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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
NUMBER
TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
RESTRICTION
01
etter
to Mr President Elect
12/4/08
B,A
DECLASSIFIED PER RAC REVIEW 6/13/2008
02
Report
covert Operations of the united States
12/1/08
M
Government
DECLASSIFIED PER RAC REVIEW 6/13/2008
03
Report
covert Operations of the united States
12/1/68
B
MANDATORY Government REVIEW REQUEST NLN 03-21/1 Spp
DECLASSIFIED PER LTR 6/25/2010
04
letter
From Burnett to HAK
12/6/68
B
w/ attachments
FILE GROUP TITLE
BOX NUMBER
HAK Office Files
I
FOLDER TITLE
13
Covert Operations
RESTRICTION CODES
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
B. National security classified information.
financial information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law
rights.
enforcement purposes.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
or a libel of a living person.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADI Reproduced the Richard Nixon Presidentiald. 35-084/084/00024
NA 14021 (4-85)
Kissinger
4 December 1968
Dear Mr. President-Elect:
During the last 15 months a study group composed of people with backgrounds in
intelligence matters and foreign affairs has met under the sponsorship of the Institute of
Politics of Harvard University to study the conduct of covert operations by the United
States government.
This has been an entirely private group, and no publicity on its existence or findings
has been given or is planned. The memorandum attached is the product of the group's
work and is intended for the private use of the new administration.
The report covers only the clandestine operations of the government. It does not
cover the research, analysis and estimating functions, nor the technical intelligence
activities, except in respect to certain broad organizational matters.
In our report we recommend that you should concern yourself with certain critical
clandestine activities during the early days of your Administration. We believe, however,
that major organizational and program changes are not priority tasks to which attention
should be devoted during the first 90 days of your Administration. In particular, we
recommend that you not appoint a new Director of CIA during the first year of your
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
PER RAC REVIEW 6/13/2008
By JUS NARA, Date 2/16/2012
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Fee. 1 of e]
Administration. The present director is an able professional who has served contin-
uously in the intelligence community since the early days of World War II. CIA has not
been a political organization. Its people have served successive administrations with
equal loyalty. We believe it will help CIA to become less conspicuous and more pro-
fessional if you ask Mr. Helms to continue to serve as Director at your pleasure. (There
is no reason, however, to give such a decision the kind of prominence which President-
Elect Kennedy did when he announced as his first personnel decision the reappointment
of Allen Dulles and J. Edgar Hoover.) By the end of the first year, you will be in a better
position to make changes which you believe are called for in the organization of the
intelligence agencies and in the guidelines for their activities.
A next-to-final draft of this memorandum was reviewed with Mr. John A. Bross,
one of the senior officials of CIA, and the findings have been discussed with him. CIA
views, however, were not sought during the study, and the conclusions represent only
the private views of the participants.
Franklin A. Lindsay
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
[pp. 2 of 2]
1 December 1968
COVERT OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Summary of Recommendations for Action by the President
1. We recommend that the President concern himself directly with certain critical
clandestine activities during the early days of his Administration. We believe, however,
that major organizational and program changes are not priority tasks to which attention
should be devoted during the first 90 days of the new Administration.
2. We recommend that the President not appoint a new Director of CIA during the
first year of the Administration. The present Director, Richard Helms, is an able pro-
fessional who has served continuously in the intelligence community since the early days
of World War II and should be asked to continue serving at the pleasure of the President.
He should not, however, give such a decision to continue Mr. Helms the kind of promi-
nence which President-Elect Kennedy did when he announced as his first personnel
decision the reappointment of Allen Dulles and J. Edgar Hoover.
3. The President should give one of his own senior assistants who has easy and
direct access to him responsibility for watching all covert operations and direct him to
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
PER RAC REVIEW 6/13/2008
1
By
UMS
NARA, Date 2/16/2012
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
[pp. 1 of 3)
ascertain that before any covert operation is approved, all potential overt alternatives
have been thoroughly canvassed and found unacceptable.
4. The President should ask to be briefed on the extent of covert capabilities and
the extent of the clandestine service and its operations. The President as one of his
early acts should ask the Director of CIA to advise him of any operations currently
underway which might conceivably create serious problems.
5. The President should ask the Director of CIA to draft a letter from the President
to the DCI which sets forth the scope of activities which the President can expect the
CIA to be capable of handling, and to coordinate this draft with the Secretaries of State
and Defense as well as the President's assistant for national security matters.
