domain of Public Works: the arch (no gravity) "Shoshone" Dam
6
7
(1905-1909, 100 m high) and the gravity "Elephant Butte" Dam (1912-1916, 91 m high). The
8
9
10
development of large water storages system around the world -- even in France, one could
11
12
number seventy "large" dams, i.e., higher than 15 meters, in 1919 (Bordes, 2010, p. 75) -- led
13
14
to the creation of the "International Commission on Large Dams" in July 1928. By
15
16
17
progressively embracing the dam solution, Greek engineers were merely keeping up with the
18
19
views of their counterparts abroad.
20
21
22
23
The first comprehensive study of the artificial lake and the related dam at the site of Marathon
24
25
was produced by the American firm "Ford, Bacon and Davis" at the end of the 1910s (Ford,
26
27
28
Bacon and Davis, 1920; Archibald, 1921; Genidounias, 1923; Mpotsaris, 1925). Invited by
29
30
the recently founded "Bank of Piraeus", which, alongside other banks and industrial
31
32
companies of the time, was entertaining fond hopes for a concession of the (future) water
33
34
35
supply system of Athens, a team of thirty American men, placed under the supervision of
36
37
Walter Spear, a graduate from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the then chief
38
39
40
engineer at the Board of Water Supply of the New York City (Speer, 1922), was dispatched in
41
42
Greece in 1920, and "were in the field from March until September with forty or fifty Greek
43
44
45
assistants. All survey work was done by stadia. Experienced rod men and instrument men
46
47
were almost impossible to get, but a large part of the drafting was done by local men. They
48
49
proved to be good workmen, but very slow, and the English characters bothered them when it
50
51
52
came to lettering a plan" (Archibald, 1921, p. 465). This cosmopolitan team "did an
53
54
unbelievable amount of excellent work and within about a year produced an exhaustive study
55
56
57
of the various problems presented and reached conclusions, which, with certain modifications
58
59
60
7
61
62
63
64
65
due to unpredictable changes, should form the basis for all future work on these projects
1
2
(Gausmann, 1940, p. 79)", in the words of R. Gausmann, the General manager of Ulen for the
3
4
5
Marathon dam (infra). The technical and financial elements of the study were presented to the
6
7
Greek government in October 1920, but the 1920-1922 war against Turkey prevented the
8
9
10
project from coming into fruition.
11
12
13
Immediately after the hostilities between the two countries were definitively brought to a
14
15
close, a team of Greek State engineers once more came to grips with the question of supplying
16
17
18
Athens and Piraeus with water. The "task force" squad, which was headed by Theologos
19
20
Genidounias (1871-1938) and comprised two other engineers, Petros Loprestis and Argyrios
21
22
23
Koumousis, reported the results of their study in January 1923 (Genidounias, 1923). After a
24
25
detailed examination of all the proposals produced so far, they followed in "Ford, Bacon and
26
27
28
Davis" company's footsteps, and suggested the construction of a water storage system in
29
30
Marathon. In several respects, the composition of the team was a microcosm of the
31
32
community of engineers in Greece in the 1920s (Antoniou, 2006; Antoniou et al., 2007). As
33
34
35
in the 19th century, the latter showed strong cosmopolitan strains, as it was composed of a
36
37
great number of graduates of engineering institutions in Europe -- in the meantime France
38
39
40
ceased to be the main destination and was superseded in this role by German speaking
41
42
countries and Italy -, graduates who often had also gained professional experience abroad.
43
44
45
For instance, Genidounias was a graduate of the famous Polytechnic School of Zurich, and
46
47
worked for a long while outside the borders of his fatherland. His baptism of fire as a young
48
49
engineer took place in Asia Minor, where he was employed by the company involved in the
50
51
52
building of the railway line connecting EsciSehir and Ikonio. In 1897, he returned to
53
54
Switzerland, and specialized in hydraulic works and the use of reinforced concrete (the
55
56
57
"Hennebique" system). From 1905 to 1919, Genidounias served the Egyptian government,
58
59
60
8
61
62
63
64
65
and as a high civil servant at the Ministry of Public Works, he played a key part in the
1
2
development of several large programs of public works aiming to harness and to exploit the
3
4
5
water resources of the Nile. Once back in Greece, in 1919, he was assigned a position at the
6
7
"Water Works Department" (WWD), set up in 1917 within the Ministry of Transportation,
8
9
10
founded, in turn, three years earlier by the first government of the liberal Eleftherios
11
12
Venizelos (1864-1936), the politician who stamped inter-war Greece with his modernizing
13
14
zeal (Personal Folder of Genidounias; Tsatsos, 1938; Gausmann, 1940, p. 59-61). Within the
15
16
17
WWD, Genidounias thoroughly examined the different proposals concerning the "water
18
19
issue" of Athens that had been produced since Rosseel's contribution, and steadily defended
20
21
22
the "dam solution" at the site of Marathon (Genidounias, 1922). Petros Loprestis (1870-1941)
23
24
graduated from "R. Scuola d'Ingegneria di Padova" in 1893. After serving as a municipal
25
26
27
engineer on the island of Corfu, he moved to the Greek Capital, and from 1919 on, he worked
28
29
for the central government at the Ministry of Transportation. He even managed WWD from
30
31
32
1931-1932. An author of many publications on urban hydraulics, he actively participated in
33
34
the design and implementation of nearly all the large hydraulic works programs in Greece
35
36
during the 1920s and the 1930s (Kitsikis, 1934, p. 190; Anonymous, 1941). Argyrios
37
38
39
Koumousis, the youngest member of the team, was a former pupil of the "Technische
40
41
Hochschule" in Munich, from which he graduated as a civil engineer in 1915 (Kitsikis, 1934,
42
43
44
p. 161).
