Ask the Scholar
Document scope · 1 page
Scholar
Ask about this object, its catalog metadata, its source description, or the page inventory.
For page-specific OCR and visual context, open one of the page chats.
Scholar Source Context
Document identity
localId
266848703
label
NSC Meeting - Middle East 9/1/70
core
doc
dtoType
document
citationUrl
pageCount
1
Source metadata
id
266848703
contentType
document
title
NSC Meeting - Middle East 9/1/70
citationUrl
collections
National Security Files (Nixon Administration)
Institutional Files
iiifBase
thumbnailUrl
largeImageUrl
imageCount
1
hasImages
yes
source
import
hasTranscription
no
Source extras
naId
266848703
levelOfDescription
fileUnit
recordType
description
ocrSource
nara-archive
Single page context
seq
1
pageIndex
0
type
document
url
mediaId
023b7c97665e2e1d
ocrText
WITHDRAWAL SHEET (PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES)
FORM OF
DOCUMENT
CORRESPONDENTS OR TITLE
DATE
RESTRICTION
l.MEMO
FRom HAL SAUNDERS To ALEXANDER m HA16,JR. (4pp.)
9/1/70
A
FILE LOCATION
I FILES Box H-29 FOLDER 4
RESTRICTION CODES
(A) Closed by applicable Executive order governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS Reproducement the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
NA 14029 (1-98)
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
21670
MEMORANDUM
NSC mtg 9/1
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ACTION
TOP SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT:
The Vice President's Report to the National Security
Council on His Visit to East Asia
The Vice President will report to the National Security Council at 10:00 a.m.
September 1 on the results of his visit to Korea, the Republic of China,
South Vietnam, Cambodia and Thailand.
You will want to congratulate the Vice President on the outstanding job that
he did in reaffirming our commitments under the Nixon Doctrine and express-
ing our determination to help our Asian friends defend themselves against
agression. He also handled very well the difficult job of pointing out the
Congressional and public opinion problems which you and the Administration
currently face, and enlisting their patience and cooperation. The only diffi-
cult situation was in Korea, where President Park showed surprising insen-
sitivity to your need to get a majority of the Congress and the public on your
side in continuing to honor our Asian commitments.
Following are brief highlights of each of the Vice President's stops, with
suggested questions for you to raise in the discussion.
Republic of Korea
-- President Park insisted that U.S. troop reductions be held to the
20, 000 already agreed until ROK force modernization was completed, and
would not compromise. However, following the Vice President's press
remarks on possibly having all U.S. troops out in five years, the ROKG
agreed to meet with our representatives in Seoul to discuss troop withdrawal
along with the modernization program -- failure to do so would have left the
withdrawal time-table entirely in our hands.
You might wish to ask:
-- What is the Vice President's estimate of President Park's position
-- will he come around ?
TOP SECRET
DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/16/02
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined RHy to be declassified.
under provisions of E.O. 12958
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
TOP SECRET
2
What recommendations does the Vice President have in obtaining
a greater degree of ROK cooperation in working out our withdrawals ?
Republic of China
There were no problems, and the atmosphere was very good despite
the Vice President's forewarning that military aid to the GRC would be cut to
help provide for Cambodia. President Chiang and Chiang Ching-kuo expressed
unease about U.S. - Peking contacts and urged the grant of F-4s and submarines
to defend against what they called an imminent Chinese Communist threat. The
Vice President discounted this because of the firmness of our commitment.
You might wish to ask:
-- Can we expect any problems in our relations with the GRC on aid
reductions ?
- What steps might we take to ease the blow ?
Republic of Vietnam
-- The reports so far available all point to a successful and uncontro-
versial visit, with Thieu having expressed satisfaction over the visit and on
the depth of U.S. support. Most press coverage was balanced, sensible, and
relaxed.
You might wish to ask:
-- What changes for the better had the Vice President noted since his
last visit ? What military, political, and economic problems remain ?
-- What is the state of the relations between Thieu and Ky ? Will these
raise difficulties for us ?
Cambodia
-- By the Vice President's presence and his affirmation of continued
U.S. support for Cambodia (he cited our $40 million MAP and other aid) he
gave Lon Nol and other Cambodian leaders a real psychological boost. In
response, they emphasized their determination to fight on, but hoped that
their substantial economic and military needs could be met. The loan of six
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
3
U.S. helicopters to Cambodia which the Vice President informed them of
privately was received with much gratitude.
You might wish to ask:
-- What is the Vice President's estimate of the capacities of the
Cambodian leaders and their ability to hang on ?
-- What are his judgements concerning the military and political
viability of Cambodia over the longer run ?
Thailand
-- The Vice President asked for Thai cooperation in avoiding state-
ments which might complicate Administration relations with the Hill and
feed U.S. isolationist sentiment, thus impairing our ability to furnish aid
under the Nixon Doctrine. He assured them of our intention to help them
help Laos and Cambodia through indirect means, and listened to their esti-
mate of the security situation in Laos, Cambodia and Burma.
You might wish to ask:
-- Do the Thai leaders now fully understand our problems with Congress
and public opinion ?
-- Are they now convinced that we wish to help them in steps undertaken
to help safeguard security in Laos and Cambodia ?
