Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
266848701
label
NSC Meeting - Middle East 6/10/70 [2 of 2]
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
266848701
contentType
document
title
NSC Meeting - Middle East 6/10/70 [2 of 2]
citationUrl
collections
National Security Files (Nixon Administration)
Institutional Files
iiifBase
thumbnailUrl
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
266848701
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
url
mediaId
9d38372866fa64e3
ocrText
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)
FORM OF
DOCUMENT
CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
1. PAPER
PAPER ON THE MIDDLE EAST (8pp.)
5/28/70
A
2. PAPER
PAPER ON THE MIDDLE EAST (22 pp.)
5/27/70
A
3.PAPER
INTRODUCTION To PAPER ON THE MIDDLE EAST (4pp.)
[6/70]
A
4.FoRm
DISTRIBUTION SHEET(Ip.)
6/9/70
A
5.REPORT
REPORT ON THE MIDDLE EAST (16pp.)
6/10/70
A
FILE LOCATION
H FILES Box H-28 FOLDER 6
RESTRICTION CODES
(A) Closed by applicable Executive order governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ARMINISTR ATION Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
NA 14029 (1-98)
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CTA PAPER
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER
ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MILITARY Y BALANCE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
ument has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER
2
ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
HAK:
Defense's
Mid-East paper
{Seenario begins
page 10.3
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
cument has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be decla
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 3
ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/NODIS
June 9, 1970
HAK:
Just before you speak, Dick Helms will have briefed on
the implications of the Soviet presence on the military
balance.
Therefore, I have assumed you will want to speak mainly
on the issues.
I have included a critique of the common perceptions, but I am
not sure you want to use this at the meeting. You could just
skip that and pick up with either the "considerations of strategy"
or the issues themselves.
Hal
HHS
DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/16/02
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC
under provisions of E.O. 12958
Rth
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/NODIS
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Mid-East Issues--NSC Meeting Wednesday, June 10
The situation in the Middle East is now the most dangerous we face.
It is difficult to see how the situation in Southeast Asia could produce
a major-power war. It is easy to see a number of ways the situation
in the Mid-East could. Moreover, the question of the U.S. position
there giving way to Soviet predominance is no longer academic. The
decisions to be faced now will have an important effect on how the
situation develops.
Implications of the Soviet Presence in Egypt
The character of the Soviet move in the UAR should not be underrated.
You may hear the argument made (by Defense) that this move was
precipitated by Israeli action or that it is purely defensive and does not
threaten Israel. These arguments do not meet the main point: This is
a unique turn of Soviet policy--never before have the Soviets put their
own forces in combat jeopardy for the sake of a non-Communist govern-
ment.
It is argued that now the Soviets have rescued Nasser both of them may
suddenly change character and be prepared to negotiate seriously. This
seems doubtful. Having scored a psychological gain with apparent
impunity, it has generally been the Soviet tactic first to consolidate
their gains and then to press forward, testing the ground as they move.
The problem, therefore, is not simply that the Soviet military presence
may have, at a minimum, limited Israeli military options. The problem
is that the USSR has established a new kind of foothold in the UAR and
the U.S. has a strong interest in preventing its consolidation and expansion.
SECRET/NODIS
under provisions of E.O. 12958
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC
DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/16/02
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
Rtbx
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
- 2 -
Some Common Perceptions- - A Critique
You will hear argument over what the U.S. interest requires and
how far the U.S. should go in trying to check the USSR. Some of this
argument rests on assumptions that should be carefully examined.
1.
The Israeli view is that if Israel and the U.S. will only
to negotiate.
stand fast, the USSR and the Arabs will decide/This means that the
U.S. must give Israel all the equipment it needs and make no con-
cessions to the USSR.
The problem with this is that the Israelis have not really
offered the Arabs a negotiating position the Arabs could even consider
accepting. So the Arabs feel they have no choice but to fight. Thus
the U.S. is left backing Israel in a war of attrition that seems likely
to lead only to another war--probably involving the USSR without any
negotiating escape to offer Moscow.
2.
The Defense Department view is that all we have to do is
to get the Israelis off the Suez Canal to begin the process of reaching
a settlement and that will prevent further erosion of U.S. influence.
Their argument is that the U.S. has no interest in the Mid-East great
enough to warrant a nuclear showdown with the USSR. The U.S. is
militarily over-extended and has every interest in avoiding involvement
in the Mid-East. Besides, the Arab-Israeli problem is not susceptible
of military solution.
The problems with this view are that: (a) If the U.S. shows
that it does not have enough interest in the Mid-East to warrant a
showdown, then the USSR will never back off. (b) If Israel does not
believe the U.S. will defend its existence against the USSR, Israel will
have no incentive whatsoever to agree to a settlement based on with-
drawal from present lines.
3.
It is also commonly said that the Soviets are acting in the
UAR purely in a defensive capacity and that the U.S., therefore, need
not be concerned because the Soviets will not threaten Israel.
Yet it would be logical for the USSR to extend its influence
as far as possible. The near term Soviet objective in the Middle East
is to destroy Western influence. The main enemy is not Israel but the
West in general and the U.S. in particular. Therefore, it must be
assumed that the USSR will do all it can to that end--over and above
defending their client.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
SFG documenthas emreviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
- 3 -
4.
It is sometimes argued that the U.S. can only preserve
its position in the Arab world by forcing Israeli withdrawal and
placating the Arabs. The supposition here is that if there is a peace
settlement the Arab radicals will cease to be a threat.
Arab radicalism, however, is not just a product of the
Arab-Israeli impasse. It exploits that impasse for its own ends,
but it has roots of its own and will still be present to attack Western
interests if there is a settlement.
Considerations of Strategy
The problem is to develop a strategy that will bring into balance the
following elements:
1.
The Israeli quest for security. Israel views its margin
as relatively narrow. Despite its clearcut military superiority on
the present scene, its capacity to survive a long war of attrition is
limited. Israel feels it must have some breadth of options in trying
to cut off a war of attrition or it will feel hemmed in and compelled
to strike out. The problem is to put enough pressure on Israel to
demonstrate that its stand-fast strategy will not work and yet not so
much as to make the Israelis feel they have lost the option to move
preemptively.
