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DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]
DOCUMENT
DOCUMENT
NUMBER
TYPE
SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS
DATE
RESTRICTION
11
note
From Andy to HAK w/attachments
1/7/69
D
FILE GROUP TITLE
BOX NUMBER
HAK Office Files
I
FOLDER TITLE
25
RESTRICTION CODES
A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or
B. National security classified information.
financial information.
C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's
F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law
rights.
enforcement purposes.
D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy
G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
or a libel of a living person.
H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.
NATIONAL ARCHIVES ATND Ddsuant to E.O. 13526 be declassified.
NA 14021 (4-85)
Henry
Revised Version-
New point
is No, 1
&
en reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determi
DRAFT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT-ELECT
From:
Henry A.Kissinger
General Goodpaster
The State Department is proposing a change in NSDM 2 that would
require policy papers prepared by NSC Interdepartmental Groups for the
NSC to be transmitted through the Secretary of State to the NSC Review Group.
This arrangement is in basic conflict with the concept of direct
channels of tasking and response between Interdepartmental Groups and the
NSC Review Group, which was the basis on which we proposed retaining
the IRG's. It is inconsistent with a strong NSC system in several ways:
1. Unless transmittal were purely pro forma, and hence meaningless,
it would carry the power to review, to return for revision, or to
re-schedule/all functions that should lie with the NSC machinery.
2. The proposal thus retains the idea of State Department control
over what reaches the President in the NSC, and when.
3. When the Secretary reviews the substance of the paper in
transmitting it his action freezes the position of the State
Department man on the NSC Review Group, which should be free to
examine papers from a broad Presidential perspective.
4. The proposed arrangement constricts the Interdepartmental Groups
in preparing policy papers to the scope and context of State
Department functions, rather than giving them, fully and directly,
the broader perspective of Presidential security concerns.
This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
- 2 -
(Please note that this proposal does not involve operational
aspects of "interdepartmental activities of the US Government overseas, "
for which you have assigned responsibility to the Secretary of State.
This proposal relates to policy papers.)
In overall effect, the proposal would keep the issue open as to
whether you are going to have a State Department oriented system
rather than an NSC oriented system. To make clear it is to be an NSC
oriented system, the proposal should be rejected.
This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
Jone
will
taing
ALTERNATIVES
a fevorable accteach
(i.e., at least a
par tial
These alternatives present a broad range of possibilities including, but not
limited to, all of the alternatives now advocated within the Government. Each
alternative is intended to be a coherent military, political and negotiating
strategy, The alternatives are grouped according to basic national objectives.
The first three are oriented to victory) the next three to a compromise settlement,
and the last to extracation. The military strategics described under alternatives I,
II, III, could be used to pursue the objectives described under alternatives IV,
and V. Other options are possible, based on different combinations of military
continued pacification effort including attacks ve infrastructive
and negotiating strategies. Along with all officers would 90
A.
Strategies Aimed at Communist "Fade Away" or Negotiated Victory
continued
effort
to
build
I.
Military Escalation.
solitical
Expanded military operations, from resumption of bombing, or ground
operations into Cambodia, to limited or full invasion of North Vietnam, aimed at
Hangbut
obtaining withdrawal of all Communist subversive forces in 1-2 years with maintenance
the
of current GVN.
Country
II.
Current Military Posture.
Continue current force levels and pressures, aimed at withdrawal or
destruction of all NVA/VC forces and structure in 1-2 years (but perhaps longer),
leaving current GVN in power. We would insist in Paris on withdrawal of all Communist
forces.
III.
Small Unit Counter-Insurgency Strategy.
Radical restructuring of U.S. and ARVN into small units deployed with
RF/PF throughout populated areas and supported by large reserve system and improved
police activities. Tacit threat in negotiations that with such changes, U.S. can
remain in Vietnam a long time and put meaningful pressure on NLF.
B. Strategies Aimed at Compromise Settlement
IV.
Negotiated Political Compromise Settlement; With Alternative Military
Strategyes,
Seek to negotiate in Paris a compromise political settlement involving
a coalition government or elections. Mutual withdrawal or cease-fire acceptable
only as part of an agreed overall settlement.
V.
Negotiate Mutual Withdrawal Only; With Alternative Military Strategyes
Seek to negotiate in Paris a mutual withdrawal with Hanoi only, rather
than involving the US directly in negotiations for a political settlement.
VI.
Substantial Reduction in U.S. Presence While Seeking Compromise
Settlement.
Withdrawal of between 100,000 and 200,000 men in the first year and
probably additional withdrawals thereafter, while seeking to negotiate a compromise
settlement. Willingness to stay indefinitely at reduced level (and reduced cost) to be
used to bargain for NVA withdrawal in exchange for total U.S. withdrawal.
C. Strategy to Extricate the U.S.
VII.
Unilateral Withdrawal of All U.S. Forces.
This course involves a U.S. decision (publicly announced, now or later)
to withdraw all U.S. forces from SVN in one or two years, whether or not an
agreement is reached in Paris. It has no advocates within the US Government, but
might become necessary if some of the other alternatives failed.
This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
I. MILITARY ESCALATION AIMED AT COMMUNIST "FADE-AWAY"
OR NEGOTIATED VICTORY'
Expanded military operations, from resumption of bombing, or ground operations
into Cambodia, to limited or full invasion of North Vietnam, aimed at obtaining
withdrawal of all Communist subversive forces in 1-2 years with maintenance of
current GVN.
A. Beliefs of Advocates
1. Military victory - South Vietnam is on its way to victory with
the present course (some would say it has "already been won, i.e. assured),
but DRV may not yet recognize or accept this. Even with present constraints,
the enemy will probably crack within 12-24 months. But with escalated
pressure, victory would come sooner.
2. Present constraints allow the defeat of the enemy's army in South
Vietnam, but prevent its complete destruction, which cannot be done as
long as the enemy's zone of communications remains a sanctuary. He can
rebuild his forces and threaten again the security of South Vietnam if he
is not destroyed once and for all. The military measures proposed below
would cost more in casualties and dollars, but would make possible a U.S.
withdrawal--about as soon as by any other approach (i.e. 1-3 years) that
would leave a non-Communist GVN much safer in both the short and long run
than any other approach.
3. The credible threat, explicit or tacit, of unrestricted bombing or
limited invasion of North Vietnam might well (some would say, probably)
cause the DRV to accept our conditions for victory immediately.
4. U.S. public opinion and U.S. allies will tolerate course, especially
if DRV proves intransigent in Paris or, even more, if VC/NVA fail to de-
escalate or increase activity. Risk of strong response by Soviets or
Chinese, for anything short of full invasion, is slight.
B. Military Actions
Continue washington pressure against VC/NVA main
1. Option A. Resume pre-Tet pattern of operations: increase ground
operations against base areas, seek maximum attrition of NVA/Main Force
force nits
units! resume bombing of North Vietnam either up to 20° or on earlier pattern
insun:
and
(Perhaps increase U.S. forces in South Vietnam to 750,000 or more.>
accilerate military operations).
2. Option B. Conduct air and ground operations in Cambodia and
increase ground operations in Laos aimed at closing VC supply routes,
destroying units, stockpiles and logistic facilities.
3. Option C. Unrestricted bombing of North Vietnam, including Hanoi,
Haiphong and facilities near Chinese border, and mining of Haiphong, aimed
to destroy will and capability of DRV to support insurgency in South Vietnam.
This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
option G with other options,
X forces, quertillas and Infrastancture.
ail cases continue to expand and
intensify the attack section I-2 local
4. Option D. Limited invasion of North Vietnam and Laos; amphibious
landing in southern North Vietnam (perhaps in vicinity of Vinh) and perhaps
move from Thailand into Laos, leading to a line of ground forces within and
across southern North Vietnam and Laos to the Thai border, to prevent
infiltration and cut off NVA troops in South Vietnam.
5. Option E. Any combination of above.
6. Option F. Full-scale invasion of North Vietnam, aiming at downfall
of DRV and permanent elimination of North Vietnamese Communist efforts and
threat to foment insurgency in Southeast Asia.
C. Paris
a favorable outcome
1.
Accept GVN lead in negotiations on the assumption it will insist
on victory conditions, i.e., withdrawal of all Communist forces and
apparatus from SVN, Laos, and Cambodia, except individuals reconciled to
current GVN.
2. Accept no restriction on U.S. assistance to allow RVNAF to cope with
residual security threats after U.S. withdrawal.
D. GVN
1. Emphasize need for stability; support present government, extend
pacification.
Press hard for
2.
Urge but not demand reforms and improvement of RVNAF.
E. Cost
1. Budget costs increase over current $24 billion/year.
2. Casualties increase over current level (200 fatalities per week).
for the more extensive options.
