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Saunders Memoranda - Sensitive Egypt/Hafez Ismail 1973 [3 of 5]
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ACTION
869-X
SECRET/NODIS/CEDAR DOUBLE PLUS (XGDS)
February 22, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
HAROLD H. SAUNDERS
SUBJECT:
Memo for the President on His Talk with
Hafis Ismail
Attached is a memorandum for you to send the President for his
meeting with Ismail.
There are (1) the usual cover memo with talking points and (2) a back-
ground memo from you. Secretary Rogers' menio is attached.
RECOMMENDATION: That you send the attached to the President
this afternoon.
XGDS - 3
DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.
BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
SECRET/NODIS/CEDAR DOUBLE PLUS (XGDS)
HHSaunders: Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
MEETING WITH HAFIZ ISMAIL
Friday, February 23, 1973
11:00 a. m. (30 minutes)
The Oval Office
From: Henry A. Kissinger
1. PURPOSE
To receive as the emissary of President Sadat of Egypt his
National Security Adviser, Hafis Ismail, to discuss the prospects
for negotiation of an Arab-Israeli peace agreement.
II. BACKGROUND, PARTICIPANTS & PRESS PLAN
A. Background: Ismail has recently been to Moscow and London
to discuss prospacts for a Middle East peace and asked for
appointments here. This is part of Egypt's current diplomatic
effort after a year of relative inactivity to see whether efforts
to achieve an Arab-Israeli peace settlement can now be revived.
A background memo is at Tab A. Secretary Rogers' memo is
at Tab B.
B. Participants: Mr. Ismail has been urged to keep the meeting small,
but he may be under instructions to bring at least one of the following:
Dr. Muhammad Hafis Ghanem, a special adviser to President Sadat
is most likely; Abdel Hadi Makhiouf, Ismail's chief of cabinet;
Ahmed Khalil, the head of the US Interests Section in Washington.
General Scowcroft will sit in on our side.
C. Press Plan: Press photo opportunity at the outset. The meeting
will have been announced beforehand, and Mr. Ziegler will say a
few general words about it afterward.
III. TALKING POINTS
1. Please to convey to President Sadat my respect for his efforts to
restore the integrity of bis country. I recognise the constructive
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
- 2 -
steps that he has taken. His decision to ask Seviet troops
to leave Egypt last summer was recognized here as a very
significant step. 1 also recognize the importance of Presi-
dent Sadat's statement that Egypt is prepared to make peace
with israel.
2. 1 would welcome hearing what you (Mr. Ismail) would like
to say.
3. As a general point I would like President Sadat to understand
that 1 fully recognize that the US has an interest in peace in
the Middle East. 1 believe that conditions of peace provide
the best framework for each nation in the Middle East to
progress in its own way, and that is consistent with the interests
of the United States. When each nation has an opportunity to
pursue its own interests constructively, this will put limits to
the influence of outside powers, such as the USSR. I also believe
that in conditions of peace the US with its modern technology
and management skills can be helpful to each nation in the
Middle East. [Note: It is probably tactically best to avoid
mention of oil so that no impression will be created that the US
is unduly concerned over the "energy crisis. "]
4. The US is not committed to any one kind of settlement. We
pressed the Idea of as interim settlement when President Sadat
raised the possibility. This may still represent a sensible
part of an overall approach, but we are willing to explore all
reasonable ideas on how to proceed.
5. We are, however, quite serious about the necessity to establish
some sort of negotiating process. 1 would like to say a word
about what this means to me. First of all, I believe that genuino
negotiating process must be established so that it does not
humiliate either side and so that It does not cause either side to
give up its basic principles in advance. When I went to Peking I
made it very clear that I did not expect my talks there to change
basic positions on either side, but I did expect that we would be
able to address those issues where accommodation was possible
now and at least find a way of dealing peacefully with those dif-
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
- 3 .
ferences that could not be resolved soon. I firmly believe
that it is in the interest of peace if adversaries can put them-
solves in a relationship where making peace can become a
process which addresses each issue, starting with those most sus-
ceptible of accommodation. This is the process which we feel is
essential to break the impasse in the Middle East. We are pre-
pared to help start such a process.