45
46
47
48
49
The study by Genidounias and his two fellows proved to be instrumental in the adoption of
50
51
the Marathon dam as the best solution for the supply of Athens and Piraeus with water. Apart
52
53
from a small minority, whose members persisted in defending the option based on the
54
55
56
transportation into Athens and its environs of spring waters from Peloponnesus (supra), Greek
57
58
engineers were now massively voting for the "dam solution" in Marathon (X, 1923; Ta
59
60
9
61
62
63
64
65
Chronika, 1923; 1925). The same year in which Genidounias and his team at WWD published
1
2
their study, in an article that appeared in "Archimidis", Alexandros Sinos, a professor of
3
4
5
hydraulics at the Polytechnic School of Athens, informed the community of Greek engineers
6
7
about the advantages of the water storage systems (Sinos, 1923), a subject that continued to be
8
9
10
a matter of interest for Greek engineers in the 1930s (Floris, 1933; 1936). At the same time,
11
12
politicians (Mpotsaris 1925, p. 575), physicians (Kalantzopoulos, 1964, p. 59) and the press
13
14
(Ta Chronika, 1923) were frequently referring to the many examples of cities in the US as
15
16
17
well as in Europe that had already successfully adopted water storage techniques, and were
18
19
trying to convince the inhabitants of Athens and Piraeus that water from artificial lakes could
20
21
22
be as tasty and healthy as spring water.
23
24
25
26
27
28
The construction of the dam
29
30
31
32
In the early 1920s, the "dam solution" in Marathon was very popular among Greek engineers
33
34
and politicians. The massive arrival (at) and the subsequent settlement of successive tides of
35
36
37
Greeks from Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace in the region of Athens functioned as a catalyst,
38
39
compelling the Greek governments of the time to take action and materialize the plan. Given
40
41
the technical experience American companies had gained in this domain since the end of the
42
43
44
19th century, and the growing presence of American capitalism in inter-war Europe (Bonin and
45
46
de Goey, 2009; Bairoch, 1997), it is not by chance that the two firms that made a tender both
47
48
49
had American nationality (Cassimatis, 1988). As we have already said in the Introduction, the
50
51
race was eventually won by Ulen & Company, which, in the opinion of the Greek Embassy in
52
53
54
Washington and part of the press at least, surpassed its competitor MacArthur Brothers Co in
55
56
international reputation and financial stamina (Efimeris ton syzitiseon tis D' en Athinais
57
58
59
Syntaktikis ton Ellinon Synelefseos, 1925, p. 553 ; Empros, 1928).
60
10
61
62
63
64
65
Under the terms of the contract, Ulen and the Bank of Athens granted the Greek State a loan
1
2
of ten million dollars over twenty years and half, to be used for the construction of a modern
3
4
5
water network, capable of meeting the increasing needs of the cities of Athens and Piraeus. In
6
7
order to service such a loan and to cover the running costs of the projected network, the Greek
8
9
10
state imposed upon the owners of all city buildings that would be supplied by the new water
11
12
system a specific tax during the building process, and after the completion of the network, a
13
14
compulsory subscription. According to the agreement, the State would also hand out
15
16
17
concession of the network over twenty-two years after its completion to a company to be set
18
19
up. In addition to loaning the Greek State, Ulen was designated as the contractor of the
20
21
22
project, and was entrusted with the tasks of the design and building of the water supply
23
24
system to come; for these services, the American firm would receive the total payment of
25
26
27
1,200,000 dollars (Efimeris Kyverniseos, 1925).
28
29
30
Judging from the track-record of the firm, the choice of Ulen as contractor seems sound.