3. Larger U.S. force-level in Southeast Asia--perhaps needed for
Option A, probably for Option B, required for Options D and F-would require
mobilization of reserves in the U.S.
4. For limited or full-scale invasion of North Vietnam, planning
factors on which to base estimate of costs and fatalities are not known,
but in any case should be regarded as subject to great uncertainty; upper
limits are presently not calculable.
F. Consequences
1. Of those
who believe that present course will lead to
victory in 12-24 months, some believe various forms of escalation could
bring it sooner, more surely, and more permanently, with the very threat or
onset of the higher levels (all-out bombing, limited or full invasion of
North Vietnam, options C, D or F) likely to bring major concessions from
DRV. Many of these would hold that if the present military course should--
contrary to their expectations--fail to bring victory close, escalation would
remain as the only path to victory. (There are no known advocates of
full-scale invasion /Option F7 at present, but it might find proponents
should C or D be tried and fails.)
This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
I-3
sustained maxium pressure
2. Most others believe that return to pre Tet pattern or expanded
operations in Laos and Cambodia (Options A and B) would simply fail, at high
cost, either to win victory or even to bring a favorable settlement nearer,
and that this is probably true of the other options as well, at a much higher
level of cost and risk. They also believe that each level of escalation would
reduce obstacles and, in failing, increase pressures to go to higher levels,
at still higher costs and with increasingly significant risks of confronting
larger participation in the war by China or Russia.
3. U.S. domestic opposition to any of these measures and especially
to mobilizing reserves, could strongly encourage Hanoi to hold out, without
concessions, until U.S. forced to withdraw.
G. Options in Case of Failure
1. U.S. domestic opposition, almost inevitably aroused by any of these
options, would probably preclude shift, in case of failure, to strategies
requiring continued large-scale combat involvement in South Vietnam for a
prolonged period (e.g., Alternatives II, III, or VI).
2. Failure at any one of these levels of escalation would probably
confront policy-makers with a choice between escalating still further
or arranging to phase out of Vietnam relatively quickly (i.e., unilateral
withdrawal or compromise settlements with minimal requirements on an
"acceptable" compromise). Critics are especially concerned about the
likelihood of pressures to recoup lost U.S. prestige by escalating further,
and ultimately--especially after failure of all-out bombing or of limited
invasion--to undertake the incalculable costs of full-scale invasion.
H: unknowns
No basis for estimations with bring whether the conficture was (or the to these en provintion.) end in course 12-24
months, Does appear that major progress X improvement
(could be a cheque
as
Considerable Teaction of china & Russia
Very difficult to estimate the intensity of
U.S. documestic reaction, pacticularly adverse reaction,
both during refish Aer mouths and if the
fighting goes beyond that time,
Also difficult to estimate the
the
effects The dreat Occ Hanoi Hitude re gelding continuing (won;
this applies buthieflects ella is of military operations a these attitudes and
to the This document has been reviewed pursuant to 13526 and has been determined declassified. to them,
II. CURRENT MILITARY POSTURE AIMED AT COMMUNIST,
"FADE-AWAY" OR NEGOTIATED VICTORY"
Continue current force levels and pressures, aimed at
withdrawal or destruction of all NVA/VC forces and structure
in 1-2 years (but perhaps longer), leaving current GVN in
power. We would insist in Paris: on withdrawal of all
Communist forces with current GVN in power.
will lad
A. Beliefs of Advocates
focus, it?
+
for
we
1. Current levels of U.S. troops, costs, and casualties
at least for the time required to win DRV acceptance of US/GVN
victory (variously estimated: from few months to 3-4 years) --
with At prese
are acceptable domestically in the U.S., and justified by
appour
international advantages of victory.
2. No risk of a major dramatic setback, because Viet
does
vity
Cong/North Vietnam cannot carry out or will not accept costs
time
of major attacks within next 18 months; or if they try, only
result will be their visible defeat and further weakening.
STATE
housewe
3. Although RVNAF improvement is marked, it cannot
results
justify sizeable U.S. troop reductions in next 12-18 months (barring
substantial
"Streamlining" to extent of 50,000 troops, might be possible,
NUA
though even this) might have undesirable psychological effects
withdrawals
on both GVN and Hanoi.
4.5 me advocates proposer
but the practical feasibility
4. Preferable to keep up current military pressure till
of doing
assured, verified victory conditions achieved, than to accept
this has
prior cease-fire, de-escalation, or major U.S. reduction in
hot been
forces (even if accompanied by NVA withdrawals).
evaluated
by responsible
B. Military Actions
Community
and it
1. Maintain present U.S. force level.
Modification: Reduce U.S. forces by limited amount --
50-75,000 -- designed and declared to be merely "streamlining, If
with no effect on combat role or strength feasibility has evaluated) not been
2. Continue current military operations: i.e., emphasis
on defense of Saigon and other cities;
multi battalion sweeps
and cordons; increasing U.S. artillery and air support to
RVNAF, and re-equipping of RVNAF; military/policy efforts
against Vietcong Infrastructure.
and
expension
and operations ist
witersive intelligence and combat
into base areas
oberations 3. Loos and incl dis possible
This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O 13526 and has been determined to be.declassified. and expant
II. 2
fevorable outcome
C. Paris
1. Let GVN take lead in negotiations on assumption
GVN will insist on (victory conditions: i.e., withdrawal
of all Communist forces and apparatus from South, Vietnam,
Cambodia and Laos except individuals reconciled to
current GVN.
2. Until convinced of DRV/VC intent to abide by
victory terms, avoid ceasefire, de-escalation and withdrawals.
D. GVN
l. Avoid destabilizing pressures on GVN to reform or
broaden base; continue low key encouragement toward these.
Make clear to (but wreatting
U.S. military presence till victory assured. is conditioned upon effective
2. (Assure GVN of continued support and large-scale
3. Discourage GVN/NLF talks or accession to power of
Vietnam elements inclined to major compromise.
including GVN performancy
cooperation 14
urgotiation
E. Costs
1. Financial costs continue at current rate of about
$24 billion per year.
Present operations
(subs/antially)
2. Viet Cong can continue to impose 200 U.S. casualties
a week. (If willing to accept higher casualties themselves,
VC/NVA could impose higher loss-rate on U.S.)
Somewhate
3. If 50,000 non-combat troops removed in 1969, costs
reduced by $1 billion by 1970.
F. Consequences
l. Most proponents now predict "victory" achieved in
South Vietnam within 18-24 months, with or without explicit
settlement with DRV; a few believe conditions already sub-
stantially achieved, settlement possible almost immediately.
Some who accept assumptions above believe victory attainable
but will take 3-5 years (some of these still prefer this
option, some prefer escalation for quicker win, others some
formof compromise).
these
2. But others
reject all beliefs, above and
believe "victory" unlikely short of 5 years, or possibly
ever, by this approach. And they would sharply question
This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
II. 3
invalve
will be
whether current costs were acceptable to the U.S. public
over two or more years even if victory resulted
especially if "progress" were slow and ambiguous If,
as they expect, the strategy had not brought victory
close within two years, once more refuting in public
eyes apparently optimistic official beliefs (especially
if the LVC had managed to mount major attacks) they
would expect strong public pressure to accept "any"
settlement or to carry out unilateral withdrawal.
G. Options in Case of Failure
1. If "victory" were not demonstrably near within
12-18 months, pressure might be strong either to escalate
or to phase out of Vietnam relatively rapidly; i.e., it
would be politically difficult (though conceivable) to
shift to a restructured counter-insurgency program
(Option III) or to sustain moderate forces (100-200,000)
for a prolonged period (Option VI) or to set strong terms
for a compromise political settlement (Option[V).
2. Mutual withdrawal (Option v) could still be chosen
as a negotiating aim. However, the U.S. domestic controversy then
probably prevailing would encourage Hanoi (unless it was substantially
weakened) to become recalitrant in negotiations, and to await
unilateral United States withdrawal.
(Threats of
escalation could be combined with compromise offers, but
might be less credible than earlier).
3. Unilateral U.S. withdrawal (Option VII) would
probably become a live option, with strong advocates in
Congress and the public. Or, if measures of escalation
were tried and failed, pressure for unilateral withdrawal
could become strong even sooner.
bas Lesin
H. Unknown
confident estimate
this course
No basis for whether can being the
war to [ludin 12-24 months. Does appear that
leape progress and improvement could be achieved.
to estimate reaction, within H.U.S., although the steps of
Option I tending to inflame opposition
bewise, the clear effects who the or the Hanci are still hard to estimate Not
attempture another offersive, possies a threat-in-beens, on x it
This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526and has been determined to be declassified.
