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G ROS
"CZECHOSLOUAKIA"
December 31, 1968
Mr. Eugene Gros
Scientific Information
Consultants, Ltd.
661 Finchley Road
London N.W. 2, England
Dear Mr. Gros:
Thank you very much for your letter of
December 24 and the enclosed memo concerning
the problems in Europe in the aftermath of
the occupation of Czechoslovakia.
Dr. Kissinger is presently out of the
city, but I will bring the report to his
attention upon his return.
Sincerely,
Henry A. Kissinger
Larry Expleberger
Sally Dohu
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Scientific Information Consultants Ltd
661 FINCHLEY ROAD LONDON NW2 TELEPHONE SWISS COTTAGE 2217
EG/JVW
24th December, 1968.
Prof. Dr. Henry Kissinger,
Hotel Pierre,
Fifth Avenue/61st Street,
DEC 3 1 1968
New York, N.Y.,
U. S. A.
Dear Sir,
I have much pleasure in enclosing herewith a brief memo concerning
the political, economic, cultural and social problems in Europe in the
aftermath of the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. The situation is
extremely complex and for obvious reasons many of the events are not
reported in the press. It is hoped that the enclosed memorandum will
make some contribution towards understanding the events in the Soviet
bloc countries.
The views expressed in this report are based on very reliable
information and my own interpretation of events, drawing on my
experience of over twenty years in screening, abstracting, translating
and reporting on scientific and industrial developments in the Soviet bloc
countries. I have never been satisfied to rely on printed material alone
and have always made an effort to establish personal contacts with authors
whose material I used. As a result I maintain personal contacts with
many leading authors in various Soviet bloc countries, including the USSR.
The very latest reports from Czechoslovakia seem to indicate that
the resistance of the population to the Russian occupation and interference
is undiminished and that full emergency plans have been made to cope
with the situation if the squeeze from the Russians became tighter. It is
for the first time that the extensive network of underground activity
originally prepared with Soviet guidance to counter the possibility of a
Western occupation of the country, is now being prepared to work against
the Soviet Union on an unprecedented scale. People in the know in
Czechoslovakia believe that much will depend on the attitude of the new
American administration, and that the Russians would be more amenable
to compromise if the line adopted towards them is hard, even very hard,
but by no means rigid.
Directors: E. Gros. G. Gros
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Prof. Dr. Henry Kissinger
2.
24th December, 1968.
I myself have an engineering background. I studied in Czechoslovakia
and in Paris, and in the immediate post-war period I began specializing in
industrial reporting and then later on began to concentrate almost
exclusively on Soviet bloc scientific and industrial developments. For
many years I worked as an adviser and a contractor to the U.S. Embassy
in London and other Government organizations and bodies, in addition to
commercial publishing on my own account.
I hope that you will find my report useful and I would appreciate any
comments which you may have to make.
Yours very truly,
Eugene Gros
encl.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
PROBLEMS IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE RUSSIAN
OCCUPATION OF CZECHOSLOVARIA
by Eugene Gros
Scientific Information Consultants Ltd.,
661 Finchley Road, London, N.W.2.,
England.
Page
1. Cultural Relations
2
2. Information Media
3
3. Trade Relations with the USSA
3
4. Trade with Eastern European Countries
4
5. Gold
5
6. Finance
5
7. Political Problems and News Media
5
8. Diplomatic Personnel
7
9. Defence Considerations
9
10. Screening and Interpretation of Technical
and Scientific Literature
10
11. Saving of Strategically Important Raw
Materials
10
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
PROBLEMS IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE RUSSIAN
OCCUPATION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA
The invasion of Czechoslovakia and the subsequent events have revealed
an urgent need for reassessing policies to be followed towards the Soviet Union
and other Communist bloc countries. The conditions in these countries are
very complex and therefore it is imperative that in formulating policies towards
individual Communist bloc countries, due consideration should be given to
political, economic, social and cultural aspects, in addition to strategic
considerations and sentiment.
One of the most fundamental political changes inside Czechoslovakia
produced by the invasion is that the Soviet Union completely lost any support
from the ranks of lower paid working classes and other sections of the population
on which, traditionally, they could always rely either for active support or at
least passive acceptance. Even the lowest paid and most under-privileged
people in Czechoslovakia who believed that they had nothing to lose suddenly
realised that everybody has something to lose as a result of the Soviet occupation.