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NUMBER
MO
DA
HR
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING AND CONTROL PROFILE
21670
09
02
11
TO: PRES x
FROM: ELIOT
CLASSIF: U
EXDIS
HAK
ROGERS
C
NODIS
LAIRD
LOU
EYES ONLY
DOCUMENT SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION
DOC DATE:
9/2
S
RES DATA
HAK
TS
X
CODEWORD
SENSITIVE
PARIS MTG
NO FORN
SUBJECT: The VP Report to the NSC on Conclusion
of his Tmp to Asia, AUGUST, 1970
ENCLOSURES: (
)
(
) NOT XEROXED FOR SUSPENSE FILE
INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION
ACTION required
NAME:
MEMO FOR HAK
(
)
ACTiON
INFO
RCD CY
MEMO TO PRESIDENT
(
)
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/HAIG
FOR:
REPLY FOR hak SIGNATURE
(
)
STAFF SECRETARY
REPLY FOR PRES SIGNATURE
(
)
MEMO
TO
(
)
SECRETARIAT DISTRIBUTION/ACTION
dir SECRETARIAT
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
RECOMMENDATIONS
(
)
NR EAST/NORTH AFRICA
JOINT MEMO
(
)
EUROPE/CANADA
APPROPRIATE ACTION
(
)
LATIN AMERICA
ANY ACTION NECESSARY
(
)
UNITED NATIONS
CONCURRENCE
(
)
ECONOMIC
DUE DATE:
SCIENTIFIC
PLANNING GROUP
COMMENTS: (Including Special Instructions)
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
Logged m/ant/pe
record pen pasis only
DATE
FROM
TO
ACTION Sant REQUIRED
by wine, 31 AVG
INTERNAL ROUTING
MICROFILM DATA
DO
RJ
INIT
SEP 04 DATE 1970
ORIG) NSC.
TO
)
PAF
WHC
SUBF
DISPATCH: LETTER/MEMO
NSC
X
STAFF approval
DISPOSITION
PAF
HAK APPL
NOTIFY:
WHC
HAK MARGINALIA
SUBF
No
NS3 FORM REQUIRED
COPIES: (AS MARKED ABOVE)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
* GPO: 1970-385-803
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER
ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER
A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
contains information restricted under the Privacy Act
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NSC
TOP SECRET
August 31, 1970
Mr. President:
Attached for tomorrow's NSC meeting
are two briefing papers. At Tab A is a
memorandum for the fisht item on the
Agenda, the Vice President's report on
his trip to East Asia. At Tab B is a
memorandum on the second agenda item,
a brief review of the Middle East
situation.
Henry A. Kissinger
Attachments
TOP SECRET
DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/16/02
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC
under provisions of E.O. 12958
Rtlex
HAK:WL:ms:8/31/70
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
/
in
A
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
FORMATION
TOP SECRET
August 31, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Agenda Item 1 - - The Vice President's Report on
His Visit to East Asia - NSC Meeting, September 1
The Vice President will report to the National Security Council at
10:00 a. m. September 1 on the results of his visit to Korea, the
Republic of China, South Vietnam, Cambodia and Thailand. After his
report, the NSC will briefly review the Middle East situation on which
I am providing you a separate memorandum.
You will want to congratulate the Vice President on the outstanding job
that he did in reaffirming our commitments under the Nixon Doctrine
and expressing our determination to help our Asian friends defend
themselves against aggression. He also handled very well the difficult
job of pointing out the Congressional and public opinion problems which
you and the Administration currently face, and enlisting their patience
and cooperation. The only difficult situation was in Korea, where
President Park showed surprising insensitivity to your need to get a
majority of the Congress and the public on your side in continuing to
honor our Asian commitments.
Following are brief highlights of each of the Vice President's stops,
with suggested questions for you to raise in the discussion.
Republic of Korea
President Park insisted that U.S. troop reductions be held to the 20, 000
already agreed until ROK force modernization was completed, and would
not compromise. However, the Vice President's press remarks on pos-
sibly having all U.S. troops out in five years apparently helped to induce
the ROK to agree to meet with our representatives in Seoul to discuss troop
withdrawal along with the modernization program. They may have thought
that failure to do so would have left the withdrawal timetable entirely in
our hands.
DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/16/02
TOP SECRET
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon
- rer
R7G
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
- 2 -
You might wish to ask:
-- What is the Vice President's estimate of President Park's
position -- will he come around?
-- What recommendations does the Vice President have in
obtaining a greater degree of ROK cooperation in working
out our withdrawals?
Republic of China
There were no problems, and the atmosphere was very good despite the
Vice President's forewarning that military aid to the GRC would be cut
to help provide for Cambodia. President Chiang and Chiang Ching-Kuo
expressed unease about U.S. Peking contacts and urged the grant of
RF-4s and submarines to defend against what they called an imminent
Chinese Communist threat. The Vice President discounted the threat
because of the firmness of our commitment.
You might wish to ask:
-- Can we expect any problems in our relations with the GRC on
aid reductions?
-- What steps might we take to ease the blow?
Republic of Vietnam
The reports so far available all point to a successful and uncontroversial
visit, with Thieu having expressed satisfaction over the visit and on the
depth of U.S. support. Most press coverage was balanced, sensible,
and relaxed.
You might wish to ask:
-- What changes for the better had the Vice President noted since
his last visit? What military, political, and economic problems
remain?
-- What is the state of the relations between Thieu and Ky? Will
these raise difficulties for us?
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
- 3 -
Cambodia
By the Vice President's presence and his affirmation of continued U.S.
support for Cambodia (he cited our $40 million MAP and other aid) he
gave Lon Nol and other Cambodian leaders a real psychological boost.
In response, they emphasized their determination to fight on, but hoped
that their substantial economic and military needs could be met. The
loan of six U.S. helicopters to Cambodia which the Vice President
informed them of privately was received with much gratitude.
You might wish to ask:
-- What is the Vice President's estimate of the capacities of
the Cambodian leaders and their ability to hang on?
-- What are his judgments concerning the military and poli-
tical viability of Cambodia over the longer run?
Thailand
The Vice President asked for Thai cooperation in avoiding statements
which might complicate Administration relations with the Hill and feed
U.S. isolationist sentiment, thus impairing our ability to furnish aid
under the Nixon Doctrine. He assured them of our intention to help
them help Laos and Cambodia through indirect means, and listened to
their estimate of the security situation in Laos, Cambodia and Burma.