2.
The Arabs have two problems:
The general problem is that Israel is asking Arab
recognition as an entry price to a negotiation in which
Israel will hold out for substantial acquisition of Arab
territory. The Arabs--entirely apart from their
political problems in giving up a principle--do not want
to surrender their most valuable negotiating asset until
they are sure they will get their territory back for it.
The moderates' particular problem is that the radicals
are exploiting anti-Israeli feeling to win the Arab world.
They must have ambivalent feelings about a settlement.
On the one hand, they want an honorable settlement.
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
- 4 -
On the other, they cannot look complacently on the
prospect of a Nasser whose forces are no longer tied
down by Israel and are backed by Soviet combat
personnel.
3.
The problem of dealing with the Soviets is to balance
between giving them a sense of the dangers of the present situation
without denying them an escape. They do not want a confrontation
with the U.S., and they will eventually have to help the Arabs get
their territory back if they are to enhance their standing in the
Mid-East. At the same time, they have an interest in controlled
tension and in maintaining as large a military foothold in the area
as they can.
Some Policy Issues
Against the background of the above considerations, it is important
to examine some of the policy issues raised:
1.
Is a political settlement really an alternative to confronting
the USSR, or are the two correlated? The argument has been made
(by Defense) that, since we want to avoid"a confrontation with the USSR,
the only alternative is a political settlement.
On the one hand, a settlement is conceivable in which
the radical Arabs are freed to turn their weapons against
the moderates. The Syrians if no longer tied down by Israel
would turn against Jordan and Lebanon; the Iraqis would turn
against the moderates and Iranian interests in the Persian
Gulf; Nasser against the Saudis and the moderates in the Gulf.
Back of this would be a strong Soviet military position in the
UAR. Nasser backed by the Russians would be a potent anti-
Western, anti-moderate force. In other words a settlement
is possible which would enhance rather than check Soviet
opportunity.
- On the other hand, some methods of confronting the
Soviets could create a situation in which Soviet influence
expanded while the U.S. position was narrowed. If, for
instance, the U.S. simply backed Israel in a long war of
attrition, Arab reaction against the U.S. would gradually
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
- 5 -
whittle away at U.S. influence, and the Arabs would
have no one to turn to but the USSR.
The question is not whether we should confront the USSR or
try for a political settlement. The question is how we can confront
the USSR in trying for a political settlement and how we can improve
chances for a political settlement by confronting the USSR.
2.
A second issue is: Is a settlement conceivable through
negotiations between the belligerents? Is any settlement conceivable
that is not imposed?
On the one hand, the argument has been made (by State)
that the interests on both sides must be brought together
so a genuine accommodation can be reached. Unless both
sides face up by themselves to the requirements of this
accommodation, there cannot be a settlement that will last.
On the other hand, it can be argued that the problem is
not that the two sides fail to understand each other's
interests but that they understand those interests too well.
The Arabs know the Israelis want territory in a settlement.
The Israelis know that the Arabs will only grudgingly- - and
therefore with some thought of eventual reversal of position--
accept Israel's existence. That is why there is not sufficient
will on either side to reach a settlement.
If the second is at all true, then it remains for outsiders to devise a
situation in which settlement of key issues--withdrawal and the recog-
nition of Israel--is virtually forced on the parties along with security
measures that make the settlement as enforceable as possible. If there
is to be a settlement, it will have to be imposed, regardless of what
facade of negotiation may be erected around it for tactical purposes.
3.
The next issue is: How can Israel's aircraft requests best
be related to the process of achieving a settlement? The two horns of
the dilemma are:
- On the one hand, Israel will feel under the greatest
pressure to resist a settlement based on withdrawal if
it feels that it will not have the means to defend itself.
Israelis would judge that their military needs in such a
settlement would at least not diminish because it would
be giving up its improved defensive positions.
SECRET/Ne at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
- 6 -
On the other hand, providing aircraft to Israel now
would jeopardize U.S. ability to work with the Arabs for
a settlement. Moreover, if the Israelis had what they
wanted from the U.S., there would be little incentive to
accede to U.S. pressures for a settlement.
Without some commitment from the U.S. that Israel will have the means
of defense, it is impossible to expect Israel even to consider withdrawal.
The difficulty, therefore, is to combine this assurance with the implied
threat of its withdrawal so as to produce the Israeli concessions necessary
to peace.
4.
The ultimate issue is: Can the U.S. induce Israel to with-
draw to essentially pre-war borders in the context of a settlement?
On the one hand, it is possible to argue (as Defense does)
that Israel is so heavily dependent on the U.S. for military
supplies and financial support that it cannot stand up against
the threat of losing them. The other side of this argument
is that nothing shor t of the clear threat of losing them will
move Israel.
- On the other hand, it can be argued (as State does) that
the only thing that will change Israel's policy is Israel's
own realization that that policy will not work. The task of
the U.S. is not just to threaten Israel's lifeline; that would
leave Israel with no choice but to stay where it is behind its
most defensible lines. The task of the U.S. is to make clear
that neither Israel nor the U.S. can win in the present
situation but to demonstrate that abundant U.S. support is
possible in a changed situation.
The first approach to Israel should not be the threat of cutting off aid;
Israel needs the assurance of U.S. support. The moment of truth comes
when Israel says it will have to forego U.S. support if the price is with-
drawal. Does the U.S. then cut off aid? The realistic choice at that point--
having made a substantial offer to demonstrate good faith--is between an
absolutely minimal flow of aid and a very substantial flow and not between
aid and no aid.
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
- 7 -
The Principal Options
The considerations above seem to eliminate the extremes. Backing
Israel without qualification would give the Israeli Cabinet a controlling
voice in setting the conditions for a U.S. -Soviet confrontation. Cutting
ourselves off from Israel would leave Israel no incentive for a political
settlement and would enhance the Soviet position. The two options that
will be advanced at the NSC are:
1.