6. I fully recognize the political problem that would be caused for
President Sadat if be were to make the concession of entering
talks with Israel and then were to appear to have gained nothing
in return. That is a problem which we are prepared to help
address realistically. What is essential for us at this stage is
to know whether the governments of Egypt and Israel are com-
mitted to a negotiated solution. Until that decision is made on
both sides, it will not be possible to move forward. This means
that each side much be prepared to negotiate realistically around
certain of its basic principles. No outsider can provide a sub-
stitute for the fundamental decision to negotiste. (That decision
in Hanoi was the turning point in negotiations on peace in Vietnam.)
7. I will be seeing Prime Minister Meir next week and will discuss
these same views with her. What is essential for the US in trying
to launch a negotiating process is the conviction that each side is
prepared to negotiate realistically. Anything you, Mr. Ismail,
can convey on this subject will be useful next week.
8. I want to stress that the US has no interest in an agreement which
will either produce the seeds of another war or will for a long
time alienate Egypt from the United States. We want good and
full relations with Egypt, which we recognize as a major country
in the Middle East. We realise that a partial settlement if it
stops before a full settlement would not serve that and. In this
connection, I would like President Sadat to be aware of our desire
for the best possible relationship between us.
9. We believe it is important to maintain the ceasefire as a background
for nogotiations.
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
- 4 -
10. I would like you to convey to President Sadat directly my best
personal wishes. I have appreciated the opportunities to com-
musicate directly with him by message and through our various
representatives. 1 particularly appreciate the opportunity
afforded by your visit, Mr. ismail, and want President Sadat
to know our door continued to be open. We are prepared to
explore ways of advancing toward peace in the Middle East
provided there is a realistic prospect of serious negotiations.
11. I am very sorry about the loss of life in the shoot-down of the
Libyan airliner.
HHSaunders:imp:2/22/73
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
ACTION
SECRET/NODIS/CEDAR DOUBLE PLUS (XGDS)
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT:
Background for Your Meeting with Egyptian
Emissary Hafiz Ismail
Setting. Ismail is coming to see whether Egypt can anticipate renewed
US--particularly Presidential--help in achieving a settlement with Israel.
His trip here follows visits to Moscow and London, and Egyptian Foreign
Minister Zayyat is travelling to Moscow and Peking. It is difficult to
know whether this is just another show of diplomatic activity or whether
the Egyptians have indeed done some fresh thinking about their position
and are prepared to enter the real give-and-take of negotiation.
Sadat feels that Egypt has made two major concessions to Israel and
that Egypt has been let down both times. Egypt has stated publicly that
it is prepared to make peace with Israel, and Sadat went out on a limb
in 1971 against the counsel of his advisers to propose the idea of an
interim agreement providing for partial withdrawal from the Suez Canal.
He feels that Israel turned aside both of these initiatives and that, when
Israel objected, the US backed down.
Sadat accepted the fact that the US could not involve itself in a major
Mid-Eastern diplomatic initiative last year. His probing now is an effort
to find out whether the US will now resume a more active role and--hope-
fully, from Egypt's viewpoint--be prepared to press Israel for concessions.
The Egyptian position now consists of two main points:
1. Sadat is prepared to accept Israel within its pre-war borders
provided Israel will respect Egypt's territorial integrity within
the same borders. He speaks of not surrendering Egyptian "sovereignty"
over any Arab soil, but he seems prepared to bargain over the terms
of demilitarizing the Sinai and over different possible modes of
international guarantees for a settlement. How much flexibility
XGDS - 3
DECLAS - Date impossible to determine.
BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
SECRET/NODIS/CEDAR DOUBLE PLUS (XGDS)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET/NODIS/CEDAR DOUBLE PLUS (XGDS)
- 2 -
there is in this position and whether it could lead to the basis
for negotiations with Israel remains to be tested.
2. Sadat says he is no longer interested in an "interim" settlement.
This does not necessarily mean that an arrangement for a short
Israeli withdrawal from the Canal so it could be reopened might
not be the first phase in a general settlement. It means that Sadat
seems no longer willing to reach any agreement with Israel without
assurance that he will regain sovereignty over all his territory.
The implications of this for the US are that, since Sadat will insist
on linking any partial agreement to the key elements of an overall
agreement, any effort to achieve an interim agreement may again
founder on the key issue of final boundaries.
There are three basic choices for the US in deciding what, if any, new
effort should be made toward breaking the Arab-Issaeli impasse:
1. We could stand back and let the two sides reflect further on
their position. This might be especially attractive in this Israeli
election year. Mrs. Meir will argue vigorously for this course so
as not to encourage Sadat to think the US will relieve him of rewpon-
sibility to make the hard decisions that will be required if Egypt is
to come to terms with Israel. It is difficult to argue that another
few months' delay in moving toward a negotiation would be disastrous
for US interests. The principal concern is that the passage of time
seems gradually to increase the threat that the Arabs would try to
use such US interests as our oil interests as leverage to press us
toward greater effort on & settlement. There is also the danger that
hostilities would be renewed at some point.
