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Saunders Memoranda - Sensitive Egypt/Hafez Ismail 1973 [2 of 5]
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MEMORANDUM
Egypt-Sensitive
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
April 25, 1974
MEMORANDUM FOR:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
BRENT SCOWCROFT
B
Attached are materials dealing with the following aspects of
your discussions with Egypt:
Tab A - Cairo/Washington Hotline
Tab B - Cairo/Jidda Hotline
Tab C - Egyptian Commercial Aircraft Purchase
Tab D - Military Equipment for Cairo
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
A
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET
Status Report on Cairo/Washington Hotline
In late March we proposed to the Egyptians a dedicated cable circuit
between Washington and Cairo. The United States would pay all
leasing costs (approximately $140, 000 annually) and make all
installations.
After some delay the Egyptians responded with a request for the
hotline to go via satellite rather than submarine cable. There are
no differences between the two methods insofar as hotline communi-
cations themselves are concerned, but the satellite route would
provide the Egyptians with greater communication potential (up to
24 circuits). There are, however, some complicating factors. In
order to receive a satellite signal, Egypt must lease a portable
earth station until such time as a permanent station can be constructed
(at least one year). An earth station can be made available to Egypt
only after approval by the countries of the Intelsat Community. That
is only a formality, but it would obviously become very widely known
and would be big news in the communications industry. Under these
conditions, there is no way that the United States could pick up the
leasing costs for the earth station. (COMSAT has shaved the costs
as closely as they can, but they would still run about $250, 000 per
year.) The U.S. would still be able to pay the satellite circuit costs
in a discreet manner, however, ($90, 000 - $130, 000 annually) but,
at least for "cover" purposes, the Egyptians would probably have to
lease openly one additional circuit from Cairo to their embassy here
in Washington.
This latter setup was agreed upon between the U.S. and Egyptian
technicians here in Washington, and arrangements were made last week
for COMSAT people to go to Cairo to arrange for the earth station.
Marwan, however, has held up the COMSAT trip because he is
apparently confused about the costs (see attached cable). As you
recall, you had told Marwan we should pay for the hotline. As I have
explained above, we will pay for the hotline, but we cannot pay for
the earth station nor for any additional "cover" circuit to Washington.
I think that once you explain the situation, the Egyptians will still opt
for the satellite circuit, although if they wish to return to the submarine
cable route we can pick up the entire cost. An additional advantage
of the satellite route is that the earth station has a capability of
handling 24 circuits. It takes only a matter of hours to order up any
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET
2
of these additional circuits, so that with the earth station Egypt will
be in a position to do such things as to bring special television programs
from the U.S. or elsewhere, to add special circuits for Sadat when
he travels (assuming earth stations near his destination), and so forth.
SECRET
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
No Objection To Declassification 2009/01/29 : NLN-HAK-130-3-1-2
*******
SECRET
*******S COPY
25X1
ROUTINE
DE
#0144 1141535
R 241258Z APR 74
FM CAIRO
TO THE WHITE HOUSE
SECRE T SENSITIVE 241258Z APR 74
25X1
APRIL 24, 1974
TO: GENERAL SCOWCROFT
FROM: AMBASSADOR EILTS, CAIRO 144
1. IN CONNECTION WITH TEMPORARY EARTH SATELLITE STATION,
I HAD UNDERSTOOD FROM WALDMAN THAT THIS WAS NO LONGER A
USG AFFAIR, BUT THAT TWO COMSAT OFFICIALS WOULD BE ARRIVING
IN CAIRO TODAY TO DISCUSS PROJECT WITH EGYPTIANS. HAVE
SINCE BEEN TOLD
THAT ENGINEER GALAL
25X1
OF MARWAN'S OFFICE TELEPHONE URGENTLY LAST NIGHT TO ASK
THAT THEIR TRIP BE CALLED OFF AND
COMMUNICATED
25X1
WITH GENERAL ADAMS TO ARRANGE THIS.
2. THIS MORNING ASHRAF MARWAN TELEPHONED TO EXPLAIN WHAT
HAD HAPPENED. ACCORDING TO MARWAN, THE SECRETARY HAD TOLD
MARWAN IN WASHINGTON THAT THERE SHOULD BE "HOT LINE" BETWEEN
CAIRO AND WASHINGTON AND THAT USG WILL PAY FOR IT. WHEN
GALAL TALKED WITH ADAMS, THE LATTER APPARENTLY SAID USG
WOULD PAY FOR THE LINE, BUT NOT FOR THE TEMPORARY EARTH
STATION. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, MARWAN FELT IT WAS
PREMATURE FOR COMSAT PEOPLE TO ARRIVE. HE HOPES THAT
THE SECRETARY CAN "FINALIZE" WHAT EXACTLY USG IS PREPARED
TO DO ON THE "HOT LINE" AND TEMPORARY EARTH STATION DURING
THE UPCOMING VISIT.
3. IF THERE IS ANYTHING I SHOULD TELL MARWAN ON EITHER
OF THESE BEFORE THE SECRETARY ARRIVES, PLEASE ADVISE
URGENTLY.
4. WARM REGARDS.
170
ON-FILE NSC RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY
State Dept. review completed
:
JHS 2/6/2012
WHSR COMMENT
SCOWCROFT,BURKE,MCFARLANE.RODMAN
PSN:019928
PAGE 01
OF 01
TOR:114/15:48Z
DTG:241258Z APR 74
*******
SECRET
*******S COPY
No Objection To Declassification 2009/01/29 : NLN-HAK-130-3-1-2
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
No Objection To Declassification 2009/01/29 : NLN-HAK-130-3-1-2
SECRET/SENSITIVE
CAIRO/JIDDA HOTLINE
25X1
everything is proceeding well with regard to the
25X1
Cairo/Jidda Hotline.
now in the process of procuring the
25X1
necessary equipment.
estimates that completion of pro-
curement and installation will take perhaps three months (some
of the equipment must be manufactured to specification).
SECRET/SENSITIVE
No Objection To Declassification 2009/01/29 : NLN-HAK-130-3-1-2
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
C
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Egyptian Commercial Aircraft Purchase
Roy Atherton will have an information memo for you on this
subject.
Attached are the related cables from Eilts.
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
Lax- Wtt
OF STATE
Department of State
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TELEGRAM
SECRET
7
R 231200Z APR 74
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6292
CONTROL: 6205Q
BT
RECD: 23 APR 14 46Z
SECRET CAIRO 2497
NODIS/CHEROKEE
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR ETRN BEXP EG
SUBJECT: DC-9'S
1. FAHMY TOLD ME AI GERMAN RECEPTION LAST EVENING THAT
GOE UNDERSTANDS YOUR CONCURRENCE IS NEEDED FOR THE
POSSIBLE SALE OF TWELVE DC-9'S AND 10'S TO EGYPT. HE HAD
APPARENTLY GOTTEN HIS INFORMATION FROM EGYPTIAN CIVIL
AVIATION AUTHORITIES, WHO HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING WITH
DOUGLAS REPRESENTATIVES ACQUISITION OF ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT.
IF IT IS NEEDED, HE ASKED THAT YOU GIVE APPROVAL IN
PRINCIPAL TO SUCH SALES.
2. QUITE BY CHANGE LATER IN THE EVENING I ENCOUNTERED
ONE OF THE DOUGLAS REPRESENTATIVES NOW HERE. HE
TOLD ME THAT YOU WILL BE ASKED DURING YOUR FORTHCOMING
TRIP THAT USG PROVIDE AN UNSPECIFIED NUMBER OF C-9B'S.
HE DESCRIBED THIS AS THE NAVY VERSION OF THE DC-9 9 FOR
COMMERCIAL USE. DOUGLAS REPRESENTATIVE IS COMING BY
TOMORROW TO PROVIDE MORE DETAILS. IT YOU DO NOT ALREADY
KNOW OF THIS FROM TALKS WITH FAHMY, I THOUGH YOU SHOULD
BE FOREWARNED.
EILTS
BT
#2497
S
SECRET,
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
UN-LOX
11
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Department of State
TELEGRAM
SECRET
R 2413052 APR 74
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
6671Q
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6320
Apr 24, 1974
BT
17:25Z
SECRET CAIRO 2542
NODIS CHEROKEE
N
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR
200
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR ETRN EG BEXP
SUBJ: DC-9'S
REF: CAIRO 2497
1. DOUGLAS REPRESENTATIVE CALLED TODAY TO EXPLAIN WHAT
GOE HAS IN MIND IN CONNECTION WITH ACQUISITION OF DOUGLAS
AIRCRAFT. ACCORDING TO HIM, EGYPTAIR OFFICIALS,
S
WHO HAVE BEEN HIS CONTACTS, UNDERSTAND THAT GOE WILL
REQUEST THE SECRETARY ON HIS UPCOMING VISIT TO AGREE TO
THE SALE OF A NUMBER OF C-9B'S FOR USE BY THE EGYPTIAN
MILITARY. THE INITIAL NUMBER OULD BE FIVE, BUT MORE
MIGHT BE BOUGHT LATER. EGYPTAIR WOULD LIKE TO TIE IN
THE SALE OF THESE AIRCRAFT TO AN ADDITIONAL SIX DC-9'S
FOR USE BY THE AIRLINE.
2. DOUGLAS REPRESENTATIVE STRESSED EGYPTIANS HAVE
BEEN TALKING ABOUT PURCHASE, BUT HAD NO RPT NO,
INFO RE PROPOSED FINANCING.
3. IF SALE GOES THROUGH, DOUGLAS IS ALSO THINKING OF
ESTABLISHING MAINTENANCE FACILITY AND SPARE PARTS
INVENTORY IN CAIRO TO SERVICE BOTH EGYPTIAN CIVILIAN
AND MILITARY DOUGLAS BUILD AIRCRAFT.
EILTS
S
SECRET
NOT TO BE REPRODU Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSTFIUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
D
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order. 13526 and has been determined to bei declassified
[SECRET/SENSITIVE]
August 20, 1974
Dear Mr. Foreign Minister:
As Secretary Kissinger promised, attached is the list
of military equipment indicating dates of availability.
In some cases, where the items must come from the
production line, you will note that scheduled availability
from production is far into the future. On those items,
we will take whatever steps we can to develop a better
production schedule or otherwise reduce deliver time,
and those lead times should not at this point be considered
definitive.
If you have any immediate questions on the list, you
could give a note to the courier who delivers this. Any
further questions could probably best be passed through
General Guay.
Sincerely,
Brent Scowcroft
Lieutenant General, USAF
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
His Excellency
Ismail Fahmy
Minister of Foreign Affairs
of Egypt
(Llelivered by Cerrier)
SECRET
(3)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
ED
bi
A. KISSINGER
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
(SECRET/SENSITIVE]
ITEM
AVAILABILITY
Unattended Sensors
Available from production line with a lead
for Tanks & Personnel
time of 12 months for first delivery
Bomb, CBU-58
Available within 90 days
Portable Lightweight
AN/APR-39 (for helicopter) available from
Sensors
production line with lead time of 6 months
Torpedoes, MK-46
Available from production line with deliveries
during August-October 1975. Also requires
aircraft change kit for Sea King helicopter
Helicopter (Huey B)
Available in "as is" condition, equipped with
SS-11 missile, within 60 days. With over-
haul would require additional 6 months
Radar, TPS-58A
Available from production line beginning
July 1977. Sale requires agreement of
France and Germany
TOW Launcher
Available from production line with lead time
of 30 months for first deliveries
TOW Missile
Same as TOW Launcher
Drone, Target
Target drones are available within 90 days
without control system. (No control sytem
is available). Ground launched reconnaissance
drone is available from production beginning
18 months after signature of letter of offer.
Bomb, ROCKEYE
Available within 90 days
MAVERICK
Available within 90 days (would require air-
craft modification)
WALLEYE
Available within 90 days (would require air-
craft modification)
F-4
Delivery times not yet available
175
Available from production line beginning in
October 1976
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
SECRET/SENSITIVE
April 1, 1974
Henry --
These are informal Defense recommendations
on the Egyptian request list.