Viceo to
III. SMALL UNIT COUNTER-INSURGENCY STRATEGY
AIMED AT COMMUNIST "FADE-AWAY OR
NEGOTIATED"VICTORY
Redical restructuring of U.S. and ARVN into small units deployed with
RF/PF throughout populated areas and supported by large reserve system
and improved police activities. Emphasis on protecting population
and neutralizing enemy political and logistical support system. Enemy
units in remote areas harassed but not engaged in major battles. Tacit
threat in negotiations that with such changes, U.S. can remain in
Vietnam a long time and put meanginful pressure on NLF.
A. Beliefs of Advocates
1. Low prospects of achieving negotiated victory on "fade-away" with
current strategy.
2. New military tactics and police/intelligence efforts can destroy
local forces and guerrillas, while holding off NVA/VC main forces.
?
3. The enemy, facing unfavorable trends and lacking logistical and
operational support by local forces and guerrillas, will find it
increasingly difficult to operate and become easier for U.S. to
identify and destroy.
4. This approach is likely to lead to victory -- by gaining us control
of the population -- while present military course, or even escalation
cannot.
5. Given stakes, it is worth trying to implement this approach, though
major changes in U.S. Army practices required. These will be difficult
to achieve at best and may not be attainable. They certainly will
require Presidential and Cabinet-level initiative and monitoring.
B. Military
1. Military-police actions designed to protect the population and to
cut the sources of VC regeneration and NVA logistical support rather
than aiming at casualties and gains in terrain.
2. Economy of force by concentrating upon populated lowlands and
highland district capitals, deferring efforts to drive enemy out of
remainder of the highlands. This reduces enemy main force
confrontations until after his regenerative and logistical support
capacity has been cut.
3. Conversion of the highlands and DMZ area into an in-depth ambush zone.
This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
III 2.
4. Transformation of part of American combat support and combat service
support into light infantry (possibly adapting U.S. Army organization
flexibly to Vietnamese conditions).
5. Assign small U.S. units, supported by reserves and artillery,
throughout the rural populated areas to bolster a revitalized GVN
territorial security system.
6. Revolutionary Forces and Popular Forces integrated with U.S.
detachments for greater effectiveness and better morale, equipment,
logisticalsupport, and training. Portions of ARVN combined with
American units.
7. Major effort addressed to RVNAF leadership problems: officer
selection, promotion, and command discipline (aim to reduce impact
of corruption and bring competence toward level achieved by Communist
Vietnamese military).
8. Fully coordinated, professionalized Vietnamese-U.S. intelligence
effort against Communist apparatus, integrated with military activities
at all levels.
9. U.S. forces could be reduced under this option by emphasizing
reductions in less essential categories of personnel. Possibly as
many as 250,000 troops might be withdrawn over several years and
more thereafter, reflecting changes in aims, strategy, Vietnamese
role, and improvement and U.S. organization.
C. Paris
1. Avoid substantial U.S. withdrawal or formal cease-fire until victory
negotiated or "fade-away" achieved or strategy proves unsuccessful
(at least 18-24 months for test).
2. Confront DRV negotiators with the tacit threat that the U.S. can
remain in Vietnam for a long time, given reduction of U.S. forces and
reliance upon tactics designed to reduce U.S. casualties.
D. GVN
1. Overhaul police and territorial security forces: Improve leadership,
training, discipline, etc., and try to create an effective territorial
security force by merging Revolutionary Forces, Popular Forces, National
Police and other units into a single organization.
2. Greatly increased incentives to RVNAF troops, especially Revolutionary
and Popular Forces: pay, dependents' benefits, housing, along with
stronger discipline against misbehavior toward civilian population.
This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
much of what is proposed is being
docc now, plus intensive operations
exper time waximum sustand
pressure on man force units
rid base areas, and common liaison
routes. They point out that relief
3. Strong pressure on GVN to broaden government participation and of pressure on
base of support; to promote cohesion of non-Communist elements; to
appoint local representative, competent and responsive province
these units, and
and district officials.
screening operation
would pennit
F. Consequences
reservention of
attaches on
1. A favorable consequence will either be NVA-VC "fade-away" or willingness major
to agree to a negotiated victory, or (more likely) major concessions in
cities
an attempt to preempt completion of our effort before VC suffers too much
and
damage.
toems
2. An unfavorable consequence will be the long time required for the
and disruption
strategy to produce a military victory. Six to twelve months required
of f pecification
for the programs to be instituted, 12-24 months for significant results
to appear; at least 4-5 years to achieve military victory.
heavy
they including
a Hacks on
3. However, should this strategy fall short of the expected success
small freidli
which should become apparent within 1-2 years it would nonetheless
territorial
how ?
have improved our bargaining position for a compromise settlement.
security
writs
"spell
4. Opponents of this strategy point out that the U.S. forces at village
level throughout countryside may make U.S. presence more visible and
Also,
provoke anti-American reactions among populace.
G. Options in the Event of Failure
1. The U.S. could escalate militarily if failure attributable tq massive
NVA intervention (Alternative I).
2. The U.S. might still obtain a compromise settlement although the
terms would be lowered by the fact of failure. (However, the presence
of U.S. forces at village level could make mutual withdrawal even ore
difficult.)
3. The U.S. could still extricate itself. (Alternate VII)
H. Unknowns
whether VC/NVA (or be kept from making
major inpoads under this concept (73%
what reaction B2). in U.S. could capacit
(ref. caupbe A2), cut whether (ref. lalay's whether foristical us. are how
-If VCINVA score major successes
what reaction in SUN ? Could government service?
what This document has been reviewed pursuantito E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
IV. NEGOTIATED POLITICAL COMPROMISE SETTLEMENT;
CONTINUE CURRENT MILITARY POSTURE
Seek to negotiate in Paris a compromise political settlement. This
might involve a coalition government negotiated prior to new elections
in South Vietna, or elections under proper såfeguards, the outcome
of which may either lead to a coalition government or to the
acceptance of the legitimacy of the NLF as a political party.
Mutual withdrawal or cease-fire acceptable only as part of an
agreed overall settlement.
A. Beliefs of Advocates
1. There are sufficient elements of common interest among
all South Vietnamese to warrant the search for a formula of
political compromise that would create an independent, neutralist
state in the South, supported by its principal political forces.
2. Given the costs of pursuing victory in continued war with
U.S. forces in Vietnam, the Communists might believe (rightly or
wrongly) their prospects for achieving dominance in South Vietnam
in a political contest are good enough to accept a compromise formula
that halts major violence, even one that does not guarantee them
success or makes it unlikely in the short run, so long as it leads
to U.S. withdrawal.
3. U.S. active participation in the search for a political
solution through negotiation in Paris is necessary to get a
political compromise, is likely to result in more satisfactory
results and, in particular, decreases the possibility of NLF
?
coming to power by violent means than if the Vietnamese were left
to settle the conflict on their own. The expected outcome of U.S.
efforts outweighs the risks involved in the U.S. assuming greater
?
responsibilities for the immediate settlement and indirectly for
later developments that may result therefrom.
4. Some advocates concede that this process could lead to the
NLF coming to power by peaceful means but believe that running this risk is
acceptable.
B. Military Actions
1. Although this political strategy is compatible with each
of the military strategies outlined in options I, II, III, and VI,
most proponents favor continuing the current military strategy.
They view escalation as unnecessary and likely to increase the cost
of accepting a political compromise, and view "small-unit" counter-
insurgency strategy as infeasible. Some proponents of a substantial
U.S. reduction believe we should negotiate a political compromise
(see VI below)
This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
IV. 2
C. Paris Negotiations
1. U.S. participates in direct negotiations concerning the
terms of a political compromise including such matters as
composition of the Government and election procedures.
2. Negotiate mutual withdrawal of forces with DRV only as
part of a political settlement.
D. Relations with GVN
1. Use our leverage on GVN to induce rapidly a genuine policy
of accommodation with all non-Communist political forces in South
Vietnam, such as militant Buddhists, Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, Montagnards,
in order to broaden support for the GVN in its negotiations with the
NLF.
2. Threaten GVN with complete withdrawal of U.S. support (which
would immediately raise the spector of a coup against the present
team) or even with unilateral withdrawal from South Vietnam, if it does
not negotiate in good faith with the NLF.
E. Costs
1. Casualties and budget costs depend on military strategy
persued while compromise is being negotiated.
2. After the political settlement is agreed, a cease-fire
would probably result, which together with U.S. withdrawal would
reduce cost rapidly; a saving of $11 billion with a cease-fire and
saving the remainder as U.S. forces are phased out.
F. Consequences
l. Proponents argue that successful negotiations, although they
probably will take 12-18 months, could lead to a non-Communist
South Vietnam, viable for at least 5 years. NLF coming to power
by violence is unlikely.