You might wish to ask:
--
Do the Thai leaders now fully understand our problems with
Congress and public opinion?
-- Are they now convinced that we wish to help them in steps
undertaken to help safeguard security in Laos and Cambodia?
The Vice President is scheduled to meet with you right after the NSC
meeting to explore the results of his trip in greater depth. I am sending
you a separate memorandum on this, including some questions that
seem more appropriate for this private meeting.
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
INFORMATION
TOP SECRET
August 31, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Agenda Item 1 - - The Vice President's Report on
His Visit to East Asia NSC Meeting, September 1
The Vice President will report to the National Security Council at
10:00 a. m. September 1 on the results of his visit to Korea, the
Republic of China, South Vietnam, Cambodia and Thailand. After his
report, the NSC will briefly review the Middle East situation on which
I am providing you a separate memorandum.
You will want to congratulate the Vice President on the outstanding job
that he did in reaffirming our commitments under the Nixon Doctrine
and expressing our determination to help our Asian friends defend
themselves against aggression. He also handled very well the difficult
job of pointing out the Congressional and public opinion problems which
you and the Administration currently face, and enlisting their patience
and cooperation. The only difficult situation was in Korea, where
President Park showed surprising insensitivity to your need to get a
majority of the Congress and the public on your side in continuing to
honor our Asian commitments.
Following are brief highlights of each of the Vice President's stops,
with suggested questions for you to raise in the discussion.
Republic of Korea
President Park insisted that U.S. troop reductions be held to the 20, 000
already agreed until ROK force modernization was completed, and would
not compromise. However, the Vice President's press remarks on pos-
sibly having all U.S. troops out in five years apparently helped to induce
the ROK to agree to meet with our representatives in Seoul to discuss troop
withdrawal along with the modernization program. They may have thought
that failure to do so would have left the withdrawal timetable entirely in
our hands.
DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/16/02
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC
TOP SECRET
under provisions of E.O. 12958
Rtlx
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
- 2 -
You might wish to ask:
-- What is the Vice President's estimate of President Park's
position -- will he come around?
-- What recommendations does the Vice President have in
obtaining a greater degree of ROK cooperation in working
out our withdrawals?
Republic of China
There were no problems, and the atmosphere was very good despite the
Vice President's forewarning that military aid to the GRC would be cut
to help provide for Cambodia. President Chiang and Chiang Ching-Kuo
expressed unease about U.S. -Peking contacts and urged the grant of
RF-4s and submarines to defend against what they called an imminent
Chinese Communist threat. The Vice President discounted the threat
because of the firmness of our commitment.
You might wish to ask:
-- Can we expect any problems in our relations with the GRC on
aid reductions?
-- What steps might we take to ease the blow?
Republic of Vietnam
The reports so far available all point to a successful and uncontroversial
visit, with Thieu having expressed satisfaction over the visit and on the
depth of U.S. support. Most press coverage was balanced, sensible,
and relaxed.
You might wish to ask:
-- What changes for the better had the Vice President noted since
his last visit? What military, political, and economic problems
remain?
-- What is the state of the relations between Thieu and Ky? Will
these raise difficulties for us?
TOP SECRET
DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/16/02
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC
under provisions of E.O. 12958
R7Gx
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET
- 3 -
Cambodia
By the Vice President's presence and his affirmation of continued U.S.
support for Cambodia (he cited our $40 million MAP and other aid) he
gave Lon Nol and other Cambodian leaders a real psychological boost.
In response, they emphasized their determination to fight on, but hoped
that their substantial economic and military needs could be met. The
loan of six U.S. helicopters to Cambodia which the Vice President
informed them of privately was received with much gratitude.
You might wish to ask:
-- What is the Vice President's estimate of the capacities of
the Cambodian leaders and their ability to hang on?
-- What are his judgments concerning the military and poli-
tical viability of Cambodia over the longer run?
Thailand
The Vice President asked for Thai cooperation in avoiding statements
which might complicate Administration relations with the Hill and feed
U.S. isolationist sentiment, thus impairing our ability to furnish aid
under the Nixon Doctrine. He assured them of our intention to help
them help Laos and Cambodia through indirect means, and listened to
their estimate of the security situation in Laos, Cambodia and Burma.
You might wish to ask:
--
Do the Thai leaders now fully understand our problems with
Congress and public opinion?
-- Are they now convinced that we wish to help them in steps
undertaken to help safeguard security in Laos and Cambodia?
The Vice President is scheduled to meet with you right after the NSC
meeting to explore the results of his trip in greater depth. I am sending
you a separate memorandum on this, including some questions that
seem more appropriate for this private meeting.
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
B
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
INFORMATION
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
August 31, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Henry A. Kissinger HK
SUBJECT:
Agenda Item 2 -- Tour d'Horizon of the
Middle East -- NSC Meeting, September 1st
Purpose of the Meeting
An NSC meeting has been convened for Tuesday, September 1st,
at 10:00 a. m. The first part of the meeting will consist of a
trip report by the Vice President on his Far Eastern tour.
Following completion of this report and a discussion generated
by this report, covered in a separate memorandum, a brief
tour d'horizon of the Middle East situation will be conducted.
Particular emphasis will be placed on future U.S. actions in
the face of further evidence of violations of the standstill cease-
fire.
Background
There continues to be mounting evidence of Egyptian/Soviet
missile movements towards the Canal during the period prior
to and following the acceptance of the U.S. standstill cease-fire
proposal. While there have been some disputes -- in large part
flowing from different perspectives -- over the timing and inter-
pretation of evidence about these movements, there remains
little doubt that there has been a substantial change in the military
situation along the Canal in the wake of the U.S. peace proposal.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/16/02
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC
under provisions of E.O. 12958
R7lx
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
-2-
Egyptian/Soviet Violations
Egyptian and Soviet violations can be considered in the context of three
benchmarks:
1.