What is even more important, the traditionally very good cultural relations
which existed over many decades between the Czechs and the Slovake on the one
hand and the Russians on the other, and were accepted by the people as a whole,
have suffered a severe setback and it will take a long time for these wounds to
heal, even superficially. In contrast to Poland, where natural animosities
existed since the first division of Poland in the 18th century, there was no
historical reason for the Czechs and Slovaks to hate the Russian people as
people, and for that reason they were always sympathetic to Russian culture,
as distinct from Russian politics. Even the very left-wing Communists among
the Czechs and Slovaks who had great faith in the Russians before the invasion
were completely shattered and lost all confidence in the Russian Communists
after the invasion; many of these people are even more bitter about the Russian
betrayal than others who never trusted the Russians too much. It will depend
to a very great extent on the Soviet policy during the next few months whether
the very small number of politicians who are at present prepared to support
the Russians under any conditions will widen. There was reason to fear that
the unity of the people in Czechoslovakia might disintegrate slowly, but it
appears that, on the contrary, the unity is maintained or may even get stronger.
The workers have expressed unanimously their sympathy with the students in
their strike after November 17th. One must not over-estimate the importance
of the differences between the political views of the individual leaders because,
for the time being at least, they are forced by the various classes of the Czech
people, and especially the working class, to resist many of the Russian demands
to which they might have agreed.
Another vitally important feature of the events in Caechoslovakia during
and after the invasion was that, for the first time in history, Soviet political
and military actions were exposed to the fullest reporting by the world news
media. In this a vital role was played by the official Czech news media,
especially the Caech radio, so that Western news media were able to give very
full radio and television coverage to the events and bring home to the millions
of people who never realised what a Soviet invasion means, the realities of
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
- 2 -
such an invasion in a very graphic and dramatic manner. It is very difficult to
appreciate how many people in the Warsaw Pact countries did, at the time of
the Czech invasion and immediately afterwards, listen to Czech and Western
broadcasts and what influence these broadcasts had on them, but it can be
said with reasonable certainty that more and more people in those countries
are becoming accustomed to rely on Western news media for information.
Another extremely important factor is obviously the fact that the very full
reporting by the world press has opened the eyes of millions of very intelligent
but also very naive people in the West to the realities of the situation.
This report deals briefly with the main aspects of East-West relations.
1. Cultural Relations.
It has taken many years to establish cultural relations with various bodies
in the USSR, and even now there are very few people in Western countries who
have succeeded in establishing and maintaining personal relations with persona-
lities in the Soviet Union. The limited experience of those who have established
and maintain such personal relations - as distinct from purely official ones -
has shown that, generally speaking, Soviet scientists, economists and other
personalities are very eager to learn and understand life and attitudes in
Western countries. Many of these who come on these exchanges are highly
skilled and talented specialists in their own fields, and it is extremely important
to the Western democracies that as large a number as possible of such people
gain a balanced opinion about life and attitudes in Western countries, and the
more personal contacts the better. Western people should not expect from
Russians the same frankness as they expect from their own colleagues in the
Western countries. There have been occasions when Western people publicised
too freely and too naively information given to them in confidence by their
Russian colleagues or guests, and therefore visiting Russians cannot be blamed
for being very, very careful before being frank. From the Western point of
view such "frankness" is less important than the fact that Russian professional
people should have the opportunity of gaining a balanced view on life in the
West and, as a result, develop less dogmatic and less hostile attitudes towards
Western activities, aims and aspirations when they return to their own country.
Professional people who had the opportunity of working with their Russian
colleagues in conjunction with international conferences on various subjects
have found that very many of their top professional people are extremely human
and have a very strong sense of responsibility. Therefore any rash breaking
off of cultural contacts would only serve the policies of the Soviet rulers who
have never been very happy about personal relationships and friendships with
people in Western countries. Therefore, breaking off cultural relations will
only deprive professional people in the USSR from keeping in touch with their
Western colleagues, and it will deprive Western professional people of the
very small trickle of private information thus gained. The top, policy-making
stratum of Soviet officialdom will always find a way to visit any Western
country if they choose to do so. Of course, one must always be aware that
a certain percentage of those seeking such contact may have other, ulterior,
motives for doing so.
The situation in the individual Communist bloe countries apart from
Russia differs greatly from country to country. Therefore each country has
to be treated individually. Basically the treatment should consist of keeping
open channels of communication and personal relations, both by making it
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
- 3 -
easy for the people in the individual countries to visit their Western colleagues
and for Western professional people to visit conferences and various interna-
tional meetings in Communist bloc countries, and to exchange views with their
colleagues in those countries, many of whom have no opportunity whatever to
travel to Western countries.
2. Information Media.
Very few people in the West know enough of the complexity and sublety of
information media in Communist bloc countries which also differ from one
country to the next. In addition to continuously changing in many cases what
was true two months ago may no longer be true today. Therefore the reports
published by the newspapers and other media will have to be interpreted with
great skill and caution if one wants to get a bit nearer to the facts. A good
example of the continuous changes in the reporting of the news media is the
situation in Czechoslovakia. Another example on the difficulties of interpreting
news media is Rumania, where the newspapers are extremely cautious and are
trying very hard not to offend anybody. On the other hand sensitive topics are
freely discussed and criticised and the people are much better informed than
one would assume from reading their newspapers.