2. Others argue that such negotiations will almost certainly
take 2-3 years at current costs and fatality levels. U.S. will
Sign
have to put great pressure on Saigon thereby incurring, great
responsibility for the settlement and for maintaining agreed
political structures. Some critics believe that NLF will almost
certainly take over in 2-3 years of U.S. and NVN withdraw and NLF
incorporation
into political life in the South.
high likelihood that
This
document
has
been
reviewed
pursuant
to
E.O.
13526 and a the has Saigar been Lisin determined followe to be declassified. to, problem by it a
be
Even
Host
IV. 3
G. Options in case of failure
The U.S. could expand its military opërations if it believes
Hanoi is being intransigent or reduce or withdraw its forces if
it believes Saigon is not negotiating in good faith.
This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
V. NEGOTIATE MUTUAL WITHDRAWAL ONLY
Seek to negotiate in Paris a mutual withdrawal with Hanoi only] rather than
involving the US directly in negotiations for a political settlement.
A. Beliefs of Advocates
good
1. On the one hand, mutual U.S.-NVA withdrawal could give the GVN a fair
chance to overcome the VC insurgency gradually. Afterwards, it might
survive, like South Korea, with an acceptable level of U.S. support.
2. On the other hand, should the GVN and RVNAF be defeated eventually by
the VC, the United States could accept such a Communist take-over in SVN,
since it would have resulted from a primarily indigenous conflict. The
principal U.S. objective of repelling external aggression would have been
met.
3. Hanoi might be willing to run the risk of leaving the VC to fight
GVN forces or to compete politically after a cease-fire, provided U.S.
forces are withdrawing and unlikely to return. The alternative risk of
continuing the war for many years might seem worse to them.
4. Mutual withdrawal could be agreed upon and carried out within three
years. Indeed, this might be the only impor tant issue on which we and
Hanoi could agree. And such an agreement would be the one objective for
which domestic support in the United States is least divided.
permitting
B. Military Levels and Actions
1. In one variant, the United States would not initiate withdrawal (or
would stop it), unless NVA went along with a tacit or explicit
deescalation that, in effect, permitted the GVN forces to maintain their
present partial control of SVN, andE to the extent possible under the
deescalation understanding permitted the GVN to attempt to extend this
control. (Some would advocate that only under these conditions should
mutual withdrawal be sought.)
a. U.S. forces play role of reserve reaction for SVN forces, providing
Z
needed air and artillery support, but refraining from offensives to
broaden GVN control of countryside.
b. U.S. continues to provide military and advisory assistance to
GVN. (Under the Accelerated Modernization Program -- if successful -- the
SVN forces would have significant manpower and firepower advantage over
residual enemy forces.)
might
2. In another variant, mutual withdrawal would take place without
deescalation or a cease-fire, In this case, US forces RVNAF would have
to concentrate on the defense of areas now controlled by them, or even
consolidate some of these areas.
This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
V-2
3. In further variants, the U.S. might seek to negotiate a formally agreed
mutual withdrawal, while pursuing the current military strategy (Alternative II),
or escalatory or counterinsurgency strategies (Alternatives I and III)
C. Paris
1. U.S. would not participate in negotiations regarding a political
settlement in SVN.
2. The principal choice lies between a formally agreed mutual withdrawal
and a tacitly coordinated withdrawal. If an attempt to obtain an agreed
mutual withdrawal succeeds, it would have the advantages that:
a. there would be a clear expression, politically useful both for
the GVN and the United States, that the main purpose of the U.S. involvement
had been accomplished -- hence U.S. withdrawal was appropriate.
b. in the event of major NVA re-entry, the United States would
have a better political justification for retaliatory reescalation -- hence
against large main unit re-invasion the agreed mutual withdrawal might
give better deterrence than a tacit arrangement.
if we do not
but the disadvantages that:
retain some of
C. depending on the terms of the agreement, the U.S. troop
verification al
reductions might be frozen into a specific schedule -- denying the
United States flexibility for slower or faster reductions
d. if the agreement provided specifically for total withdrawal,
verifica problem. great we
be
*** final implementation would put us at a disadvantage/: U.S. troops are
clearly identified, NVA soldiers are not. In particular, there are the
vexing issues of NVA cadres in VC units and of the Regroupees.
3. If the choice is for a formally agreed withdrawal, the cuestion
arises whether the United States should insist on Hanoi's agreement also
to withdraw (or at least not to increase) its forces in Laos and
Cambodio,
would Love to
D. GVN
1. Try to maintain good relations with GVN, but not at the price of
holding up bilateral talks with Hanoi.
2. Give encouragment and economic aid, but don't press for reforms
and concessions, [except, perhaps, for some territorial consolidation under
?
the second variant above
3. Consider retaining an advisory team even after withdrawal. (This is not
precluded by the Manila formula, which just refers to "forces," not all
personnel.)
This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
V-3
E. Cost
1. Budgetary savings from withdrawals per year:
a. Without deescalation, $3 billion per 100,000 U.S. ground
troops withdrawn less $2.5 billion for building up RVNAF. Reduction of
air forces to one-third of present level will save an additional $5 billion.
b. With cease-fire, $11 billion (in ordinance, attrition, etc;) plus
$1.5 billion per 100,000 U.S. troops withdrawn and $2 billion for reducing
air forces to one-third.
F. Consequences
probatiol extend their
1. GVN forces, even with diminishing U.S. role, would be able to prevent
vc overrunning major population centers and could provide strong challenge
to TO countryside (depending on decscalation understanding) Under
strong pressure from the VC, RVNAF might feel compelled to thdraw to
District Towns, leaving the countryside to the VC; under these circumstances
it might be preferable for RVNAF to consolidate territorially, abandoning
certain districts to ve control
2, Some analyst believe
3. After U.S. withdrawal completed, present leadership structure of GVN
would probably change, with degree of eventual Communist influence determined
by reactions of other SVN political groups (Hoa Hao, Catholics, Buddhists,
etc.) and cohesion and effectiveness of GVN forces.
4. Haless NVA forces were also removed from
Combodian and the Laotier. persondle, the danger
would exish that they could quickly intervene, with
G. Options in Case of Failure
demaging effect, after us.
1. If Hanoi refused to agree to mutual withdrawal (or failed to carry it forces
out), the U.S. could pursue its current military strategy to obtain a
hast
Communist "fade-away" or a victory (Alternative II), or it could escalate
or otherwise change its military strategy (Alternative III and I).
gove
Alternatively, the U.S. could reduce its forces while building up RVNAF
(Alternative VI).
2. If NVA forces were reintroduced after most of US forces withdrawn, U.S.
could escalate (Alternative I) or perhaps return to current military
posture (Alternative II) by reintroducing troops.
3. If VC defeated GVN, or GVN collapsed for other reasons, see above point
A.2.
Unknowns-
whether Handi will agree
- - Whether they would fulfill their agreement
- whether U.S. opinion will hold fine
This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified:
what may be protracted negotiation
white
VI. SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN U.S. PRESENCE WHILE SEEKING COMPROMISE settlement
Withdrawal of between 100,000 and 200,000 men in the first year and probably
additional withdrawals thereafter, while seeking to negotiate a compromise
settlement. For the first few months, however, essentially no U. S. troops
withdrawn and strategy not revealed in effort to negotiate mutual withdrawal
with NVN. Afterwards, preferred mode of implementation is to obtain GVN
approval of a schedule for withdrawal and continuing growth of RVNAF
capability, so as to get down to 100,000 men by the end of 1971. Willingness
to stay indefinitely at reduced level (and reduced cost) to be used to bargain
for NVA withdrawal in exchange for total U.S. withdrawal.
A. Beliefs of Advocates
( ualess NVA withdraws)
1. U.S. must remain in SVN for next several years
to prevent NLF takeover
based on NVN military force.
2. Domestic political realities in the U.S., as well as need to motivate
CoR
improved GVN/RVNAF performance, require a reduction in U.S. forces in the
short run. Moreover, a substantial reduction in U.S. forces will make it
possible politically to sustain U.S. involvement in Vietnam.
3. Even substantially reduced U.S. forces can prevent an NVA/VC
victory, though not attain a quick friendly victory.
Life
4. NVN has no incentive to reduce its commitment to the war as long as
it believes U.S. support for the war is collapsing. Withdrawal of the U.S.
forces will lead Hanoi to revise estimate of U.S. staying power upwards.
5. Favorable outcome depends on improved GVN and RVNAF performance. As
?
long as the U.S. shows no firm signs of leaving, the GVN has limited incentive
to reform and RVNAF limited less incentive to increase its efforts.
land improve
6. Increased assumption of military responsibility by RVNAF will help
prevent chances of collapse of U.S. domestic support for war.