Defense proposes providing only the first four
items (about $10 million). Their reasons for
denying the other items are threefold:
(1) Susceptibility to technical compromise
(i. e., mistrust of Egyptians).
(2) Similar equipment has not been provided
the Israelis.
(3) Equipment still in R&D status.
In addition, there were a couple of items not
identifiable from the description.
Price of the total identifiable request list is only
about $260 million.
There is also the question of the legal aspects of
third country transfer. Saunders has a separate
paper for you on that issue.
(I have checked a couple of additional items
which it appears could easily be provided, even
within Defense's restrictive parameters. )
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
Brent
ocument has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be decla
Attachment to
BS Note of
April 1974
SECRET
SENSITIVE
ANALYSIS OF REQUEST
EXTENDED
ITEM
QUANTITY
PRICE
Unattended Seasors for
10
+
$ 14,870
Banks: Itemmost closely meeting deccriptic is AM/02-154 MINISID
detection of enery tanks
III, I ich requires 1 AN/039-46 PROTENTALE !!! for sensor read-out.
and personal (Ser 8)
Items could be provided firm production /o dignificant inpact with
12 month production leaitime. Could probibly be provided from
U.S. stocks (Anny/MC), but impact on US Forces is unknown.
Recessation: Agree to provide; take freea US stocks.
Portable Lighweight Sensors to
20 helo
avoid detection by encury radars
10 usen
+
$ 265,000
Remarks: AN/APR-39 (1:e1o) could be produced from producti with
(w/Spt cquip)
PTT of 6 months. AN/185-10 (mikid) (2kn) is development item w/first
(for men & helicopters) (Ser 7)
production schoduled for FY77. Not considered feasible.
Recommendation: Agree to provide AN/APR-39 from production
Torpodees, MK46 (Ser 2)
70
$8,500,000
Ramarks: Can provide from production w/deliveries Aug-Oct 75.
Could from Navy stock, but would represent 18: drawdown; considered
unacceptable inpact. Also requires aircraft change kit, none of
which are on procurement -PLT unavailable. Do not know that aircraft
change kit (which requires 430 minhours for installation) could be
installed on foreign-produced Sea King helicopter.
Recommendation: Agree to provide free precurement contingent upon
determination of compatibility of aircraft change kit w/Sea King
helicopter.
Anti-Personnel Cluster Romb
100
+
152,000
Renarks: Item immediately available from stock w/no impact on
(CRI-53) (Ser 16)
USAF cepability. DIA states item could be insuranted on MIG-21
w/only ninor nolification to aircraft required.
Recommendation: Agree to provide.
Anti-Tax Cluster Forb
100
+
$ 249,000
Remarks: Item immediately available frui stock w/no impact on USAF
(ROCKEYE, (SU-MK20)
capability. DIA states item could be mounted on MIG-21 w/only uinor
(Ser 16)
podification to aircraft required. In the past, this arsor
piercin: munition has been considered very sensitive.
Recousendation: Do not provide due to potential technical intelligence
and pro- action exploitation.
SECRET.
SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has beenreviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET
SENSITIVE
Page 2
ENTENDED
ITBI
QUANTITY
PRICE
MAVERICK (Ser 14)
100
+
$ 2,400,000
Reserts: Item immediately available from stock w/no impact on USAF
x
capability. Bould require extensive modification of aircraft (MIG-21),
cost of which cannot be estimated. Also no information available
as to :bility to provide equipment required for aircraft sodification.
Munition and guidance system considered sensitive.
Recommendation: Do not provide due to potential technical
intelligence and production exploitation.
WALLEYE (Ser 15)
x 200
$ 320,000
Remarks: Same as for MAVERICK.
become indation: Same as for MAVERICK
CORRA-TOW
24
$31,500,000
Rewarks: Could be provided from procurement w/PLT of 36mos. Air-
Helicopters
craft schoduled for precurement does not have all weather or night
passive vision equipment; AAB is first helicepter to be so equipped
and will not be available until the 1980s. It skiuld be noted that
Israeli request for Cobra has been refused.
Recommendation: Deny request.
TOP Launcher (Ser 3)
100
+
$ 2,600,000
Remarks: Can be provided from new procurement w/ilt of 18 mos.
Diversion from Arwy stocks or scholuled procuresent considered
unacceptable inpact. System considered sensitive due to potential
technical intelligence and production exploitation.
Recomm ndation: Deny request.
Firebce Drones (Ser 5)
48 +
65,000,000
Remarks: Request is for three types: low altitude target, high
altitu'e target and recce, all to be ground launched. Target
drones, AGE and spares could be provided w/no impict. Bowever,
no centrol system is available (the four in USAF investory are
perminent installations, not suitable for coverant) and information
is available as to lead time required to procure. There are no
ground launched recce drones in USAF inventory. Could be provided
at rate of 3 neaths beginning 18 mos after signing letter of offer.
Control station problem still pertains.
Records adation: Dairy request.
SECRET
SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET
SENSITIVE
Page 3
EXTENDED
17734
QUANTITY
PRICE
Field Serveillance
5
$ 2,500,000
Reaarks: Anny has 110 radar with range requested. Could provide
AN/TPS-53A from procureaent beginning FY73. Ridar has range of
10 ni for personnel and 20 miles for vehicles. Radar is produced
under co-production agreement which requires approval of FRG and
France for sale to third country. Sale to Israel luis been denied
on this basis.
Recommendation: Deny request.
Aerial Caseras
8
$ 5,000,000
Renarks: Could provide from production at rate of 1 a month
(Ser 9)
beginning 7 mos after signing og letter of Offer. Heaver,
Israeli requests for high resolution photographer recce capability
has been denied up to this time.
Recommendation: Exny request.
Panasonic Proad
V 5
Bank Receiver (30-500 MS)
Remarks: Check with Anny, NSA & ASA indicates that no equipment
fitting description is available.
Recommendation: Deny request.
IV
Aircraft equipped for radar
3
$68,300,000
Reserks: Could be supplied first new procurement s/PLT of 1800s
jumming (LB-6) (Ser 11)
Aircraft and associated FCM equipment considered extremly
sensitive and subject to technical intelligence and production
exploitation. BOX is developed, would place CVAs in severe
jeopardy, Similar repiest from Israelis has been denied.
Recommend tion: Deny request.
Electronic Rocce
- 2
$11,600,000
Aircraft (Ser 12)
Rearks: System requested not addressed due to special sonsitivities.
An alternate system designed for use in the RF-4 could be rade
available from production in 31 months, but adaptability to MIG
aircraft is unknown. Alternate system also sensitive due to
potential for technical intelligence and production exploitation.
Israeli request for similar capability has been denied.
Recommendation: Deny request.
at the Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET SENSITIVE
Page 4
EXTEND
ITM
CUNNTITY
PRICE
REMARES/RECOM/ENDATION
Laser Range Finders
7 100
$ 250,000
Remirks: Item currently under development. 1b substitute available.
for Artillery OPS
Could be supplied frem progrement beginning
(Ser 12)
Recomendation: Deny request.
Aircraft equipped as airborne
- 1
$ 9,400,000
Remarks: Could provide from new production a C-130 with an Airborne
operations and control units
Bittlefield Countried and Centrol Center capsule, W/PLT 18:0s.
(Ser 17)
Providing from USAF assets considered unacceptable impact. Syster
is interio until ANACS (E-3A) is available in 3QFY77. Israeli
request for similar capability has been denied.
Recommendation: Deny request.
UFF Direction Finder,
U
$
Remarks: Fer Army, no such capability currently exists. OCRD
Mcbile (200-500 YCS)
states that R&D in out years is planned, AF has AN/CRD-6, with
(Ser 18)
25-400 MCS coverage, but system is fixed installation. No
price and availability data available.
Recommendation: Dury request.
OTAL
$217,875,870
SECRET SENSITIVE
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
Military Equipment for Egypt
Attached at Tab I are the recommendations of Defense on the equip-
ment list submitted by the Egyptians at Tab II.
The items which Defense does not wish to provide are as follows:
1.
Aerial cameras (Ser 9) -- This is highly sophisticated
equipment.
2.
E6 B aircraft for radar jamming. (Ser 11) - - Very
sensitive equipment provided to no other country.
3.
Electronic reconnaissance aircraft (Ser 12) -- Also
extremely sensitive equipment.
4.
Aircraft equiped as AWACS (Ser 17) -- Highly sophis-
ticated equipment.
5.
Artillery laser range finders (Ser 12) -- This is still
an R & D item.
Two other items could not be identified.
1.
Panoramic broad band receivers (30-500 MCS) (Ser 10)
2.
UHF mobile direction finder (200-500 MCS) (Ser 18)
While Defense is prepared to furnish the remaining items, contained
in the list at Tab I, there will on some of them be a question of time
of availability.
Note that the Defense list contains 16 F-4 aircraft. These have
been added solely because the MAVERICK and WALLEYE missiles
cannot be adapted to MIG aircraft. In other words, without the
F-4, they are worthless.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
TOP SECRET Associate XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED
BY:
HERRY at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
Ser. Qty.
Type
1
24
Helicopters Huey Cobra equipped for all weather operations
complete with passive night vision equipment for fire
control and opertional observatiom. Armament to include
TOW A/TK missiles.
2
70
Torpedoes MK 46 Anti Submarine to be launched from heli-
copters, 60 live torpedoes, and Lo for training. Fire
control computers and system for 6 helicopters (Sea-
King ).
3
400
Launchers TOW anti/TK missiles.
4
4000
TOW anti/TK missiles (3000 live warheads, 1000 practic
heads ).
5
48
Firebee Drones (different types) for target practice for
aircraft and air defence missiles, low and high altitude.
The number will include some drones dedicated to recce
work for low and high altitude fotography all to be launch-
ed from the ground. Sensors and other means for electronic
recce also to be negociated..
6
5
Field surveillance radars with rang up to 40Km (cars).
7
20
Portable lightweight sensors to avoid detection by enemy
radars ; (different Freq. to be used by men and helicopters)
8
10
Unatended sensors to detect enemy tank and car traffic in
enemy rear and relay information by wireless.
9
8
Aerial cameras for highest resolution oblique fotography
from-10 14-18 Km to cover ranges of 10 to 60 Km to
give scales of 1;6-8000 (camers to be mounted in pods-
films suitable for high speed processing- aircraft high
speed)
.
10
5
Panoramic broad band receivers (30- 500 mcs) high precision
with automatic search.
TOP SECRET - XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
Ser
Qty
Type
11
3
Aircraft equipped for radar jamming all bands (EB-6)
12
2
Electronic recce aircraft (to cover wireless and
radar Freq. all necessary equipment for recording,
analysis and data link with ground station.
13
100
Laser range finders for field artillery o, Ps
14
100
Maveric air to ground missiles (if it could be mounted
on our Migs).
15n
200
Walleye TV guided air to surface (if it could be mounted
on our Migs).
16
100
each of AP and A/TK clusters (Flechettes and pellets)
if they could be mounted on our aircrafts.
17
1
Aircraft equiped as airborne operations and control
center for fighters.
18
5
UHF Direction finder stations mobile (200 -500 MCS )
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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I
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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QUANTITY
QUANTITY
DOLLAR
SERIAL #
ITEM
REQUESTED
OFFERED
VALUE
COMMENT
8
Unattended Sensors
10
60
89,500
Quantity increased in
for Tanks & Personnel
order to permit efficient
deployment pattern.
16
Bomb, CBU-58
100
300
456,000
7
Portable Lightweight
20
20
265,000
Sensors
2
Torpedoes, MK-46
70
70
8,500,000
1
Helicopter (Huey B)
24
24
15,000,000
Defense proposes the
Huey B in place of the
Cobra. There is no
TOW package as yet for
use on helicopters The
Huey B can accommodate
the SS-11 or other port-
able anti-tank missiles.
