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SECRET He added that it would be best if only U.S. had nuclears, but that unlikely to happen again. Next best, only U.S. and Soviet Union. Fact that France and UK have nuclears makes it cumbersome and awkward and dis- turbing. This was his opinion. But France and UK have some nuclear capa- bility. This is a problem. This also an obstacle to an MRBM force. The FRG is prepared to cooperate in the MRBM project. It regrets that France and UK are so negative - for obvious reasons. In Europe there is some speculation that after UK has entered the Common Market there will be a better chance to deal with the nuclear problem. This prospect is vague, but he wouldn't exclude it. Secretary McNamara said that the MRBM is under development and not being delayed by these discussions. However, if NATO wants to proceed it should recognize the costs of the force and its relation to the costs of other needed forces. Minister Schroeder said that this is a long term problem and the point is a political and psychological one rather than a military. That's why the FRG favors the force. 6 SECRET

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    "ocrText": "SECRET\nHe added that it would be best if only U.S. had nuclears, but that\nunlikely to happen again. Next best, only U.S. and Soviet Union. Fact\nthat France and UK have nuclears makes it cumbersome and awkward and dis-\nturbing. This was his opinion. But France and UK have some nuclear capa-\nbility. This is a problem. This also an obstacle to an MRBM force. The\nFRG is prepared to cooperate in the MRBM project. It regrets that France\nand UK are so negative - for obvious reasons.\nIn Europe there is some speculation that after UK has entered the\nCommon Market there will be a better chance to deal with the nuclear problem.\nThis prospect is vague, but he wouldn't exclude it.\nSecretary McNamara said that the MRBM is under development and not being\ndelayed by these discussions. However, if NATO wants to proceed it should\nrecognize the costs of the force and its relation to the costs of other needed\nforces.\nMinister Schroeder said that this is a long term problem and the point is\na political and psychological one rather than a military. That's why the FRG\nfavors the force.\n6\nSECRET"
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