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1) Negotiations 2) Escalation 3) De-Escalation Vietnam H.A. Kissinger
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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Vietnam Papers
Attached are several papers on Vietnam focused on:
(1) negotiations, (2) possible escalation, and (3) U.S. force levels
in the South and possible de-escalation. The papers attached are:
HAK Memo on Vietnam Situation and Options.
My effort to summarize where we stand and my recommenda-
tions for action in the next several months. Attached to this
memo is my memo to you on de-escalation and a staff paper
on negotiations.
Laird Memo.
Trip report plus recommendations, particularly on U.S. troop
levels and ARVN improvement. A lucid description of the
situation we face in South Vietnam. A summary of the memo
is also at the Tab.
Wheeler Memo.
Recommendations related mainly to reactions to enemy shelling.
Mutual Withdrawal Memo.
This memo points to the evidence that Hanoi may be seriously
interested in negotiating mutual withdrawal.
Encls: a/s
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
HAK
ME MO
ind to be ifo
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This dument bas been Order. 12526 and
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Vietnam Situation and Options
This memorandum contains my analysis of the Vietnam situation
and my views on the major decisions which you will have to face in the
next several weeks concerning: (1) negotiation strategy, (2) the level of
our forces in the South and possible de-escalation, and (3) response to
further enemy shelling of major cities.
I. The Situation as of January 20
The situation in South Vietnam which we inherited on January 20
is well described in Secretary Laird's memorandum to you:
"General Abrams has made remarkable progress in
achieving a measure of military superiority throughout
South Vietnam. The pacification program, which must
depend primarily and increasingly on South Vietnamese
efforts, is also proceeding, though at a slower rate. But
none of our officials, either military or civilian, is under
any illusion that the battle in South Vietnam can be brought
to a military conclusion within six months, a year or even
several years. Options, over which we have little or no
control, are available to the enemy for continuing the war
almost indefinitely, although perhaps at a reduced intensity. "
While the domestic opposition to the war which was again increasing
quieted down after January 20, there is little question that domestic
controversy will begin to mount, certainly within a few months.
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
II. Assets and Liabilities
In evaluating our options now, we need to take account of our
own assets and liabilities and those of the enemy.
Our main asset is the presence of our troops in South Vietnam.
Hanoi has no hope of attaining its objective of controlling the South
unless it can get us to withdraw our forces. Because of our over-
whelming economic strength and military power Hanoi knows that we
cannot, by military means, be forced to withdraw.
Our substantial capability to escalate the war confronts Hanoi
with the danger of having to rely even more heavily on China and the
Soviet Union.
Our liabilities are the domestic opposition in the United States
and the continuing weak political base of the Saigon government.
Hanoi's assets and liabilities are to a large extent the reverse
of our own. Hanoi knows it cannot defeat us militarily and that a
step up in our actions could threaten its autonomy. There are signs
of strains in morale in North Vietnam which must worry the leader-
ship. Moreover, the danger of a Sino-Soviet clash which would disrupt
their supplies from both countries almost certainly poses a continuing
sense of unease. The unpredictable international situation provides an
incentive to Hanoi to negotiate.
Hanoi's main asset is the high value it attaches to gaining control
of South Vietnam and hence its willingness to accept casualties and risks
that seem disproportionate to us. Hanoi is, of course, fighting in
familiar terrain and has been able to develop a political-military strategy
for the conflict. The Hanoi leadership also counts on world and U.S.
public opinion.
III. Where Do We Go From Here?
We must, in the coming months, fully coordinate our diplomacy
with our military actions in a carefully orchestrated plan designed to
maximize the possibilities of getting a satisfactory settlement.
We face the continuing dilemma that if Hanoi believes we are
running out of time it has no incentive to negotiate. We, thus, must
play our hand in a way which:
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
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TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
(1) increases the time we have available,
(2) makes clear to Hanoi that our domestic opposition will
not force a precipitous withdrawal, and
(3) provides incentives to both Hanoi and Saigon to negotiate.
In order to do this, we must:
(1) seek private talks and progress in the negotiations without
appearing over eager or anxious,
(2) maintain the confidence of the GVN,
(3) assess military questions, including possible escalation,
not in military terms alone but also for the political effect of our actions
and, in particular, its impact on the negotiations.
We must recognize the paradox that a deliberate pace is the
fastest route to a settlement. A calm posture will bring peace faster
than constantly pressing for talks, seeking to force the pace, and putting
forward a smorgasbord of proposals.
How should we apply these general principals in dealing with
the specific questions of negotiations, U.S. force levels and possible
U.S. de-escalation and the political effects of possible escalatory
steps particularly in relation to the Soviet Union?
IV. Negotiations
It is extremely important that we carefully consider the pace of
our negotiations and the subjects we wish to negotiate about. We must
avoid the mistakes of the past.
Prior to January 20, we fluctuated between intensive efforts to
get negotiations started and long periods in which there was no contact
at all. During our "peace offensives" American envoys descended on
capitals all over the world; during the intervals between these spasms,
we relied largely on military measures. When we engaged in diplomacy
we sometimes seemed SO anxious that we encouraged Hanoi to believe
that domestic support was fast running out. We thus encouraged Hanoi
intransigence by giving rise to the hope that domestic opposition would
force us to withdraw.
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
Governor Harriman's negotiating style compounded these
problems. He presented a picture of being desperate for a settle-
ment and gave Hanoi a smorgasbord of proposals from which to
choose. This gave Hanoi a feeling that we were enormously anxious
and gave Hanoi the ability to choose to discuss those proposals which
would create maximum difficulty between us and the GVN.
We must avoid these pitfalls in the future. Thus far, our
objective has been to establish a deliberate pace in the negotiations.
We have developed a careful plan of action designed to assure the GVN
that we do not intend to sell out their interests in a desperate effort
to get out as quickly as possible and to convince Hanoi that we believe
we have time. We have not blocked private talks; we have simply not
asked for them. To have pressed for private talks sooner would have
run the risk of a confrontation with the GVN.
There are signs that this strategy is evolving successfully:
(1) Hanoi has indicated a willingness to engage in private dis-
cussions which would at least include military questions. This was
reflected in a Vance/Lao conversation and in several recent conver-
sations with Soviet officials. There is no comparable period during the
Vietnam War in which the enemy has been making so many overtures
to us for private talks. The enemy is also complaining publicly that
we are refusing to talk to them privately.
(2) The GVN has inaugurated private contacts with the NVN and
the NLF.
(3) Our relations with Saigon have greatly improved. We are
just beginning to establish full mutual confidence as reflected in your
conversation with Ky, their failure to press hard for retaliation after
the Saigon shellings, and Thieu's agreement to our proposing to Hanoi
that we begin bilateral private talks.
We must now begin to make progress in Paris moving carefully
and deliberately. As we move into private talks with Hanoi, the issues
we must face are:
(1) The Pace of the Negotiations. We wish to move as quickly
as possible towards a settlement. However, we should gear the pace of
the negotiations to actual progress and not seek talks for their own sake.
To press for frequent private meetings and to constantly alter our position
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
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TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
in an effort to show sincerity would be counterproductive. Hanoi
would only conclude that by waiting they can get better terms.
(2) Agenda.
We should first discuss the issue of mutual withdrawal on
which our bargaining position is the strongest. Hanoi's primary objec-
tive is to get us to withdraw our troops; our major objective is to get
their troops withdrawn. We must recgonize that neither we nor Hanoi
may want to implement a complete withdrawal until the other parts of
a settlement take shape, but we should delay talking about political
issues related to SVN since such discussions can only lead to acrimony
with the South -- a basic objective of Hanoi. Saigon, in any talks on
political matters, is likely to appear to be obstinate and we will be
under great pressure to press the GVN not to prevent successful negoti-
ations.
I recognize that we must at some point be prepared to dis-
cuss a political settlement. But the issue is what we talk about first.
We should begin with an issue on which our position is close to that
of the GVN and which the GVN believes is a legitimate subject for US/NVN
discussions.
(3) Relations with the GVN. There is no doubt that at some
point we will have to engage in arm twisting of the GVN. The question
is again one of timing. If we press the GVN now, since their structure
is fragile, there may be nothing to negotiate about. We should only be
prepared to press them very hard towards the end of the negotiations
when an overall settlement is in sight.
(4) Relations with the Soviets.
There is no question that the Soviets could play a major role
in bringing the war to an end if they decide to put pressure on Hanoi.
The Soviets probably would like the war to end but we have not yet
found the leverage to get them to act on that desire.
There are two views on how we can influence the Soviets.
The first argues that we must demonstrate our good faith, our desire
for peace.
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
5
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
The second view, which I share, is that the Soviets will
put pressure on Hanoi only if after a careful calculation of costs and
gains they decide that it is in their interest to do so. The Soviets
clearly would pay a price in terms of their relations with Peking,
with Hanoi, and with the world communist movement if the Kremlin
pressured Hanoi into accepting settlement. We must give those in
the Soviet hierarchy who might want to move in this direction credible
arguments to use with their hard-line colleagues.
We must find a way either within the Vietnam context or
beyond it to change the current Soviet calculation of gains and risks.
Within Vietnam, we must worry the Soviets about the possi-
bility that we are losing our patience and may get out of control.
Possible escalatory steps must be considered in this light.
Our negotiating strategy must be related to our military
operations in the field. Our decisions regarding responses to Hanoi's
shelling of the cities, U.S. military operations in the South, and
possible troop deployments must show the same determination not
to be panicked and a sense that we know what we are doing.
V.
Escalation
Any escalatory moves that we take in response to Hanoi's shelling
of the cities must be based on a clear understanding of what we are
rying to achieve. Our escalatory moves would not have primarily a
military objective. Our concern would be the political effect of our
actions.
It is difficult to conceive of political effects in response to Hanoi
which would justify full scale resumption of the bombing. We must weigh
the physical damage we can do to North Vietnam against the loss of
domestic and international support of the American position which would
follow a resumption of the bombing. A consideration of these factors
leads, I believe, to the conclusion that a sustained resumption of the
bombing of North Vietnam would not now be justified. What we have
done thus far has, I believe, conveyed the appropriate message. If the
shelling and abuse of the DMZ continues over the next several weeks,
a single escalatory strike might be warranted.
If we do engage in more extensive escalation, I believe it should
be aimed at influencing the Soviet Union not Hanoi. We must worry the
Soviets about the possibility that we are losing our patience and may get
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
out of control. The only credible objective we could have in escalating
would be to give the Soviets concern. Our planning for possible escala-
tion does not have this criteria in mind and thus our current options
have only the unfortunate consequences of a bombing attack without the
possible advantages of posing a threat to the Soviets. We have just
begun to give imaginative thought to this problem.
VI. U.S. Military Forces and Operations in the South
One school of thought argues that we should de-escalate the war
in the South in concert with a negotiating initiative and then hope that by
demonstrating good faith to the Russians we can get a settlement. As
I noted above, I do not believe that we could influence the Russians by
demonstrating sincerity. Moreover, I believe that we must keep up
our military pressure in the South. When and if we withdraw troops it
should be on the basis that the ARVN forces are now in a position to
pick up the slack of a full scale military campaign against the enemy.