It is also becoming increasingly important to improve the quality of the
information available in English on scientific, technological, medical, economic
and political developments in the Soviet bloc countries. The volume of material
published in these fields in the Soviet Union is so vast that indiscriminate trans-
lation would defeat the object because it would clog up the channels of communi-
cation with much information which is of a low priority or low quality. It is
necessary to bring in much more sophistication in the processing, analysis and
interpretation of Russian and other Communist bloe specialised literature, so
as to achieve the best utilisation of the limited manpower available in this field
in the USA and Great Britain. Few people realise that the American lead in
screening, abstracting and translating Soviet bloc literature was an important
contributory factor in maintaining leadership in the fields of science, technology
and medicine.
The scope of activities in this field has widened By patience and diplomacy
it would even be possible to influence some of the basic research carried out
in Communist bloc countries, and perhaps even in the Soviet Union, and as a
result reduce to some extent duplication of effort and cost of this research.
In many cases this cannot be achieved by the official negotiations but by
patient personal persuasion of the individuals concerned.
3. Trade Relations with the USSR.
Although trade with the USSR is of some significance to various Western
countries, the overall volume of this trade is not excessively large. Even if
the countries concerned would wish to make cuts in this trade they could do so
only to a limited extent. I personally consider it vitally important that Western
industrialists, engineers, scientists and economists should be sufficiently
familiar with the range and quality of Soviet products and technology. The
simplest and cheapest way of achieving this is through normal trade where
the seller, if he wants to sell, has to supply the relevant information and data
on the goods he is trying to sell. This is particularly important for sophisticated
equipment involving advanced technology. Even in the case of such highly
sophisticated products as jet aircraft or even supersonic transport aircraft,
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
. 4 -
there is a very good argument for allowing and even encouraging some of
the wellknown Western airlines to buy and operate a small number of
Russian built aircraft on a purely commercial basis. It is highly unlikely
that the number of planes thus purchased would be large enough to affect
significantly the commercial interests of Western aircraft manufacturers.
There is one aspect of trade with the Soviet Union which requires
drastic revision, namely, that of financing deliveries to the Soviet Union
by long-term credits at low interest rates. At present when there is such
a high demand all over the 110 rld for investment capital and credit, it is
necessary to consider carefully whether there is sufficient justification for
granting such long-term laons to the Soviet Union.
A further aspect of trade relations with the USSR which has to be studied
is the Soviet policy of presenting the carrot of "lucrative" orders from the
Soviet Union for gaining political advantage and playing off one country against
another. An example of this is the sudden sharp criticism of Great Britain
for "taking a hostile attitude" towards Russia, whilst simultaneously generating
hopes in France that the French industry will receive large Russian orders.
4. Trade with Eastern European Countries.
The trading position of most Eastern European countries is complicated
by the existence of a large volume of unprofitable trading with the USSR and
other COMECON countries.
From the long-term, economic and political points of view it would be
very desirable to establish for each of these countries teams of specialists
whose terms of reference would be to study the long-term industrial and
economic prospects of each of these countries and to spotlight projects which
would be profitable and desirable for each, in particular projects which will
make them less dependent on the USSR. The interest of Western countries
will be served by any project which will help to develop the resources of these
countries for their own respective benefits, and direct their trade to the
natural, commercially most profitable market and not markets imposed on
these countries by the Soviet Union. The Czech example has shown that the
Soviet bloc countries cannot solicit or accept Western development loans at
present. There is no reason, however, why these countries should not be
granted long-term credit facilities for any equipment or know-how on
projects aimed at improving their consumer goods industry, or their
standard of living. From the long-term, economic and political points of
view it might be desirable and even profitable to supply to some manufacturers
in these countries advanced technological know-how in the consumer goods
industry and public services, so as to help to raise their standard of living
and lessen their dependence on the Soviet Union.
In a nutshell: in addition to existing lists of goods which must not be
exported to Communist bloc countries, there should be additional guide lines
listing projects in each of these countries which would qualify for favourable
commercial and financial terms. The favoured projects would be related to
the consumer goods industry and other industrial projects which will lessen
the dependence of these countries on the Soviet Union. A great deal could
be achieved by supplying management know-how and commercial assistance
for marketing certain products in the West. For instance, in Csechoslovakia
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
- 5 -
there is a great surplus of foundry capacity which could be used, for
instance, in Western Germany, where there is a relative scarcity of
foundry capacity and no commercial interest in expanding it. Similarly,
there is a great surplus of lost wax casting capacity for producing stainless
steel or other high-melting-point precision castings which could be utilized
to the advantage of Western clients. Surplus capacity is often played down
for reasons which have nothing at all to do will th capacity and feasibility.
