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SECRET
- 24 -
whether present procedures constitute merely identification of
Western military traffic or "control" of that traffic will have
been resolved in our favor.
The argument against this course of action is that it
may be politically infeasible.
The British have only agreed to present contingency
planning under great duress; in an emergency, they would
almost certainly propose that the East Germans be allowed to
perform the functions which the Soviets now discharge, There
would probably be considerable European press and popular
support for the British position; there would be a disinclination
for seeming to make paper stamping a casus belli, no matter how
much we explained the underlying issue.
The alliance would thus be divided over an essentially
procedural question, at the very time when maximum allied unity
was needed as a basis for possible armed action in defense of
Berlin. The situation would be the more difficult since there
might be some questioning in the US press, public and Congress
as to whether we had really chosen the most suitable issue
on which to fight. There would also be grave difficulty in
making our position plausible to the uncommitted countries.
All this would be apparent to the Soviets, and they would
be encouraged to press ahead to exploit the Western disarray.
In the face of Bloc pressures and allied disunity, it seems
likely that the allies would eventually accept the same paper-
stamping from the East Germans that they now accept from the
Soviets. To avoid such a last minute change in our position
under fire, it would be better to straighten out this issue
beforehand.
This report suggests, therefore, that the Western powers
should announce, before a peace treaty is concluded, that
they would allow East German personnel to perform the
same functions as the Soviets no more. This would mean
holding the same line against a variety of ostensibly minor
changes in these functions which we have held for many years.
How does thus ge
The
SECRET
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"ocrText": "SECRET\n- 24 -\nwhether present procedures constitute merely identification of\nWestern military traffic or \"control\" of that traffic will have\nbeen resolved in our favor.\nThe argument against this course of action is that it\nmay be politically infeasible.\nThe British have only agreed to present contingency\nplanning under great duress; in an emergency, they would\nalmost certainly propose that the East Germans be allowed to\nperform the functions which the Soviets now discharge, There\nwould probably be considerable European press and popular\nsupport for the British position; there would be a disinclination\nfor seeming to make paper stamping a casus belli, no matter how\nmuch we explained the underlying issue.\nThe alliance would thus be divided over an essentially\nprocedural question, at the very time when maximum allied unity\nwas needed as a basis for possible armed action in defense of\nBerlin. The situation would be the more difficult since there\nmight be some questioning in the US press, public and Congress\nas to whether we had really chosen the most suitable issue\non which to fight. There would also be grave difficulty in\nmaking our position plausible to the uncommitted countries.\nAll this would be apparent to the Soviets, and they would\nbe encouraged to press ahead to exploit the Western disarray.\nIn the face of Bloc pressures and allied disunity, it seems\nlikely that the allies would eventually accept the same paper-\nstamping from the East Germans that they now accept from the\nSoviets. To avoid such a last minute change in our position\nunder fire, it would be better to straighten out this issue\nbeforehand.\nThis report suggests, therefore, that the Western powers\nshould announce, before a peace treaty is concluded, that\nthey would allow East German personnel to perform the\nsame functions as the Soviets no more. This would mean\nholding the same line against a variety of ostensibly minor\nchanges in these functions which we have held for many years.\nHow does thus ge\nThe\nSECRET"
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