Ordering de-escalation would not necessarily reduce casualties, since
the enemy could still attack, nor would it reduce pressures to bring
forces home and to end the war. Of equal importance, it would be
very difficult to devise orders which would be at all acceptable to the
field commanders and which would in fact lead to de-escalation. (My
memorandum to you discussing de-escalation is attached.)
It is conceivable that at some point we would de-escalate. How-
ever, to try to negotiate de-escalation would be demoralizing to our
forces and any negotiation could only be very protracted. Hanoi may
seek to discuss de-escalation but we should not assume that we must
talk about whatever the enemy wantsto talk about. Discussions about
de-escalation would only be time wasting.
An announcement at the right time, probably May or June, of
our intention to withdraw about 75, 000 troops this year and to re-examine
the situation at the end of the year would buy us a considerable amount
of time at home, make clear to Hanoi that we will not be forced into
the total withdrawal which they seek, and at the same time indirectly
put pressure on Saigon to negotiate a political settlement in the South.
I believe we should move in this direction. We should aim at with-
drawing U.S. maneuver battalions leaving the combat support units
behind to aid the ARVN. Prior to their withdrawal, we may want to
regroup some of our combat units and hold them in reserve. Since
the vast majority of our casualties occur in maneuver battalions,
this process would result in reduced U.S. casualties while permitting
us to support the ARVN.
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
VII. Recommendations
1. Between now and June we should engage in private talks
with the North Vietnamese about mutual withdrawal and press Saigon
to talk to the NLF. If Hanoi proposes 4-party private talks, we should,
with GVN agreement, enter into them but let the GVN take the lead in
discussing political matters.
2. We 'should announce in June that we will withdraw 75, 000
troops from South Vietnam during the remainder of the year and that
at the end of the year we will re-examine the situation. (General
Abrams should be told that the decision to withdraw some troops this
year has been made in principle and be asked to submit a concrete
plan for withdrawal of 50 or 75 thousand men between July and December.
This is Secretary Laird's recommendation except that he suggests
withdrawing 50-70 thousand men.)
3. The U.S. withdrawal announcement should be in the context
of a major Presidential speech stressing our desire for peace, presenting
a detailed peace plan, and calling upon Hanoi to engage in serious negoti-
ations about mutual withdrawal. (I am working on a detailed scenario.)
4. We should do everything possible to accelerate ARVN moderniza-
tion and put all the pressure that we can on the GVN to improve the quality
and effectiveness of the ARVN.
5. We should develop a plan for the withdrawal of our combat
forces over the next several years. The plan should explore the possi-
bility of withdrawing U.S. combat troops leaving support units behind
to aid ARVN combat units.
6. We should not take any de-escalatory moves within the South.
If Hanoi proposes discussions of this subject we should refuse to talk about
de-escalation except in the context of an agreement on mutual withdrawal.
7. We should begin immediately to develop alternate plans for
possible escalatory military actions with the motive of convincing the
Soviets that the war might get out of hand. (At your direction, work is
underway on this question.)
8. We should continue to press the GVN to engage in discussions
with the NLF. We should instruct Ambassador Bunker to continue his
discussions with the GVN about political arrangements in the South and
urge them to develop a specific plan which they could put forward publicly
with details which could be passed privately to the NLF and Hanoi.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential 8 Library DECLASSIFIED
This Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DE-ESCALATION
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
March 8, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT:
Reflections on De-escalation
It has become obvious that once private talks start, de-
escalation will be high on the agenda. Zorin referred to a "promise"
made by Harriman which I believe to be true. Hanoi has been
putting it out in newspapers -- see, for example, Joe Kraft's
column.
The question then becomes: what is being de-escalated?
What will be the impact?
De-escalation can come about in one of two ways: tacit
or formal; that is to say, it can occur de facto or by agreement.
However it might take place, it would bring about a major change
in the situation and thus requires careful assessment.
De-escalation must be seen in the light of our overall
strategy. The component of the Communist forces which gave the
war its distinguishing characteristic has been the guerrilla forces.
These have enabled Hanoi and the VC to prevent the consolidation
of governmental authority, to move large forces unobserved and to
create a general climate of insecurity.
When American forces appeared in the war, they were
used mainly to fight North Vietnamese main force units. I have
always considered this to be a strategic error, though the choice
was not entirely up to us. Hanoi was determined to use its forces
the way a bullfighter uses his cape: to keep us lunging in strategi-
cally unproductive areas and to prevent us from grinding down the
guerrilla forces.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
-2-
In recent months, many main force units have been withdrawn
into Cambodia, Laos and North Vietnam -- either because they were
forced or because they wish to preserve these forces for the post-
war period. This has enabled us to devote -- for the first time in the
war -- substantial forces to anti-guerrilla action. If we now de-
escalate, Hanoi will get for nothing what it has had to pay heavy,
perhaps excessive casualties to obtain: the effective neutralization
of U.S. forces with respect to the Communist infrastructure.
Our military effort leaves a great deal to be desired, but
it remains one of our few bargaining weapons.
The impact of de-escalation on the two sides would be highly
asymmetrical. The guerrillas operate by terror or assassination;
our side requires massive military effort. The opponent can achieve
a major impact by occasional actions well below the threshold of
violation; no corresponding actions are available to us.
You will be told that we can always start military operations
again. In fact, the recent Communist offensive has shown that ob-
taining clear criteria as to what constitutes a violation is very
complicated. Every difficulty we have had in deciding whether the
bombing halt "understanding" had been violated will be compounded
in the case of de-escalation. How is one to construe the murder,
kidnapping or intimidation of selected South Vietnamese officials
Will we even know who did it?
Violation criteria would probably be assessed in terms of
major military operations of the type U.S. and Allied forces are
now conducting in South Vietnam. These operations have been de-
signed to provide a military shield for the GVN which enables them,
with our assistance, to progress in the pacification area through
the establishment of law and order and security for the populace.
Conversely, it appears that the enemy has concluded that major
military confrontations are no longer to their advantage. Their
best hope for success rests with increased emphasis on terror and
assassination, while preserving their main force elements as a
psychological threat and for direct action after U.S. withdrawal.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
-3-
Thus, de-escalation would amount to a self-imposed defusing of our
most important asset and the simultaneous enhancement of his most
important asset -- terrorism. We would, in effect, be tying the
hands of our forces in Vietnam.
The related problems associated with maintaining a force
level of 500, 000 -plus combat troops lacking an active combat
mission could also prove troublesome. Unquestionably, pressures
would build to bring our troops home. It would be very difficult to
counter these demands if the level of military activity in Victnam
did not require their presence. An additional problem area would
be the constructive employment of our forces in Vietnam during a
period when military activity had dropped off substantially or com-
pletely. A rash of incidents with the South Vietnamese populations
might occur which paralleled our experiences in Europe after
World War II when an unbusy occupation Army soon found itself in
uneasy economic and social competition with the populace with whom
they were stationed.
All this suggests that we should not agree to de-escalate
now -- all the more so if you plan to withdraw some forces in a few
months. Such 2 measure will be politically meaningful only if it is
taken as the result of a choice -- not as the inevitable corollary of
under-utilized forces.
All this, of course, must be considered as part of an
overall "game-plan" on which I am now working.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NEGOTIATIONS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
VIETNAM NEGOTIATIONS:
ISSUES AND PROCEDURES
Before we move into private negotiations with representa-
tives of the DRV we should decide:
(1) What issues we are prepared to negotiate about. For
these issues we will have to determine our position on a number of
sub-issues, as well as developing negotiating tactics.
(2) What issues we are prepared to discuss without
engaging in actual negotiations.
(3) What issues we should refuse to discuss.
This memorandum considers each of the major issues which
we or Hanoi may raise in the negotiations in terms of each of these
questions.
I. ISSUES
1. DMZ
We have, of course, made this the major issue in the public
talks and we should press it in private sessions. The secret negoti-
ations we have had with Hanoi since March 1968 provide a basis for
our taking the position that Hanoi has committed itself to discussing
the DMZ issue once the bombing was halted. While the discussions
about the Phase I and Phase II negotiating schemes were never
formalized, they were carried far enough so that Hanoi is clearly
on notice that we would want to discuss a DMZ agreement once the
bombing stops and, in effect, is committed to discussing the subject.
We should press this point with Hanoi without getting into an argument
about whether or not there is any existing agreement on the DMZ in
connection with the bombing halt.
We want a clear understanding that there will be no infiltra-
tion of men and material through the DMZ. We should make clear that
abuse will lead to attacks on the DMZ.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
There is agreement within the US Government that while we
should press this issue vigorously we need not hold back negotiations
on other problems until agreement is reached. However, the more
the enemy "abuses" the DMZ the more we will need to highlight the
issue in Paris. The three issues which are likely to arise regarding
the DMZ are:
a. Inspection
We would like to have some kind of inspection of the
DMZ either by the existing ICC, by a new international commission
or by a joint commission of belligerents. We should raise these
points and press them but back off if necessary. We can on a
unilateral basis detect gross violations, and getting Hanoi committed
to not move troops through the DMZ is worth a good deal even if
smaller numbers can continue to infiltrate. We have in the past
discussed both with the Indians and Canadians what steps would be
necessary to modify the ICC so that it could police the DMZ and we
should consider introducing these into discussions with Hanoi. We
may want to take a strong stand on this question initially.
b. The DMZ as a Political Boundary
Hanoi is leery of accepting any DMZ agreement which solidifies
the division of Vietnam and gives formal political status to the demarca-
tion line. The Geneva Accords stated flatly that the demarcation had no
particular significance. We have in the past told Hanoi that we wanted
simply to go back to the provisions of the 1954 agreement. But we need
to consider how explicit we will be in asserting that the DMZ has no
political significance.
C. Participation of the NLF
Hanoi insists that the NLF has every right to be in the
southern half of the DMZ and, therefore, no DMZ arrangements can
be discussed without the NLF. We have to consider whether we should
be prepared to move this issue into a private 4-sided group dealing
with this single question. We would, of course, have to sound out
Saigon in advance if we decide we are prepared to move in this direction.
-2-
Reproduced at the Richard Nispial Library DECLASSIFIED
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SECRET
2. POWs
We have an agreed position on this question which we would
want to use in the private talks. In general, we should keep this
issue separate from other questions and try to distinguish problems
concerning American prisoners from those concerning South Vietnamese
ones.
3. Mutual Withdrawal
This should be the major focus of our discussions with the
North Vietnamese. A paper has been prepared by the Vietnam Working
Group which incorporates the views of Saigon and Paris, as well as
those of the Washington agencies. There is a broad measure of agree-
ment on most of the issues concerned. The two major issues on which
there are differences of opinion are:
(a) How should mutual withdrawal be related to a political
settlement? and
(b) How large a U.S. force should remain behind after
mutual withdrawal?
4. Laos
The Laos issue is in part related to mutual withdrawal
since we will have to insist that North Vietnamese forces now in
South Vietnam be withdrawn not to Laos (or Cambodia) but rather
to North Vietnam, and that North Vietnamese forces in the panhandle
withdraw to North Vietnam. There is the broader question of the
future of Laos following a Vietnam settlement and the withdrawal
of other North Vietnamese forces from Laos. We may want to raise
this issue with Hanoi in private discussions making it clear to them
that a Laos settlement is an essential part of an overall agreement.