2. We could renew the efforts to achieve an interim settlement that
lost momentum in 1971. The State Department's view [Secretary
Rogers! memorandum is attached under Tab B] is that this is our only
choice given firm Israeli insistence on making permanent changes in
the boundary between Egypt and lerael. State sees no alternative to
working toward an interim agreement and leaving the question of
final boundaries up in the air for a later negotiation. State is therefore
concentrating on trying to find a formula which would (a) commit both
sides to negotiate on terms of an overall settlement after an interim
SECRET/NODIS/CEDAR DOUBLE PLUS (XGDS)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET/NODIS/CEDAR DOUBLE PLUS (XGDS)
- 3 -
agreement is reached and (b) provide that any such negotiation
would begin with no possible solutions precluded at the outset.
3. We could try to work privately toward an understanding on
the framework for an overall settlement. This effort could take
place on a separate track from the effort to reach an agreement
on a first-phase withdrawal from the Sues Canal. It would stand
or fall on whether or not it is possible to persuade Israel to think
in terms of exercising control at militarily strategic points in the
Sinal while restoring sovereignty over most of the Sinai to Egypt
rather than insisting on a permanent change in boundaries.
The basic question which must be answered now is whether either
Israelia or Egyptians are prepared to negotiate seriously. Specifically
is either prepared to move back from present negotiating positions in
response to significant concessions from the other side?
This question applies equally to both sides, but it is of particular
importance for us not to get very far out in front of Israel or let Egypt
believe that we might deliver more than we could persuade Israel to
accept. The viability of a concept which depends on restoring Egyptian
severeignty in the Sinal while providing for Israeli military control of
key points for some period will depend on whether Israel is willing to
give up its aspirations for a permanent change in the Sinai border. On
the other hand, It would be pointless to pursue this idea with the Israelia
unless we had some feeling that the Egyptians were prepared to think
pragmatically about such a settlement.
Thus, our principal objective in talks with Ismail will be to discern
whether Egypt would be prepared to discuss all possible overall solutions
if Israel would do the same--that is, whether Egypt would be prepared to
negotiate without preconditions on either side. Whatever we sense of
Ismail's position could be conveyed to Mrs. Meir next week.
The attached talking points from the State Department suggest that you
urge Egypt to accept a negotiating process as an essential step on the
way to an agreement. More specifically, however, State urges that you
press Egypt to consider how to break the current impasse on negotiations
on an interim agreement. In doing this, State urges that you make clear
SECRETINODIS/CEDAR DOUBLE PLUS (XGDS)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET/NODIS/CEDAR DOUBLE PLUS (XGDS)
- 4 -
to Ismail that we do not seek only a "partial" settlement--that we want
a final settlement--but that we see an interim agreement as the only way
to proceed now. The purpose of this assurance would be to try to
persuade Egypt to accept the concept of an agreement as the most
practical way to begin.
There is no harm in discussion of how progress might be made toward
an interim agreement, but my recommendation is to avoid creating the
impression that this is the only course that we are prepared to follow.
It seems to me that the main point to be put across to Sadat through
Ismail is that the US will be prepared to help pursue either an interim
or an overall agreement--or both simultaneously--provided both
Egyptians and Israelis are prepared to negotiate realistically. We will
be talking to Prime Minister Meir next week and our purpose while Ismail
is in the United States will be to discern whether Egypt is prepared to
discuss all possible solutions realistically and without preconditions.
SECRET/NODIS/CEDAR DOUBLE PLUS (XGDS)
HHSaunders:tmt 2/22/73
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
INFORMATION
(Outside System)
SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
May 23, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
HAROLD H. SAUNDERS 78al
SUBJECT:
Summary of Your May 20 Conversation
with Ismail
At Tab A is a summary of your sessions with Ismail. It covers both
the formal talks and what you told me of your private talk. This could
be changed easily into a memo for the President, or you could simply
forward it with a short cover note dealing with the tactical situation as
you see it in relation to the US-USSR summit.
At Tab B is a summary of the main points you mentioned to me that
you covered in your private talk with Ismail. These are included in the
longer summary, but I thought you might want them broken out for your
own records.