6. The President should make certain that his assistant concerned with intelligence
remains informed on the current operational rules limiting potentially provocative over-
flights, surface or submarine incursions at sea and electronic stimulation.
7. The President should make it very clear to the Director of CIA that he expects
him to say "No" when in the Director's judgment a proposed operation cannot be done
within an acceptable risk of disclosure. In the past, problems have arisen when the CIA
has accepted tasks beyond its capabilities.
8. The White House should maintain a standard form of "no comment" on clandestine
activities, and a directive should be issued to the various departments to do likewise.
Further, this policy should be made known publicly before there is a "flap."
2
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
5pp. 2 of 3]
9. Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty should be funded overtly, either through a
national foundation supported by government funds or through the USIA. We prefer that
RFE and Radio Liberty be made a component of USIA but not the VOA. As to the
lesser CIA "orphans" with a civilian base, such as the Asia Foundation, every effort
should be made to obtain overt public support for them through a government financed
national foundation.
3
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
[pp. 3 of 3]
1 December 1968
COVERT OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Summary of Conclusions
I. Purposes and benefits of covert operations
1. The expertise of the clandestine service is secrecy. Covert operations should
be called upon only when something should be done in a secret manner-and only when
secrecy is possible. It is up to the President to determine what he wants done and
whether it should be done secretly or openly.
2. An important function of a clandestine service is to maintain private liaison
with important and potentially important people in other countries.
3. Covert operations permit forms of conflict which avoid open hostilities. This
can be especially important in near-war situations.
4. Clandestine operations allow the Administration to support activities in one
country without having the next country demand "equal treatment." A foreign leader—
government, labor, political-may need help desperately but be unable to accept it
openly because of internal political repercussions.
DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, Section 3.5
NLN 03-21/1 per Itr. 6/25/2010
1
By AM NARA, Date 11/02/2010
[p. 10f 5]
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
5. Covert operations permit the Government to act quickly, bypassing domestic
US political, bureaucratic, and budgetary controls.
II. Inherent limitations of covert operations
1. Covert operations can rarely achieve an important objective alone. At best, a
successful covert operation can win time, forestall a coup, or otherwise create favor-
able conditions which will make it possible to use overt means to finally achieve an
important objective.
2. Covert operations are best suited to tactical situations where success will bring
an immediate short-term gain.
3. Large operations cannot be kept secret. Some things simply cannot be done
truly secretly because of their size, duration, and impact.
4. In a bi-polar world, all-out covert operations could often be justified on the
ground that they were like military measures designed to help our side at the expense
of their side. In the complicated political world of today it is far more difficult to
know who is on whose side, for there are no clear-cut or permanent sides.
III. Risks and costs of engaging in covert operations
1. In a war or near-war situation, much greater risks of exposure can be justified
not only because of greater need for the activity but also because the penalties for ex-
posure are far less than in a period of detente.
2
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
NLN P.
2. An individual, a political party, or a government in office may be seriously
injured or destroyed by exposure of covert assistance from CIA. The more democratic
the country or the more open its politics, the greater the possibility of damage.
3. On balance, exposure of clandestine operations costs the United States in terms
of world opinion. To some, exposure demonstrates the disregard of the United States
for national rights and human rights; to others it demonstrates only our impotence and
our ineptness in getting caught. To still others it can expose secret US support for
one of their political or national enemies.
4. The impression of many Americans, especially in the intellectual community
and among the youth, that the United States is engaging in "dirty tricks" tends to alienate
them from their government. Disclosures in this atmosphere have created opportunities
for the "New Left" to affect a much wider spectrum of political opinion than otherwise
would have been the case.
5. The United States has been in the forefront of those nations concerned with
expanding the role of law in international affairs. Our credibility and our effectiveness
in this role is necessarily damaged to the extent that it becomes known that we are
secretly intervening in what may be (or appear to be) the internal affairs of other
nations.
IV. Changes within CIA in the conduct of covert operations
1. The CIA does not need additional supervisory control but rather needs strict
standards to be applied internally.
3
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
NLN 03-21/11:p.30f5
2. CIA can make an important contribution to counterinsurgency operations both
before armed action begins and after. Its particular capabilities for developing local
police intelligence capabilities, for counterintelligence and for skilled interrogation
need to be used more effectively by the government.
3. Throughout the CIA's covert activities much greater attention must be paid to
clandestinity. The Agency has often tolerated risks of disclosure which were far too
high.