7. Advocates of this alternative span a wide range of "optimism" or
"pessimism" as to GVN/RVNAF response to U.S. reductions. Either view is
consistent with a readiness to consider complete withdrawal if appropriate
response is not forthcoming.
B. Military Activity
1. Withdrawal of between 100,000 and 200,000 men in the first year and
probably more thereafter. Perhaps going down, so that only 100, 000 would be
left by December 1971.
2. As U.S. forces are withdrawn, the U.S. military effort would be
limited to the protection of Saigon, protection of decreasing number of
U.S. bases and substantial logistic and combat support for ARVN.
This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
VI-
3. Press ARVN to take over major combat responsibilities. Give high
priority to ARVN modernization; turn over to ARVN equipment of withdrawing
U.S. forces; maintain high level of military aid and reduce U.S. fire
support to ARVN only slowly.
4. Risk of NVA escalation to be deterred or met by (a) threat of
resumption of bombing in North with former restraints relaxed, and (b)
slow-down of U.S. troops withdrawal.
C. Paris Negotiations
Two variants:
1. Limit negotiations to mutual withdrawal, de-escalation, P.O.W.
release, and, perhaps, cease-fire.
2. Seeking compromise political settlement and NVA and U.S. withdrawal.
D. GVN
1. Urge GVN to broaden and reform but not threaten to cut off aid.
2. As complement to reduction in military presence, U.S. should
limit its prominence in non-military aspects as well.
E. Costs
1. Annual financial cost reduced from $25 billion to $8-10 billion by
December 1971.
2. Casualties decline in proportion to troop withdrawal.
F. Consequences
The moparents point out
1. / U.S. would find it easier to stay in SVN for an indefinite period
at reduced cost.
They believe that the
2.
Outcome in SVN will depend on whether GVN/ARVN pulls itself together,
collapses, or negotiates with the NLF. There is ample room for differing
judgment on what will happen.
3. If Hanoi withdraws in response, result would be de facto mutual
withdrawal.
sustains
and pronticularly if its increases
4.
If Hanoi increases its level of effort, result could be Communist
control of much of SVN. Hanoi may step up its infiltration in an effort
to demonstrate to U.S. that its alternatives are a high military effort or
total withdrawal. Deterrence of this move may depend on the effectiveness
of the threat of resumed bombing in North Vietnam, a slowdown of troop
withdrawals, or both.
The opponents point with that
disiutegreting offolitied
would
be serious
5, This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526.and has been determined to be declassified.
of SUN and the possibility
VI-3
5. The prospect that the U.S. would find a sizable presence sustainable
indefinitely (because it had reduced costs) would press Hanoi to agree to
mutual withdrawal, unless it were willing to gamble on "forcing" U.S. out
at high costs in casualties at the risk of a resumption of possibly increased
penalties against the North.
G. Options in the Case of Failure
overthere)
conhoulation;
1. If U.S. troop reductions lead to open U.S. GVN conflict, this could
provoke down-fall of present GVN. Depending on further political developments
in Saigon, this might (a) (ead to a reformed GVN with wider political take the form
support and/or a junior officers coup which might be only way to reform
of a militery
RVNAR, or (b) a neutralist regime and breakdown of RVNAF, necessitating
require
complete U.S. withdrawal and perhaps resulting in a Communist regime in
South Vietnam.
conducted sustained attacks, there would be
2. (a). If NVA/VC Consentrated their attacks against RVNAP units and
keep defeating them, then US/MACV would probably have to encourage RVNAF to
pacification
consolidate major litelihood territory and that give they air and could artillery disrupt support] and reverse process, an the I substantial make
(b). If NVA/VC attacked the residual U.S. forces, U.S. casualties
gains in
would continue to be high, although less than current levels.
control
of tenitory
Under both 2a and 2b pressure might be great to escalate or withdraw
and
completely. U.S. leverage to negotiate mutual withdrawal or a political
population
settlement could be reduced if Hanoi believed U.S. would withdraw remaining
troops even without a settlement.
unknows
allied
forces
Serious)
whether
heaper /could inroads by NVA/VC + wajor
hold possibility of
Reaction in US
reverses to
Reaction of SUN
us, RUNAF,
Reaction of Handi
and
perification
placess
This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
VII. UNILATERAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL U.S. FORCES
This course involves a U.S. decision (publicly announced,
now or later) to withdraw all U.S. forces from SVN in one
or two years, whether or not an agreement is reached in
Paris. It has no advocates within the U.S. Government,
but might become necessary if some of the other alternatives
failed.
A. Beliefs of Advocates
l. The war is unwinnable (in acceptable ways). No
matter what statistics might indicate or official reporters
feel, our efforts cannot resolve the political problems that
are at the heart of this war. We should therefore cut our
losses and avoid unknown additional risks while we can, and
devote resources and energies to other activities elsewhere.
2. The new Administration can successfully explain this
course to the American people and other nations, particularly
in its early days.
a. The American people will be receptive because
many are disenchanted with the war, and because many believe
that domestic priorities would benefit. (Public opinion has
responded favorably to de-escalation and has favored
escalation only "to get it over with." If no acceptable
"get it over with" prospect is in sight, the public is likely
to favor unilateral withdrawal.)
b. Other nations will accept our action because we
have met our commitments by large investment in men and
resources, and shown "wisdom" in accepting the situation.
3. It is important to start the withdrawal process now
and complete it quickly because otherwise -- with every other
option -- the new administration runs a risk of getting
locked in (War transferred from Johnson to Nixon Administration
rather than from U.S. to SVN).
4. The only way to get the SVN to try to negotiate a
settlement with the NLF or to assume the burden of fighting
is by credible announcement of actual full withdrawal.
5. Withdrawal "limits damage," saves lives, conserves
resources now.
B. Military Actions
1. U.S. forces are drawn down to zero, with possible
exception of a MAAG.
This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
VII. 2
2. U.S. immediately assumes posture suited for
redeployment and for protection against enemy harassment.
C. Paris
1. U.S. tries to get cease-fire during withdrawal,
and reiterates request for NVA withdrawal.
D. GVN
1. U.S. says it will continue to help present or other
non-Communist forces as much as we can. Maintains a small
force of technical advisers.
2. U.S. applies no pressure for reforms and is friendly
to whatever GVN (or non-Communist in a coalition government)
wants to do.
E. Cost
l. Fastest and surest way of reducing cost radically.
2. Fastest and surest way of reducing U.S. casualties.
F. Consequences
I. Probable collapse of GVN and Communist takeover, but
possibility of non-Communist coalition government. SVN
countryside quickly taken over by VC.
2. If U.S. withdrawal were slow, spread over 2 years
or more, Communist might possibly step up attacks to speed up
departure or to humiliate U.S. But much more likely that
Communist would avoid risks of slowing or reversing U.S.
withdrawal, desisting from attacks once withdrawal was clearly
underway.
3. Possible very serious consequences in other Asian
countries.
This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
15 December 1968
MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Kissinger
Pursuant to our conversation by phone a week ago, I have pre-
pared memoranda on the following four subjects:
1 - Security Affairs Staff Responsibilities Under President
Eisenhower
2 - Organization and Procedures for the Conduct of National
Security Affairs
3 - Priority List of Security Projects
4 - Defense Organization and Management Procedures
They are presented herewith for consideration, and as a basis
for further discussion.
b
A. J. GOODPASTER
General, United States Army
CONFIDENTIAL
This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
12 December 1968
MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Security Affairs Staff Responsibilities Under
President Eisenhower.
1. This note undertakes, in response to your request, to describe
the organization of security affairs staff responsibilities under
President Eisenhower as they existed at the close of his adminis-
tration. While it is not complete (being produced only from memory)
it does, I believe, cover the main essentials.
2. In broadest terms, international and security operations of a
current nature involving the action of the President fell to me.
National security policy and planning, plus security operations at
the interdepartmental rather than the Presidential level, fell to the
President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. Obviously,
the division was not so clear-cut as these words suggest. Moreover,
each of us had other duties extending outside these areas. For these
and other reasons, the requirement existed for the closest kind of
coordination intimate, informal and constant -- together with the
fullest cross-flow of information between the two of us. I believe
we can fairly say that we met this requirement.
3. In more specific detail, my duties in this capacity involved
handling the flow of matters that came to the President from the
departments and agencies primarily concerned with security and
international activities, operations and programs -- and that went
from the President to these same departments and agencies (State,
Defense, CIA and AEC, OCDM and its predecessors, MSA and its
predecessors, USIA, the Arms Control group, as well as BOB
international and defense divisions, the President's Science Advisory
Board on security-related matters, plus ad hoc groups from time
to time). These "actions" took many forms -- memoranda submitted
to the President to provide him information or to request his approval
of a proposal or program, or to ask his guidance; oral or written
direction from the President, or from me on his behalf; a note sent
by me to the departments and agencies regarding an action, decision,
or request of the President, frequently in the form of a request to
give thought to a certain problem and provide him with views; etc.