31
32
Founded in 1897, the company soon became member of the small group of first-rate
33
34
35
American corporations specialized in large Public Works programs. Indeed, before being
36
37
interested in the Greek market, the company had already carried out more than a hundred
38
39
40
water supply and sewage programs in the US and South America. Among them was the
41
42
building of the longest underground aqueduct of the time, and probably the flagship of the
43
44
45
firm's achievements: designed as part of the water supply system for New York City, the
46
47
"Shandaken Tunnel" was 29 kilometers long, and its quick completion in 1923 was
48
49
immediately hailed as a technical breakthrough. Besides designing and building urban
50
51
52
hydraulics works, Ulen was also involved in the sectors of railways, harbor works, and
53
54
hydroelectric power plants. It even worked on behalf of Ford Corporation, and built plants for
55
56
57
the giant of the automotive industry (Ethnos, 1925).
58
59
60
11
61
62
63
64
65
For its first contract in Greece, Ulen mobilized the large stock of experience it had
1
2
accumulated so far. Being part of the class of concrete gravity dams, the Marathon
3
4
5
construction was 285 m long, 54 m high, and varied in thickness from 4.5 m at the top to 48
6
7
m at the bottom, while it had a circular shape with a 400 m radius (Gausmann, 1934) (Figure
8
9
10
2). Less impressive, to be sure, than the then largest water storage systems in the US, the
11
12
Greek product of the American company was nevertheless a sizeable dam, and one of the
13
14
biggest European constructions of the time. It could match, for example, the highest French
15
16
17
dam in the 1920s, the "Furens Dam": built in 1862-1866, this legendary masonry construction
18
19
near Saint-Etienne had a maximum height of 56 m. In one respect at least, the Marathon Dam
20
21
22
was, and probably still is, even unique around the world, since it was entirely paneled
23
24
externally on both sides with Pentelic marble, the building material that the Parthenon was
25
26
27
made of (Figure 3). This feature of the construction --- to be sure, a hint of the region's
28
29
glorious past (Kaika, 2006) --- didn't pass unnoticed. Not later than November 1929, the
30
31
32
"Popular Science Monthly" hailed "The World's only Marble Dam" (Anonymous, 1929a),
33
34
and did so the "New Reclamation Era" (Anonymous, 1929b), and more recently the "New
35
36
Scientist and Science Journal" (White, 1971, p. 481).
37
38
39
40
[INSERT FIGURES 2 & 3]
41
42
43
The building site opened its doors in October 1926 (Figures 4 and 5), and three years later, in
44
45
October 1929, the dam had been totally erected with success. It cost 2,120,000 dollars,
46
47
48
contained over 156,000 m³ of concrete, and its completion mobilized 900 people a day on the
49
50
average (Gausmann, 1934). Organizing efficiently the work of many workers gathered in a
51
52
53
limited place was one of the thorniest problems for engineers after the rise of the big
54
55
corporation at the turn of the 20th century (Porter, 2006).
56
57
58
59
[INSERT FIGURES 4 & 5]
60
12
61
62
63
64
65
In the 1920s, the rationalization of work, that is the effort at increasing the output of labor and
1
2
machinery thanks to a series of strategies -- such as separating the conception from the
3
4
5
execution of work, breaking down the work into simple operations, "objectifying" and
6
7
measuring tasks carried out by machines and laborers, stimulating worker's productivity with
8
9
10
financial incentives was already a fully-fledged area of engineering practice and research,
11
12
symbolized by a series of neologisms, such as "Taylorism", "Fordism", or "Scientific
13
14
Management" (Rabinback, 1992, Chatzis, 2008). Being already familiar with the rationalization
15
16
17
of work movement, probably while involved in the construction of factories for the Ford
18
19
Motor company, Ulen's staff didn't hesitate to mobilize "Scientific management" techniques
20
21
22
on the dam building site in Greece (Figure 6). Indeed, the various operations were sorted out
23
24
on the basis of their difficulty of execution, while the working people employed at the site,
25
26
27
engineers and foremen included, were assigned specific tasks according to their qualifications
28
29
- and their gender (Figure 7) --, and they were paid accordingly. Specialized Ulen staff
30
31
32
proceeded to the evaluation of the time needed for the different construction tasks and
33
34
operations, and used such times to stimulate the work effort provided by the operators through
35
36
a system of financial incentives and bonuses (Loprestis, 1928; Tsalikis, 1927, p. 196). Though
37
38
39
"Scientific Management" was not a terra incognita for the Greek engineers, who first heard
40
41
about Taylor and "Taylorism" as early as 1916 in the columns of the journal "Viomichaniki
42
43
44
kai VIotechniki Epetheorisis", very few applications of such techniques eventually took place
45
46
in inter-war Greece (Antoniou et al., 2007, p. 245-250). The Marathon Dam was one of these
47
48
49
scarce applications. It even turned out, in the opinion of the witnesses of the time at least, to
50
51
be a successful one. Indeed, it seems that the Greek workers at the building site were not
52
53
opposed to being subjected to such techniques (Tsalikis, 1927, p. 196).