6
Radar, TPS-58A
5
10
5,000,000
Quantity of 10 recom-
mended for better
coverage.
3
TOW Launcher
100
200
5,200,000
There will be an obvious
availability problem on
this item.
4
TOW Missiles
4000
7500
26,000,000
5
Drone, Target
48
24
30,000,000
Only Target Drones can
be provided. There are
no ground launched
RECCE Drones in U.S.
inventory
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- 2 - - -
QUANTITY
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SERIAL # ITEM
REQUESTED
OFFERED
VALUE
COMMENT
16
Bomb, ROCKEYE
100
300
750,000
14
MAVERICK
100
200
4,800,000
Adaptable only to F-4
aircraft.
15
WALLEYE
200
200
320,000
Adaptable only to F-4
aircraft.
New
F-4
0
16
84,000,000
Required for use with
MAVERICK and
WALLEYE.
Total Dollar Value - $180,380,500
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SECRET/ ENSITIVE
QUANTITY
QUANTITY
DOLLAR
SERIAL # ITEM
REQUESTED
OFFERED
VALUE
AVAILABILITY
8
Unattended Sensors
10
60
89,500
From production with 12 mos.
for Tanks & Personnel
lead time. From stockpile with
unacceptable impact.
16
Bomb, CBU-58
100
300
456,000
Immediately available.
7
Portable Lightweight
20
20
265,000
From production with 6 mos.
Sensors
PLT.
2
Torpedoes, MK-46
70
70
8,500,000
From production w/delivery Aug
Oct 75. From stockpile is 18%
drawdown.
1
Helicopter (Huey B)
24 mil enth 24
15,000,000
UHIB
service
as almot 60dwyo. 6
6
Radar, TPS-58A
5
10
5,000,000
From production by FY 78.
Requires third country approval.
3
TOW Launcher
100
200
5,200,000
From production w/30 mos. PLT
From stock w/unacceptable
impact.
TOW Missiles
4000
7500
26,000,000
Same as launcher.
(i)
Drone, Target
48
24
30,000,000
Available but without control
system.
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QUANTITY
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REQUESTED
OFFERED
VALUE
AVAILABILITY
16
Bomb, ROCKEYE
100
300
750,000
Immediately available.
14
MAVERICK
100
200
4,800,000
Immediately available.
15
WALLEYE
200
200
320,000
Immediately available.
New
F-4
0
16
84,000,000
175mm SP Gun
40
11,666,960
From production by Oct 76.
(Army has only 129 total) Pro-
(M107)
curement begins in 1976. 36 for
Israel from 76 procurement @
5 per month.
Total Dollar Value - $192, 047, 460
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SANITIZED COPY
EO 12958
3.3 (b) (1) >25Yrs
THE WHITE HOUSE
(S)
WASHINGTON
SANITIZED
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY (XGDS)
SUBJECT:
Message for
"1. Dr. Kissinger appreciates
message of June 11.
"2. In the February meeting with Dr. Kissinger,
proposed that Dr. Kissinger talk with both Egyptians and Israelis
and then attempt to develop some heads of agreement on an overall
Egyptian-Israeli settlement which could serve as a basis for
negotiation of provisions to implement them. Dr. Kissinger has
agreed that this could be a reasonable way to proceed but has made
two points:
"a. He has said that it would be important to keep these
principles general enough SO that while they would address
all the major issues in a settlement, they would not attempt
to resolve issues that can only be resolved definitively
through the give-and-take of a negotiating process. Otherwise
the discussion could lead to immediate deadlock. He has
explained the practical reasons why this approach could
enhance the effectiveness of US involvement.
"b. Within that context, Dr. Kissinger has noted that the
SANITIZED
Egyptian side would consider engaging in simultaneous
concrete discussions of the first step toward an overall
settlement. In this case, Dr. Kissinger assured
that the US would be prepared to declare publicly that these
discussions would take place with the clear understanding
that they represented a first step in a broader understanding.
XGDS. - 3
DECLAS Date Impossible to Determine.
BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY (XGDS)
DECLASSIFIED
SANITIZED COPY
E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5
NLN 03-01/4
sec. 3.3 AUG 2 6 2003
By
2
Date
AUG
2007
[p.lof2]
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- 2 -
He suggested that any such declaration would make
clear that these discussions would not attempt to cover
all issues in a settlement since some would be handled
SANITIZED
in separate talks on an overall agreement.
3.3 (6)(1)(b)
"3. The question which Dr. Kissinger is now putting to
relates to the former--to the heads of agreement on an overall
settlement. The question is whether the Egyptian side would regard
as helpful serious US-Soviet discussion of possible principles of
agreement for an overall settlement.
"4. Since Chairman Brezhnev will arrive in Washington June 18,
it would be helpful to have
reply as soon as possible.
"5. In reference to
comment on Ambassador Scali's
statement, Dr. Kissinger assures
that there is no
discussion in Washington of a 'mutual' pullback of forces from the
Suez Canal. The position of the US Government cannot be judged
on the basis of erroneous reports in the press. 11
Henry A. Kissinger
SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY (XGDS)
[p 2 of 2]
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written night of
2/25/73 as
summary of
first day's talks
I. Main points in Ismail's presentation:
A. Urgency: a settlement in 1973. The area can't
stand waiting for 15 years while new relationships
evolue, as some Israeli leaders recommend.
B. Objective:
1. A Middle East of strong, healthy, upperative,
independent states. whether Israel is among them
depends on whether Israel recognizes itself as a
Middle Eastern state. A settlement could be a
basis for normalization of relations, but that
would take a long time.
2. An Eqypt - Israel agreement would establish a
state. of peace. This would end the state of war,
but would not be full peace.
-- This agreement would produce a situation
different from the Eqypt-Israel relationship
K
before 1967 in that it would:
-- allow Israel free passage through waterways;
-- end the boycott on Third-party goods;
-- commit Eqypt to prevent querrilla
to extent possible!
operations from Egyptian soil and charles
-- end Egypt's "reservation" on multilateral
agreements;
radio -- commit each side to non-intervention.
" It would not include exchanging ambassadors,
trade agreements, borders open for routine
travel. These would be characteristics of
later normalization.
3. Normalization is an objective, but that will
take time. will depend on a refugee
settlement.
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- 2-
C. There are two main aspects of a settlement:
1. Israel's return to pre-war borders.
2. Palestinian rights. The problem should be
reduced to the size of Arab and Jewish
communities in Palestine deciding how
to divide the territory and how to live together.
-- Eqypt would pose no objection if Hussein
got the West Bank back and then gave
the West Bank Palestinians a chance to
determine their own future.
-- A refugee settlement is necessary.
-- Gaza must have self-determination.
Egypt will hundle the negotiation
leading to this.
D. Israel's "legitimate security concerns can be met:
-- "Legitimate concerns include international
quarantees and Eqyptian peace
commit ments.
-- "Illegitimate concerns" are a desire
for a presence at Sharm at- Shaikh
and in the Sinai . These are political,
E. The problem can be settled by stages and
by sectors, but they must be linked so as
to lead to an overall settlement. There must
be a full settlement. Eqypt cannot accept
a partial withdrawal "left hanging."
F. The big powers and UN should state what
kind of Israel they envisage
univitially at
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- 3-
II. What was new in Ismail's presentation?
In its essential points this was The familiar
Egyptian position. However, There seemed to
be three new points of emphasis,none dramatic:
A. Normalization of relations between
Egypt and Israel. Although Ismail
said this would take a long time, he
spoke of normalization as being at
the end of the road. If this could
be developed concretely and related
to steps in the settlement process, it
could be useful in persuading Israel
that Egypt would be willing to have a
normal relationship.
B. Eqypt has not publicly endorsed
Hussein's plan for a United Arab Kingdom.
Ismail seemed to say Egypt would pose
no objection to Hussein's getting the
self-datermination. West Bank back and granting
C. Eqypt has indicated before that it does
not want Gaza but that it must
remain Arab. More seemed to be said
yesterday Than previously about
the mechanics (UN auspices)with Eqypt
handling its negotiation) of achieving
self- determination.
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-4- -
III. Questions for further elaboration
The following are questions for further
Egyptian elaboration either in discussion
now or in writing before the next
meeting:
A.
Can Egypt be more precise about the
relationship that would exist between Eqypt
Why not distinguish
and Israel when a peace agreement is
between "peace" and
normalization
signed and about how further normalization
rather Than between
peace? de facto and de jure
would take place? Can hormalization be
stages of of
related to other developments (e.g. a refugee
settlement) ? To phasing of agreements?
B. How, precisely, might Israel's security needs
be met 2 what measures would a sovereign Egypt allow?
Could rastoration of Eqyptian soveretenty Israel: withdrawall be phased differently
C. How does Eqypt envision the staging of
agreements ? Under what circum tances,
if any, could Egypt begin negotiating
the terms of a First- step withdrawal
from The Canal ? (Is there a way to start with
the so-called interim preement?
D. What modifications might be made
in The Eqyptian position in return
for what modifications in The
Israeli position?
E. Exactly how might Gaza's self-datermination
be negotiated and arranged ?
F. How would a refugee settlement be
negstiated?
G. what is the relationship of an Eqypt-Israel
settlement to Jordm - Is rael, Syria-Israd,
and refugee settlements?
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1 5-
IV. Other points to stress
A. The purpose of these talks has been
exploratory -- to see whether the basis
for a settlement can be developed by
some fresh thinking. Believe it was understood
that our willingness to meet was an indication
of our interest in a settlement, but the
fact of our meeting implied no commitment
to follow one course or another.
B. Eqyptians don't believe it, but we have no
magic for producing Israeli agreement ta
Eqyptian terms. If there is an
agreement, it will require difficult
decisions on both sides. Only readiness to
make such decisions can turn the course
of negotiations. we don't want the Eqyptions
to have any illusions about what is
possible as a result of these meetings.
C. Reiterate: Please give serious
consideration to what you can give us to
make the case that Eqypt is ready to
move toward normalization of relations.
[ See Peter's checklist for
meeting agenda and procedural.
points to be covered.
]
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Caico
HAK notes
2/26 day) (second
Imaeli dominent ! Sittlement role in ME us can play
Uannel for talks.
Freedom of Achin
Lobby used influence.
cn
W int un medo?
Heads of Agreement
primiples W/WA do your mian by fundamental
Get Inaeli unsend mil.
When should /zcael be Granget in
2 arpects: / lsuel informed L brack-
Egyptian talks.
Barders - Navijation
Generally informed - re S.U.
One -snay in the other will inform sa.
Recognition-
1
UN requirision / Gash. iscludes mil. myst
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2
tussin - Wednesday,
Egyptian Territaries solution
- sovereignty.
2. Gaga - relf. determination under
inspires of UN.
Refryer problem adveday un UN.
intural question - N. bank Have
clence Z often accours.
Syik similar permiples
Interreletenship between different rettlements
Fundermental
Inden.- -
implementation Heads of agreement
Perignition of /nil 1 after entrie cottlement
End of state March
Freedom of nevifition
G aga - WN
Inal Evainated
2
Time every prepare
A for self determination my
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He'll get
answers to:
- - When Isnel should be brought in
(Hell leave it tous)
-- Who talks to th Syrians ?
-- Who hundles refugee issue?
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Jab A
ACTION
838-X
SECRET (XGDS)
February 21, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
HAROLD H. SAUNDERS
SUBJECT:
The State of US-Egyptian Talks and Your
Possible Role
The purpose of this memo, in response to your request, is (a) to
describe the present state of US-Egyptian talks, (b) to suggest one way
you might relate to them and (c) to relate these points to the visit of
Hafis Ismail this Friday.
The State of US-Egyptian Talks
US- Egyptian talks on an Interim settlement lost momentum in the summer
of 1971 after the Rogers-Sisco visits to Calro, the Bergus paper, the
failure of Sadat to send an emissary to Washington for follow-up talks,
and the lack of results from Sisco's July visit to Israel. At that point
these were the outstanding issues:
--Sadat wanted an interim agreement linked to an Israeli commit-
ment to full withdrawal under a later agreement. The Israelis
rejected any such linkage and insisted on a self-contained agreement
on partial withdrawal.