CONFIDENTIAL
This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
These actions were of varying degrees of formality -- some, such
as authorizations to expend nuclear weapons in tests, were in a
meticulous, legal format, while others were no more than ideas or
suggestions for consideration. One of the most important duties I
performed as did the Special Assistant -- was to set up meetings
in the President's office to take up "specific" problems, bringing
in all of the principal officers of government having a material
interest in the matter. A large proportion of the most vital items
of the government's business in our respective field was handled
in this way. Normally, there would be some kind of document that
would record the decision taken, and provide a greater or lesser
amount of supporting discussion.
4. I carried no title which quite corresponded to the function just
described which was my principal duty. As Staff Secretary, I
was responsible for the flow of all material, the domestic as well
as the "international/security," from the Executive Branch to and
from the President. However, I handled the material of a domestic
nature in a manner separate and distinct from that just described,
insofar as my personal participation was concerned. Within my
office, I had an assistant who performed essentially the full Staff
Secretariat function for domestic matters enabling me to limit
my role to one of overall supervision, and, in general, to avoid
getting into the specifics of these matters. With certain limited
exceptions, international/security affairs were not a primary or
direct concern of other elements of the President's staff. I also
had responsibility as Staff Secretary for the administrative manage-
ment of the White House Office and for related service and support
activities. In the additional capacity of Defense Liaison Officer I
had a little extra responsibility for seeing that defense and military
service matters were handled with the President. In addition
and I consider this very important -- as a part of my "international
and security duties I spentaa brief period with the President every
day giving him an intelligence "up-date," and obtaining his reaction
or his comment which frequently took the form of a request to
obtain further information, to have the matter looked into by a
particular department or agency, or to have specific action taken,
or explored. Out of this there came a continuing flow of intelligence-
stimulated action and reaction between the President and his chief
subordinates. (He also had a regular, more comprehensive
intelligence report from the Director of Central Intelligence at the
weekly NSC meetings). The "operations" of the CIA with which I
was concerned for the President were those on which his specific
2
CONFIDENTIAL
This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
action was involved. Often times, these would be taken up with
him by the Director of Central Intelligence, with myself and
frequently the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs in
attendance. In all of this work, the duties which I had involved
those of an office executive and those of a substantive adviser and
analyst, in varying combinations.
5. The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs was responsi-
ble for the formulation of national security policies and the conduct
of national security planning. In the Eisenhower administration
these functions were carried out almost exclusively within the
NSC framework, insofar as the top level activity of the Executive
Branch was concerned. He also managed the NSC structure and
gave broad supervision to the conduct of security affairs at the
interdepartmental level through the OCB mechanism. As the manager
of the NSC structure, he was concerned with the functioning of
its various subcommittees. In addition, through the 5412 group
he and other top officials at the undersecretary level reviewed
CIA operational activities not handled directly with the President.
He was the President's representative on the Committee of
Principals, concerned with Disarmament matters. He of course
consulted repeatedly and in great detail with the President on all
of this. In addition, where approved policy did not exist as
guidance for the OCB, for the 5412 group or for other agencies,
he would initiate its operation.
6. His main responsibility in all of this, I would say, wastto
further the development of a comprehensive, thoroughly deliberated,
and well-expressed body of explicit policy guidance which, with
supporting analyses, covered all major areas of US security affairs.
He was responsible for keeping it dynamic and at the same time
coherent, constantly reaching out for new formulations and new
sources of thought. As previously indicated, he as I would set up
meetings with the President of the principal officers of the
Government on matters that fell within his field. We would talk
by phone, and easily decide who should do the "setting up" on any
particular item.
7. One minor anomaly deserves note. It has to do with "foreign
policy. " Much of what State terms foreign policy consists of a
mixture of operations and policy, in the terms I have been using
in this memorandum. Where the matter raised a substantive
question of international security policy, I normally passed it to
3
CONFIDENTIAL
This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
the Special Assistant for International Security Affairs to handle
or return to me as he decided. Where it fell within NSC policy,
and particularly where it was a specific action of an operational
nature (a message or letter conveying the President's views to
a foreign head of government or Chief of State; an invitation to
pay a visit or a reply to an invitation; etc.) I would tend to
handle it with the President.
8. The Special Assistant "ran" the NSC meeting each week, in
the sense that he prepared the agenda (approved by the President),
introduced each item, summed up the position taken at the meeting,
and finally, after the meeting was over, presented a statement on
the matter to the President for a decision. In addition, the
Special Assistant presided over the Planning Board, which at that
time met twice a week, as I recall, and which prepared essentially
all the NSC papers that came before the council. He also
established major study groups and study projects such as the
Von Neumann Group and the Gaither Panel. Prior to the formation
of the OCB he either presided over, or attended and coordinated
the work of, the Psychological Strategy Board. In addition to
managing the work of the NSC, he was a senior substantive adviser
to the President, particularly on the overall tone and tenor of
U.S. action in the security field, and on the main lines and
directions of effort to be followed over a considerable period by
the U.S. in providing for its security.
9. Neither the Special Assistant nor I had direct dealing with the
press. We had a minimum of exposure to the public. The rule I
set for myself was to handle the President's information thessame
way I handled his official funds. We provided information to the
President's Press Secretary and he obtained a good deal directly
from the State Department much of it in connection with the
meeting we had with the President each week just prior to the
Presidential Press Conference. It was the President himself, of
course, whose role with the press was primary on matters in
this field.
10. If I were to choose the single procedure (other than constant
and friendly coordination) that was of the greatest importance in
the work of the Special Assistant and myself it would be our
practice of bringing the principal officers of Government into
the President's office on specific important questions involving
security matters, so that each in the presence of all had the
4
CONFIDENTIAL
This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
opportunity -- and the obligation -- to express his views and to
hear the President's decision, thereafter going out to carry it
out faithfully unless he wished to ask that the matter be brought
up again for reconsideration. Where possible, appropriate
preparation for the meeting was made in advance. In every
case the relevant facts were assembled to the best extent possible.
11. While the foregoing pattern is by no means the only solution
that can be imagined or developed, it does represent the product
of some eight years of experience and development, and it does,
I believe, provide useful elements for a mechanism capable of
dynamic yet coherent action.
b
A. J. GOODPASTER
General, United States Army
5
CONFIDENTIAL
This document has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
CONFIDENTIAL
13 December 1968
MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Organization and Procedures for the Conduct of National
Security Affairs
1. Attached are two sets of notes I have prepared:
a. Notes on organization for the conduct of national security
affairs. This paper addresses organization and procedures for the
Executive Branch as a whole, as well as organization and procedures
within the White House.
b. Supplementary notes on staff procedures. These spell out in
some detail (and somewhat mechanically, I am afraid) the various
component steps involved.
2. I have tried to avoid recommending a particular organizational
form, or overall procedural mode, at this time. I feel that these,
so far as I am concerned, could better grow out of our discussions.
3. Regardless of such restraint, however, there are certain main
functions that practically define themselves. They are "building-blocks"
out of which the organization inevitably will be formed. In brief,
they are:
a. The NSC itself as the President's highest deliberative, advisory
and policy-formulating body. The staff functions here are to prepare
for, conduct, and take further action on the meetings, and to manage
the NSC supporting structure.
b. The policy planning function. Here the role of a Planning
Board, or something like it, is central. The main staff functions
are to run the Planning Board and direct the preparatory planning
work and studies, and, in addition, to pursue broader, more
speculative, more creative studies of a longer-range character --
drawing from sources within and without the Government, keeping
channels open to all centers of thought and study.
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C. The handling of current operational matters involving
Presidential participation. The functions are those of an executive
advisor -- giving a staff-type review to material from the depart-
ments and agencies, presenting it to the President and, discussing
it with him, and taking follow-up actions; initiating action on the
President's behalf, arranging top-level meetings on specific subjects;
"keeping the system honest" as to policy-observance and responsive-
ness; maintaining a limited information bank; and encouraging a
flow of new ideas and fresh thinking from every source to the
President.
d. Closely related to this -- merging with it, in fact is the
briefing function of providing a flow of current intelligence and
operations information to the President, and proceeding with follow-
up action in response to the President's reactions and desires.
e. Next is the handling of interdepartmental operations in
the security field not involving the direct participation of the
President. Some mechanism along the lines of the OCB or the
SIG/IRG structure is required. The problems of achieving and
maintaining effectiveness, of relating these operations to Presidential
policy and to the policy-planning and current operations functions,
and the task of getting the departments and agencies to bring in the
problems that should receive this treatment are difficult but inescapable.
