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Syrian-Israeli Disengagement Documents Fifth HAK Trip [2 of 4]
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Syrian-Israeli Disengagement Documents Fifth HAK Trip [2 of 4]
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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
NUMBER
TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
RESTRICTION
I
report
re: Middle East
n.d.
B
2
memo
Forsman to Saunders
5/23/74
B
3
report
Israeli Analysis of the Findings
5/12/74
B
4
memo
Saunders to Hoskinson
n.d.
B
5
report
Foreign Forces in Syria
5/23/74
B
6
telegram
SecState to Amconsul Jerusalem
5/28/74
B
7
telegram
SecState to Amconsul Jerusalem
5/28/74
B
8
brief
Plan for the Golan Heights
n.d.
B
FILE GROUP TITLE
BOX NUMBER
NSC
1190
FOLDER TITLE
11
RESTRICTION CODES
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
B. National security classified information.
financial information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law
rights.
enforcement purposes.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
or a libel of a living person.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
GPO;
1989-235-084/00024
DECLASSIFIED
NA 14021 (4-85)
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER
ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
total
is
TOP SECRET
25.3.74
SEPARATION OF FORCES PLAN
ISRAELI PROPOSAL
legend:
67 CEASE FIRE LINES
73 CEASE FIRE LINE
MOVE
LIGHT FORCES ZONE
2 INF. BATTALIONS
60 TANKS
3000 MEN
LIMITED FORCES AREA
1 INF. DIV.
16 ARMOUR DIV. (300 TANKS)
ART. BATTALIONS (100 GUNS)
(to cover only own forceskline)
MISSILE FREE AREA
ISRAELI SIDE
wt OF SHOE unsu
COMPLETE RESTRICTION ON ANY
MISSILES & SITES (GROUND TO AIR
SYRIAN SIDE
GROUND TO GROUND
30m
25km
Limited Forces Area
Light Forces Zone
10 km
Light - Forces Zone
Limited Forces Area
10km
25km
30km
Miseile Free Area
U.N.E.F.
Missile Free Area
Buffer
Zone
TOP SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SHEMONA
BERU
legend:
JUNE 67 LINES
OCT. 73 LINE
ISRAELI SETTLEMENT
SYRIAN ABANDONED VILLAGE:
OVER 500 INHABITANTS
LESS THEN 500 INHABITANTS
SYRIAN INHABITED VILLAGE:
OVER 500 INHABITANTS
LESS THEN 500 INHABITANTS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
STRATEGY IN EVENT OF FAILURE IN
SYRIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT NEGOTIATIONS
Objectives:
If our current round of negotiations in the area fails to
produce Syrian-Israeli agreement on the main elements of dis-
engagement, our objectives will be:
1. To manage the diplomatic situation in such a way that the
Secretary leaves the area without there being a major blowup.
2. Rio retain US credibility and influence in key Arab countries,
including in particular Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Algeria.
3. To preserve the elements of a negotiating process that can
be picked up and re-started when circumstances are more propitiousl.
Two Possible Scenarios
The courses of action open to us will be determined in large
measure by the circumstances under which the negotiations break
down. For analytical purposes, we are likely to face one of the following
two situations:
1. A breakdown in circumstances where (a) Israel will have
taken a position that moderate Arab opinion (meaning Egypt in particular)
perceives as a reasonable result of our efforts, and (b) Syria balks.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
2
This could arise, for example, if Israel agrees to a disengagement
line that returns Kuneitra to Syrian civilian administration, and
Syria insitts on a significantly larger withdrawal. (Scenario 1)
2. A breakdown which is widely perceived in the area and
elsewhere as the result of Israeli inflexibility -- e.g., Israel
stands on its present position - something close to it with respect
to the location of the disengagement line (Scenario 2).
Scenario 1 (Syria to blame)
This is cheiezsier of the two situations for us to manage. Our
immediate task will be to make sure that the facts are clearly under-
stood in key Arab and European capitals, since we can expect the
Syrians and their supporters, especially the Soviets, to seek to
obfuscate and misinterpret the issues.
We should:
(a) Make sure Sadat, Boumediene and Faisal understand the
reasons for the impasse and seek their assurances they will not be
drawn into military of political support of Syria if it goes to war.
This would best be accomplished by further visit to those capitals,
as well as a full briefing of NATO and of the Soviets on the specific
positions adopted by each side.
(b) Adopt a public postable of willingness to continue our efforts
through diplomatic channels.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
3
(c) Avoid public criticism of Syria, while continuing our
dialogue with Asad to keep the door open to further negotiations if
his position later becomes more flexible.
(d) Make a factual written report on the status of thennegotiations
to the UN Secretary General and to the participants in the Geneva
Peace Conference.
(e) If the issues goes to the Security Council, adopt a position
supportive of Israel and seek to line up as many other members as
possible.
(f) Intensify our bilateral cooperation activities with key Arab
countries.
Scenario 2 (Israel to blame)
This situation would place us in a difficult position, and our
maneuverability would be greatly circumscribed.
We should:
(a) Elicit from Israel maximum flexibility on as many elements
of disengagement as possible with a view to obtaining Israeli agreement
to terms that, except for the Israeli position on the disengagement line,
are as close as possible to the terms of the Israeli-Egyptian agreement.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS
4
(b) Adopt a public posture that disassociates us from the positions
of both sides to the extent that they deviate from the model of the
Egyptian-Israeli agreement.
(c) If the issue goes to the Security Council, avoid supporting
the Israeli position; this might be the time for us to "non-participate"
in any vote, on the grounds that participation would be inconsistent
with our middleman role in the negotiations.
(d) Agree, if others press, to a meeting of the Geneva
Conference to review the status of the negotiations and to consider
next steps.
(e) Seek Israeli and Syrian agreement to a statement defining
principles of disengagement on which both sides could agree as well
as the areas remaining to be negotiated. Such a statement could be
forwarded to the UN Secretary General and the Geneva Conference
participants as a basis for future negotiations when either side
indicated an interest in resuming talks.
(1) While continuing scheduled military deliveries and economic
aid to Israel, defer decisions on new items of equipment sought by
Israel and leave the optional $500 million under the Emergency Security
Assistance Act as a loan rather than connecting it to grant aid.
(g) Undertake intensive diplomatic efforts with key Arab countries
to (1) persuade them that the stalemate innegotiations is a transitory
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Secretary Kissinger's Luncheon Toast, May 3, 1974
Some months ago when we first started in our Middle East
efforts, it was as if Syria were on the other side of the
moon. That is why we proposed that Mr. Sisco come here.
Seriously, relations have been frozen for two decades and
public opinion in the United States viewed Syria as a hostile
country and one allied to our opponent.
Since my first visit four months ago there has been a tremen-
dous change. We have learned that Syrians are a proud and
independent people and that Syria is nobody's tool.
We have experienced tremendous Syrian hospitality. I am grate-
ful that the Foreign Minister arranged for only a light lunch
today. We have become convinced that the freezing of relations
that had taken place was not natural. We are committed to a
rapid improvement in our relations. We ask nothing from Syria
except what is natural to Syria, which is to be true to its
own national interest. On this basis, we are prepared to
cooperate in the reconstruction of Syria and are prepared to
have the same close relations with Syria as with any other
Arab country. We realize that some objective difficulties
have to be overcome before we can continue on this road. But
we consider cooperation our natural relationship.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Page 2
I am here on a very difficult mission to begin the process
of making peace between Syria and its neighbor. While Syria
has proved that it has a great capacity for friendship, it
has also proved an implacable enemy to its enemies. There
is a generation of distrust and warfare between Israel and
Syria. Therefore, it is difficult to take the first step.
After one of my earlier trips here, I made the point that it
is a tremendous step for Syris to engage in this process at
all and to be prepared to do it on a step-by-step basis.
I cannot report that my argument met with universal appro-
bation in the Israel government. But I do believe a possi-
bility exists for a first step, and once that is taken, the
process becomes irreversible. We are interested in the first
step not to draw another permanent line but to start the
process leading toward a lasting peace. In assessing specific
proposals, it is important to keep in mind our ultimate destina-
tion as well as the independent proposals themselves. I will
discuss all of this in detail with His Excellency, the President.
We will make a major effort. We have our own ideas that are
not bound by the ideas of anyone else, and I have great hope
that we can accomplish on the northern front what we have
accomplished on the southern front. In this spirit, my colleagues
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Page 3
and I will be returning as often as necessary to make sub-
stantial progress and perhaps to complete an agreement.
I would like to thank my colleague, the Foreign Minister, for
the understanding which he has shown and for the attitude
which has been important in the transformation of our relations.
May I ask you to join me in a toast to the Foreign Minister.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Secretary Kissinger's Luncheon Toast, May 3, 1974
Some months ago when we first started in our Middle East
efforts, it was as if Syria were on the other side of the
moon. That is why we proposed that Mr. Sisco come here.
Seriously, relations have been frozen for two decades and
public opinion in the United States viewed Syria as a hostile
country and one allied to our opponent.
Since my first visit four months ago there has been a tremen-
dous change. We have learned that Syrians are a proud and
independent people and that Syria is nobody's tool.
We have experienced tremendous Syrian hospitality. I am grate-
ful that the Foreign Minister arranged for only a light lunch
today. We have become convinced that the freezing of relations
that had taken place was not natural. We are committed to a
rapid improvement in our relations. We ask nothing from Syria
except what is natural to Syria, which is to be true to its
own national interest. On this basis, we are prepared to
cooperate in the reconstruction of Syria and are prepared to
have the same close relations with Syria as with any other
Arab country. We realize that some objective difficulties
have to be overcome before we can continue on this road. But
we consider cooperation our natural relationship.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Page 2
I am here on a very difficult mission to begin the process
of making peace between Syria and its neighbor. While Syria
has proved that it has a great capacity for friendship, it
has also proved an implacable enemy to its enemies. There
is a generation of distrust and warfare between Israel and
Syria. Therefore, it is difficult to take the first step.
After one of my earlier trips here, I made the point that it
is a tremendous step for Syris to engage in this process at
all and to be prepared to do it on a step-by-step basis.
I cannot report that my argument met with universal appro-
bation in the Israel government. But I do believe a possi-
bility exists for a first step, and once that is taken, the
process becomes irreversible. We are interested in the first
step not to draw another permanent line but to start the
process leading toward a lasting peace. In assessing specific
proposals, it is important to keep in mind our ultimate destina-
tion as well as the independent proposals themselves. I will
discuss all of this in detail with His Excellency, the President.
We will make a major effort. We have our own ideas that are
not bound by the ideas of anyone else, and I have great hope
that we can accomplish on the northern front what we have
accomplished on the southern front. In this spirit, my colleagues
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Page 3
and I will be returning as often as necessary to make sub-
stantial progress and perhaps to complete an agreement.
I would like to thank my colleague, the Foreign Minister, for
the understanding which he has shown and for the attitude
which has been important in the transformation of our relations.
May I ask you to join me in a toast to the Foreign Minister.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Secretary Kissinger's Luncheon Toast, May 3, 1974
Some months ago when we first started in our Middle East
efforts, it was as if Syria were on the other side of the
moon. That is why we proposed that Mr. Sisco come here.
Seriously, relations have been frozen for two decades and
public opinion in the United States viewed Syria as a hostile
country and one allied to our opponent.
Since my first visit four months ago there has been a tremen-
dous change. We have learned that Syrians are a proud and
independent people and that Syria is nobody's tool.
We have experienced tremendous Syrian hospitality. I am grate-
ful that the Foreign Minister arranged for only a light lunch
today. We have become convinced that the freezing of relations
that had taken place was not natural. We are committed to a
rapid improvement in our relations. We ask nothing from Syria
except what is natural to Syria, which is to be true to its
own national interest. On this basis, we are prepared to
cooperate in the reconstruction of Syria and are prepared to
have the same close relations with Syria as with any other
Arab country. We realize that some objective difficulties
have to be overcome before we can continue on this road. But
we consider cooperation our natural relationship.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Page 2
I am here on a very difficult mission to begin the process
of making peace between Syria and its neighbor. While Syria
has proved that it has a great capacity for friendship, it
has also proved an implacable enemy to its enemies. There
is a generation of distrust and warfare between Israel and
Syria. Therefore, it is difficult to take the first step.
After one of my earlier trips here, I made the point that it
is a tremendous step for Syris to engage in this process at
all and to be prepared to do it on a step-by-step basis.
I cannot report that my argument met with universal appro-
bation in the Israel government. But I do believe a possi-
bility exists for a first step, and once that is taken, the
process becomes irreversible. We are interested in the first
step not to draw another permanent line but to start the
process leading toward a lasting peace. In assessing specific
proposals, it is important to keep in mind our ultimate destina-
tion as well as the independent proposals themselves. I will
discuss all of this in detail with His Excellency, the President.
We will make a major effort. We have our own ideas that are
not bound by the ideas of anyone else, and I have great hope
that we can accomplish on the northern front what we have
accomplished on the southern front. In this spirit, my colleagues
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Page 3
and I will be returning as often as necessary to make sub-
stantial progress and perhaps to complete an agreement.
I would like to thank my colleague, the Foreign Minister, for
the understanding which he has shown and for the attitude
which has been important in the transformation of our relations.
May I ask you to join me in a toast to the Foreign Minister.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
May 22, 1974
Mr. Secretary:
We believe Assad is frozen against the Egyptian
model for the reasons given. The three of us are
convinced we have to alter the approach somewhat.
This approach would be based on giving Israel as
early a warning of attack as possible rather than
trying to get the guns out of range of opposing lines.
The space is too small, and Assad won't accept such
restrictions. Thus instead of applying the Egyptian
model, we would try to provide detection of indi-
cations of possible offensive action.
We suggest it be discussed in general with
Israel this morning and then tried out on Assad this
afternoon.
Joe Sisco
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
AU.S.PROPOSAL
A. Mount Hermon
The Red Line would be moved three to four kilometers to the
west toward the peak as indicated in Israel Tuesday
morning.
Israel would turn over to the U. N. the positions
it did not occupy on October 6.
B. Limitations
1. Within 10 kilometer zone, deployment would con-
sist of no more than 5,000 men, 70 tanks, and
36 artillery pieces (short range).
2. U. N. Disengagement Observer Force would inspect
these deployments.
3. In a second 10 kilometer zone:
(a) in the southern sector Syria would be
permitted to retain the present strength
of its forces and equipment;
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-2-
(b) in northern sector where Israel pulls back,
Syria would, after moving forward into the area
vacated by Israel, with forces consistent with
what is allowed in the 10 kilometer zone,
redeploy its troops towns in positions normal for the
defense of Damascus. Syria would specify in
advance to us what their deployment would be.
(c) Syria would keep its SAM's where they are
and provide following commitments:
(1) There would be no SAM's in second 10 kilometer
zone,
(2) Syria will not move them forward x from where they
are,
(3) Syria will not shoot at any Israeli airplanes
flying on the Israeli side of the line.
(d) US aerial reconnaissance would be the form of
monitoring, not UN inspection. Purpose of this
inspection would be not to check on a firm stand-
still of deployment, but rather to detect whether
either change of equipment or its increase in num-
bers or disposition indicate intention to mount
offensive action. Intelligence would be made
available to both sides.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-3-
4. Syria would agree to this as a US proposal, and give
us a private assurance rather than this being
reflected in the agreement.
C. The Red Line
The Red Line would be moved westward in accordance with
the following general principles:
one to two kilometers west in the area opposite the
Quneitra area on grounds that this would be part of
an effort to lessen the possibility that the people
of Quneitra will be involved in future military
activity;
three to four kilometers west in the area to the north
of that.
D. U.N. Disengagement Observer Force
1,500 men
E. Area of Separation
There would be no military forces or equipment and a maximum
number of 150 police forces.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SYRIAN OR GANIZATION
Division has 3 brigades (3000 men each)
Division alsohas 2 battalious of artillery
Each brigade has a battalion of artillery (122mm. is organic)
An armored brigade has 93 tanks
An infantry brigade has 31 tanks (Asad said sometimes 41)
9- BRIGADE DEPLOYMENT : TANKS
Best case : 9 infantry brigades = 279 tanks
First probable: 6 infantry brigades (186)
3 armored brigades (279) = 465
tanks
Second probable: 7 infantry brigades (217)
(Best attainable) 2 armored brigades (186) = 403
tanks
Theoretical
case worst. : 9 armored brigades = 837 tanks
Present deploymentwithin 25km. of front:
49.000 men
752 tanks
369 artillery pieces
"Normal" peacetime deployment (July 1,1973) in 25km. area
34,500 men
465 tanks
276 artillery
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CURRENT EMPLOYMENT
7th Infantry Division Area of Operation
124 Tanks
30'
XX
72 Artillery Pieces
3
14000 Personnel
Damascus
9th Infantry Division
217 Tanks
1
azraat Beit Jinn
XX
126 Artillery Pieces
1024
1
15250 Personnel
Sassa
5th Infantry Division
217 Tanks
126 Artillery Pieces
X
15250 Personnel
Kuneitra
RIA
Kafr
68th Independent Armor Brigade
Naffakh
DEMILITA
ONE
93 Tanks
X9
18 Artillery Pieces
Khushing
33° 00'
2250 Personnel
Rafid
80th Independent Armor Brigade
93 Tanks
18 Artillery Pieces
5
2250 Personnel
ELAL
TOTALS
45'
752 Tanks
369 Artillery Pieces
49000 Personnel
JORDAN
45'
36'0
15'
ATT 1
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
The Arab-Israeli Handbook
1723/73
NORMAL DEPLOYMENT
1 July 1973
o
An Nasariyah
BEIRUT
26
3
13
Lebanon
Ar Ruhaybah
213
AI Qutayfah
SF
Harasta al Basal
Realat Asad
0
AI Qabun
Armd Dr ense
O
DAMASCUS
Force
Yalfur
AI Mezzah
Atid
Qatana
AI Kiswah,
Mazra'at Bayt Jinn
Hadar
Sa'Sa'
Jabbata
AI Khashab
Kanakir
7th Infantry Division
*Maás
Khan Arnabah
Ghabaqhib
186 Tanks
102 Artillery Pieces
Agraba
GOLAN
12000 Personnel
As Sanamayr
Nab' As Sakhr
Basir
Ruhin
9th Infantry Division
HEIGHTS
Qasim
Israel
Ar Rafid
62 Tanks
Nawa
Ayn Dhakar
"Izra
48 Artillery Pieces
Lake
Ash Shaykh Said
7000 Personnel
Tiberias
"Ash Shaykh
Miskin
Jallin
Tafas
5th Infantry Division
217 Tanks
SC'
126 Artillery Pieces
15500 Personnel
TOTALS:
465 Tanks
276 Artillery Pieces
34500 Personnel
13,000 = one broyade of
ATT TT 2
each of above
forward
(
3000
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
ARMOR DIV
2 Armor Bdes.
Contains: 186 Tanks; 36 Artillery Pieces; 4,500 Personnel
1 Artillery Bde.
Contains: 54-71 Artillery Pieces; 3,000 Personnel
1 Mechanized Inf Bde.
Contains: 31 Tanks; 18 Artillery Pieces; 3,000 Personnel
TOTALS FOR ONE (1) DIVISION: 217 Tanks; 107 Artillery;
10,500 Personnel
INFANTRY DIV
2 Infantry Bdes.
Contains: 62 Tanks; 48 Artillery Pieces; 7,000 Personnel
1 Mechanized Inf Bde.
Contains: 31 Tanks; 6 Artillery Pieces; 3,000 Personnel
x
1 Armor Bde.
Contains: 124 Tanks; 18 Artillery Pieces; 2,250 Personnel
1 Artillery Bde.
Contains: 54 Artillery Pieces; 3,000 Personnel
TOTALS FOR ONE (1) DIVISION: 217 Tanks; 126 Artillery Pieces;
15,250 Personnel
THERE ARE TWO (2) ARMOR DIVISIONS PLUS ONE (1) ARMOR TASK FORCE.
WE HAVE A TOTAL BREAK OUT AS FOLLOWS:
TANKS: 713
ARTY : 268
PERS : 27,750
THERE ARE THREE (3) INFANTRY DIVISIONS.
WE HAVE A TOTAL BREAK OUT AS FOLLOWS:
TANKS: 651
ARTY : 378
PERS : 45,750
ATT.4 4
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
It a
ESTIMATED POST DISENGAGEMENT
DAMASCUS
XX
3
30
LEBANON
XX
1
7th Infantry Division
186 Tanks
x
X
66 Artillery Pieces
68
78
12250 Personnel
15
X
X
85
X
9th Infantry Division
12)
7
155 Tanks
XX
48 Artillery Pieces
9
x
52
9250 Personnel
SYRIA
X
DEMILITARIZED
x
ZONE
43
33
5th Infantry Division
33° 00
xx
217 Tanks
5
X
72 Artillery Pieces
x
112
X
12500 Personnel
46
x
Lake
61
x
TOTALS:
Tiberias
132
X
132
558 Tanks
45
186 Artillery Pieces
34000 Personnel
JORDAN
30'
45'
36°00'
15'
ATT. 3
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 2 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum
TO
:
Mr. Saunders
DATE:
May 5, 1974
FROM :
Col. B. B. Forsman, USAF, Defense Attache
SUBJECT:
IDF Peacetime Golan Heights Deployment
1. The attached map depicts the pre-October 1973 normal IDF deployment
on the Golan Heights. The information was derived from numerous brief-
ings. Our observations on road trips confirm the general deployment,
but not all units were continuously deployed in the positions shown.
2. You will note the outposts along the ceasefire line. Those under-
lined were continuously manned, as far as we can determine. These
outposts were designed to withstand attack as opposed to the trip-wire
concept on the Bar Lev line. The Arman units behind the line were
deployed in platoon strength (three tanks) as a general rule.
3. Hope this satisfies your request.
Attachment:
As stated.
Billy B Farm
DAO:Col.BBForsman:p1r--5/5/74
Buy U.S. Savings Plan
5010-108
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
102
N
230
Q
No
N
40
0001
300000
Deir Sirjane
Maz, Sarda
Kherouiaa
Hadai
Kafer Kela
Aridla
193
Taibe
Vazzani
Harfa
hajar
dilpi
Mughs
Shab'a
104
11111
11
Mayan Baruk
PAL
Quiya
1188
Lahoussa
Grannje
Markabe
Hay
H. Mamri Dafna 0
.165
She ar
En
Yashuv LIV'AT
Fill
198
TELL EL AHMAR
Koum Marj
lim
Qiryat
HaGosherim
MIZPE
Za'ura
226
Barrhoure
Hould
Margaliyyot
Shemona
197'
GOLAN
Rass 1023 enn Nouriye"
OBet Hillel
05
290
1029
Qainal Donbed
HARE
Outain
Ketar Szold
100
HAR
That Erennbe
Sede
Nehemya
Jibab Meis
drom
D
IONIT
124
TELL ECH CHAAR
Na'am
Amir
Meiss Jebell
Kefar Blum
Uyun el Hajal
Ein of Haur
Jabaa
33° 10'
Shamir
Qata
Ne'ot
hmadiya
4107
©Samdapiye
2
Mordekha
Sariaqa
Bab et Hawä
Sanstan
Lahayot HaBishan
Mansura
Gharbiya
Blidal
Näsil
Meroin (
Qana
Yiftah
HAR BENT
Oumm Batne
unditra
Gonen
Rawiya
Airaroun
Mezudat esha'
Darahta
280
HAR
Mudariya
Oumm Tine Q
Rast
Malkiyya
S
Ramot Naftali
Noterd
Dalwa
529
QEREN
Hafar
Ziwan
Ein
Ziwan
Mrabaate
Emeg Hula
109
Mnaithate
O
NAFTALI
Mughaiyir
Kammouniye ©Nabaa
Dishor
x
Ribaniye
es Sakhr
own
*807
Huseiniya
HAR SHIFON
Majdouliye
HAR GERSHOM
549
977
Khuweikho
3
1110
Yesud
Kafr Naffikh
720
HAB OSIFON
8 110
HaMa'ala
HAR
'Aleiqa
Dalhamiyg
Ajam
Ein Eisha
SAlma
ELIEZER
Hulata
$66.)
Dabbura
Sindiyäna
Qadiripa
900
Koum Ain
el Pacha
Y
H. Oazyon Sede Eli'ezer
Juwer
Briqa
TELL AKASHA
ran
270
Ramthaniya
1029
sign
1(-)
Fasara
Kodna
Prior to the Tom Kippur War the IDF
Dabiya
900
ya
III
Soueisse
998
33°00'
Khushniya
manned the 12 ceasefire line positions
*877
Qasrin
TULUL
UMUR
with, for the most part, reservists.
Qusbiya
Asbah
758
Asha
4
The Total INfantry strength was
HAR
Farj
Rafid
approximately 7 companies. The 188 ш
Nahal Geshur
Butimy414
ARMOR Bde
Tuiyiba
Umm ed Dananir
with approximately
260
Mansüra
Old Fort
Shabba
P
1115
80 tanks manned tank platoon
-
Maalaqa
Cr.