4. CIA internal control mechanisms should clearly distinguish between operations
which must remain truly secret and operations that provide only nominal disclaimability.
The latter are useful only when the objective is to avoid provoking an adversary by
confronting him with the public knowledge of our activities.
5. CIA should concentrate on doing the special clandestine things that it is ex-
pected to be especially competent in accomplishing. Where, for sufficient political
reasons, the government decides to support airlines, newspapers, publishing houses
or radio stations, the CIA role should be limited to the secure transmission of funds,
intelligence and possibly guidance or control.
6. It is our impression that CIA has become much too ingrown over the years.
Nearly all of the senior people have been in the organization on the order of 20 years.
Because of the special security restrictions surrounding CIA, and because it is con-
cerned exclusively with foreign activities, there is an unusually great pressure to
isolation and inwardness.
4
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
NLN 03-21/11 p.4 of 5
V. Organizational changes that have been proposed from time to time
1. Covert operations should be carried out by the same agency which handles
clandestine intelligence collection. It is often suggested that the clandestine intelligence
service should be separated from that service which engages in clandestine operations.
We are firmly convinced this would be a mistake.
2. The collection of technical intelligence, involving large radio monitoring activi-
ties and use of overhead reconnaissance, has become the most important source of
intelligence about unfriendly nations. This activity is today conducted both by the
Defense Department and CIA although it is coordinated within the DOD. The arguments
for consolidation of this activity center upon the tremendous cost and the possibilities
of wasteful duplication rather than on operational security. We believe that the
President should review the findings of the Eaton Committee and then consider whether
or not you wish to appoint a committee to review this activity during your first year.
3. A third organizational issue is whether to separate the clandestine service from
the intelligence analysis and estimating activity of CIA. Most of us believe that this
would be a mistake.
5
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
NLN 03-21/1: P 50f5
NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD.
ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER
A. RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOYED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 04
ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT. OF THIS FILE FOLDER.
A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
APPENDIX I: PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S STATEMENT ON THE "KATZENBACH
REPORT"
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
MARCH 29, 1967
Office of the White House Press Secretary
THE WHITE HOUSE
STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
I have received the report from the committee which I appointed on February 15 to re-
view relationships between the Central Intelligence Agency and private American vol-
untary organizations. This committee consisted of Under Secretary of State Nicholas
Katzenbach, as Chairman, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare John Gardner,
and CIA Director Richard Helms.
I accept this committee's proposed statement of policy and am directing all agencies
of the government to implement it fully.
We will also give serious consideration to the committee's recommendation "that the
government should promptly develop and establish a public-private mechanism to pro-
vide public funds openly for overseas activities of organizations which are adjudged
deserving, in the national interest, of public support." To review concrete ways of
I-1
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
accomplishing this objective, I am requesting Secretary Rusk to serve as chairman of
a special committee which will include representatives from the Executive, the
Congress, and the private community.
I-2
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
APPENDIX II: EXCERPTS FROM THE "KATZENBACH REPORT"
In summary, the committee offers two basic recommendations:
1. It should be the policy of the United States Government that no federal agency shall
provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the
nation's educational or private voluntary organizations.
2. The Government should promptly develop and establish a public-private mechanism
to provide public funds openly for overseas activities of organizations which are
adjudged deserving, in the national interest, of public support.
STATEMENT OF POLICY
No federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance
or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational
or private voluntary organizations. This policy specifically
applies to all foreign activities of such organizations and it
reaffirms present policy with respect to their domestic
activities.
II-1
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Where such support has been given, it will be terminated as
quickly as possible without destroying valuable private
organizations before they can seek new means of support.
*
We belive that, particularly in the light of recent publicity, establishment of a clear
policy of this kind is the only way for the government to carry out two important respon-
sibilities. One is to avoid any implication that governmental assistance, because it is
given covertly, is used to affect the policies of private voluntary groups. The second
responsibility is to make it plain in all foreign countries that the activities of private
American groups abroad are, in fact, private.
The committee has sought carefully to assess the impact of this Statement of Policy
on CIA. We have reviewed each relevant program of assistance carried out by the
Agency in case-by-case detail. As a result of this scrutiny, the committee is satisfied
that application of the Statement of Policy will not unduly handicap the Agency in the
exercise of its national security responsibilities. Indeed, it should be noted that,
starting well before the appearance of recent publicity, CIA had initiated and pursued
efforts to disengage from certain of these activities.
*On the basis of our case-by-case review, we expect that the process of termina-
tion can be largely-perhaps entirely-completed by December 31, 1967.