The main staff functions are to manage the machinery and the program
of work, participate in whatever committee structure is maintained,
and initiate action to obtain policy guidance where needed.
f. A final function meriting specific recognition is that of
formulating broad and far-reaching conceptions of a long-range
character, providing the main structure of the nation's approach to
its international and security problems. This work should provide
coherence and reasoned dynamism, together with a sense of direction,
to the whole complex of policy and action. It should be, I believe,
the highest preoccupation of the President's top assistant for National
security affairs.
4. Additional procedures internal to the security affairs staff should
facilitate the work of the whole structure, keep up momentum, bring
in new approaches and new issues, and perform an overview of
departmental and agency operations.
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5. I believe there is some range of latitude in how these functions
can be successfully combined, and fitted into an overall security
structure, and will be prepared to consider specific possibilities
with you.
A. J. b GOODPASTER
General, United States Army
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NOTES ON ORGANIZATION FOR THE
CONDUCT OF NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
GENERAL.
1. National security does not, of course, embrace all of our
foreign interests and concerns. But because it governs our national
survival, it is in a true sense a paramount concern of the President.
Also, in national security affairs the President's role is central.
"National Security" may therefore be soundly utilized as a major
functional focus for organization and operations within the Executive
Branch, and within the President's immediate staff.
2. The guiding purpose for the organization employed for the
conduct of national security affairs should be to aid the President
in the discharge of his responsibility in this field. At the outset
of a new Administration, this clear purpose should orient every
effort that goes into building organization and establishing procedures
in this field. It should be used to provide a sense of priority and a
basis of selection among competing possibilities.
3. The national security structure needed is one that is strong
and vital -- one whose operations are marked by vigor, keenness and
wisdom. The National Security Council and related machinery can
be made to fill this need.
4. "Policy" in the form of well-formulated policy documents
can provide a valid framework in this field. The policy process
must reconcile coherence and duration with dynamism and flexibility
of thought and action if it is to be successful. Specifically, the
policy machinery must provide open avenues for the introduction
of new ideas into an ever-evolving mosaic of policy.
5. The security structure must provide operating elements
which can produce timely, informed, coordinated actions which are
in harmony with the policy framework.
6. The security structure must assist the President in
constantly reshaping, renewing and extending forward his conception
of the security situation in all of its principal elements. It must
help him set the terms and the tone of our international discourse,
and the role in the world of the U.S. under his leadership.
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7. Several distinct major interacting functions can be
discerned in the national security structure, both for the Executive
Branch as a whole and in the immediate staff serving the President.
These include a) planning and policy formulation, b) deliberation
by the President and his chief lieutenants, and c) the conduct of
operations. Such operations divide further into 1) those involving
the active participation of the President and 2) those handled at
a departmental or interdepartmental level.
ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES EXECUTIVE BRANCH.
8. To provide the assistance the President needs, there is
required within the Executive Branch as a whole organizational
machinery for performing the functions of deliberation, policy
planning and the conduct of operations. Such organizations, to
be most effective and responsible, should embody the concept of
direct participation both by high departmental and agency officials
bearing responsibility for results and by representatives able to
reflect the overall viewpoint of the President, to initiate or
expedite work in his behalf, and to provide necessary staff analysis,
support, and management.
9. In the Eisenhower Administration, these concepts were
embodied in the NSC for thepperformance of the deliberative
function and in the planning board and NSC staff for the policy
planning function. With regard to operations, those involving the
direct participation of the President were handled through his
Staff Secretary. Those requiring interdepartmental action without
involving the participation of the President were handled by the
OCB. Those capable of being handled by an individual department
or agency on its own within the framework of presidentially-
approved policy or presidential guidance were handled in that
fashion. While adjustments in detail are possible, arrangements
following these general lines appear responsive, indeed essential,
to the needs and purposes earlier described.
10. Among specific questions to be considered in planning the
organization are the following:
a. Persons to attend NSC meetings.
b. Frequency of meetings.
C. Nature of papers -- length, depth of analysis, action
content, etc.
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d.
Methods for providing overall guiding concepts and
setting directions.
e.
Role of advisors, as distinguished from members.
f. Level of membership of the planning board. Relating
of departmental and NSC responsibilities of members.
bio
Staff support for the planning board.
h. Arrangements for interdepartmental operations. Possi-
bility that the SIG/IRG can be made to work satisfactorily, assuming
that a framework of NSC policy is constructed.
ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES WHITE HOUSE.
11. Within the White House, the functions to be performed may
be divided into a) those relating to policy, b) those relating to inter-
national operations and programs (in turn subdivided into (1) those
involving the direct participation of the President, and (2) those
interdepartmental operations or program activities in which the direct
participation of the President was not required) plus c) an intelligence
and operations briefing function.
12. These functions can be combined and correlated in a variety
of ways. Under President Eisenhower, the policy function -- relating
to the Council itself and to its Planning Board as well as the over-
view of interdepartmental security operations not involving direct
Presidential participation fell to the Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs. The other functions fell to the Staff Secretary. In
actuality, the two-headed system proved effective. However, a
pattern heading up in a single individual can offer evident advantages
of unified and coordinated effort, particularly if the single individual
is a man suited to large conceptions, and broad far-reaching
formulations and interpretations designed to have validity over a
considerable period of time.
13. In such case he might well have three principal subordinates
one for policy planning, one for current operations involving the
participation of the President, and one for interdepartmental
coordination of operations. Each should be served by a small staff.
The assistant for current operations should also be charged with the
intelligence and operations briefing function.
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SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES ON STAFF PROCEDURES
1. Staff procedures with respect to the NSC itself include:
a. Preparation of a plan of work.
b. Preparation of the agenda.
C. Managing the preparation of papers (in the Planning
Board or comparable organization) and distributing them in advance
of NSC meetings.
d. Introducing or presenting the paper at NSC meetings;
relating it to the main lines of the President's security policy.
e. Bringing out major issue (significant matters of policy,
controversial points, etc.).
f. Summing up the discussion.
g. Preparation of a record of action and proposed decision
for consideration of the President.
h. Promulgation of the approved record of action and
decision, and distribution of the paper as approved.
2. Staff procedures with respect to the planning function
include:
a. Preparation of a plan of work.
b. Preparation of the agenda for Planning Board meetings.
c. Organization of task groups and assignment of tasks
to them.
d. Initial review of draft papers.
e. Chairmanship of the Planning Board; also, provision
of supporting services to the Planning Board.
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f. Conduct of additional planning activities within the staff,
or by request to an ad hoc group within the Government, or by
commissioning outside studies.
3. Staff procedures with respect to the OCB-type function
include:
a. Preparation of a plan of work and conduct of staff and
committee work to survey and define needs for interdepartmental
substantive action.
b. Managing the machinery established, to include, for
example, setting up project working groups, and reviewing their
work.
C. Initiating action to obtain policy guidance where it is
needed but not available.
4. Staff procedures with respect to current operational matters
involving Presidential participation include:
a. Staff review of material submitted by departments and
agencies to the President for action or information, on their initiative
or at the request of the President or his staff. Such review includes
checking for completeness (to include balanced presentation of both
pros and cons), adequate coordination, and conformance to policy,
as well as clarity and effectiveness. Further action as needed is
accomplished.
b. Presentation of the matter to the President, and provision
of any additional supporting material he requires.
C. Follow-up as required (e.g., sending an instruction,
an approved document, or a further request to a department or
agency).
d. Arranging meetings with the President of senior depart-
ment and agency officials to take up specific problems, assuring that
all who have a significant responsibility involved in the matter are
present, and that all pertinent facts and points of view are aired.
Appropriate preparation for the meeting is made, and relevant
facts assembled.
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e. Maintenance of systematic controls to make sure that
responses are submitted, and scheduled dates are met. Sufficient
following of departmental actions and programs to give confidence
that they were being conducted within the guidelines of the President's
policies and desires -- also to pick up problems at an early stage
in order to initiate fore-handed action.
f. Maintenance of selected information of a current nature
of interest to the President, or useful for the performance of this
group of staff functions.
g. Bringing to the President's attention new ideas, concepts,
or contributions from outside the Government having interest or
value in the security field.
h. Commissioning studies, or obtaining views and analyses,
from a wide range of sources - within and without the Government -
on matters of interest to the President.
5. Staff procedures for the provision of current intelligence
and operations information to the President, and for Presidential
action thereon, include:
a. Arranging a flow of current intelligence from CIA, DOD
and State appropriate to the President's needs. Arranging for
immediate provision of critical items of intelligence, often in a raw
initial state, so identified.
b. Arranging a similar flow of operational information,
primarily from State and Defense (significant messages to and from
Ambassadors, reports of military operations or actions, etc.)