Also, instead of destroying surplus food in Common Market countries,
such food could be used to relieve shortages in Eastern Europe and other
poor areas of the world.
5. Gold.
One of the big problems about allowing an increase in the fixed price of
gold is the fact that one of the countries which would greatly benefit from an
increase in the price of gold is Russia. A partial solution of the problem
could be to offer the one major non-Communist gold producing country,
i.e. South Africa, some indirect compensation (tariff concessions or any
other benefit which can be quantized) so that South Africa retains an interest
in increasing her gold production and selling the output to reserve banks
instead of selling to the highest bidder on the free market. Some arrangement
on these lines could provide a solution to this very pressing problem without
giving a bonus to the Soviet Union.
6. Finance.
It would be desirable to make a study and publish reports on trade
relations between individual Communist bloc countries and also of the great
differences which exist between the commerce inside the individual Soviet bloc
countries which differ radically from each other. Due to the differing degree
of nationalisation of retail trade and other factors, such as whether a manu-
facturing plant is allowed to deal with foreign clients direct, or whether they
have to deal through centralised trade organizations.
7. Political problems and news media.
Due to the fact that the confidence of the population in Soviet inspired news
media has been thoroughly shaken, more and more people in Eastern Europe
tend to rely on information from Western radio stations. To retain the interest
and confidence of this vast audience in Western news media it is very important
that broadcasts which are specifically intended for these countries should be
sober, responsible and free of exaggerations. One of the reasons why the
Soviet invasion of Caechoslovaida was a failure politically was that due to the
brilliant performance and courageous action of the Czech and Slovak newsmen
and radio and television reporters the Caech public was fully informed of what
was going on. It is vital that adequate steps are taken to report immediately
and fully to the native populations and the world any similar recurrence, for
instance, in Rumania.
It would be advisable to sponsor studies of various agreements covering
regions at present under Soviet control or within the area of Soviet expansion.
The aim should be to have immediately available information to counter Soviet
arguments on various "rights" which they claim for themselves. To quote
instances from the recent past: When the Russians claimed that they have
the right to intervene in West Germany if they consider it a "threat to peace",
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
- 6 -
some Professor Brown of Smith or some other university should have written
an article that East Germany is not only a threat to peace but actually an
aggressor, and consequently the Western allies have a right to intervene in
East Germany and possibly also in Hungary and Bulgaria because these
countries were enemy countries during the war. or course, such statements
must not be made officially. It is enough to just indicate that such views are
being held and considered without giving any hint or indication on whether
these views reflect in any way official thinking, or whether they are only the
views of one individual who published them.
More prominence should be given to comparisons of conditions in
individual Soviet bloc countries as is done, for instance, at present in Czech
news media where it is pointed out that many of the "crimes" which served as
a pretext for the Russian invasion are also perpetrated by the other Warsaw Pact
countries, for instance, the effort of Poland, East Germany and Hungary to gain
tourist trade from the West, was no smaller than that made by Csechoslovaida,
and there is little reason to believe that the West Germans who went to Czecho-
slovakia are any more or any less fifth column than those who go to any other
Soviet bloc country.
Another interesting event, for instance, was that after the Israeli commando
raid in Egypt when they blew up a transformer near the Aswan Dam, the Russians
warned that "their interests are at stake". This is very interesting because on
many occasions when the interests of various Western countries were "at stake"
in various parts of the world the views of the Soviet Union were completely
different. It is politically important to record these data and publicise them
again and again when appropriate.
In numerous past crises Western statesmen weakened their positions by
making their intentions public far too early, for instance, announcement of the
British withdrawal from Aden. In the case of Czechoslovakia the Russian
decision to invade would have been a much more difficult one if they would
have been less sure of Western, in particular American, reaction and forced
to consider the possibility, even if very remote, of there being a stiff
resistance from Western countries. It is one thing to make a decision that
if a certain contingency arises certain action would or would not be taken,
but quite a different thing to let the adversary believe that in the case of such
a contingency no action will be taken.
For instance, it is known from a very reliable source that on the critical
evening of Saturday, August 24, during the negotiations between the Russians
and the Czechs in Moscow, there was a complete change in the Soviet attitude
during the negotiations between the Russland and Caechs in Moscow as soon as
it became known that President Johnson left Washington for the weekend; from
that minute onwards the Russians completely dropped any pretence of negotiation
and simply dictated terms. Apparently the Russians seemed to assume that if
the President leaves Washington it means no American action, in spite of the
fact that this is not true at all and the President can act wherever he may be.