Twn with memo
for Run.
XGDS - 1 and 3
DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.
BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
Your should include
what said
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
A
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
Tab A A
SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
SUMMARY OF CONVERSATION
Henry A. Kissinger - Hafiz Ismail
May 20, 1973
In short, Ismail came to this meeting to probe White House intentions--
not to discuss concrete elements of a possible Egypt-Israel agreement.
The result was that the formal talks were less useful than last time, but
through private talks significant headway was made in bringing Ismail
to understand the reasoning and the domestic political realities behind
our proposal to move toward a settlement in a step-by-step approach.
It remains very much an open question how Sadat will respond; he has rejected
this approach before and may do SO again.
These talks took place against the background of an agenda of specific
issues left from the February meeting which Ismail had promised to
consider. These included:
As full and concrete a statement as possible of the obligations
Egypt and Israel would accept toward each other in a state of
peace.
The relationship of an Egypt-Israel agreement to other aspects
of a Palestine settlement. For example: Could a state of peace
become effective between Egypt and Israel before Syrian and
Jordanian settlements with Israel or a refugee settlement are
achieved?
-Concrete ways for assuring Israeli security in the Sinai while
restoring Egyptian sovereignty there.
However, it quickly became apparent that Ismail was not prepared to
discuss these issues this time. He wanted to discuss US intentions in
these talks. These were the main points in his presentation:
The Egyptian side had the impression from the last talks that
Egypt was being asked to come up with a new position that would
enable the US to try to move Israel.
Even with a new Egyptian position, however, the US seemed
uncertain whether Israel would withdraw. In the Egyptian view,
Israel has shown no sign that it is interested in peace.
XGDS - 1 and 3
DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.
BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
SECRET/SENSITFV Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
- 2 -
- -Ismail had found continued hesitancy about the role, if any,
to be played by the White House. It is not clear that the White
House has decided to put its weight behind an effort to achieve
a peace settlement.
-- The events of March, April and early May had raised further
questions in Egyptian minds about US intentions:
-- The decision to continue aircraft deliveries to Israel
through 1974-75 was "very revealing.' 11
The decision to provide technological assistance to
Israeli military industry was "dangerous" because it would
free Israel of US influence.
- US financing ($50 million) for the settlement in Israel of
Jewish emigres from the USSR provides further support for
Israel.
The US equating of the acts of the radical Palestinians
with Israel's raid in Beirut was "most unfair. "
-- Egypt had observed how pressure from the US Congress
had forced the Administration against its will to put pressure
on the USSR for the emigration of Soviet Jews. This caused
Egypt to wonder whether the US could freely play a role in the
Middle East.
It cannot even be excluded that there is US nuclear
cooperation with Israel.
-- Egypt feels that the most important factor encouraging Israel
to stand fast is the fact that the US is committed to defend Israel's
conquests until the Arabs concede to Israel's demands. Unless
there is a more balanced US approach, it is difficult to see how
there can be progress. If the US is prepared to shift its "balance
of power" approach of assuring overwhelming Israeli predominance,
there could be some positive results.
SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
- 3 -
-- Egypt is, therefore, faced with two choices:
--It can accept an "interim agreement" which will "almost
certainly " become a final one.
- Or it can move toward a final agreement which would
require "enormous concessions" by Egypt.
If neither approach is acceptable, what is left to Egypt except
military action? [Ismail in private conversation said he felt
military action would be "too adventurous" now, SO he was
apparently thinking of the longer term future.]
Given Ismail's unreadiness to talk about the concrete elements of a
settlement, it seemed most useful to concentrate discussion with him
on the general theory of how we should proceed. This seemed best done
in private talks. These points were covered:
-- The US is not trying to exploit the Arab-Israeli conflict to
achieve some global objective. The US remains prepared to
work with Egypt for a just solution.
-- The most the US can now foresee persuading Israel to accept
is restoration of nominal Egyptian sovereignty in the Sinai with
a transitional Israeli security presence at key positions. This
might not be the full exercise of sovereignty but it would establish
the principle of legal sovereignty.
- It might be 1974 before real progress on an interim agreement
could be made and a year after that before there could be progress
on an overall agreement.
On the other hand, it is not the US strategy to keep the Israelis
in the Sinai. It is the US policy to try to get a process going in
which the US could exercise its influence.