The details of any new political arrangement should be negotiated
among the Laotians and broader international questions might well
be discussed at a reconvened Laotian conference. (This is a
separate and complicated issue which requires detailed examination
but need not be considered in this context.)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED
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SECRET
SECRET
5. Cease-Fire
There is no evidence that either side is interested in a
cease-fire. The NLF depends on coercion and does not appear
confident of its ability to survive in a cease-fire situation in the
absence of a political settlement. Saigon objects to a cease-fire
because it would legitimize, at least de facto, the NLF's control
over some of South Vietnam. The crucial modalities of a cease-fire,
therefore, would concern allied access and freedom of movement. The
President has, of course, said publicly that a cease-fire makes no
sense in this war. There has been a considerable amount of work on
the cease-fire question, and there is agreement on the question of
how we should respond if the enemy proposes a general cease-fire,
i. e., accept in principle and propose immediate implementation in
a limited area such as the DMZ while the two sides work out the
arrangements for a general cease-fire. At some point, cease-fire
would become a serious issue in terms of relating it to a political
settlement or mutual withdrawal but for the moment it is largely
a tactical propaganda issue.
6. Inspection and Verification
There is growing skepticism in Washington about the value
of any inspection and verification procedure, particularly to insure
compliance with the initial terms of any agreement. In particular,
it would be difficult to devise international inspection arrangements
to verify the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from South
Vietnam, and Hanoi is very unlikely to accept any such arrangement.
There is some interest in international inspection procedures to
monitor continuing compliance with an agreement including monitoring
of the Laotian passes. Whether we should press for such arrange-
ments obviously depends on the shape of the agreement and this is
not something that we can or should get into at an early stage except
perhaps to put Hanoi on notice in the discussion of mutual withdrawal
that we believe some international inspection and verification system
would be necessary and should be discussed at an appropriate time.
7. International Guarantees
This issue concerns the question of whether or not a group
of powers should be asked to guarantee the agreement which was
arrived at. There might be some utility in seeking international
guarantees for the continued absence of North Vietnamese forces
from South Vietnam but it would be difficult to conceive of inter-
national guarantees protecting a particular government or political
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structure in the South. Again, this is an issue which can and should
be delayed until the shape of a settlement is more clearly seen.
8. Reunification
The U.S. position has been that we are not opposed to
reunification provided it comes as a free choice of the people of both
South and North Vietnam. The Geneva Accords, which we claim to
still support, explicitly states that Vietnam is a single country.
Hanoi has been relatively relaxed on the reunification issue and they
may well not bring it up. If they do, we probably have no choice but
to stick to our current position. As noted above, it will mainly
arise in connection with the DMZ.
9. Political Accommodation
Hanoi is, of course, taking the position that political issues
must be settled simultaneously, if not prior to, military issues.
Hanoi is likely to bring up questions relating to political settlement in
the private talks. Initially, we should take the position that we are not
prepared to discuss such matters, but we may have to fall back to the
position that we are prepared to talk to Hanoi in general terms but
that we believe any negotiation should be among the South Vietnamese.
Our position will, of course, have to be closely coordinated with
Saigon and it should take the lead in negotiating these matters. The
GVN has said that it is prepared to talk to the NLF in Paris.
On the substance of a political accommodation our knowledge
is exceedingly poor. We do not really know what the consequences for
the possible survival of a non-communist South Vietnamese govern-
ment would be of various alternative forms of political settlement.
For this reason, if for no other, we should be very careful not to do
the negotiating. There is, of course, the broader issue of not taking
responsibility for defending a particular political arrangement in the
South or being held accountable for it in the future. We can improve
our knowledge but never be very confident.
Thieu has told Bunker that he sees three possible solutions
to the NLF problem:
(a) coalition
(b) a general election before 1971 on a one man-one vote
basis, and
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(c) authorize the NLF members to organize a non-communist
political party and engage in local and national elections, as those
are now scheduled.
Thieu told Bunker that the first was unacceptable; that the second and
third offered possibilities. He stated that he inclined with the second
option since he would want to have the contest before the NLF had
time to organize a peaceful campaign. Ky has told Lodge that the
GVN was ready for (3).
10. De-escalation
Based on recent hints through the French and the Soviets,
it appears likely that Hanoi will raise the issue of mutual de-escalation.
We should agree in principle to discuss the subject but indicate that
we wish to do so in the context of mutual withdrawal.
-6-
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MEMO
LAIRD
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SECRET SENSITIVE
Summary of
Secretary of Defense Memorandum for the President
Conclusions and Recommendations
1. In attmpting to make the determination about how we could
achieve our objectives, I used four basic assumptions:
1. No breakthrough in Paris is likely in the near future
which will achieve a political resolution of the conflict.
2. We will not escalate beyond the limited objective of
attempting to insure for the South Vietnamese people
the right to determine their own political and economic
institutions.
3. Self-determination requires a capability for sustained
self-defense and self-reliance.
4. The North Vietnamese will not voluntarily abandon their
aim to secure political control of South Vietnam.
2. Our fighting men in Southeast Asia, under the superb leader-
ship of General Abrams, are fully supported and have the resources in
men, material, and facilities to accomplish their assigned tasks with
maximum possible safety and security.
3. Steady progress is being made in the application of military
pressure on the enemy. But there is consensus among our civilian and
military leaders in South Vietnam that a military victory within 6, 12,
18, or 24 months, or even longer, is not feasible under prevailing
constraints.
4. The enemy's increased use of border sanctuaries as safe
havens for logistics, training, and command and control support is a
matter of increasing danger to our forces. Consideration should be
given to the modification of our rules of engagement to permit more
effective actions against this threat, short of lasting extension of the
geographic area of the war.
5. The RVNAF continues to show improvement, but we must
explore ways to accelerate equipment delivery and increase combat
effectiveness. There may be certain areas such as pilot and technical
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SECRET SENSITIVE
2
training which will be difficult to accelerate. In any event, we shall
need to provide additional funding for RVNAF modernization purposes.
6. The precondition for this additional assistance on an
accelerated basis must be that it will permit the expedited replacement
of U.S. forces.
7. This replacement process should begin and be pursued on a
systematic basis designed to assure sustained pressure on the enemy
and sustained support of the war by the American public.
8. The leadership of the Republic of Vietnam is prepared to
participate in such replacement program and expresses the belief
that, as our forces are replaced, the RVN's independent ability to
meet the enemy's aggression will be strengthened.
9. We must make sure that our entire Defense establishment
understands the need to refine our concept of T-Day planning and to
develop a detailed program for transferring and redeploying men and
materiel as hostilities diminish and finally terminate.
10. To enhance the vital interests of our country (particularly in
recognition of our worldwide military requirements), to stimulate in-
creased self-defense effectiveness and self-reliance by the Government
of RVN, and to sustain the support of the American public for our
stated objectives, plans should be drawn for the redeployment of
50-70 thousand U.S. troops from South Vietnam this year. These
plans should also be developed to provide for continuing substantial
replacement of U.S. with South Vietnamese forces in the following years.
Reaction to Enemy Shelling
The indiscriminate enemy attacks are not militarily significant.
The attacks, furthermore, have as yet done little to affect adversely
the morale of the South Vietnamese public. In the view of President
Thieu, they are designed primarily to improve the morale of the
North Vietnamese by demonstrating a residual ability to control
the level of the conflict in the south.
In my opinion, any further significant shelling or rocketing of
Saigon, Danang, or Hue should bring about an appropriate response on
our part. This leaves, of course, the key question as to what kind of
response would be appropriate. In my conversation with President
Thieu, he stated that it should be a wise and measured one, not
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3
disproportionate to the level of the enemy attacks. He also suggested
that the response might be political or diplomatic, rather than military.
As I see it, a response which would entail any extensive bombing of
North Vietnam would yield us little militarily. Though it might
demonstrate to the South Vietnamese our continued commitment to
their cause, it would serve to equate justifiable military activity on
our part with unjustifiable and indiscriminate attacks on the enemy's
part. It would lead to a renewal of the criticism from many factions
within both the United States and the world community, and would tend
to put us into the position vis a vis world and U.S. opinion in which the
previous administration found itself just about a year ago.
I believe it would be reasonable to confine ourselves to con-
sideration of political and diplomatic alternatives in the indiscriminate
shellings. A temporary suspension of attendance at the plenary Paris
sessions might be effective. If the North Vietnamese are eager for
U.S. withdrawal and resolution of the conflict in SVN, such a
temporary recess might be more of a burden on them than a military
response. North Vietnam would be cast in the role of impeding
progress to peace and would take the brunt of adverse world opinion.
To the extent further military action may be indicated against the
enemy's current offensive, we should look for a response which would
work to our advantage, either by securing some immediate military
gain or by bringing us closer to genuine substantive discussions in
Paris. A well-considered and effective operation against some enemy
military target in the border areas might provide both an appropriate
signal and some military benefit. I will be prepared to discuss this
issue further with you privately and with the National Security Council.
SECRET SENSITIVE
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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON D.C. 20301
March 13, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Trip to Vietnam and CINCPAC, March 5-12 1969
At your direction, I have now spent five days reviewing, with
General Wheeler, the military situation in Vietnam. Two of these
days were spent in consultations with Ambassador Bunker, Generals
Abrams and Goodpaster and their colleagues, and South Vietnamese
leaders, including President Thieu, Vice President Ky and Prime
Minister Huong. Two other days in South Vietnam were spent in the
field. I was able to visit I Corps, 111 Corps and IV Corps, the
areas where the major part of the current military activity is
taking place. In the field I saw elements of the Army, Navy, Air
Force and Marine Corps. Finally, I spent a day-and-a-half at
CINCPAC headquarters in Hawaii, discussing with Admiral McCain and
his staff their views on the current status of affairs in Southeast
Asia.
General Wheeler and Assistant Secretary Froehlke were in
Thailand for one day and will submit separately their observations
about the situation there. General Wheeler has also prepared a
report for you on his views on certain key Vietnam issues.
In this report I will make, first, some general observations.
Thereafter, I will review in somewhat more detail:
The current military assessment, including the
issue of retaliation for the recent military
attacks and the shellings of major population
centers.
The status of our forces, specifically, whether
General Abrams has everything that he needs in
men and equipment to insure the maximum safety
and security of our personnel.
The present readiness and progress of the
Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF).
The plans for withdrawal of American forces.
Termination Day ("T" Day) Planning.
Finally, I shall draw some conclusions and make some recommendations.
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and hasbeendetermined.to be dectassified. 284
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General Observations
The trip I just completed to South Vietnam constituted the initial
opportunity anyone from the new Administration has had to look first-
hand at the military situation there. The trip was, therefore, in many
respects a beginning. Both practically and symbolically, it was the
beginning of a concerted and dedicated attempt by your Defense leadership
to come to grips with the complexities and practicalities of the Southeast
Asia conflict. The essential purpose of this aspect of the trip was to
&
determine how we could achieve our objectives in Southeast Asia, consistent
with our vital national interests.
But my presence in South Vietnam constituted a beginning, too, for
our military leadership there. Just as it was their duty to provide for
me the picture of what is happening in Southeast Asia, it was my duty
to provide for them the realities of the situation in the United States.
Hopefully, each of us accomplished our task.
In attempting to make the determination about how we could achieve
our objectives, I used four basic assumptions:
1. No breakthrough in Paris is likely in the near future
which will achieve a political resolution of the conflict.
2. We will not escalate beyond the limited objective of
attempting to insure for the South Vietnamese people
the right to determine their own political and economic
institutions.