An interesting point deserving much study is what do the Russians mean
by "Communist Commonwealth" and how are they going to implement or try to
implement their ideas.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
- 7 -
About four countries would be interested in approaching the possibility
of a convertible currency, and these are: Eastern Germany, probably, due
to the large volume of trade which it has with West Germany; Humania
because they mine gold and oil, and their large volume of trade with the West;
Csechoslovakia because its industry is of a structure designed for export and
not for self-sufficiency; Hungary. Bulgaria and Poland are much less
interested in convertibility.
The realities of the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia were graphically
brought home to people in Western Europe and the United States by the excellent
television, radio and press coverage of the events as they unrolled. Books
which will be written on this subject by individual writers will hardly ever be
able to convey the same dramatic picture of the events as the news media did
whilst the events happened. For this reason it would be a very good idea to
use this material for documentary films to be shown again and again in
educational establishments and in training service personnel. Watching such
films for one hour is likely to have considerably more impact than conventional
lectures on East-West relations for weeks.
Based on the same philosophy the writer of this report is planning to
compile a "scrapbook of Csechoslovakia" which will consist almost exclusively
of cuttings from newspapers in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, Austria,
Germany, Britain, USA, etc., arranged in a chronological order.
8. Diplomatic Personnel.
In appointing diplomatic personnel it is very important to find people who
have a thorough knowledge of the respective country and its problems. The
immense difference this can make is clearly evident from the highly successful
work of the present British Ambassador to Csechoslovakia, who is a known
scholar in Czech, Slavonic and political studies and has a large number of
personal acquaintances in the country. of course, this is an exceptional case
and not always easy to achieve. It is ironical but true that in a Communist
controlled country like Csechoslovakia the Russians were grossly misinformed
because they had extensive official but very few private contacts, whilet the
British authorities and public were well informed due to a large extent to the
numerous private and official personal relations. There is no doubt that
good personal relationships existed also with people from other countries in
Western Europe.
Personal contacts between Western diplomatic personnel and individuals
in Soviet bloc countries are likely to be restricted for a long time to come,
but it will obviously be easier to establish and maintain a limited degree of
useful personal contacts with people who are sufficiently familiar with the
local conditions and have the skill, tact and restraint which is necessary
under the given conditions.
A very important task is to widen the circle of people who are invited
to various functions at the Western embassies. Very frequently such functions
are restricted to political personnel and Government officials. It is very
important to organize non-political functions for various professional strata
of the population. When a top specialist or a top personality in any particular
field visits the Soviet Union or a Soviet bloe country a reception or a cocktail
party be given to which the respective people working in their own fields, or
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
- 8 -
in allied fields, be invited, whatever that field may be (economics, science,
labour relations, the film industry, etc.). Of course, here again, one must
anticipate certain restrictions but inevitably it will be a different set of people.
The Western powers can make a positive contribution to reducing brutality
to individuals in Soviet bloc countries by issuing statements to the effect that
anybody who engages in such brutality will be refused visas or entry permits
into Western countries. Many of the people who are very good at bullying
others lack personal courage and at least some of them will be afraid that
they will have to account for their deeds at some future date.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
- 9 -
9. Defence Considerations.
The invasion of Csechoslovakia proved that in final analysis there is
only one thing which top Soviet leaders seem to respect, namely, force.
They give considerable lip service but are obviously not very much
concerned about world opinion, the standard of living of people, even their
own people, or humanitarian considerations.
The invasion and occupation of Csechoslovakia has shown up both the
strength and the weakness of the Soviet defence system. A major weakness
is their inadequate logistics and the insecurity of the supply lines and means
of communication. It is a fact that the populations in the territories where
the Soviet supply lines and lines of communication pass are hostile to the
Russians. The vital supplies to the borders of what the Russians now call
the "Communist Commonwealth" are transported by pipelines, rail or road,
which are highly vulnerable to sabotage. It will be necessary to pay much
more attention than hitherto to commando raids deep in enemy territory
because in final analysis these are likely to be much more successful and
ultimately cost less lives than aerial bombardment.
The fact that Russians rely on local supplies rather than on their own
logistics will make it more imperative to devise some system of protecting
essential food and fuel supplies for the civilian population from confiscation
by occupying forces.
When judging the breakdown of the logistics during the Caech invasion
it is necessary to bear in mind that although the logistics broke down
completely inside Csechoslovakia, there were no reports about breakdowns
in Hungary, Poland and East Germany in the logistics supporting the invasion.
From the defence point of view it is important to allow normal trading
between the Soviet Union and the major capitalist countries. It is cheaper and
more convenient to get familiar with the quality and potential of an industry
through the comme reial market than to acquire the same information through
other channels. This is particularly true of sophisticated equipment in fields
where development costs are very high as, for instance, aircraft, electronics,
certain precision equipment, etc. It is unlikely, for instance, that the number
of aircraft purchased from Russia by Western airlines will ever be high
enough to become a series competitor to Western aircraft manufacturers.