54
55
56
57
[INSERT FIGURES 6 & 7]
58
59
60
13
61
62
63
64
65
To deal with the construction of the Marathon dam, Ulen dispatched a part of its engineering
1
2
staff to Greece. As the General Manager of the project in Athens, R Gausmann, put it, given
3
4
5
the lack of experience of Greek engineers in the management of large public works programs,
6
7
"it could not be expected that foreign capital, or in fact Greek capital either, would be willing
8
9
10
to risk money on important projects, entirely under Greek direction" (Gausmann, 1940, p. 40).
11
12
But even so, to a significant extent the construction of the dam was a Greek adventure as well.
13
14
Several Greek engineers were, indeed, involved in the design and building of the structure.
15
16
17
They proved to be helpful, even indispensable, to their American counterparts, especially
18
19
thanks to their mathematical and scientific skills. To his amazement, for Gausmann the Greek
20
21
22
engineer proved to be able to "produce formulae with the same facility that the magician
23
24
produces rabbits from a borrowed hat", and, in doing so, "he dazzles the poor American with
25
26
27
his mathematics and his reasoning, which are both faultless" (Gausmann, 1940, p. 99). In this
28
29
respect, he contrasts with the American engineer. To quote Gausmann once more, the latter
30
31
32
demonstrates in his practice a series of qualities that make him an efficient practical man,
33
34
since " he has (...) been brought up to realize that there are usually more than one acceptable
35
36
ways of obtaining the desired results, and that the main thing is not to spend too much
37
38
39
valuable time, trying to determine beforehand which is absolutely the best way of doing a job,
40
41
but to select a method, which is known by past experience to be adequate and which will
42
43
44
produce good results, and then to go ahead and push it through as quickly and as cheaply as
45
46
possible" (Gausmann, 1940, p. 99). But, at the same time, Gausmann noted wistfully, "the
47
48
49
American engineer is never quite certain about formulae, nor how much they should be
50
51
trusted. If he can find some way to measure and weigh and experiment, even on a small scale,
52
53
he feels more certain of his results" (Gausmann, 1940, p. 99). These national specificities
54
55
56
concerning mathematics and theoretical sciences and their use for engineering purposes
57
58
stemmed, in part at least, from the differences between the education Greek and American
59
60
14
61
62
63
64
65
engineers used to receive at that time. Indeed, despite the fact that by the end of 19th century
1
2
the leaders of the American engineering community accepted formal educational training as
3
4
5
the best means for entering the field, it was only after the arrival of a number of European-
6
7
born or European educated engineers in the US in the wake of World War I that the
8
9
10
engineering schools in the USA started emphasizing higher mathematics and abstract scientific
11
12
knowledge in their curricula (Seely, 2004, p. 53 & 65). Greek engineers, in contrast, had had a
13
14
strong theoretical background since the foundation of the Greek State. When Modern Greece
15
16
17
lacked sufficient engineering educational infrastructures, they used to study abroad, enrolling
18
19
in schools that were often leaders in building bridges between scientific knowledge and
20
21
22
engineering: indeed, some of the best French engineering institutions during the 19th century,
23
24
and their German and Italian counterparts in the first decades of the 20th century were
25
26
27
frequently visited by young Greeks wishing to become an engineer. Little by little, this
28
29
theoretical tradition in engineering education also took root in Greece; as a result, engineers
30
31
32
graduated from the Polytechnic School of Athens after the 1890s were also offered a
33
34
curriculum placing strong emphasis upon scientific and mathematical fundamentals
35
36
(Antoniou, 2006; Antoniou et al., 2007, p. 254-250).
37
38
39
40
Some of the Greek engineers who impressed Gausmann with their mathematical skills and
41
42
"faultless" reasoning were hired by the American firm, and even worked in positions of
43
44
45
responsibility. Thus Aristopahnis Tsalikis was employed by Ulen from 1925-29 as one of the
46
47
right-hand men of the American chief engineer Keayes. Tsalikis graduated from the Civil
48
49
Engineering Department of the "Technische Hoschschule" in Munich in 1903, and started his
50
51
52
professional career working for the large corporation "Siemens-Halske" in the building of the
53
54
subway in Hamburg. His second employer was another German company, "Lenz", in Berlin.
