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the SECRER TOP SECRET ANNEX TO APPENDIX C DISCUSSION 1. Summary of Requirements. A summary of the forces required is included in Appendix B. Since Berlin is located in the central area and since the primary involvement of US forces will take place in the central area, a detailed study of requirements and adequacy of capabilities will be limited to this area. However, it must be most strongly emphasized that since the actions outlined in these studies could lead to general war it is most important that the north area and south area be reinforced. If this is not accomplished the central area can be outflanked and the entire NATO position in central Europe be placed in jeopardy. Summary of the requirements for Central Europe are: a. To restore access if opposed only by the GDR. Seven Allied divisions and four tactical air wings would be required. b. To permit progressive application of nonnuclear forces as successively higher levels of GDR and Soviet resistance were encountered. Forces on the order of magnitude of 50 Allied divisions and a corresponding magnitude of air strength would be required. C. Navy. Since it is assumed that the actions contained in this study are taken prior to commencement of hostilities, it follows as a corollary that Army and Air Force units sealifted to Europe would be moved administratively under peacetime conditions. Under actual conditions, this as- sumption might not prove to be valid in view of Soviet capability to initiate submarine warfare at any time of their choice. Preparations must be made to insure the TOP SECRET Annex to JCSM-431-61 Appendix C 31

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    "ocrText": "the SECRER\nTOP SECRET\nANNEX TO APPENDIX C\nDISCUSSION\n1. Summary of Requirements. A summary of the forces\nrequired is included in Appendix B. Since Berlin is located\nin the central area and since the primary involvement of US\nforces will take place in the central area, a detailed study\nof requirements and adequacy of capabilities will be limited\nto this area. However, it must be most strongly emphasized\nthat since the actions outlined in these studies could lead to\ngeneral war it is most important that the north area and south\narea be reinforced. If this is not accomplished the central\narea can be outflanked and the entire NATO position in central\nEurope be placed in jeopardy. Summary of the requirements for\nCentral Europe are:\na. To restore access if opposed only by the GDR. Seven\nAllied divisions and four tactical air wings would be\nrequired.\nb. To permit progressive application of nonnuclear forces\nas successively higher levels of GDR and Soviet resistance\nwere encountered. Forces on the order of magnitude of 50\nAllied divisions and a corresponding magnitude of air\nstrength would be required.\nC. Navy. Since it is assumed that the actions contained\nin this study are taken prior to commencement of hostilities,\nit follows as a corollary that Army and Air Force units\nsealifted to Europe would be moved administratively under\npeacetime conditions. Under actual conditions, this as-\nsumption might not prove to be valid in view of Soviet\ncapability to initiate submarine warfare at any time of\ntheir choice. Preparations must be made to insure the\nTOP SECRET\nAnnex to\nJCSM-431-61\nAppendix C\n31"
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