GIVAT BAZAQ
Bassa
Rhadir el Boustane
Meskine
positions located normally quite
498 Jurnaya
A
116
Road
near the ceasefire OP positions
o
Zeita Jurnaya
:.Maz. Quneitra
Mazraa
5
(Capernanm)
gu. all
Mas'adiya
Roman Road
Er Razoniya
Jike Raggad
Kare Deshe
Maz. Kanaf Deir Asiz
Jise Masri
Lite aruf AMERICA
En Sheva (Heptapegon)
1) m (Täbigha)
Kafr Aqab
Q
tamot
7
Ain Dakar
Biq'at
TEL HODIM
Amarat el Fareij
HAR RAVID
Sabahiya
Khisfir
250
Ginnosar
Lawiyn
Ramar
Savyona
117
50'
Weradin
Villa Melchet
Hutiya
ab
Kursi
Adeisa
7)
H.Arbet
Zetim
Marjahiya
Kafr el Ma
Naf'a
Biarai
Arbel
Arbel
Tel Raqqat
Yo'ay,
Nabal
Biresh
V
Hittin
Heitil
TTM
Nugeib
6
Shuqum Sukufiy Bene Yehuda
Nafrali
Heta
alahal Gola
Sahm el Joulane
Tiberias
'En Gev
" O"
Abdine
Zayatine
441*
9. Mara Ditsuerya
9.
gusito
Ne'ot Golan
Aarda
Hammat
Chajara
Rabbi
Menora
Maariye
Mo." Tomb
Yogusa
H. Menorim
Kafr Harib
Beit Erré
240
H. Sirgond
Hospital
Offeite
ok.ouaiye
IaZore'im
Qoussair ©
resid HAR ADAMI
W. Khond
:H.Ordesh
levellamma
Poriyya 'Ittil
Sharona
HaOn
Kair
# Zedata
Mosha
MEZOQE
Agraba
Shajara
Maqarin
seizoun
Kanna
Poriyya
Kåziye
Semudar
YIN'AM
and Bet Derah
Misimur HaShe osha
Oholah
Ma'agan,
Rafid
9
7
Bitanya
O
Tel Qagir
OMukheiba
411
Yavneer
Alummor
Davor
Degany
Rhiet
agafig
OSa
Harta
Dhune
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON
PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER
3
ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
STATE 105745
21 MAY
16
52z
0 211422Z MAY 74 ZFF6
To SEC 863
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHDM/USINT DAMASCUS NIACT IMMEDIATE 0711
INFO RUESAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE 0521
RUESJR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM NIACT IMMEDIATE 5872
BT
CONFIDENTIAL
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE SECTION 1 OF 3 STATE 105745/1
TOSEC 863
E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJ: UNTSO MANDATE
REF: JERUSALEM 1003
FOR SISCO FROM BUFFUM
FOLLOWING IS MATERIAL REQUESTED REFTEL:
1. FIRST SUBSTANTIVE DIRECTIONS TO UNTSO OBSERVERS BY
SECURITY COUNCIL APPEARED IN COUNCIL RESOLUTION 73 OF 11
AUGUST 1949 IN PARA 6 WHICH READ:
"REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO ARRANGE FOR THE
CONTINUED SERVICE OF SUCH OF THE PERSONNEL OF THE PRESENT
TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION AS MAY BE REQUIRED IN
OBSERVING AND MAINTAINING THE CEASE-FIRE, AND AS MAY BE
NECESSARY IN ASSISTING THE PARTIES TO THE ARMISTICE
AGREEMENTS IN THE SUPERVISION OF THE APPLICATION AND
OBSERVANCE OF THE TERMS OF THOSE AGREEMENTS, WITH
PARTICULAR REGARD TO THE DESIRES OF THE PARTIES AS
EXPRESSED IN THE RELEVANT ARTICLES OF THE AGREEMENTS;"
2. ENTIRE TEXT OF THIS RESOLUTION (73) READS AS FOLLOWS:
"THE SECURITY COUNCIL:
"HAVING NOTED WITH SATISFACTION THE SEVERAL
ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BY MEANS OF NEGOTIATIONS
BETWEEN THE PARTIES INVOLVED IN THE CONFLICT IN
PALESTINE IN PURSUANCE OF ITS RESOLUTION 61 (1948) OF
16 NOVEMBER 1948,
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Pg.2 2 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Pa
STATE
105743
"1. EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE GOVERNMENTS AND
AUTHORITIES CONCERNED, HAVING UNDERTAKEN BY MEANS OF
NEGOTIATIONS NOW BEING CONDUCTED BY THE PALESTINE
CONCILIATION COMMISSION, TO FULFIL THE REQUEST OF THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN ITS RESOLUTION OF 11 DECEMBER 1948
TO EXTEND THE SCOPE OF THE ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS AND TO
SEEK AGREEMENT BY NEGOTIATIONS CONCLUDED EITHER WITH THE
CONCILIATION COMMISSION OR DIRECTLY, WILL AT AN EARLY
DATE ACHIEVE AGREEMENT ON THE FINAL SETTLEMENT OF ALL
QUESTIONS OUTSTANDING BETWEEN THEM;
"2. FINDS THAT THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS CONSTITUTE
AN IMPORTANT STEP TOWARD THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PERMANENT
PEACE IN PALESTINE AND CONSIDERS THAT THESE AGREEMENTS
SUPERSEDE THE TRUCE PROVIDED FOR IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTIONS 50 (1948) OF 29 MAY AND 54 (1948) OF
15 JULY 1948;
"3. REAFFIRMS, PENDING THE FINAL PEACE SETTLEMENT,
THE ORDER CONTAINED IN ITS RESOLUTION 54 (1948) OF
15 JULY 1948 TO THE GOVERNMENTS AND AUTHORITIES
CONCERNED, PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 40 OF THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS, TO OBSERVE AN UNCONDITIONAL CEASE-FIRE
AND, BEARING IN MIND THAT THE SEVERAL ARMISTICE AGREE-
MENTS INCLUDE FIRM PLEDGES AGAINST ANY FURTHER ACTS OF
HOSTILITY BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND ALSO PROVIDE FOR THEIR
SUPERVISION BY THE PARTIES THEMSELVES, RELIES UPON THE
PARTIES TO ENSURE THE CONTINUED APPLICATION AND OBSER-
VANCE OF THESE AGREEMENTS;
"4. DECIDES THAT ALL FUNCTIONS ASSIGNED TO THE
UNITED NATIONS MEDIATOR ON PALESTINE HAVING BEEN
DISCHARGED, THE ACTING MEDIATOR IS RELIEVED OF ANY
FURTHER RESPONSIBILITY UNDER SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS;
"5. NOTES THAT THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS PROVIDE
THAT THE EXECUTION OF THOSE AGREEMENTS SHALL BE SUPER-
VISED BY MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSIONS WHOSE CHAIRMAN IN
EACH CASE SHALL BE THE UNITED NATIONS CHIEF OF STAFF OF
THE TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION OR A SENIOR OF THAT
ORGANIZATION DESIGNATED BY HIM FOLLOWING CONSULTATION
WITH THE PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENTS;
"6. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO ARRANGE FOR
THE CONTINUED SERVICE OF SUCH OF THE PERSONNEL OF THE
PRESENT TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION AS MAY BE REQUIRED
IN OBSERVING AND MAINTAINING THE CEASE-FIRE, AND AS MAY
BE NECESSARY IN ASSISTING THE PARTIES TO THE ARMISTICE
AGREEMENTS IN THE SUPERVISION OF THE APPLICATION AND
OBSERVANCE OF THE TERMS OF THOSE AGREEMENTS, WITH
PARTICULAR REGARD TO THE DESIRES OF THE PARTIES AS
EXPRESSED IN THE RELEVANT ARTICLES OF THE AGREEMENTS;
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Pq.3
LIMITED OFFICIAL USESTATE 105743
"7. REQUESTS THE CHIEF OF STAFF MENTIONED ABOVE TO
REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE OBSERVANCE OF THE
CEASE-FIRE IN PALESTINE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF
THIS RESOLUTION; AND TO KEEP THE PALESTINE CONCILIATION
COMMISSION INFORMED OF MATTERS AFFECTING THE COMMISSION'. S
WORK UNDER THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 194 (III) OF
11 DECEMBER 1948."
3. AFTER THE 1967 WAR, SC ADOPTED RES 236 ON JUNE 11,
1967 WHICH READ AS FOLLOWS:
"THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
"TAKING NOTE OF THE ORAL REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY
GENERAL ON THE SITUATION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA, MADE
AT THE 1354TH, 1355TH, 1356TH AND 1357TH MEETINGS AND
THE SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION SUPPLIED IN DOCUMENTS
S/793Ø AND ADD.1-3,
"1. CONDEMNS ANY AND ALL VIOLATIONS OF THE
CEASE-FIRE;
"2. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO CONTINUE HIS
INVESTIGATIONS AND TO REPORT TO THE COUNCIL AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE;
"3. AFFIRMS THAT ITS DEMAND FOR A CEASE-FIRE AND
DISCONTINUANCE OF ALL MILITARY ACTIVITIES INCLUDES A
PROHIBITION OF ANY FORWARD MILITARY MOVEMENTS SUBSEQUENT
TO THE CEASE-FIRE;
"4. CALLS FOR THE PROMPT RETURN TO THE CEASE-FIRE
POSITIONS OF ANY TROOPS WHICH MAY HAVE MOVED FORWARD
SUBSEQUENT TO 163Ø HOURS GMT ON 10 JUNE 1967;
"5. CALLS FOR FULL COOPERATION WITH THE CHIEF OF
STAFF OF THE UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZA-
TION AND THE OBSERVERS IN IMPLEMENTING THE CEASE-FIRE,
INCLUDING FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND ADEQUATE COMMUNICATIONS
FACILITIES."
4. RES 34ø OF OCTOBER 25, 1973 WHICH ESTABLISHED UNEF
ALSO PROVIDED ROLE FOR UNTSO. FULL TEXT OF RES 34Ø
FOLLOWS:
"THE SECURITY COUNCIL,
"RECALLING ITS RESOLUTIONS 338 (1973) OF 22 OCTOBER
AND 339 (1973) OF 23 OCTOBER 1973,
"NOTING WITH REGRET THE REPORTED REPEATED VIOLATIONS
OF THE CEASE-FIRE IN NON-COMPLIANCE WITH RESOLUTIONS 338
(1973) AND 339 (1973),
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Pq.4
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
STATE 105743
"NOTING WITH CONCERN FROM THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S
REPORT THAT THE UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OBSERVERS HAVE
NOT YET BEEN ENABLED TO PLACE THEMSELVES ON BOTH SIDES
OF THE CEASE-FIRE LINE,
"1. DEMANDS THAT IMMEDIATE AND COMPLETE CEASE-FIRE
BE OBSERVED AND THAT THE PARTIES RETURN TO THE POSITIONS
OCCUPIED BY THEM AT 1650 HOURS GMT ON 22 OCTOBER 1973;
"2. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL, AS AN IMMEDIATE
STEP, TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF UNITED NATIONS MILITARY
OBSERVERS ON BOTH SIDES;
"3. DECIDES TO SET UP IMMEDIATELY UNDER ITS
AUTHORITY A UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE TO BE COMPOSED
OF PERSONNEL DRAWN FROM STATES MEMBERS OF THE UNITED
NATIONS EXCEPT THE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY
COUNCIL, AND REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO REPORT
WITHIN 24 HOURS ON THE STEPS TAKEN TO THIS EFFECT;
"4. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO REPORT TO
THE COUNCIL ON AN URGENT AND CONTINUING BASIS ON THE
STATE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESENT RESOLUTION, AS
WELL AS RESOLUTIONS 338 (1973) AND 339 (1973);
"5. REQUESTS ALL MEMBER STATES TO EXTEND THEIR FULL
COOPERATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE PRESENT RESOLUTION, AS WELL AS RESOLUTIONS 338 (1973)
AND 339 (1973)."
5. SYG REPORTED TO SC ON 27 OCTOBER 1973 SPECIFYING
"TERMS OF REFERENCE" OF UN FORCE AS FOLLOWS:
"(A) THE FORCE WILL SUPERVISE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
OPERATIVE PARAGRAPH 1 OF RESOLUTION 34Ø (1973), WHICH
READS AS FOLLOWS:
'1. DEMANDS THAT IMMEDIATE AND COMPLETE CEASE-
FIRE BE OBSERVED AND THAT THE PARTIES RETURN TO THE
POSITIONS OCCUPIED BY THEM AT 1650 HOURS GMT ON
22 OCTOBER 1973;'.
"(B) THE FORCE WILL USE ITS BEST EFFORTS TO PREVENT
A RECURRENCE OF THE FIGHTING, AND COOPERATE WITH THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS IN ITS
HUMANITARIAN ENDEAVOURS IN THE AREA.
"(C) IN THE FULFILMENT OF ITS TASKS, THE FORCE WILL
HAVE THE COOPERATION OF THE MILITARY OBSERVERS OF
UNTSO."
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon-Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Pq.5 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
STATE 105743
6. SC APPROVED FOREGOING REPORT OF SYG IN RES 341
ADOPTED OCTOBER 27, 1973.
7. WHILE PERHAPS LESS RELEVANT TO YOUR CURRENT NEEDS,
SHOULD YOU WISH LANGUAGE ESTABLISHING ORIGINAL UN TRUCE
COMMISSION, IT APPEARS IN SC RES 48 OF APRIL 23, 1948
AS FOLLOWS:
"REFERRING TO ITS RESOLUTION OF 17 APRIL 1948,
CALLING UPON ALL PARTIES CONCERNED TO COMPLY WITH
SPECIFIC TERMS FOR A TRUCE IN PALESTINE,
"THE SECURITY COUNCIL
"ESTABLISHES A TRUCE COMMISSION FOR PALESTINE
COMPOSED OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THOSE MEMBERS OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL WHICH HAVE CAREER CONSULAR OFFICERS IN
JERUSALEM, NOTING, HOWEVER, THAT THE REPRESENTATIVE OF
SYRIA HAS INDICATED THAT HIS GOVERNMENT IS NOT PREPARED
TO SERVE ON THE COMMISSION. THE FUNCTION OF THE
COMMISSION SHALL BE TO ASSIST THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN
SUPERVISING THE IMPLEMENTATION BY THE PARTIES OF THE
RESOLUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF 17 APRIL 1948;
"REQUESTS THE COMMISSION TO REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITHIN FOUR DAYS REGARDING ITS
ACTIVITIES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION, AND
SUBSEQUENTLY TO KEEP THE SECURITY COUNCIL CURRENTLY
INFORMED WITH RESPECT THERETO.
"THE COMMISSION, ITS MEMBERS, THEIR ASSISTANTS AND
ITS PERSONNEL SHALL BE ENTITLED TO TRAVEL, SEPARATELY OR
TOGETHER, WHEREVER THE OMMISSION DEEMS NECESSARY TO
CARRY OUT ITS TASKS.
"THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS SHALL
FURNISH THE COMMISSION WITH SUCH PERSONNEL AND ASSIST-
ANCE AS IT MAY REQUIRE, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE SPECIAL
URGENCY OF THE SITUATION WITH RESPECT TO PALESTINE."
8. YOU ARE, OF COURSE, FAMILIAR WITH DIVERGENT POSITIONS
OF ISRAEL AND SYRIA RE APPLICABILITY OF ORIGINAL 1949
ARMISTICE AGREEMENT. ASSUME YOU FINESSING THIS QUESTION
AND THEREFORE AM NOT HOLDING UP THIS MESSAGE TO INCLUDE
LENGTHY TEXT OF ARMISTICE AGREEMENT ITSELF. HOWEVER,
AM SENDING IT OUT IN SUBSEQUENT SEPTEL IN CASE YOU
NEED IT. RUSH
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
CHECKLIST FOR DAMASCUS
Mr. Sisco-May 28
1. Convey Israeli decision and map.
2. If Asad agrees, you can show him a final copy of the Agreement
and of the U. N. Protocol and ask his representative somehow
to identify the copies as texts they have verified for
signing. (These copies will have been typed in Damascus. You
will have a binder with you to put them in. When the Syrians
have verified the text you should get it back; the U. S. will
carry it to Geneva for signing.)
3. You can give Asad the original of the letter signed by the
Secretary transmitting the U. S. proposal on limitations.
Ask him to have his representative sign the proposal and turn
it over to our representative in Geneva at the signing.
4. Give Asad a copy of the letter on the hills and tell him the
U. S. representative in Geneva will give him the signed original
when the Agreement is signed at the time when we receive the
copy of the U. S. proposal signed by the Syrian representative.
5. Inform Asad of the statement the U. S. will make that Paragraph
A of the Agreement covers all armed attacks across the
demarcation line.
6. Coordinate the timing (and text) of a statement to be issued
simultaneously in Damascus, Jerusalem and Washington saying that
an agreement has been reached and will be signed May 30.
7. Tell Asad he will receive the letter on the next stage in two
or three weeks.
8. You need to give Asad the number of police in the area of
separation and confirm that they will have soft vehicles (no APCs).
9. (A copy of the suspension statement is in your folder.)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
CHECKLIST FOR DAMASCUS
Mr. Sisco-May 28
1. Convey Israeli decision and map.
2. If Asad agrees, you can show him a final copy of the Agreement
and of the U. N. Protocol and ask his representative somehow
to identify the copies as texts they have verified for
signing. (These copies will have been typed in Damascus. You
will have a binder with you to put them in. When the Syrians
have verified the text you should get it back; the U. S. will
carry it to Geneva for signing.)
3. You can give Asad the original of the letter signed by the
Secretary transmitting the U. S. proposal on limitations.
Ask him to have his representative sign the proposal and turn
it over to our representative in Geneva at the signing.
4. Give Asad a copy of the letter on the hills and tell him the
U. S. representative in Geneva will give him the signed original
when the Agreement is signed at the time when we receive the
copy of the U. S. proposal signed by the Syrian representative.
5. Inform Asad of the statement the U. S. will make that Paragraph
A of the Agreement covers all armed attacks across the
demarcation line.
6. Coordinate the timing (and text) of a statement to be issued
simultaneously in Damascus, Jerusalem and Washington saying that
an agreement has been reached and will be signed May 30.
7. Tell Asad he will receive the letter on the next stage in two
or three weeks.
8. You need to give Asad the number of police in the area of
separation and confirm that they will have soft vehicles (no APCs).
9. (A copy of the suspension statement is in your folder.)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
CHECKLIST FOR DAMASCUS
Mr. Sisco-May 28
1. Convey Israeli decision and map.
2. If Asad agrees, you can show him a final copy of the Agreement
and of the U. N. Protocol and ask his representative somehow
to identify the copies as texts they have verified for
signing. (These copies will have been typed in Damascus. You
will have a binder with you to put them in. When the Syrians
have verified the text you should get it back; the U. S. will
carry it to Geneva for signing.)
3. You can give Asad the original of the letter signed by the
Secretary transmitting the U. S. proposal on limitations.
Ask him to have his representative sign the proposal and turn
it over to our representative in Geneva at the signing.
4. Give Asad a copy of the letter on the hills and tell him the
U. S. representative in Geneva will give him the signed original
when the Agreement is signed at the time when we receive the
copy of the U. S. proposal signed by the Syrian representative.
5. Inform Asad of the statement the U. S. will make that Paragraph
A of the Agreement covers all armed attacks across the
demarcation line.
6. Coordinate the timing (and text) of a statement to be issued
simultaneously in Damascus, Jerusalem and Washington saying that
an agreement has been reached and will be signed May 30.
7. Tell Asad he will receive the letter on the next stage in two
or three weeks.
8. You need to give Asad the number of police in the area of
separation and confirm that they will have soft vehicles (no APCs).
9. (A copy of the suspension statement is in your folder.)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
CHECKLIST FOR DAMASCUS
Mr. Sisco-May 28
1. Convey Israeli decision and map.
2. If Asad agrees, you can show him a final copy of the Agreement
and of the U. N. Protocol and ask his representative somehow
to identify the copies as texts they have verified for
signing. (These copies will have been typed in Damascus. You
will have a binder with you to put them in. When the Syrians
have verified the text you should get it back; the U. S. will
carry it to Geneva for signing.)
3. You can give Asad the original of the letter signed by the
Secretary transmitting the U. S. proposal on limitations.
Ask him to have his representative sign the proposal and turn
it over to our representative in Geneva at the signing.
4. Give Asad a copy of the letter on the hills and tell him the
U. S. representative in Geneva will give him the signed original
when the Agreement is signed at the time when we receive the
copy of the U. S. proposal signed by the Syrian representative.
5. Inform Asad of the statement the U. S. will make that Paragraph
A of the Agreement covers all armed attacks across the
demarcation line.
6. Coordinate the timing (and text) of a statement to be issued
simultaneously in Damascus, Jerusalem and Washington saying that
an agreement has been reached and will be signed May 30.
7. Tell Asad he will receive the letter on the next stage in two
or three weeks.
8. You need to give Asad the number of police in the area of
separation and confirm that they will have soft vehicles (no APCs).
9. (A copy of the suspension statement is in your folder.)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
CHECKLIST FOR DAMASCUS
Mr. Sisco-May 28
1. Convey Israeli decision and map.
2. If Asad agrees, you can show him a final copy of the Agreement
and of the U. N. Protocol and ask his representative somehow
to identify the copies as texts they have verified for
signing. (These copies will have been typed in Damascus. You
will have a binder with you to put them in. When the Syrians
have verified the text you should get it back; the U. S. will
carry it to Geneva for signing.)
3. You can give Asad the original of the letter signed by the
Secretary transmitting the U. S. proposal on limitations.
Ask him to have his representative sign the proposal and turn
it over to our representative in Geneva at the signing.
4. Give Asad a copy of the letter on the hills and tell him the
U. S. representative in Geneva will give him the signed original
when the Agreement is signed at the time when we receive the
copy of the U. S. proposal signed by the Syrian representative.
5. Inform Asad of the statement the U. S. will make that Paragraph
A of the Agreement covers all armed attacks across the
demarcation line.
6. Coordinate the timing (and text) of a statement to be issued
simultaneously in Damascus, Jerusalem and Washington saying that
an agreement has been reached and will be signed May 30.
7. Tell Asad he will receive the letter on the next stage in two
or three weeks.
8. You need to give Asad the number of police in the area of
separation and confirm that they will have soft vehicles (no APCs).
9. (A copy of the suspension statement is in your folder.)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER
FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
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NUMBER
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ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
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DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
CHECKLIST FOR JERUSALEM
SUNDAY, MAY 26
Limitations
--New positions taken by Asad:
--36 short-range 122mm in 10 km-zone.
--Agreed to measure the 10 km zone from the Red Line.
--Asad is willing to accept either:
--All guns are acceptable within 25 km except
the 130 mm,. which would be beyond the 25 km line.
Or:
--If the second area were 20 km, he would position
all guns with a range of more than 20 km beyond
the 20 km line.
--You have the "impression" that he will move all non-Syrian
forces beyond 25 km provided there is no Israeli publicity.
-(Confirmed that SAMs would be beyond 25 km.)
-Issues that remain to be resolved:
--36 short-range 122 mm in 10 km zone.
--Decision on guns in 20-25 km zone.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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SECRET
-2-
(9 brigade deployment in 25 km zone.)
--The format in which the limitations would be recorded.
Red Line
--Must be moved as far west as possible.
United Nations
--Asad still wants less than 1000. &
---
Mount Hermon
--Asad position is uncertain.
--(Israel wants a sentence in The Protocol on the -Area of
Separation reading: "No liaison officers of any side will
be present and no persons other than UNDOF will be permitted
into that area. " This has not been raised.)
Area of Separation
(Police: Israel wants a limited number, 30 in Quneitra and
30 elsewhere in the area. Not raised yet. )
(Fedayeen: We have put this issue in terms of preventing
border-crossing. This is reflected in Paragraphs A and D
of the Agreement and in The Protocol on the Area of
Separation. This has not been discussed yet.)
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
CHECKLIST FOR DAMASCUS
Sunday, May 26
Limitations
-- In the 10 km. zone measured from the Red Line, the
following is now agreed:
-- 6000 men,
--- 75 tanks,
-- 36 122 mm. guns of less than 15 km. range.
-- In the area behind the 10 km. limitations area the
following needs to be decided or confirmed:
-- There may be up to 162 guns of 122 mm. of
less than 15 km. range.
-- For other artillery, there are three possi-
bilities, the last two to be used only to
break an impasse on the Red Line:
-- Israel accepts the proposal to
station all guns with a range of
more than 20 km. behind a line
20 km. from the Red Line.
-- (Apply the above limitation in
an area of 25 km. measured from
the Blue Line.)
-- (Apply the above restriction in
an area of 20 km. measured from
the Syrian October 6 line, or
Purple Line.)
-- The following is confirmed:
-- SAMs will be 25 km. from the Red Line (or 30 km.
from the Blue Line).
-- (You will provide the Israelis a written state-
ment of your understanding that it is Asad's
intention to station about 9 brigades in the
10-25 km. area.)
-- It is necessary to decide the format in which
the above limitations would be expressed.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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SECRET
2.
Red Line
-- Show the new map.
-- (Use moving the line another kilometer west in
connection with one of the fallbacks on drawing the
line for artillery limitations to break an impasse.)
United Nations
-- Number: Israel prefers 1500 but gives you some
flexibility (say, to 1300).
-- Name remains undecided.
Mount Hermon
-- The Red Line has been moved west in this area.
-- Israel will turn over to the UN all its positions in
the area of separation.
-- Israel wants a sentence in the Protocol saying: "In
the Mount Hermon sector, the UN (presence) will be the
only and exclusive presence. No liaison officers of
any side will be present and no persons other than
those of the UN (presence) will be permitted into
that area."
Area of Separation (in addition to the last point on
Mount Hermon above)
--- Police: Israel wants a limited number, 30 in Quneitra
and 30 elsewhere in the area.
-- Fedayeen control: Israel wants the following language
in the Protocol: "The UN shall deny access to any
military or para-military forces into the area of
separation." We have put this in the Agreement in terms
of preventing "hostile actions" (Paragraph A) and
preventing border-crossing (Paragraph D). If we can
retain the former, the latter might drop out of the
agreement as the Syrians are already insisting. Then
there are two possibilities:
-- We also have the language of Paragraph Dion
börder-crossing in the Protocol on the Area of
Separation.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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SECRET
3.
-- If that language drops out of the Protocol also,
perhaps you could elicit a statement of intent
by Asad on keeping the border quiet and provide
this to Israel in a letter.
Documents
You will be trying to get the following documents into
final form:
-- Agreement,
-- Protocol on UN,
-- Protocol on area of separation,
-- paper on limitations,
-- letter on Quneitra hills,
-- letter on next stage. In this connection,
you may also want to discuss how you see
the diplomacy evolving through the rest
of 1974.
Procedures at Geneva
You may want to discuss our role there.
Syrian Jewry
-- You promised to take this up in the context of US-Syrian
relations.
POWs
-- Israel has agreed to release "all prisoners captured
on the Syrian front." Israel wants to assure release
of its two pilots in Lebanon.
Civilian Repatriations
-- Asad was going to give you a list of "Arabs in Israeli
Jails.
-- Asad said he would look into the question of the body
of Eli Cohen.
-- (The question of release of Albert Elias, Secretary-
General of the Lebanese Jewish Community, was left
that Israel would furnish further information if
possible.)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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SECRET
4.
Recess of Negotiations (if necessary)
-- The issue is how to recess the negotiations. The
choice is between the appearance of blow-up and
maintaining the appearance of a continuing process.
--- Joint statement.
-- Backgrounding the press.
Bilateral Relations
-- Timing of improved relations, i.e., raising interests
sections to Ambassadorial level.
-- Timing of the President's trip.
-- Economic cooperation (see attachment).
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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SECRET
Economic Cooperation
As a concrete manifestation of closer relations, you
would be prepared to instruct Mr. Scotes to pursue the
following if Asad agreed:
-- The US is prepared to resume educational and cultural
exchanges between the US and Syria. (Note: The
Syrians felt the time was not yet ripe for such
contacts when Scotes made the offer for FY 1974.
In FY 1975, we are aiming for 5 international visitor
grants, 4 graduate student or professors' research
grants, and at least one US professor teaching at
Damascus University.)
-- A representative of the Department of Commerce will
be visiting Syria shortly to explore the possibilities
of increasing trade. (Note: One Commerce official
is in the area for this purpose and will come to
Syria. The only big commercial deal pending is the
sale of aircraft by Lockheed or McDonnell Douglas
to Syrian Arab Airlines.)
-- The US is ready to enter into talks with the
government of Syria for the settlement of economic
claims by both sides with a view to opening new
possibilities of economic and commercial cooperation
between the US and Syria. (Note: The two main
issues are (a) the status of 21 million Syrian
pounds from counterpart funds frozen by Syria in
1967 and (b) about $75,000 owed to Ex-Im Bank
following nationalization of a textile firm. We
could presumably agree to Syrian use of the 21
million pounds for appropriate Syrian economic
activity, e.g., rehabilitation of villages. Settle-
ment of the nationalization claim would permit Ex-Im
financing. Several US firms have recently sought
US financing.
-- The US would be prepared to participate in the
1974 Damascus Fair if we were invited. (Note: The
fair takes place in July. We have not yet been
invited, but if invited promptly, we could still
arrange a commercial presence.)