3. Self-determination requires a capability for sustained
self-defense and self-reliance.
4. The North Vietnamese will not voluntarily abandon their
aim to secure political control of South Vietnam.
The uniform view of U.S. civilian and military leaders in Vietnam,
of the CINCPAC staff, and of the GVN leadership is that we now have and
can retain sufficient military strength to preclude the enemy from
achieving any kind of military verdict in South Vietnam. At the same
time, considering the restrictions with which we are compelled to
operate in seeking our limited objectives, none of these men forecasts
3
a military victory for U.S. and allied forces within the foreseeable
future.
That, in essence, is what our military leaders in South Vietnam
told me. I believe of equal importance is what I conveyed to them.
In the sense that beginnings constitute breaks with the past, I emphasized
that the American people expect the new Administration to bring the war
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3
to a satisfactory conclusion. The people will not be satisfied with less.
A satisfactory conclusion, I emphasized, means to most Americans the
eventual disengagement of American men from combat.
Again, in the context of beginnings and breaking with the past, I
told our people your Administration is not being held responsible for
past decisions. The decisions which committed more than half-a-million
troops, nearly $100 billion of resources, and more than 33,000 American
lives are behind us. They represent "sunk" costs.
&
The decisions and the costs the American people and the new
Administration are interested in, I stressed, are those in the future.
Accordingly, I told our leaders in South Vietnam the key factor in
sustaining the support of the American people is to find the means by
which the burden of combat may promptly, and methodically, be shifted to
the South Vietnamese. This must be done while continuing to insure the
safety and security of our own and allied forces and while working towards
the objective of self-determination for the South Vietnamese. These aims,
I pointed out, are not in conflict. They can, and must, be attained as
a package. That is the challenge posed for and by the new Administration.
The Current Military Assessment
Since the last week in February, the enemy forces have been engaged
in a new offensive in South Vietnam. This has consisted primarily of
attacks by fire against American and Allied military bases. In addition,
there has been a troubling frequency of attacks on the civilian population,
including rocket attacks on Saigon, Danang and Hue. These attacks are
clearly inconsistent with the understandings that provided the reported
basis on which the bombing of North Vietnamese territory was stopped.
From the military standpoint, the current offensive appears to be
destined for failure. Ambassador Bunker, General Abrams, our commanders
in the field, and the leaders of the Government of Vietnam are in unanimous
accord that the enemy's efforts will gain no territory, nor will they
bring about any permanent reduction in the level of pacification. The
recently initiated enemy action has had little impact on the morale of
the South Vietnamese people and their support for their Government. At
the same time, this escalation of activity has increased substantially
7
the rate of U.S. and South Vietnamese casualties, and has brought into
public question the validity of the assumptions which led to the elimina-
tion of the bombing of North Vietnam.
It would appear that the enemy's objectives are not primarily
military, but rather are political and psychological. Perhaps most
important is the enemy's desire to demonstrate that he retains the ability
to control the level of the combat in South Vietnam. By so doing he
probably hopes both to achieve greater negotiating strength in Paris and
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4
to increase the amount of disaffection within the United States. The
enemy's goal appears to be that of producing pressure which will lead
to an early and disorderly withdrawal of American forces. In the view
of President Thicu, Hanoi also feels compelled to attempt to show its
own military personnel and civilian population that the NVA/VC are in
control of the situation in South Vietnam and have not entered into
understandings with the U.S. in relation to the bombing halt. The MACV
staff informed me that enemy attacks, since initiation of the current enemy
offensive have been below the level of those of the Tet and May offensives
in 1968, as have been the casualties on both sides.
Our military leaders in South Vietnam assured me that this offensive
can and will be contained, but they also conceded the enemy's ability to
conduct similar offensives in the future, at least on an intermittent
basis. This continued capability on the part of the enemy derives from
certain intractable factors in the Vietnamese situation. The forces of
Hanoi and the NLF continue to be supplied with sophisticated equipment
and weapons, such as 122 mm rockets, from Soviet and Communist China
resources. In addition, the enemy forces are able to take refuge and
sanctuary across the borders of Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam. The
Laotian and Cambodian sanctuaries are of great importance in the enemy's
ability to withstand our overwhelming superiority in mobility and fire
power. Moreover, Cambodia has become increasingly important in the
infiltration of supplies and men, and in the command and control of the
enemy forces.
Consideration should be given to border area operations that will at
least temporarily diminish the advantage to the enemy of our self-imposed
geographical restrictions. Unless we are willing to expand greatly the
geographic confines of the conflict, however, the availability of
sanctuary areas for the enemy will continue to contribute to the impos-
sibility of a final military solution.
Insofar as U.S. and allied military efforts are concerned, steady
progress is uniformly reported. For example, in I Corps both General
Cushman and General Stilwell cited significant advances in eliminating
enemy influence, including the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI). General
Cushman, however, informed me that an additional two years would be
required before he could see the situation as being completely in hand.
Insofar as the VCI is concerned, Ambassador Colby, the Deputy for Civil
,
Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), estimates that
the anti-VCI program, the so-called "Phoenix" campaign, has eliminated
perhaps 16 thousand of the 83 thousand estimated VCI. At the same time,
he recognizes that these VCI losses have probably been replaced. A
successful anti-infrastructure effort will thus require a substantially
higher rate of attrition than has yet been realized.
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5
Militarily, the situation in 111 Corps is coming more and more
under control. General Abrams' tactics and precautions have virtually
foreclosed the risks of significant enemy incursion into the capital
city of Saigon. The mortar and rocket attacks have been infrequent
and unimpressive in number. In IV Corps, as well, the military situation
is steadily moving in a direction favorable to the Government of South
Vietnam and the United States. But Major General Eckhardt, the senior
U.S. Military Advisor in IV Corps, recognizes that the pacification
effort is proceeding slowly in this traditional VC stronghold.
&
Similarly, the pacification effort has reached the point where
more than 79 per cent of the South Vietnamese population is credited
to the "relatively secure" category. This category includes so-called
"A", "B", and "C" hamlets. The "C" category, which includes about
30 per cent of the population, is pivotal and subject to ready reversion
to the "contested" classification. "A" hamlets remain relatively rare.
There is none, for example, in the strategic area of 111 Corps immediately
north of Saigon which I visited. Thus some appreciable VC influence
continues to exist for the major share of South Vietnam's people.
The basic problem remains that of achieving permanent South
Vietnamese governmental control over the country. Although Ambassador
Bunker gives persuasive documentation of steady political growth by
the Government of Vietnam, this progress is difficult to translate into
nationwide security. Even greater national exertion will be necessary
to bring GVN administrative and political structures into the villages
and hamlets of South Vietnam. This would be a difficult task under
peaceful circumstances. It is herculean while hostilities continue at
the present level.
Substantial de-Americanization of the war is an indispensable
precondition, it appears, to the healthy growth of indigenous political
institutions. This thesis was highlighted in a comment made to me by
the Senior Province Advisor assigned to Go Cong Province in the Delta.
This advisor remarked that he sees his job as being "to put myself out
of business as quickly as possible." We should all regard that as our
job in Vietnam. This would be consistent with the attainment of U.S.
objectives in this area.
In short, General Abrams has made remarkable progress in achieving
a measure of military superiority throughout South Vietnam. The
,
pacification program, which must depend primarily and increasingly on
South Vietnamese efforts, is also proceeding, though at a slower rate.
But none of our officials, either military or civilian, is under any
illusion that the battle in South Vietnam can be brought to a military
conclusion within six months, a year or even several years. Options,
over which we have little or no control, are available to the enemy
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6
for continuing the war almost indefinitely, although perhaps at a reduced
intensity. Under these circumstances, and unless some change can be made
in the relative contributions of U.S. and South Vietnamese forces, we
are faced with an American killed-in-action rate which could run in excess
of 100 a week, and at the enemy's initiative could be increased to multiples
of that rate.
A matter that requires the closest scrutiny is the question of
retaliation for the NVA/VC violations of the Paris understandings.
s
Whatever the deliberate ambiguity of these understandings, there can be
no doubt that the rocket attacks on Saigon, Danang and Hue are completely
inconsistent with the assumptions which underlie the bombing halt. We are,
therefore, faced with the question of appropriate response to these indis-
criminate attacks on the civilian population. Obviously, the question of
retaliation, as well as its nature and extent, should be considered in
the context of bringing us closer to our objectives in Southeast Asia
and protecting our credibility. We should not be interested in merely
"getting even," but rather in advancing vital U.S. interests.
These indiscriminate enemy attacks are not militarily significant.
As of the preparation of this report, the attacks had not added in any
substantially new way to the jeopardy of U.S. forces. The attacks,
furthermore, have as yet done little to affect adversely the morale of
the South Vietnamese public. In the view of President Thieu, they are
designed primarily to improve the morale of the North Vietnamese by
demonstrating a residual ability to control the level of the conflict
in the south.
The last rocketing of Saigon occurred on the morning of Thursday,
March 6. Since then, enemy rockets have been launched against the
city of Hue. In my opinion, any further significant shelling or rocketing of
Saigon, Danang, or Hue should bring about an appropriate response on our
part. This leaves, of course, the key question as to what kind of response
would be appropriate. In my conversation with President Thieu, he stated
that it should be a wise and measured one, not disproportionate to the
level of the enemy attacks. He also suggested that the response might
be political or diplomatic, rather than military. As I see it, a response
which would entail any extensive bombing of North Vietnam would yield us
little militarily. Though it might demonstrate to the South Vietnamese
our continued commitment to their cause, it would serve to equate justifi-
able military activity on our part with unjustifiable and indiscriminate
3
attacks on the enemy's part. It would lead to a renewal of the criticism
from many factions within both the United States and the world community,
and would tend to put us into the position vis a vis world and U.S.
opinion in which the previous administration found itself just about a
year ago.
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7
As I indicated in a separate message to you on March 9, I believe
we stand to lose, on balance, if we are encouraged to actions which serve
to equate military action on our part to indiscriminate terrorism on the
enemy's part. I believe it would be reasonable to confine ourselves to
consideration of political and diplomatic alternatives to the indiscriminate
shellings. A temporary suspension of attendance at the plenary Paris
sessions might be effective. If the North Vietnamese are eager for U.S.
withdrawal and resolution of the conflict in SVII, such a temporary recess
might be more of a burden on them than a military response. North Vietnam
&
would be cast in the role of impeding progress to peace and would take
the brunt of adverse world opinion.
To the extent further military action may be indicated against the
enemy's current offensive, we should look for a response which would
work to our advantage, either by securing some immediate military gain
-or by bringing us closer to genuine substantive discussions in Paris.
A well-considered and effective operation against some enemy military
target in the border areas might provide both an appropriate signal and
some military benefit. I will be prepared to discuss this issue further
with you privately and with the National Security Council.
Status of U.S. Forces -- Men and Equipment
Under the superior leadership of General Abrams, our commanders and
our men in the field exhibit the most heartening qualities of dedication
and performance. They are confident of their ability to counter and
throw back any enemy attack anywhere in South Vietnam. Our men are not
only well led, but they are also well equipped and provided for. Not the
least among the factors contributing to high morale among our forces is
the realization that the most prompt and modern medical care is available.