55
56
57
There, Tsalikis was involved in several railways and hydraulic works as chief engineer. In
58
59
60
15
61
62
63
64
65
1917, the year he moved back to Greece, he was assigned a position of responsibility at
1
2
WWD within the Ministry of Transportation. After working for Ulen, he was appointed
3
4
5
General Director of the Technical Works Department within the Ministry for Agriculture
6
7
(Kitsikis, 1934, p. 358).
8
9
10
11
But the most important Greek actor participating in the Marathon venture was of a
12
13
"collective" nature: the group of Greek engineers within the Ministry of Transportation who
14
15
were responsible for controlling and overseeing the design and building process on behalf of
16
17
18
the Greek State. Let us close this section by mentioning a specific contribution of a member
19
20
of this group to the success of the operation. We have already referred to Loprestis, one of the
21
22
23
proponents of the Marathon Dam solution as the best means to supply Athens and its
24
25
surroundings with water (supra). During the construction of the dam, Loprestis suggested the
26
27
use of volcanic ash, known as "Santorin earth"-- from the name of a Greek volcanic island--
28
29
30
for enhancing the strength and the hydraulic properties (the imperviousness) of the concrete,
31
32
i.e., the material the dam was made of. Loprestis's idea appealed to the Ulen staff, who asked
33
34
35
the person responsible for the "Laboratory of Strength of Materials" at the Polytechnic School
36
37
of Athens to undertake a series of experiments, after the completion of which the idea first put
38
39
40
forward by the Greek engineer was endorsed by the Americans, and turned into reality
41
42
(Tsalikis, 1927).
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
Conclusion
50
51
52
The Marathon Dam was dedicated in October 1929, and it is still operational. Built by an
53
54
55
American contractor on behalf of the Greek State, this technological artifact was by no means
56
57
the mechanical application of know-how elaborated in the USA and simply transferred
58
59
60
16
61
62
63
64
65
without the slightest alteration to Greece. As we have seen, the Marathon dam bears the stamp
1
2
of the Greek engineering community as well. First of all, it was the late outcome of a
3
4
5
particularly lengthy public debate in Greece, which started in the 1890s and in which many
6
7
Greek engineers took part. The decisive study that suggested that the storage system was the
8
9
10
best solution for supplying Athens with water was also probably produced by a team of Greek
11
12
state engineers working at the Water Works Department within the Ministry of Transportation.
13
14
But even after the Greek State turned to a foreign company for the final design and the
15
16
17
building of the dam, the Greek engineering community continued to be fully involved in the
18
19
venture. Greek engineers proved, indeed, to be a worthy partner for the Ulen engineering staff
20
21
22
in several respects, exhibiting specific skills and demonstrating qualities in which their
23
24
American counterparts seemed to be lacking.
25
26
27
28
The Marathon Dam can thus be read as an example of cooperation, to be sure an
29
30
unsymmetrical one but a real cooperation all the same, between a technologically advanced
31
32
nation and one located on what is conventionally regarded as the edge of the developed world
33
34
35
of the time. In this respect, the case of the Marathon Dam questions a series of views and
36
37
practices that have dominated the writing of the history of technology until recently. Indeed,
38
39
40
many historians serving the field have focused on a handful of nations, deemed the sole
41
42
interesting actors participating in the race for technological innovation. In turn, this almost
43
44
45
exclusive focus on a very small number of nations, considered uncritically to be the only ones
46
47
that deserve the attention of scholars, to the detriment of the supposedly "uninteresting"
48
49
multitude, has led to a conception of technological transfer as a bipolar and mono-faceted
50
51
52
process that comprises an active "transmitter" and a passive "receptor", and involves no
53
54
significant transformation. Does the case studied here stand as unique? In the light of a series
55
56
57
of recent works by historians of science and technology, the answer seems to be a rather firm
58
59
60
17
61
62
63
64
65
"no" (Saraiva, 2009; Raj, 2007; Krige, 2006). We would like thus to encourage researchers to
1
2
carry out investigations into other technological systems, the design and building of which
3
4
5
involved nations and geographical areas that researchers traditionally ignored. We are
6
7
convinced that new insights and substantial reappraisals will emerge after scholars introduce
8
9
10
in the picture of the technological development and its heritage the contributions of the many
11
12
components of an increasingly, thanks to the action of technology among other forces,
13
14
interconnected world.
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
REFERENCES
22
23
24
Anonymous (1929a) The World's only Marble Dam, a unique engineering feat near the battlefield of
25
26
27
Marathon. Popular Science Monthly 115(5): 58.