-- The US has no interest in bringing about a change in Egypt-Israel
frontiers. The longer the present situation continues, the greater
the danger that it will become permanent. Any line through the
Sinai would be less natural than the Suez Canal, SO there is advantage
simply in beginning Israeli movement back. If a negotiating process
could be started, the US would stick with it beyond the first-stage
SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
- 4 -
agreement for withdrawal from the Suez Canal. We would make
this clear publicly and elicit a comparable public commitment
from Israel. It is not excluded that negotiations on a Canal
agreement and on an overall agreement could be carried on
simultaneously.
The US view is that an effort should be made soon to work
out general principles of agreement that could get talks started.
The US needs to avoid the kind of concrete detail that would
trigger sharp domestic and Israeli pressures on us at the outset
and limit the usefulness of our involvement before we have even
begun. The potential of these public pressures is great. It
might be useful to work toward such principles with the USSR
during the summit.
Debate in the UN Security Council (beginning June 4) could
complicate the process of arriving at some useful understanding
with the USSR, if the Egyptians thought some such understanding
would be helpful. Ismail said that, if the Security Council debate
dragged on to the eve of the US-USSR summit, Egypt would be
receptive to a proposal for adjournment.
The issue now is whether Sadat can accept this kind of approach. Ismail
frankly said he could not commit himself; he would have to talk with Sadat.
There is a good chance that Sadat will not feel able to go along. Ismail
said he would send word of Sadat's reaction in the next couple of weeks.
SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
Tab B
SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
SUMMARY OF PRIVATE CONVERSATION
The following are points summarized by Dr. Kissinger as having
been discussed between him and Hafiz Ismail in a private talk
following lunch at their session on May 20, 1973:
1. Dr. Kissinger thought, "paradoxically, 11 that more
progress had been made in the private talks this time
than in the talks on February 25-26. Last time, he felt
that Ismail had listened with an open mind and had agreed
to consider new ideas that Dr. Kissinger had advanced,
but he did not appear to have realized fully the implications
of what Dr. Kissinger was proposing. This time, Ismail
seemed to "take aboard" more of the implications of the
approach that Dr. Kissinger was discussing. Particularly,
he seemed to have greater understanding of the step-by-
step approach to an Egypt-Israel agreement--the political
reasons for it on the US side and the pace at which it might
proceed. Ismail even said that he surmised from
Dr. Kissinger's comments that there might not be an
interim agreement until 1974 and little progress on an
overall agreement before 1975. Dr. Kissinger said that
he felt there had been little point at this meeting in getting
into the details of a possible agreement between Egypt and
Israel before there was full understanding on the theory of
how the US and Egyptian sides were going to proceed.
2. In response to a question from Mr. Saunders, Dr. Kissinger
acknowledged that Ismail must have understood the official USG
rationale for an interim settlement before, but maybe he needed
to hear directly from the White House an assurance that the
White House would stick with the process after an interim
agreement and not walk away from it, leaving the interim
agreement as a final one.
XGDS - 1 and 3
DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.
BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
- 2 -
3. Mr. Ismail had asked Dr. Kissinger what he thought
was the most Egypt could get from Israel. Dr. Kissinger
had said that he thought the most that he could foresee now
Israel's giving was nominal Egyptian sovereignty in the Sinai
with Israeli security positions at key points.
4. Ismail said that he could not give any commitments now;
he would have to talk to Sadat. He would send word back to
Dr. Kissinger within the next ten days or so, in time for the
US-USSR summit. Dr. Kissinger after the meeting with Ismail
acknowledged that the principal problem is with President Sadat;
he may very well decide that he does not wish to engage in this
process and send word that such is the case.
5. Mr. Ismail got a clearer understanding of the inter-
relationship among the various diplomatic problems the US
faces--particularly right now the inter-relationship between
the US-USSR summit and the UN Security Council debate
scheduled to begin June 4. Mr. Ismail promised that, if the
debate at the UNSC went on for a couple of weeks, Egypt would
be prepared to accept a proposal for adjournment before the
US-USSR summit begins on June 18. Egypt did not want to make
too much trouble for the US in the Security Council. Mr. Ismail
seemed to grasp better than before the complexities of the US
domestic situation in dealing with this problem--one of the reasons
why a step-by-step approach seems more feasible to the US than
a single jump to a final settlement.
6. Mr. Ismail said that Egypt would be willing to sign an
agreement with Israel before Jordan or Syria. Dr. Kissinger,
commenting afterward, said he was doubtful that they would make
full peace effective before those other agreements were signed,
however.
SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
Ismail to Kissinger--2215 (EDT) October 20, 1973.
"
The Egyptian Government sets out the following stand with respect
to the present conflict:
(A) A ceasefire on the present lines,
(B) convening a peace conference with the object of reaching a
fundamental settlement,
(C) a guarantee by the United States and the Soviet Union of the
ceasefire and the withdrawal of Israeli troops.
"Mr. Ismail believes that the presence of Dr. Kissinger in Moscow now
will be helpful in reaching an agreement on the above mentioned lines. "
Kissinger to Ismail--October 21, 1973.
"I deeply appreciate your message of October 20
We have reached
agreement with General Secretary Brezhnev that our Governments will
introduce a joint Security Council resolution
On this basis, I believe
we can look toward a settlement satisfactory to all parties. To this end,
we have agreed with the Soviet Government that the US together with the
USSR will be prepared to use their good offices and participate as required
to facilitate a fundamental settlement.
I can assure you that as the
fighting ceases, the US will use its influence to secure a lasting peace in
the Middle East on a basis just for all parties. 11
Ismail to Kissinger--October 23, 1973.
"Very urgent. We have very strongly drawn your attention to the dangers
of a ceasefire and therefore have demanded guarantees for the fulfillment
by both parties of their obligations once they accept the ceasefire.
"It is our understanding according to reports received from the Soviet
Union that the US Government have accepted to guarantee the ceasefire which will
create the conditions necessary for the commencement of peace talks
"
XGDS - 1 and 3
DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determine.
BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified
B
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
- 2 -
Sadat to Nixon--2115 Cairo time, October 23, 1973
"
I am formally asking you to intervene effectively even if that
necessitates the use of forces in order to guarantee the full implementation
of the ceasefire resolution in accordance with the joint US-USSR agreement.
"We were asked to comply with the ceasefire resolution with the full
understanding of the effectiveness of the joint guarantees
...
The Egyptian
Government will consider the U.S. Government fully responsible for what
is happening at present, in spite of your guarantees and of the Security
Council Resolution co-sponsored by the USA and the USSR, as well as of
our acceptance of the Resolution on that basis.
11
What is happening now, in the light of your guarantees, does not
induce confidence in any other future guarantees."
Nixon to Sadat--October 23, 1973
"I appreciate your recent message and the frankness with which you
spoke. Let me be equally frank. All we guaranteed-- no matter what you
may have been told from other sources--was to engage fully and constructively
in promoting a political process designed to make possible a political
settlement.
"Nevertheless, as evidence of our earnest desire to promote a lasting
settlement.
I have instructed Secretary Kissinger to make urgent
representations to the Government of Israel requesting its full compliance
with Security Council Resolution 338
11
Sadat to Nixon- 1400 EDT, October 26, 1973
11
The two superpowers bear a major responsibility in seeing that the
Security Council resolutions are being fully and promptly implemented.
"
SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
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MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
April 13, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
HAROLD H. SAUNDERS
SUBJECT:
Memorandum Recording Your
Conversation with Ismail
At Tab A. as you requested is a record of your conversations with
Mr. Ismail for you to show to Joe Sisco. It is a full record but
without procedural details like the following:
- References to procedures used in establishing and
following through on direct communication between you
and Mr. Ismail.
- Reference to the relationship between your channel and
Egypt's normal contact with the State Department. [FYI,
the transcript did not show at any point your saying that the
Egyptians should disregard the State Department. ]
Discussion of exactly what role the US should play between
Egypt and Israel through this special channel. There is one
paragraph in which Ismail described in very general terms
a three-part process beginning with agreement on general
principles, filling in provisions and then moving on to
implementation. This will cover his general view of what
needs to be done and provides the framework within which
you agreed that negotiation of an interim settlement with the
State Department could be useful as an opening phase in this
process.
- Details of exactly what you and he might say to your respective
Soviet contacts about your particular conversation.
- Discussion of what went wrong in 1971.
XGDS - 3
DECLAS - Date Impossible to Determi
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE(XGDS)
BYAUTH - Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
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- 2 -
-- Detailed discussion of demilitarization and possible long
term transitional security arrangements in the Sinai, except
for one sentence in the form of a question by you which raises
the possibility of such arrangements.
-
In this connection, you should be aware of the State Department
Memorandum at Tab B saying that Secretary Rogers has asked Ted
Eliot to request that he be provided with copies of the memoranda
concerning the President's and your conversations with Hafiz Ismail.