I had the opportunity personally to see how this medical care is being
provided in one of the many American hospitals which exist throughout the
country. I was assured by General Abrams that he needs nothing further in
the way of men, equipment or facilities to insure the maximum safety and
security for U.S. forces.
A striking illustration of the complete adequacy of our military
support can be seen in the comparative figures on air ordnance expendi-
tures. In World War 11, air ordnance utilized by the U.S. in the
European and Mediterranean theaters amounted to 1.5 million tons. The
,
Pacific theater accounted for 0.5 million tons. In the Korean War,
the total expended by U.S. elements was 0.6 million tons. World War 11
and the Korean War together thus accounted for 2.6 million tons. By way
of comparison, during the years 1966 through 1968, 2.8 million tons have
already been expended in Southeast Asia.
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8
Readiness and Progress of RVNAF
I recognize that the RVNAF modernization program had been designed
to create an RVNAF capable of coping with insurgency that could remain
if US/NVA forces withdrew. I was disappointed, though, by the relatively
low rate of progress evidenced toward raising the RVNAF capability to
assume more of the burden of the war.
$
In total, the regular, irregular, and police forces of South Vietnam
now include over one million men. The arms and equipment furnished by
the United States have increased in quantity and quality. I am recom-
mending that we advance our plans and furnish additional items needed to
achieve full modernization for these indigenous forces. I am doing so,
however, solely on the basis that this will permit us immediately to
begin the process of replacing American forces in South Vietnam with
better trained, better led, and better armed South Vietnamese military
and para-military personnel.
I regret to report that I see no indication that we presently have
a program adequate to bring about a significant reduction in the U.S.
military contribution in South Vietnam. The development of such a program
should receive our first priority. For example, despite a strong recom-
mendation made, I understand, last summer that the promotion policy of
ARVN should be adjusted so as to rectify the substantial shortages in
officers in the ranks of captain through colonel, substantial shortages still
exist. Progress has been slow. The need for a drastic change in promotion
policies apparently has been accepted in principle and potentially adequate
corrective programs have been initiated but progress continues to be slow.
Similarly, although our military leaders have recommended the adoption
of the accelerated Phase 11 modernization program, I was given no indication
that its completion would enable us to effect any substantial reduction in
American forces in South Vietnam. As mentioned earlier, the present RVNAF
modernization program was designed only to build up the South Vietnamese forces
so that they could cope with VC insurgents. Our military authorities be-
-lieve neither the South Vietnamese manpower base nor any possible moderniza-
tion program would enable the RVNAF to cope alone with a threat comparable
to the present level of aggression. This has been the assumption from
the inception of the RVNAF improvement program. However, I do not believe
we can accept the proposition that U.S. forces must remain in substantial
3 numbers indefinitely to contain the North Vietnamese threat, if political
settlement proves unobtainable. The heavy expense of RVNAF modernization
cannot be justified as a measure merely to permit the GVN to cope with
local insurgency.
The presentation given to me by the MACV staff was based on the premise
that no reduction in U.S. personnel would be possible in the absence of
total withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops. I do not believe that our national
interests, in the light of our military commitments worldwide, permit us to
indulge in this assumption. Nor do I feel that true pacification and GVN
control over its own population can ever be achieved while our own forces
continue such a pervasive presence in South Vietnam.
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9
Our orientation seems to be more on operations than on assisting
the South Vietnamese to acquire the means to defend themselves. Thus,
for example, we have continued to tolerate notoriously incompetent
Commanders in the Fifth and Eighteenth ARVN Divisions in the key
111 Corps region. I sense, too, a tendency on the part of both our
own people and the GVN to discount somewhat the seriousness of the high
RVNAF desertion rate. The emphasis can and must now be shifted to
measures through which South Vietnam can achieve a self-defense capa-
&
bility that will strengthen our joint hand in Paris and prevent ultimate
military defeat if political settlement proves impossible.
Planning for Withdrawal of U.S. Forces
The question that arises is not whether we should do more in
South Vietnam, but rather whether we should do less. No one now suggests
the necessity for sending more U.S. troops to Southeast Asia. But at
the same time, no one has furnished me with any detailed analysis of
the necessity for the continued presence of over 549 thousand Americans
in South Vietnam and Thailand.
We are presently able to contain the enemy militarily and to
maintain mass military pressure on him. With an appropriate improvement
in the performance of the Armed Forces of South Vietnam, we should be
able to retain this posture with a simultaneous diminution in the U.S.
share of the total military effort. This will require full study of
the best way to effect the maximum replacement of U.S. combat forces
with those of South Vietnam. With your approval, I will direct that
such a study be undertaken immediately.
In the meantime, I believe it is essential that we decide now to
initiate the removal from Southeast Asia of some U.S. military personnel.
The qualitative and quantitative improvement of the RVNAF to date,
although perhaps less than desired, should permit us to redeploy from
Southeast Asia between 50 to 70 thousand troops during the remainder of
this calendar year. I am convinced that this will in no way jeopardize
the security of the remaining U.S. and Allied forces and that such a
move is necessary to retain U.S. public support for our continued efforts
in South Vietnam. Embassy officials in Saigon suggested to me that any
reduction on our part would trigger proportionate reductions in other
3
allied forces. Given the present highly disproportionate contribution
of South Vietnam's Asian neighbors, as compared with our own, such
reduction on their part would be unwarranted. But even if they were made,
withdrawal of Korean, Thai, Australian and New Zealand troops in an equal
percentage would not significantly affect the total military strength
confronting the enemy. Moreover, it is clear that South Vietnam's leaders
expect and are entirely ready for a reduction of this size. President
Thieu has indicated this repeatedly in public pronouncements. He expressed
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10
this opinion forthrightly in our private discussion on March 8. At the
same time, I feel very strongly that we, rather than the GVN or the
possible reaction of other troop-contributing countries, should determine
when and how many American soldiers should be withdrawn from the conflict
in SEA.
Termination ("T" Day) Planning
&
The foregoing discussion assumes no termination of the war in South
Vietnam, but rather the orderly replacement of United States Forces as
the armed forces of South Vietnam take over a steadily increasing share
of the war effort. I have discussed with Admiral McCain and General
Abrams the status of their plans for the more rapid turnover and removal
of American military equipment that would be required in the event a
political settlement brings the conflict to a termination.
Under such circumstances, we would want to leave the South Vietnamese
forces with the equipment necessary for them to cope with the residual
insurgency and to help deter any renewal of aggression by North Vietnam.
At the same time, we should not feel that the forces of South Vietnam
must be turned into a replica in miniature of the United States military
establishment. As in the case of the Republic of Korea, we should
anticipate that the more sophisticated elements of the needed defensive
strength could continue to be derived from United States resources.
For planning purposes we should define "T" Day as that date on
which agreement is reached to cease hostilities in South Vietnam and
the North Vietnamese are returning their forces to North Vietnam. Our
Paris delegation continues to refer to the terms of the 1966 Manila
Conference communique. 1, personally, have had serious questions about
those terms and believe that they were rendered obsolete by initiation
of the Paris negotiations. Under the Manila communique terms, the allied
forces would begin their withdrawal concurrently with the gradual with-
drawal of North Vietnamese troops. Withdrawal of U.S. and Free World
forces would continue only while North Vietnam moves toward total with-
drawal and ceases all infiltration. The provision of the Manila com-
munique to the effect that U.S. and other allied forces will be withdrawn
not later than six months after these conditions have been fulfilled must
be interpreted, if it is to apply at all, as referring to those residual
3
forces that would be on hand at the time when all North Vietnamese forces
have returned to their own country.
The Manila communique may not, of course, form the basis of any
settlement that may be reached in Paris. The Manila communique was
designed on the assumption of a de facto termination to hostilities,
rather than negotiations. The Paris talks may yield a withdrawal formula.
which is either more gradual or more precipitate than that contemplated
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SENSITIVE
11
at Manila. In any event, our planning should proceed on a basis that
will permit US to effect an orderly withdrawal of U.S. troops and an
efficient turnover of United States equipment to the South Vietnamese,
beginning as soon as hostilities have ceased.
I found T-Day planning has advanced to the stage where plans
are either under development, or the plans have been published and are
under review by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Abrams' staff has
&
been able during the past few weeks to define more accurately the size
of the problem confronting us in withdrawing personnel and equipment.
For example, whereas in October 1968 MACV estimated that some 10 million
short tons of materiel and supplies would require removal from Southeast
Asia, the current estimate is that the amount is more like 5.5 million
short tons. The ongoing MACV staff work includes attempts to improve
inventory control and to reduce inventories in certain supply categories.
I believe, however, that we need to address more expeditiously the "T"
Day problems of orderly and systematic withdrawal of men and equipment.
Even short of cessation of hostilities, such planning can have considerable
utility in making our phase-down and the transfer of effort to the RVNAF
more efficient.
As in the case of RVNAF modernization, there appears to be considerable
reluctance to recognize the inevitability of an early reduction in the
American effort in South Vietnam. In the event that a political solution
cannot be found in Paris, I am convinced that achievement of our objectives
requires immediate initiation of efforts to diminish our share of the
total military effort. Accordingly, our entire defense organization must
be alerted to the need to develop and implement promptly the measures that
will facilitate an efficient and orderly reduction in the current United
States involvement in Vietnam.
Conclusions and Recommendations
1. Our fighting men in Southeast Asia, under the superb leadership
of General Abrams, are fully supported and have the resources in men,
material, and facilities to accomplish their assigned tasks with maximum
possible safety and security.
3
2. Steady progress is being made in the application of military
pressure on the enemy. But there is consensus among our civilian and
military leaders in South Vietnam that a military victory within 6, 12,
18, or 24 months, or even longer, is not feasible under prevailing constraints.
3. The enemy's increased use of border sanctuaries as safe havens
for logistics, training, and command and control support is a matter of
increasing danger to our forces. Consideration should be given to the
modification of our rules of engagement to permit more effective actions
against this threat, short of lasting extension of the geographic area
of the war.
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12
4. The RVNAF continues to show improvement, but we must explore
ways to accelerate equipment delivery and increase combat effective-
ness. There may be certain areas such as pilot and technical training
which will be difficult to accelerate. In any event, we shall need
to provide additional funding for RVNAF modernization purposes.
5. The precondition for this additional assistance on an accelerated
basis must be that it will permit the expedited replacement of U.S.
forces.
=
6. This replacement process should begin and be pursued on a
systematic basis designed to assure sustained pressure on the enemy
and sustained support of the war by the American public.
7. The leadership of the Republic of Vietnam is prepared to
participate in such a replacement program and expresses the belief
that, as our forces are replaced, the RVN's independent ability to
meet the enemy's aggression will be strengthened.
8. We must make sure that our entire Defense establishment under-
stands the need to refine our concept of T-Day planning and to develop
a detailed program for transferring and redeploying men and materiel as
hostilities diminish and finally terminate.