C. Follow-up as required - often a request for further
information, to look into and report on a certain matter, to submit
recommendations for action, to takeccertain action, to set up a
meeting ofssenior officials, etc.
6. A further major staff function is the development for the
President's consideration of broad, far-reaching conceptions of
central importance in guiding policy and operations. This should be
a special responsibility of the senior Presidential staff assistant in
the security field. He will have his own methods, but the support
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of a small group of people of the highest ability, some continuing
on the group, others serving for one or a few projects, would be
of value. In the first instance, their work would be for his use.
They should give special effort to developing new perceptions of the
evolving international scene, and fresh approaches to the issues
that have theggreatest role in shaping the security situation.
7. Finally, there are procedures internal to the national
security affairs staff that facilitate the work of the whole structure,
keep up momentum, and assure that departmental operations
conform to policy and are adequately coordinated. Included among
specific procedures are:
a. Continuing review of the adequacy and effectiveness
of national security machinery.
b. Search for new approaches and new issues for study
that could result in improved policy.
C. A continuing look at departmental actions from the
standpoint of Presidential policy and decision.
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13 December 1968
MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Priority List of Security Projects.
1. In the thought that suggestions for a priority listing of security
affairs planning and study "projects" may be useful, I submit the
following contribution:
a. Immediate projects:
(1) Vietnam
(2) NATO
(3) USSR and Eastern Europe
(4) Basic National Security Policy*
(5) Middle East
(6) Assessment of U.S. Military Security Position
(7) Assessment of Status of U.S. Defense Research
(8) Defense Organization and Management Methods
2. Most of these are self-explanatory, and the reasons for their
inclusion self-evident. Item (4), marked *, Basic National Security
Policy, is conceived ofnnot as a comprehensive catalogue, but as
something analogous to an early study of U.S. posture and concept
in the Eisenhower Administration. (It examined three broad alternatives
of policy based, respectively, upon roll-back, containment, or drawing
a line).
3. Second List:
(1) Communist China
(2) UN
(3) U.S. Organization Overseas
b
A. J. GOODPASTER
General, United States Army
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15 December 1968
MEMORANDUM FOR: Dr. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Defense Organization and Management Procedures
1. This memorandum responds to your request for views concern-
ing organization and operation of DOD at the OSD/JCS level. It
undertakes to identify steps that might be considered to improve
and strengthen this organization and operation.
2. The clear, guiding purpose and criterion for an inquiry of this
kind should always be, I believe, the military security of the United
States. It is against this criterion that the concerns currently
voiced should be weighed. The concerns, in the aggregate, are
that although significant innovations in management techniques
have been made in recent years, serious problem areas have
developed. As to the factors responsible, the following are re-
peatedly cited:
a. Increased size and structure of OSD, involving increased
centralization and inappropriate placement of responsibility for
detailed program formulation.
b. Arrangements which exclude the JCS from full and mean-
ingful participation in the formulation of force and weapons pro-
grams.
C. Insufficient recognition and consideration of military as-
pects of major security and strategic decisions, and of JCS advice
thereon.
3. There is a feeling that the performance of the Military Depart-
ments, the JCS within the role permitted to them, and the field
forces has been positive and effective. In contrast, there is a
feeling that, at OSD level, there have been problems of delay,
excessive impediments to new developments and processes, and
substitution of less qualified civilian staff judgment for military
judgment, particularly on program and international issues having
deep military content.
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4. Proposals for improvement tend to focus on two things: a)
major surgery at the ASD level; b) strengthening the JCS contri-
bution, and making better use of it. Detailed suggestions selected
from among these proposals are contained in the attached notes.
5. The overall effect of actions along the lines detailed therein
would be to restore the role of OSD to one of control over the
military structure rather than centralized performance of detailed
programming and provision of military advice. As pointed out in
the notes, the steps would place added responsibility on the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and require them to strengthen their capability to
discharge it.
6. The aim of the changes would be to improve the advice reaching
the President and the Secretary of Defense, to improve the validity
of the program-formulation process, and hence to give better sup-
port to the Secretary than he can receive from having this type of
work performed in elements of the ASD-level staff. The changes
thus should fulfill the purpose and criterion stated in paragraph 2,
above.
7. One further effect should be noted. The changes will on occasion
cause the President to be more directly confronted with the views
of the JCS, and will result in these views having an identity of their
own; rather than being embodied in OSD documents. The tendency
for OSD to serve as an opaque buffer between the President and the
JCS will thus be diminished. In a sense this shift may increase the
burden on the President. The steps imply however that the JCS
will themselves take increased responsibility and more of the bur-
den of developing military plans and programs within a realistic
total context--political, economic and military--conforming to the
overall determinations of the President.
8. A source of difficulty in recent years has been the dictum that
military requirements were supposed to be met, or would be met,
without regard to economic and financial constraints. The purpose
of this was widely thought to be one of avoiding the charge that a
budget "ceiling" was being imposed upon military security needs.
In actual fact there is no way to avoid the necessity of ultimately
setting military programs with consideration of both military needs
and financial resource availabilities. In consequence, the policy
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as stated seems in practice to have been fulfilled through the
technique of refusing to accept as requirements any recommen-
dations which went beyond such constraints or "guidelines"; in
the process, the determination (specifically, the application of
the financial guidelines) was kept in OSD, beyond the knowledge
and participation of the JCS. An implication of the proposals
listed herein is that the JCS would have to accept, and to parti-
cipate meaningfully in, the process of considering military
needs against financial constraints.
9. Changes as far-reaching in their ramifications as those de-
tailed herein should only be introduced after the most searching
and thorough exploration and deliberation. Accordingly, they
are presented here only as specific matters for consideration.
A. J. GOODPASTER
General, United States Army
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NOTES ON CHANGES IN ORGANIZATION AND
OPERATION -- OSD AND JCS
(SUGGESTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION)
CHANGES AT OSD LEVEL
1. In general, the proposals are to reduce the number of ASD's,
and drastically reduce their staffs. Management should be de-
centralized and streamlined by pushing meaningful participation
in decision making to JCS and Military Department level. ASD's
should be taken out of the detailed programming business. Their
role should be restored to one of reviewing, questioning, probing,
and unifying the work of the Department, rather than superseding
program development and military advisory functions in the JCS
and the Military Departments. They should advise the Secretary
and Deputy Secretary of Defense but should not undertake to "do it
themselves. " Their staffs should be a balance of civilian and mili-
tary, and should be reduced in total numbers to accord with the
reduced function. Specific steps for consideration include:
a. Eliminate ASD (SA). Put a reduced systems analysis func-
tion under the Comptroller. Put a competent systems analysis
function in the Joint Staff.
b. Overhaul ISA, reducing it to a small advisory group. Trans-
fer ISA's detailed planning and staff functions to the Joint Staff.
C. Eliminate ATSD (A/E).
d. Continue ASD (Admin) with some reduction in personnel.
Realign DINS to report to the Chairman JCS, but to provide inspec-
tion services for OSD elements.
e. Reduce weapons development lead time from research to
delivery. Encourage more starts; weed out nonperformers prior
to major expenditures.
f. Reinstitute the Armed Forces Policy Council.
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CHANGES AT JCS LEVEL
2. In general, the proposals are intended to provide for more
meaningful participation by the JCS, and provision of their judg-
ment and advice on major issues; to place more responsibility on
them; and to require steps that would strengthen their capability
to discharge it. Specific steps for consideration are:
a. Submit JCS advice on operational matters directly to the
President, with SECDEF providing his comments and views if he
desires.
b. Insure that within DOD only SECDEF or DEPSECDEF will
overrule JCS views and recommendations submitted to them, or
change them, disregard them, set them aside or defer action on
them, or hold them "for continuing consideration. 11
c. Direct the Chairman JCS to provide for Joint Staff repre-
sentation on interdepartmental groups within the National Security
Affairs structure.
d. Direct the Chairman JCS to provide for staff-level support,
advice and assistance to OSD elements by the Joint Staff.
e. Introduce an appropriate proportion of civilians into the
Joint Staff. Raise the present restriction on the numbers of per-
sonnel in the Joint Staff.
f. Require the Joint Chiefs of Staff to concentrate their atten-
tion on major issues and guiding policies. Eliminate every ves-
tige of the "veto" by services at levels below the JCS themselves.
Charge the Chairman with responsibility for procedures to achieve
timely and valid action by the JCS on program issues, strategic
advice and recommendations, and military advice at staff levels.
Vest the Chairman with the authority and responsibility to imple-
ment decisions and act within established policy, utilizing the
Joint Staff as necessary.
g. Elevate the Chairman JCS to the next higher grade. Make
the Director Joint Staff a four-star officer.
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MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER
FROM: GENERAL A. J. GOODPASTER
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has been reviewed pursuant to E.O. 13526 and has been determined to be (