-- We will let key Congressmen know of Asad's interest
in having them visit Syria. Perhaps Dr. Kabbani
could follow this up.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT
or
Department of State
,
TELEGRAM
/
of
S/S - 15
0 212251Z MAY 74
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
21 MAY 74 - 23:07Z
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
Classification
TO RUESJR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 5890
INFO RUESAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0535
BT
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE STATE 106493
TOSEC 878
E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJECT: UNEF'S MANDATE
REF: SECTO 56
FOR SISCO FROM BUFFUM
1. WHILE YOUR REQUEST INVOLVED ONLY INFO ON UNTSO, WHICH
HAS BEEN TRANSMITTED, IN EVENT YOUR DISCUSSIONS INVOLVE
AVAILABILITY OF UNEF ON SYRIAN FRONT WITHIN SCOPE OF
PRESENT MANDATE, FOLLOWING REMINDER MAY BE USEFUL:
SC RESOLUTION 346 OF APRIL 8, 1974 RENEWED UNEF'S
MANDATE FOR SIX MONTHS AND IN EFFECT PROVIDED FOR THE
TRANSFER OF UNEF CONTINGENTS TO ISRAELI/SYRIAN FRONT
WITHOUT FURTHER SC ACTION BY THE INSERTION OF THE FOLLOW-
ING LANGUAGE:
" OTES THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S VIEW THAT THE DIS-
ENGAGEMENT OF EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI FORCES IS ONLY A FIRST
STEP TOWARDS THE SETTLEMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST problem
AND HAT THE CONTINUED OPERATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS
EMERGENCY FORCE IS ESSENTIAL NOT ONLY FOR THE MAINTENANCE
OF THE PRESENT QUIET IN THE EGYPT-ISRAEL SECTOR BUT ALSO
TO ASSIS:, IF REQUIRED, IN FURTHER EFFORTS FOR THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUST AND DURABLE PEACE IN THE MIDDLE
EAST AND ACCORDINGLY DECIDES THAT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE RECOMMENDATION IN PARAGRAPH 68 OF THE SECRETARY
GENERAL'S REPORT OF 1 APRIL 1974 (S/11248), THE MANDATE
OF THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE, APPROVED BY THE
SECURITY COUNCI.. IN ITS RESOLUTION 341 (1973) OF
27 OCTOBER 1973, SHALL BE EXTENDED FOR A FURTHER PERIOD
OF SIX months, THAT IS, UNTIL 24 OCTOBER 1974." RUSH
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
FORM
Classification
4-68
FS-412(H)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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DEPARTMENT
8
STATE
Department of State
WALING
TELEGRAM
or
S/S - 15
0 211551Z MAY 74
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 21 MAY 74 - 18:32Z
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
Classification
TO RUEHDM/USINT DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0716
INFO RUESAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0525
RUESJR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 5878
BT
LIMITED OFFICIAL use STATE 105761
TOSEC 866
E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJECT: UNTSO MANDATE
REF: 105745, TOSEC 853
FOR SISCO FROM BUFFUM
1. AS PROMISED REFTEL, WHILE THIS MAY NOT BE ESSENTIAL,
FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF ISRAELI-SYRIAN GENERAL ARMISTICE
AGREEMENT OF JULY 20, 1949:
"THE PARTIES TO THE PRESENT AGREEMENT,
"RESPONDING TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF
16 NOVEMBER 1948, CALLING UPON THEM, AS A FURTHER PRO-
VISIONAL MEASURE UNDER ARTICLE 40 OF THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS AND IN ORDER TO FACILITATE THE TRANSITION
FROMTHE PRESENT TRUCE TO PERMANENT PEACE IN PALESTINE, TO
NEGOTIATE AN ARMISTICE:
"HAVING DECIDED TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS UNDER
UNITED NATIONS CHAIRMANSHIP CONCERNING the IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF 16 NOVEMBER 1948;
AND HAVING APPOINTED REPRESENIATIVES: EMPOWERED TO
NEGOTIATE AND CONCLUDE AN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT;
"THE UNDERSIGNED REPRESENTATIVES, HAVING EXCHANGED
THEIR FULL powers FOUND TO BE IN GOOD AND PROPER FORM,
HAVE AGREED UPON THE FOLLOWING PROVISIONS:
"ARTICLE I. WITH A VIEW TO PROMOTING THE RETURN OF
PERMANENT PEACE IN PALESTINE AND IN RECOGNITION OF THE
IMPORTANCE IN THIS REGARD OF MUTUAL ASSURANCES CONCERNING
THE FUTURE MILITARY OPERATIONS OF THE PARTIES, THE
FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES, WHICH SHALL BE FULLY OBSERVED BY
both PARTIES DURING THE ARMISTICE, ARE HEREBY AFFIRMED:
"1. THE INJUNCTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AGAINST
Classification
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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PAGE 2 S'ATE 105761 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
RESORT TO MILITARY FORCE IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THE
PALESTINE QUESTION SHALL HENCEFORTH BE SCRUPULOUSLY
RESPECTED BY BOTH PARTIES. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN
ARMISTICE BE'WEEN THEIR ARMED FORCES IS ACCEPTED AS AN
IND: SPENSABLE STEP TOWARD THE LIQUIDATION OF ARMED
CONFICT AND THE RESTORATION OF PEACE IN PALESTINE.
"2. NC AGGRESSIVE ACTION BY THE ARMED FORCES --
LAND, SEA OR AR ⑉⑉ OF EITHER PARTY SHALL BE UNDERTAKE,
PLANNED, OR THEATENED AGAINST THE PEOPLE OR THE ARMED
FORCES OF THE (THER; IT BEING UNDERSTOOD THAT THE USE OF
THE TERM PLANNE) IN THIS CONTEXT HAS NO BEARING ON NORMAL
STAFF PLANNING S GENERALLY PRACTISED IN MILITARY
ORGANIZATIONS.
"3. THE RIGHT OF EACH PARTY TO ITS SECURITY AND
FREEDOM FROM FEAR OF ATTACK BY THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
OTHER SHALL BE FULY RESPECTED.
⑉ "ARTICLE II. WITH 1 SPECIFIC VIEW TO THE IMPLE-
MENTATION OF the RESOLUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF
16 NOVEMBER 1948, THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES AND PURPOSES
ARE AFFIRMED:
"1. THE PRINCIPLE THAT NO MILITARY OR POLITICAL
ADVANTAGE SHOULD BE GAINED UNDER THE TRUCE ORDERED BY
THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS RECOGNIZED.
"2. IT IS ALSO RECOGNIZED THAT NO PROVISION OF
THIS AGREEMENT SHALL AN ANY WAY PREJUDICE THE RIGHTS,
CLAIMS AND POSITIONS or EITHER PARTY HERETO IN THE
ULTIMATE PEACEFUL. SETTIEMENT OF THE PALESTINE QUESTION,
THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT BEING DICTATED EXCLUSIVELY
BY MILITARY, AND NOT BY POLITICAL, CONSIDERATIONS.
"ARTICLE III.
"i. IN PURSUANCE OF THE TOREGOING PRINCIPLES AND OF
THE RESOLUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF 16 NOVEMBER 1948,
A GENERAL ARMISTICE BETWEEN THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
TWO PARTIES -- LAND, SEA AND AIR -- IS HEREBY ESTABLISHED.
"2. NO ELEMENT OF the LAN), SEA OR AIR, MILITARY OR PARA-
MILITARY, FORCES OF EITHE PARTY, INCLUDING NON-REGULAR
FORCES, SHALL COMMIT ANY MARLIKE OR HOSTILE ACT AGAINST THE
MILITARY OF PARA-MILITARY FORCES OF THE OTHER PARTY, OR
AGAINST CIVILIANS IN TERRITORY UNDER THE CONTROL OF THAT
PARTY; 0R SHALL ADVANCE BEYOND OR PASS OVER FOR ANY PURPOSE
WHATSOEVER THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE SET FORTH IN
ARTICLE V OF THIS AGREEMENT: OR ENTER INTO OR PASS THROUGH THE
AIR SPACE OF THE OTHER PARTY OR THROUGH THE WATERS WITHIN
THREE MILES OF THE COASTLINE OF THE OTHER PARTY.
"3. NO WARLIKE ACT OR ACT OF HOSTILITY SHALL BE CONDUCTED
FROM TERRITORY CONTROL Reproduced Riche Richard residential Library THIS
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed.pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PAGE
3
STATE
105761
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
AGREEMENT AGAINST THE OTHER PARTY OR AGAINST CIVILIANS IN
TERRITORY UNDER CONTROL OF THAT PARTY.
"ARTICIE IV.
the LINE DESCRIBED IN ARTICLE V OF THIS AGREEMENT
SALL BE DESIGNATED AS THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE AND
IS DELINEATED IN PURSUANCE OF THE PURPOSE ANDINTENT OF
THE RESOLUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF 15 NOVEMBER 1948.
"2. The BASIC PURPOSE OF THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE
IS TO INEATE THE LINE BEYOND WHICH THE ARMED FORCES OF
THE RESP. TIVE PARTIES SHALL NOT MOVE.
"3. RULES Ain REGULATIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PARTIES, WHIC, PROMIBIT CIVILIANS FROM CROSSING THE FIGHTING
LINES OR ENTER.NG THE AREA BETWEEN THE LINES, SHALL REMAIN
IN EFFECT AFTER :HE SIGNING OF THIS AGREEMENT, WITH APPLICATION
TO THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE DEFINED INNVRZVCLE v,
SUBJECT TO THE PROV-SIONS OF PARAGRAPH 5 OF THAT ARTICLE.
"ARTICLE v.
"1. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT THE FOLLOWING ARRANGEMENTS
FOR THE ARMISTICE DEMARCAT. LINE BETWEEN THE ISRAELI
AND SYRIAN ARMED FORCES AND FOR THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE
ARE NOT TO BE INTERPRETED AS HAVING ANY RELATION WHATSOEVER
TO ULTIMATE TERRITORIAL ARRANGEMENTS AFFECTING THE TWO PARTIES
TO THIS AGREEMENT.
"2. IN PURSUANCE OF THE SPIRIT OF : HE SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION OF 16 NOVEMBER 1948, THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE
AND THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE HAVE BEE DEFINED WITH A VIEW TOWARD
SEPARATING THE ARMED FORCES OF THE two PARTIES IN SUCH MANNER
AS TO MINIMIZE THE POSSIBILITY OF FRICTION AND INCIDENT,
WHILE PROVIDING FOR THE GRADUAL RESIORATION OF NORMAL
CIVILIAN LIFE IN THE AREA OF THE DEMILIARIZED ZONE, WITHOUT
PREJUDICE TO THE ULTIMATE SETTLEMENT.
"3. THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE SHALL BE AS DELINEATED
ON THE MAP ATTACHED TO THIS AGREEMENT IS ANNEX I. THE
ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE SHALL FOLLOW A LINE MIDWAY BETWEEN
THE EXISTING TRUCE LINES, AS CERTIFIED BY THE UNITED NATIONS
TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION FOR THE ISRAELI AND SYRIAN
FORCES. WHERE THE EXISTING TRUCE LINES RUN ALONG THE INTERNATIONAL
BOUNDARY BETWEEN SYRIAN AND PALESTINE, THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION
LINE SHALL FOLLOW THE BOUNDARY LINE.
"4. THE ARMED FORCES OF THE TWO PARTIES SHALL NOWHERE
ADVANCE BEYOND THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE.
"5. (A) WHERE THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE DOES NOT CORRES-
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PAGE 4 STATE хникх 105761 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
POND TO THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY BETWEEN SYRIA AND PALESTINE,
THE AREA BETWEEN THE ARMISTICE DEMARCATION LINE AND THE BOUNDARY,
PENDING FINAL TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES,
SHALL BE ESTABLISHED AS A DEMILITARIZED ZONE FROM WHICH THE ARMED
FORCES OF BOTH PARTIES SHALL BE TOTALLY EXCLUDED, AND IN
WHICH NO ACTIVITIES BY MILITARY OR PARA-MILITARY FORCES SHALL
BE PERMITTED. THIS PROVISION APPLIES TO THE EIN GEV AND
DARDARA SECTORS WHICH SHALL FORM PART OF THE DEMILITARIZED
ZONE.
"(B) ANY ADVANCE BY THE ARMED FORCES, MILITARY OR PARA-
MILITARY, OF EITHER PARTY INTO ANY PART OF THE DEMILITARIZED
ZONE, WHEN CONFIRMED BY THE UNITED NATIONS REPRESENTATIVES
REFERRED TO IN THE FOLLOWING SUB-PARAGRAPH, SHALL CONSTITUTE
A FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF THIS AGREEMENT.
"(C) THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION
ESTABLISHED IN ARTICLE VII OF THIS AGREEMENT AND UNITED
NATIONS OBSERVERS ATTACHED TO THE COMMISSION SHALL BE RESPON-
SIBLE for ENSURING THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS ARTICLE.
"(D) THE WITHDRAWAL OF such ARMED FORCES AS ARE NOW FOUND IN
THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE SHALL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SCHEDULE
OF WITHDRAWAL ANNEXED TO THIS AGREEMENT CANNEX II),
"(E) THE CHAIRMAN OF THE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION SHALL
BE EMPOWERED TO AUTHORIZE THE RETURN
OF CIVILIANS TO VILLAGES AND SETTLEMENTS IN THE DEMILITARIZED
ZONE AND THE EMPLOYMENT OF LIMITED NUMBERS OF LOCALLY RECRUITED
CIVILIAN POLICE IN THE ZONE FOR INTERNAL SECURITY PURPOSES,
AND SHALL BE GUIDED IN THIS REGARD BY THE SCHEDULE OF WITH-
DRAWAL REFERRED TO IN SUB-PARAGRAPH (D) OF THIS ARTICLE.
"6. ON EACH SIDE OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE THERE SHALL BE
AREAS, AS DEFINED IN ANNEX III TO THIS AGREEMENT, IN WHICH
DEFENSIVE FORCES ONLY SHALL BE MAINTAINED, IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE DEFINITION OF DEFENSIVE FORCES SET FORTH IN ANNEX IV TO
THIS AGREEMENT.
"ARTICLE VI. ALL PRISONERS OF WAR DETAINED BY EITHER PARTY
TO THIS AGREEMENT AND BELONGING TO THE ARMED FORCES, REGULAR
OR IRREGULAR, OF THE other PARTY, SHALL BE EXCHANGED AS
FOLLOWS:
"1. THE EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS OF WAR SHALL BE UNDER
UNITED NATIONS SUPERVISION AND CONTROL throughout, THE
EXCHANGE SHALL TAKE PLACE AT THE SITE OF THE ARMISTICE CON-
FERENCE WITHIN TWENTY-FOUR HOURS OF THE SIGNING OF THIS
AGREEMENT.
"2. PRISONERS OF WAR AGAINST WHOM A PENAL PROSECUTION MAY BE
PENDING, AS WELL AS THOSE SENTENCED FOR CRIME OR OTHER OFFENCE,
SHALL BE INCLUDED IN THIS EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
LIMITED DECLASSIFIED
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PAGE 5 S'ATE 105761 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
"3. ALL ART.CLES OF PERSONAL USE, VALUABLES, I.ETTERS,
DOCUMENTS, IDENTIFICATION MARKS, AND OTHER PERSONAL EFFECTS
OF WHATEVER NATURE, BELONGING TO PRISONERS OF WAR WHO ARE
BEING EXCHANGE), SHALL BE RETURNED TO THEM, OF: IF THEY HAVE
ESCAPED OR DIEL. TO THE PARTY TO WHOSE ARMED FORCES THEY BE-
LONGED.
"4. ALL MATTERS NO: SPECIFICALLY REGULATED IN THIS AGREEMENT
SHALL BE DECIDED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRICAIPLEELAID DOWN
IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION RELATING TO THE TREATMENT OF
PRISONERS OF WAR, SIGNED AT GENEVA ON 27 JOLY 1929.
"5. THE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION ESTABLISHED IN
ARTICLE VII OF THIS AGREEMENT SHALL ASSIME RESPONSIBILITY
FOR LOCATING MISSING persons, WHETHER MILITARY OF CIVILIAN,
WITHIN THE AREAS CONTROLLED BY EACH PATTY, TO FACILITATE
THEIR EXPEDITIOUS EXCHANGE. EACH PART'. UNDERTAKES TO EXTEND
TO THE COMMISSION full COOPERA: AND ASSISTANCE IN THE
DISCHARGE OF THIS FUNCTION.
"ARTICLE VII.
"1. THE EXECUTION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT SHALL
BE SUPERVISED BY A MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION COMPOSED OF
FIVE MEMBERS, OF WHOM EACH PART? TO THIS AGREEMENT SHALL
DESIGNATE TWO, AND whose CHAIRMAN SHALL BE THE UNITED NATIONS
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION OR A SENIOR
OFFICER FROM THE OBSERVER PERSONNEL OF THAT ORGANIZATION DE-
SIGNATED BY HIM FOLLOWING CONSULTATION WITH BOTH PARTIES TO
THIS AGREEMENT.
"2. THE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION, SHALL MAINTAIN ITS HEAD-
QUARTERS AT THE CUSTOMS HOUSE NEAR JISR BANAT YA QUB AND AT
MAHANAYIM, AND SHALL hold ITS METINGS AT SUCH PLACES AND
AT SUCH TIMES AS IT MAY DEEM NECESSARY FOR THE RFFECTIVE CON-
DUCT OF ITS WORK.
"3. THE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION SHALL BE CONVENED IN ITS
FIRST MEETING BY THE UNITED NATIONS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE TRUCE
SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION NOT LATER THAN ONE WEEK FOLLOWING THE
SIGNING OF THIS AGREEMENT.
"4. DECISIONS OF THE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION, TO THE EXTENT
POSSIBLE, SHALL BE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE OF UNANIMITY.
IN THE ABSENCE OF UNANIMITY, DECISIONS SHALL BE TAKEN BY
MAJORITY VOTE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION PRESENT AND
VOTING.
"5. THE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION SHALL FORMULATE ITS OWN
RULES OF procedure. MEETINGS SHALL BE HELD ONLY AFTER DUE
NOTICE TO THE MEMBERS BY THE CHAIRMAN. THE QUORUM FOR ITS
MEETINGS SHALL BE A MAJORITY OF ITS MEMBERS.
"6. THE COMMISSION SHALI Reproduc ed at the Nixon esidential OBSERVERS,
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PAGE #6 STATE 105761 LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
WHO MAY BE FROM AMONG THE MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS OF THE
PARTIES OR FROM THE MILITARY PERSONNEL OF THE UNITEDNAL IONS
TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION, OR FROM BoTH, IN SUCH NUMBERS
AS MAY BE CONSIDERED ESSENTIAL TO THE PERFORMANCE OF .TS
FUNCTIONS. IN THE EVENT UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS SHOULD BE so
EMPLOYED, THEY SHALL REMAIN UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE
UNITED NATIONS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION.
ASSIGNMENTS OF A GENERAL OR SPECIAL NATURE GIVEN TO ANITED
NATIONS OBSERVERS ATTACHED TO THE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION
SHALL BE SUBJECT TO APPROVAL BY THE UNITED NATIONS CHIEF OF
STAFF OR HIS DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE ON THE COMMISSION,
WHICHEVER IS SERVING AS CHAIRMAN.
"% CLAIMS OR COMPLAINTS PRESENTED BY EITHER PARTY RELATING
TO THE APPLICATION OF THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE REFERRED IMMED-
IATELY TO THE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION THROUGH ITS CHAIRMAN.
THE COMMISSION SHALL TAKE such ACTION ON ALL SUCH CLAIMS OR
COMPLAINTS BY MEANS OF ITS OBSERVATION AND INVESTIGATION
MACHINERY AS IT MAY DEEM APPROPRIATE, WITH A VIEW TO EQUITABLE
AND MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY SETTLEMENT.
"8. WHERE INTERPRETATION OF THE MAINING OF A PARTICULAR
PROVISION OF THIS AGREEMENT, OTHER THAN THE PREAMBLE AND
ARTICLE I AND II, IS AT ISSUE, THE COMMISSION'S INTERPRE-
TATION SHALL PREVAIL. THE COMMISSION, IN ITS DISCRETION AND
AS THE NEED ARISES, MAY FROM TIME TO TIME RICOMMEND TO THE
PARTIES MODIFICATIONS IN THE PROVISION SOF THIS AGREEMENT.
"9. THE MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION SHALL SUBMIT TO BOTH
PARTIES REPORTS ON ITS ACTIVITIES AS FREQUENTLY AS IT MAY
CONSIDER NECESSARY. A COPY OF EACH SUCK REPORT SHALL BE
PRESENTED TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS
FOR TRANSMISSION TO THE APPROPRIATE ORGAN OR AGENCY OF THE
UNITED NATIONS.
"10. MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION AND ITS OBSERVERS SHALL BE
ACCORDED SUCH FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND ACCESS IN THE AREA
COVERED BY THIS AGREEMENT AS THE COMMISSION MAY DETERMINE
TO BE NECESSARY, PROVIDED THAT WHEN SUCH DECISIONSOF THE
COMMISSION ARE REACHED BY A MAJORITY VOTE UNITED NATIONS
OBSERVERS ONLY SHALL BE EMPLOYED.
"11. THE EXPENSES OF THE COMMISSION, OTHER THAN THOSE RELATING
TO UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS, SHALL BE APPORTIONED IN EQUAL
SHARES BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES TO THIS AGREEMENT.
" "ARTICLE VIII.
"1. THE PRESENT AGREEMENT IS NOT SUBJECT TO RATIFICATION AND
SHALL COME INTO FORCE IMMEDIATELY UPON BEING SIGNED.
"2. THIS AGREEMENT, HAVING BEEN NEGOTIATED AND CONCLUDED IN
PURSUANCE OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF 16
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
LIMITED OFFOECLASSIFIEDE
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PAGE 7 STATE 105761
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
NOVEMBER 1948, CALLING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ARMISTICE
IN ORDER TO ELIMINATE THE THREAT TO THE PEACE IN PALESTINE AND
TO FACILITATE THE TRANSITION FROM THE PRESENT TRUCE TO PERMANENT
PEACE IN PALESTINE, SHALL REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL A PEACEFUL
SETTLEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS ACHIEVED, EXCEPT AS PROVIDED
Ill PARAGRAPH 3 OF THIS ARTICLE.
"3. THE PARTIES TO THIS AGREEMENT MAY, BY MUTUAL CONSENT,
REVISE THIS AGREEMENT OR ANY OF ITS PROVISIONS, OR MAY SUSPEND
ITS APPLICATION, OTHER THAN ARTICLES I AND III, AT ANY TIME.
IN THE ABSENCE OF MUTUAL AGREEMENT AND AFTER THIS AGREEMENT
HAS BEEN IN EFFECT FOR ONE YEAR FROM THE DATE OF ITS SIGNING,
EITHER OF THE PARTIES MAY CALL UPON THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF
THE UNITED NATIONS TO CONVOKE A CONFERENCE OF REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE TWO PARTIES FOR THE PURPOSE OF REVIEWING, REVISING, OR
SUSPENDING ANY OF THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT OTHER
THAN ARTICLES I AND III. PARTICIPATION IN SUCH CONFERENCES
SHALL BE OBLIGATORY UPON THE PARTIES.
"4. IF THE CONFERENCE PROVIDED FOR IN PARAGRAPH 3 OF THIS
A.TICLE DOES NOT RESULT IN AN AGREED SOLUTION OF A POINT IN
DI:PUTE, EITHER PARTY MAY BRING THE MATTER BEFORE THE SECURITY
COUNCIL OF THE UNITED NATIONS FOR THE RELIEF SOUGHT,
ON THE GROUNDS THAT THIS AGREEMENT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED IN PUR-
SUANCTOF SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION TOWARD THE END OF ACHIEVING
PEACE IN PALESTINE.
"5. THIS AGREEMENT, OF WHICH THE ENGLISH AND FRENCH TEXTS
ARE EQUALLY AUTHENTIC, IS SIGNED IN QUINTUPLICATE. ONE COPY
SHALL BE RETAINED BY EACH PARTY, TWO COPIES COMMUNICATED TO
THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS FOR TRANSMISSION
TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE UNITED NATIONS CONCILIATION
COMMISSION ON PALESTINE, AND ONE COPY TO THE ACTING MEDIATOR
ON PALESTINE." RUSH
BT
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Changes in Paragraph A
1.
"
will refrain from
all hostile actions against each
other
"
2.
"
will refrain from
all actions against each other
"
3.
"
will refrain from
all acts of violence against each
other
"
Private assurances
1. To PM Meir: "I have conveyed to President Asad the U. S. interpretation
that raids by armed groups or individuals across the demarcation line
are contrary to the ceasefire. President Asad has reaffirmed his
intention to see that the ceasefire is scrupulously observed."
/Or: "President Asad understands this. "I
2. To PM Meir: "On the basis of my conversations with President Asad,
I have the impression that he expects the ceasefire to be scrupulously
observed all along the front the front to be quiet7 as long as there
is hope for the full implementation of Resolution 338, including the
legitimate interests of the Palestinian people.'
3. To PM Meir: "President Asad has stated that all forces under the
control of the Syrian government will scrupulously observe the casefire."
4. To PM Meir: "President Asad has assured me that he understands the
importance of the ceasefire in creating an atmosphere conducive to
further negotiation and will do all in his power to see that it is
scrupulously observed."
5. To PM Meir: "I fully understand your government's concern over
possible armed attacks across the disengagement line. It is my
conviction that the best way to thwart these is, on the one hand,
to offer hope of a negotiated settlement and, on the other, to build
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 2
trust between the parties by scrupulous observance of the ceasefire.
I have conveyed this view to President Asad, and I have particularly
informed him of the U. S. view that armed attacks
6. To PM Meir: "President Asad understands the position of the U. S.
that raids by armed groups or individuals across the demarcation
line are contrary to the ceasefire. It is my impression that he
intends to see that the ceasefire is scrupulously observed.'
7. To PM Meir: "President Asad in his discussions with me has indicated
his understanding that Resolutions 338 and 339 in calling for a
ceasefire includes all kinds of firing and all military action.'
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Changes in Paragraph A
1.
"
will refrain from
all hostile actions against each
other
"
2.
"
will refrain from
all actions against each other
"
3.
"
will refrain from
all acts of violence against each
other
"
Private assurances
1. To PM Meir: "I have conveyed to President Asad the U. S. interpretation
that raids by armed groups or individuals across the demarcation line
are contrary to the ceasefire. President Asad has reaffirmed his
intention to see that the ceasefire is scrupulously observed."
/Or: "President Asad understands this. "I
2. To PM Meir: "On the basis of my conversations with President Asad,
I have the impression that he expects the ceasefire to be scrupulously
observed all along the front / the front to be quiet7 as long as there
is hope for the full implementation of Resolution 338, including the
legitimate interests of the Palestinian people.'
3. To PM Meir: "President Asad has stated that all forces under the
control of the Syrian government will scrupulously observe the casefire."
4. To PM Meir: "President Asad has assured me that he understands the
importance of the ceasefire in creating an atmosphere conducive to
further negotiation and will do all in his power to see that it is
scrupulously observed."
5. To PM Meir: "I fully understand your government's concern over
possible armed attacks across the disengagement line. It is my
conviction that the best way to thwart these is, on the one hand,
to offer hope of a negotiated settlement and, on the other, to build
Repróduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 2
trust between the parties by scrupulous observance of the ceasefire.
I have conveyed this view to President Asad, and I have particularly
informed him of the U. S. view that armed attacks
6. To PM Meir: "President Asad understands the position of the U. S.
that raids by armed groups or individuals across the demarcation
line are contrary to the ceasefire. It is my impression that he
intends to see that the ceasefire is scrupulously observed."
7. To PM Meir: "President Asad in his discussions with me has indicated
his understanding that Resolutions 338 and 339 in calling for a
ceasefire includes all kinds of firing and all military action."
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 5
ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SYRIAN OR GANIZATION
Division has 3 brigades (3000 men each)
Division alsohas 2 battalious of artillery is
Each briqade has a battalion of artillery (122mm. is organic)
An armored brigade has 93 tanks
An infantry brigade has 31 tanks (Asad said sometimes 41)
9- BRIGADE DEPLOYMENT : TANKS
Best case : 9 infantry brigades = 279 tanks
First probable: 6 in fautry brigades (186)
3 armored brigades (279) =
465 tanks
Second probable: 7 infantry brigades (217)
(Best attainable) 2 armored briqades (186) = 403 tanks
Theoretical
case worst, : 9 armored brigades = 837 tanks
Present deployment within 25km. of front:
49,000 men
752 tanks
369 artillery pieces
"Normal" peacetime deployment (July 1,1973) in 25km. area
34,500 men
465 tanks
276 artillery
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CURRENT EMPLOYMENT
7th Infantry Division Area of Operation
30
124 Tanks
72 Artillery Pieces
3
Damascus
14000 Personnel
9232
9th Infantry Division
217 Tanks
Pazraat BeitJinn
126 Artillery Pieces
1024
1
Jassa
15250 Personnel
15'
5th Infantry Division
217 Tanks
x
126 Artillery Pieces
15250 Personnel
KuNeitra
SYRIA
Kafr
68th Independent Armor Brigade
Naffakh
DEMIL TARIZED
ZONE
93 Tanks
18 Artillery Pieces
Khushiye
33° 00
2250 Personnel
Rafid
80th Independent Armor Brigade
93 Tanks
18 Artillery Pieces
5
2250 Personnel
ELAL
TOTALS
45'
752 Tanks
369 Artillery Pieces
49000 Personnel
JORDAN
45'
36°00'
15'
ATT.1
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
The Arab-Israeli Handbook
1723/73
NORMAL DEPLOYMENT
1 July 1973
3
An Nasariyah
BEIRUT
2103
26
3
13
3
Lebanon
Ar Ruhaybah
HQ
XXX
213
Al Qutayfah
SF
90
X
Indep
Harasta al Basal
Rifa'at Asad
1
XXX
AI Qabun
Armd Defense
211
*
DAMASCUS
Force
Ya'fur
7
X
AI Mezzah
41
X
7
Afld.
