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6. Because of the need for air bases, staging areas, and
1
assembly areas, it is impractical for the United States to con-
2
sider unilateral action in the Berlin area. As a minimum, full
3
cooperation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) is required
4
and to a lesser degree that of France and Great Britain is also
5
required. In addition, the United States cannot put sufficient
6
forces in Europe in a four month period to restore access
7
against successively higher levels of GDR and Soviet resistance.
8
7. Considering the reinforcement rate of both sides and the
9
need for industrial mobilization in order that the United States
10
can support its Allies as well as its own forces, it would not
11
be feasible for European Allies or the United States to engage
12
in nonnuclear war with the Soviet Bloc forces which could be
13
brought into the area by 31 October 1961. In some cases mobili- 14
zation of the Allied countries requires 15 months and only after 15
full mobilization of Allies and the United States is attained
16
(one year plus) do the Allied forces appear to exist in compara-
17
ble numbers with Soviet forces.
18
TOP SECRET
JcSM-431-61
Appendix C
30
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"ocrText": "TOP SECRET\n6. Because of the need for air bases, staging areas, and\n1\nassembly areas, it is impractical for the United States to con-\n2\nsider unilateral action in the Berlin area. As a minimum, full\n3\ncooperation of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) is required\n4\nand to a lesser degree that of France and Great Britain is also\n5\nrequired. In addition, the United States cannot put sufficient\n6\nforces in Europe in a four month period to restore access\n7\nagainst successively higher levels of GDR and Soviet resistance.\n8\n7. Considering the reinforcement rate of both sides and the\n9\nneed for industrial mobilization in order that the United States\n10\ncan support its Allies as well as its own forces, it would not\n11\nbe feasible for European Allies or the United States to engage\n12\nin nonnuclear war with the Soviet Bloc forces which could be\n13\nbrought into the area by 31 October 1961. In some cases mobili- 14\nzation of the Allied countries requires 15 months and only after 15\nfull mobilization of Allies and the United States is attained\n16\n(one year plus) do the Allied forces appear to exist in compara-\n17\nble numbers with Soviet forces.\n18\nTOP SECRET\nJcSM-431-61\nAppendix C\n30"
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