Much
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
- 10 -
10. Screening and interpretation of technical and scientific literature.
Much more effort and sophistication will be required in this field.
Excessive complete translations of Russian works are not a satisfactory
solution because of inadequate specialised manpower, too high costs and
the swelling of the volume of reading matter beyond the point of saturation.
It is very interesting for the British or American specialists to know what
their Russian colleagues are doing but they must also have sufficient time to
read about work in their own and other Western countries. In practical
terms this means that much more attention has to be paid to formulation
and stabilisation of policies for selection and processing various types of
material which is available. Many of the methods at present in use are too
patchy and too wasteful.
11. Saving of strategically important raw materials.
Much could be done in this field by sponsoring research projects on the
entirely novel topic "design for scrap" which would study the possibility of
design modifications which would ensure that in due course when the equipment
is scrapped, individual parts or components which have a high content of costly
alloys should be appropriately marked so that they can be returned to the
normal production cycle as a recoverable or a useful component, or as a high-
quality alloy and not mixed up with other low grade scrap. Also the designers
should give some thought as to how to dismantle the equipment in order to re-
utilize at least some of the very high priced parts when the equipment is
scrapped. This is a completely new concept of "designing with taking into
consideration scrap value at the end of service life", but it is conceivable
that it could save vast sums of money and resources.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
U.S. POLICY AND THE INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA
William E. Griffith
Revised from a paper delivered at a conference on "The
Impact of the Czechoslovak Events on Current International
Relations" of the Center for International Studies, New
York University, for publication in a forthcoming volume
of the conference papers, edited by Prof. I. William
Zartman.
Center for International Studies
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
Research Project on Communism, Revisionism, and Revolution
January, 1969
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
Recent U.S. policy toward Czechoslovakia has been in my view
short-sighted and shameful. In order to explain briefly why it
deserves in my opinion to be characterized by what may be thought to
be such strong adjectives, I must begin by outlining my own analytical
assumptions. What were the causes for the 1967-1968 Czechoslovak
developments? What would their implications have been for the USSR and
the U.S.?
Czechoslovakia was liberalized in 1962-1968 by the interaction of
five factors. * The first was de-Stalinization, which destroyed Novotny's
prestige by making public his complicity in crime. The second was the
1962 serious economic recession, caused by the increasing inefficient
centralized Stalinist economic model: low worker productivity disrup-
tion in foreign trade patterns,
extensive Soviet-directed aid to the
third world, and low agricultural productivity. This recession convinced
the Czech and Slovak intelligentsias that drastic economic reforms, the
end of wage egalitarianism, and massive infusion of high-level western
technology were necessary in order again to make Czechoslovak exports
internationally competitive, and that since Novotny would not agree to
these reforms because they would threaten his political power, he must
go. The third was the recoalescence and return to power of the Czech
and Slovak intelligentsias, to the leftist, social democratic traditions
of Masaryk and the First Republic, and, let it not be forgotten, to the
pre-1929 moderate traditions of Czechoslovak Communism, The fourth was
the development in the Czech intelligentsia of a less unfavorable attitude
toward the West Germans and of a more unfavorable one to the East Germans
and the Russians. This reversal was caused by (a) the realization that,
however politically undesirable, there was no other source for both western
technology and investment credits than West Germany, which was largely
democratized; and (b) resentment at Ulbricht's and Moscow's support of
Novotny and at rigid soviet control over Czechoslovakia, plus realization
of the technological inferiority of the USSR to the West. The fifth factor,
the Slovak nationalist: revolt and demand for autonomy and equality was
the immediate incident cause of Novotny's fall.
*See, for more extensive analysis and bibliographies, my "Eastern
1968. Europe after the Soviet Reproduced Invas at the ion Richard of Nixon Presidential lovaki Library RAND P-3983, October 9,
3
The invasion was primarily an assertion of Great Russian imperialism,
not "proletarian internationalism." Indeed, the Thermidor of Bolshevism"
may well become a peaceful transition into Great Russian Fasciam:
imperialism, anti-intellectualism, anti-Semitism, anti-Westernism.
In the short run, a fortiori since they seem determined to move
toward more extremism in general at home and abroad, the Soviet leaders
thus probably had no alternative. In the long run, however, their
prospects in Eastern Europe seem to me to be less favorable. The
invasion will not only not solve but will probably make it more diffi-
cult for Moscow to solve Soviet and East European technological
backwardness and to contain indefinitely East European nationalism.
On the international scene, the Soviets for the near future restored
their domination in Czechoslovakia, thus also stifled any tendencies in
Hungary, Poland, East Germany, or Bulgaria toward liberalization or
independence, and checked a major potential success for West Germany.
On the other hand, Moscow greatly worsened its relations with Yugoslavia,
Romania (although the latter has much less room for maneuver) and West
European Communist parties, who for the first time almost unanimously
denounced the Soviet invasion, as have the Chinese and the New Left.
(But even so Moscow recently got near-unanimous endorsement for its
planned May 1969 international conference--a sign that opposition to
its policies by Western Communists is subsiding.) Castro, dependent on
Soviet aid, endorsed Moscow but only in order to try to push Soviet
policy in a more militant, anti-American direction, and for the first
time publicly asked for a Soviet military guarantee. The disintegration
of NATO and unilateral withdrawal of U.S. troops from West Germany was
at least delayed. West Germany, more fearful of Moscow, is less likely,
as is Japan, to move away from the United States. Bonn also suspended
its decision to begin ministerial-level discussions with East Berlin, a
major Soviet and East German objective. Franco-American relations
improved as a result of the French assessment of the invasion, the franc
crisis, and rising Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean and influence
in Algeria. (Yet in the long run the invasion, by frustrating Bonn's
eastern policies, and the franc crisis, which saw Bonn opposed to its
allies, will probably aid German nationalism, 8 developmentttward which
Moscow is not unfavorable.) The U.S. loss of international prestige and
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
5
it seems to me unlikely that any permanent reversal has occurred. Rather
the invasion has probably limited and slowed down tendencies that will
reoccur.
This seems likely for reasons arising out of Soviet as well as East
European affairs. As to the former, I share Professor Brzezinski's
view that Soviet society is tending toward bureaucratic rigidity* and
that its countervailing forces of intellectual ferment, nationalities
tensions, and economic revisionism make a full-scale reversion to
Stalinist imperialism in Eastern Europe extremely difficult. Brezhnev
has neither Stalin's complete power nor the former dictator's iron
conviction that his own solutions should be imposed regardless of cost
in life or rubles. Nor did Khrushchev. And the likelihood that even a
new and more charismatic leader in Moscow could reconsolidate the Soviet
political elite without the aid of wartime pressure is slim.
As to Eastern Europe, modernization furthers rationalization and
popular pressures on their regimes, which may be controlled as in East
Germany or acquire independent impetus as in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.
If politicization outruns institutionalization it leads to political decay
(e.g. Poland). Everywhere politicization and nationalism, combined with
the demand for economic growth, threaten rigidly centralized regimes.
Moreover, the attraction of Western Europe, and particularly the economic
pull of Western Germany, can be temporarily contained but hardly obliterated.
Thus an interim period of repression and then a slower, more limited
resumption of liberalization seem to me the most likely prospect for
Eastern Europe. Even so, however, it will probably remain, as will
Western Europe, the object, not the subject of world politics. Soviet
evolution, the East-West relationship, and the German problem will over-
shadow although not necessarily override internal changes in Eastern
Europe.
I now turn to a reassessment of Soviet policies in the light of the
invasion. First, the present Soviet leadership has within the last few
years adopted a more prpressive policy at home and a more expansionist
one abroad. Given this, and its refusal to loosen its grip on the
northern East European states, it will apparently preemptively intervene
*Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Soviet Political System: Transformation
or Degeneration?", Reproduced at the Richard (January-February 1966),
pp. 1-15.
7.
In Europe the military situation has changed significantly. For
the first time in modern history Russian divisions are stationed on the
Czechoslovak-Bavarian Border. Although this does not increase the size
of the Warsaw Pact forces, it advances their forward deployment in an
area confronting U.S. ground forces. (True, Czechoslovak military forces
are presumably now less reliable to Moscow, but this hardly counter-
balances the new forward Soviet deployment.) As a minimum this makes
significant unilateral withdrawals of U.S. forces from Central Europe
undesirable and unlikely in the near future. It also makes undesirable
any further rundown of British, French, or West German forces as well as
any unilateral decline for political gain in Western tactical atomic
capabilities in Europe. Finally, the rapidity, massiveness, and reportedly
high-level professional competence of the Soviet invasion require an
urgent reassessment of the NATO early warning system.
With respect to U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations in general, the new U.S.
administration will presumably reasses the U.S. policy of peaceful
engagement. Specifically, this means reevaluating such issues as
ratification of the non-proliferation treaty, strategic weapons
discussions with Moscow, and cultural and economic relations with the
U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe.
The policy of peaceful engagement was a logical consequence of
U.S. economic and military aid to Yugoslavia, which enabled Belgrade
to consolidate its independent course. Begun by Truman and pursued
by Eisenhower and subsequent Presidents, it was a policy of the possible,
an attempt to act, even if slowly and in a limited fashion, rather than
merely verbally to condemn. (The post-Stalin Soviet policy of peaceful
coexistence, including active engagement in Central and Western Europe,
was its counterpart.) Peaceful engagement was not directed toward
removing all Soviet influence from Eastern Europe and did not intend
to substitute Western penetration for Russian control. Rather, its
purpose was to heal peacefully the division of Europe into East and West
"with the consent of the East European countries and the Soviet Union. "
Peaceful change in Eastern Europe became possible in part because of such.