The period following the acceptance by the parties of the
cease-fire but prior to its effective date.
The Intelligence Community agrees that in the week or so
before the cease-fire was implemented (August 7) there was a substantial
forward deployment of surface-to-air missiles into and within what
became the Egyptian cease-fire zone. We have previously confirmed,
on the basis of satellite photography, that between July 28 and August 10
some 23 additional Egyptian-manned SA-2 sites and 5 Soviet-manned
SA-3 sites were occupied and that 15 new SA-2 sites were constructed
in the area. (Each SA-2 site has 6 missiles, each SA-3 site has 4 missiles.)
2.
The period of the night the cease-fire was implemented.
We have been unable, using evidence provided by the
Israelis and our own photography, to tell precisely when specific viola-
tions of the cease-fire occurred during the fuzzy period just before and
immediately following the implementation of the cease-fire. Never-
theless, there does seem to be enough evidence to suggest strongly
that some Soviet and Egyptian activity may not have been completed
until several hours after the cease-fire military standstill deadline.
For its part, Israel has made a public point of their opinion that there
were substantial Egyptian and Soviet violations immediately after the
cease-fire went into effect.
3.
The period since implementation of the cease-fire.
Some of the above debate has been overtaken by events.
There is new evidence of continuing Soviet-Egyptian violations of the
cease-fire during the period August 9 to date. Satellite photography
developed on August 29 suggests that in addition to the 1 SA-2 site
moved into the cease-fire zone which was confirmed earlier and about
which we complained to Egypt and the Soviet Union, there now appear
to be between 7 and 8 additional SA-2 sites. Further, there is
evidence that at least 3 or 4 of these were definitely emplaced well
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
-3-
after the cease-fire went into effect. More importantly, recently
analyzed photography now confirms that 5 or 6 Soviet-manned SA-3
sites have been moved within the cease-fire zone, in addition to the
5 SA-3 sites which were picked up earlier. There remains some
question as to precisely when these SA-3 sites were moved.
Israeli Violations
The Israelis have been flying almost daily reconnaissance flights over
the Egyptian cease-fire zone. This is clearly in violation of the cease-
fire. The Egyptians have also accused the Israelis of improving their
fortified positions on the East Bank.
The Israelis have also carried on military operations at about the same
level along their other borders and cease-fire lines. They have justified
this on the basis of the need to discourage and pre-empt continuing
Fedayeen activities along these borders. Jordan has formally protested
the Israeli operations to the U.N.
Implications
Whatever the precise pattern of events, the strategic
military situation along the Canal has been modified in the wake of our
cease-fire proposal and after the cease-fire was accepted.
:
The Egyptians have moved their air defense complex
forward to cover their artillery and forces along the Canal and thus
threaten Israel's strategic position. There are also intelligence
reports that Soviet-supplied 203 mm long-range howitzers are now
being emplaced along the Canal to reenforce substantial Egyptian
shorter range artillery emplaced along its length. Israeli Doctrine
relies on air suppression of Egyptian artillery along the Canal. The
forward movement of the Soviet/Egyptian SAM complex will significantly
complicate Israel's ability to suppress Egyptian artillery in the future
and thus jeopardize the viability of Israel's East Bank defensive
positions. It will permit selected massing of Egyptian artillery to
neutralize these defenses at given points along the East Bank.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
-4-
Although the initial controversy surrounding Israeli
charges of a violation of the cease-fire immediately after its imple-
mentation may never be verified, we now know that subsequent
violations have occurred afterwards. Furthermore, positive evidence
of the forward movement of the SA-3s into the cease-fire zone confirms
that the Soviets, rather than restraining the Egyptians, have actually
participated in the violations. They have violated not only the cease-
fire but warnings by the highest U.S. officials, including the Secretary
of State. The new evidence on the SA-3s further complicates the
situation.
The Soviet/Egyptian missile movements have been
carried out despite two types of warnings in our discussions with them:
1.
Prior to the cease-fire, Secretary Rogers stipulated
to the Soviets that missiles with their personnel should not be placed
within 30 kilometers of the Canal for this could not be considered
"defensive".
2.
Subsequent to the cease-fire, the Soviets/Egyptians
have violated both the spirit and the substance of the cease-fire pro-
hibitions within the 50 kilometer zone.
On August 24th, the Egyptians in effect rejected a U.S.
demarche requesting that a newly occupied site be restored to an un-
occupied condition and that the construction work on two other sites be
halted. The Egyptian response preceded the more recent confirmation
of additional violations. We have yet to receive a definitive Soviet
response to the demarche. In the interim, we have provided the
evidence of the earlier violations to the Israelis and requested that
they say nothing publicly until the UAR has had an opportunity to respond.
- -
Related to the foregoing, on August 29th, the Soviets,
at the Deputy Foreign Minister level have protested our U-2 recon-
naissance flights along the Israeli side of the Suez Canal. According
to Deputy Foreign Minister Vino Gradov, these flights run the "risk
of special surprises" and full responsibility for "possible consequences"
lies with the U.S. Concurrently, Brezhnev delivered an unusually mild
speech on the Middle East which seems to commit the Soviet prestige
to a peace settlement.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
-5-
3.
To the extent that the credibility of our promise to
stand behind the cease-fire is undermined, we lose leverage on the
negotiations. What will move the Israelis to give up conquered territory
is a U.S. promise of support for the new frontier. This will, in turn,
depend on the general validity of our promises.
Options for the Future
In the face of the most recent evidence of continued cease-fire
violation, there appear to be the following choices for U.S. action:
1.