9. To enhance the vital interests of our country (particularly
in recognition of our worldwide military requirements), to stimulate
increased self-defense effectiveness and self-reliance by the Government
of RVN, and to sustain the support of the American public for our stated
objectives, plans should be drawn for the redeployment of 50-70 thousand
U.S. troops from South Vietnam this year. These plans should also be
developed to provide for continuing substantial replacement of U.S.
with South Vietnamese forces in the following years.
office
2 Attachments
,
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
Participants:
RVN
His Excellency Nguyen Van Thieu
President of the Republic of Viet-Nam
His Excellency Nguyen Cao Ky
Vice President
His Excellency Tran Chanh Thanh
Minister of Foreign Affairs
General Cao Van Vien
Chief of Joint General Staffs
Mr. Nguyen Phu Duc
Special Assistant to the President
US
The Honorable Melvin R. Laird
Secretary of Defense
The Honorable Ellsworth Bunker
Ambassador
General Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Honorable G. Warren Nutter
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)
The Honorable Robert Froehlke
Assistant Secretary of Defense (A)
General Creighton W. Abrams
COMUSMACV
The Honorable Samuel D. Berger
Deputy Ambassador
Time/Place: Independence Palace, Saigon
March 8, 1969 - 11:30 a.m. - 1:30 p.m.
Subject:
Meeting of Secretary of Defense with President Thieu
1. After some social exchange, Secretary Laird said that President Nixon
wished him to visit South Viet-Nam at this time both in connection with his
new duties as Secretary of Defense, and in preparation for his appearance
before Congress on the defense budget and military assistance program for
1970. The new administration has some time, which the last administration
did not have, to work out matters with the South Vietnamese government in
order to achieve our common objectives. He had, therefore, to have a full
understanding of the situation and what the needs would be in the future.
President Thieu replied by asking how the Secretary saw the situation in
the United States.
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2. Secretary Laird said when the new administration took over it was
quite clear that time had run out on the last administration in terms
of public support for our Viet-Nam policy. Since the changeover, the
American people and Congress have shown a willingness to give President
Nixon time to see what can be done to bring the conflict to an end, along
with achieving our objectives. There is not the same amoùnt of pressure
now that there was toward the end of last year, and the new administration
has some time -- perhaps six months or twelve -- he cannot say exactly.
The most immediate problems were the modernization and improvement of the
Vietnamese forces and the assumption by Viet-Nam of a greater share of
responsibility for the fighting. The reduction of American troops should
be based on the improvement of the Vietnamese fighting forces and the
military requirements. It is important that numbers be avoided in state-
ments about American reductions until after the necessary studies have been
made. He could tell the President, in confidence, that when he appears
before Congress in March, he will ask for additional funds for Phase 11 to
accelerate the modernization and equipment of the Vietnamese forces.
3. President Thieu said he would like to clearify the Vietnamese view
of this matter. He knows that South Viet-Nam has given American adminis-
trations and the American people many problems. He wants to alleviate
these and reduce the burden on the United States. This can only be done
under certain conditions. Thére is as yet no sign from the other side that
they wish to de-escalate the war. This means the fighting will go on. To
reduce the burden on the United States, the Vietnamese armed forces must
be better trained and equipped so as to enable the United States gradually
to reduce the size of its forces here. He asked for full support of the
United States to achieve this.
4. Secretary Laird asked President Thieu to comment on the effect of the
shelling of the cities on the people and on the government. President
Thieu replied with a long statement, the highlights of which were:
a. The communists hoped in February to initiate another
Tet offensive such as occurred last year, but they were unable
to achievethis. First, we were too well prepared. Second,
they were unable to coordinate the shelling with the spear-
headed units moving into the cities, to be followed by ground
attacks, all designed to produce a general uprising. They
now have no hope of an uprising in the South.
b. The shelling is designed to give their troops confidence
and build their morale for attacks; also to show the people in the
North that they are doing something. They could not indefinitely
sit in their bases and sanctuaries waiting for Paris to produce
victory. This offensive is a sign of weakness, not strength.
C. The political aim of these shelling attacks was to impress
the United States with their capability to mount another offensive
and to show the Americans that Hanoi is not prepared to agree
easily to the US terms for a withdrawal.
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d. The shelling, further, is an attempt to make people be-
lieve there was no understanding with the United States in connec-
tion with the bombing cessation. It was to prove that the US had
to call off the bombing because of its weak position in the eyes of
public opinion, not because of any understandings.
e. They hope the shelling will demoralize the people and
government in South Viet-Nam and create strains between the
South Vietnamese and the United States. They want the GVN
to ask the Americans to find a solution, and if the United States
does not dare to retaliate, they expect this will create differences
between the United States and the GVN. It is thus a test of Presi-
dent Nixon and the new administration. Everything now depends
on how we respond both in Viet-Nam and in Paris.
f. The first rocketing had no effect, but as it goes on,
people are beginning to ask what the United States will say in
Paris, and what we will do. If there is no response, the South
Vietnamese will conclude that the United States "does not have a
strong attitude of support for the South. The communists will ex-
ploit this in their propaganda to try to convince people in
South Viet-Nam that the US is moving toward a soft solution."
g. If the shelling continues and no response is made,
diplomatically, politically, or militarily, it would have very
bad effects here. President Nixon's statement at his press conference
on this subject, and Secretary Laird's arrival statement have given
great satisfaction here, but if the shelling continues with no
response, people will begin to wonder.
h. He is not pushing to resume the bombing of the North.
"At least not now, for we must be wise and deliberate in
our reaction. Each time there is a shelling, we must
examine the situation together, and at some point we must
decide what to do. General Vien and General Abrams should
get together to study what kind of responses might be made."
5. President Thieu commented on the excellent relations which now
exist with the United States. He understands perfectly well that Presi-
dent Nixon is not yet ready to make decisions and announcements as to
what he will do in South Viet-Nam, but he hopes that this will be
done after Secretary Laird returns. He hopes that the "wise actions"
that he referred to in conjunction with retaliation will be taken in
concert and will be discussed in advance between the two governments.
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6. Secretary Laird commented favorably on the strong leadership
which President Thieu had given the pacification program and the pro-
gram to modernize the forces. He then asked how things were going
on the building of a political base in order to compete with the
communists after a settlement. He noted that President Thieu was getting
around the country a great deal. Speaking as a former politician, he knew
how important it was that President Thieu take time to do this.
7. President Thieu said that he was no politician, but the simple fact
was that the GVN had to have a strong and broad political base if it
was to fight the war, carry out the negotiations, and ultimately deal
with the new situation that would arise when peace came. Viet-Nam,
unfortunately, has more politicians than businessmen. There are many
political parties and organizations, and politicians operate freely,
but they do not operate together. Many have tried to bring them to-
gether with no success. He must now do this himself. He had, however,
to move with some caution. People still have vivid memories of Presi-
dent Diem's political party -- the Can Lao. It was a strong party,
composed of the military forces, government officials, politicians and
the people. But that party led to dictatorship, and many people are fear-
ful that another strong party would produce the same result. This was
why he had to move with care, but he hoped to have good results by the end
of the year. Everyone recognized that after a settlement, the Communists
would operate in the free political life of South Viet-Nam and would con-
stitute a danger. The genuine nationalists therefore had to come together
to meet this threat.
8. Continuing on this same subject, President Thieu said while it is
a fact that the nationalists are not well organized, what is also true
is that the communists have no firm control over the people either. There
is a vacuum here that has to be filled. One of his main objectives this year
is to strengthen the GVN's political base at the local level. This means
elections in the villages and hamlets, and good administration at that level.
"We are confident that we can build this base in the countryside. It is
more important than uniting the politicians in Saigon, because many of the
politicians have no political following.'
9. One of his main problems is the communists' deliberate campaign of
assassination directed at anyone with leadership ability, from the top
to the bottom. They are trying to exterminate every South Viet-Nam
nationalist leader, following the same pattern as they did in 1945.
This year is the decisive year for both sides. But the government is now
in an advantageous position to win the support of the people and consoli-
date its political base. This is why he is training local officials in
large numbers, and why he attaches so much importance to land reform.
"I have called for a revolution in the countryside to win popular support."
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10. Secretary Laird said that one problem in the United States is
that over the years, the administration has made one optimistic re-
port after another to Congress and the people. If those reports of
progress had been true, the war should have been won long since. The
new administration must be careful about its reports of progress, and
its predictions, or it, too, will be discredited. It cannot give our
Congress and our people the impression that success is just around the
corner either in Paris or in Viet-Nam. It must present the situation
as it really is, or the American people will soon come to disbelieve
it as well.
11. President Thieu said that his government was proceeding very
methodically. It has set out its objectives and now it must "capture"
them one by one. One of the most important areas is the pacification
of the countryside. The present communist offensive had, up to now,
had little effect on the pacification program. It has not been set back
and, indeed, is proceeding. If the communists cannot disrupt the paci-
fication program with this offensive, then it will become obvious that
there is no hope for them.
12. Secretary Laird asked the President if he would discuss the pro-
gress being made in the police forces. President Thieu replied in
much the same vein as the Prime Minister in the earlier conversation.
This year concentration is on establishing the police forces in the
villages. It was here and in the hamlets that law and order and security
had to be established, and civil administration improved. This was the
job of the Defense and Interior Ministries. Many police and local offi-
cials were being trained for this work.
13. Secretary Laird said when he saw President Nixon on his return
from Europe, the President said he was very pleased with his visit.
He had made that trip for several reasons, and President Nixon wished
President Thieu to understand that while he made his first visit abroad
to Europe, it did not minimize in any way the importance he attaches to
the problems in Asia, and here in Viet-Nam. Our position in Europe had
deteriorated in several ways, and many questions were being asked by
the Europeans. The cost of the war in South Viet-Nam has been a major
portion of the American defense budget, and while we were engaged here
the Soviet Union had been busy building up its military power. The
Europeans were greatly concerned over American intentions.
14. Presidnt Thieu said he would like to confirm what Vice President
Ky had told President Nixon. All Presidents have their priorities, and
he understands the reasons why President Nixon went to Paris first.
However, the leaders of Asia, and especially Southeast Asia, feel they
must have an opportunity to talk with President Nixon before long. A
meeting was needed not just on Viet-Nam, but on the future of Southeast
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Asia. We have a common point of view with this administration on Viet-
Nam, he said, but there is much uneasiness in the area, and other
leaders have a psychological need for assurances about the future of
American policy in this area. Secretary Laird said he would convey this
message to the President, adding that President Nixon had many things to
do at home in the immediate future and was not likely to move out of
Washington very much in the next few months.
15. President Thieu asked when the next elections would be held in
the United States. Secretary Laird said in the fall of 1970, but there
would be an election in early April in the Secretary's district to fill
his seat. It would be a very tough fight, but it might be an indication
of the attitude of the American people toward the new administration.
16. The Secretary said that the communists seemed to have impressed
many in the world that it is they who want peace, and it is our side
which wants war. Has President Thieu any suggestions as to how our
side might deal with this problem of convincing people that it is we
who really want peace? President Thieu's reply was rather discursive.
He said there is a problem here which he recognizes, but it is not easy
to solve. We must stake our case on the defense of freedom. We must show
we want peace, but not a false peace. We must show that it is the com-
munists who are aggressors and it is they who make war. The peace which will
come to Viet-Nam must not be a temporary peace. It must be a peace which
is guaranteed by the free nations. The communists have one aim -- to
get American power out of Southeast Asia. If that happens, then there
will be no peace. We must therefore think of the long term. The com-
munists may make concessions in Paris in order to have the Americans
leave South Viet-Nam and the area, but when this war ends, the com-
munists must know that the free world will come back if they invade again.