--Sadat wanted Israell withdrawal east of the mountain passes.
Israel spoke of withdrawing only 10-15 kilometers from the Canal.
-Sadat insisted that Egyptian regular military forces Cross the
Canal. Israel insisted on civilians only, fearing that Soviet forces
then in Egypt would cross.
--Israel wanted immediate use of the Canal. Sadat wanted to defer
Israeli use until conclusion of a final peace agreement, resulting in
full Israeli withdrawal.
XGDS 40 3
DECLAS Date impossible to determine.
BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
SECRET (XGDS)
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- 2 a
The Israelis wanted commitment to an indefinite cease-fire,
while the Egyptians wanted limited extension. One had the feeling
that this issue might take care of itself if the others began falling
into place.
The nature of supervisory arrangements was recognized as an issue
but was not a primary one then.
That is where diplomatic exchanges on the specifics of an interim agreement
stand as suspended in mid-1971.
Recently President Sadat publicly and Hafia Ismail privately have described
the following as the present Egyptian position:
Egypt is no longer interested in an "Interim" agreement If by "Interim"
is meant a settlement leaving the major issue of territory in abeyance.
Egyptians are concerned that the re-opening of the Canal and the
restoration of normal life in the cities along the west bank will create
a buffer against renewed military confrontation while removing the
inconvenience and danger that give the powers outside the area an
interest. In London Tuesday Ismail said Egypt "totally rejects" an
Interim agreement under US auspices.
--Egypt is prepared to make peace with Israel and respect the territorial
integrity within pre-war borders, but Egypt expects Israel to do the
same toward Egypt's borders.
Procedures for making peace need not be an obstacle if the
substance is right. UN Resolution 242 is one guide for a settlement
but there may be others.
-Egypt is ready to accept international guarantees, including
presence at Sharm al-Shaikh and demilitarized zones, but Egypt
could not accept Israeli sovereignty over one inch of Egyptian
territory.
--There have been some recent indications that Egyptians are making
a distinction between resolving the issues which grew out of the 1967
war and those Palestinian issues which date back to 1948-49. Foreign
Minister Zayyat recently seld the latter are for the Palestinians to
solve.
SECRET (XGDS)
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- 3 -
A Framework: The Broad Choices
Just for the sake of sharpening the issues, It is worth stopping briefly
to note the two broad areas of choice before us as we consider ways of
reactivating efforts to advance Arab-Israeli peace negotiations:
1. Substance of a general approach.
The State Department approach continues to favor (1) concentrating
on an Egypt-Israel settlement, leaving a Jordan-Israel settlement
till later and (2) trying to start Egypt-Israel negotiations on an
interim agreement, establishing a commitment to negotiate later on
an overall settlement but not addressing any of the fundamental
issues like boundaries now.
The alternative would be (1) to deal with a Jordan-Israel agreement
simultaneously with Egypt-Israel negotiations, recognizing that the
US role would be quite different and (2) to address the issue of
territory, at least in terms of general principles, at the outset in
private talks with the Israelie, and eventually with the Egyptians.
The latter point could be handled on a separate track from proximity
talks, supplementing them. There are elements of both approaches
that are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
2. Style.
The State approach has normally been to begin consultations with
the Israelis and Egyptians on the basis of a formal demarche and a
fully developed formula from which the two sides would begin
negotiations. Although that formula may be presented with expression
of readiness to consult fully, this approach can have the appearance
of trying to force something of our making on Israel.
The alternative is to make a more general but still substantive
approach, speaking at first in terms of fundamental points but not
having a fully worked out formula which we are pressing on all
major issues. The initial approach would be less formal and dramatic.
The purpose would be to preserve an atmosphere of collaboration,
to minimize the appearance of pressure, to encourage the Israelis
to develop a formula, and yet to make clear the points we feel must
be addressed.
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a 4 -
The suggestion developed for your thought in the fuller discussion
below is that State proceed more or less openiy on an interim agreement
with lower-key style while you develop a simultaneous private track on
the broader issues 11 and when the conditions seem right. When a
decision is made on this, the Jordanian question could be pursued
separately.
The Basic Question: Is Egyptian-Israeli Negotiation Possible?
The basic question is whether either Israclie or Egyptians are prepared
to negotiate seriously. Specifically, is either prepared to move back
from present negotiating positions in response to significant concessions
from the other side?
While the question applies equally to both sides, It is important for us
to answer it with regard to Israel before we commit ourselves to Egypt
to involve ourselves in a negotiating process. It is important to know
where Israel standsinot because we want Israel to make all the concessions
but because it would be unrealistic to get very far out in front of Israel
and to let Egypt believe that we can deliver more than we can persuade
Israel to accept. It will not help to begin any effort with another crisis
of confidence between us such as the one that followed Rogers' December
1969 speech.
To put Israel first is not to dismiss the Egyptian side of the question.
Nothing would be so helpful as background for Mrs. Meir's visit (February 27-
March 2 in Washington; March 1 with the President) as evidence that
Egypt is prepared to negotiate to the expectation of real give-and-take.
Mrs. Meir will come with a strong argument against any new diplomatic
activity until Egypt demonstrates its readiness to negotiate seriously.
On the one hand, we will not want to appear to have fallen for phony
Egyptian bait; on the other, the more Ismail shows Egyptian seriousness
of purpose, the more we would have reason to discuss negotiations with
Israel.
Thus the most useful result of Ismail's visit would be an indication that
Egypt would be orcoared to discuss all possible overall solutions at
least privately if Israel would do the negotiate with no preconditions
on either side.
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- 5 4b
Another aspect of this question-discussed further below--is how far
the Soviets might now be prepared to go in pressing Egypt. Again,
It seems best to establish first what is possible on the Israeli side
because the Israclis will object to Soviet involvement.
What Are the Substantive Areas for Concentration?
What seems to be the substantive areas where discussion on an Egypt- No
Israel settlement would be most likely to yield progress?
One question, of course, is whether we should continue to concentrate
exclusively on an Egypt-Israel settlement, leaving a Jordan-Israel
settlement in abeyance as to the State Department is inclined to do.
Because of the immediacy of Ismail's visit, I shall leave this question
aside for the moment, although I believe there would be advantage in
encouraging parallel but separate movement on both tracks.
On the Egypt=Israel front, there seem to be two schools of thought:
1. The State Department is concentrating on finding a formula
that could get talks started on an interim agreement. The formula
they are currently considering is along the following lines [in
paraphrase]:
Israel and Egypt would agree to begin indirect negotiations
without preconditions on an interim agreement looking toward
a peace agreement in accordance with Resolution 242. Both
sides would agree to begin negotiations on an overall agreement
once execution of an interim agreement starts. No negotiating
procedure will be barred [i.e., negotiations could be direct].
Each side will begin these negotiations recognizing the right
of the other to negotiate from the particular interpretation of
Resolution 242 it holds but also recognizing that Resolution 242
neither endorsed nor preciuded withdrawal to pre-war boundaries,
The disadvantage with this approach is that Sadat has rejected an
approach which does not provide some assurance that Israel and the
US are committed to steps beyond partial withdrawal from the Canal
which would lead to full withdrawal. He is afraid of playing his
Canal and peace cards and being left without what he really wants
In return. If he is desperate for some movement--as he apparently
was in 1971 when he broached the agreement
formula might interest him, but the chances are that he will want more.
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- 6 -
In addition, the chances are that negotiations on a partial withdrawal
will again founder unless the two sides know what its broader
context will be.
2. The alternative would be to address some of the fundamental
issues of an overall settlement simultaneously. This could be
dons on at quite separate track. With public knowledge, State
could manage discussions of a first-stage withdrawal. In private,
you might address at least the framework for an overall settlement.
The purpose of the private talks would not necessarily be to reach
a definitive understanding in advance of negotiations between Egypt
and Israel. The purpose would be to establish that both sides are
prepared to move into a negoliating mode on the key issues-that
both are prepared to consider seriously discussing solutions that are
less than their present negotiating positions suggest. This approach
has the two virtues of (a) making a major substantive contribution
and (b) making use of State Department energies for detailed
negotiations and to draw public attention.
Thus, whereas the State Department would concentrate on finding a
diplomatic formula to permit both sides to begin negotiating on an interim
agreement, the alternative approach would require that attention be given
to concepts for a final settlement. Two related ideas seem to offer the
greatest possibility for exploration:
The first is to shift the focus from Israell "withdrawal" to
"restoration of Egyptian sovereignty in the Sinai, This is not
just semanties. It would require at significant and perhaps impossible
Israeli decision not to change borders significantly (except for Gaza
and perhaps a little around Ellat) but would at the same time permit
an important decision by an Egypt sovereign in the Sinai to permit
stationing of Israeli security forces at agreed points in the Sinal over
agreed and extended periods.
The second idea follows at this point: The peacemaking process
should be phased over a long period, perhaps as long as twenty-five
years. The number of Israell posta in the Sinal might be reduced at
stated intervals, and international cover might be provided at points
like Sharm al-Shaikh. The phasing would provide a framework for
development of other elements of an Egyptian-Iaraeli relationship
80 that israci could test whether a peaceful relationship is possible.
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- 7 -
You will recall that these two ideas underlay the papers we drew up
together before the Moseow summit last May. In addition, they are
developed in the larger book written for you in November.
Dealing with Hafez Ismail
One point is fundamental: The State Department through Sisco's
agreement with Rabin on February 2, 1972, is committed not to
discuss specific proposals with Egypt before consulting with Israel.
State recognizes this and sees the talks with Ismail as a listening
session and as an opportunity to probe what new elements of flexibility
there might be in Egyptian thinking about an interim agreement.
Your choice is between two courses:
1. Give Ismail a friendly hearing, say the right things about
wanting a settlement but not offer any concrete hope of further
US involvement now. This is the course the Israelis would
probably prefer. They believe the Egyptians should be left alone
to reach the conclusion that they will have to pay a price for a
settlement.
2. Give Ismail reason to report to Sadat that greater White House
involvement would be possible If Egypt were willing to negotiate
seriously. On the assumption that the Israells might get wind of
any concrete proposal, anything that is hinted along these lines
should be consistent with what we know to be Israeli thinking. One
way of approaching the issue is to say that we need to know what
we will have to work with before we talk with Mrs. Meir. One
could be fairly direct privately in saying that we would need to be
assured that discussion could include such issues as arrangements
for stationing Israeli troops at key points over extended periods by
agreement with a sovereign agreement, ways of assuring demili-
tarisation and other such issues. The key question--perhaps better
left unspoken until after talks with formel--is whether Egypt would
agree to have Isracli troops on Egyptian soil if Egyptian sovereignty
were reconfirmed in most of the Sinai.
The Egyptians, of course, may not choose to negotiate on grounds other
then their full demands, but then there is little possibility of a negotiated
settlement now. Even if the Egyptians choice, the israclis
will still have a fundamental decision to make on their readiness to
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negotiate on a basis other than their full demands. Thus an effort
should be made during Ismail's visit to keep all options open.
How to Deal with the USSR
No decision has to be made now, but if we decide to move in any
direction the questions will arise whether the Soviets can make any
contribution in changing Egypt's position and how fully we want to keep
M BCOW informed of our approach. In sending Ismail to Washington.
Sadat has indicated a desire for direct communication with us, even
though Ismail has just been to Moscow. The Israells would obviously
like to keep the USSR out of the picture. This issue does not become
active until we have talked with the Israelis and decided what we want
to do.
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506
ACTION
tyr NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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May 29, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
HAROLD H. SAUNDERS 75al
SUBJECT:
Memo for the President on
Your Talk with Ismail
Attached is the memo for the President you asked me to
develop from my earlier summary. It is much more
precise than the summary in identifying what you told
Ismail.