The Defense Department proposal [a memo from Secretary
Laird is in your briefing book] would involve denial of aircraft to Israel
until Israel had agreed to a phased withdrawal. When Israel's future
aircraft requirements are to be met, they should not be met with more
attack aircraft like the Skyhawks and Phantoms but with fighter-interceptors
more exclusively designed for defense. The Defense proposal would have
us work step by step from a de facto cease-fire to partial Israeli with-
drawal, demilitarization of vacated territories, reopening the Suez
Canal to all nations and the beginning of formal peace negotiations.
The three main conclusions on which Defense bases this position are:
There is no acceptable military solution to the present
impasse. The indigenous belligerents can only fight to a
stand-off. Soviet involvement could lead to a nuclear
confrontation triggered either by a U.S. Soviet clash or by
Israeli introduction of nuclear weapons in desperation.
The U.S. also has an interest in checking the spread of
Soviet influence. U.S. sale of more attack aircraft now will
contribute to further Soviet success in the Arab world.
The expansion of the U.S. commitment to Israel by
promising or implying that U.S. forces would be used
directly to support Israel under any circumstances is
unacceptable. If Israel surfaces nuclear weapons, the U.S.
cannot afford to be involved.
The problem with this approach--viewed in the light of what is written
above is that it is likely to increase Israeli hysteria and the probability
that Israel would feel compelled to fall back on nuclear weapons or to
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
- 8 -
strike out, thereby triggering another war. It would provide no incentive
for Israel to reach a settlement. It would encourage the Soviet feeling
that they are achieving their objective, and there would be nothing to
restrain them from further advances. Even if a settlement were achieved
on this basis, it would leave the USSR strong and no sense among the
moderate Arabs that they could depend on the U.S.
2.
The State Department proposal [a memo from Secretary
Rogers is in your briefing book] would involve a limited commitment
of aircraft now pending outcome of a new effort to get negotiations
started along with a clearly implied promise of continuing aircraft
shipments in the fall. To understand this proposal, it is necessary to
look in detail at the steps that would be taken:
- Tell Israel that the U.S. is going to make a direct
approach to Nasser urging (a) acceptance of a cease-fire
from July 1 to September 15 and (b) agreement to get indirect
talks started under Jarring. If Nasser responds positively
we would expect a positive Israeli response.
Offer Israel three additional Phantoms each in July and
August; as replacements, earmark four Phantoms and four
Skyhawks per month for delivery starting in September through
year's end. This would be subject to review only if negotiations
between the parties showed signs of success. We would in any
case make contingency plans for delivery sooner if there is a
dramatic shift in the balance; other military requirements
would continue to be met.
- Make a direct approach in Cairo urging (a) a ceasefire and
military standstill [no further fortification on the Canal] from
July 1 to September 15 and (b) agreement to begin indirect
negotiations under Jarring promptly on the basis of a simple
acceptance by both sides of the 1967 UN resolution. Israel
would have to say it is willing to withdraw in accordance
with the resolution and the Arabs would have to state their
willingness to recognize Israel's existence if it withdraws.
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
- 9 -
-Inform Nasser that we are limiting ourselves for the
time being not to go beyond the 50 Phantom and 100
Skyhawk level committed in 1968 and 1966 but that further
deferral of additional sales is only feasible in the context
of a cease-fire and negotiations. [This would be true
because 6 Phantoms from the original contract for 50 are
of a special configuration not to be delivered until 1971,
and 3 have been lost. Original Skyhawk deliveries are not
scheduled for completion before September. ]
After Cairo had been approached the USSR would be urged
tosupport our effort. However, the primary emphasis would
be on direct contacts between Washington, Cairo, Tel Aviv
(and Amman). [Secretary Rogers' memo recognizes that
more must be done to "reflect our resolve to the USSR, 11 but
it recommends only that you direct him and Secretary Laird
to make a high priority study of this aspect. ]
There are several problems with this approach:
- Above all, it is not clear what the objective is. If it is
conceived as a first step toward an imposed settlement, then
livel Public mlyz light
it could have merit. If not, it is not likely to produce any
but minimal interim results. If so, then this should be
recognized at the outset because trying to impose a settlement
would have political costs. The key decision in imposing a
Liminim
settlement is whether the U.S. is prepared to intervene to
settle the boundary issue by pressing Israel's return to very
nearly pre-war borders in Jordan and the Sin ai in return for
enforceable security arrangements.
- --Second, a related point is that by making success depend
on negotiations with Jarring, this would dilute direct U.S.
influence and lessen chances of success. It would be hard
enough to impose a settlement on U.S. terms without working
through someone who has not proved himself as very
imaginative or forceful.
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
- 10 -
-Third, we would be asking Israel to agree to the principle
of withdrawal in return for six Phantoms plus implied
promise of 16 more by year's end along with perhaps another
ten Skyhawks. What the Israelis would do would depend on
how they interpreted our offer. If they just see themselves
getting six more Phantoms, then the incentive will be to keep
present borders. If they think they will get planes only if
negotiations are not promising, there will be no incentive
making negotiations succeed. Since there are already
serious obstacles to success, it is not hard to see this as a
decisive disincentive. Moreover, this still leaves us with
another aircraft decision to be made in September just as
the proposed cease-fire would be ending.
-Fourth, there is no provision in this proposal to convince
the USSR that it will face a more difficult situation if the
present situation continues than if there is a settlement. It
shows the Soviets too much hesitation.
In short, the Defense proposal seems a non-starter. The State proposal
has merit--but only if it is considered as a step toward imposing a
settlement. Otherwise, its chances of success are slim and it would
seem likely to leave us worse off three months from now than we are now.
For the sake of illustrating a modification of the State proposal to take
care of some of the above objections, I am attaching a possible "third
option. "
Conduct of the NSC Meeting
I recommend that you make clear at the end of this meeting that you will
need time to decide and that no action should be taken yet. This is
necessary to maintain your control over timing of any action and to give
you time to consider refinements (or alternatives) to the course of action
proposed. In any case, you should have a final look at a detailed course
of action before implementation begins.