I simply request your guidance on the handling of this State Department
request. The attached memo could meet the request as far as your
talk is concerned and a record of the President's conversation would
presumably be quite general.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
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Saunders FYI
2036
B
7306732
department OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520
CONFIDENTIAL
April 11, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Memoranda of Conversations with
Hafez Ismail
The Secretary has asked me to request that
he be provided with copies of the memoranda con-
cerning the President's and your conversations
with Hafez Ismail.
Jarry Bany Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary
CONFIDENTIAL
GDS
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A
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
February 26, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT:
Conversations Between Dr. Henry Kissinger
and Mr. Muhammad Hafiz Ismail
Dr. Kissinger opened the meeting by proposing a very faank
exchange. He said he had no proposals to make but hoped that
each side could tell the other as candidly as possible what it
thinks and feels. The US wants most seriously to have a solution
to the logjam in the Middle East, but there is no sense in the US
promising anything that it cannot deliver. Thus, the purpose of
the discussion is to talk in a general way about what the problems
are and what approaches might be used to resolve them.
Mr. Ismail thanked Dr. Kissinger for his very sincere offer to
have serious discussions about the question and about how solutions
might be devised. He noted that the discussions do not start from
scratch. There have been Four Power talks, Two Power talks and
a number of contacts between our two governments as well as
policy statements made by the US government over the past four
years.
Mr. Ismail said that he would speak only for Egypt, but he said
frankly that Egypt could not think in terms of a separate Egyptian
settlement unless it is in the context of a general framework of
a Middle East settlement.
Mr. Ismail reaffirmed that Egypt is not a satellite of any nation.
Egypt had asked the Soviets to leave for the sake of Egypt's independence
and for the sake of lessening the possibility of a US-USSR confrontation.
Egypt knows that the US wants peace in the Middle East and that without
US help there can be no peace in the Middle East. Egypt feels that
progress requires a certain measure of shift in American policy toward
the countries in the area. Egypt sees the present US policy of main-
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- 2 -
taining a balance of power as working in the interests of continued
occupation of Arab land and in opposition to any genuine effort to
reach peace. This is the same position, he noted, which he had
elaborated during his lunch at the State Department.
Mr. Ismail said he might take a moment to address the question,
"How do we see the Middle Eastin ten years time?" It is
important to have an objective -- a sense of direction. As Egypt
sees it, the Middle East will in five to ten years, he hopes,
include a number of political units, strong, healthy, independent,
cooperating among themselves, freed from external influences as
much as possible, and free to cooperate with foreign political
units outside the area. Egypt wants an independent Middle East.
Egypt has lived for years with Jewish communities and they have
offered something to the Egyptian way of life. Therefore, Egyp tians
can see a day when all countries in the area may have a common
understanding.
Reaching such a state of understanding will be difficult, however,
because of high emotions in the area and because of external
influence. Also, as long as Israel does not recognize itself as a
Middle Eastern country, how can Egypt so recognize it?
Now, if the foregoing statement defines a broad objective that all
parties could reach for, Egypt sees the starting point as a settle-
ment of the present armed conflict in the area. This would lay
a good basis for the development of normalization in the area, so
this must be our immediate objective -- to get a settlement based
on all the resolutions of the United Nations, and based on existing
international agreements related to the area such as the 1888 Con-
stanople Convention on the Suez Canal.
Those UN resolutions as interpreted by the Big Powers, he said,
recognize two things: the international borders and the human
rights of the Palestinians. Those are the two pillars of a settle-
ment. Because of the history of international involvement in the
creation of Israel, the big powers must now say how they envisaged
the new state which has been created. They must state not only
that but also guarantee in the future that this presente (Israel) does
not overflow its limits.
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- 3 -
Egypt thinks the problem lends itself to a settlement in several
stages in an overall framework. Progress might be made on
different fronts within each sector, but Egypt also believes that
those phases and stages must be interrelated so they can lead
to a defined goal. A settlement must include Egypt, Jordan and
Syria. Probably Lebanon must come in later on. It must be
a final settlement, and it must be just. It must be immediate.
Egypt believes the most logical approach to the problem is to
reduce the problem to its exact size: the conflict between the
communities living within Palestine. That conflict has overflowed
its borders, and we should bring it back to its original size and
find how Jews and Palestinian Arabs can live together within
Palestine -- or live apart, whichever they choose. If and when
they agree, they can negotiate a political settlement. To help
reach that objective, we have to eliminate the other aspects of
the conflict outside Palestine and to achieve complete disengage-
ment on the Arab-Israeli front. Mr. Ismail said he did not want
to get into how the Palestinian problem should be solved. He
would say that if it were not possible for Palestinidna and Israelis
to work out a way of having a democratic state including both of
them, then maybe they may agree on ways to divide the country.
