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    "localId": "6037283",
    "label": "Memorandum for the President - Preliminary Draft - The Berlin Crisis",
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{
    "id": "6037283",
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    "contentType": "document",
    "title": "Memorandum for the President - Preliminary Draft - The Berlin Crisis",
    "citationUrl": "https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6037283",
    "collections": [
        "Robert S. McNamara Papers",
        "Records Relating to the Defense Program and Operations"
    ],
    "subjects": [
        "Berlin Wall, Berlin, Germany, 1961-1989"
    ],
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    "productionDates": [
        {
            "day": 28,
            "logicalDate": "1961-06-28",
            "month": 6,
            "year": 1961
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    "ocrText": "SECRET\n-29-\n(b) The force, together with the other ground forces\navailable for the battle, should be able to defend itself with\nnon-nuclear weapons until it was plain that the political purpose\nwould not be achieved and that nuclear weapons must be used.\nAn opinion of the JCS leads to the belief that such a force\n?\nis well within US and aliled capability.\nThe way in which such a ground operation might best serve\nits political purpose requires much further elaboration by the\nDefense Department.\nThe initial force to be deployed across the zonal boundary\nmight, for example, be one division 00 with one in reserve.\nbase 1922\nsadan\nThis was the course discussed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff\nin their April 28 memorándum to the Secretary of Defense, which\nindicated that \"the use of substantial non-nuclear ground forces,\nin the magnitude of two divisions, could facilitate negotiations\nto restore ground access to Berlin and compel the Soviets to face\nthe imminent possibility of a broadening of the conflict as\nwell as the possibility of general war, should they persist in\nobstructing access to Berlin.\" The annex to the JCS April\n28 memorandum said: \"A division could fight well for several days,\n01.1130\nlong enough to accept reinforcement by another US or Allied\ndivision\nIf an enemy force of not more than 3=4 divisions\n1956\nopposes the allied force. it is quite likely that we could\nsupport a two division force indefinitely in East Germany. \"\n&\nThe Soviets might conclude, at this point, that the\ndanger of escalation was getting out of hand and move toward\na negotiated settlement. Indeed, they might be impelled to\nthis conclusion by preparations for use of this two division\nforce, which could not fail to be evident to them well in\nadvance.\nIf, on the contrary, the Soviets threw in more force, the\nallied operation would need to be reinforced. The seven\ndivision force mentioned by the JCS might then come into play\nThis force could continue the non-nuclear combat in the\nface of Soviet/GDR reinforcements and thus provide more\ntime\nSECRET"
}