In your briefing book are talking points and the memos from Secretaries
Laird and Rogers. Also, there is a good short CIA paper on the Soviet
impact on the Arab-Israeli balance. A much fuller study has been
completed but this fairly reflects its conclusions.
Attachment: "A Third Option"
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
A THIRD OPTION
The purpose of this illustrative course of action is to show how two
shortcomings in the State proposal might be met: (1) Instead of
dribbling out the aircraft, it offers a large number at once with the
thought of withholding delivery. (2) It addresses the Soviet problem
more directly. This would involve the following:
-Make this approach directly to Nasser: The U.S. is
prepared to press Israel to withdraw essentially to pre-war
borders provided Nasser is willing to commit himself to us
now and in a formal agreement later to specific arrangements
for establishing and enforcing peace. The U.S. is the only
government that can attempt this. To do this the U.S. will
have to provide assistance to Israel; if Nasser asks us to
squeeze Israel and to withhold aid at the same time, he is
asking the impossible. If we can achieve Israeli agreement
to withdraw, we would ask Nasser to have his representative
meet with the Israelis and Jarring to negotiate detailed security
arrangements. The U.S. would take an active part in that
negotiation. The U.S. would expect that, after agreement,
Soviet combat personnel would be withdrawn. In conclusion,
Nasser has an important choice to make: If he uses our provision
of aircraft to Israel as a pretext for encouraging attacks on U.S.
installations elsewhere, then Israel will get the planes without
being pressed to withdraw.
-Make this approach to Israel: (1) The U.S. will prepare
beginning in September to provide another 25 Phantoms and
40 Skyhawks to be added to present deliveries at the present
rates but this must remain secret; the U.S. is prepared to
discuss additional requirements in January 1971; the U.S.
is prepared to discuss a five-year program of economic assistance.
(2) Soviet involvement introduces an element which Israel alone
cannot handle regardless of how much equipment the U.S. supplies.
Since the U.S. is potentially involved, the U.S. must have a voice
in determining the issue on which it becomes involved. The U.S.
cannot base that involvement on Israel's rightto negotiate major
changes in its boundaries. (3) The U.S. therefore wants the
Prime Minister's assurance that Israel will withdraw to pre-war
borders if the Arabs commit themselves to live at peace and
agree to arrangements for enforcing the peace which do not
involve Israeli acquisition of territory. [Discussions on military
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
and economic assistance could proceed, but no deliveries or
disbursements would take place until the Israelis had responded
satisfactorily. U.S. leverage would rest on the statement that
the U.S. cannot go on supporting Israel unless Israel commits
itself to withdraw in a peace settlement and the implied threat
of reducing deliveries to a minimal flow. ]
- Tell the USSR the same thing we tell the UAR. Suspend for
the time being any plans to reduce the size of the Sixth Fleet.
Perhaps reinforce the Sixth Fleet with additional anti-submarine
warfare capability.
Comment: The purpose of this approach would be to face the USSR with
a Vietnam-type involvement against a well-supplied Israel but at the
same time to provide an escape via a settlement. The USSR would have
to weigh the disadvantage of letting the U.S. out of its present box against
the disadvantage of that sort of involvement. The USSR could expect
enough tension to remain for its exploitation even after a settlement.
This approach would have for the U.S. the advantage of going far enough
on the key issues boundaries -- to justify realistic hope for a settlement
while at the same time offering a sizeable enough inducement to Israel to
make an Israeli concession conceivable.
This would seem to combine the best mix of responses to the basic
considerations of strategy described above. It would provide Israel with
a substantial incentive to cooperate while making clear that the U.S.
will not back an Israeli strategy that is likely to produce a U.S. confron-
tation with the USSR. It is a strong enough response, however, to indicate
to the USSR that we mean to stand firm. It would have promise for the
Arabs of U.S. pressure on Israel to withdraw.
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
10961
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
June 8, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL HAIG
FROM:
Jeanne W. Davis
and
SUBJECT: Ambassador Yost's Attendance at NSC Meeting
on Middle East
Ambassador Yost's office has called to inquire as to the
time of the NSC meeting on the Middle East scheduled for
this Wednesday, June 10 -- the implication being, of course,
that he is planning to come. Hal Saunders tells me he has
been at virtually all NSC meetings on this subject.
Can you please confirm that he is to attend Wednesday's
35%
meeting.
Yost to attend NSC
meeting on ME
Yes
No
JUN 10 1970
MICROFILM
DO
DATA
INIT
DATE 6/15
ORIG) NSC
TO ) PAF
WHC
SUBF
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER
4
ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER
5
ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET SENSITIVE
I. Policy Alternatives
1. The major factor that determines political attitudes and shapes
political strategy in the Middle East and about which almost all other issues
revolve is the existence of the state of Israel. This statement in no way
implies the chief US interest is to preserve the independence of Israel.
However, it does serve to highlight the fact that the presence of a Jewish
state in the Middle East is at the heart of the problem -- a problem that must
be solved before any settlement can be considered permanent.
2. If it is true that the basic problem is the existence of Israel, then
our policy alternatives must first address this issue. What are our alter-
natives?
a. Guarantee the continued existence of Israel* with whatever
unilateral, bilateral, multilateral, regional, or international means and
policies are required, with the implicit recognization that unilateral employ-
ment of US forces may be necessary at some future time if there is no other
alternative to ensure the survival of Israel.
b. Support the continued existence of Israel* with multilateral,
regional, or international means and policies feasible without a commitment
to guarantee Israel's survival by unilateral employment of US forces.
C. Assume no moral responsibility for Israel*, adopt policy of non-
intervention in any future war, assume only those responsibilities delineated
in the UN charter, supply weapons to both sides on cash or short-term credit
basis, with the implicit recognition that Israel may become relatively weaker
*Guarantee of the continued existence of Arab states is not included since
the declared policy of Israel does not include their destruction.
DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON
4/16/02
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC
Reproduced SECRET the Richard Nixon Presidential SENSITIVE Library ASSIFIED
under provisions of E.O. 12958
RHx
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET SENSITIVE
2
and be forced to compromise or to face another war with the Arabs.
In the past, our declaratory policy has been Alternative b, yet there has
been an implicit assumption that we would intervene to ensure Israel's
survival by unilateral means if her destruction appeared imminent.
3. What are the US interests? The chief interests appear to be:
a. Avoid nuclear war with USSR or a direct confrontation wherein
the threat of nuclear war is possible.
b. Promote géneral objectives of US foreign policy, e.g., create
world environment suitable for peaceful enjoyment of our own freedom,
encourage democratic and peaceful governments, encourage economic development,
etc.
c. Prevent area from falling under Communist domination or under
domination of any ideology or state antithetical to US interests.
d. Preserve access to oil, and to area in general for communications,
transit, commerce, contingency operations, business, investment, and other
strategic reasons.
e. Prevent nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of Middle
Eastern states.
(Although not stated in US interests listed above, there are strong domestic
political reasons for US support for the continued existence of Israel.
Additionally, it would not appear to be consistent with our political tra-
ditions and moral stance throughout the world to allow the destruction of a
democratic, progressive, developing, pro-US, and anti-Communist country.)
4. The problem of Soviet-US confrontation in the Middle East cannot be
considered in isolation from other aspects of Soviet-US relations. The
SECRET SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET SENSITIVE
3
conflict of interests in the Middle East between the two superpowers is caused
both by factors indigenous to the area and by factors external to the Middle
East, e.g., Soviet ideology, US forward strategy, worldwide US and Soviet
commitments, US domestic politics, traditional Russian expansionism, etc.
An assumption of this study is that Soviet-US agreement -- implicit or
explicit -- is necessary to defuse the Middle East. A Soviet-US agreement
in the Middle East not only must contribute to a specific settlement in the
area, but also must be consistent with other actions taken in the broader
context of East-West relations.
5. Soviet interests in the Middle East are based upon geopolitical and
economic factors rooted in tradition, history and ideology. Specific Soviet
interests are:
a. Avoid nuclear war with US, and, presumably, the threat of one
due to a direct confrontation.
b. Eliminate Western influence from area.
c. Strengthen Soviet influence in area.
d. Preserve access to area for communications, transit, commerce,
and strategic defensive reasons.
e. Prevent nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of Middle
Eastern states.
At present, the Soviets are using the Arab-Israeli dispute, and ensuing
Arab hatred of US, as levers to accomplish b, c, and d, above. However,
even if the Arab-Israeli dispute were settled, the Soviets would undoubtedly
search for other levers to continue to increase their influence and to
decrease US influence.
SECRET SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
SENSITIVE
4
II. Choosing a Policy
1. The present course of events, in which each side increasingly
pursues maximal objectives via essentially military means, has worsened the
situation and seriously undermined US interests. Israel, in the flush of its
1967 victory, confidently expected very substantial Arab concessions, and
has since refused to modify its expectations and demands. In turn, the
Arabs refused to negotiate from weakness, especially given Soviet aid, and
consider time is on their side. Each side has come to rely almost exclusively
on military means to achieve its objectiveș. The Palestinian refugees have
used terrorism, and the Arab governments have developed the "war of attrition".
Israel has used air strikes which have turned the Jordan's east bank largely
into a no-man's land and have driven 600,000 Egyptian civilians away from the
Suez area, and has used commando-style raids which now threaten southern
Lebanon with the same fate. It is more than evident to outside observers
that matters have gotten steadily worse, rather than better, as more and more
emphasis has been given to military solutions.
2. There is no military solution to the present impasse. The Israelis
come to us with requests for more bombs and more attack aircraft, to counter
Egyptian artillery and to prevent a new Arab offensive, yet experience
demonstrates the virtual impossibility of permanently suppressing dug-in
artillery by means of air strikes, against a determined and well-supplied foe.
Israel has always thought offensively, and does not wish, now, to change
its approach, yet to continue to proceed offensively appears destined to
provoke a greater Soviet response, and to increase the level of hostilities.
SECRET SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET SENSITIVE
5
Israel itself has come to recognize that it cannot, alone, carry out an
offensive strategy against the UAR, given the present direct Soviet in-
volvement. Even if we gave Israel the assurances of support it seeks, in
the form of limitless supplies of aircraft, equipment, and credit, and even
if we delivered ultimatums to the Soviets, this would at best result in an
uneasy and unsatisfactory stalemate. The Soviets who are providing large
amounts of equipment and thousands of advisors to the UAR and, now, active
forces to the Arab "defense", are certainly not going to back down easily
from the advantageous position which they now hold. The plain fact is that
neither side can, with or without help from its great power sponsors, hope
to impose an acceptable military solution on the other.
3. If we continue our present policies, our position and that of Israel
will get steadily worse rather than better, leading perhaps to a direct
confrontation with the Soviets. The longer the present quarrel continues,
the less flexible is either side, the less influence do the moderates exercise,
the more extreme the solutions proposed. Deliberately to polarize this
situation, and write off the entire Arab world, will not even provide Israel
with assurances of an acceptable future: There is nothing we can provide
which will enable Israel to halt Nasser's war of attrition, or completely
suppress terrorist activity, or assure control of a captive and restive Arab
population, or stop Soviet penetration. Thus, at best, Israeli casualties
will continue undiminished and will probably increase; worse, Israel will find
itself in terrible isolation, with its borders turned into a continuous
no-man's land, its neighbors growing more bitter, and the refugees, now
SECRET
SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET SENSITIVE
6
increased in number, more than ever dedicated to Israel's destruction. The
Soviets will have an open door to the entire Arab world, and we can expect
to lose our oil investment, to see even the conservative Arab world
radicalized, to see North Africa drawn into the dispute to our (and the
entire Western World's) loss, to see Turkey and Iran increasingly unhappy with
the US position, and to alarm our NATO allies.