XGDS - 1 and 3
DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.
BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
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ACTION
Outside System
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May 29, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
HAROLD H. SAUNDERS
SUBJECT:
Memo for the President on
Your Talk with Ismail
Attached is the memo for the President you asked me to
develop from my earlier summary. It is much more
precise than the summary in identifying what you told
Ismail.
XGDS - 1 and 3
DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.
BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
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MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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(Outside System)
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June 14, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
HAROLD H. SAUNDERS 7al
SUBJECT:
A. US-USSR Statement of Principles
on Arab-Israel--Message to Ismail
Mr. Ismail in his latest message asked for clarification of what you
mean by a statement of principles of a general nature which would
permit the parties to start a process of negotiation. Before con-
sidering whether and how you might reply, it seems worthwhile to
look briefly at the way such a list of principles might be used. It may
be helpful to consider these points:
1. A list of principles could be useful under the following
circumstances:
As a vehicle for discussing with Gromyko what kind
of settlement the US and USSR might support, even if
no subsequent use is made of the principles.
As a means of averting any joint US-USSR action by
pressing the discussion of principles to the point where
agreement is unlikely.
As a means of demonstrating to Sadat that he cannot
rely on Soviet support for his position of settling the
boundaries before negotiation.
As a vehicle for starting negotiations provided we have
prior indication that the two sides would welcome a call
for negotiation on such a basis.
If the Egyptians would welcome the appearance of
irresistible pressure from the US and USSR to begin
negotiating.
XGDS - 3
DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.
BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
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2. A list of principles would not be helpful under the
following circumstances:
--If the Egyptians would agree to begin a negotiating
process based on a US-drafted statement of principles
without the appearance of US-USSR agreement and if
the Egyptians would prefer not to have the USSR
involved in this process.
--If the statement of principles is a simple rehash of
those in Resolution 242 and would not encourage the
parties to begin negotiating.
--If the Soviets would insist on some role in overseeing
any talks that resulted since Israel would object sharply.
It would seem to me that the main purpose to be served by another
exchange with Ismail would be as one more effort to see whether
Soviet involvement in this process helps Sadat or not--to see whether
he would welcome the appearance of irresistible US-Soviet pressure
to negotiate.
RECOMMENDATION: That you consider sending the attached message
to Ismail today.
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THE WHITE House
WASHINGTON
Henry
This is for the possentity
that you may wish
to try Ismail again
before One summit.
Bunt
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INFORMATION
(outside system)
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MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT:
Meeting with Hafiz Ismail on May 20
In short, Ismail came to this meeting to probe White House intentions
further--not to discuss concrete elements of a possible Egypt-Israel
agreement. The result was that the formal talks were less useful than
last time, but I felt that more progress was made than last time in
bringing Ismail to understand the reasoning and the domestic political
realities behind our proposal to move toward a settlement in a step-by-
step approach. Last time he had listened well, but only in this second
talk did I feel that he fully understood the implications of the step-by-
step approach we are proposing.
I explained to him concretely in private talks that it is essential for us,
if we are to be influential with the Israelis, to be dealing with proposals
which represent politically manageable steps rather than tackling the issue
of total withdrawal all at once. It remains very much an open question
how Sadat will respond; he has rejected this approach before and may do
so again. The issue on Sadat's mind is whether the White House will
remain engaged beyond the first stage. It may be that he needed to hear
this directly from us.
The issue I posed, which the Egyptians are now considering, is whether
a general statement of principles like that in Resolution 242 could be
used to get talks started on the first phase of an agreement provided the
US and Israel stated publicly that this first step would not become the
final settlement. Ismail promised to let me know before your meetings
with Brezhnev. If the Egyptians are agreeable, some progress in working
out a set of principles might be made during the summit meetings here.
XGDS - 1 and 3
DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.
BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
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Background
These talks took place against the background of an agenda of specific
issues left from the February meeting which Ismail had promised to
consider. These included:
--As full and concrete a statement as possible of the obligations
Egypt and Israel would accept toward each other in a state of
peace.
--The relationship of an Egypt-Israel agreement to other aspects
of a Palestine settlement. For example: Could a state of peace
become effective between Egypt and Israel before Syrian and
Jordanian settlements with Israel or a refugee settlement are
achieved?
--Concrete ways for assuring Israeli security in the Sinai while
restoring Egyptian sovereignty there.
Ismail's Position This Time
It quickly became apparent that Ismail was not prepared this time to
discuss those issues left from our first meeting. He wanted to discuss
US intentions. These were the main points in his presentation:
--The Egyptian side had the impression from the last talks that
Egypt was being asked to come up with a new position that would
enable the US to try to move Israel.
--Even with a new Egyptian position, however, the US seemed
uncertain whether Israel would withdraw. In the Egyptian view,
Israel has shown no sign that it is interested in peace.
--Ismail had found continued hesitancy about the role, if any, to
be played by the White House. It is not clear that the White House
has decided to put its weight behind an effort to achieve a peace
settlement.
--The events of March, April and early May had raised further
questions in Egyptian minds about US intentions:
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--The decision to continue aircraft deliveries to Israel
through 1974-75 was "very revealing."
--The decision to provide technological assistance to
Israeli military industry was "dangerous" because it would
free Israel of US influence.
--US financing ($50 million) for the settlement in Israel
of Jewish emigres from the USSR further supports Israel's
growth.
--The US equating of the acts of the radical Palestinians
with Israel's raid in Beirut was "most unfair.
--Egypt had observed how pressure from the US Congress
had forced the Administration against its will to put pressure
on the USSR for the emigration of Soviet Jews. This caused
Egypt to wonder whether the US could freely play a role in the
Middle East.
--It cannot even be excluded that there is US nuclear
cooperation with Israel.
--Egypt feels that the most important factor encouraging Israel
to stand fast is the fact that the US is committed to defend Israel's
conquests until the Arabs concede to Israel's demands. Unless
there is a more balanced US approach, it is difficult to see how
there can be progress. If the US is prepared to shift its "balance
of power" approach of assuring overwhelming Israeli predominance,
there could be some positive results.
--Egypt is, therefore, faced with two choices:
--It can accept an "interim agreement" which will "almost
certainly" become a final one.
--Or it can move toward a final agreement which would
require "enormous concessions" by Egypt.
--If neither approach is acceptable, what is left to Egypt except
military action? [Ismail in private conversation said he felt military
action would be "too adventurous" now, so he was apparently thinking
of the longer term future.
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My Response
Given Ismail's unreadiness to talk about the concrete elements of a
settlement, it seemed to me most useful to concentrate my discussion
with him on the general theory of how we should proceed. I had a long
private talk with him in which I made these points:
--The US is not trying to exploit the Arab-Israeli conflict to
achieve some global objective. The US remains prepared to
work with Egypt for a just solution.
--The most the US can now foresee persuading Israel to accept
is restoration of nominal Egyptian sovereignty in the Sinai with
a transitional Israeli security presence at key positions. This
might not be the full exercise of sovereignty but it would establish
the principle of legal sovereignty.
--It might be 1974 before real progress on an interim agreement
could be made and a year after that before there could be progress
on an overall agreement.
--On the other hand, it is not the US strategy to keep the Israelis
in the Sinai. It is the US policy to try to get a process going in
which the US could exercise its influence.
--The US has no interest in bringing about a change in Egypt-Israel
frontiers. The longer the present situation continues, the greater
the danger that it will become permanent. Any line through the
Sinai would be less natural than the Suez Canal, so there is advantage
simply in beginning Israeli movement back. If a negotiating process
could be started, the US would stick with it beyond the first-stage
agreement for withdrawal from the Suez Canal. We would make this
clear publicly and elicit a comparable public commitment from Israel.
It is not excluded that negotiations on a Canal agreement and on an
overall agreement could be carried on simultaneously.
--The US view is that an effort should be made soon to work out
general principles of agreement that could get talks started. The
US needs to avoid the kind of concrete detail that would trigger sharp
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February 24, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
HAROLD H. SAUNDERS
SUBJECT:
US-Egyptian Conversation
Attached at Tab A as requested is a paper containing a checklist of
points that might be covered in the course of a US-Egyptian conver-
sation. I call it a checklist rather than a talking paper because I
assume that it would be desirable to present these at appropriate
points as ideas to be explored rather than as points to be pressed.
At Tab B for your convenience is my earlier paper describing some
possible concrete ideas for a Sinai settlement. Obviously variations
are possible, so this is illustrative only.
Other more detailed material is available to you in the loose-leaf book
which you have.
One basic point is omitted here because you are in the best position
to make the necessary assessment: How far we go depends on what
we feel the Israeli position would permit or could be altered to
permit. It is repeating the obvious to say that some of the premises
underlying the attached go beyond Israel's present formal position.
XGDS - 3
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BYAUTH - - Dr. Kissinger
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A
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February 24, 1973
POINTS TO COVER
The following are points which might be covered in a conversation with
senior Egyptian officials. With a little adaptation, they could also serve
as a checklist in probing the Israeli position.
1. Why we need a negotiating process and what we mean by "negotiating
process".
--Suspicion is too great on either side for peace to come all
in one step. It is necessary to find a place where each side
finds it politically possible to begin and then build a series
of signals and steps that can contribute to the evolution of a
peaceful relationship. [The US experience with the PRC might
be cited as an example.]
--One objective in seeking the initial opening and in developing
subsequent steps is to try to stimulate a political dynamic in
each country that will provide internal political support for
making peace. In Israel, for instance, it is easy for everyone
to take a hard line as long as everyone can say that the Egyptians
are not ready to make peace. It is not ready to make peace. It
is not guaranteed that the Israelis would completely reverse posi-
tion if the Egyptians agreed to negotiate, but debate would begin
in Israel and at least begin to introduce flexibility into the Israeli
position. [Note: King Hussein is ready to make peace, and
Israel has not retreated past the Allon Plan. However, there
was significant debate in the Israeli Labor Party last summer
which seemed to conclude that Israel should withdraw from control
over Arab populations. This relates to Gaza too. Thoughts that
the Israelis would not discuss seriously three years ago can now be
discussed and minds changed.]
--Only if there is concrete evidence that Egypt is prepared to
engage in such a process can the US realistically be expected to
XGDS - 3
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BYAUTH - Dr. Kissinger
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- 2 -
be helpful. We need evidence to make the case to Israel
that it will be missing a real opportunity for peace if it
refuses to engage now. (What can we say to Mrs. Meir?)
2. What kind of process? We recognize that the Western concept of
negotiation is not the Arab concept. That is why we use the world
"process". We in the US are not wedded to one particular procedure
or another. It would help us a great deal to understand very specifically
what they regard as the principal elements of a proper negotiation.
What kind of "process" would fit their political and cultural needs? If
we knew this, we might see what kind of approach might be constructed
to meet the requirements of both sides.
3. In a process such as the Egyptians envision, what might each side do
that could help the other embark on the process?
--What does Egppt want from Israel? The conventional answer
is that Egypt must have an Israeli commitment to total with-
drawal. But is there some way to put this proposition or some
alternative to it that would meet Egypt's need?
--Israel wants assurance that Egypt is prepared eventually to live
in a normal peaceful relationship with Israel. Of course, Israel
wants to guarantee its security, but how that is done will depend
on the long term partly on whether a normal relationship can
evolve which would begin to reduce Israeli fears. What could
Egypt say now about the kind of overall relationship it could
foresee between Egypt and Israel?
4. What kinds of settlement are possible ?Some flexibility might be intro-
duced into the situation if it were known how open Egypt might be to varied
approaches to meeting Israel's concern for security. For instance:
--We have heard Egyptians carefully use the world "sovereignty" in
reference to their unwillingness to give up any Arab soil. If Egyptian
sovereignty over most [leave room for minor adjustments] of the
Sinai were restored or pledged, could Egypt envision an agreement
which would permit Israel certain rights to station troops or patrol
at specified points? Would this be more possible if under an inter-
national umbrella?