Do nothing and press ahead in our efforts to get
negotiations underway. This could lead to sharp escalation as a result
of continued violations by both sides and Israeli retaliatory action against
the forward SAM sites through ground action across the Canal, a surge
of Israeli air activity or a combination of both.
2.
Launch a diplomatic protest through routine diplomatic
channels. In the face of the most recent evidence, such action may
not satisfy Israeli concerns and involves the same risks as the "do
nothing" course.
3.
Launch a diplomatic protest at the Foreign Minister
level. This would appear to be the minimum action necessary in the
light of the seriousness of the vi olations and the need to convince the
Israelis that we are serious about enforcing adherence to the cease-fire
provisions.
4.
Launch a diplomatic protest at the Foreign Minister
level, combined with action to step up arms deliveries to Israel. This
course of action would go farther toward assuaging Israeli concerns
and demonstrating U.S. determination to the Soviets/Egyptians. At
the same time, it could run the risk of contributing to Arab intransigence
and suspicion.
- 5.
Support an Israeli refusal to go ahead with negotiations
until a status quo ante within the cease-fire zone had been re-established.
This action would require the removal of the SA-2 and SA-3s whose
establishment after the cease-fire was confirmed.
6.
Inform the Israelis that they are free to take whatever
reprisal action they deem appropriate to achieve a status quo ante.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
-6-
The proposal could be adopted with or without a decision to provide
additional assistance to the Israelis. It would probably generate a
request from them. This would lead to a severe crisis with risks of
U.S. - Soviet confrontation.
Conduct of the Meeting
Director Helms will be prepared to provide a current assessment of
cease-fire violations by all parties. The assessment should be fol-
lowed by a discussion of the implications of these violations and,
finally, a consideration of the choices available to us for future action.
Talking Points
You may wish to utilize the following talking points in the conduct of
the meeting:
This morning's meeting has been convened to review
the Middle East situation in light of the most recent evidence of
cease-fire violations within the Egyptian cease-fire zone.
--
Call on Director Helms to present a current update of
the intelligence picture in the Middle East, with emphasis on recent
evidence of Soviet/Egyptian cease-fire violațions.
--
Ask Admiral Moorer for his assessment of the strategic
implications of the forward emplacement of the Soviet/Egyptian SAM
installations within the cease-fire zone and current Israeli capabilities
to retaliate.
--
Ask Secretary Packard for a brief update on the status
of our military deliveries to Israel.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
-7-
--
Ask Secretary Rogers/Assistant Secretary Sisco to
provide the group with an update of the most recent diplomatic inter-
play, to include:
1.
The status of our demarche to the Soviets/Egyptians
on the earlier evidence of cease-fire violations.
2.
The status of our communications with the Israelis
on their cease-fire violations.
3.
An assessment of the implications of the Soviet
warning on our U-2 flights.
4.
An assessment of the implications of the most
recent evidence of cease-fire violations in the Egyptian cease-fire zone.
5.
An assessment of current Soviet, Arab, and
Israeli attitudes with respect to the U.S. initiative.
--
Conduct a pro and con discussion of each of the follow-
ing options for future U.S. action:
1.
The "do nothing" course.
2.
Diplomatic protest through diplomatic channels.
3.
Diplomatic protest at Foreign Minister level.
4.
Diplomatic protest at Foreign Minister level,
combined with stepped-up U.S. arms deliveries.
5.
Delay negotiations pending return to status quo ante.
6.
Tell Israel it is free to take remedial action on its
own without additional U.S. arms -- with additional U.S. arms.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
21563
INFORMATION
TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE
August 25, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
Samuel M. Hoskinson
SUBJECT: Middle East Situation
I have prepared the attached memo with the thought that you might find
it useful to have a summary of the military and diplomatic situation as
the peace talks get underway in New York. The memo is addressed
from you to the President in case you wish to pass it along to him.
DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/16/02
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC
under provisions of E.O. 12958
RHX
TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE
SMH.tmt 8/25/70
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
21646
SECRET/NODIS
August 31, 1970
TO:
GENERAL HAIG FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
HAL SAUNDERS
SUBJECT: Background for Discussions on Mid-East
I have pouched to you this afternoon a fuller CIA memo on the latest
intelligence analysis of Soviet and UAR standstill violations. To simplify,
they boil down to the following when all the uncertainties of photo inter-
pretation are stripped away.
1.
The major developments revealed by this latest intelligence
analysis relating to Soviet SA-3 sites are as follows:
--As of August 22, the intelligence community had identified
5 operational SA-3 sitee. These were the 5 sites carried
Rtap
in our listing as of establishment of the cease-fire.
DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/16/02
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC
--Since August 22, the intelligence community has discovered
two additional SA-3 sites. These are not fully developed sites;
under provisions of E.O. 12958
the usual revetments are absent, but the missiles and guidance
equipment are arranged in their normal pattern. In looking
back over earlier photos, analysts conclude that deployment
at one site was partially completed between August 7 and 10.
It was totally completed by August 18 (though we did not realize
this until after the photo missions of August 23-24). Deployment
SECRET/NODISReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
- 2 -
to the other site probably was not started until after August 10,
It was totally completed by August 18 (though, again, we did
not realize this until after the August 23-24 missions).
--In - addition, the intelligence community has discovered SA-3
equipment in three and possibly 4 SA-2 sites. Assuming that
our intelligence people made no mistakes, SA-3 equipment has
replaced SA-2 equipment at these sites.
-- Therefore: At a minimum, there seem to be two clearcut
Soviet violations. One was a case of completing deployment
to a site after the standstill. The other was a case of moving
an entire SA-3 unit to a new site after the standstill. Beyond
this, there are 3-4 cases that are violations by strict definition
of the standstill--cases where SA-3 equipment has replaced
SA-2. In short, we are now talking about 10 or 11 SA-3 units
in the standstill zone, while the Israelis-- as far as we know
are still only aware of 5.