Even that is not the worst: The situation is too unstable and too
explosive for us to hope, once complete polarization has taken place, that
it can be stabilized. it is more likely the Soviets will reject our ultimatums,
and will be able to find considerable international support for their position
(for example, in opening Suez). Their involvement could increase, along with
Israeli loss rates, and we would face the excruciating question of further
US involvement. The Soviets could well increase their forces in Egypt, with
armored forces and additional air force units, and it is likely that Turkey,
Greece, Italy and Spain would refuse to permit the US to use bases in their
territory to conduct hostilities against the USSR-Arab forces. Under these
circumstances, to make our involvement effective might be very difficult and
very costly. The consequences, once US and Soviet forces were directly
engaged, are incalculable.
4. If we are to have any hope of achieving our objectives, we must
undertake major new political initiatives. Repetition of past proposals
is not enough, and it is too late to put together a "bits-and-pieces" policy
based on holding on in Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia, while providing
some modified help to Israel and attempting a Two- or Four-Power solution.
SECRET SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET SENSITIVE
7
5. For these initiatives to have any chance of working they require,
first, that we not provide any additional attack aircraft to Israel at this
time, and, second, that Israel agree to a step-by-step approach, including
limited withdrawal from the Canal. It is the unanimous belief of the US
Intelligence Community, of all US embassies in the Arab world, and of numerous
friendly governments, that agreement to further F-4 sales would destroy any
hope of settlement. Further, the Intelligence Community believes we could not
keep further sales secret. It is likewise the carefully considered judgment
of NSSM 93 that Israel does not need additional attack aircraft at this time.
Israel already enjoys a very substantial edge in bombing capability over
its combined Arab opponents, and the Arabs having nothing remotely as good
as the F-4 for attack purposes. To the extent Israel has an air defense
requirement it could be met by offering to sell an air defense aircraft
without nearly the adverse effect of the F-4s or even A-4s. The F-5 is
available from US production, and it already has been sold to Morocco and
Libya; the F-8, a plane with good success against MIGs in Vietnam, is avail-
able from US excess, and 50 could be rebuilt and sold to Israel in better-
than-new (better engines) condition (Israel has requested and been provided
this information); and F-104s are available from Canada -- indeed, reports
have been received indicating several already have been delivered surreptitiously
to Israel. Our decision on aircraft need not, and should not, be based solely
on Israel's requests, but on US interests taken together with Israel's demonstrated
needs, and on this calculus the F-4 and A-4 can be ruled out completely:
Israel does not need them, and it is not in our interest to supply them.
Reproduced SENSITIVE
at the Nixon Presidential Library ASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
SENSITIVE
8
For three years now Israel has held out promises of prospective con-
cessions and hints of future flexibility, but only in the context of a
complete settlement of all issues in direct negotiations. This approach
has not worked, and it is highly unlikely that it will work in the future.
Therefore, Israel must modify its all-or-nothing approach, with suitable
safeguards and conditions, for there to be any hope for progress toward.
a solution There is of course no guarantee that Israeli concessions,
including a limited withdrawal from the canal, will achieve peace, but
they will at least unlock one side of the door It will then be up to
us and the Arabs to try, jointly, to unlock the other side
6
The need for progress toward a political solution is so important
to the US, and the alternatives are so disastrous, that it is worth taking
whatever steps are necessary, including strong pressures on Israel, to
achieve this objective. This is true for Israel as well as for the US. it
surely is not in Israel's long-term interests to try to live indefinitely
in a hostile land with every man's hand against her Being isolated with
the US may resolve Israel's short term arms supply problems, but it merely
makes long-term prospects more grim It must also be pointed out that, even
if these new initiatives and these Israeli concessions do not achieve their
full objective, they are certain to have some positive advantages Israel's
image will have improved, as will that of the US The Soviets will come
under pressure to support the new peace moves. Moderate Arab regimes will
be under less radical pressure, and Jordan's and Lebanon's chances for
survival will be better. We shall, in short, have advanced at least a
little toward our basic objectives -- or if not advanced, at least stopped
ReproduosECRET Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
SENSITIVE
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
SENSITIVE
9
the backward slide In Pope's words, "Not to retreat is somewhat to
advance/a man must learn to walk before he dance. "
7. Rather than trying to reconcile anti threat US-Soviet positions
by confrontation, a more positive approach - one that proceeds from
common interests - would appear more logical. Soviet and US interests
coincide in the desire to avoid nuclear war and to prevent Middle Eastern
states from acquiring nuclear weapons However, mutual access to the
area without exclusive, unilateral control should be possible Arabs and
Israelis have mutual interest in survival, although the terms of this
survival differ in the two camps The crucial question that must be asked
is
"Are there sufficient mutual interests among the indigenous and external
powers upon which a settlement can be developed?"
8. In summary, this is alternative b, from paragraph 5, above It
would represent a substantial US initiative, and even if only the initial
aspects are successful, it would provide a breathing spell for more orderly
consideration of the new element injected into the Middle East by the Soviets
If the Israelis accept the plan, and the Arabs do not, any subsequent US
sale of military equipment - including jet aircraft, if considered necessary
to ensure Israeli security -- could be justified, and the aftereffects of
any such sale in Arab countries should be attentuated If the Arabs accept
and the Israelis do not go along, the Israelis would be put on notice that
our heretofore implicit guarantee of their security is contingent upon
Israeli actions being consistent with US national interests
SECRET SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library ASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET SENSITIVE
10
III
Scenario for Cease Fire and Initial Withdrawal
The moves recommended in this scenario are designed to achieve dis-
engagement between Israeli and Egyptian forces along the Suez Canal. In
turn, these steps toward a guaranteed cease fire would be geared
to other phases leading to an ultimate peace treaty between Israel and the
Arabs. While undertaking these initiatives, the US would be furthering
certain important policy objectives in the Middle East: (a) tangible move-
ment would take place toward a peace which is in the interest of the United
States to achieve; (b) Israel's security, which ultimately depends upon
Arab acceptance, would be enhanced, (c) the Arabs and Soviets would be
separated by the active intervention of the US through peaceful initiatives,
our only hope for countering the Soviets at this point in time being a po-
litical one, (a) the political and moral position of the United States in
the Middle East and the world at large would be bettered; and (e) military
attention in the United States would stay riveted on that area of the world,
where paramount military tasks still remain to be accomplished, Southeast
Asia.