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--Could there be a series of successive arrangements phased
over a prolonged period? Could a succession of steps take
place subject to review at intervals of 1, 2 or 5 years over a
period up to even 25 years, for instance?
--Is Egypt prepared to deal with the issues between it and Egypt
separately from other aspects of an Arab-Israeli settlement?
Would this be easier if there were at least some progress simul-
taneously on another front?
--What contingent commitments might be made on Egypt's eventual
relationship with Israel? Could cultural, trade or diplomatic
missions be exchanged after an agreed period?
5. What relationship with the USSR does Egypt envisage? [Note: The
current Egyptian answer is that Sadat "normalized" his relations with
the USSR when he asked Soviet combat forces to leave and that the US
should now "normalize" its relationship with Israel. The response
should probably be that we don't accept the analogy as exact but that
we understand what he is saying and do not want to argue the point.]
--What will be the Soviet position in Egypt? The presence
of Soviet troops last year greatly complicated the situation.
--If negotiations can begin, what role does Egypt see for the
USSR? Does Egypt want Soviet involvement or not?
[Note: This question should probably not be posed directly, but
one point we wish to get a feel for is how concerned the Egyptians
are over Soviet support and therefore how responsive they might
be to Soviet pressure.]
6. If a basis for negotiation could be developed, what kinds of procedure
dould Egyp t live with?
--Could Egypt foresee talks on two levels: (a) a more or less
open exchange on the first phase of a settlement with (b) more
private exchanges in the background dealing, at first at least,
with the general principles of an overall agreement? What kind
of public justification would Egypt need for this?
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--If there were to be discussions on the first phase of withdrawal,
what procedures would meet Egypt's needs? "Proximity" talks
or a variation? Would US auspices be acceptable? If not, whose?
--At what point might there be a meeting between Egyptian and
Israell representatives?
7. Confirm means of continuing communication.
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domestic and Israeli pressures on us at the outset and limit the
usefulness of our involvement before we have even begun. The
potential of these public pressures is great. It might be useful
to work toward such principles with the USSR during the summit.
--Debate in the UN Security Council (beginning June 4) could
complicate the process of arriving at some useful understanding
with the USSR, if the Egyptians thought some such understanding
would be helpful. Ismail said that, if the Security Council debate
dragged on to the eve of the US-USSR summit, Egypt would be
receptive to a proposal for adjournment.
Where the Matter Stands
The issue now is whether Sadat can accept the step-by-step approach
with assurance of persistent White House involvement. Ismail frankly
said he could not commit himself; he would have to talk with Sadat. There
is a good chance that Sadat will not feel able to go along. Ismail said he
would send word of Sadat's reaction in the next couple of weeks.
If Sadat were prepared to engage on the basis I outlined, then it might be
possible to make some progress on a statement of principles during the
US-Soviet summit. We would try to keep these general, and this would
be one reason for Egyptian hesitancy. If we were to proceed, we would
want to discuss this approach further with the Israelis.
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TabH
5
B
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May 15, 1972
EGYPT - ISRAEL
The arrangements described below would flow from an agreement
which, in addition to describing the general terms of peace between
Egypt and Israel, would combine the following key elements: (1)
reaffirmation of nominal Egyptian sovereignty over the Sinai; (2)
recognition of the Sinai as a demilitarized zone with effective Israeli
and Egyptian carly warning capabilities and opportunity to redeploy
in the Sinai in response to threat of ground attack; and (3) assurance
of passage through the Straits of Tiran in the context of Sinai' demili-
tarization.
The main elements of Agreement would be recognized in a resolution
passed by the UN Security Council, referring to Resolution 242. The
principal instruments would be a "Sinai Demilitarization Commission"
and two observer forces under it a Sinai force and a Tiran waterways
force. An outline of the principal elements of such an arrangement
follows:
1. Sinai demilitarization.
- Israel and Egypt would agree that (1) civil authority and police
functions in the Sinai would return to Egypt, (2) the Sinai would be
established as a demilitarized zone and (3) a small observer force
and other arrangements would be agreed on for assuring demilitarization
with UN participation. [The purpose of UN participation would be
Egyptian face-saving and providing some great-power endorsement
of the permanency of the arrangements. ]
The UN Security Council, referring to Resolution 242, would pass
a resolution which would:
Establish a "Sinai Demilitärization Commission" (described below
Establish two observer forces to operate under that Commission
(described below) with missions to observe adherence to the
agreements on (a) demilitarization of the Sinai and (b) assurance
of innocent passage through the Straits of Tiran.
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II - 5
--Provide for review of these arrangements at five year
intervals (a) by the negotiators of the Egypt-Israel agreement
and (b) by the Security Council in the context of the relationship
between Egypt and Israel. No change would be possible except
by vote of the Security Council.
The composition and mission of the "Sinai Demilitarization
Commission" and the two observer forces would be as follows:
The Commission would be headquartered at Al Arish and would
consist of (a) a UN Chairman nominated by the Secretary General
and approved by Egypt and Israel and (b) one representative each
of Egypt and Israel. Its missions would be to administer the
Sinai and Tiran Observer Forces and to provide the forum for
discussion of violations. Major violations would be referred to
the two governments for negotiation. Major violations that
appeared likely to lead to an outbreak of hostilities or a general
breakdown in demilitarization would be reported by the UN
Chairman to the President of the Security Council.
The Sinai Observer Force, headquartered at al Bir Hassanah,
would consist of Egyptian and Israeli observers in equal numbers
with a UN commander responsible to the Commission and UN
personnel in numbers equal to those of each of the national con-
tingents. Israeli units would provide the necessary support
services to maintain the facilities at Bir Hassanah.
The Tiran Observer Force is described in paragraph 2 below.
--For purposes of administering demilitarization and giving precision
to rights under the agreement, the Sinai would be divided into three
zones by two lines:
-One line would roughly parallel the Sucz Canal, running along
the western edge of the Mitla and Gidi passes past Jabal Margam
(just west of Bir Jifjafah) to a point such as Rumani on the
Mediterranean coast.
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II = 5
The other line would follow from al Arish southeast along the
Wadi al Arish through the road junction at Abu Aweigila following
that Wadi to a point southeast of Bir Hassanah and then following
the Wadi al Aqaba and ending at a point on the coast of the Gulf of
Aqaba 10-15 miles south of Eilat.
--Deployment of the Sinai Observer Force would be as follows:
--The two zones adjacent to the Suez Canal and to the Israel
border would be called the early warning zones. In each, a
combination of forward observers or sensors and comprehensive
early warning posts would be used.
--Israel would maintain, along with a UN representative,
comprehensive early warning facilities as technically necessary
along the line closest to the Canal. There would be stations
/
to include the present facilities in the mountains, covering the
Mitla and Gidi passes, retaining the Bir Jifjafah base and adding
a post on the Mediterranean coast on the road from al Arish to
Kantara. The purpose would be to provide surveillance of the
four main roads as well as to provide early warning against air
attack.
--Egyptians, along with a UN representative, would man early
warning stations at al Arish, Abu Aweigila, and one or two points
in the southern sector such as Thamad (near Jabal Mushayt).
--The central zone would be maintained with observer posts at
the main road junctions at Jabal Libni and Bir Hassanah. The
base now at Bir Hassanah would be maintained as a support post.
--Observer units staffed by the UN and both parties would have
the right of regular patrol in each area. In addition, each party
would schedule regular overflight on a specified patrol track.
The airfield at Sharm al-Shaikh could be used by both in connection
with these flights.
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II - - 5
--Any violation of the demilitarization agreements which had been
reported to the Security Council and remained unresolved twenty-
four hours after being reported would entitle the aggrieved party
the right to redeploy into the Sinai.
2. Straits of Tiran.
Egypt and Israel agree privately that President Sadat will sound
out Kings Faisal and Hussein on their willingness to become parties
to the following arrangement: Once Israel and Egypt and Egypt, Jordan
and Saudi Arabia had agreed, President Sadat would publicly propose
that the four riparians of the Gulf of Aqaba under conditions of peace
should cooperate on behalf of the UN Security Council for guaranteeing
innocent passage through the Straits of Tiran. Israel, Jordan and
Saudi Arabia would inform the UN Secretary General and the President
of the Security Council that they were prepared to respond positively.
The UNSecurity Council, referring to Resolution 242, would pass a
resolution stating that:
The Security Council collectively and each of its members
individually recognize the right of innocent passage through the
Straits of Tiran.
The Security Council, with the written agreement of the four
riparians of the Gulf of Aqaba, would establish the Tiran Observer
Force (described below) under the Sinai Demilitarization Commissio
Its character and mandate would be subject to change only by vote
of the Security Council.
The Tiran Observer Force would be authorized to cooperate
with other comparable bodies established to maintain rights of
passage through other waterways of the region. [This would permit
inclusion of Ethiopia and Iran, among others, in broader arrange-
ments covering the Suez Canal, Red Sea and Persian Gulf if it
appeared that this would provide greater assurance to Israel. ]
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.The Tiran Observer Force would consist of: (a) a UN Commander
reporting to the Sinai Demilitarization Commission; (b) units from
each of the four riparian states. The force would be headquartered
in Eilat [in order to put a UN peace-enforcement institution on
Israeli soil]. These units would be deployed as follows:
--A small Egyptian naval unit would be assigned responsibility
for patrolling the immediate Red Sea approaches. This unit
would be based at existing Egyptian facilities on the west' side
of the Red Sea. [A broader agreement for guaranteeing passage
through the Canal, Red Sea and perhaps Persian Gulf would
introduce other than Egyptian patrol forces into the Red Sea.]
--A small UN observer post at Sharm al-Shaikh would consist
of a UN commander, an Egyptian officer with a ship-to-shore
communications unit, and small Israeli and Jordanian observer
groups. These groups would be stationed at the airfield with
helicopters. An Israeli unit would maintain and provide operating
services for the airfield.
--On - Tiran Island [Saudi] would be stationed a UN commander,
and a Saudi and Jordanian or Saudi and Egyptian observer unit.
--An access road from headquarters in Eilat along the Gulf of
Aqaba would be for use of all members. This road woul be
protected by observers stationed at key east-west approaches to
the road, similar in composition to the force at Sharm al-Shaikh.
[This would particularly allow Jordanians to transit Israeli ter-
ritory at Eilat in resupplying and rotating their unit at Sharm
al-Shaikh.]
--Civil authority and police responsibilities at Sharm al-Shaikh
would be Egyptian. Tourist facilities would be Egyptian owned and
managed. Israeli citizens would be allowed access under terms of
a general peace agreement.
-- A joint Jordan-Israel port authority would be established to develop
the Eilat-Aqaba ports and area. No change would take place in existing
sovereignties. The airfield at Naqb (12. 5 northwest of Eilat) would serv
the entire port area, would be available to the Tiran Observer Force
for air support, would be maintained by Isracli units.
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3. Suez Administration.
Egypt and Israel would agree that administration of the Canal and
sovereignty over it would return to Egypt. A commission to receive
complaints about discriminatory treatment would be established with
offices at each end of the Canal. The commission would be established
by a UN Security Council resolution. Members would rotate and would
parallel the composition of the Security Council. Agreement would be
reached on the level of personnel necessary on the east bank of the
Canal to administer and secure it.
The UN Security Council, referring to Resolution 242, would
reaffirm the right of international passage and the establishment of
the commission.
4. Gaza.
- Egypt and Israel would agree to the procedure in the next paragraph.
The UN Security Council would establish a Council to oversee
transition and refugee resettlement from Gaza. This Council would
operate for the next five years with review to take place at that time
on whether another five-year period of operation was necessary.
The Council would include three international representatives nominated
by the UN Secretary General and approved by the regional members;
representatives of the residents of Gaza and of the West Bank; repre-
sentatives of the governments of Jordan and Israel. The Council would
be charged with arranging compensation for the Palestinian refugees
in Gaza and determining their interests on permanent settlement. The
Council would work closely with an international group if such were
established to deal with the entire refugee problem. The Council
would be the governing body for Gaza with'a manager under it responsibl
for administration.