2.
While the above look like major new developments, the Egyptians
have continued to develop new SA-2 sites.
-Our analysts now identify 57 or 58 SA-2 sites occupied by
SA-2 equipment. As of August 10, they identified 51.
- --At least four of these 6 or 7 newly identified SA-2 sites have
appeared since August 11 (three of these since August 22).
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
histdacumen has.been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
- 3 -
The above--especially the Soviet moves when the Israelis learn of them--
will certainly compound the disagreement centering around Dayan in the
Israeli Cabinet over whether to send their representative back to the
Jarring talks before they get some satisfaction on the standstill violations.
That is the fundamental tactical issue we face.
You will have seen Sisco's three options:
1.
Continue to support the ceasefire and the Jarring talks, pressing
the Soviets and the UAR to stop their violations but in effect acquiescing in
them.
2.
Continue to support the ceasefire and urge Israel to observe it
but tell the Soviets we would support Israel in suspending participating in the
Jarring discussions until the UAR and USSR removed the missiles introduced
during the ceasefire period and ceased all further violations.
3.
Tell the USSR that we will no longer cooperate in pursuing the
peace talks or in the continuation of the ceasefire and would support Israel
in a return to the military and political situation pre-August 7 unless the
violations are corrected and no further violations occur.
As a refinement of the third option above, you or someone else could tell
the Soviets privately that we have the latest information on their violations,
that the Israelis are likely to abstain from any serious talk when we give
SECRET/NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
- 4 -
them this information and suggest that they make some movements that
we can point to as response to our approaches; if we cannot move Israel
there will be no settlement and we cannot as a practical matter move
Israel without Soviet cooperation.
SECRET/NODIS
HHSaunders:tmt 8/31/70
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
INFORMATION
TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT:
Middle East Situation
I thought you might find it useful to have a summary of the military
and diplomatic situation as the Middle East peace talks get underway in New
York. This is the context within which the talks have begun.
Egyptian and Soviet Violations
The intelligence community knows that in the week or so before the
cease-fire (August 7) there was a substantial forward deployment of
surface-to-air missiles into and within what became the Egyptian
cease-fire zone. We can confirm, on the basis of satellite photography,
that between July 28 and August 10 some 23 additional Egyptian-manned
SA-2 sites and five Soviet-manned SA-3 sites were occupied and that
15 new SA-2 sites were constructed in the area. But we can not, even
using the evidence provided by the Israelis, tell precisely when these
changes occurred. Nevertheless, there does seem to be enough evidence
to at least strongly suspect that some of this Soviet and Egyptian activity
may have not been completed until immediately after the cease-fire
military standstill deadline.
The Israelis have made a big public point out of their opinion that there
were substantial Egyptian and Soviet violations immediately after the cease-
fire went into effect. The evidence indicates that in fact, although we
can not be absolutely sure, this may be true. But the more important
point is that this was only the tailend of an attempt to alter the military
balance on the eve of the cease-fire and in opposition to the spirit of the
peace initiative. Clearly the Soviets and Egyptians moved rapidly to
take military advantage of the diplomatic situation and to some extent
managed to cut down the margin of Israeli air superiority along the
Egyptian side of the Suez Canal and make more vulnerable the Israeli
positions along the Canal.
TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE
- 2 -
There is evidence of continuing Egyptian violations of the military
standstill provision of the cease-fire agreement. Our intelligence
analysts have determined, on the basis of both U S and Israeli
intelligence, that missile-related movement and construction activity
occurred on at least seven and possibly three additional sites (for a
total of ten) during the period August 9 through 18. The preliminary
analysis of the photography from the most recent U-2 mission on
August 22 indicates that this activity is continuing. It is important to
note, however, that all this activity concerns the Egyptian-manned
SA-2 sites and that there has been no change observed in five Soviet-
manned SA-3 sites within the cease-fire zone since the military
standstill deadline.
Israeli Violations
The Israelis have been flying almost daily reconnaissance flights over
the Egyptian cease-fire zone. This is clearly in violation of the
cease-fire, The Egyptians have also accused the Israelis of improving
their fortified positions on the east bank of the Suez Canal. Both sides
have probably been responsible for the periodic firings across the
cease-fire line.
The Israelis have also carried on their military operations at about
the same level along their other borders and cease-fire lines. They
have justified this on the basis of the need to discourage and preempt
the continuing fedayeen terrorist activities along these borders. The
Jordanians have formally protested the Israeli violations of their cease-
fire line to the UN.
U.S. Actions
State has attempted, without much success, to keep the Israeli charges
of cease-fire violations out of the press and, at least initially, in quiet
diplomatic channels. The major effort has been to shift the focus from
cease-fire violations to the peace talks. As you know, most of the
public outcry has come from Israel and the Egyptians, at least publicly,
have been playing the whole affair low-key and using it to help create an
image that the Israelis are unwilling to get down to the serious business
of the peace talks.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE
- 3 -
As you know, once we determined that there had in fact been Egyptian
violations of the cease-fire agreement rather strong demarches were
made in both Cairo and Moscow. The Egyptians have, after careful
consideration, responded to the effect that by their interpretation of the
military standstill provision they have not violated the cease-fire
agreement. They have assured us that they have not and will not
introduce additional missiles into or construct new sites within the
cease-fire zone. On the other hand, the Egyptians insist on reserving
the right to "rotate" the same kind of missiles in and out of the cease-fire
zone and to "maintain" and "repair" the present missile sites in the
broadest sense. In part, they seem to be rationalizing their extremely
loose interpretation of the cease-fire agreement on the basis that it is
one-sided since there are no restrictions on the Israelis strengthening
their offensive capabilities against the Egyptian air-defense system.