SECRET SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET SENSITIVE
11
A. General View of All Phases
The recommendations made below involve only one small but vital
movement a movement by the UAR and ISrael, followed by other Arab
powers, to stop their open warfare so that they can prepare for peace.
Moves on all sides would take place simultaneously in order to avoid
embarrassing situations where one party must "lose face" by moving first.
Also, public disclosure of detailed plans would be kept at a bare minimum,
since it is essential to peace in the Middle East that old rhetorical
symbols be jettisoned for minimal gains instead of maximal demands. This
scenario details only the establishment of a de facto cease fire on all
fronts, including all parties. Beyond such a cease fire are envisaged
other phases of a movement toward permanent peace, the first phase meant
to move forward to succeeding phases These phases are
(a) de facto cease fire,
(b) progressive demilitarization of the occupied territories
with assistance from demilitarization specialists who will prepare studies
and recommendations;
(c) reopening of the Suez Canal to all nations, special attention
to points of international sensitivity in the Middle East (Straits of Tiran,
Jerusalem), and formal peace negotiations as inducements for progressive
Israeli withdrawal under conditions of maximum security,
(d) UN action on the status of the West Bank of the Jordan and
the position of the Palestinians in international society,
(e) a formal peace treaty.
During the de facto cease-fire phase, and thereafter, the U.S. would
SECRET SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET SENSITIVE
12
work through the following channels:
(a) its own good offices in political/military channels;
(b) third countries (with minimum reliance on USSR);
(c) interested and reliable private individuals and groups;
(a) the UN
B. Basic Rules for Cease Fire
Certain basic rules would be agreed upon by the UAR and Israel.
First, no crossing of the Suez Canal by UAR ground/air, or Israeli air-
craft would be allowed, except for eventual reconnaissance flights.
Second, areas of Israeli withdrawal in the Sinai and elsewhere will re-
main demilitarized until a final peace treaty Third, multilateral
guarantees for the cease fire, probably growing out of an association
of states interested in opening the Suez Canal, would be implemented
through normal diplomatic pressures and perhaps through UN forces at
critical junctures, such pressures and forces would be given carte
blanche access. to demilitarized zones during the entire period from
initial cease fire to final peace. Fourth, the UAR would agree not to
build up its forces in a strip along the west bank of Suez equivalent to
the first area of Israeli withdrawal on the east bank, except to. install
ordinary air defense systems up to and including SA-2 but not SA-3 posi-
tions. Fifth, no publicity as to arrangements, concessions or negotiations
would be made, except in mutually agreed-upon terms. And sixth, both
sides would commit themselves publicly to previous U.S. peace settlement
proposals -- Egypt to final peace with and recognition of Israel, Israel
to withdrawal from the occupied territories.
SENSITIVE
Nixon Presidential Library DECL ASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET SENSITIVE
13
C. First Steps
Discussions would begin with the UAR, Israel and those powers who
might be interested in a multilateral guarantee of a cease fire and
withdrawal, if this were coupled with moves to open the Suez Canal to all
traffic To Israel we would raise, through military channels closely
held, the question of exchanging a token Israeli withdrawal for a guaran-
teed cease fire We recognize the adament Israeli political position
against any withdrawal until a final peace treaty, but a simple Israeli
statement favoring withdrawal while significant in itself may not be
enough for a President Nasser who has found new confidence with assistance
from his Soviet friends He may want something more tangible from Israel
in exchange for a cease fire, especially when he has already gone beyond
the issue of Israel stating its intention to withdraw to a demand for
total, immediate withdrawal (he will have to give on the last point) We
can offer the Israelis the possibility of a cease fire with an end to
unacceptable casualties, and beyond this, a channel to the Arabs in which
mutually advantageous quid pro quos might be arranged. We can also supply
them with enough ground mobility - - armored personnel carriers, new tanks,
self-propelled guns and more helicopters - - to be able to move back to
the Canal quickly in the event of an emergency. We would also offer them
sensing devices and reconnaissance drones At the same time, however, we
would make clear that our military commitment is limited to supply of
certain equipment (not attack aircraft of the F4 and A4 varieties), and
we will provide no direct military support under any circumstances
Reproduced at the Nixon Presidential Library SSIFIED
SECRET Richard SENSITIVE
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET SENSITIVE
14
To the UAR we would hold out the possibility of a token Israeli
withdrawal in exchange for a cease fire, with further withdrawals likely
as experience and other quid pro quos continue to develop. We have the
great advantage in the Arab world (which is also a liability of course)
of being in direct contact with Israel and of having immediate access to
Israeli defense thinking In other words, we can offer our good offices
to Nasser so that he can get major concessions from Israel. Also, we
offer Nasser an alternative to the USSR, which he will doubtless use to
his own advantage But since our advantage is served by both pease and
by stepping between the Arabs and the Russians, we should not balk at the
prospect that the UAR will play Machiavellian games. We might also offer
the UAR certain sensing equipment for its own surveillance of the cease
fire. Simultaneously, we might relax our export controls on certain items--
such as trucks, radios, light aircraft and the like--which might be sold
by American firms to the so-called "radical" Arab states. Finally, we
would want Nasser to give serious attention to resumption of full dip-
lomatic relations with the US.
To other Arab states with whom we have diplomatic relations we would
give the broad outlines of our plans, with more details supplied as
interest is evinced in cease fire exchanges with Israel. Within the con-
text of official Lebanese and Jordanian auspices, we would attempt to
communicate some of these ideas to the Palestinians as well, including
future phases of our plan whereby the issue of Palestinian statehood
would be raised in connection with the future of the West Bank.