-Security would be provided by a force consisting of representatives of
members of the Council.
--At the end of ten years, taking into account the disposition of the
refugees, the final arrangements on the West Bank and the state of
relationships under the peace agreements, a permanent semi-autonomou
government would be established in Gaza to negotiate with the governmen
of Jordan and Israel its relationships with them.
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5. Phasing.
Egypt and Israel would agree that the above arrangements would be
carried out in the following stages beginning with the passage of the
UN resolution:
Stage 1: Within four weeks Israel would pull back ten kilometers
from the Suez Canal to permit clearing operations to begin.
Stage 2: For the following six months while the Canal is being
cleared the Israelis will prepare the posts on the Bar Lev line to
be sealed and will prepare for withdrawal of all forces to the passes.
During this period, the Sinai Observer Force will be established to
move into position as ready but not later than seven months after
passage of the UN resolution.
--Stage 3: For the next eleven months while the Observer Force
begins operation, Israeli forces will remain in place behind the
passes (at Bir Jifjafah) and at Sharm al-Shaikh.
-Stage 4: Eighteen months after passage of the UN resolution
provided terms of the peace agreement are being observed, Isracli
forces will turn Sharm al-Shaikh over to the Tiran Observer Force
and will pull their Sinai forces back to Bir Hassanah in the central
demilitarization zone.
-Stage 5: One year later, Israel would withdraw into the eastern
early warning zone.
Stage 6: One year later, regular Israeli forces would withdraw
behind the eastern early warning zone, and the demilitarization
agreement would be in full effect.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive DECLASSIFIED Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
7303062
WASHINGTON
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February 20, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
Subject: Visit. to Washington by Egyptian
National Security Adviser
Hafez Ismail
President Sadat's initiative in sending his National
Security Adviser, Hafez Ismail, to Washington is a
significant reflection of the importance Sadat attaches
to a U.S. role in Middle East peace efforts, despite his
critical public posture toward us. The Egyptians for
their own face-saving purposes have sought to portray
Ismail's visit as a response to a U.S. suggestion and as
part of their current highly visible round of diplomatic
consultations with the permanent members of the Security
Council and the Third World. Despite these cosmetics,
Sadat undoubtedly views this initiative as a major diplo-
matic move. At a time when we have indicated we want to
give priority to the Middle East, and with King Hussein
just having been here and Mrs. Meir coming next week,
Sadat clearly wants to be--and to be seen to be--in direct
contact with Washington at the highest level.
The Ismail visit provides an opportunity to assess
whether there is any new flexibility in Cairo's attitude
toward negotiations with Israel. We believe Ismail is
not likely to have new ideas, but that he will stress
that the U.S. must "do something" to bring about Israeli
flexibility. He is reported to be carrying a message to
you from Sadat. With Mrs. Meir's visit still in the
offing, it will be primarily a listening exercise for us,
but there will also be the opportunity for us to seek to
ameliorate Egyptian doubts about the advantages of getting
into negotiations.
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2
Current Status of the Sadat Regime. Now in power for
two and a half years, Sadat continues to be faced with
pressures stemming from restiveness over the current no-war,
no-peace situation, as well as discontent with the economic
conditions and the regime's authoritarian rule. Neverthe-
less, Sadat has so far successfully out-maneuvered his
enemies, keeping the left as well as the right off balance,
and preventing the widespread malaise in the country from.
coalescing into any kind of organized political move against
him. He has by now replaced all of Nasser's lieutenants
with his own people, among whom Ismail is one of the closest
and most trusted. Sadat has neither solved his country's
basic problems nor demonstrated the kind of charismatic
leadership Nasser provided, but he has dealt with challenges
to his leadership firmly and on the whole skillfully. We
think his position for the present at least is strong enough
to resist pressures either to resume warfare before he
thinks Egypt is ready for it, or to go into negotiations
in which he thinks the cards are stacked against Egypt.
Sadat realistically knows Egypt cannot at present
profitably resume fighting against Israel, and at the
same time he has become extremely skeptical that a
negotiated settlement at this time can produce terms
acceptable to Egypt. Seeing these two options closed to
him for the time being, Sadat has for the past year opted
for the only other strategy available: a protracted effort
to build Egyptian and Arab strength vis-a-vis Israel while
living with a continuing no-war, no-peace situation.
Elements of this strategy are a tightening of the economic
belt within Egypt to put more resources into military
programs, building greater coordination among the Arab
states for pressure against Israel--and possibly against
U.S. interests as well, and a campaign to increase inter-
national support for Egypt's position. Sadat does not
find this option particularly attractive: he knows it
involves painful political decisions at home and constant
control over forces both within Egypt and elsewhere in
the Arab world that demand quicker results. Nevertheless,
he will settle for it if neither of the other options
becomes more attractive.
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Cairo's Position on Negotiations. Sadat feels that
he stuck his neck out in 1971 in favor of an interim Suez
Canal agreement, which most of his advisers opposed, and
that he was let down when the U.S. failed to deliver
Israel on terms which Egypt could accept. Since then,
Sadat's attitude toward an interim agreement, and also
with the U.S. role as intermediary, has hardened, though
he has been careful not to close the door. When we
proposed late in 1971 that the two sides get into a more
intensive negotiating procedure--the so-called "proximity
talks" proposal--Sadat at first reacted favorably but at
that time the Israelis balked. When we finally got the
Israelis on board in early 1972, Sadat had backed off.
He has informed us that he would only enter such talks
if the Israelis give a prior commitment that they will
withdraw to the pre-June war Egyptian border in a final
peace settlement. We have told the Egyptians candidly
that we see no prospect of getting such a commitment
from Israel as a precondition to negotiations. We have
also indicated that we think there are other ways of
handling the linkage between the interim agreement and
on-going negotiations for an overall settlement based on
the November 1967 Resolution.
Cairo's strategy is to refocus world attention on the
territorial issue of a final peace settlement. Cairo's
recent public line has been that the interim agreement is
dead and that the U.S. should now cooperate with the
other powers (Ismail has just been to Moscow and London
and his Government is also in touch with Paris and Peking)
in a renewed assault on the problems of an overall peace
settlement in accordance with the 1967 Security Council
Resolution.
Disillusioned as the Egyptians are with the U.S.,
they believe that the U.S. alone has the ability to
influence Israel toward more flexible positions. They
have been also disillusioned with Soviet inability to
produce meaningful political results for them and Soviet
unwillingness to give them more advanced offensive
weaponry. These were undoubtedly factors in Sadat's
decision, after the Moscow Summit, to call for the virtual
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complete withdrawal of Soviet military forces from Egypt.
While both sides have subsequently sought to improve the
tone of USSR-Egyptian relations and have a mutual interest
in maintaining a measure of a special relationship, there
remains considerable distrust today between Cairo and
Moscow.
The U.S. Objective at This Meeting. We will want to
listen carefully to what Ismail has to say, even though
we are not yet in a position to decide exactly what
approach we will take in any effort to get negotiations
started.
Defined briefly, the present negotiating impasse
stems from Egypt's unwillingness to consider an interim
agreement that is not linked to an Israeli commitment
for eventual total withdrawal from Egyptian territory,
and Israel's unwillingness to give such a commitment
either as a precondition for talks on an interim agreement,
or for negotiations under UN auspices for an overall peace
settlement. On the Egyptian side of the equation, the
key to movement will be any hint that they might be willing
to accept something less than ironclad assurances of total
Israeli withdrawal from Sinai in an interim agreement, or
that in the context of a final settlement, they might be
willing to talk about arrangements at Sharm al-Shaykh
that would enable Israel to maintain a security presence
there. We will want to listen carefully for any indica-
tions of greater Egyptian flexibility on these key points.
If, on the contrary, Ismail's message is that Cairo
really does consider the interim agreement concept dead
and believes the U.S. should cooperate in a renewed
international effort on the overall peace settlement, I
think we should say that up to now, as a practical
matter, we have seen no realistic prospect that such an
approach can produce results. We are prepared to listen
to any practical ideas the parties themselves may have
which would offer any hope for progress.
Some Comments about Ismail Personally. Ismail is a
former Major General of the Egyptian Army who has also
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held high diplomatic posts (Ambassador to London and Paris)
as well as having been chief of the Egyptian Intelligence
Service. Just prior to becoming Sadat's National Security
Adviser, he held the position of Deputy Foreign Minister.
Sadat put him in his present position in conscious
emulation of the present White House arrangement. For
an Egyptian, Ismail is rather cool and formal in manner.
He is highly intelligent, however. Ismail does not have
any kind of independent power base within Egypt and häs
always functioned, both for Nasser and Sadat, as a
respected technician. He speaks excellent English. His
loyalty to Sadat seems unquestioned.
We are attaching suggested talking points for your
meeting (Attachment 1).
This memorandum is basically of a tactical character
devoted specifically to your talks with Ismail. We have
prepared a more fundamental assessment of the Arab-Israeli
dispute and the current situation in the area which I
believe will provide additional useful background and
help put the Ismail visit into a broader perspective
(Attachment 2). If you believe it desirable, I would
be glad to meet with you for a talk about our Middle
East policy sometime prior to your meeting with Ismail
on February 23.
Attachments:
1. Suggested Talking Points.
2. Assessment of Arab-Israeli
Dispute.
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Talking Points for Hafez Ismail Visit
-- You wish to express appreciation for hospitality
shown to Secretary Rogers during his visit to Cairo in
1971.
-- We respect President Sadat as a leader who is trying
resourcefully to get his country. out of a very difficult
predicament. He has trièd to approach the matter realistically
and has rejected extremist, simplistic solutions. Many of
the things he has done have been constructive. The decision
to request the departure of Soviet troops from Egypt last
summer has helped to defuse the situation and improve the
atmosphere for a negotiated settlement.
--- With major positive changes in Great Power relations
following Peking visit and Moscow Summit in '72, with the
Vietnam agreements, and with negotiations in progress
around the world on other deep-rooted conflicts, the
Middle East stands out as the sole exception. Our interests
lie in a stable, peaceful Middle East, and we would like to
help bring that about.
-- We do not seek a "partial" settlement or to force
"direct" negotiations. We want a final settlement. We
have pursued the interim agreement concept because it
seems the most practical way to begin. Both President
Sadat and Prime Minister Meir were interested in the idea
in 1971. It was not the U.S. that initiated the proposal.
This has seemed the most promising way to begin, and we
have never seen an interim agreement as an end in itself.
-- We recognize Egypt's concern that an interim
agreement might become frozen into a new status quo of
indefinite duration. We think these concerns are exaggerated.
The U.S. will not be content with such a half-way house
and does not think it would provide a satisfactory founda-
tion for our long-term interests in the Middle East. The
U.S. Government would immediately seek to build on the
achievement of any interim agreement by urging the start
of negotiations for a further stage of agreement; we
would not wish the momentum toward peace created by an
interim agreement to be lost.
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-- We understand Egypt's concern for its territorial
integrity, and for the legitimate aspirations of Palestinians
and of other Arab governments. But we also understand
Israel's concern for its security and its reluctance to
put its faith alone in written assurances and the guarantees
of others. The problem is how to reconcile these two
perceptions of Egypt's and Israel's national interests.
- In practical terms, the problem is to find an agreed
basis for negotiations. After five years of efforts by
others--UN, Two Powers, Four Powers--it is obvious there
is no realistic alternative to a genuine give-and-take
negotiating process, involving the parties themselves,
if the present impasse is to be overcome. You have asked
Secretary Rogers to explore with Mr. Ismail how the
current impasse on negotiations on an interim agreement
can be broken.
-- As Ismail knows, you have just seen King Hussein
and will be welcoming Prime Minister Meir shortly. For
this reason we are particularly pleased to welcome
Mr. Ismail in Washington at this time so as to be able
to hear first hand the Egyptian views on the Arab-Israel
problem. We are in the process of reviewing the question
of how we might be of assistance in getting negotiations
started, so we want to listen carefully to what Ismail
has to say.