In fact, they have specifically accused us of violating the cease-fire by
supplying Israel with weapons and devices to attack the Egyptian air
defenses. Finally, the Egyptians also alleged that the Israelis are
fortifying home positions within the cease-fire zone and violating Egyptian
air space.
Our response to this Egyptian answer has been to inform them that we
simply do not agree with their loose interpretation of the military standstill
provision of the cease-fire agreement. We have further pressed to them
our hope that our clarification, which rules out the actions they have cited,
will remove any misunderstandings and that strict adherence to the cease-
fire will enable us to close out this chapter and turn our full attention to
the peace talks.
The Egyptians have also been informed that we have already taken up the
question of overflights with the Israelis and that we intend to raise their
other charges in Tel Aviv. The Israelis have also been informed of our
actions in Cairo.
The Soviets have not yet formally responded to our demarche on the
Egyptian violations. You will recall, however, that Deputy Foreign
Minister Kuznetsov's initial response was to stall for time and to place
the blame on Israel.
TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526. and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE
- 4 -
Conclusion:
The talks in New York under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring
have finally begun. But the diplomatic atmosphere is clouded by
the deep animosity and suspicion that exists on both sides. In a
broad sense, the whole affair over the cease-fire violations is only
a manifestation of this fact which has held up the start of the talks
and will be a constant threat to abort them.
As the originator of the peace initiative and the negotiator of the
cease-fire agreement, the U.S. is caught in the middle. We can take
considerable credit for what has been achieved so far--which is
substantial--but we will also be blamed by the parties and others for
the failures. Clearly the most difficult obstacles are still ahead of us
on the road to a peace settlement.
TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE
SMH. 8/25/Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Hi
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Modified NSC Meeting on the Middle East
You are scheduled to meet on Tuesday, September 1st at
10:00 a. m. in your office with:
Secretary Rogers
Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard (in lieu of
Secretary Laird)
Attorney General Mitchell
Director of Central Intelligence Helms
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Moorer
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs, Henry Kissinger
Purpose of the Meeting
The meeting is designed to convene selected members of the
National Security Council for a tour d'horizon of the Middle East
situation, with particular emphasis on future U.S. actions in the
face of further evidence of violations of the standstill cease-fire.
Background
There continues to be mounting evidence of large scale
Egyptian/Soviet missile movements towards the Canal during the
period prior to and following the acceptance of the U.S. standstill
cease-fire proposal. While there have been some disputes -- in
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED ON 4/16/02
by NARA on the recommendation of the NSC
under provisions of E.O. 12958
Rtb
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
-2-
large part flowing from different perspectives -- over the facts and
interpretation of evidence about these movements, there remains
little doubt that from the Israeli perspective at least there has been
a substantial change in the military situation along the Canal in the
wake of the U.S. peace proposal.
Egyptian/Soviet Violations
Egyptian and Soviet violations can be considered in the context
of three benchmarks:
1.
The period following the U.S. cease-fire proposal but
prior to its effective date.
The Intelligence Community agrees that in a week or so
before the cease-fire was implemented (August 7) there was a
substantial forward deployment of surface-to-air missiles into and
within what became the Egyptian cease-fire zone. We have can confirmed
on the basis of satellite photography, that between July 28 and
August 10 some 23 additional Egyptian manned SA-2 sites and
five Soviet-manned SA-3 sites were occupied and that 15 new SA-2
sites were constructed in the area.
2.
The period of the night the cease-fire was implemented.
We have been unable, using evidence provided by the
Israelis and our own photography, to tell precisely when specific
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
-3-
violations of the cease-fire occurred during the fuzzy period just
before and immediately following the implementation of the cease-
fire. Nevertheless, there does seem to be enough evidence to at
least strongly suggest that some of the sighted Soviet and Egyptian
activity may not have been completed until immediately after the
cease-fire military standstill deadline. For its part, Israel has
made a public point of their opinion that there were substantial
Egyptian and Soviet violations immediately after the cease-fire
went into effect.
3.
The period since implementation of the cease-fire.
There is new evidence of continuing Soviet-Egyptian
violations of the cease-fire during the period August 9 to date. This
evidence developed on August 29 suggests that in addition to the ISA-2
site moved into the cease-fire zone which was confirmed earlier and
about which we complained to Egypt and the Soviet Union, there now
appear to be between 7 and 8 additional SA-2 sites. Further, there is
evidence that at least 3 or 4 of these were definitely emplaced well
after the cease-fire went into effect. More importantly, recently
analyzed photography now confirms that 3 or 4 Soviet-manned SA-3
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
-4-
sites have been moved within the cease-fire zone, in addition to
the 5 SA-3 sites which were picked up earlier. There is still remains
some question as to precisely when these SA-3 sites were moved.
Israeli Violations
The Israelis have been flying almost daily reconnaissance
flights over the Egyptian cease-fire zone. This is clearly in
violation of the cease-fire. The Egyptians have also accused the
Israelies of improving their fortified positions on the East Bank.
The Israelies have also carried on military operations at
about the same level along their other borders and cease-fire lines.
They have justified this on the basis of the need to discourage and
pre-empt continuing Fedayeen activities along these borders.
Jordan has formally protested the Israeli operations to the U.N.
Implications
--
Whatever the precise pattern of events, the strategic
military situation along the Canal has been modified in the wake of
our cease-fire proposal.
--
The Egyptians have moved their air defense complex forward
to cover their artillery and forces along the Canal and thus threaten
Israel's strategic position. There an 16, also that
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
-5-
Soviet-supplied 203 mm long-range howitzers are now being emplaced
along the Canal to reenforce substantial Egyptian shorter range
artillery already emplaced along its length. Israeli Doctrine
relies on air suppression of Egyptian artillery along the Canal. The
forward movement of the Soviet/Egyptian SAM complex will signi-
ficantly complicate Israel's ability to suppress Egyptian artillery
in the future and thus jeopardize the viability of Israel's East Bank
defensive positions. It will permit selected massing of Egyptian
artillery to neutralize these defenses at given points along the
East Bank.