The guarantee of peace in this part of the world is therefore very im-
portant. It must rest, in the first instance, on the nations in the
area being strong, so that they can defend themselves, and also they must
join together to help each other. But American power will always be
essential. The problem is how to reduce further burdens on the United
States, and this can only be done if each of the countries is made stronger
to defend itself, and the countries unite for security.
17. President Thieu then asked Vice President Ky if he had any remarks.
Ky said he had talked to many newsmen in Paris and it was clear they
were tired of hearing the communists repeating their verions of history,
the war, their demands, etc. This rigidity was doing the communists no
good. They were losing press interest and support. On the other hand,
South Viet-Nam had shown its good will and its desire to arrive at a peace-
ful conclusion to the war, and he believed the South Vietnamese government
has gained some support in the press.
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18. Ky then went on:
"As the negotiations progress, we must not be expected to con-
tinue to make concessions in order to make progress. We must
show Hanoi that we have more determination than they. We must
prove they cannot win by force. We must convince them they cannot
ask us or expect us to surrender. American public opinion is
very important to us, but if American public opinion demands that we
make concession after concession, then we will lose in the nego-
tiations, and the American sacrifice here will have been in vain.
A cease-fire or a temporary solution cannot bring lasting peace.
"The trouble is that nations who are not involved, nations which
know nothing about South Viet-Nam, speak loudly about peace,
and stopping the war. But for the South Vietnamese the outcome
of the negotiations is a matter of survival. The issue is funda-
mental: Hanoi must withdraw, then we can solve our internal
problems by ourselves. If the United States forces us to make
concessions, or to deal with the communists while the forces of
Hanoi are still in the South, this will never be accepted by the
South."
19. Ky said there were differences between the Vietnamese government
and the last American administration, and these added to the con-
fusion in Viet-Nam and the United States. Because of this confusion
people began to question the validity of the American commitment or
the value of continuing the fight. President Nixon asked him for mutual
trust and understanding. He assured the President that South Viet-Nam
would give him that trust and understanding. He had said the same
thing to Harriman. If there was a solid foundation of trust between
the two, we will succeed. If there is division between us, we will both
lose this war.
"We in South Viet-Nam must take over a greater share of the
burden of the war from the United States, but for that we must
have help -- more military forces, more training, more and
better equipment."
20. Ky remarked bitterly that the Soviet Union helps North Viet-Nam,
but no one criticizes her. Why then this criticism of the United States?
He blamed American newsmen. He ended up with an emotional appeal to put
Viet-Nam in front:
"We do not ask you to bomb the North -- we will do it ourselves.
There will be less criticism, or no criticism, if we bomb. Let
our pilots be captured, nor yours. If the shelling continues, the
Vietnamese Air Force should be turned loose, and if President
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Thieu orders me I will lead the attacks myself. We have that
right. I am aware that the resumption of bombing creates
problems for the United States, but if the cities continue
to be shelled, we must retaliate. Otherwise what can we tell
our people? If we do nothing our people will regard us as
weak, there will be no progress in Paris, and people here will
begin to say that the ultimate outcome will be a communist takeover
in the negotiations."
21. Secretary Laird said that President Nixon has decided to go ahead
with a supplemental budget in order to accelerate the training and equip-
ment of the South Vietnamese forces so that they can take over more of
the burden from the United States. We are prepared to move as rapidly
as we can to turn over more and more of the fighting to South Viet-Nam.
22. After the conference concluded, President Thieu made a few further
remarks to the Secretary and Ambassador Bunker, while they were waiting
for lunch to be served.
a. He went over the ground of retaliation for the shelling,
emphasizing that the response must be "correct, wise, and
moderate." The communists were trying to put the GVN in a
position of asking for a resumption of the bombing of the North.
Perhaps, he speculated, a preferable course would be "one-for-
one, a tooth-for-a-tooth. Each time they shell, we strike the
North." Thieu had obviously not thought through all the implica-
tions of this tactic, for he said again that General Abrams and
General Vien should talk about the problems and come up with
suggestions.
b. On the enemy's strategy, he thought there would be a
renewal of the current offensive any day. They had a capability
to strike again for two or three weeks, and this time they might
direct their aim at the pacification program. They would then
pause, and the pattern would be repeated some time later. He
thought this would probably go on through April or May, and by
then if they were unsuccessful -- and he was confident they would
fail -- they might be ready to move to substantive talks, possibly
proposing a cease-fire at Paris.
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SECRET
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON D.C. 20301
13 March 1969
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
SUBJECT: Meeting of Secretary of Defense with the Prime Minister
Participants:
Republic of Vietnam
His Excellency Tran Van Huong - - Prime Minister of the RVN
His Excellency Nguyen Van Vy - Minister of Defense
His Excellency Huynh Van Dao Minister to the Prime Minister
Mr. Tran Van Dinh - Interpreter
United States
Honorable Melvin R. Laird Secretary of Defense
Honorable Ellsworth Bunker - Ambassador
General Earle G. Wheeler - Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Honorable G. Warren Nutter - - Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)
Honorable Robert Froehlke - - Assistant Secretary of Defense (A)
General Creighton W. Abrams - COMUSMACV
Honorable Samuel D. Berger - Deputy Ambassador
Time: 1030 - 1130, 8 March 1969
Place: Prime Minister's Office
1. Secretary Laird opened with an expression of concern over the attempted
assassination, and our great happiness with the Prime Minister's escape.
The Prime Minister smiled, "It's one of the risks of office." The Secretary
said he hoped everything would be done to improve further the Prime Min-
ister's personal security arrangements.
2. The Secretary said he would be appearing before Congress soon on the
,
defense budget for 1970. He had been 17 years in Congress, but this was
the first time he would be on the administration's side of the table.
President Nixon thought he should take this trip to Vietnam to acquire a
better understanding of the situation here for his job and for his appear-
ance as a witness.
3. The Prime Minister replied that this was a good idea. Perhaps the
reports he has been getting from here are "too rosy." The Secretary replied
that President Nixon has great confidence in Ambassador Bunker and General
Abrams and in what they report, and then asked the Prime Minister how he
viewed the progress, and what he thought of the problems which still remain.
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2
4. The Prime Minister said the situation has greatly improved during this
past year, thanks to the vigorous activities of the government, but espec-
ially thanks to the firmness of President Thieu, who had made the right
decisions at the right time. He asked the Secretary what problems he saw
here in Vietnam. The Secretary said that we were concerned about reports
of desertions in the armed forces, and he would like the Prime Minister's
views of this matter.
5. Mr. Huong said the armed forces had come a long way in improving, both
in quality and quantity. Morale has never been as high as now, and discip-
line has improved. Proof of the progress can be seen in the successes of
the fighting efforts of the SVN forces in these last months. But the situa-
tion is not yet satisfactory. The Prime Minister then called on the Minis-
ter of Defense to explain the reasons for desertions.
6. Minister Vy said that compared with previous years desertions are much
lower, and the desertion rate is not alarming. Most of those who desert
quit one branch of the service to enroll elsewhere, where they can be nearer
their homes or where the pay and allowances are greater, or the conditions
better. He has been trying to improve conditions in all the services in
order to reduce the desertion rate. What is very reassuring is that there
were few soldiers defecting to the enemy. The Prime Minister expanded on
this, but made no additional points.
7. The Secretary then asked the Prime Minister to discuss the programs for
improving and expanding the police forces. The Prime Minister said that
both recruiting and training of the police are going on all the time. About
10,000 are being added each year. The main emphasis this year is training
the police for service in the villages and hamlets. Ambassador Bunker said
the plan is to put six policemen in each village. The Prime Minister said
that the extension of the pacification program has been so great and has
come so quickly that it has been beyond their expectations. There is much
now to be done to consolidate the presence of the government in the villages
and hamlets and to introduce projects that would help improve life in the
villages. More funds were needed for this kind of work.
8. The Secretary asked General Wheeler if he would like to make any re-
marks, and General Wheeler said he wanted to go back to desertions. It is
our experience that where there is good leadership there are good results.
Soldiers like to serve under good officers and when there are good officers
and good leadership, desertion rates are low. The Prime Minister agreed,
but said good officers must have more than technical knowledge of fighting.
,
The men must know what they are fighting for and for whom. There must be
justice in the units. There must be good morale and a good spirit. The
officers must look after their men and be concerned with their welfare.
9. Secretary Laird then expressed concern about statements made giving
numbers of American troops to be reduced this year (an oblique reference to
President Thieu's interview last week with the Washington Post). He was
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SECRET
3
sure he would be asked about these numbers when he appeared before Congress.
American troop reductions will require close coordination between the two
governments. The question had to be studied by the respective staffs and
any statement made had to be carefully worked out together and coordinated.
To make statements that could not be fulfilled would create additional prob-
lems in the United States. At the end of the last administration, he had
to say frankly, public support for Vietnam was very low, and many of our
people no longer believed what they were told. The new administration had
to work on these matters in order to revive public support for our Vietnam
policy. The American people will give the new administration some time to
work out things, both here and in Paris. He doesn't know how long that
will be -- six, ten, twelve: months, or longer. The important thing is
that troop reductions must be associated with the ability of the South
Vietnamese forces to take on the greater share of the burden of fighting
so as to reduce the American burden, and that when we make the reduction
announcement we know it can be carried out.
10. The Prime Minister said that he understood this problem very well.
President Thieu's statement was aimed to appease the American people and
give them a feeling that South Vietnam was prepared to take on a greater
share of the fighting. Secretary Laird said that until we see the studies
of General Vien and General Abrams and have some better estimate of the
degree of progress in the training and equipment of the South Vietnamese
forces and in the general situation, it would be wise to avoid giving out
any numbers for the reduction. The Prime Minister agreed.
11. The Secretary asked what effect the shelling of the cities was having
the people of South Vietnam. The Prime Minister said the people were
getting used to it. Vietnamese, like other asians, are fatalistic. They
believe there is a time fixed in destiny when each person will die, and
nothing can be done about it. What was remarkable was that there was no
panic here during these recent shellings, and this was perhaps because the
intensity and frequency of the rocketing was small compared with the past.
The rocketing has also given the government some advantages. It has proved
to both the Vietnamese people and the people of the world the true face
of communism. It has sown even more hatred here for the communists. The
fighting forces are very angry and they speak only of revenge. Ambassador
Bunker asked what is the enemy's purpose in shelling the cities. The Prime
Minister said their ultimate purpose is to take over the country at any
cost, but this they can no longer do. They have suffered too many losses,
and so they find it difficult to face their people in the North and in the
,
South. They must therefore do something to show they are active, something
dramatic to impress their supporters. This is one aspect, but there is
another. Hanoi believes the people here and abroad are impatient for peace.
The rocketing is designed to show the world and the people in the South
that they are strong and they can strike at will. They believe it will
put them in a better position in Paris. The Northerners arepatient and they
believe that American patience is running out. If they step up the attacks
perhaps the Americans will pull out. They, therefore, have staged these
recent attacks in order to try to extract concessions in Paris. This is
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SECRET
4
the trap that they are laying. Southerners are also patient, and indeed
more patient than Northerners. The question is American patience. It is
here where the South Vietnamese are concerned.
12. Secretary Laird said that the Americans recognize Hanoi's game and
take this into account. He believes the great majority of Americans will
give the new administration some time to see what progress could be made
in terms of bringing the war to an end, but it is a little early to gauge
how American public opinion will go. He then asked if South Vietnam has
to face elections how much public support does the government have.
13. The Prime Minister said when he took over in May the situation was
very difficult. It was just after Tet with all its destruction and uncer-
tainty, and the confidence of the people was low. He accepted office be-
cause it was his duty to help restore the confidence of the people in
government and in victory. It is difficult to measure the extent of public
support of the government, but there are tangible signs that confidence
has been restored:
a. Last May there was much talk of an economic crisis and collapse,
and people were getting ready to leave the country. But there has been no
collapse. Prices have since been fairly stable and there has been an
economic revival. The people no longer fear danger in this quarter.
b. The military successes of last year have also done much to restore
confidence. Last year many people were doubtful and fearful of the future
because of the heavy attacks of the communists at Tet. But the communists
have had so many casualties, so many caches have been captured, and the
fighting forces of the South are so much more effective that people now, he
thinks, do have confidence in the future.
C. Many of the caches that have been found, much of the success in
battle, have come through the cooperation of the people, who more and more
are supplying information about the enemy to the government. This is a
very good sign.
d. Finally, although he did not want to appear vain, he thought it
might be useful to mention the reaction of the people to the attempted
assassination on him earlier this week. He has had hundreds of cables and
letters and expressions of sympathy. These have come from every part of
the country, from all the religious groups, from both sides of the Buddhists,
from the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao, and others. "Even the Upper and Lower
,
House and the Tri Quang Buddhists," he said with a smile, "have come to me
to express their sympathy."
14. The Prime Minister ended by saying there has been a very great im-
provement here since last May when he took over, and he thinks there is
now a good measure of confidence in the country and support for what the
government is trying to do.
15. The Secretary thanked the Prime Minister, and this concluded the
conversation.
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MEMO
WHEELER
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
March 13, 1969
MEMO FOR THE PRESIDENT
I am providing separately the
impressions I gained from the recent trip
General Wheeler and I made to South
Vietnam.
Attached are General Wheeler's
observations and recommendations.
Capitaint
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SENSITIVE
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
CM-4001-69
12 March 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SUBJECT: Observations and Recommendations Concerning
the Military Situation in Southeast Asia
1. This memorandum is designed to set forth in summary
fashion my impression of the current situation in South
Vietnam, to include the effect of the enemy attacks launched
in recent days, and the military problems posed General
Abrams by the continuing enemy build-up in the DMZ area,
Laos and Cambodia. Also presented are my views concerning
military actions which we should take. Since this report
is deliberately in summary form, I will not attempt docu-
mentation from operational and intelligence sources; such
supporting detail is readily available.
2. The current series of enemy attacks has, to date,
achieved no results of military significance. Contrary
to effects of the Tet offensive of 1968, the enemy has
gained little or nothing psychologically. Indeed, I was
surprised at the calmness displayed by President Thieu,
Prime Minister Huong and General Vien, Chief of the
Vietnamese Joint General Staff, regarding the attacks by fire
(ABF) launched by the enemy against Saigon and DaNang and, most
recently, against Hue. Nevertheless, I think it clear that,
if rocket attacks (even in the small numbers employed to date)
continue against major population centers, an appropriate
reaction must be undertaken. I make this judgment based on
two factors: first, the GVN will be under great pressure to
retaliate in kind; and, second, beyond a certain point U.S.
restraint will be interpreted as confirming North Vietnamese
contentions that our bombing halt was "unconditional," and
that the U.S. lied to the GVN regarding the circumstances
leading to the cessation of acts of force against North
x
Vietnam. I understand that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have
forwarded a package of appropriate retaliatory actions to
Mr. Packard. (Apropos of retaliatory actions, you will
recall Vice President Ky's assertion that the Vietnamese
Air Force could retaliate with attacks against Hanoi.
Copy
/
or
copies
of
4
pages series
DOWNORADED
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This is nonsense. However, at my request General George
Brown, Commander, Seventh Air Force, drew up a plan for
an attack against military facilities in the vicinity of
Dong Hoi. Under this concept the South Vietnamese forces
would provide the strike aircraft; U.S. forces would
provide support in the areas of MIG cap, Sam and flak
supp ession, ECM, photo reconnaissance, etc. I consider
that this plan has a certain political and military
attractiveness.)
3. All sources, U.S. and Vietnamese, confirm that
the pacification effort has been very little affected by
current enemy actions. Indeed, there is evidence that,
spurred by President Thieu's personal interest, progress
continues in this key program. The Phoenix attacks on
the VC infrastructure continue successfully. The Hoi
Chanhs (enemy defectors) are on the rise. The RVNAF,
including RF & PF, is steadily improving in effectiveness;
they can be expected over time to assume more of the burden.
4. Free World forces continue to hold the initiative
within SVN. The enemy continues to have the capability
to mount offensive "surges" periodically. However, he can
do so only at the expense of heavy personnel losses when
he debouches from his sanctuaries, weeks and months of
preparation of the battle area, and the expenditure of
laboriously assembled logistic resources. Moreover, his
tactical concepts require that he preposition supplies along
his routes of advance to the battle, thus exposing them to
capture or destruction. As General Abrams expresses it,
the VC/NVA do not base their operations on a logistic "tail"
as do other armies but on a logistic "nose."
5. The most striking and dangerous situations are
comprised of the enemy troop and logistic build-ups in the
DMZ area, in the panhandle of Laos and in Cambodia.
a. Ten (10) NVA regiments are deployed just north
of, within and south of the DMZ. Moreover, intelligence
now indicates that an additional NVA division may well be
,
deployed in this same area. Moreover, the enemy has, since
1 November 1968, established an ample logistic base contiguous
to the DMZ with which to support forces of the above magnitude
in offensive operations. Also, there is quite convincing
evidence that the enemy is infiltrating through the DMZ.
2
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ISA SECRET
b. The enemy has been urgently stocking his base
areas in the panhandle of Laos in order to be logistically
prepared for the onset of the rainy season in that area.
Normally, the monsoon will switch about four to six weeks
hence. The immense quantities of materiel and supplies
seized or destroyed during the recent operation in the A Shau
valley are, I think, ample proof that enemy base areas situated
deeper and further to the north in Laos represent lucrative
targets for pre-emptive action by our ground and air forces.
As an illustration, using 1968 rates of enemy ammunition
expenditure and friendly casualties the caches found in the
A Shau valley would have provided the enemy the capability
of inflicting 7,658 friendly KIA and 24, 471 friendly WIA.
C. By now, I think that all of us recognize the
importance to the enemy and the threat to our forces posed
by the Cambodian sanctuary base areas. In actuality, it is
those base areas from which the threat to Saigon originates
and is sustained. They, and their counterparts in Laos and
contiguous to the DMZ, are also the prime cause of U.S.
casualties.
6. I have reached the following conclusions and,
accordingly, submit the recommendations which follow:
a. Enemy base areas provide the human and material
means to inflict casualties on U.S. forces and those of our
allies. If these base areas are destroyed or neutralized,
friendly casualties will automatically decrease.
b. The next rocket attack (s) on Saigon, Hue or Da Nang
must be followed by an appropriate response by us. Preferably
our response should take the form of naval and/or air attacks
against targets in North Vietnam.
C. General Abrams should be authorized immediately
to operate offensively in the southern DMZ in order to pre-
empt enemy build-up in and use of that area.
d. General Abrams should be tasked for plans to
attack and destroy, by air and ground action (raids in force)
critical enemy base areas in Laos in order to deplete enemy
logistic resources during the rainy season in Laos.
3
SENSITIVE
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TOR SEMIT
e. General Abrams should be tasked for plans to
destroy by air and ground action (raids in force) enemy
Cambodian sanctuary base areas.
EARLE G. WHEELER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
>
4
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SECRET
PARIS 20873, September 15, 1968 (Section 1 of 8)
*
8. We said that in connection with withdrawal of forces we had
indicated at our last meeting that we would have some further comments
on this subject. We said we wished to make a statement of policy on
this matter which was important and new.
9. We said: United States and Free World forces will be withdrawn
from South Viet-Nam as North Viet-Nam withdraws to the North all
personnel infiltrated from North Viet-Nam. Withdrawal by both sides
will begin simultaneously and as soon as possible.
10. Any US or Free World forces remaining in South Viet-Nam, after
the complete withdrawal of all North Vietnamese forces, will leave
South Viet-Nam as soon as possible and in any event not later than
six months thereafter.
11. When North Vietnamese withdrawal has been completed, there
will be no more infiltration from the North. Similarly, when all US
and Free World forces have left, no further troops will be introduced.
12. In the Manila Declaration there was a phrase "When the level of
violence thus subsides. 11 This phrase is descriptive of the condition
which would result from withdrawal of external forces. It does not
refer to any violence that may occur among South Vietnamese after
the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces.
13. As we said at the last meeting, the question of modalities and
timing of mutual withdrawal should be discussed and agreed between us.
14. Xuan Thuy interrupted twice while we were reading the above
statement to be sure he understood it correctly. First regarding our
statement on the level of violence subsiding, Thuy said he took our
statement to mean that if fighting continues after the withdrawal of
foreign forces such violence would be considered to be between
southerners. We replied affirmatively. Thuy also asked about our
statement to the effect that we were willing to withdraw simultaneously
as NVA troops withdraw. He wondered whether there was not a contra-
diction between that statement and the subsequent one that US and Free.
World forces would withdraw six months after the withdrawal of North
/ietnamese forces had been completed. We replied that we have many
more forces in South Viet-Nam than the DRV does. We have many more
bases to evacuate and much farther to go. Tho replied that the US has
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considerable means to effect a withdrawal. Its forces came to
Viet-Nam quickly and they can leave more quickly than the North
Vietnamese could.
15. We replied. we would be glad to provide transportation for the
DRV to take its troops back quickly. These were matters to be dis-
cussed. As for the six-month period, it is the outside limit. The
general idea is that these should be simultancous withdrawals to start
as soon as possible. This is not intended to be a condition, but an
affirmative guarantee that our troops will be withdrawn within six
months at the latest after complete withdrawal of North Vietnamese
forces.
16. We said we believed our new statement is a major step in the
direction of peace and should resolve any question DRV side may have
about our good will and serious intentions to withdraw our forces from
SVN, as well as our serious intention to leave the future of SVN to
the South Vietnamese people without interference from outside.
* * *
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WITHDRAWAL
MUTUAL
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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/NODIS/PARIS MEETINGS/PLUS
March 20, 1969
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT:
Hanoi's Interest in Mutual Withdrawal
There is evidence that Hanoi is seriously interested in mutual
withdrawal.
On September 15, 1968, Harriman presented to Xuan Thuy
of the DRV a statement of the U.S. position on mutual withdrawal.
Thuy interrupted twice during the presentation to clarify the U.S.
position on the "level of violence thus subsiding" and on the "six
month clause. 11 His remarks, at least by implication, accepted
that there were North Vietnamese troops in the South (Report of
Conversation attached).
Since January, Hanoi has moved from saying that political
issues must be negotiated first to the position that U.S. withdrawal
is the paramount issue. They must understand that we will not
withdraw unless they do.
If we stick to the issue of mutual withdrawal in the private
conversations for several weeks, I believe Hanoi may be prepared
to begin to discuss this issue. If we waiver and start to introduce
poltical issues, they will almost certainly pull back and
demand that we talk to the NLF.
Attachment
SECRET/NODIS/PARIS MEETINGS/PLUS
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