To interested third parties we would begin to explore the possibility
of a multinational guarantee for a cease fire, perhaps linked with use of
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon SENSITIVE
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET SENSITIVE
15
the Suez Canal. We might start by approaching certain nations immediately
west and east of Suez, such as Spain, Italy, France, Great Britain, Greece,
Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Iran, Pakistan, Ethiopia, India,
Ceylon and Australia, with the idea of using our combined good offices for
persuasion on a cease fire/withdrawal quid pro quo between the UAR and
Israel Italy has been particularly interested in an approach something
like this Consultations would take place through US diplomatic channels
on bilateral bases with interested parties, and between the parties them-
selves on the subject of demilitarization Perhaps the USSR could be
coaxed into such guarantees by some power other than the US, by India
for instance. Multilateral representations to the Arabs and Israel would
include issues of quid pro quo on cease fire/withdrawal, opening of Suez
to all nations (including Israel), carte blanche for diplomatic inter-
vention during demilitarization phases, and so on
In the United Nations we would first issue a public call --- perhaps
in a major public address by the President or Secretary of State -- for
support for disengagement, de-escalation and rigorous arms control We
would also approach the Secretary General confidentially on the details
of our plan, in order to enlist his good offices.
To the Russians we would announce our plan in general terms, but
save intimate negotiations for our relations with other powers (who might
well leak information to the Russians). This would force the Russians to
guess at our aims and future moves, which would in turn constantly force
them off balance They might well "over-compensate" by trying to
Reproduced at the
SECRET SENSITHED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
SENSITIVE
16
out-initiate us in peaceful overtures, because the highest prize of all
in the Middle East could well go to those powers who bring peace with
honor to the region. At any rate, our initiatives could in no way
escalate warfare in the region, but instead might well contribute to a
race between the US and USSR for more clever political tactics. One
such tactic might well be an agreement between the US and USSR on
limiting new arms deliveries to the Middle East.
To both the Israelis and Arabs we would appeal privately for a
temporary cessation of hostilities or at least a stalemate in military
operations which would provide a proper context for our new initiatives.
This appeal might be carried by special emissaries from the President to
heads of states and to key leaders in the Palestinian movement.
If signals are positive in all of the approaches above, we would
then move to orchestrate them for an actual cease fire and first Israeli
withdrawal. A special group in the US government, perhaps along the lines
of the Special Review Group of the NSC which has been meeting on NSSMs
81-82 and 93 (Undersecretary of State, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Chair-
man JCS, Director CIA, Assistant Secretary of State for NEA, and chaired
by The Special Assistant to the President on National Security Affairs),
would be organized for purposes of quick response and action on steps
toward peace Working groups would be formed to deal with questions
arising out of multilateral guarantees, emergency military supply,
Israeli-Arab negotiations, demilitarization, internationalization, UN
affairs, Palestinian statehood and a formal peace treaty
SECRET SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
SENSITIVE
17
IV. Overall Settlement
The objective of these first steps, of course, is to open the door
for an overall settlement.
1. Such a settlement would have to include the following ele-
ments.
a. The Arab side would have to:
(1) End state of belligerency.
(2) Control terrorist activity.
(3) Allow free transit of Suez and Straits of Tiran.
(4) Allow resettlement of Palestinian refugees.
(5) Agree to some form of negotiations with Israel.
b. Israeli side would have to
(1) Withdraw from most of the occupied territories.
(2) Accept some refugees and assist in resettlement
of remainder.
(3) Sign NPT and agree not to acquire nuclear weapons
(4) Accept indirect negotiations with Arabs since direct
negotiations do not appear feasible.
C. Special areas requiring compromise by both sides
(1) Gaza Strip
(2) Jerusalem
(3) Type of negotiations and resultant peace document.
d. Countries external to area would have to:
(1) Guarantee territorial integrity of all states.
(2) Guarantee freedom of transit.
SECRET SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET SENSITIVE
18
(3) Assist in controlling violations of agreement to
include activities of fedayeen terrorists as well as Israeli reprisals.
(4) US and USSR agree not to intervene directly with
own forces.
e. Critical factors that must be accomplished.
(1) Persuade Arabs to agree to these concepts including
control of fedayeen.
(2) Persuade Israelis to withdraw, thus leaving security
to outsiders.
(3) Agreement on resettlement of refugees.
(4) Determine sincerity of USSR to agree to genuine
settlement by withdrawal of combat units.
(5) Determine capability of UN to manage affair.
2. The special areas of compromise might include these aspects:
a. Israel and Arab countries to agree not to produce or
acquire nuclear weapons or other strategic weapons as long as terms of
this agreement maintained.
b. Jerusalem to be declared a demilitarized and open city,
with free access to all. For example, tripartite administration -- UN,
Arabs and Israeli -- might be established.
C. UN forces to be stationed at Sharm el Sheik and on both
sides of Israeli borders. These areas to be demilitarized except for UN
force. (Some other sponsorship of peacekeeping forces might be feasible.)
SECRET SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET SENSITIVE
19
d. Gaza Strip to be made part of Israel but with special
status and autonomous Arab administration under UN supervision. (Al-
ternatively, Gaza might become part of Jordan.)
e. Big Four to sign separate protocol to guarantee terms
of settlement, to limit supply of arms to area and not to intervene with
own forces.
3. This will necessitate at least the following continuing
courses of action:
a. Re-establish ceasefire.
b. Formulation of all aspects of a settlement that we are
prepared to promulgate, support, and exert pressure to have accepted.
C. Pressure on Israel to agree to this package settlement.
d. Pressure on Arabs to agree to a genuine settlement by
accepting independence of Israel and other commitments outlined in this
paper.
e. Ascertaining that Soviets want a settlement and not just
a temporary defusing while they continue efforts to dominate area.
f. Relating Soviet-US agreements in the Middle East to the
broader arena of East-West relations.
g Information program to ensure domestic and international
political support.
SECRET SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.