II-2
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
The committee also recommends that the implementation of this policy be supervised
by the senior interdepartmental review committee which already passes on proposed
CIA activities and which would review and assist in the process of disengagement. **
If the Statement of Policy is to be effective, it must be rigorously enforced. In
the judgment of this committee, no programs currently would justify any exception to
this policy. At the same time, where the security of the nation may be at stake, it is
impossible for this committee to state categorically now that there willnever be a con-
tingency in which overriding national security interests may require an exception- -
nor would it be credible to enunciate a policy which purported to do so.
We therefore recommend that, in the event of such unusual contingencies, the
interdepartmental review committee be permitted to make exceptions to the Statement
of Policy, but only where overriding national security interests so require; only on a
case-by-case basis; only where open sources of support are shown to be unavailable;
and only when such exceptions receive the specific approval of the Secretaries of State
and Defense. In no event should any future exception be approved which involves any
educational, philanthropic, or cultural organization.
II-3
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
2: NEW METHODS OF SUPPORT
While our first recommendation seeks to insure the independence of private voluntary
organizations, it does not deal with an underlying problem-how to support the national
need for, and the intrinsic worth of, their efforts abroad.
Anyone who has the slightest familiarity with intellectual or youth groups abroad knows
that free institutions continue to be under bitter, continuous attack, some of it carefully
organized and well-financed, all of it potentially dangerous to this nation.
It is of the greatest importance to our future and to the future of free institutions every-
where that other nations, especially their young people, know and understand American
viewpoints. There is no better way to meet this need than through the activity of
private American organizations.
The time has surely come for the government to help support such activity in a mature,
open manner.
Some progress toward that aim already has been made. In recent years, a number of
federal agencies have developed contracts, grants, and other forms of open assistance
to private organizations for overseas activities. This assistance, however, does not
deal with a major aspect of the problem. A number of organizations cannot, without
hampering their effectiveness as independent bodies, accept funds directly from
government agencies.
II-4
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
The committee therefore recommends that the Government should promptly develop
and establish a public-private mechanism to provide public funds openly for overseas
activities of organizations which are adjudged deserving, in the national interest, of
public support.
Such a mechanism could take various forms. One promising proposal, advanced by
Mr. Eugene Black, calls for a publicly funded but privately administered body patterned
on the British Council.
The British Council established in 1934, operates in 80 countries, administering approx-
imately $30,000,000 annually for reference libraries, exhibitions, scholarships, inter-
national conferences, and cultural exchanges. Because 21 of its 30 members are drawn
from private life, the Council has maintained a reputation for independence, even though
90 percent of its funds are governmental.
According to the UNESCO Directory of Cultural Relations Services, other nations have
developed somewhat similar institutions. The Indian Council for Cultural Relations,
for example, is entirely government-financed but operates autonomously. The govern-
ing body of the Swedish Institute for Cultural Relations consists of both government
and private members. This institute receives 75 percent of its funds from the govern-
ment and the remainder from private contributions.
The experience of these and other countries helps to demonstrate the desirability of a
similar body in the United States, wholly or largely funded by the federal government.
II-5
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Another approach might be the establishment of a governmental foundation, perhaps
with links to the existing Federal Inter-Agency Council on International Education and
Cultural Affairs.
Such a public-private body would not be new to the United States. Congress established
the Smithsonian Institution, for example, more than a century ago as a private corpora-
tion, under the guardianship of Congress, but governed by a mixed public-private
Board of Regents.
The committee began a preliminary study of what might be the best method of meeting
the present need. It is evident, however, that, because of the great range both of ex-
isting government and private philanthropic programs, the refinement of alternatives
and selection among them is a task of considerable complexity. Accordingly, we do not
believe that this exclusively governmental committee is an appropriate forum for the
task and we recommend, instead, the appointment of a larger group, including in-
dividuals in private life with extensive experience in this field.
The basic principle, in any event, is clear. Such a new institution would involve govern-
ment funds. It might well involve government officials. But a premium must be placed
on the involvement of private citizens and the exercise of private judgments, for to be
effective, it would have to have-and be recognized to have-a high degree of
independence.
II-6
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
The prompt creation of such an institution, based on this principle, would fill an
important-and never more apparent-national need.
Respectfully,
/s/ John W. Gardner
Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare
/s/ Richard Helms
Director of
Central Intelligence
/s/ Nicholas deB. Katzenbach
Under Secretary of State,
Chairman
II-7
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library