Qatana
AI Kiswah
Mazra'at Bayt Jinn
Hadar
Sa'Sa'
Jabbata
68
AI Khashab
78
Kanakir
7th Infantry Division
7
Maâs
Khan Arnabah
Ghabaqhib
186 Tanks
70
7
102 Artillery Pieces
GOLAN
Aqraba
52
9
12000 Personnel
As Sanamayr
Nab' As Sakhr
.
Basir
Ruhin
River
33\9
12
5
9th Infantry Division
Jordan
HEIGHTS
Qasim
Israel
Ar Rafid
86
X
5
62 Tanks
Nawa
50
5
Ayn Dhakar
45
5
Izra
48 Artillery Pieces
Lake
Ash Shaykh Said
7000 Personnel
Tiberias
61X5
Ash Shaykh
Miskin
Jallin
. Tafas
5th Infantry Division
217 Tanks
126 Artillery Pieces
15500 Personnel
TOTALS:
465 Tanks
276 Artillery Pieces
34500 Personnel
13,000 In one brigade of
ATT TT 2
each of above
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
forward
DECLASSIFIED
2 000
+
extras.
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TALKING POINTS
Congressional Briefings
on Syrian-Israeli Disengagement
The Setting
Since the October war, our strategy has been
-- to consolidate the ceasefire;
-- to create a realistic diplomatic alternative to war
as a way of settling the Arab-Israeli dispute;
-- to convince the Arabs that the US and not the USSR
is the effective power in the Middle East.
Specifically:
-- The Six Point Agreement in November between Egypt
and Israel stopped the shooting on that front and
set the stage for disengagement.
-- The Geneva Peace Conference in December established
a framework for negotiation acceptable to both sides.
-- The Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement agreement in
January:
-- made war less likely;
-- established the fact that negotiation between
Israel and an Arab government could produce
an agreement that works;
-- demonstrated that US diplomacy is effective;
-- gave hope of further movement toward a peace
agreement.
In this context, Syrian-Israeli Disengagement was crucial.
-- If the negotiation failed:
-- the fighting would have escalated and even
Egypt might have been drawn in;
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-2-
-- negotiations would have been set back
and the radicals who oppose making peace
with Israel would have been strengthened;
-- the oil embargo could soon have been reimposed.
-- If the negotiation succeeded:
-- the chances would be good that the Middle
East could remain at peace for the rest of
the year;
-- further diplomatic steps toward peace could
be taken;
-- political moderates in the Middle East would
be strengthened;
-- opponents of peacemaking would be undercut
if radical Syria committed itself to the process;
-- re-imposition of the oil embargo this year
would be very unlikely;
-- the US would have time to strengthen its relations
with the Arab states and to give them a stake
in not acting against US interests.
It was the realization of the consequences of failure that
kept us going at moments in the negotiation when there
seemed little alternative but to suspend the negotiation.
THE NEGOTIATION
This negotiation was far more difficult than the Egyptian-
Israeli disengagement negotiation:
-- Above all, in January both sides had decided they
wanted an agreement. In this negotiation, both Asad
and the Israelis made up their minds during the
negotiation.
-- The pressures on both sides were less. The Syrian
front was more stable, and armies were not behind
each other.
-- Technically, the problems were more difficult:
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-3-
-- There was less space to create a buffer.
-- Populated areas were involved on both sides.
-- Before January, the Egyptians and Israelis had
actually negotiated quite seriously at Kilometer 101
in November and December. They had developed
realistic positons that took into account the needs
of the other side. They had brought those positions
within negotiating range. All this we had to do
on this trip.
The negotiation nearly broke down at three key points but
we kept going because of our concern for the consequences
of failure.
The negotiations developed through the following stages:
-- Before we left, the visits of General Dayan (March 29)
and General Shihabi (April 13) to Washington had
produced a formal proposal from each side (Map 1).
The lines were far apart, but some agreement had
emerged on a general concept of disengagement
essentially following the Egyptian-Israeli model.
-- On the basis these talks in Washington and the analysi
we did before leaving, we developed the following
objective:
-- a disengagement line just enough west of the
1967 ceasefire line to establish the principle
of movement toward final borders;
-- but a line not so far west that it would touch
Israeli settlements, which in some cases
are quite close to the 1967 line.
-- Much of the first week was spent building a base of
support for our general approach through talks with
Gromyko, Boumediene, Sadat, Hussein and Faisal.
-- We adopted the strategy of trying first to achieve
agreement on the disengagement line on the assumption
that other issues would fall into place once there
was agreement on the line.
Reaching that agreement
took two weeks (May 7-20).
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-4-
-- First there was the issue of getting the
line west of the 1967 line. (Map 2 shows
the first Israeli line on the map of May 7-8
and the line of May 20 reflecting the US
proposal on Quneitra.)
-- Second, the discussion on the line narrowed
to the question of Quneitra (Blow-up photo
of Quneitra is marked to show the dividing
lines the Israelis tried to establish in
Quneitra, the hills, and the final arrangement.)
-- The problem in Quneitra: the two
Israeli settlements.
-- The discussion stalemated, and on May 18
we had actually drafted a statement recessing
the talks and put our luggage on the plane to
go on to Cairo that night. President Asad
broke that deadlock by dropping his insistence
on holding the two high hills just west of
Quneitra. This permitted us to develop a
US proposal combining a line and an assurance
from Israel conveyed by us to Syria that there
would be no Israeli forces on the hills or
weapons that could fire into Quneitra.
-- The next issues were the related questions of (a)
limitations on armament and forces behind the
disengagement line and (b) the location of the Syrian
military line.
-- Again the negotiations deadlocked. The Israelis
insisted on detailed limitations, and Asad
resisted any restrictions on the exercise of
his sovereignty.
-- Again we drafted a statement recessing the
talks and on May 23 (Thursday) felt we could
not carry the talks further.
-- This time it was the Israelis who gave us the
latitude to develop and refine a US proposal
(May 24-27).
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Orderi13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-5-
-- Throughout all this was the question of Mount Hermon.
Reaching agreement on putting the positions there
under the UN was largely a matter of sticking to
a position and wearing the Syrians down.
-- When there seemed to be agreement on substance, we
turned to the documents (May 26-27), and much of what
we thought was agreed was re-opened. After our talks
Sunday night, May 26, we concluded that agreement
was not possible. The following morning, we were on
the verge of leaving when Asad pulled back. We agreed
to make a major effort to see whether we could
complete the documents that day. Ten hours of
talk followed.
-- The final issue was the question of whether Asad
would assume responsibility for preventing terrorists
from operating across the border. This was the
cause of our final trip to Damascus May 28.
THE AGREEMENT
Map 3 shows the final agreement. That agreement is recorded
in these documents:
-- Agreement restoring the ceasefire, establishing the
lines, describing procedures for signing and planning
implementation, and relating disengagement to final
peace.
-- Protocol establishing the UN Disengagement Observer
Force.
-- A secret paper recording the limitations in armament
and forces which both sides have agreed to.
-- We also conveyed in letter form certain assurances
which were stated to us. This was done because
there were some subjects that each side was willing
to discuss with us but not with each other. (Example:
forces on Quneitra hills.)
The main elements of the agreement are:
-- the two disengagement lines.
-- Area of separation with UNDOF.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
-6- -
-- Mount Hermon in the area of separation.
-- Special demilitarized area around Quneitra.
-- 10 kilometer limitation area behind each disengagement
line.
-- Further limitations in the 10-25 km area.
-- No missiles closer than 25 kilometers.
WHAT NEXT
We need a month or two for carrying out the Syrian-Israeli
disengagement.
Then we will turn to possible next steps in the move toward
an overall peace.
NSC: : HHSaunders CV
5/31/74
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TALKING POINTS
Congressional Briefings
on Syrian-Israeli Disengagement
The Setting
Since the October war, our strategy has been
-- to consolidate the ceasefire;
-- to create a realistic diplomatic alternative to war
as a way of settling the Arab-Israeli dispute;
-- to convince the Arabs that the US and not the USSR
is the effective power in the Middle East.
Specifically:
-- The Six Point Agreement in November between Egypt
and Israel stopped the shooting on that front and
set the stage for disengagement.
-- The Geneva Peace Conference in December established
a framework for negotiation acceptable to both sides.
-- The Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement agreement in
January:
-- made war less likely;
-- established the fact that negotiation between
Israel and an Arab government could produce
an agreement that works;
-- demonstrated that US diplomacy is effective;
-- gave hope of further movement toward a peace
agreement.
In this context, Syrian-Israeli Disengagement was crucial.
-- If the negotiation failed:
-- the fighting would have escalated and even
Egypt might have been drawn in;
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-2-
-- negotiations would have been set back
and the radicals who oppose making peace
with Israel would have been strengthened;
-- the oil embargo could soon have been reimposed.
-- If the negotiation succeeded:
-- the chances would be good that the Middle
East could remain at peace for the rest of
the year;
-- further diplomatic steps toward peace could
be taken;
-- political moderates in the Middle East would
be strengthened;
-- opponents of peacemaking would be undercut
if radical Syria committed itself to the process;
-- re-imposition of the oil embargo this year
would be very unlikely;
-- the US would have time to strengthen its relations
with the Arab states and to give them a stake
in not acting against US interests.
It was the realization of the consequences of failure that
kept us going at moments in the negotiation when there
seemed little alternative but to suspend the negotiation.
THE NEGOTIATION
This negotiation was far more difficult than the Egyptian-
Israeli disengagement negotiation:
-- Above all, in January both sides had decided they
wanted an agreement. In this negotiation, both Asad
and the Israelis made up their minds during the
negotiation.
-- The pressures on both sides were less. The Syrian
front was more stable, and armies were not behind
each other.
-- Technically, the problems were more difficult:
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-3-
-- There was less space to create a buffer.
-- Populated areas were involved on both sides.
-- Before January, the Egyptians and Israelis had
actually negotiated quite seriously at Kilometer 101
in November and December. They had developed
realistic positons that took into account the needs
of the other side. They had brought those positions
within negotiating range. All this we had to do
on this trip.
The negotiation nearly broke down at three key points but
we kept going because of our concern for the consequences
of failure.
The negotiations developed through the following stages:
-- Before we left, the visits of General Dayan (March 29)
and General Shihabi (April 13) to Washington had
produced a formal proposal from each side (Map 1).
The lines were far apart, but some agreement had
emerged on a general concept of disengagement
essentially following the Egyptian-Israeli model.
-- On the basis these talks in Washington and the analysi
we did before leaving, we developed the following
objective:
--- a disengagement line just enough west of the
1967 ceasefire line to establish the principle
of movement toward final borders;
-- but a line not so far west that it would touch
Israeli settlements, which in some cases
are quite close to the 1967 line.
-- Much of the first week was spent building a base of
support for our general approach through talks with
Gromyko, Boumediene, Sadat, Hussein and Faisal.
-- We adopted the strategy of trying first to achieve
agreement on the disengagement line on the assumption
that other issues would fall into place once there
was agreement on the line.
Reaching that agreement
took two weeks (May 7-20).
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-4-
-- First there was the issue of getting the
line west of the 1967 line. (Map 2 shows
the first Israeli line on the map of May 7-8
and the line of May 20 reflecting the US
proposal on Quneitra.)
-- Second, the discussion on the line narrowed
to the question of Quneitra (Blow-up photo
of Quneitra is marked to show the dividing
lines the Israelis tried to establish in
Quneitra, the hills, and the final arrangement.)
-- The problem in Quneitra: the two
Israeli settlements.
-- The discussion stalemated, and on May 18
we had actually drafted a statement recessing
the talks and put our luggage on the plane to
go on to Cairo that night. President Asad
broke that deadlock by dropping his insistence
on holding the two high hills just west of
Quneitra. This permitted us to develop a
US proposal combining a line and an assurance
from Israel conveyed by us to Syria that there
would be no Israeli forces on the hills or
weapons that could fire into Quneitra.
-- The next issues were the related questions of (a)
limitations on armament and forces behind the
disengagement line and (b) the location of the Syrian
military line.
-- Again the negotiations deadlocked. The Israelis
insisted on detailed limitations, and Asad
resisted any restrictions on the exercise of
his sovereignty.
-- Again we drafted a statement recessing the
talks and on May 23 (Thursday) felt we could
not carry the talks further.
--- This time it was the Israelis who gave us the
latitude to develop and refine a US proposal
(May 24-27)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-5-
Throughout all this was the question of Mount Hermon.
Reaching agreement on putting the positions there
under the UN was largely a matter of sticking to
a position and wearing the Syrians down.
-- When there seemed to be agreement on substance, we
turned to the documents (May 26-27), and much of what
we thought was agreed was re-opened. After our talks
Sunday night, May 26, we concluded that agreement
was not possible. The following morning, we were on
the verge of leaving when Asad pulled back. We agreed
to make a major effort to see whether we could
complete the documents that day. Ten hours of
talk followed.
-- The final issue was the question of whether Asad
would assume responsibility for preventing terrorists
from operating across the border. This was the
cause of our final trip to Damascus May 28.
THE AGREEMENT
Map 3 shows the final agreement. That agreement is recorded
in these documents:
-- Agreement restoring the ceasefire, establishing the
lines, describing procedures for signing and planning
implementation, and relating disengagement to final
peace.
-- Protocol establishing the UN Disengagement Observer
Force.
-- A secret paper recording the limitations in armament
and forces which both sides have agreed to.
-- We also conveyed in letter form certain assurances
which were stated to us. This was done because
there were some subjects that each side was willing
to discuss with us but not with each other. (Example:
forces on Quneitra hills.)
The main elements of the agreement are:
-- the two disengagement lines.
-- Area of separation with UNDOF.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-6-
-- Mount Hermon in the area of separation.
-- Special demilitarized area around Quneitra.
-- 10 kilometer limitation area behind each disengagement
line.
-- Further limitations in the 10-25 km area.
-- No missiles closer than 25 kilometers.
WHAT NEXT
We need a month or two for carrying out the Syrian-Israeli
disengagement.
Then we will turn to possible next steps in the move toward
an overall peace.
NSC: HHSaunders: CV
5/31/74
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TALKING POINTS
Congressional Briefings
on Syrian-Israeli Disengagement
The Setting
Since the October war, our strategy has been
-- to consolidate the ceasefire;
-- to create a realistic diplomatic alternative to war
as a way of settling the Arab-Israeli dispute;
-- to convince the Arabs that the US and not the USSR
is the effective power in the Middle East.
Specifically:
---- The Six Point Agreement in November between Egypt
and Israel stopped the shooting on that front and
set the stage for disengagement.
-- The Geneva Peace Conference in December established
a framework for negotiation acceptable to both sides.
-- The Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement agreement in
January:
-- made war less likely;
-- established the fact that negotiation between
Israel and an Arab government could produce
an agreement that works;
-- demonstrated that US diplomacy is effective;
--- gave hope of further movement toward a peace
agreement.
In this context, Syrian-Israeli Disengagement was crucial.
-- If the negotiation failed:
-- the fighting would have escalated and even
Egypt might have been drawn in;
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been!determined to be declassified.
-2-
--- negotiations would have been set back
and the radicals who oppose making peace
with Israel would have been strengthened;
-- the oil embargo could soon have been reimposed.
-- If the negotiation succeeded:
-- the chances would be good that the Middle
East could remain at peace for the rest of
the year;
-- further diplomatic steps toward peace could
be taken;
-- political moderates in the Middle East would
be strengthened;
-- opponents of peacemaking would be undercut
if radical Syria committed itself to the process;
-- re-imposition of the oil embargo this year
would be very unlikely;
-- the US would have time to strengthen its relation
with the Arab states and to give them a stake
in not acting against US interests.
It was the realization of the consequences of failure that
kept us going at moments in the negotiation when there
seemed little alternative but to suspend the negotiation.
THE NEGOTIATION
This negotiation was far more difficult than the Egyptian-
Israeli disengagement negotiation:
-- Above all, in January both sides had decided they
wanted an agreement. In this negotiation, both Asad
and the Israelis made up their minds during the
negotiation.
--- The pressures on both sides were less. The Syrian
front was more stable, and armies were not behind
each other.
-- Technically, the problems were more difficult:
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-3-
--- There was less space to create a buffer.
-- Populated areas were involved on both sides.
-- Before January, the Egyptians and Israelis had
actually negotiated quite seriously at Kilometer LOI
in November and December. They had developed
realistic positons that took into account the needs
of the other side. They had brought those positions
within negotiating range. All this we had to do
on this trip.
The negotiation nearly broke down at three key points but
we kept going because of our concern for the consequences
of failure.
The negotiations developed through the following stages:
-- Before we left, the visits of General Dayan (March 29
and General Shihabi (April 13) to Washington had
produced a formal proposal from each side (Map 1)
The lines were far apart, but some agreement had
emerged on a general concept of disengagement
essentially following the Egyptian-Israeli model.
-- On the basis these talks in Washington and the analys.
we did before leaving, we developed the following
objective:
--- a disengagement line just enough west of the
1967 ceasefire line to establish the principle
of movement toward final borders;
-- but a line not so far west that it would touch
Israeli settlements, which in some cases
are quite close to the 1967 line.
-- Much of the first week was spent building a base of
support for our general approach through talks with
Gromyko, Boumediene, Sadat, Hussein and Faisal.
-- We adopted the strategy of trying first to achieve
agreement on the disengagement line on the assumption
that other issues would fall into place once there
was agreement on the line.
Reaching that agreement
took two weeks (May 7-20).
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-4-
-- First there was the issue of getting the
line west of the 1967 line. (Map 2 shows
the first Israeli line on the map of May 7-8
and the line of May 20 reflecting the US
proposal on Quneitra.)
-- Second, the discussion on the line narrowed
to the question of Quneitra (Blow-up photo
of Quneitra is marked to show the dividing
lines the Israelis tried to establish in
Quneitra, the hills, and the final arrangement.
-- The problem in Quneitra: the two
Israeli settlements.
-- The discussion stalemated, and on May 18
we had actually drafted a statement recessing
the talks and put our luggage on the plane to
go on to Cairo that night. President Asád
broke that deadlock by dropping his insistence
on holding the two high hills just west of
Quneitra. This permitted us to develop a
US proposal combining a line and an assurance
from Israel conveyed by us to Syria that there
would be no Israeli forces on the hills or
weapons that could fire into Quneitra.
-- The next issues were the related questions of (a)
limitations on armament and forces behind the
disengagement line and (b) the location of the Syrian
military line.
-- Again the negotiations deadlocked. The Israelis
insisted on detailed limitations, and Asad
resisted any restrictions on the exercise of
his sovereignty.
-- Again we drafted a statement recessing the
talks and on May 23 (Thursday) felt we could
not carry the talks further.
-- This time it was the Israelis who gave us the
latitude to develop and refine a US proposal
(May 24-27)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-5-
Throughout all this was the question of Mount Hermon.
Reaching agreement on putting the positions there
under the UN was largely a matter of sticking to
a position and wearing the Syrians down.
-- When there seemed to be agreement on substance, we
turned to the documents (May 26-27), and much of what
we thought was agreed was re-opened. After our talks
Sunday night, May 26, we concluded that agreement
was not possible. The following morning, we were on
the verge of leaving when Asad pulled back. We agreed
to make a major effort to see whether we could
complete the documents that day. Ten hours of
talk followed.
-- The final issue was the question of whether Asad
would assume responsibility for preventing terrorists
from operating across the border. This was the
cause of our final trip to Damascus May 28.
THE AGREEMENT
Map 3 shows the final agreement. That agreement is recorded
in these documents:
-- Agreement restoring the ceasefire, establishing the
lines, describing procedures for signing and planning
implementation, and relating disengagement to final
peace.
-- Protocol establishing the UN Disengagement Observer
Force.
-- A secret paper recording the limitations in armament
and forces which both sides have agreed to.
-- We also conveyed in letter form certain assurances
which were stated to us. This was done because
there were some subjects that each side was willing
to discuss with us but not with each other. (Example:
forces on Quneitra hills.)
The main elements of the agreement are:
-- the two disengagement lines.
--- Area of separation with UNDOF.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-6-
-- Mount Hermon in the area of separation.
-- Special demilitarized area around Quneitra.
-- 10 kilometer limitation area behind each disengagement
line.
-- Further limitations in the 10-25 km area.
-- No missiles closer than 25 kilometers.
WHAT NEXT
We need a month orstwo for carrying out the Syrian-Israeli
disengagement.
Then we will turn to possible next steps in the move toward
an overall peace.
NSC: HHSaunders : CV
5/31/74
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
TALKING POINTS
Congressional Briefings
on Syrian-Israeli Disengagement
The Setting
Since the October war, our strategy has been
-- to consolidate the ceasefire;
-- to create a realistic diplomatic alternative to war
as a way of settling the Arab-Israeli dispute;
-- to convince the Arabs that the US and not the USSR
is the effective power in the Middle East.
Specifically:
-- The Six Point Agreement in November between Egypt
and Israel stopped the shooting on that front and
set the stage for disengagement.
-- The Geneva Peace Conference in December established
a framework for negotiation acceptable to both sides.
-- The Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement agreement in
January:
-- made war less likely;
-- established the fact that negotiation between
Israel and an Arab government could produce
an agreement that works;
-- demonstrated that US diplomacy is effective;
-- gave hope of further movement toward a peace
agreement.
In this context, Syrian-Israeli Disengagement was crucial.
-- If the negotiation failed:
-- the fighting would have escalated and even
Egypt might have been drawn in;
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-2-
--- negotiations would have been set back
and the radicals who oppose making peace
with Israel would have been strengthened;
--- the oil embargo could soon have been reimposed.
--- If the negotiation succeeded:
-- the chances would be good that the Middle
East could remain at peace for the rest of
the year;
-- further diplomatic steps toward peace could
be taken;
-- political moderates in the Middle East would
be strengthened;
-- opponents of peacemaking would be undercut
if radical Syria committed itself to the process;
-- re-imposition of the oil embargo this year
would be very unlikely;
-- the US would have time to strengthen its relations
with the Arab states and to give them a stake
in not acting against US interests.
It was the realization of the consequences of failure that
kept us going at moments in the negotiation when there
seemed little alternative but to suspend the negotiation.
THE NEGOTIATION
This negotiation was far more difficult than the Egyptian-
Israeli disengagement negotiation:
--- Above all, in January both sides had decided they
wanted an agreement. In this negotiation, both Asad
and the Israelis made up their minds during the
negotiation.
-- The pressures on both sides were less. The Syrian
front was more stable, and armies were not behind
each other.
-- Technically, the problems were more difficult:
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive DECLASSIFIED Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-3-
-- There was less space to create a buffer.
-- Populated areas were involved on both sides.
-- Before January, the Egyptians and Israelis had
actually negotiated quite seriously at Kilometer 101
in November and December. They had developed
realistic positons that took into account the needs
of the other side. They had brought those positions
within negotiating range. All this we had to do
on this trip.
The negotiation nearly broke down at three key points but
we kept going because of our concern for the consequences
of failure.
The negotiations developed through the following stages:
-- Before we left, the visits of General Dayan (March 29
and General Shihabi (April 13) to Washington had
produced a formal proposal from each side (Map 1).
The lines were far apart, but some agreement had
emerged on a general concept of disengagement
essentially following the Egyptian-Israeli; model.
-- On the basis these talks in Washington and the analys
we did before leaving, we developed the following
objective:
-- a disengagement line just enough west of the
1967 ceasefire line to establish the principl
of movement toward final borders;
-- but a line not so far west that it would touc
Israeli settlements, which in some cases
are quite close to the 1967 line.
-- Much of the first week was spent building a base of
support for our general approach through talks with
Gromyko, Boumediene, Sadat, Hussein and Faisal.
-- We adopted the strategy of trying first to achievé
agreement on the disengagement line on the assumption
that other issues would fall into place once there
was agreement on the line.
Reaching that agreement
took two weeks (May 7-20)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-4- -
-- First there was the issue of getting the
line west of the 1967 line. (Map 2 shows
the first Israeli line on the map of May 7-8
and the line of May 20 reflecting the US
proposal on Quneitra.)
-- Second, the discussion on the line narrowed
to the question of Quneitra (Blow-up photo
of Quneitra is marked to show the dividing
lines the Israelis tried to establish in
Quneitra, the hills, and the final arrangement. )
-- The problem in Quneitra: the two
Israeli settlements.
-- The discussion stalemated, and on May 18
we had actually drafted a statement recessing
the talks and put our luggage on the plane to
go on to Cairo that night. President Asad
broke that deadlock by dropping his insistence
on holding the two high hills just west of
Quneitra. This permitted us to develop a
US proposal combining a line and an assurance
from Israel conveyed by us to Syria that there
would be no Israeli forces on the hills or
weapons that could fire into Quneitra.
-- The next issues were the related questions of (a)
limitations on armament and forces behind the
disengagement line and (b) the location of the Syrian
military line.
-- Again the negotiations deadlocked. The Israelis
insisted on detailed limitations, and Asad
resisted any restrictions on the exercise of
his sovereignty.
-- Again we drafted a statement recessing the
talks and on May 23 (Thursday) felt we could
not carry the talks further.
-- This time it was the Israelis who gave us the
latitude to develop and refine a US proposal
(May 24-27).
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-5-
Throughout all this was the question of Mount Hermon.
Reaching agreement on putting the positions there
under the UN was largely a matter of sticking to
a position and wearing the Syrians down.
-- When there seemed to be agreement on substance, we
turned to the documents (May 26-27), and much of what
we thought was agreed was re-opened. After our talks
Sunday night, May 26, we concluded that agreement
was not possible. The following morning, we were on
the verge of leaving when Asad pulled back. We agreed
to make a major effort to see whether we could
complete the documents that day. Ten hours of
talk followed.
-- The final issue was the question of whether Asad
would assume responsibility for preventing terrorists
from operating across the border. This was the
cause of our final trip to Damascus May 28.
THE AGREEMENT
Map 3 shows the final agreement. That agreement is recorded
in these documents:
-- Agreement restoring the ceasefire, establishing the
lines, describing procedures for signing and planning
implementation, and relating disengagement to final
peace.
-- Protocol establishing the UN Disengagement Observer
Force.
--- A secret paper recording the limitations in armament
and forces which both sides have agreed to.
-- We also conveyed in letter form certain assurances
which were stated to us. This was done because
there were some subjects that each side was willing
to discuss with us but not with each other. (Example:
forces on Quneitra hills.)
The main elements of the agreement are:
-- the two disengagement lines.
-- Area of separation with UNDOF.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
-6-
-- Mount Hermon in the area of separation.
-- Special demilitarized area around Quneitra.
-- 10 kilometer limitation area behind each disengagement
line.
-- Further limitations in the 10-25 km area.
-- No missiles closer than 25 kilometers.
WHAT NEXT
We need a month or two for carrying out the Syrian-Israeli
disengagement.
Then we will turn to possible next steps in the move toward
an overall peace.
NSC: HHSaunders : CV
5/31/74
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
AGREEMENT ON DISENGAGEMENT
BETWEEN ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES
A. Israel and Syria will scrupulously observe the
ceasefire on land, sea and air and will refrain from all
military actions against each other, from the time of the
signing of this document, in implementation of United
Nations Security Council Resolution 338 dated October 22, 1973.
B. The military forces of Israel and Syria will be
separated in accordance with the following principles:
1. All Israeli military forces will be west
of the line designated as Line A on the map attached
hereto, except in the Quneitra area, where they will
be west of Line A-1.
2. All territory east of Line A will be under
Syrian administration, and Syrian civilians will return
to this territory.
3. The area between Line A and the line designated
as Line B on the attached map will be an area of
separation. In this area will be stationed the United
Nations Disengagement Observer Force established in
accordance with the accompanying protocol.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 2 -
4. All Syrian military forces will be east of
the line designated as Line B on the attached map.
5. There will be two equal areas of limitation
in armament and forces, one west of Line A and one
east of Line B as agreed upon.
6. Air forces of the two sides will be permitted
to operate up to their respective lines without
interference from the other side.
C. In the area between Line A and Line A-1 on the
attached map there shall be no military forces.
D. This agreement and the attached map will be signed
by the military representatives of Israel and Syria in Geneva
not later than May 30, 1974, in the Egyptian-Israeli Military
Working Group of the Geneva Peace Conference under the aegis
of the United Nations, after that group has been joined by a
Syrian military representative, and with the participation
of representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union.
The precise delineation of a detailed map and a plan for the
implementation of the disengagement of forces will be worked
out by military representatives of Israel and Syria in the
Egyptian-Israeli Military Working Group who will agree on the
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 3 -
stages of this process. The Military Working Group described
above will start their work for this purpose in Geneva under
the aegis of the United Nations within 24 hours after the
signing of this agreement. They will complete this task
within five days. Disengagement will begin within 24 hours
after the completion of the task of the Military Working
Group. The process of disengagement will be completed not
later than twenty days after it begins.
E. The provisions of paragraphs A, B and C shall be
inspected by personnel of the United Nations comprising the
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force under this
agreement.
F. Within 24 hours after the signing of this agreement
in Geneva all wounded prisoners of war which each side holds
of the other as certified by the ICRC will be repatriated.
The morning after the completion of the task of the Military
Working Group, all remaining prisoners of war will be
repatriated.
G. The bodies of all dead soldiers held by either side
will be returned for burial in their respective countries
within ten days after the signing of this agreement.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 4 -
H. This agreement is not a peace agreement. It is
a step toward a just and durable peace on the basis of
Security Council Resolution 338 dated October 22, 1973.
For Israel:
For Syria:
Witness for the United Nations:
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
Dear Mr. Minister:
I am transmitting the attached proposal to assist
in the implementation of the agreement between Israel
and Syria on the disengagement of their forces. I am
also transmitting the attached proposal to the Israeli
government.
Receipt of your signature or that of an appropriate
representative designated by the Syrian government on
the attached proposal will constitute acceptance, subject
to the signature of the proposal by an appropriate repre-
sentative of the Government of Israel.
Sincerely,
Henry A. Kissinger
His Excellency
'Abd al-Halim Khaddam,
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Damascus.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
Dear Mr. Minister:
I am transmitting the attached proposal to assist
in the implementation of the agreement between Iornel
and Syria on the disengagement of their forces. I am
also transmitting the attached proposal to the Syrian
government.
Receipt of your signature or that of an appro-
priate representative designated by the Israeli govern-
ment on the attached proposal will constitute acceptance,
subject to the signature of the proposal by an appropriate
representative of the Government of Syria.
Sincerely,
Henry A. Kissinger
His Excellency
Abba Eban,
Minister for Foreign Affaire,
Jerusalem.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
U. S. PROPOSAL
In order to facilitate agreement between Israel and Syria
and in implementation of that agreement, and to assist in main-
taining scrupulous observance of the ceasefire on land, air and
sea, the United States proposes the following provisions:
(1) That the area of limitation in armament and forces
west of Line A and east of Line B will be 10 kilometers in
width. In each area, respectively, the following are permitted:
(a) two brigades of armed forces, including 75 tanks and 36
pieces of short-range 122-mm artillery; and (b) the entire force
of each party shall not exceed 6,000 men. The United Nations
Disengagement Observer Force will inspect these provisions in
the 10 kilometer zone.
(2) That in the area between 10 and 20 kilometers west of
Line A and east of Line B: (a) there will be no artillery
pieces whose range exceeds 20 kilometers; and (b) the total
number of artillery pieces permitted is 162 with a range of not
exceeding 20 kilometers; and (c) surface-to-air missiles will
be stationed no closer than 25 kilometers west of Line A and
east of Line B.
(3) Inspection of the provisions in paragraph 2 above will
be performed by the U. S. aerial reconnaissance and the results
will be provided to both sides.
(4) The area of separation between Lines A and B will not
have any military forces. In the towns and villages in the
area there will be stationed police forces of a size and
character similar to those stationed in other Syrian towns
and villages of comparable size.
(5) The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force will
take over the positions in the area of separation on Mount
Hermon. No military observation of any kind may be conducted
in that area.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PROTOCOL TO AGREEMENT ON
DISENGAGEMENT BETWEEN ISRAELI AND SYRIAN FORCES
Concerning the United Nations
Disengagement Observer Force
Israel and Syria agree that:
The function of the United Nations Disengagement
Observer Force (UNDOF) under the Agreement will be to
use its best efforts to maintain the ceasefire and to
see that it is scrupulously observed. It will super-
vise the Agreement and protocol thereto with regard
to the areas of separation and limitation. In carry-
ing out its mission, it will comply with generally
applicable Syrian laws and regulations and will not
hamper the functioning of local civil administration.
It will enjoy freedom of movement and communication and
other facilities that are necessary for its mission.
It will be mobile and provided with personal weapons
of a defensive character and shall use such weapons
only in self-defense. The number of the UNDOF shall
be about 1,250, who will be selected by the Secretary
General of the United Nations in consultation with the
parties from members of the United Nations who are not
permanent members of the Security Council.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 2 -
The UNDOF will be under the command of the United
Nations, vested in the Secretary General, under the
authority of the Security Council.
The UNDOF shall carry out inspections under the
Agreement, and report thereon to the parties, on a
regular basis, not less often than once every fifteen
days, and, in addition, when requested by either party.
It shall mark on the ground the respective lines shown
on the map attached to the Agreement.
# * *
Israel and Syria will support a resolution of
the United Nations Security Council which will pro-
vide for the UNDOF contemplated by the Agreement. The
initial authorization will be for six months subject
to renewal by further resolution of the Security
Council.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
SECRET
Dear Mr. President:
I have the honor to transmit the following
text of a letter from President Nixon:
Dear Mr. President:
As you begin to rebuild and re-
populate Quneitra, I want you to know
that the United States is prepared to
consider how it might assist in the re-
habilitation of that area. One impor-
tant objective we share in seeking a
lasting peace in the Middle East is to
help people return to normal lives. It
is a source of great satisfaction to me
to know that the agreement on the dis-
engagement of Syrian and Israeli forces
will make it possible for some of the
people displaced by war to return to
their homes.
Sincerely,
(Richard Nixon)
The signed original of this letter will be
forwarded to you.
Sincerely,
Henry A. Kissinger
His Excellency
Hafiz al-Asad,
President of the Syrian
Arab Republic,
Damascus.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
washington
SECRET
Dear Mr. President:
I have the honor to transmit the following
text of a letter from President Nixon:
Dear Mr. President:
In connection with the arreement
between Syria and Israel on the dis-
engagement of their forces, the Govern-
ment of the United States has received
the assurances below from the Govern-
ment of Israel with respect to the
Israeli presence on Tell abou Nida and
Tell el Aaram, the two hills just to
the west of Quneitra.
First, Israel will scrupulously
observe the consefire, including obser-
vance with respect to the people and
city of Quncitra.
Second, there will be no Isracli
forces or weanons on the eastern slopes
of the two hills.
I want to assure you, Mr. President,
that the United States will do its ut-
most to assure that these conditions are
scrupulously observed.
Sincerely,
(Richard Nixon)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 2 -
The signed original of this letter will
be forwarded to you,
Sincerely,
Henry A. Kissinger
His Excellency
Hafiz al-Asad,
President of the Syrian
Arab Republic,
Damascus.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DRAFT ANNOUNCEMENT
"The discussions conducted by United States Secretary
of State Dr. Henry Kissinger with Syria and Israel have led
to an agreement on the disengagement of Syrian and Israeli forces.
The agreement will be signed by Syrian and Israeli military
representatives in the Egyptian-Israeli Military Working
Group of the Geneva Conference on Thursday, May 30, 1974, in
Geneva. "
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SADAT-KISSINGER REMARKS TO PRESS
5:00 p.m., May 30, 1974 - Giza Residence, Cairo
Question: Mr. President, did you agree on the next steps?
Sadat:
We agreed upon everything!
Question:
When will you go to Geneva?
Sadat:
First, I have a statement. [Reads]
"Egypt welcomes reaching an agreement on the disengagement
of forces on the Syrian front as another step on the road
towards a durable peace based on justice in accordance with
the Security Council resolutions.
"The agreement, even though it is merely a military one
for the consolidation of the ceasefire, is an important
step that will generate momentum towards the realization
of the Arab national goal which is the total Israeli
withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories as well
as the restoration of the legitimate rights of the
Palestinian people. Furthermore, it confronts all the
parties concerned with their responsibilities and paves
the way for the activation of the Geneva Conference.
"We hail, in particular, the wisdom and farsightedness
of President Hafez Al-Assad, and the positive and
effective role of the United States of America which
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
2
proved that it is capable and qualified, under the
leadership of President Nixon, to assume its responsi-
bilities as a great power. In recognition of this role
we welcome the forthcoming visit of President Richard
Nixon and we trust that it will be a further step for
intensifying mutual understanding and consolidating
the friendship between the American and Arab peoples.
"The tireless efforts undertaken by Dr. Henry Kissinger
and his colleagues represent a new page in the field
of human creative achievement which would never have
come about had it not been founded on a deep humanistic
vision and a genuine commitment to the cause of peace. "
By all measures, Dr. Kissinger has done again a miracle.
I myself am proud because Dr. Kissinger is my friend and
my brother, and since the beginning I was sure -- and
maybe you remember in Alexandria I told you this -- and in
spite of all the difficulties and all the tireless efforts
that were needed, DR. Kissinger spared no effort and no
time to do his best to perform -- as I told you ---- another
miracle.
My congratulations to President Nixon, and I am sure he is
much more proud than me for what you have done, and my
congratulations to the American people.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
3
Kissinger:
Mr. President, I would like to express appreciation
for your very generous words. Six months ago I had the
honor for the first time of meeting President Sadat,
who since then has become my friend, on whose advice we
relied, and whose inspiration has guided our efforts.
The United States is dedicated to achieving a permanent
peace based on justice in the Middle East. And we
engaged ourselves in the efforts on disengagement with
Egypt and Syria because we were convinced it was a
necessary first step.
The negotiations concluded yesterday between Syria and
Israel could not have succeeded without the advice and
constant support of President Sadat and the Egyptian
Government.
The relations between the United States and Egypt have
improved and will continue to improve. In order to
intensify this cooperation, President Sadat and President
Nixon have agreed to establish a Joint Cooperation Commission
between the United States and Egypt to work in various
fields to the mutual benefit. A further announcement
of the details will be made tomorrow in Cairo and Washington.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
4
It remains only to thank my friend, President Sadat,
for the warm hospitality we received and for his constant
friendship.
Question:
When will President Nixon leave [for the Middle East] ?
Kissinger:
The date will have to be set after I return to Washington.
Question:
Will the PLO be invited to Geneva?
Sadat:
We have to discuss the whole thing with the Arabs first.
Question:
Dr. Kissinger, do you expect a resumption of diplomatic
relations with Syria?
Kissinger:
At the airport in Damascus Monday night, by agreement with
the Syrian Government, I stated that the United States
and Syria agreed to engage in a rapid improvement in relations,
that will begin immediately. I don't want to speculate
on any given step at any given time. I know I speak for
the Syrian Government when I say this.
Question:
When will the Geneva Conference reconvene?
Sadat:
We must discuss the whole thing among ourselves ---- Egypt,
Syria, Jordan, the Palestinians. We must have some time
for that. And after that we will approach the two super
powers on reconvening.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
5
Question:
Is that weeks or months?
Sadat:
How long, I don't know.
Question:
The next step is the immediate fulfillment of 242?
Or will it be other steps?
Sadat:
Sure, the aim of Geneva is fulfillment of 242.
Question:
Dr. Kissinger, will you have time to complete the solution
in the term of President Nixon?
Kissinger:
We are committed to a major effort to. achieve a just and
durable peace. We are determined to succeed.
Question:
Will you go to the Middle East before or after you go to
Moscow?
Kissinger:
I will report to President Nixon on my travels here and
will discuss it.
Question:
What will be the level of this Joint Commission?
Kissinger:
There will be an announcement.
Question:
What is its function?
Kissinger:
There will be a formal announcement tomorrow in Washington
and Cairo.
Question:
Do you expect to come back, Sir?
Kissinger:
I always expect to come back. [Laughter]
Question:
When will be the next disengagement negotiation?
Sadat:
Ask Dr. Kissinger.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Situation When the Trip Began (April 28 )
The Dayan (March 29) and Shihabi (April13) visits had achieved The
following points of agreement:
-- Separation of forces is just a first step
toward an overall peace agreement.
-- Both sides would observe the ceasefire.
-- There would be two disengagement lines
with a disengagement zone between them
-- Syrian administration would be restored
up to the Isracti disengagement line.
-- Behind the disengagement lines, force and
equipment limitations can be negotiated
on a reciprocal basis.
-- There would be a UN presence in the
disengagement zone, the exact nature of
that presence to be negotiated.
-- Prisoners would be exchanged.
The hey points that remained to be clarified were:
-- The disengagement lines. the The Quneitra
hills and The mount Hermon positions
were seen as the critical issues
-- How many areas of limited armament
there would be and the nature of the
limitations.
-- The function and strength of the UN presence.
-- The timing of the prisones exchange
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 2
Laying the Ground work ( April 29- May 7)
The first week was spent establishing
a framework Talks with Gromyko in
Geneva, Boumechine, sadat and Three then to
four sessions week's end, from sessions
in (Thursday Saturday Mon
Hussein and an emersary sent to
King Faisal and and Then, at week's
end, The first two stops in Jerusalem
and Damascus. Over that weekend,
an emissary from the party was sent to
King Faisal and back to Boumediene and
you had a second meeting with sadat.
The Blue Line
The Diseng agement Line-- ( May 8-12)
The first Israch to map of Haller the dising agement
in response your
time A was presented in
in Jesul Jerusalem was presented in
the to President asad on Wednesday,
may 8. The result of this was
to focus the negotiation on (1)
Quneitra and (2) pressures to "straighten
out" The blue line.
Quneitra and the US Proposal (May 13-18) 20
This phase began with the long Israeli
Cabinet meeting of May 13. This produced
an Israeli position which removed Israeli
and the UM
forces, N from Quneitra, put the hills just north
of town in Reproduced to atthe DECLASSIFIED Richard Nixon Presidential The Library culmination The village of
This document has been d reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
of
-
we meeting with on a draft may the talks st 90 atement on and to
had gone to the 18,
prep on we is cessing were cairo acted that night
this phase was the formulation of the us
proposal on Quneitra which led to asad's
saying on May 18 that he would "forego
The question of the hills A The one remaining
step in this phase was having the
Israelis put the Quneitra arrangements
on a map. This map was shown to
asad may 20.
Red Line and Limitations (may 20-27)
This phase began with the Isractes saying they
could consider The Red Line only when
the question of limitations was settled The
Syrians took the opposite position The
negotiations again seemed on the verge of
statemate when Tuesday, we returned to Jerusalem
the night of a May 21, The morning of May 23
each member of The Israeli team endorsed
Mrs. Meir's position that without realistic
limitations this would be nothing more than
a one -sided with drawal and ceasefire.
he came back from Damasars that Thursday
night prepared to suspend The talks,
It was Then the Israeli group on Friday
morning May 24, that gave Secretary
Kissinges enough latitude to develop a us
Proposal on limitations. This was developed Friday,
refined over Reproduced the at the Richard weekend Nixon Presidential and Library finally concluded
Monday, may 2 (DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
The Documents (may 26-27)
Terrorism ( may 28)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Asad
1.
Bilateral commission
2.
Relations after desengagement
3.
Emissary to Coash to discuss how
This to he done
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Syrian Map
Jan. 20
Israel Map # 1 A
March 29, 1974
Syria Map #
Apri ( 13, 1974
Israel Map # 2 May 7, 1974
Syrian Observations May 8, 1974
Inali Map # 3
May 12, 1974
Syrian observations
E
Quneitra
May 12 -
M
May 17 - developin 9 us proposal are Q
May 18 - arad caved on the hills - us prop.
Fast suspension statement
Map # 4
#
Limitations
May 20 (gaus them agreement + ure protocol
Map # 5
May 26,1974
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Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
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Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- -will also want
page size
Maps on The disengagement line: :
-- Syrian map, January 20
brought to washing ton by Dayan,
- Israeli map March 29
brought to Washington by Shihabi,
- Syrian map 1 April 13
1
- Israeh map, May 7-8
2
- Israeli map, May 12
3
- Israeh map, May 20 (showing
Quneitra proposal)
4
- Israeli map, May 26
5
- Agreement map, May 28
6.
- Composite showing all of above
on one map
Quneitra
- Checklist of May 12 Gur- Sisco - Sameless - UN strip
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
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Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Syrian position 5/16-17
west of 1967 line
1.
Syria needs position on mount Hermon, that
Grad says Israel re-ompried after October 22
cearefire.
2.
secretary told asad us prepared to propose what
he considered maximum he would "impose "based
on talks with indivials fake into account
7
- In. obsers
- widen The pocket about / km. north and south
to produce a substantially straight line,
- To west, move line 1/4 km. to west. Create
a DM2 from there to foot of wills
from foot of hills to other side of hills only
The lightest of weapons us would give
Nixon asad letter guaranteeing only lightest
of weapons
straight line north south 1km. bey and map 2,
move west 200 meters, Israeli military
line at foot of hill, main Israeli forces on other
side of hill.)
3.
asad:
- Line on peak of hill
- straight north and south to hook up with
Nap# 2 line
- No, cultivate. Israeli settlers cultivating fields Aprians would not
No marqin for give any more. If hill in enemy
hands Q is aseless
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
just to put help orystallize thoughts on where we
stand, I offer the following.
negotiation on
This A disengagement of forces is hung up over an issue
that really belongs in negotiation the of The first phase
of Israeli withdrawal over two from 1967 line -- the constriction
or removal of A Isracti settlements.
three possible
Theoratically there are two ^ ways out of This
statemate :
1. To seek less -- a simple separation of forces.
This could range from withdrawal tothe A tober 6
line to Israel's present offer with some
adjustments north and south of Qunertra
one way to do this would he to eta true to arrange some Joraeli fallback
quickly in exchange for a ceasefire while continuing negotiations on
Quneitra until the new Isralli government is formed
$ asad sepms accept This because he would have
unlikely to
to give up his war of attrition, which he sees
as his main card in playing for a first phase
of Inaeli withdrawal behind the 1967 lines
which would permit him to begin resettling
1967 refugees. The Israelis would # not accept
without a ceasefire and probably some agreement on
force and arms limitations.
2. To seek more -- Israeli withdrawal from the
cultivated fields between Quneitra and Tel
abou Nida. This even is asad's proposal. The
Isractis seem unable, to consides consider this until They
have a new government, and acceptance
seems unlikely even then unless they feel
a lot more pressure them they do now,
4 The argument for This approach is that it
would create a situation that could last
for some time. It would require the
passa Reproduced at the DECLASSIFIED Richard Nixon-Presidential the Library Israeti political
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- -
situation to stabilize. for the us administration
₹ to build understanding in the us for where
from was of attrition and
approach, and for pressures ^ in the middle
East to work on Inal
3. To 90 on trying to split the difference between
the Ayrian and Isracti positions by persuading
Israel to give up enough fields and accept
to give Quentra "breathing space." with this,
of course, would go assurances that the hills
would not be used for Israch harrassment or
offensive operations.
neither side seems able to give enough to
make this possible. also, it would. not create
a stable the setuation as long as Serian and
Israeti civilians are within sight of each
other.
The present negotiation suggests to me that a real
disengagement of forces agreement is not possible
in present circumstances because Syria does not
want to give up its military option now.
Here are some possible approaches:
1. we can let The war of attrition go on while
trying to keep alive for a time the semblance
of disengagement talks, letting each side
reflect. This is The course we are on now,
2.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
WATMENT
Oz.
DEP
STATE
Department of State
/ AMERICA
TELEGRAM
S/S 10
of
SECRET
NODIS
Classification
15 MAY 131ø
0 150920Z MAY 74
FM USINT DAMASCUS
TO RUESJR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 126
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 538
BT
SECRE T DAMASCUS 0721
EXDIS CHANDLE AS NODIS)
NO DISTRIBUTION OUTSIDE NEA
JERUSALEM FOR ATHERTON
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP CHENRY A. KISSINGER), SY
SUBJECT: ANNOUNCEMIN SHOWING CLOSER US-SYRIAN RELATIONS
REF: A. JSAUSALEM 845 ; B. STATE 100589
10 AFTER A LONG NIGHT OF WRESTLING WITH THE PROS AND
CONS OF THE PROPOSAL DESCRIBED IN REFTEL, I HAVE CONCLUDED
THAT I HAVE SERIOUS RESERVATION ABOUT ITS MERITS. BELOW
I HAVE LISTED WHAT I BELIEVE ARE SOME SALIENT QUESTIONS
ABOUT THE PROPOSAL, WITH MY ANSWERS WHICH TO MY SATISFACTION
AT LEAST SHOW WHY WE SHOULD PROCEED CAUTIOUSLY WITH THIS
KIND OF "PUBLIC IMPACT" STATEMENT AT THIS TIME.
1. IS SUCH AN AD HOC PROCEDURE WARRANTED? I AM SURE THAT
YOU WILL AGREE WITH ME THAT ONE OF THE MAJOR PROBLEMS
WITH OUR ASSISTANCE AND EXCHANGE PROGRAMS IN THE PAST HAS
OFTEN BEEN THE SLAPDASH NATURE OF THE APPROACH. THERE WAS
AN IMMEDIATE PROBLEM, E.G., IRAN AFTER MASADEQ, so WE JUMPED
IN WITH GOOD INTENTIONS, PLENTY OF MONEY AND QUITE OFTEN
HALFBACKED IDEAS. WHILE THERE WERE MANY SUCCESSES, THERE
WERE ALSO MANY EGREGIOUS MISTAKES. AS I MENTIONED IN MY
CABLE (DAMASCUS 235) WE MUST APPROACH THE PROBLEM OF WHAT
WE INTEND FOR THE MIDDLE EAST POST-DISENGAGEMENT AND MORE
IMPORTANTLY POST-OVERALL SETTLEMENT IN A RATIONAL, REALISTIC
MANNER. I SUGGESTED IN THAT CABLE THAT WE BEGIN THINKING
NOW ABOUT THESE PROBLEMS SO THAT WE WOULD BZJPN A POSITION
TO MAKE PROPOSALS AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME WHICH WOULD
INDICATE TO THE AREA THAT WE ARE CONSIDERING REGIONAL
PROBLEMS NOT IN SOME SUPERFICIAL ONE-TIME MANNER BUT RATHER
SECRET
FORM FS-412(H)
Classification
4-68
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DECLASSIFIED
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PAGE 2
DAMASCUS 0721
SECRET
NODIS
IN A STUIDED LONG-TERM FASHION WHICH AMONG OTHER THINGS WOULD
OPERATE ON THE BASIS OF "PARTNERSHIP" AND NOT SIMPLY OF
UNILATERAL, IF YOU WILL PARDON THE EXPRESSION, GIMMICKRY. I
FULLY APPRECIATE THE NEED FOR IMAGINATION, FLECIBILITY AND
DEFT UTILIZATION OF CURRENT OPPORTUNITIES BY FRANKLY, I
DO NOT THINK THE CURRENT SITUATION REQUIRES THAT WE NOW
RUSH IN AS I WILL EXPLAIN LATER. I THINK WE HAVE TIME
AND FOR THIS REASON I THINK WE SHOULD DO A LITTLE MORE
THINKING ABOUT WHAT WE WOULD LIKE TO ACHIEVE NOT ONLY IN
SYRIA BUT IN THE ARAB WORLD AS A WHOLE. WITHOUT FURTHER
BELABORING THE POINT, I STRONGLY OPPOSE THIS KIND OF AD
HOC APPROACH.
3. CAN WE OFFER SYRIA ANYTHING AT THIS TIME THAT IS
CREDIBLE? I HAVE JUST SEEN WHAT THE DEPARTMENT HAS COME
UP WITH. ALTHOUGH THE LIST IS LONG, IN FACT IT IS PIDDLING.
1 FEW MORE SCHOLARSHIPS, SEVERAL ADDITONAL INTERNATIONAL
WSITORS GRANTS, LOOSENING UP OF EX-IM, SETTLEMENT OF DEBTS,
ET.. THE QUESTION, HOWEVER, IS WILL THIS "PEANUTS" KIND
OF PPROACH HAVE ANY EFFECT ON THE SYRIANS. IN THIS REGARD,
I RECALL SOME OF THE COMMENTS WHICH I HEARD HERE IN DAMASCUS
AFTER THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF OUR FY 1975 AID BILL IN WHICH
ALLUSIONS WERE ALSO MADE THAT PROVISIONS FOR ASSISTANCE
TO SYRIA WAS ALSO BEING CONSIDERED ON A CONTINGENCY BASIS.
THE COMPARISON BETWEEN WHAT WE WERE PROPOSING FOR ISRAEL,
NOT TO MENTION JORDAN, AND WHAT WE MIGHT POSSIBLY SET ASIDE
FOR SYRIA WAS NOT LOST ON SEVERAL OF MY OBSERVANT
CONTACTS. FRANKLY, I JUST DO NOT THINK THERE IS VERY MUCH
WE CAN OFFER THE SYRIANS AT THIS TIME THAT WILL HAVE AN
INPACT. MOREOVER, AS YOU HAVE LONG KNOWN, THE SYRIANS
HAVE NEVER REALLY BEEN IMPRESSED BY OUR AID PROGRAMS IN
THE PAST. I WOULD VENTURE TO SAY THIS HAS BECOME EVEN
MORE TRUE SINCE THE BAATHI TAKEOVER WITH ITS EMPHASIS ON
NATIONALISM AND SELF-RELIANCE. FINALLY, IN VIEW OF THE HUGE
INFUSION OF ARAB OIL MONEY INTO SYRIA OVER THE LAST SEVERAL
YEARS AND PARTICULARLY SINCE THE OCTOBER WAR, I THINK THAT
SYRIA WOULD BE EVEN LESS IMPRESSED BY OUR PALTRY GESTURES.
THEREFORE, HERE AGAIN I MUST CONCLUDE THAT THERE IS LITTLE
WE CAN DO AT THIS TIME TO CATCH THE PUBLIC EYE IN SYRIA
IN THE DRAMATIC AND SUSTAINED WAY WHICH I THINK WE should
IF WE ARE REALLY GOING TO SET LONG-TERM MILAGE OUT OF NOT
ONLY PUBLIC STATEMENTS BUT FROM THE FOLLOW-THROUGH AS WELL.
4. WOULD SUCH PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT BE APPROPRIATE AT THIS
TIME? AS FAR AS THE SYRIANS ARE CONCERNED BOTH AS A REGIME
AND AS A PEOPLE, THE MAIN PURPOSE FOR THE SECRETARY' CURRENT
MUCH ADMIRED AND MUCH APPRECIATED EFFORT IS DISENGAGEMENT.
ONCE ACHIVED, I BELIEVE THAT THE USG IS ON ITS WAY TO
CLOSER AND MORE COOPERATIVE RELATIONS WITH THE SYRIANS. HOW-
EVER, IF DISENGAGEMENT SHOULD BE ACHIEVED, I SERIOUSLY QUESTION
THE APPROPRIATENESS OF AMKING ANNOUNCEMENTEAOF THIS KIND IN
THE WAKE OF THE AGREEMENT. HERE AGAIN THE PALTRINESS OF
WHAT WE WOULD Reproduced at the Richard BE Library BUT MORE IMPORTANT,
I THINK MANY PEOPLE IN THDECLASSIFIEDOULD INTERPRET THIS AS
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PAGE 3
DAMASCUS 0721
SECRET
NODIS
SOME SORT OF APYOFF WHICH IS OBVIOUSLY NOT WHAT WE INTEND
TO CONVEY. IN THIS CONNECTION, YOU MAY RECALL THAT WHEN I
BEGAN DISCUSSING CULTURAL EXCHANGES WITH THE FOEIGN
MINISTRY A FEW MONTHS AGO, I WAS TOLD THAT THE SYRIAN
GOVERNMENT WAS APPRECIATIVE OF OUR INTEREST BUT THIS WAS
NOT THE TIME TO BE PUSHING TOO HARD FOR THESE KINDS OF
PROGRAMS. IN EFFECT I WAS TOLD, "LET'S WAIT UNTIL WE SEE
WHAT HAPPENES WITH DISENGAGEMENT." (DAMASCUS 321) MORE-
OVER, YOU MAY ALSO RECALL I REPORTED THAT I WAS ASSURED
THAT TPB SYRIANS WERE GOING TO BE BUYING AMERICAN
AIRCRAFT FOR SYRIAN ARAB AIRLINES AND THAT THE DECISION
WOULD BE TAKEN VERY SHORTLY (SEE DAMSCUS 417). THAT
DECISION HAS NOT YET BEEN TAKEN AND I STRONGLY SUSPECT
THAT IT, TOO, IS BEING DEFERRED UNTIL THE SYRIANS SEE WHAT
HAPPENS WITH DISENGAGEMENT. FINALLY, NEEDLESS TO SAY, IF
DISENGAGEMENT IS NOT ACHIEVED, THEN I SCARCELY BELIEVE
THAT THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF SOME RELATIVELY MINOR SYMBOLIC
GEST URES WILL HAVE MUCH EFFECT ON WHAT WILL DOUBTLESS BE
A DISILLUSIONED AND DISAPPOINTED REGIME AND PUBLIC.
ALL IN ALL, THERFORE, I JUST DO NOT SEE THAT THIS KIND
OF ANNOUNCEMENT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE AT THIS TIME.
5. RECOMMENDATIONAN I BELIEVE THE BEST THING THAT WE
COULD DO UWOULD BE FOR THE SECRETARY AT ONE OF HIS MEETINGS
WITH ASAD OVER THE NEXT COUPLE OF DAYS TO SOLICIT FROM
HIM HS IDEAS ON HOW HE VIEWS THE FUTURE OF U.S. AND SYRIAN
RELATIONS, NOTING AS THE SECRETARY HAS IN THE BAST SEVERAL
AREAS IN WHICH FE BELIEVES THERE IS ROOM FOR "COOPERATION
AND PARTNERSHIP" CAND THE SECRETARY SHOULD EMPHASIZE THESE
TWO CONCEPTS). DEPENDING ON PRESIDENT ASAD'S REWGTION,
THE SECRETARY COULD THEN THROW OUT THE IDEA THAT
PERHAPS THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT MIGHT WISH TO COME UP WITH
SOME SUGGESTIONS WHICH COULD IN TURN BE CONSIDERED BY OUR
PEOPLE OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS. SECRETARY MIGHT,
FOR EXAMPLE, SUGEST A JOINT COMMISSION SIMILAR TO ONES
SET UF FOR SAUDI ARABIA AND EGYPT. IN THIS WAY I THINK
WE COULD SIGNAL PRESIDENT ASAD OF OUR INTEREST AND AT
THE SAME TIME GET IDEAS OF WHAT THEY HAVE IN MIND,
RATHER THAN TRYING TO PRESENT PRESIDENT AYRD WITH SUGGESTIONS
WHICH MAY NOT, !N FACT, BE WHAT THEY WANT. FINALLY, IF
THE SECRETARY BELIEVES THERE IS UTILITY IN
SOME SORT OF PUBLIC ANNOUCMEMENT, HE MIGHT AGAIN INQUIRE
FROM PRESIDENT ASAD HOW HE BELIEVES THE TWO OF THEM COULD
HANDLE A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT OR JOINT COMMUNIQUE TO INDICATE TO
THE WORLD THAT EYRIAN/U.S. RELATIONS ARE NOW ENTERING A
CLOSER PHASE AS EVIDENCED BY THEH NTENTION TO BEGIN DIS-
CUSSIONS ABOUT FUTURE COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS. IN
THIS WAY AGAIN THE SECRETARY COULD GIVE PRESIDENT AND THE
OPPORTUNITY OF HELPOUNG GUIDE THE PUBL IC. RELATIONS ASPECT OF THIS
at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
SORT OF PROPOSAL.
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PAGE 4
DAMASCUS 0721
SECRET
NODIS
6. I AM SORRY TO TAKE A NEGATIVE POSITION ON WHAT IN
PRINCIPLE IS SOMETHING WHICH MANY OF US IN THE BUREAU HAVE
BEEN WORKING FOR A LONG TIME, I.le, WAYS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS
BETWEEN SYRIA AND THE UNITED STATES. I CERTAINLY HOPE
THAT YOU WILL NOT ACCUSE ME OF LACKING IMAGINATION OR
INITIATIVE BUT THIS IS THE WAY I SEE THINGS FROM MY LOW
POINT ON THE TOTEM POLE. IN ANY EVENT, I AM SURE THAT MY
RESERVATIONS WILL BE TAKEN IN THE SPIRIT OF OPENNESS AND
MUTUAL EXCHANGE WHICH HAS MADE THE DEPARTMENT THE EXCITING
PLACE IT IS NOW TO WORK IN SINCE THE SECRETARY ASSUMED ITS
LEADERSHIP.
SCOTES
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Department of State
AMERICA
TELEGRAM
STATES
OF
S/S-10
SECRET NODIS
15 MAY°754//0221Z
Classification
0 150113Z MAY 74XX
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUESJR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 5580
INFO RUEHDM/USINT DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0655
BT
S E C R E T STATE 100589
EXDIS (DISTRIBUTE AS NODIS) TOSEC 641
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJECT: ANNOUNCEMENT SHOWING CLOSER US-SYRIAN RELATIONSHIPS
REF: JERUSALEM 845 (SECTO 401)
FOR ATHERTON
1. FOLLOWING IS LISTING OF ITEMS THAT MIGHT BE
CONSIDERED. EACH ITEM IS DRAFTED ACCORDING TO FORMAT
REQUESTED REFTEL, I.E. INTRODUCTORY LANGUAGE THAT COULD BE
USED IN PUBLIC STATEMENT FOLLOWED BY BACKGROUND EXPLANATION:
A. TALKS ON ECONOMIC CLAIMS: THE UNITED STATES GOVERN-
MENT IS READY TO ENTER INTO TALKS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF
SYRIA FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF OUTSTANDING ECONOMIC CLAIMS
BY THE TWO SIDES, WITH A VIEW TO THE OPENING OF NEW POSSI-
BILITIES OF ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL COOPERATION BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND SYRIA. BACKGROUND: TWO MAIN OUT-
STANDING ISSUES ARE (1) STATUS OF US-OWNED 21 MILLION
SYRIAN POUNDS FROM COUNTERPART FUNDS FROZEN BY SARG AS
RESULT OF UNILATERAL USG CANCELLATION IN FEBRUARY 1967
OF GRAIN SILO CONSTRUCTION PROJECT AND (2) APPROXIMATELY
DOLLARS 75,000 OWED EX-IM BANK BY SARG AS RESULT OF SARG'S
FAILURE TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR REPAYMENT OF EX-IM
LOAN TO BOUSTANY TEXTILE FIRM FOLLOWING SARG'S NATIONALI-
ZATION OF FIRM IN MID-196ØS CKNOWN AS "THE BOUSTANY
CLAIM"). IN TALKS CONDUCTED IN ATMOSPHERE OF IMPROVED
US-SYRIAN RELATIONS WE COULD PRESUMABLY AGREE TO USE BY
SARG OF 21 MILLION POUNDS FOR APPROPRIATE ECONOMIC DEVEL-
OPMENT ACTIVITY, OR SIMPLY TO WRITE-OFF OF FUNDS. RE
BOUSTANY CLAIM, ITS RESOLUTION would BE PARTICULARLY HELP-
FUL SINCE EX-IM UP TO NOW HAS BEEN UNWILLING EVEN TO
CONSIDER REQUESTS FOR CREDIT FOR SYRIA UNTIL IT IS
SETTLED.
B. DAMASCUS FAIR: THE UNITED STATES LOOKS FORWARD TO
RENEWING IN 1974 ITS PARTICIPATION IN THE WORLD FAMOUS
FORM
Classification
FS-412(H)
4-68
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PAGE 2
STATE 1005₦89
SECRET NODIS
DAMASCUS FAIR. BACKGROUND: STATE AND COMMERCE ARE
PREPARED TO FUND WHAT IS CALLED "COMMERCIAL PRESENCE"
TRADE FAIR PRESENTATION; THIS WOULD BE SUBSTANTIAL
PAVILLION WITH PARTICIPATION BY INTERESTED U.S. COMPANIES.
MAIN COMPLICATION HERE IS THAT PARTICIPATION IN DAMASCUS
FAIR IS BY INVITATION AND THUS FAR SARG HAS NOT INVITED
US. THERE ARE ALSO PROBLEMS OF CLEARING EXHIBITS THROUGH
SYRIAN CUSTOMS IN RELATIVELY SHORT TIME BEFORE FAIR'S
OPENING, WHICH WE UNDERSTAND NOW SCHEDULED FOR JULY, AND
RECRUITMENT OF U.S. PARTICIPANT FIRMS, BUT THESE CAN
PROBABLY BE HANDLED IF DECISION IS MADE PROMPTLY AND WE
ARE PREPARED MAKE ALL-OUT URGENT EFFORT.
C. DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE: A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE WILL BE VISITING SYRIA SHORTLY
TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR INCREASED TRADE BETWEEN
THE U.S. AND SYRIA. VARIOUS COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS
ARE CURRENTLY UNDER CONSIDERATION BETWEEN PRIVATE u.s.
FIRMS AND SYRIA. BACKGROUND: VISIT REFERRED TO IS THAT
OF FS0 PATRICK KILLOUGH, NOW ON DETAIL TO COMMERCE, WHO
IS CURRENTLY IN AREA CONSULTING WITH POSTS. ONLY BIG
COMMERCIAL DEAL PENDING BETWEEN u.s. AND SYRIA IS
POSSIBLE PURCHASE BY SYRIAN ARAB AIRLINES OF THREE WIDE-
BODY AIRCRAFT. ALTHOUGH FRENCH MANUFACTURERS ARE
STILL IN THE RUNNING, INDICATIONS POINT TO ACQUISITION OF
EITHER LOCKHEED'S 1ø11 TRISTARS OR MC DONNELL'S
DC-10-30'S. SCOTES MAY HAVE MORE RECENT INFO; SALE HAD
BEEN EXPECTED TO BE CONCLUDED THIS PAST WEEK. (ALSO,
COMMERCE DEPARTMENT HAS RUMORS THAT CHRYSLER IS CONSIDER-
ING APPROACHING THE SYRIANS TO put UP AN AUTO ASSEMBLY
PLANT, BUT NEITHER THEY NOR WE ABLE TO OBTAIN IMMEDIATE
CONFIRMATION OF THIS.)
D. EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL ACTIVITIES: THE UNITED
STATES IS PLEASED TO PROPOSE THE RESUMPTION OF EDUCATION-
AL AND CULTURAL EXNHANGES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
SYRIA. WE LOOK FORWARD TO BEING ABLE TO RECEIVE PROMINENT
SYRIANS, IN BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE, AS OUR GUESTS
IN THE UNITED STATES AND TO RENEW EXCHANGES OF STUDENTS
AND OTHER ACADEMIC PERSONNEL. BACKGROUND: WE ARE AIMING
AT PROVIDING FUNDS FOR 5 INTERNATIONAL VISITOR (IV) GRANTS,
4 GRADUATE STUDENT OR PROFESSORS' RESEARCH GRANTS, AND AT
LEAST ONE u.s. PROFESSOR TEACHING AT DAMASCUS UNIV. IN
FY 1975. ORIGINALLY, TWO IV GRANTS WERE TO BE MADE
AVAILABLE FOR THE REMAINDER OF FY 74, BUT THE SYRIANS
INDICATED THE TIME WAS NOT RIPE FOR SUCH CONTACTS. 1975
CULTURAL EXCHANGE PLANS, AS PRESENTED ABOVE, HAVE NOT BEEN
DISCUSSED WITH THE SYRIANS, PENDING OUTCOME OF THE PRESENT
DISENGAGEMENT TALKS.
SECRETNODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PAGE 3
STATE 100589
SECRET NODIS
E. JOHNS HOPKINS EXPEDITION TO THE EUPHRATES VALLEY:
AN AMERICAN ARCHEOLOGICAL EXPEDITION, ORGANIZED BY A
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR, ARRIVED IN DAMASCUS
EARLIER THIS MONTH IN COORDINATION WITH THE DEPARTMENT
OF ANTIQUITIES OF THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT. THE EXPEDITION
WILL BE EXCAVATING SITES ALONG THE EUPHRATES RIVER VALLEY
SOON TO BE INUNDATED AS A RESULT OF THE NEW EUPHRATES
DAM. BACKGROUND: LEADER OF EXPEDITION HAD BEEN IN
CONTACT WITH MUSEUM AND ANTIQUITIES OFFICIALS FOR SOME
TIME SEEKING PERMISSION FOR THIS DIG, WHICH WAS GRANTED
EARLIER THIS YEAR. WOULD SUGGEST THAT IF THIS ITEM IS
USED DEPT. BE INFORMED so THAT WE CAN EXPLAIN IN
ADVANCE TO JOHNS HOPKINS BACKGROUND OF ANNOUNCEMENT.
F. USGS TECHNICAL COOPERATION: THE UNITED STATES
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY HAS RESPONDED TO A QUERY BY AN OFFICIAL
OF THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT CONCERNING THE POSSIBILITY OF
MAKING AVAILABLE ONE OF ITS EMPLOYEES TO WORK AS A
CONSULTANT, FOR THE MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM AND ELECTRICITY,
IN THE FIELD OF BAUXITE EXPLORATION. THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT WILL BE PLEASED TO MAKE AVAILABLE TO SYRIA
THE SERVICES OF A QUALIFIED EXPERT IN THIS FIELD SHOULD
THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT SO DESIRE. BACKGROUND: SEVERAL
MONTHS AGO, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF GEOLOGICAL RESEARCH AND
MINERAL RESOURCES IN SYRIAN MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM
CONTACTED A USGS EXPERT ON BAUXITE EXPLORATION DIRECTLY
AND ASKED IF HE WOULD BE WILLING TO WORK AS A CONSULTANT
TO THE MINISTRY. USGS OFFICER REPLIED DIRECTLY TO
THE DIRECTOR GENERAL THAT IT would BE NECESSARY FOR
A FORMAL REIMBURSABLE SERVICE ARRANGEMENT TO BE
CONCLUDED BETWEEN USGS AND THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT. NO
REPLY HAS BEEN RECEIVED YET FROM THE SYRIAN OFFICIAL.
IN THE MEANTIME, USGS HAS INITIATED CONTACTS WITH AID, AS
REQUIRED BY LAW, IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO RESPOND FAVORABLY
should THE SYRIANS DECIDE THEY WANT TO CONCLUDE AN
ARRANGEMENT WITH USGS. IN VIEW OF TENTATIVE NATURE OF
SYRIAN CONTACT, WE DOUBT IT WOULD BE ADVISABLE TO USE THIS
ITEM BUT SUBMIT IT IN CASE THERE HAVE BEEN DEVELOPMENTS
ON SYRIAN SIDE OF WHICH WE ARE UNAWARE.
G. PARLIAMENTARY VISITS: CONGRESSMAN PAUL FINDLEY OF
ILLINOIS VISITED DAMASCUS IN APRIL OF THIS YEAR. THIS
FOLLOWED A VISIT IN JANUARY 1974 BY SENATOR JAMES
ABOUREZK OF SOUTH DAKOTA. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
BELIEVES such VISITS ENHANCE UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE
TWO PEOPLES AND WOULD WELCOME VISITS TO THE UNITED
STATES BY SYRIAN PARLIAMENTARIANS. BACKGROUND: FINDLEY
WAS REPORTEDLY TOLD BY ASAD THAT ALL HIS COLLEAGUES IN
CONGRESS ARE "WELCOME" TO VISIT SYRIA; SCOTES WAS
SECRET NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PAGE 04
STATE 100589
SECRET NODIS
SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD (DAMASCUS 536) THAT SARG WOULD BE
SENDING INVITATIONS TO VARIOUS U.S. CONGRESSMEN TO VISIT
SYRIA FOLLOWING SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME OF THE CURRENT TALKS.
H. FLOOD ASSISTANCE: DURING THE RECENT FLOODING OF THE
EUPHRATES RIVER IN NORTHERN SYRIA, THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT, AT THE REQUEST OF THE UNITED NATIONS, MADE
AVAILABLE TENTS AND BLANKETS FOR VICTIMS OF THE FLOOD.
THE UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE WAS PROVIDED VIA THE UN
RELIEF ORGANIZATION. BACKGROUND: AT TIME ASSISTANCE
WAS GIVEN, SARG DID NOT WANT PUBLICITY ON USG CONTRIBU-
TION. WE DO NOT KNOW WHETHER SARG MIGHT NOW BE DISPOSED
TO GIVE USG PUBLIC CREDIT BUT MENTION THIS ITEM IN CASE
YOU WANT TO CHECK IT WITH SYRIANS.
2. REGARDING EX-IM DEALINGS WITH SYRIA, SEVERAL U.S.
FIRMS HAVE RECENTLY SOUGHT BANK'S ASSISTANCE IN FINANCING
SALES TO SYRIA BUT THE BANK HAS ADAMANTLY MAINTAINED ITS
REFUSAL TO CONSIDER DOING BUSINESS IN SYRIA UNTIL
BOUSTANY CLAIM IS PAID BY SARG. SOBER TRIED TO REACH
CASEY BY PHONE AFTERNOON MAY 14 TO SEE WHETHER WE MIGHT
GET AUTHORIZATION TO ANNOUNCE EX-IM 1 WILLINGNESS IN
PRINCIPLE TO ASSIST IN PROMOTION OF US-SYRIAN TRADE BUT
CASEY WAS ABSENT FROM WASHINGTON AND NOT IMMEDIATELY
AVAILABLE.
3. THERE ARE NUMBER OF OTHER SENSITIVE ITEMS INVOLVING
REQUESTS BY SARG FOR SUPPLY OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT BY U.S.
FIRMS. WE DOUBT THEY WOULD BE SUITABLE FOR INCLUSION IN
PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT BUT NOTE THEM HERE FOR YOUR BACK-
GROUND: (A) SYRIAN APPROACH TO LOCKHEED IN APRIL ON
POSSIBLE SALE OF C-13ø'S; (B) PENDING MUNITIONS CONTROL
APPLICATIONS FILED BY RF COMMUNICATIONS (NEW YORK STATE
FIRM) FOR SALE OF 25 RADIO TRANSCEIVERS TO SYRIAN
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND 100 RADIOS TO MINISTRY OF
DEFENSE; AND (C) SYRIAN REQUESTS TO MAJOR u.s. AUTOMOBILE
MANUFACTURERS PERIODICALLY SINCE 1967 TO PURCHASE
MILITARY-TYPE TRUCKS FOR SYRIAN ARMY; LAST FULL CONSIDER-
ATION GIVEN TO THIS REQUEST WAS IN 1971 WHEN DEPARTMENT
RECOMMENDED APPROVAL TO WHITE HOUSE BUT WAS TURNED DOWN.
4. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AND PL 480 ACTS. PROHIBITION ON
ASSISTANCE UNDER THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT AND
SALES UNDER PL 480 TO COUNTRIES WITH WHICH DIPLOMATIC
RELATIONS HAVE BEEN BROKEN (SECTION 62ø(T) OF THE ACT)
CAN BE WAIVED BY THE PRESIDENT UNDER AUTHORITY OF
SECRET NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
PAGE 5
STATE 100589
SECRET NODIS
SECTION 614(A) OF THE ACT IF HE DETERMINES IT IS IMPOR-
TANT TO THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES AND SO REPORTS,
IN ADVANCE, TO CONGRESS. WAIVER AUTHORITY MAY BE USED TO
PROVIDE NO MORE THAN DOLLARS 50 MILLION TO ONE COUNTRY
IN ANY FISCAL YEAR.
5. AS YOU ARE AWARE, THERE ARE ALSO OTHER PROHIBITIONS
AND REQUIREMENTS OF THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT AND PL 480
WHICH MAY APPLY TO SYRIA. THESE APPLY TO COUNTRIES WHICH
EXPROPRIATE PROPERTIES OF U.S. NATIONALS WITHOUT
COMPENSATION, WHICH TRADE WITH CUBA OR NORTH VIETNAM, ETC.
WAIVERS POSSIBLE FOR MOST OF THESE RESTRICTIONS DEPENDING
ON SPECIFIC FORM OF ASSISTANCE IN QUESTION. WE WILL
PROVIDE MORE DETAIL ON THESE IF YOU WISH. RUSH
SECRET NODIS
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
President Asad made these observations on the map:
1. It shows no return behind the October 6 line.
2. There is no parallel straight line. This complicates the situation.
3. Israel keeps points occupied after October 22. For example, Israel
retains positions on Mount Hermon. The only post the 6Israelis had
therebbefore the war was right on the October 6 line.
4. There is no significant area of land from which Israel is
withdrawing.
5. Under these circumstances, I could not send civilians back to
Quneitra. (Note: He later phoned to say that he could not send
civilians back to Quneitra unless the hills west of Quneitra were
in Syrian hands.)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Sun. Apr. 28
Geneva
Apr. 29
Algiers
Apr. 30
Alexandria
will
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Alexandria primark
Thurs May 2
Jerusalem
3
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Mon
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7
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7
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(first map presented)
8
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Sat. 11
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(Sisco-Saunders to as Quneitra)
Sun. 12
wamascus second map presented)
Alan 12
Jerusalem
Mon 13
Jerusalem
( full Cabinet cabinet until monday 130a.m )
Tues. 14
Damasas
( New Israeli position removes Israeli forces
and the UM from the town; puts the wills north
in UN handl; puts all Ahmadiya in UM hands)
14
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Thus 16
Damasas
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left with asad
16
Jarusalam
Fri.
Sat 18
Damas us (asad said he would forego the hills
Sun
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
ProsplA
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Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
CHECKLIST FOR CAIRO
May 30
Israel-Syria Disengagement
-- Your reflections on the negotiation.
-- Thanks for Gamasy's efforts.
-- Give Sadat copies of the Agreement, the UN Protocol,
and perhaps the US Proposal on limitations since an
Egyptian military representative will be in Geneva.
If you give him the US Proposal, you should probably
ask him not to tell the Syrians he has it. (Copies
to give Sadat are in your folder. A map is also
there.)
--- You are counting on the Egyptian representative to
help the talks in the Military Working Group at Geneva
go smoothly.
-- You may want to explain particularly how the fedayeen
issue has been handled.
Soviet Union
-- Gromyko in Damascus. Your courtesy call.
-- Grechko in Algiers and USSR-Libyan communique.
The Pace of Further Peace-making
--- Syrian-Israeli disengagement will occupy most of June.
--- Sadat said at your last meeting he wants most of the
summer to straighten out his relations with the USSR
and in the Arab world. But you will want to discuss
his needs in connection with a next step on the Sinai
front. (One approach would be to design the next step
so as to expand the UN zone "for the purpose" of putting
into place and testing some of the techniques for
assuring demilitarization over a broader area. This
would maintain momentum while still not addressing the
final border.)
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
-2-
-- You will want to discuss the elements affecting the
timing of a move on the Jordan-Israel front. (The
important issue to discuss with Sadat is whether a
political process can be developed which draws the
moderate Palestinians into the negotiation in informal
consultation with the Jordanians rather than confront-
ing formally the issue of Palestinian representation
at Geneva.
-- The issue implicit in the question of next steps with
Jordan or Egypt is whether to keep someone busy at
Geneva, for instance discussing a future agenda.
Egyptian-US Relations
-- The President's trip.
--- Announce Egyptian-US commission on economic coopera-
tion (statement attached).
Israeli-Egyptian Relations
-- The Israelis have raised the question of some sort of
direct emergency communications link between the Israeli
and Egyptian military in the disengagement area to
avoid incidents over straying helicopters, etc. There
is no longer an easy meeting point such a Kilometer 101
provided, and apparently the UN machinery for arranging
a meeting when problems arise is slow.
-- The Israelis on May 19 gave you a paper (attached)
asking you to raise again with the Egyptians the
question of the body search. They thought the exercise
was being undercut by Egyptians at lower levels.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DRAFT ANNOUNCEMENT
The Governments of the United States and Egypt agreed
today to the formation of a Joint Economic Commission which
will be designed to promote more intensified economic
cooperation between the two countries. Both governments are
convinced that such a Joint Commission will enable the United
States and Egypt to develop mutually beneficial programs in
the areas of trade, investment and industrial development.
Today's agreement is a result of a series of discussions
between President Anwar Sadat and Secretary of State Henry
A. Kissinger and is consistent with the desire of the two
countries to strengthen their overall relationships. In
agreeing to establish this Joint Commission, both governments
are further reaffirming their hope that a lasting peace in the
Middle East will be realized and thereby the people of the
area may enjoy the rewards of stability and development.
On the American side, the Commission's efforts will
be directed by
Minister of
will coordinate
.
the work of the Commission for Egypt. Representatives of
the
and
will meet soon to outline jointly agreed
goals and to establish working groups to carry on the day to
day work of the Commission.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
SEARCH FOR MISSING BODIES
We have reliable information of deliberate efforts by higher and
lower Egyptian echelons to undermine the joint plan for the renewed search
of missing bodies in the Canal vicinity.
The joint operation (UN, Egypt and Israeli military chaplains) is
supposed to resume this coming week.
We believe that the Egyptian intention is to sabotage the search
SO that no bodies will be discovered. The probable purpose is to discredit
any possible Israeli claim that bodies are still to be found in the Egyptian-
held area, despite the allegedly thorough search already conducted by the
Egyptian Army. We view this as an attempt to discourage Israeli requests
for additional searches.
It is our belief that intervention with the highest Egyptian echelon
is required to assure Egyptian good-faith in this matter.
19 May 1974
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
CHECKLIST FOR CAIRO
May 30
Israel-Syria Disengagement
--- Your reflections on the negotiation.
-- Thanks for Gamasy's efforts.
-- Give Sadat copies of the Agreement, the UN Protocol,
and perhaps the US Proposal on limitations since an
Egyptian military representative will be in Geneva.
If you give him the US Proposal, you should probably
ask him not to tell the Syrians he has it. (Copies
to give Sadat are in your folder. A map is also
there.)
- You are counting on the Egyptian representative to
help the talks in the Military Working Group at Geneva
go smoothly.
-- You may want to explain particularly how the fedayeen
issue has been handled.
Soviet Union
--- Gromyko in Damascus. Your courtesy call.
-- Grechko in Algiers and USSR-Libyan communique.
The Pace of Further Peace-making
-- Syrian-Israeli disengagement will occupy most of June.
---- Sadat said at your last meeting he wants most of the
summer to straighten out his relations with the USSR
and in the Arab world. But you will want to discuss
his needs in connection with a next step on the Sinai
front. (One approach would be to design the next step
so as to expand the UN zone "for the purpose" of putting
into place and testing some of the techniques for
assuring demilitarization over a broader area. This
would maintain momentum while still not addressing the
final border.)
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
-2-
-- You will want to discuss the elements affecting the
timing of a move on the Jordan-Israel front. (The
important issue to discuss with Sadat is whether a
political process can be developed which draws the
moderate Palestinians into the negotiation in informal
consultation with the Jordanians rather than confront-
ing formally the issue of Palestinian representation
at Geneva.
-- The issue implicit in the question of next steps with
Jordan or Egypt is whether to keep someone busy at
Geneva, for instance discussing a future agenda.
Egyptian-US Relations
- The President's trip.
-- Announce Egyptian-US commission on economic coopera-
tion (statement attached).
Israeli-Egyptian Relations
--- The Israelis have raised the question of some sort of
direct emergency communications link between the Israeli
and Egyptian military in the disengagement area to
avoid incidents over straying helicopters, etc. There
is no longer an easy meeting point such a Kilometer 101
provided, and apparently the UN machinery for arranging
a meeting when problems arise is slow.
-- The Israelis on May 19 gave you a paper (attached)
asking you to raise again with the Egyptians the
question of the body search. They thought the exercise
was being undercut by Egyptians at lower levels.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DRAFT ANNOUNCEMENT
The Governments of the United States and Egypt agreed
today to the formation of a Joint Economic Commission which
will be designed to promote more intensified economic
cooperation between the two countries. Both governments are
convinced that such a Joint Commission will enable the United
States and Egypt to develop mutually beneficial programs in
the areas of trade, investment and industrial development.
Today's agreement is a result of a series of discussions
between President Anwar Sadat and Secretary of State Henry
A. Kissinger and is consistent with the desire of the two
countries to strengthen their overall relationships. In
agreeing to establish this Joint Commission, both governments
are further reaffirming their hope that a lasting peace in the
Middle East will be realized and thereby the people of the
area may enjoy the rewards of stability and development.
On the American side, the Commission's efforts will
be directed by
Minister of
will coordinate
.
the work of the Commission for Egypt. Representatives of
the
and
will meet soon to outline jointly agreed
goals and to establish working groups to carry on the day to
day work of the Commission.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
SEARCH FOR MISSING BODIES
We have reliable information of deliberate efforts by higher and
lower Egyptian echelons to undermine the joint plan for the renewed search
of missing bodies in the Canal vicinity.
The joint operation (UN, Egypt and Israeli military chaplains) is
supposed to resume this coming week.
We believe that the Egyptian intention is to sabotage the search
SO that no bodies will be discovered. The probable purpose is to discredit
any possible Israeli claim that bodies are still to be found in the Egyptian-
held area, despite the allegedly thorough search already conducted by the
Egyptian Army. We view this as an attempt to discourage Israeli requests
for additional searches.
It is our belief that intervention with the highest Egyptian echelon
is required to assure Egyptian good-faith in this matter.
19 May 1974
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
CHECKLIST FOR CAIRO
May 30
Israel-Syria Disengagement
-- Your reflections on the negotiation.
-- Thanks for Gamasy's efforts.
--- Give Sadat copies of the Agreement, the UN Protocol,
and perhaps the US Proposal on limitations since an
Egyptian military representative will be in Geneva.
If you give him the US Proposal, you should probably
ask him not to tell the Syrians he has it. (Copies
to give Sadat are in your folder. A map is also
there.)
-- You are counting on the Egyptian representative to
help the talks in the Military Working Group at Geneva
go smoothly.
-- You may want to explain particularly how the fedayeen
issue has been handled.
Soviet Union
-- Gromyko in Damascus. Your countesy call.
-- Grechko in Algiers and USSR-Libyan communique.
The Pace of Further Peace-making
--- Syrian-Israeli disengagement will occupy most of June.
-- Sadat said at your last meeting he wants most of the
summer to straighten out his relations with the USSR
and in the Arab world. But you will want to discuss
his needs in connection with a next step on the Sinai
front. (One approach would be to design the next step
so as to expand the UN zone "for the purpose" of putting
into place and testing some of the techniques for
assuring demilitarization over a broader area. This
would maintain momentum while still not addressing the
final border.)
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
-2-
-- You will want to discuss the elements affecting the
timing of a move on the Jordan-Israel front. (The
important issue to discuss with Sadat is whether a
political process can be developed which draws the
moderate Palestinians into the negotiation in informal
consultation with the Jordanians rather than confront-
ing formally the issue of Palestinian representation
at Geneva.
- The issue implicit in the question of next steps with
Jordan or Egypt is whether to keep someone busy at
Geneva, for instance discussing a future agenda.
Egyptian-US Relations
-- The President's trip.
-- Announce Egyptian-US commission on economic coopera-
tion (statement attached).
Israeli-Egyptian Relations
--- The Israelis have raised the question of some sort of
direct emergency communications link between the Israeli
and Egyptian military in the disengagement area to
avoid incidents over straying helicopters, etc. There
is no longer an easy meeting point such a Kilometer 101
provided, and apparently the UN machinery for arranging
a meeting when problems arise is slow.
--- The Israelis on May 19 gave you a paper (attached)
asking you to raise again with the Egyptians the
question of the body search. They thought the exercise
was being undercut by Egyptians at lower levels.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DRAFT ANNOUNCEMENT
The Governments of the United States and Egypt agreed
today to the formation of a Joint Economic Commission which
will be designed to promote more intensified economic
cooperation between the two countries. Both governments are
convinced that such a Joint Commission will enable the United
States and Egypt to develop mutually beneficial programs in
the areas of trade, investment and industrial development.
Today's agreement is a result of a series of discussions
between President Anwar Sadat and Secretary of State Henry
A. Kissinger and is consistent with the desire of the two
countries to strengthen their overall relationships. In
agreeing to establish this Joint Commission, both governments
are further reaffirming their hope that a lasting peace in the
Middle East will be realized and thereby the people of the
area may enjoy the rewards of stability and development.
On the American side, the Commission's efforts will
be directed by
Minister of
will coordinate
.
the work of the Commission for Egypt. Representatives of
the
and
will meet soon to outline jointly agreed
goals and to establish working groups to carry on the day to
day work of the Commission.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
SEARCH FOR MISSING BODIES
We have reliable information of deliberate efforts by higher and
lower Egyptian echelons to undermine the joint plan for the renewed search
of missing bodies in the Canal vicinity.
The joint operation (UN, Egypt and Israeli military chaplains) is
supposed to resume this coming week.
We believe that the Egyptian intention is to sabotage the search
SO that no bodies will be discovered. The probable purpose is to discredit
any possible Israeli claim that bodies are still to be found in the Egyptian-
held area, despite the allegedly thorough search already conducted by the
Egyptian Army. We view this as an attempt to discourage Israeli requests
for additional searches.
It is our belief that intervention with the highest Egyptian echelon
is required to assure Egyptian good-faith in this matter.
19 May 1974
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
SEARCH FOR MISSING BODIES
We have reliable information of deliberate efforts by higher and
lower Egyptian echelons to undermine the joint plan for the renewed search
of missing bodies in the Canal vicinity.
The joint operation (UN, Egypt and Israeli military chaplains) is
supposed to resume this coming week.
We believe that the Egyptian intention is to sabotage the search
SO that no bodies will be discovered. The probable purpose is to discredit
any possible Israeli claim that bodies are still to be found in the Egyptian-
held area, despite the allegedly thorough search already conducted by the
Egyptian Army. We view this as an attempt to discourage Israeli requests
for additional searches.
It is our belief that intervention with the highest Egyptian echelon
is required to assure Egyptian good-faith in this matter.
19 May 1974
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DRAFT ANNOUNCEMENT
The Governments of the United States and Egypt agreed
today to the formation of a Joint Economic Commission which
will be designed to promote more intensified economic
cooperation between the two countries. Both governments are
convinced that such a Joint Commission will enable the United
States and Egypt to develop mutually beneficial programs in
the areas of trade, investment and industrial development.
Today's agreement is a result of a series of discussions
between President Anwar Sadat and Secretary of State Henry
A. Kissinger and is consistent with the desire of the two
countries to strengthen their overall relationships. In
agreeing to establish this Joint Commission, both governments
are further reaffirming their hope that a lasting peace in the
Middle East will be realized and thereby the people of the
area may enjoy the rewards of stability and development.
On the American side, the Commission's efforts will
be directed by
Minister of
will coordinate
.
the work of the Commission for Egypt. Representatives of
the
and
will meet soon to outline jointly agreed
goals and to establish working groups to carry on the day to
day work of the Commission.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
CHECKLIST FOR CAIRO
May 30
Israel-Syria Disengagement
-- Your reflections on the negotiation.
-- Thanks for Gamasy's efforts.
--- Give Sadat copies of the Agreement, the UN Protocol,
and perhaps the US Proposal on limitations since an
Egyptian military representative will be in Geneva.
If you give him the US Proposal, you should probably
ask him not to tell the Syrians he has it. (Copies
to give Sadat are in your folder. A map is also
there.)
-- You are counting on the Egyptian representative to
help the talks in the Military Working Group at Geneva
go smoothly.
-- You may want to explain particularly how the fedayeen
issue has been handled.
Soviet Union
--- Gromyko in Damascus. Your courtesy call.
-- Grechko in Algiers and USSR-Libyan communique.
The Pace of Further Peace-making
-- Syrian-Israeli disengagement will occupy most of June.
-- Sadat said at your last meeting he wants most of the
summer to straighten out his relations with the USSR
and in the Arab world. But you will want to discuss
his needs in connection with a next step on the Sinai
front. (One approach would be to design the next step
so as to expand the UN zone "for the purpose" of putting
into place and testing some of the techniques for
assuring demilitarization over a broader area. This
would maintain momentum while still not addressing the
final border.)
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
-2-
-- You will want to discuss the elements affecting the
timing of a move on the Jordan-Israel front. (The
important issue to discuss with Sadat is whether a
political process can be developed which draws the
moderate Palestinians into the negotiation in informal
consultation with the Jordanians rather than confront-
ing formally the issue of Palestinian representation
at Geneva.
--- The issue implicit in the question of next steps with
Jordan or Egypt is whether to keep someone busy at
Geneva, for instance discussing a future agenda.
Egyptian-US Relations
-- The President's trip.
-- Announce Egyptian-US commission on economic coopera-
tion (statement attached).
Israeli-Egyptian Relations
-- The Israelis have raised the question of some sort of
direct emergency communications link between the Israeli
and Egyptian military in the disengagement area to
avoid incidents over straying helicopters, etc. There
is no longer an easy meeting point such a Kilometer 101
provided, and apparently the UN machinery for arranging
a meeting when problems arise is slow.
-- The Israelis on May 19 gave you a paper (attached)
asking you to raise again with the Egyptians the
question of the body search. They thought the exercise
was being undercut by Egyptians at lower levels.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DRAFT ANNOUNCEMENT
The Governments of the United States and Egypt agreed
today to the formation of a Joint Economic Commission which
will be designed to promote more intensified economic
cooperation between the two countries. Both governments are
convinced that such a Joint Commission will enable the United
States and Egypt to develop mutually beneficial programs in
the areas of trade, investment and industrial development.
Today's agreement is a result of a series of discussions
between President Anwar Sadat and Secretary of State Henry
A. Kissinger and is consistent with the desire of the two
countries to strengthen their overall relationships. In
agreeing to establish this Joint Commission, both governments
are further reaffirming their hope that a lasting peace in the
Middle East will be realized and thereby the people of the
area may enjoy the rewards of stability and development.
On the American side, the Commission's efforts will
be directed by
Minister of
will coordinate
.
the work of the Commission for Egypt. Representatives of
the
and
will meet soon to outline jointly agreed
goals and to establish working groups to carry on the day to
day work of the Commission.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET
SEARCH FOR MISSING BODIES
We have reliable information of deliberate efforts by higher and
lower Egyptian echelons to undermine the joint plan for the renewed search
of missing bodies in the Canal vicinity.
The joint operation (UN, Egypt and Israeli military chaplains) is
supposed to resume this coming week.
We believe that the Egyptian intention is to sabotage the search
SO that no bodies will be discovered. The probable purpose is to discredit
any possible Israeli claim that bodies are still to be found in the Egyptian-
held area, despite the allegedly thorough search already conducted by the
Egyptian Army. We view this as an attempt to discourage Israeli requests
for additional searches.
It is our belief that intervention with the highest Egyptian echelon
is required to assure Egyptian good-faith in this matter.
19 May 1974
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
President Asad made these observations on the map:
1. It shows no return behind the October 6 line.
2. There is no parallel straight line. This complicates the situation.
3. Israel keeps points occupied after October 22. For example, Israel
retains positions on Mount Hermon. The only post the had
therebbefore the war was right on the October 6 line.
4. There is no significant area of land from which Israel is
withdrawing.
5. Under these circumstances, I could not send civilians back to
Quneitra. (Note: He later phoned to say that he could not send
civilians back to Quneitra unless the hills west of Quneitra were
in Syrian hands.)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
MIL
M
ISR.
L
INE LAND
KUN
200
is
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive DECLASSIFIED Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
UNITED STATES or AMERICA
Department of State
NDICATE:
TELEGRAM
COLLECT
CHARGE TO
POL-32
May 20, 1974//15152
DISTRIBUTION
CG
ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC
DPO
POL
INFO:
Amembasay AMMAN
S/S
chron
Amembassy BEIRUT
Amembassy CAIRO
Amembassy TEL AVIV
CONFIDENTIAL JERUSALEM 994
LIMDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: pfor, PINT, JO, IS
SUBJECT: Palestinian representation: Current WEst Bank attitudes
REF: Jerusalen 474
1. SUMNARY: Increasing possibility of Israeli-Syrian disengagewent
raises question of what next. While some West Bankers expect they
will be next, others seam to prefer further delay. It is realized
that if settlement efforts non turn to West Bank, Palestinian
representation question becomes acute. If PLO continues negative
stance, Hussein would be only available negotiator to bring end to
[sraeli occupation. If PLO takes positive turn, Arabs have some
jeorting out to do. END SUMMARY
2. As possibility of Syrian-Israeli disengagement has became
DRAFTED BY:
DRAFTING date 11
TEL. ext.
APPROVED BY:
CG:ARDay:er
5/20/74
Consul General
CLEARANCES:
POL.BJJones
-BJohns
Jey
CONFIDENTIAL
Classification
FORM
FS-413(H)
4-68
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
increasingly roal, question hus inovitably arisen--what next?
Some West Bankers Bo3a to expect they will be next. Arabic
daily EL Quda says May 19 that Golan disengagement should lead
to similar disengagement on Jordanian front. WE do not sense
real impatience to get shead with it, howaver. Others seen
actually to prefer further delsy, primarily, NO gather, to allow
DOPS time for sorting out Palestinian issues in fashion more
favorable to Palestinians. Several West Bankers have said to
assumed
us they ansuand a second Egyptian stage would be next. One
added ho thought his compatriots considered they stood
better chance of getting a good deal 1f their issue were dealt
with after final Egyptian and Syrian agreements reached.
3. Scze of more politically active Arabs realize that when WEst
Dank's turn cases Palestinian representation issue will be raised
in declsive way. E1 Quds May 19 editorial vent OR to stress need
for Palestinian participation in any talks. With Hussein back in
the game, there is appreciation that PLO will have to pull itself
together and move definitively onto Geneva track if it is in fact
to have any chance of representing Palestinians. PLO summit neet-
inga reported recontly in Beirut were watched for indications. Pro-
Hashemite Amar Khatib was gratified that news out of Beirut Demos had
PLO rejecting Genava, resolution 242 and separate West Bank/Gaza
state concept. Ho 88¥ this as leaving Hussein as only Arab player
on the field. Hikmat el Maari and other Nabulsis, on other hand
(PLO/Sadat oriented), vere optimistic PLO would take constructive
CONFIDENTIAL
Classification
4-68 FORM FS-412(H)a
(CONTINUATION SHEET)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
position as scon as Syrian-Israeli disengagement became reality.
They looked to June 1 Cairo PNC meeting as vehicle. Masri
conceded disarray on Arab side over Palestinian issue and said
Arabs would have to meet at summit and work it out definitively
negotiations
before could tako place about West Bank.
4. Prominent pro-PLO doctor Ibrahim Tisel (recently threatened
by Israelis with expulsion for public support of PLO representa-
ticn) told us, however, lie believed Palestinian organizations
would not negotiate for West Bank. To sign any such agreement
would invelve recognition of Israel, which they could not do. He
agreed reluctantly that in the circumstances Hussein was only avail-
able negotlator. Since first priority was getting rid of Israeli
oscupation, West Bankers would accept his representation.
5. COMMENT: If PLO persists in rejecting negotiations and leaves
the field to Hussein, the representation issue for the territorial
aspect of the negotiations is uncontested. In what seens to be
the unlikely event the PLO switches to a Geneva course, Masri is
probably right that the Arab establishment will have to make a
definitive deuision on how their side conducts negotiations
(it may already havd done 80, but the signals are ambiguous to say
will
the least). If Hussein carries the ball, the West Bank mihk hope
with skeptieisu that the outcome will provide for some autonomy.
They will have going for them a point made Juyz to US by a knowledge-
able Israeli (septel), that in a de-militarized West Bank, the
Jerdanians will have to allow the local population essentially to
CONFIDENTIAL
Classification
4-68 FORM FS-413(H)a
(CONTINUATION SHEET)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
rule itself. No one seens to take very seriously Hussein's pro--
posal that the PLO negotiate, at some subsequent stage presumably,
"Palostiniun rights."
DAY
A
CONFIDENTIAL
Ciassification
4-68 FORM F5-413(M)=
(CONTINUATION SHEET)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Department of State
INDIÇATE
TELEGRAM
COLLECT
POL-28
CHARGE
May 20, 1974//1515Z
DISTRIBUTION
CO
ACTION: SECSTATE WASHDC
DPO
POL
INFO: Amembassy AMMAN
S/S
CHRON
Amembassy BEIRUT
Amonbassy CAIRO
Amembassy TEL AVIV
CONFIDENTIAL JERUSALEM 995
LIMDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PINT, JO, IS
SUBJECT: Future status of West Bank: Current attitudes
REF: Jerusalem 474
1. SUMMARY: While emotional opposition to Hashemites remains,
there is greater willingness to accept idea that some ties to
Jordan will be necessary for any West Bank entity. Jordanian
influence is up somewhat, but in demilitarized West Bank (without
presence of Jordan army) Алимна could not reassert its authority
as before. West Bank acceptance of King's representation will be
enhanced if some way can be found to assure that Amman will in
fact permit Palestinians to have a voice in determining their
future status. END SUMMARY
orafted @V:
drafting DATE
tel. ext.
approved by:
CG:ARDay:er
5/20/74
Consul General
CLEARANCES:
POL BJJones
one BJohns
B
CONFIDENTIAL
Classification
FORM 4-68 FS-413(H)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
2. Average West Banker continues to have a blurred and shifting
picture of what rest of Arab world intends to do about
Palestinians. Not surprisingly, attitudes of West Bankers have
become increasingly and fractionated and layered. Bi-polarity of
loyalties--Hussein on one hand and PLO/Sadat on other--has con-
tinued to blur. There seems to be more sentiment that West Bank
should have more to say. Azis Shehadeh (politically-active
Ramallah attorney) is mulling over organizing "third force" eschewing
outside Links, to speak for silent majority when time comes to
accept ressonable settlement bringing end to occupation. On radical
flanks wa hear Syria has become a third external pole, looked to
by somo PLO supporters who feel Sadat is selling out Palestinians.
3. Haaretz West Bank correspondent Litani tells us he finds even
more support expressed for separate Palestinian entity than after
October war, but people now mean something different by it. AS
post-war emotional state has dissipated, majority have como to
believe some links with Jordan are necessary. (Shehadeh feels
this is view of his silent majority.) Support for totally inde-
pendent state has decreased, Litani believes. We continue to hear
that linkage with Jordan would be far more acceptable if King would
bring more trustworthy men into Government and above all if political
system were more democratic. At same time, we hear more often even
among PLO supporters reservations about M PLO "coming back" to
West Bank after Isrueli withdrawal.
CONFIDENTIAL
Classification
FORM
4-68
FS-413(H)o
(CONTINUATION SHEET)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
4. We frequently hear that Jordan is buying influence on West
Bank with lavish spending. Other reports confirm at least
that local municipalities have been receiving large leans from
Jordanian influence seens to be up somewhat, though
enotional opposition to Hashemites is unabated.
5. We asked David Farhi, until recently political adviser to
West Bank Mikkiting: Military Governor, whether he thought Jordanian
influence on West Bank was enough to assure their control if they
returned. He said they could reassert Amman's control if they
returned with ATTy. Israel would not permit Jordanian Army on
West Bank, however. Jordan would therefore be obliged to grant
sufficient autonomy to satisfy West Bank desire for local rule.
S. Problem pointed to by many who are prepared to accept King as
negotiator but want autonomous status is that of ensuring Ammun
actually fulfills its commitment on this score (there is great
distrust of Hashemites). Plebiscite in some form is mentioned
by almost everyone as one device to this end. Idea usually
accompanied by proposal for political hiatus under outside authority
such as Areb League (hardly likely to fill Israelis with confidence)
or UN. Many seem to feel some pariod, perhaps no longer than year,
is aseded, during which Palestinians could organize for self-govern-
ment. Pro-Hashemite notable Anwar Khatib, not hitherto a plebiscite
advocate, mentioned with some approval a plan Palestinian elder
statesman Musa Alami once prepared for UN. It called for 5-year
CONFIDENTIAL
Classification
FORM
4-68
FS-413(H)a
(CONTINUATION SHEET)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
period under UN control, after which West Bankers would form
government and negotiate their relationship with Israel.
Shehadeh euggested plebiscite after Isreel-Jordanian agreement but
before Israeli withdrawal. Agreement would be presented for
Palestinians' approval (to make them take responsibility for it)
an Hell as choice of future West Bank status. (We were surprised
at thought vote could occur under Israeli occupation, but Shehadsh
thought it could, especially if UN had role.)
7. COMMENT: If Farhi is right, and his point makes a good deal
of sense, the West Bankers have less to fear from the Hashemites
than most of them seen to think. Nonetheless, it will be import-
ant to try to build into any agreement, whether "disengagement" or
the final settlement, some assurance that the Palestinians will
have some voice in their future status. We have always thought a
plebiscite would give the Israelis problems, since they would
understandably want to be sure what takes their place before they
withdrav. Shehadeh's idea of a plebiscite before withdrawal might
help here, partieularly if it has been possible by then to lay soma
groundwork for an autonomous West Bank Palestinian administration
with ties to Jordan.
DAY
CONFIDENTIAL
Classification
FORM
4-68
FS-413(H)a
(CONTINUATION SHEET)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Department of State
AMERICA UNITED
TELEGRAM
STATES of
S/S-10
SECRET
24MAY72//1:32am
0 232013Z MAY 74 ZFF6
Classification
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ZEN/USINT DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
INFO UEHCR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 5972
BT
SECRET STATE 10839ø
NODIS
TOSEC 951
FOLLOWING FROM BEIRUT REPEATED YOUR INFO:
QUOTE
SECRET BEIRUT 5816
NODIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR US XF
SUBJECT: "ARAFAT REQUEST FOR ENCOURAGEMENT FROM USG
REF: A. STATE 8970.; B. BEIRUT 5250
SUMMARY: ACCORDING 10 WALID KNALIDI, ®ARAFAT KEENLY
INTERESTED IN MESSAGE OF MAY 1 CREF A) ABOUT WHICH
KHALIDI INFORMED °ARAFAT ONLY ON MAY 21. "ARAFAI
SHOWED PARTICULAR INTEREST IN REFERENCES TO PRIVATE
OFFICIAL DECLARATION OF DEPT INTEREST IN "PALESTINIAN
ROLE IN THE SETTLEMENT," THAT "LEGITIMATE INTERESTS
OF PALESTINIANS" MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN SETTLE-
MENT, AND THAT DEPT "HAS NOT EXCLUDED IN ADVANCE
ANY POSSIBLE ARRANGEMENT.* "ARAFAT WAS RELATIVELY
OPTIMISTIC ABOUT PROSPECTS OF GETTING PLO AGREEMENT
ON IDA OF "PALESTINIAN NA: IONAL AUTHORITY" FOR WEST
BANK AND GAZA, ALTHOUGH HY SAID PLO COULD NOT PARTICIPATE
IN GENEVA TALKS IF THEY WITHIN EXCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK SC
RES 242 (WHICH HAS NO EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO PALESTINIAN
PEOPLE). ARAFAT ALSO DEPLORED MAALOT INCIDENT,
BECAUSE IT INVOLVED CHILDREV, BUT SAID NEITHER HE NOR
ANY OTHER PALESTINIAN LEADER COULD OPPOSE OPERATIONS
INSIDE ISRAEL. END SUMMARY.
1. ON MAY 22 EMBOFF MET PALESTINIAN INTELLECTUAL WALID
KHALIDI IN ORDER HEAR REPORT ON CONVERSATION LATTER
FORM FS-412(H)
Cinssification
4-68
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
HAD WITH YASSER "ARAFAT ON MAY 21. KHALIDI EXPLAINED
THAT DUE TO 'ARAFAT'S RECENT ABSENCES FROM LEBANON
AND ALMOST COMPLETE PREOCCUPATION WITH HIGH-LEVEL
MEETINGS WHILE HERE, ONLY ON MAY 21 HAD HE BEEN ABLE
DISCUSS WITH "ARAFAT CONVERSATION HE HAD WITH EMBOFF
ON MAY 6 DURING WHICH LATTER CONVEYED TO KHALIDI MESSAGE
CONTAINED REF A. KHALIDI SAID THAT HE HAD INFORMED
"ARAFAT IN DETAIL OF MESSAGE WHICH HAD BEEN CONVEYED
TO HIM, AND THAT °ARAFAT HAD BEEN KEENLY INTERESTED.
KHALIDI SAID THAT, AFTER TALKING TO "ARAFAT, IN
INTEREST OF AVOIDING ANY POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING,
HAD WRITTEN OUT A REPLY TO DEPT'S MAY 1 MESSAGE
WHICH "ARAFAT HAD APPROVED.
2. TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM KHALIDI WHICH HE GAVE
EMBOFF ON MAY 22 READS AS FOLLOWS:
"I GREATLY APPRECIATED THE MESSAGE YOU TRANSMITTED
'0 ME; AND THOUGHT FIT TO SHOW IT INFORMALLY TO A
LEADING PALESTINIAN PERSONALIY. HE CAREFULLY
RiAD IT AND SHOWED PARTICULAR INTEREST IN IT BECAUSE
OF ITS REFERENCE TO "HIGH LEVELS OF THE
DE:ARTMENT". HIS ATTENTION WAS ALSO ATRACTED
BY "HE STATEMENTS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE WHOLE
QUESTION OF A PALESTINIAN ROLE IN THE SETTLEMENT"
HAS BEEN AND REMAINS VERY MUCH ON THE DEPARMENT'S
MIND; AND THAT THE DEPARTMENT HAS "NOT EXCLUDED
IN ADVANCE ANY POSSIBLE ARRANGEMENT". LIKEWISE
HIS AT:ENTION WAS ATTRACTED BY THE STATEMENT
THAT "AVY SETTLEMENT MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE
LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF THE PALESTINIANS" AS WELL
AS BY THE REFERENCE TO A JUST SETTLEMENT".
3. KHALIDI SAID "ARAFAT HAD TOLD HIM THAT, APROPOS
OF CONTAC'S WITH USG, SOVIET FONMIN GROMYKO HAD PRESSED
HIM DURING RECENT MEETING IN DAMASCUS ABOUT WHAT CON-
TACTS HE, 'ARAFAT, HAD WITH AMERICANS. "ARAFAT HAD
TOLD GROMYK) THAT HE TRYING EXTABLISH CONTACT THROUGH
VARIOUS PALESTINIAN, LEBANESE AND OTHER FRIENDS BUT
HAD NOT AS YET DONE so. EMBOFF REMARKED TO KHALIDI
THAT SITUATION APPEARED UNCHANGED IN THIS REGARD.
KHALIDI SAID TO BEST OF HIS KNOWLEGE IT WAS UNCHANGED
AND THAT A LEAS™ FOR PRESENT "ARAFAT SEEMED CONTENT
WITH STATUS QUO, ALTHOUGH HE VERY APPRECIATIVE OF
WHAT KHALIDI HAD TO TELL HIM ABOUT OFFICIAL POSITION
OF DEPT.
4. ACCORDING TO KHALIDI, GROMYKO CONTINUING PRESS
"ARAFAT FOR PLO PARTICIPATION IN GENEVA TALKS.
"ARAFAT HAD TOLD KHALIDI THAT QUESTION OF PALESTINIAN
PARTICIPATION REMAINS TO BE DECIDED, BU THAT IN ANY EVENT
plo COULD NOT AGREE 0 PARTICIPATION IF TALKS CONDUCTED
EXCISIVELY WITHIN FRAMEWORK SC RES 242. THIS RES
DOES NOT CONTAIN EXPLICIT REFERNCE TO PALESTINIANS
AS PEOPLE OR THEIR INTEREST OR RIGHTS. KHALIDI THEN
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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PAGE 3 STATE 108399 SECRET
ADDED, ON PERSONAL BASIS, THAT PERHAPS SOLUTION TO
THIS PROBLEM MIGH BE FOUND BY EXTRAPOLATION CAND
IMPROVEMENT) OF PAST STATEMENTS WHICH APPEAR LINK
GENEVA WITH PALESTINIANS, SUCH AS THAT SECRETARY
KISSINGER MADE AT FIRST SESSION OF GENEVA CONFERENCE
LAST DECEMBER AND THAT WHICH APPEARED IN JOINT US-
USSR COMMUNIQUE WHICH REFERRED TO INTERESTS OF PALESTINIAN
PEOPLE AND GENEVA CONFERENCE IN SAME DOCUMENT. PERHAPS,
VHEN PROPER TIME AROSE, CO-CHAIRMAN COULD FIND SOME
LANGUAGE WHICH WOULD REMOVE THIS OBSTACLE TO PLO
APPROVAL OF PARTICIPATION. EMBOFF TOLD KHALIDI HE WOULD
REPORT THIS, AS WELL AS OTHER REMARKS, TO DEPT.
5. "ARAFAT TOLD KHALIKI THAT HE PLEASE THAT, AT
LAST, SOME PROGRESS BEING MADE IN MOVING PFLO LEADER
GEORGI HABASH AWAY FROM CATEGORIC REJECTION OF IDEA
OF PALESTINIAN "NATIONAL AUTHORITY" ON WEST BANK AND
GAZA. FABASH HAD AGREED TO ACCEPT PHRASE PALESTINIAN
"POPULAR ARMED AUTHORITY" OVER ANY TERRITORIES LIBERATED.
THIS IS FIRST TIM HABASH HAS AGREED TO ANYTHING LESS
THAN TOTAL AUTHORITY OVER ALL OF FORMER PALESTINIAN
MANDATE AND "ARAFAT CONSIDERED IT VERY SIGNIFICANT
BREAKTHROUGH, ALTHOUGHT MORE WORK REMAINS TO BE DONE TO
GET HABASH TO ACCEPT "NATIONAL AUTHORITY3. KHALIDI
NOTED THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO SISCO AND ATHERTON IN WASH-
INGTON LAS! YEAR ABOUT NEED PROCEDD IN "STEPS" TO
INDUCE PALESTINIAN REALISM. HE CONSIDERS 'ARAFAT'S
HANDLING OF PROBLEM OF PALESTINIAN STATE AS FALLING
WITHIN T AT CONCEPT. KHALIDI ALSO CONSIDERS HABASH
MOVEMENT TO BE SIGNIFICANT, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT HABASH'S
UNYIELDING ATTITUDE IN PRIVATE TALKS WITH KHALIDI THREE
WEEKS AGO. hovever, HE READILY ADMITTED THAT TO
PERSONS NOT FILLY STEEPED IN PALESTINIAN THEOLOGY,
WHICH CAN BE VERY JESUITICAL, IMPORTANCE OF SUCH
NUANCES WOULD DE HARD TO APPRECIATE.
6. CONCERNING MA'ALOT INCIDENT AND LIKELIHOOD OF REPE-
TITIONS, KHALID1 SAID "ARAFAT HAD DEPLORED FACT
HAT FEDAYEEN HAD TAKEN CHILDREN HOSTAGE AT
MA' ALOT AND "ARAYAT DELIEVES THIS WAS DONE BY MISTAKE,
THAT FEDAYEEN HAD NOT PLANNED THIS IN ADVANCE. SAME
THING HAD HAPPENED AT KIRYAT SHIMONA. HOWEVER,
"ARAFAT HAD ALSO SAID THERE NOTHING HE OR ANY OTHER
PALESTINIAN LEADER COULD DO TO OPPOSE FEDAYEEN OPERATIONS
WITHIN ISRAEL. THIS ALL MORE TRUE IN VIEW OF INTENSE
PALESTINIAN ANGER AFTER DELIBERATE ISARELI DESTRUCTION
OF NATAIYEH REFUGEE CAMP WITH SO MANY CASUALTIES
AMONG REFUGESS.
7. EMBOFF THANKED KHALIDI FOR HIS CONTINUED
WILLINGNESS TRY AND IMPROVE UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN USG
AND "ARAFAT, EVEN AT CONSIDERABLE RISK TO HIMSELF.
CKHALIDI SAYS HIS PICTURE HAS APPEARED ON FRONT PAGE
OF JERUSALEM ARABIC-LANGUAGE PAPER AS BEING AMERICA'S
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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PAGE 4 STATE 108390
SECRET
FAVORITE COLLABORATOR AMONG PALESTINIANS). KHALIDI
SAID PRESENT PALESTINIAN-ISRAELI SITUATION OBVIOUSLY
VERY DANGEROUS FOR EVERYONE, ESPECIALLY AFTER MAALOT
(WHICH HE SEES AS SERIOUS blow TO HOPES OF PLO GETTING
ANY SORT OF HEARING IN ISRAEL) AND ISRAELI RETALIATION.
HE PROMISED TO KEEP IN TOUCH. GODLEY
UNQUOTE
RUSH
BT
#839 0
NNNNCNQ
SECRET
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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DEPARTMENT
on
STATE
Department of State
SELING
/
TELEGRAM
or
S/S-15 CG CHRO DPO POL EMB
LIMITED OFFICIALU USE
28MAY74//3:50PM
Classification
R 281200Z MAY 74
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6881
INFO RUESKG/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 3039
RUESBE/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 3998
RUEHDM/USINT DAMASCUS 155
RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 244
RUESRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 1852
RUESJR/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 517
RUESAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 3839
RUGTI/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1610
RUEHDT!"9 7, ,32 694( 3474 USMISSING USUN
RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1631
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE CAIRO 3617
BEIRUT PASS BAGHDAD
E.O. 11652: NA
TAGS: PFOR XF
SUBJ: PNC TO MEET JUNE 1
1. GUMHURIYYA MAY 28 SAYS AGENDA OF UPCOMING PALESTINE NATIONAL
COUNCIL SESSION WILL CENTER ON TWO MAIN ISSUES: GENEVA CONFERENCE
AND PROSPECTS FOR THE STATE OF WAR IN COMING STAGE. GUMHURIYYA
ADDS THAT PNC WILL ALSO CONSIDER "A NEW PLAN" FOR ESCALATION OF
MILITARY OPERATIONS WITHIN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.
2. AHRAM MAY 27 REPORTED A "TENDENCY" WITHIN PNC TO ENLARGE
EXCOMM FROM 9 TO 15, so AS TO INCLUDE ALL ORGANIZATIONS,
INDEPENDENT FIGURES, AND RZZS NATIONAL FRONT WITHIN
GAZA AND OCCUPIED WEST BANK." ROSE AL-YUSUF MAY 27 ALSO
CLAIMS NEW EXCOMM WILL BE BIGGER.
EMXKBOAIRO PRESS MAY 28 REPORTS BEIRUT ANNOUNCEMENT THAT
PLO HAS BEEN ACCEPTED AS MEMBER OF WHO.
4. MFA AND ARAB LEAGUE SOURCES HAVE CONFIRMED TO US THAT
PNC IS STILL EXPECTING TO CONVENE AT AL BUILDING RN CAIRO
ON JUNE 1, AS SCHEDULED. GOE DISCLAIMS ANY CONNECTION WITH
PNC MEETING.
EILTS
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
Classification
FORM
FS-412(H)
4-68
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
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THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER
7
ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
DEPARTMENT of STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES of
TELEGRAM
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
INFO
SECRET
DAMASCUS 994
Classification
30 May 74 1221
ACTION: Z 0 300759Z MAY 74
SS-10
FM USINT DAMASCUS
D.CHRON TO RUESJR/ANCONSUL JERUSALEM FLASH 257
10/cfb
RUESOR/AMEMBASSY CAIRO FLASH 129
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 712
RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 064
BT
SECRET DAMASCUS 0994
EXDIS CHANDLE AS NODIS)
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM SCOTES
GENEVA FOR MEPC DEL
EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP CHENRY A. KISSINGER)
SUBJECT: SYRIAN "OBSERVATIONS" RE VAP
1. WHILE AT PRESIDENTIAL SECRETARY DABOUL'S OFFICE
THIS VORNING (MAY 30), SHIHABI TELEPHONED LOOKING FOR
ME. OVER THE PHONE HE PASSED THE FOLLOWING
"SMALL OBSERVATIONS" CONCERNING THE MAP WHICH 1 HAD
TRANSMITTED TO DABOUL EARLY THIS MORNING.
2. ACCORDING TO SHIHABI WHILE YOU WERE HERE
YOU "PROMISED" TO PUSH THE RED LINE MORE THAN FIVE HUNDRED
METERS TO THE WEST TO INCLUDE THE VILLAGE OF AL-BUTVIYA, LOCATED
IN THE SEPARATION AREA NEAR TEL AL-FARAS. SHIHABI
SAID THAT WHEN THE SYRIAN SIDE HAD EXPRESSED THE DESIRE
/
FOR THIS AREA YOU HAD REPLIED, "I'LL DO IT."
3. GENERAL SHIHABI ALSO SAID THAT THE RED LINE IN
THE REGION OF KHAN ARNABA IN THE SEPARATION ZONE NEAR
QUNEITRA IS ALSO A "LITTLE BIT" TO THE EASTWARD IN
COMPARISON WITH THE MAP WHICH YOU HAD BROUGHT
THE LAST TIME.
4. GENERAL SHIHABI SAID HE WISHED VE TO BRING THIS
TO YOUR ATTENTION AND THAT THE SYRIAN NEGOTIATING TEAM,
WHICH HAS ALL THE DETAILN PLANS TO BE IN TOUCH WITH
VR. ATHERTON IN GENEVA TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER.
SECRET
Classification
FORM FS-412(H)
4-68.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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DEPARTMENT UNITED . STATES OF STATE .
Department of State
TELEGRAM
of
PAGE 2 DAMASCUS 994
SECRET
Classification
5. GENERAL SHIHABI SAID THAT THE SYRIAN TEAM WOULD BE LEAVING
SHORTLY FOR BEIRUT TO PROCEED ONWARD TO GENEVA. IT CONSISTS
OF BRIG. ADNAN TAYYARAX AND LT. COL. IBRAHIM AL-UVAR.
DR. SALAH AL-OIN TARAZI WILL BE "THE POLITICAL ADVISER" TO
THE TEAV BUT WILL NOT BE PARTICIPATING IN THE TALKS.
6. GENERAL SHIHABI ALSO ASKED IF WE COULD REQUEST
THAT THE SWISS AUTHORITIES PROVIDE SPECIAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS
FOR THE SYRIAN DELEGATION.
7. COMMENT: GENERAL SHIHABI SOUNDED RELAXED OVER
THE TELEPHONE. HOWEVER, IT WAS OBVIOUS HE WANTED TO BE
SURE THE VESSAGE ABOUT THE "OBSERVATIONS" ON THE MAP
GOT THROUGH TO YOU BECAUSE HE REPEATED IT SEVERAL TIVES,
BOTH IN ARABIC AND ENGLISH.
SCOTES
SECRET
Classification
FORM FS-412(H)
4-68
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
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NUMBER
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ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduce at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)
June 8, 1974
ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN DISENGAGEMENT
Phase II
The purpose of this paper is to suggest a concept for a second step in
Egyptian-Israeli disengagement. Such a step would have two aspects:
--the extent of further Israeli withdrawal and arrangements for
providing security for the new disengagement lines;
--elements of the agreement which would give Israel a sense of
movement toward conditions of peace.
The withdrawal must be substantial enough to allow Sadat to concede
some of the attributes of peace; Israel must get enough evidence that
peace is possible to justify the withdrawal.
A General Concept
One way of approaching a second phase of Egyptian-Israeli disengagement
is as an expansion of the present disengagement agreement, retaining the
pattern of two disengagement lines and a UN buffer between them and areas
of limited armament and forces just behind the disengagement lines. The
objective would be to maintain the momentum of negotiations without
radically altering the security situation or addressing the issues of final
borders or final peace.
The public rationale for this agreement might be that it would provide
an opportunity to put in place and begin to test the techniques and
mechanisms for assuring demilitarization and security in the Sinai. If
these are successful, on a small scale, they could then be expanded to
larger areas in the next phase of withdrawal and become the basis of
long-term security arrangements in a peace settlement. For example,
it might be desirable to begin experimenting with diminishing the role of
international forces in UNEF and experimenting with an increased
involvement of Israeli and Egyptian forces for jointly inspecting or
patroling the demilitarized area.
XGDS - 3
DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.
BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)
- 2 -
Possible Geographic Approaches
The Egyptian line. The following are possible approaches in drawing
the Egyptian disengagement line:
1. One would be to leave the Egyptian forces behind the north-
south line where they are now and expand the UN zone as
Israel pulls back further. The advantages of this approach
would be that it would be least threatening to Israel because
it would continue to minimize the Egyptian presence across
the Canal and it would widen the demilitarized area between
the forces. If most of the Sinai is to be demilitarized in any
final agreement, this may be the time to limit the eastern
expansion of the Egyptian military zone so as to avoid a
situation where Egypt would have to pull back in a final
settlement. The disadvantage would be that it would not give
the Egyptians any sense of moving forward. This approach
in the north would be more acceptable if Egyptian control were
expanded southward to include one or both of the major oil
fields. (A map showing present disengagement lines is
attached.)
2. A second would be to leave Egyptians where they are along
the Canal but expand their area southward to include some or
all of the oil fields on the Gulf of Suez, at least those at Ras Sudr
or those at Abu Rudeis further to the south as well. The
advantage would be giving the Egyptians a major gain. Although
Israel's withdrawal east of the passes would in itself be signi-
ficant, a further withdrawal that did not begin expanding the area
of restored Egyptian control in the south would arouse suspicion
that Israel does not intend to withdraw there at all. The disad-
vantage would be that in Israel this might cause even more
difficulty than moving Israeli forces east of the passes.
3. A third would be to allow the Egyptians without much augmen-
tation in the size of their forces to advance to the present
Israeli line west of the passes. The advantage of this line
would be that it would permit a modest Egyptian movement
forward while still leaving a buffer area that Egyptian forces
would have to cross before they reach the passes. The
disadvantage would be that, especially if Israel withdrew east
of the passes, the Israelis might regard this line as putting
SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)
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SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)
- 3 -
the Egyptians too close to the passes. If Israel gave up the
oil fields, it might regard that as concession enough at this
stage. In any case, it would have to be kept in mind that, if
the Sinai east of the mountains were to become the demili-
tarized buffer in a final peace, this line or one close to it
could become the final Egyptian military line.
4. Other lines could be devised by drawing new lines between
those above. Another possible variation would be to put the
oil fields in the UN zone but to apply the principle used in the
Israeli-Syrian disengagement by extending Egyptian civilian
administration into the area of separation.
The Israeli line. There will be two issues for Israel: giving up some
or all of the oil fields and moving their forces east of the passes. The
Israelis will bargain hard over either of these steps. These are the
general choices for the placement of the Israeli line:
1. The first possibility is to leave the Israeli lines where they
are now in relation to the passes but to extend Egyptian control
to the south to put one or more of the oil field areas back in
Egyptian hands. The advantage of this approach would be to
give the Egyptians something significant without addressing
any important security. issue at this stage. This might be all
that the Israeli political situation would allow at this stage
unless substantial Egyptian concessions were made on the
conditions of peace. The disadvantage would be that this would
provide no further Israeli withdrawal in the main military area.
2. A minimum Israeli line if Israel moved east of the passes would
be one starting near Misfaq on the Mediterranean and drawn
just barely at the eastern edge of the Gidi and Mitla passes,
leaving the major Israeli military center at Bir Gifgafa in the
Israeli zone. (This is "Line 1" on the attached map showing
possible Israeli disengagement lines.) The advantage would
be that this line would provide a significant pullback in that
Israel would surrender the key passes to the UNEF while still
retaining military positions close enough to the passes to
prevent a major Egyptian breakthrough. The disadvantage would
lie in the strength of opposition in Israel.
SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)
- 4 -
3. A larger withdrawal could be made to a line corresponding
roughly with the dominant topographical feature of Central
Sinai, the Wadi el-Arish. (This is "Line 2" on the attached
map showing possible Israeli disengagement lines.) The
main advantage of this line is also its main disadvantage:
It would be a significant withdrawal which would please the
Egyptians but arouse sharp opposition in Israel. This may
well be more than the traffic will bear in Israel at this stage.
This line is the most natural line of defense east of the passes,
but it is not so far east as to begin encroaching on the territory
that the Israelis are seriously considering keeping in a final
settlement. An advantage from the Egyptian viewpoint is that
this line would restore Egyptian control over el-Arish, the
only major town in the Sinai still under Israeli control.
A disadvantage would be that Israeli withdrawal this far east
would leave little room for a further step without getting into
the very difficult issues of a final withdrawal. In fact, a
withdrawal this great would create a disengagement line that
many Israelis would press to turn into the final border, although
theoretically one more line is possible between this one and
the 1967 border. Also, a large step in the Sinai could raise
Syrian pressures for a large step soon.
One special aspect of this line that should be noted is that it
would result in Israeli abandonment of a settlement in occupied
territory, thus setting a principle with implications for the
Jordanian and Syrian fronts. Nahal Sinai, outside el-Arish to
the south, is manned by members of the right-wing Herut party,
now a part of the opposition Likud bloc. A settlement farther
west, Kibbutz Yam near the Bardaweel lagoon, reportedly was
disestablished before the October war because it failed to
become viable even with a heavy subsidy.
The Elements of Peace in an Agreement
Either of the steps contemplated above--giving up some or all of the oil
fields or moving east of the passes--would be a substantial enough step
that Israel will insist on major Egyptian concessions in return. The
Israelis will probably press for an end of belligerency in return for the
next stage of withdrawal; the Egyptians will resist a complete termination
SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)
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DECLASSIFIED
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SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)
- 5 -
of belligerency for anything short of total Israeli withdrawal. The
degree of the Egyptian concessions will depend on whether the Israeli
pullback at this stage is relatively small or whether there is an
extensive withdrawal to something like the el-Arish line. Since the
Egyptians will probably not terminate the "state of belligerency" at
this stage, the solution probably lies in combining general commitments
to make peace with certain contractual arrangements that would have
some of the attributes of a beginning of normalization in relations.
The possibilities include:
1. Commitment to peace. We are talking here about those words
in the next Egyptian-Israeli agreement which commit the
parties to a final peace. There are two parts of the agreement
in which this would be handled:
a. In describing the commitment to observe the ceasefire
(opening paragraph of agreement) it would be possible to
try again, as we did unsuccessfully in January, to have
each side commit itself to refrain from "all belligerent
actions". This would have the practical effect of ending
(a) Egypt's application of the Arab boycott against
companies dealing with Israel and (b) Egypt's practice of
attaching reservations to international agreements it
signs, saying the agreements do not apply to Israel as
far as Egypt's responsibilities under the agreement are
concerned.
b. The less desirable but perhaps more realistic alternative
would be for both sides to declare their intention to
terminate all claims and acts of belligerency when a
final peace agreement is concluded. This would, of course,
be inherent in a peace agreement, but having it stated
explicitly now would still have political/psychological.
value. As a step in that direction, Egypt might state
privately that'it will take administrative steps to ease
the application of the third-party boycott and will no
longer attach reservations to international agreements.
Either of these steps would--practically if not juridically--
end all but one of the measures flowing from the continued
state of belligerency. The one remaining would be the
restriction on Israeli use of the Canal (see below).
C. In describing linkage with a final settlement, both sides
might in the last paragraph of an agreement go a bit
farther than in the January 18 agreement by declaring
their intent to negotiate a peace agreement with each other.
SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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SECRET/NODIS (XGDS)
- 6 -
d. In addition, it might be possible to talk with Sadat
about the kind of relationship he envisions with Israel
after a peace agreement is signed and then to write a
letter to the Israeli Prime Minister describing our
understanding of Egypt's intentions on the normalization
of relations. If this worked out like the conversation
with Asad on control of terrorism, the letter might be
quite concrete.
2. Israeli use of the Canal.
a. Egypt might make public, perhaps by incorporating it in
the agreement, the commitment it made secretly in January
to the effect that Israeli cargoes can go through the
Canal when it is re-opened and that Israeli ships can go
through when a peace agreement is signed. The Canal
should be re-opened not long after a second-stage agreement
is signed.
b. Presumably Egypt will not go so far as to let Israeli
ships through the Canal in connection with a further
disengagement agreement. However, another effort could
be made to have Egypt allow Israeli ships through the
Canal when it is re-opened.
3. Oil supply. Israel has a strong intrest in both access to
Gulf of Suez oil and in the principle of Egyptian willingness
to enter into normal commercial relations with Israel.
Israeli withdrawal from the Suez oil fields would open these
possibilities.
a. Egypt might agree privately that Israel may continue to
import Suez Gulf oil under arrangements made through
commercial channels in quantities comparable to those it
has been importing for domestic consumption. Even if
these arrangements were made between Israel and Egypt's
Italian concessionaires with Egypt's tacit acquiescence,
this could signify Egypt's willingness to consider some
normal commercial arrangements.
b. Egypt might agree openly to the principle of commercial
relations when a peace agreement is signed.
C. Coupled with the above might be a private Egyptian
statement of intent amount to a virtual guarantee of oil
supply to Israel in specified quantities. In return for
guaranteed supply, Israel might be asked to pay some
compensation to Egypt for the oil extracted from the
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Suez fields since 1967. Although we do not want to press
this on Israel, the total arrangement on supply and com-
pensation would be a major economic agreement between
Egypt and Israel and a significant step in normalizing
relations.
4. Straits of Tiran. "In connection with" the observance of the
ceasefire on the sea and the normalization of activities in
the Gulf of Suez if the oil fields are returned to Egypt, the
following are possible ways of addressing the question of
passage through the Straits of Tiran:
a. Egypt and Israel might state their views that the Straits
of Tiran are an international waterway in which all
nations are entitled to the right of free transit.
b. Better still would be supplementing this with a joint
Egyptian-Jordanian-Saudi declaration to the same effect.
C. Even better would be a supplementary joint Egyptian-
Jordanian-Saudi-Israeli statement. It is probably too
much to expect the Saudis to join Israel in a statement
at this stage. But in addition to reassuring Israel on
a key issue, the fact of a joint statement recording
agreement with all three Arab riparians would be a
significant sign of Arab willingness to begin to deal
with Israel in a normal way.
d. Alternatives or other supplements would be parallel
statements, arranging these now for future publication, a
UN Security Council resolution, or U.S. and Soviet
statements.
5. Bab el-Mandab.
a. Any of the procedures described above for the Straits of
Tiran could be applied to a statement by riparians to the
Red Sea on freedom of passage through the Straits of Bab
el-Mandab.
b. There might be agreement in principle to a future con-
ference, perhaps UN-sponsored, of Red Sea riparian states
which could cover freedom of passage in the Straits of
Bab el-Mandab.
6. UNEF. The objective is to meet the professed Israeli interest
in more direct and normal contact with the Egyptians without
bringing Egyptian military units closer to Israel. The possi-
bilities include:
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a. A UN headquarters with permanent Israeli and Egyptian
liaison missions could be established in the buffer zone.
This would provide an immediately available channel for
dealing with issues of disengagement and administration.
b. To supplement this, a hot line which the Israelis are
seeking could be established to provide a direct communi-
cations link between Israel's Sinai headquarters and
Egyptian headquarters to prevent military incidents such
as those that might arise from straying aircraft.
7. Normalizing relations across the border.
a. Border-crossing. An agreement to permit foreign tourists
to cross the new line as they presently cross between
Jordan and the West Bank would begin to normalize the
"border." Also, there might be a simpler arrangement for
residents of Gaza, for instance, to travel overland to
Cairo.
b. Journalists. Some agreement on an exchange of selected
newsmen in specified areas might at least be explored.
C. Jewish community. There might be an agreement on the
treatment of Jews and Jewish property in Egypt or perhaps
Egyptian commitment to encourage Syria to allow Syrian
Jews to emigrate if they wish.
8. Limitation of armament and forces. It should be noted that a
minimal movement of the Israeli disengagement line east of
the mountain passes would put the Israeli military center at
Bir Gifgafa into the limited armaments area. Because of
possible Israeli interests in maintaining this center and
because of the widening of the UN zone under this agreement,
it may be practical to consider increasing the level of forces
and equipment in the areas of limitation. This would pro-
bably permit the Egyptians to move more forces across the
Canal even if the Egyptian disengagement line remained where
it is now in the north.
It seems unlikely that Egypt could agree to all of the above,
even in connection with an Israeli pullback to the el-Arish
line which itself seems unlikely at this stage. From the
above possibilities, however, a substantial package could be
developed.
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Attached is a draft agreement on further disengagement which
begins to incorporate the above. Where maximum positions are
included, it will be remembered that some of these could drop
out into supplementary letters of assurance.
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WORKING DRAFT
EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI AGREEMENT ON THE FURTHER DISENGAGEMENT
OF FORCES IN PURSUANCE OF THE GENEVA PEACE CONFERENCE
A. Egypt and Israel will continue to observe
scrupulously the ceasefire on land, sea, and air called
for by the UN Security Council and as agreed in the
Egyptian-Israeli Agreement on the Disengagement of forces
in pursuance of the Geneva Peace conference signed
January 18, 1974. They will refrain from the time of the
signing of this document from all belligerent actions
against each other.
B. In agreeing to observe the ceasefire on land,
sea, and air, Egypt and Israel state their position that
the Straits of Tiran and the Strait of Bab el Mandab are
international straits and that ships of all nations are
entitled to free transit through them. Each side con-
sequently will refrain from interfering with the shipping
of the other in these areas.
C. Starting from the situation created by the
Agreement on Disengagement of January 18, 1974, the
military forces of Egypt and Israel will be further
separated in accordance with the following principles:
1. All Egyptian forces on the east side of the
Canal will be deployed west of the line designed as Line
A on the attached map. All Israeli forces will be deployed
east of the line designated as Line B on the attached map.
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2. The area between the Egyptian and Israeli lines
will be a zone of disengagement in which the United
Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) will be stationed. The
UNEF will continue to consist of units from countries
that are not permanent members of the Security Council.
A UN Liaison Headquarters will be established in this
zone with Egyptian and Israeli liaison missions assigned
for the purpose of coordinating matters relating to
disengagement and other questions requiring coordination
between them on a continuing basis.
3. The area between the Egyptian line (Line A on
the attached map) and the Suez Canal or the Red Sea will
be limited in armament and forces as agreed.
4. The area between the Israeli line (Line B on
the attached map) and the line designated as Line C on
the attached map will be limited in armament and forces
as agreed.
5. The limitations referred to in paragraphs 3 and
4 will be inspected by UNEF. Existing procedures of the
UNEF will be continued. Each side may fly one reconnais-
sance aircraft per week over the zone of disengagement
on a schedule coordinated at the UN Liaison Headquarters.
6. Air forces of the two sides will be permitted
to operate up to their respective lines without inter-
ference from the other side.
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D. This agreement will be signed in Egyptian-
Israeli Military Working Group of the Geneva Middle
East Peace Conference. The detailed implementation
of the disengagement of forces will be worked out by
military and civilian representatives of Egypt and
Israel, who will agree on the stages of this process
and on the safe transfer of management over the oil
fields on the Gulf of Suez. These representatives will
meet in the Military Working Group for this purpose
no later than 48 hours after the signature of this
agreement at
under the aegis of the United
Nations. They will complete this task within five
days. Disengagement will begin within 48 hours after
the completion of the work of the military represen-
tatives and in no event later than seven days after
the signature of this agreement. The process of
disengagement will be completed not later than 56 days
after it begins.
E. This agreement, like the agreement of January 18,
1974, is not regarded by Egypt and Israel as a final
peace agreement. It constitutes a step toward a final,
just and durable peace according to the provisions of
Security Council Resolution 338 and within the framework
of the Geneva Conference. Both sides express their
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intention to continue their negotiations with the ob-
jective of achieving peace which will terminate the
state and claims of belligerency between them as a basis
for the gradual normalization of relations.
For Egypt:
For Israel:
Witness:
SECRET/NODIS
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