28
29
Anonymous (1929b) Marathon Dam, Greece, Mosaic Marble-Faced. New Reclamation Era
30
31
20(11):170
32
33
Anonymous (1941) Nekrologia, Petros Loprestis. Technika Chronika 233-234: 224-225.
34
35
36
Antoniou Y (2006) Oi Ellines michanikoi. Thesmoi kai idees 1900-1940. Vivliorama, Athens.
37
38
Antoniou Y, Assimakopoulos M and Chatzis K (2007) The National Identity of inter-war Greek
39
40
Engineers: Elitism, Rationalization, Technocracy, and Reactionary Modernism. History and
41
42
Technology 23(3): 241-261.
43
44
Archibald WM (1921) Extract from a letter. The Technology Review 23: 465
45
46
47
Assimacopoulou F and Chatzis K (2003) Education et politique au XIXe siècle: les élèves grecs dans
48
49
les grandes écoles d'ingénieurs en France. Multicultural Science in the Ottoman Empire
50
51
(Ihsanoglu E, Chatzis K and Nicolaïdis E (eds.)). Brepols, Turnhout, pp. 121-137.
52
53
Assimacopoulou F, Chatzis K and Mavrogonatou G (2009) Implanter les 'Ponts et Chaussées'
54
55
56
européens en Grèce: le rôle des ingénieurs du corps du Génie, 1830-1880. Quaderns
57
58
'Història de l'Enginyeria 10: 331-350.
59
60
18
61
62
63
64
65
Bairoch P (1997) Victoires et déboires. Histoire économique et sociale du monde du XVIe siècle à nos
1
2
jours (Vol II). Gallimard, Paris.
3
4
Bechmann G (1900) Ydrefsis kai eksigiansis ton poleon Athinon kai Peiraios, Ypourgeion Esoterikon,
5
6
Athens.
7
8
9
Billington D, Jackson D and Melosi M (2005) The History of Large Federal Dams: Planning, Design,
10
11
and Construction. U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Reclamation, Denver.
12
13
Bocquet D, Chatzis K and Sander A (2008) From free good to commodity : universalizing the
14
15
provision of water in Paris, 1830-1940. Geoforum 39: 1821-1832.
16
17
18
Bonin H and de Goey F (eds.) (2009) American firms in Europe, 1880-1980. Strategy, perception and
19
20
performances. Droz, Geneva.
21
22
Bordes J-L (2010) Les barrages en France du XVIIIe à la fin du XXe siècle. Histoire, évolution
23
24
technique et transmission du savoir. « Pour Mémoire » 9: 70-120.
25
26
27
Cassimatis LP (1988) American Influence in Greece, 1917-1929. The Kent State University Press,
28
29
Kent.
30
31
Chatzis K (2004) La modernisation technique de la Grèce, de l'indépendance aux années de l'entre-
32
33
deux-guerres : faits et problèmes d'interprétation. Etudes Balkaniques 3: 3-23.
34
35
36
Chatzis K (2007) Le maire, le premier ministre et l'ingénieur : la difficile mise en place du réseau
37
38
d'adduction d'eau à Athènes, 1830-1930. Réseaux techniques et conflits de pouvoir : les
39
40
dynamiques historiques des villes contemporaines (Bocquet D and Fettah S (eds.)). Presses de
41
42
l'Ecole française de Rome, Rome, pp. 71-102.
43
44
Chatzis K (2008) Rationalizing maintenance activities within French industry during the Trente
45
46
47
Glorieuses (1945-75). Journal of History of Science and Technology 2: 75-138.
48
49
Chatzis K (2009) Jules Dupuit, ingénieur des ponts et chaussées. Jules Dupuit, Œuvres économiques
50
51
complètes (Vol. 1) (Breton Y and Klotz G (eds.)). Economica, Paris, pp. 615-692.
52
53
Chatzis K and Mavrogonatou G (forthcoming) Technologia kai dimosia sfaira stin Ellada. To zitima
54
55
56
tis ydrodotisis tis Athinas mesa apo to prisma tis 'dimopoiisis', 1880-1914. Ta Istorika
57
58
(forthcoming).
59
60
19
61
62
63
64
65
Chatzis K and Mavrogonatou G (2010) Eaux de Paris, eaux d'Athènes, 1830-1930: histoires croisées
1
2
d'un réseau urbain. Almagest. International journal for the history of scientific ideas 1(1): 7-20.
3
4
Efimeris Kyverniseos (1925), issue A, no 100, April 24, 1925, pp. 573-596.
5
6
Efimeris ton syzitiseon tis D'en Athinais Syntaktikis ton Ellinon Synelefseos (1925), Vol. IV,
7
8
9
Synedriasis 159", 19-3-1925.