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Subject: Middle Ease Peace Efforts - A Current Assesment
At present the Middle East situation is vastly better
than it was four years ago. The Soviet military involve-
ment in Egypt has been drastically reduced, King Hussein
is firmly in the saddle in Jordan, there is stability in
most of the Arabian Peninsula/Persian Gulf area, Lebanon
is taking more effective measures to control the fedayeen,
and the ceasefire along the Suez Canal remains in effect.
On the other hand, the latest Syrian-Israeli exchanges
are cogent reminders of the fragility of the ceasefire.
While the Palestinian fedayeen guerrillas are of marginal
military importance, they remain a formidable political
force with a capacity for creating continuing instability,
making difficulties for Jordan, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia,
and undermining peace efforts. Sadat needs and wants a
peaceful solution, but his freedom of action is becoming
increasingly limited. The present no war-no peace situa-
tion continues to provide the Soviets with good opportunities
for consolidating their position in Syria and Iraq, and for
recovering some of their lost influence in Egypt.
All of the foregoing factors indicate that there is
no ground for complacency. In addition, King Hussein is
anxious for us to take steps vis-a-vis Israel in support
of his position on a settlement. And, if there is no
movement on the peacemaking front over the coming months,
we can anticipate that pressures to force such movement
will grow, particularly from Cairo, as the time for any
next Summit meeting with the Soviet leadership approaches.
In looking at possible courses of action open to us,
we have essentially two options:
1. We can sit tight. Continuation of the status quo,
even if it is marred by violations of the ceasefire,
probably would bring no serious threat to basic U.S. in-
terests in the area in the near term and might well be
manageable for several years to come, although there would
likely be a gradual corrosive effect on our position in
the longer run.
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This is presently Israel's preferred strategy. Israel
holds that, faced with a firm sit-tight policy by it and
the United States, Sadat will have no choice but to come
to the negotiating table. We are not so certain. In
our judgment, given Sadat's firm conviction (which is not
without foundation) that he has made major concessions
over the past two years without reciprocal gestures from
Israel, there will almost certainly be no diplomatic
progress unless Sadat is offered some inducement. Without
eventual progress toward a settlement that holds out hope
of ending the Israeli occupation and giving some satis-
faction to legitimate Palestinian grievances, it is un-
likely the present equilibrium, including the ceasefire,
can continue indefinitely; the Soviets will have con-
tinuing opportunity for consolidation and penetration,
and the situation will at some point begin to deteriorate
militarily and politically in the area.
This would probably pose no serious threat to Israel.
It is also possible that, if we continued strongly to
hold the line with Israel, a new set of circumstances
might over the next few years emerge from further political
ferment and military setbacks on the Arab side which would
make new approaches to a settlement more promising than
they are today. From the standpoint of safeguarding U.S.
interests, however, this is an uncertain course at best.
Moreover, a major new Arab military setback would almost
certainly pose a challenge to the Soviet Union which could
result in serious differences between the Soviets and
ourselves.
There is also the question of the effect of a "sit-
tight" policy and a possible ceasefire breakdown on our
petroleum interests in the area and, more specifically,
on our access to Arab oil, which is becoming an increasingly
important factor in meeting our overall national energy
requirements. Judgments differ on this question, and it
is very difficult to give categorical answers. Obviously
progress toward an Arab-Israeli settlement, or at least
visible U.S. activity in promoting a settlement, would
weaken those extremist forces in the area advocating
concerted Arab pressure on U.S. interests. There are
some risks to U.S. oil interests in a "sit-tight" posture,
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particularly in Libya. These risks are not great, however,
over the next year or so at least, in the Arabian Peninsula/
Persian Gulf area where our oil interests are most important.
King Faisal has so far firmly resisted linking petroleum
matters to Middle East politics, and the other oil-producing
states in the Gulf are likely to follow his lead. The
risk over the longer term will increase, however, as the
corrosive effect of a protracted Arab-Israeli impasse
(particularly if hostilities resume) exerts pressures
on moderate regimes in the area and, consequently, on
their (or their successors') relations with us.
2. We can engage ourselves actively in efforts to
get an Arab-Israeli negotiating process started. Even if
this achieved no breakthroughs, the visible evidence that
the U.S. was making a serious effort would have a calming
effect, it would fortify and nurture the ceasefire, and,
at a minimum, buy additional time. We must recognize,
however, that any efforts we make, if they are to be
taken seriously and have some chance of getting Arab
agreement to enter negotiations, will require a serious
and on-going attempt by us to persuade Israel to relax
its rigid position that any settlement must necessarily
involve substantial Arab territorial concessions.
If we should decide to play a more active role,
the most realistic options (leaving aside tactical varia-
tions) are: (a) to undertake a joint effort with the
Soviet Union or (b) to seek unilaterally to get an Arab-
Israeli negotiating process started.
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U. S.-Soviet Track
U.S. and Soviet aims in the Middle East, while they
overlap in our common desire to avoid renewed hostilities
there, have never really coincided. All our experience
to date indicates that the Soviets have been unwilling to
deviate in any significant way from the Arab position on
an overall. settlement, as we were willing to do from
Israel's in 1969. A renewal of U.S. -Soviet peace efforts
would give the Israelis the most serious problems, raising
their suspicion that we were prepared to make and impose a
deal at their expense. Furthermore, to engage the Soviets
in joint peacemaking efforts would facilitate their
attempts to recover lost ground in Egypt and improve
their position elsewhere in the Arab world. We would be
making the Soviets Sadat's negotiator and advocate.
Arab-Israeli Negotiating Track
A. Jarring Mission
There is no present prospect of bridging the wide
gap between the parties on the framework for negotiating
an overall settlement, particularly as it concerns the
fundamental territorial issues. This being the case,
efforts to restart the Jarring Mission as the principal
negotiating forum would be unproductive. This also
applies to any move by Secretary General Waldheim who
is considering a possible trip to the area sometime in
the spring and has been toying with the idea of trying
to convince the parties to meet at a conference. We
have neither encouraged nor discouraged such moves by
Waldheim, leaving this matter largely to the parties
to decide.
B. Israel-Jordan Settlement
King Hussein clearly wants a settlement and has
persuaded the Israelis that he no longer harbors any
illusion that he has a realistic military option. In
fact, however, Israel's territorial desires vis-a-vis
Jordan, both in Jerusalem and on the West Bank, go far
beyond anything Hussein could accept and survive if he
were to make a separate peace. Both Hussein and the
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Israelis realize this. No issue would provoke a more
bitter U.S. -Israeli confrontation and - were concessions
to be pressed on the Israeli Government by the United
States - sharper internal dissensions in Israel than an
attempt on our part to get Israel to modify substantially
its approach to a territorial settlement with Jordan. In
these circumstances, we have up to now left this aspect
of the problem to the parties, meanwhile encouraging
continuation of the presently evolving de facto coexistence
and informal cooperation between Israel and Jordan which
is of major significance.
C. Egypt-Israel Interim Agreement
For the past two years we have considered the most
feasible negotiating track to be the idea of an interim
agreement between Egypt and Israel to achieve a limited
Israeli pullback in Sinai and re-opening of the Suez
Canal. Israel has committed itself to enter indirect
negotiations under our auspices - and only under our
auspices - looking toward such an agreement, providing
there are no pre-conditions. The principal obstacles
on the Egyptian side are twofold: (1) Sadat, while recog-
nizing that a U.S. role is necessary, sees us as an
advocate of Israeli policy rather than an objective
middleman; (2) Sadat fears that an interim agreement will
become an end in itself and leave Israel in occupation
of a substantial part of Egyptian territory.
Against the background of (a) Israel's position that
it will not withdraw to the June, 1967 lines and will
seek substantial territorial changes in a final settle-
ment, and (b) Egypt's position that it must have a prior
Israeli commitment to total withdrawal from all of Sinai
before entering negotiations, the question of how to
define the relationship between an interim and a final
agreement has emerged as the principal issue in seeking
to get interim agreement negotiations started.
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STANDARD FORM 1012-A
August 1970
TRAVEL VOUCHER
Title 7, GAO Manual
1012-212
MEMORANDUM
DEPARTMENT, BUREAU, OR ESTABLISHMENT
VOUCHER NO.
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
PAYEE'S NAME
SCHEDULE NO.
Harold H. Saunders
106-13
MAILING ADDRESS (Including ZIP Code)
PAID BY
c/o Administrative Office
Room 397 Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C.
20506
28 MAR 1973
OFFICIAL DUTY STATION
RESIDENCE
Washington, D.C.
FOR TRAVEL AND OTHER EXPENSES
TRAVEL ADVANCE
CHECK NO.
FROM (DATE)
TO (DATE)
Outstanding
$
6,337,493
2/25/73
2/26/73
CASH PAYMENT OF $
APPLICABLE TRAVEL AUTHORIZATION
Amount to be applied
RECEIVED (DATE)
NO.
DATE
Balance to remain
Admini auth. &
approved
outstanding
$
TRANSPORTATION REQUESTS ISSUED
AGENT'S
INITIALS OF
MODE, CLASS
POINTS OF TRAVEL
TRANSPORTATION
VALUATION
CARRIER
OF SERVICE,
DATE
REQUEST NUMBER
OF TICKET
ISSUING
AND ACCOM-
ISSUED
TICKET
MODATIONS
FROM-
TO-
Military a/c
New York City
Washington, D.C.
Dollars
Cts
AMOUNT
CLAIMED
March 1,1973
76
67
Approved. Long distance telephone calls are certified as necessary in the
DIFFERENCES:
interest of the Government.
NEXT PREVIOUS VOUCHER PAID UNDER SAME TRAVEL AUTHORITY
Total verified correct for charge to appropriation(s)
VOUCHER NO.
D.O. SYMBOL
DATE (MONTH-YEAR)
(initials)
Applied to travel advance (appropriation symbol)
March 19, 1973
NET TO
TRAVELER
76
67
ACCOUNTING CLASSIFICATION
1132000
LOIS G. MOOCK
AUTHORIZED CERTIFYING OFFICER
21.2
* Abbreviations for Pullman accommodations: MR, master room; DR, drawing room; CP, compartment; BR, bedroom; DSR, duplex single room; RM, roomette;
DRM. duplex roomette; SOS, single occupancy section; LB, lower berth; UB, upper berth; LB-UB, lower and upper berth; S, seat.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SCHEDULE OF EXPENSES AND AMOUNTS CLAIMED
PREVIOUS TEMPORARY DUTY (Complete these blocks only if in travel status immediately prior to period covered by this voucher and if admin-
istratively required)
DEPARTURE FROM OFFICIAL STATION
TEMPORARY DUTY STATION LAST DAY OF PRECEDING VOUCHER PERIOD
(DATE)
(HOUR)
(LOCATION)
(DATE OF ARRIVAL)
ST'S
AUTHORIZED
MILEAGE
DATE
AMOUNT CLAIMED
RATE
Ф
NATURE OF EXPENSE*
19
73
SPEEDOMETER
No. OF
MILEAGE
SUBSISTENCE
READINGS
OTHER
MILES
2/25
LV. Washington Nat'l a/p
9:00a.m.
Ar. New York LaGuardia a/p
10:00a.m.
Taxi from a/p to destination
7 50
2/26
Lv. New York LaGuardia a/p
4:30p.m.
Ar. Andrews AFB
5:30p.m.
Official telephone calls
3 17
One way airfare paid by claimant
26
00
Actual subsistance in lieu of Per Diem,-
Admin. approved & receipt attached,- allowable
40
00
DV.LE
10p
13
GPO 1970 OF - 430-454 (5A)
Grand total to face of voucher
76.67
26
00
40
00
10
67
(Subtotals, to be carried forward if necessary)
*If per diem allowances for members of employee's immediate family are included, give members' names, their relationship to employee,
and ages and marital status of children (unless this information is shown on the travel authorization).
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified