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involve the sovereignty of an Ally. The measures are
1
designed to be a clear demonstration of US determination
2
and leadership which could be expected not only to influence
3
the Soviet decision making process, but also to restore the
4
confidence of our Allies in the United States and to obtain
5
their full cooperation and support.
6
C. Although a measure of Allied agreement could probably
7
be obtained for the early execution of some of the measures
8
envisaged in Annex C to Appendix A (e.g., increase state
9
of readiness of US forces worldwide, but particularly in
10
Europe), it is doubtful in the extreme that US Allies, in
11
the absence of a clear-cut Soviet-inspired Berlin incident,
12
would agree to a rapid and systematic build-up for limited
13
nonnuclear war in Central Europe together with the risk of
14
general war.
15
d. The execution of the measures envisaged in Annex C to
16
Appendix A, is designed to produce a strong deterrent effect 17
on the Soviets. There is a possibility, however, that the
18
Soviets might react by taking military counteractions to
19
pre-empt US and/or Allied efforts to protect West Berlin.
20
For this reason the United States must be prepared for
21
general war.
22
TOP SECRET..
Appendix A
JCSM-431-61
3
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"ocrText": "TOP SECRET\ninvolve the sovereignty of an Ally. The measures are\n1\ndesigned to be a clear demonstration of US determination\n2\nand leadership which could be expected not only to influence\n3\nthe Soviet decision making process, but also to restore the\n4\nconfidence of our Allies in the United States and to obtain\n5\ntheir full cooperation and support.\n6\nC. Although a measure of Allied agreement could probably\n7\nbe obtained for the early execution of some of the measures\n8\nenvisaged in Annex C to Appendix A (e.g., increase state\n9\nof readiness of US forces worldwide, but particularly in\n10\nEurope), it is doubtful in the extreme that US Allies, in\n11\nthe absence of a clear-cut Soviet-inspired Berlin incident,\n12\nwould agree to a rapid and systematic build-up for limited\n13\nnonnuclear war in Central Europe together with the risk of\n14\ngeneral war.\n15\nd. The execution of the measures envisaged in Annex C to\n16\nAppendix A, is designed to produce a strong deterrent effect 17\non the Soviets. There is a possibility, however, that the\n18\nSoviets might react by taking military counteractions to\n19\npre-empt US and/or Allied efforts to protect West Berlin.\n20\nFor this reason the United States must be prepared for\n21\ngeneral war.\n22\nTOP SECRET..\nAppendix A\nJCSM-431-61\n3"
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