10
11
Eleftheron Vima (1924) 23-12-1924.
12
13
Empros (1928) 4-6-1928.
14
15
Ethnos (1925) 19-2-1925.
16
17
18
Floris A (1933) Oi proodoi tou ypologismou kai tis kataskevis fragmaton. Technika Chronika 29:
19
20
201-214.
21
22
Floris A (1936) To fragma Boulder (Hoover) en Ameriki, to ypsiloteron tou kosmou. Technika
23
24
Chronika 104: 357-360.
25
26
27
Ford, Bacon and Davis Inc (1920) Water supply & sewerage for the cities of Athens and Piraeus,
28
29
New York, Ford, Bacon and Davis Inc.
30
31
Gallant Th (2001) Modern Greece. Arnold, London.
32
33
Gausmann R (1932) Pos elythi to zitima tis ydrefseors ton Athinon kai Peiraios. I anakainisis tou
34
35
36
esoterikou diktyou. Ergasia Nov. 20: 1458-1459
37
38
Gausmann R (1934) Stoixeia ergon ydrefseos Athinon-Peiraios kai Perixoron. Technika Chronika 49:
39
40
26-34.
41
42
Gausmann R (1940) Water for Athens. Athens.
43
44
Genidounias Th (1922) I ydrefsis ton Athinon. To systima tis dia techniton limnon ydrefseos kai
45
46
47
sygkritiki eksetasis autou pros alla systimata. To Mellon 39-40: 65-86.
48
49
Genidounias Th (1923) Ydrefsis Athinon-Peiraios ek technitis limnis idrythisomenis epi cheimarou
50
51
Xaradrou Marathonos. Deltion Ypourgeiou Sygkoinonias, Athens.
52
53
Geniki Statistiki Ypiresia Ellados (1931) Statistiki Epetiris tis Ellados, 1928. Ethniko Typografeio,
54
55
Athens.
56
57
58
Harvey D (2003) Paris, capital of modernity. Routledge, London.
59
60
20
61
62
63
64
65
Istoriko Archeio Dimou Athinaion (1921) Praktika Dimotikou Symvouliou, Sinedriasis 199th.
1
2
Kaika K (2006) Dams as Symbols of Modernization: The Urbanization of Nature Between
3
4
Geographical Imagination and Materiality. Annals of the Association of American
5
6
Geographers 96(2): 276-301.
7
8
9
Kalantzopoulos T (1964) To Istorikon tis ydrefseos ton Athinon. Palamari & Kothrogianni, Athens.
10
11
Kinzer K (1912) Gnomodotisis peri tis liseos tou zitimatos tis ydrefseos ton poleon Athinon kai
12
13
Peiraios, Athens.
14
15
Kitsikis N (ed.) (1934) Techniki Epetiris tis Ellados (Vol. B), Ekdoseis tou Technikou Epimelitiriou
16
17
18
tis Ellados, Athens.
19
20
Kollgaard EB and Chadwick WL (eds.) (1988) Development of Dam Engineering in the United States.
21
22
Pergamon, New York.
23
24
Krige J (2006) American Hegemony and the Postwar Reconstruction of Science in Europe. The MIT
25
26
27
Press, Cambridge (Mass.).
28
29
Leigh S (1999) The Hadrianic Aqueduct in Athens. Unpublished Ph.d dissertation, University of
30
31
Pensynlvania.
32
33
Loprestis P (1928) Kostos ergon siraggos Bogiatiou kai fragmatos Marathonos. Erga 83: 319-321.
34
35
36
Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (1900) Recueil Consulaire concernant les Rapports commerciaux
37
38
des agents Belges à l'étranger (Vol. 107), Brussels.
39
40
Mpotsaris D (1925) Efimeris ton syzitiseon tis D'en Athinais Syntaktikis ton Ellinon Synelefseos, vol.
41
42
D', synedriasis 160", 20-3-1925.
43
44
Personal Folder of Genidounias (n° 1706). Archives of the Techniko Epimelitirio Ellados. Athens.
45
46
47
Porter G (2006) The Rise of Big Business, 1860-1920. Harlan Davidson, Wheeling (Illinois).
48
49
Protopapadakis P (1899) To zitima tis ydrefseos ton Athinon. Archimidis 6-9: 116-143.
50
51
Quellennec E (1899) Galliki apostoli gefypodopoion, Sympliromatiki ekthesis, Prosartima tis apo 24
52
53
Apriliou 1890 peri diochetefseos ton ydaton tis Stymfalias Ektheseos, Ypourgeion Esoterikon,
54
55
Athens.
56
57
58
59
60
21
61
62
63
64
65
Rabinback A (1992) The Human Motor : Energy, Fatigue, and the Origins of Modernity. University of
1
2
California Press, Berkeley.
