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Soviet demands.
Two methods commonly suggested completely miss the
nature of the problem.
The first of these is for the United States to threaten
to use its nuclear weapons if the Soviet Union should give
control of access to Berlin to the East Germans and if
they should attempt to exercise it. But, if Khrushchev's
belief in U.S. willingness to use nuclear weapons over
this issue is not sufficient to deter him from going
forward with the plan, the threat to use them would not
deter him either. He would not believe that we would carry
it out.
The second suggestion is that, if and when the East
Germans take over the control points and attempt to exercise
control, a small allied military force, e.g., a few vehicles,
should brush aside the control officers and proceed towards
Berlin. If this force is not stopped by the East Germans,
so the argument runs, the latter would have been deterred
from exercising control of Berlin traffic. If the force
is stopped and turned back, and if protests, military
preparations, economic pressures, and diplomatic moves are
not effective, the next resort would be use of force on the
order of a battalion or somewhat larger. If this force were
turned back, eventual resort would presumably be to nuclear
war.
There are several conclusive objections to this suggestion.
The principal one is that it is not addressed to the
main point -- Russian disbelief in U.S. willingness to use
nuclear weapons. If this disbelief continues, the East Ger-
mans would wave the small force, and then the battalions on
to Berlin and continue to control traffic on unacceptable
terms, or they would stop both the force and the traffic.
They would not have been deterred. If the U.S. then resorted
to nuclear war, it would be doing so not to deter inter-
ference with access to Berlin, but because deterrence had
failed. The United States would have failed to convince
Khrushchev that it would do what, in the end, it did do --
and failed largely because it would have made no effort to
convince him by its conduct prior to final action.
Thus we would have suffered the worst of both worlds.
We would have started nuclear war without having had the
benefit
SECRET
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"ocrText": "SECRET\n- 3 -\nSoviet demands.\nTwo methods commonly suggested completely miss the\nnature of the problem.\nThe first of these is for the United States to threaten\nto use its nuclear weapons if the Soviet Union should give\ncontrol of access to Berlin to the East Germans and if\nthey should attempt to exercise it. But, if Khrushchev's\nbelief in U.S. willingness to use nuclear weapons over\nthis issue is not sufficient to deter him from going\nforward with the plan, the threat to use them would not\ndeter him either. He would not believe that we would carry\nit out.\nThe second suggestion is that, if and when the East\nGermans take over the control points and attempt to exercise\ncontrol, a small allied military force, e.g., a few vehicles,\nshould brush aside the control officers and proceed towards\nBerlin. If this force is not stopped by the East Germans,\nso the argument runs, the latter would have been deterred\nfrom exercising control of Berlin traffic. If the force\nis stopped and turned back, and if protests, military\npreparations, economic pressures, and diplomatic moves are\nnot effective, the next resort would be use of force on the\norder of a battalion or somewhat larger. If this force were\nturned back, eventual resort would presumably be to nuclear\nwar.\nThere are several conclusive objections to this suggestion.\nThe principal one is that it is not addressed to the\nmain point -- Russian disbelief in U.S. willingness to use\nnuclear weapons. If this disbelief continues, the East Ger-\nmans would wave the small force, and then the battalions on\nto Berlin and continue to control traffic on unacceptable\nterms, or they would stop both the force and the traffic.\nThey would not have been deterred. If the U.S. then resorted\nto nuclear war, it would be doing so not to deter inter-\nference with access to Berlin, but because deterrence had\nfailed. The United States would have failed to convince\nKhrushchev that it would do what, in the end, it did do --\nand failed largely because it would have made no effort to\nconvince him by its conduct prior to final action.\nThus we would have suffered the worst of both worlds.\nWe would have started nuclear war without having had the\nbenefit\nSECRET"
}