Western acts of "measured firmness" as the Berlin airlift. *
*Speech by President Johnson, October 7, 1968, Department of State
Bulletin, October 24,Regroduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential er. Zbighiew ibrary. Brzezinski and
William E. Griffith. "Peaceful Engagement in Eastern Eurone Foreign
9
Our reassessment of policy toward Moscow should also be brought into
accord with our reassessment of our policy toward Peking. What Professor
Barnett has proposed as "containment without isolation" of Communist
China is similar to peaceful engagement toward it: a policy of the
possible, of preparing for the day after Mao, by putting ourselves in
a less hostile posture toward Peking and thus furthering moderation
there. Now there is another, more immediately compelling reason, in
my view, for revising now our policy toward Communist China: why, after
the invasion, should we continue to not only relieve Moscow of its great
fear, a U.S.-Chinese coalition, but also, in effect, join them in total
hostility toward Peking? Our conflict of interest with China is less
than the Soviet Union's: Moscow holds vast territories in Sibe ia and
Central Asia which the Tsars took from the Manchu Emperors, and the
shared Marxist-Leninist ideology exacerbates, not improves, the Sino-
Soviet split. Let us, therefore, realize that we shall continue to be in
a fundamentally competitive situation with both Moscow and Peking, and
therefore adjust our posture toward both so that we may contribute toward.
their remaining competitive to each other as to us; thus we will have
room for maneuver between them. After all, as Lord Salisbury wisely
remarked: "Her Majesty's Government has neither permanent friends nor
permanent enemies but only permanent interests.
I now return to my initial statement that U.S. policy--or more
accurately the lack thereof--was short-sighted and shameful. It was
in my opinion short-sighted because President Johnson did not foresee
that if the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia he would be compelled nolens
volens to acquiesce in postponement of the ratification of the non-
proliferation treaty (NPT) and of the initiation of U.S.-U.S.S.R.
strategic weapons discussions. When in spring 1968 some of us proposed
that the Soviets should be specifically informed that these two develop-
ments would (unfortunately) occur if they invaded, the counter-argument
was that, because the NPT and the strategic weapons negotiations were
more in our interest than in the Soviets', we should not use this threat.
This assessment was mistaken, in my view, for two reasons. First the
*Cf. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Meeting Moscow's 'Limited Coexistence,
The New Leader, Vol. LI, No. 24 (December 16, 1968), PP. 11-13.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
11
What should the U.S. do now? First, it should make contingency
plans for a sharp worsening of Soviet pressure on Czechoslovakia,
involving something like the Soviet forced removal of Svoboda, Dubcek,
etc. Such a plan in my view should involve informing the Soviets that
this would mean the end of the NPT, for the West Germans and for us,
and the end of the strategic weapons negotiations. We should privately
inform Moscow that we would follow the same policy if they invade
Eugoslavia and that in addition we would then aid Yugoslavia as they
have aided North Vietnam, including preventing, if necessary by barring
the Adriatic to the Soviet fleet, any interruption of our aid. Unless
and until we are convinced by Moscow that they will not undertake such a
sharp increase in their occupation pressure, we should continue our
cuts in cultural exchange to the invading countries, intensify exchanges
with East European countries who did not invade, and pursue, in general,
those policies suggested above which have not been implemented. We
should ratify the NPT this spring, provided that the Soviets indicate
to us that the situation in Prague will not sharply deteriorate, if
only to avoid the "Versailles syndrome." Although we should continue to
encourage Western Europe, Japan, India, Israel, etc. to ratify the NPT,
we should not do so to the extent that it is as detrimental to other
U.S. interests in these areas as it has been to date. We should open
the strategic weapons discussions while making publicly clear that we
intend to maintain qualitative strategic and conventional superiority
over the Soviet Union.
Some may say, with considerable truth, that the Soviet invasion
of Czechoslovakia was not so unfavorable to U.S. interests--it reconsoli-
dated NATO. True, but the continuation of the Czechoslovak experiment
would have been in my view more advantageous for that country, for the
U.S., since it is the U.S. interest to encourage liberalization in
Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. and, indeed, in the long run for Russia
itself. Now, as before the invasion, our enlightened self-interest, a
"decent respect for the opinions of mankind," and our realization that
Czechslovakia, even if, as Chamberlain put it, "a far-away country of
which we know little," has some moral call on our conscience, should
convince us that more can and should be done by Washington to try to
influence Moscow to Reproduced Libmary.hat tragic country.