3
4
Raj K (2007) Relocating modern science. Circulation and the construction of knowledge in South Asia
5
6
and Europe, 1650-1900. Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke.
7
8
9
Saraiva T (2009) Laboratories and Landscapes : the Fascist 'New State' and the Colonization of
10
11
Portugal and Mozembique. Journal of History of Science and Technolgy 3
12
13
(http://johost.eu/?oid=86&act=&area=2&ri=2&itid=3)
14
15
Schnitter N (1994) A history of dams, the useful pyramids. Balkema, Roterdam.
16
17
18
Seely BE (2004) European connections to American engineering education, 1800-1990. La formation
19
20
des ingénieurs en perspective. Modèles de références et réseaux de médiation, XVIIIe-XXe
21
22
siècles (Gouzévitch I, Grelon A and Karvar A (eds.)). PUR, Rennes.
23
24
Sinos A (1923) Geniki episkopisis epi ton fragmaton. Ek tis eisigitikis dialexeos peri ydrefseos ton
25
26
Athinon ek techniton limnon. Archimidis 4: 25-32.
27
28
29
Smith N (1971) A History of Dams. Peter Davies, London.
30
31
Soulis A (1884) Ydravlikin pros chrisin ton michanikon kai ergodigon. Koromilas, Athens.
32
33
Soulis A (1907) Ydrefsis ton Athinon dia fragmaton- Gnomodotisis Symvouliou Dimosion Ergon.
34
35
Archimidis 10: 117-126.
36
37
38
Spear WE (1922) The Public Works of Modern Greece. The American City 26(1): 23-27. -
39
40
Ta Chronika (1923) 13-4-1923, 10-5-1923, 11-5-1923, 12-5-1923, 13-5-1923 and 15-5-1923.
41
42
Ta Chronika (1925) 30-5-1925.
43
44
Tsalikis A (1927) I ek Marathonos ydrefsis ton Athinon kai tou Peiraios. Erga 56: 189-211.
45
46
47
Tsatsos A (1938) Nekrologia, Theologos D. Genidounias. Technika Chronika 163: 904-905.
48
49
Wegmann E (1888) The design and construction of Masonry Dams, giving the method employed in
50
51
determining the profile of the Quaker Bridge Dam. Wiley, New York.
52
53
Wegmann E (1918) The design and construction of dams, including masonry, earth, rock-fill, timber,
54
55
56
and steel structures also the principal types of movable dams (6th ed.). Wiley, New York.
57
58
59
60
22
61
62
63
64
65
White S (1971) Review of 'A guide to the industrial archaeology of Europe, by Kenneth Hudson'.
1
2
New Scientist and Science Journal 51(766): 481.
3
4
X Th (1923) Ergasiai tou Syllogou: Syzitiseis ypo tin Genikin Enosin Ellinon Epistimonon
5
6
Michanikon apartizonton Syllogon peri tis ypo Ypourgeiou Sygkoinonias meletitheisis
7
8
9
ydrefseos ton Athinon kai Peiraios ek technitis limnis en Marathoni, Archimidis 7: 55-61.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
23
61
62
63
64
65
1882
E
11
.
Auropeia
Ag.
YYP48,
napaxhs
14840
Spapping
and
14240
Truepios fequires
сухатие this yy 8333 AMOUNTAQUE
100 Y4223
14,827.
114220 ERR
Better
ФРАГМА.
парохиз
X
the
Rparai
2 3
STATE
Figure
Click here to download high resolution image
Figure
Click here to download high resolution image
PROGRESS ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE
MARATHON PROJECT AS MEASURED BY
EXPENDITURE AND EMPLOYMENT.
1925
1928
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
300,000
4,000
Expenditure in US)
Dollars during Month)
3,000
200,000
Dollars
2,000
Men
14
100,000
Average Number of Men
Employed During Menth.
Max.Manth=3,630
Ave. " *1,500±
1,000
PROGRESS EACH MONTH
0
0
Marathon Dam
WORK
Boyiati Tunnel
WORK
Distribution System
IN
IN
Purification Plant
PROGRESS
PROGRESS
Preliminary Work
Cleaning UP.
3,263,000
12,000,000
Total Employment in 8tr than Days:
3,000,000
$14289,182.18
10,000,000
8,000,000
2,000,000
Dollars
6,000,000
Eight Hour Man Days
4,000,000
Total Expenditure in U.S.Dollars
1,000,000
TOTAL PROGRESS TO DATE
2,000,000
$
1940
0
o
1923
1926
1927
1928
1929
1930
1931
1932
Figure
Click here to download high resolution image