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D'D SEGRONT TOP SECRET (1) Two airlifted battle groups: 4.5 days with zero 1 alert and on a "crash" basis. . 2 (2) Sealifted Division ( ) 3 Troops Cargo Movement to Port and) 4 Loading Time 6 days 6 days 5 Steaming Time 9 days 11 days 15 days 17 days 6 b. Estimated cost to include foreign duty pay, maintenance, 7 facilities, transportation and support for 30-60 days, 8 considering air movement for two battle groups and sea 9 movement for the division minus is: 10 (1) Army 4,000,000 11 (2) Navy 428,500 12 (3) Air Force 12,600,000 13 Total $17,028,500 14 5. Logisitcal support for the deployed forces would be pro- 15 vided by EUCOM service components with replenishment supplies 16 from CONUS. If the forces were to remain in Germany 17 indefinitely, additional logistical support units would be 13 required. 19 6. Other possible combinations of air and sea movement of 20 airborne or infantry divisions could be accomplished; however, 21. they are not discussed in this paper. 22 IMPLICATIONS 7. The posture of deployed forces would degrade the US 23 capability to execute wartime or contingency commitments in 24 other areas. 25 8. Major changes in training schedules of CONUS and EUCOM 26 units would be required. This would have a serious effect on 27 those units in Europe which would be displaced at the major 28 training areas. 29 9. There would be a temporary reduction in lift capability 3C. to support remaining CONUS based forces which might be required 3J. to execute contingency operations. 32 10. Overflight clearances would have to be obtained. 35 11. Major changes would be required in the July programmed 3L airlift support of Department of Defense requirements. 3. TOP SECRET JCSM-385-61 4 Appendix B

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    "ocrText": "D'D SEGRONT\nTOP SECRET\n(1) Two airlifted battle groups: 4.5 days with zero\n1\nalert and on a \"crash\" basis. .\n2\n(2) Sealifted Division ( )\n3\nTroops\nCargo\nMovement to Port and)\n4\nLoading Time\n6 days\n6 days\n5\nSteaming Time\n9 days\n11 days\n15 days\n17 days\n6\nb. Estimated cost to include foreign duty pay, maintenance, 7\nfacilities, transportation and support for 30-60 days,\n8\nconsidering air movement for two battle groups and sea\n9\nmovement for the division minus is:\n10\n(1) Army\n4,000,000\n11\n(2) Navy\n428,500\n12\n(3) Air Force\n12,600,000\n13\nTotal\n$17,028,500\n14\n5. Logisitcal support for the deployed forces would be pro-\n15\nvided by EUCOM service components with replenishment supplies\n16\nfrom CONUS. If the forces were to remain in Germany\n17\nindefinitely, additional logistical support units would be\n13\nrequired.\n19\n6. Other possible combinations of air and sea movement of\n20\nairborne or infantry divisions could be accomplished; however,\n21.\nthey are not discussed in this paper.\n22\nIMPLICATIONS\n7. The posture of deployed forces would degrade the US\n23\ncapability to execute wartime or contingency commitments in\n24\nother areas.\n25\n8. Major changes in training schedules of CONUS and EUCOM\n26\nunits would be required. This would have a serious effect on\n27\nthose units in Europe which would be displaced at the major\n28\ntraining areas.\n29\n9. There would be a temporary reduction in lift capability\n3C.\nto support remaining CONUS based forces which might be required\n3J.\nto execute contingency operations.\n32\n10. Overflight clearances would have to be obtained.\n35\n11. Major changes would be required in the July programmed\n3L\nairlift support of Department of Defense requirements.\n3.\nTOP SECRET\nJCSM-385-61\n4\nAppendix B"
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