--
Although the initial controversy surrounding Israeli
charges of a violation of the cease-fire immediately after its imple-
mentation may never be verified, we now know that subsequent violations
have occurred. Furthermore, positive evidence of the forward movement
of the SA-3s into the cease-fire zone confirms that the Soviets, rather
than restraining the Egyptians, have actually participated in the
violations. The new evidence on the SA-3's adds to the gravity of
the situation.
--
The Soviet/Egyptian missile movements have been carried
out despite two types of warnings in our discussions with them:
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
-6-
1.
Prior to the cease-fire, Secretary Rogers stipulated
to the Soviets that missiles with their personnel should not be
placed within 30 kilometers of the Canal for this could not be con-
sidered "defensive".
ceaufire
2.
a
The Soviets /Egyptians have violated both the spirit
and the substance of the cease-fire prohibitions within the 50
kilometer zone.
ineffact
--
On August 24th, the Egyptians rejected a U.S. demarche
requesting that a newly occupied site be restored to an unoccupied
condition and that the construction work on two other sites be
halted. The Egyptian response preceded the more recent confirmation
of additional violations. We have yet to receive a definitive Soviet
response to the demarche. In the interim, we have provided
the evidence of the earlier violations to the Israelis and requested
that they say nothing publicly until the UAR has had an opportunity
to respond.
--
Related to the foregoing, on August 29th, the Soviets,
at the Deputy Foreign Minister level have protested our U-2
reconnaissance flights along the Israeli side of the Suez Canal.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
-7-
According to Deputy Foreign Minister Vino Gradov, these flights
run the "risk of special surprises" and full responsibility for
"possible consequences" lies with the U.S. Concurrently, Brezhnev
delivered an unusually mild speech on the Middle East which seems
to commit the Soviet prestige to a peace settlement.
Options for the Future
In the face of the most recent evidence of continued cease-fire
violation, there appear to be the following choices for U.S. action:
1.
Do nothing and press ahead in our efforts to get
negotiations underway. This could lead to sharp escalation as a
result of continued violations by both sides and Israeli retaliatory
action against the forward SAM sites through ground action across
the Canal, a surge of Israeli air activity or a combination of both.
2.
Launch a diplomatic protest through routine diplomatic
channels. In the face of the most recent evidence, such action
may not satisfy Israeli concerns and involves the same risks as
the "do nothing" course.
3.
Launch a diplomatic protest at the Foreign Minister
level. This course would appear to be the minimum action necessary
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
-8-
in the light of the seriousness of the violations and the need to con-
vince the Israelis that we are serious about enforcing adherence to
the cease-fire provisions.
4.
Launch a diplomatic protest at the Foreign Minister
level, combined with action to step up arms deliveries to Israel.
This course of action would go farther toward assuaging Israeli
concerns and demonstrating U.S. determination to the Soviets/
Egyptians. At the same time, it could run the risk of contributing
to Arab intransigence and suspicion.
5.
Announce to all parties our decision to hold off on
negotiations until a status quo antè within the cease-fire zone had
been re-established. This action would require as a minimum the
removal of the already sited SA-2 position together with those more
recently confirmed sites.
6.
Inform the Israelis that they are free to take whatever
reprisal action they deem appropriate to achieve a status quo ante.
The proposal could be adopted with or without a decision to provide
additional assistance to the Israelis. It would probably generate
a request from them. This course of action may be unavoidable
in any event. Certainly the weaker our response appears to the
Israelis, the more probable Israeli action becomes.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
-9-
Conduct of the Meeting
Director Helms will be prepared to provide thoumost
currentl
available assessment of cease-fire violations by all parties.
should be followed by a discussion of the implications of these
violations and, finally, a consideration of the choices available to
us for future action.
Talking Points
You may wish to utilize the following talking points in the
conduct of the meeting:
--
This morning's meeting has been convened to review the
Middle East situation in light of the most recent evidence of cease-fire
violations within the Egyptian cease-fire zone.
--
Call on Director Helms to present a current update of
the intelligence picture in the Middle East, with emphasis on recent
evidence of Soviet/Egyptian cease-fire violations.
--
Ask Secretary Rogers/Assistant Secretary Sisco to
provide the group with an update of the most recent diplomatic
interplay, to include:
1.
The status of our demarche to the Soviets/Egyptians
on the earlier evidence of cease-fire violations.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
-10-
2.
The status of our communications with the
Israelis on their cease-fire violations.
3.
An assessment of the implications of the Soviet
warning on our U-2 flights.
4.
An assessment of the implications of the most
recent evidence of cease-fire violations in the Egyptian cease-fire
zone.
5.
An assessment of current Soviet, Arab, and
Israeli attitudes with respect to the U.S. initiative.
--
Ask Admiral Moorer for his assessment of the strategic
implications of the forward emplacement of the Soviet/Egyptian
SAM installations within the cease-fire zone and current Israeli
capabilities to retaliate.
--
Ask Secretary Packard for a brief update on the status
of our military deliveries to Israel.
- -
Conduct a pro and con discussion of each of the following
options for future U.S. action:
1.
The "do nothing" course.
2.
Diplomatic protest through diplomatic channels.
3.
Diplomatic protest at Foreign Minister level.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
-11-
4.
Diplomatic protest at Foreign Minister level
combined with stepped-up U.S. arms deliveries.
5.
Hold off on negotiations pending return to status
quo ante.
6.
Tell Israel it is free to take remedial action
on its own without additional U.S. arms -- with additional U.S.
arms.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.