On the Egyptian side, he said, the objective of an agreement would
be to bring about a state of peace and an end to the state of war.
The major problem is the question of sovereignty - -- the recognition
of Egypt's international borders and the control of its own land.
Egypt can take into considerationnthe legitimate concerns of Israel
about security. If a formula can be found that recognizes complete
Egyptian sovereignty and meets the legitimate concerns of Israel
with respect to its security, Egyptians realize that the main knot
will be broken on the Egyptian-Israeli front. Then the question of
staging could be worked out.
Finally, Mr. Ismail spoke of the need to move promptly. Disengage-
ment will have to be quick because Egypt is not prepared to accept
the withdrawal that is going to hang on for years. Egypt sees a dis-
engagement that can be realized before the end of this year. Israeli
elections should not be a cause for further delay. The whole situation
in the area is dangerous.
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- 4 -
Dr. Kissinger expressed appreciation for Mr. Ismail's presentation
and wanted to ask some questions about it. He asked whether he
was correct in summarizing one of Mr. Ismail's points by saying
that there are really two basic settlements: One is the settlement
among all the countries in the area, including Israel, with respect
to the military issues produced by the 1967 war. On this issue,
Egypt defines the essential element as a return to the mandated
borders. of Palestine.
Mr. Ismail interrupted to refine his comment by saying that this
referred principally to the Egyptian front. He would not speak for
Jordan or Syria; as for Gaza, Egypt felt that Gaza should have the
right of self-determination under UN auspices within the lines of
1949.
Dr. Kissinger returned to his effort to understand the broader frame-
work of Mr. Ismail's presentation. He characterized the second
element in a settlement, as Mr. Ismail had described it as a settle-
ment between the Palestinians and Israel about the future of mandated
Palestine.
Dr. Kissinger then asked who would speak for the Palestinians, and
Mr. Ismail replied that Egypt would not raise any obstacles for
King Hussein in settling this question.
Dr. Kissinger, still attempting to clarify the basic concept Mr. Ismail
had presented, suggested there are two problems: First, how does
one get peace in the Middle East? Second, how does one get peace in
the Hashemite Kingdom? Is Mr. Ismail saying that a settlement
between Egypt and Israel will produce progress towards peace but
not final peace until the Palestine problem is solved? Mr. Ismail
agreed.
Dr. Kissinger said it is one thing to say that a negotiation - - for
instance between Egypt and Israel -- will produce peace. It is another
thing to say that one negotiation will produce something between a
cease-fire and peace, which is then dependent on yet another negotiation.
Dr. Kissinger asked what would be the precise result of the Egypt-Israel
negotiation other than that Israel would withdraw. Mr. Ismail replied
that a commitment to full withdrawal could be accompanied by certain
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- 5 -
peace commitments on the part of Egypt toward Israel. It would
mean an end to the state of war, but not full peace. Such steps
as exchanging ambassadors or trade agreements would be excluded
at that point. Included would be free passage in international
waterways, non-intervention in each other's affairs, restriction
on any subversive activities against Israel. There could also be
security measures of an international character such as observers
or an international force in one or two strategic points. Egypt
has accepted these things. Full normalization of relations is
something that Egypt wants but that takes time.
In response to Dr. Kissinger's question, Mr. Ismail said that the
difference between conditions in 1966 and those that would be
created by this agreement would include passage in the Suez Canal,
an end of the boycott on third-party goods, an end to Egypt's
reservation clause on international agreements -- that kind of
recognition of Israel. Egypt already acknowledges the existence
of Israel. He quoted from Resolution 242 and Egypt's acceptance
of it. The only issue is the question of normalization of relations --
not recognition. He was quite firm in denying that there was any
vagueness in Egypt's position on this point.
Dr. Kissinger turned to another question: He asked Mr. Ismail what
he felt the US could do at this point since Mr. Ismail had earlier
stated that he felt the big powers should say how they envisage the
boundaries of Israel.
Mr. Ismail responded that the reason talks have not succeeded to
date is that agreement could not be reached on an interpretation of
Resolution 242. He felt that, as a first step,something like the
Dean Rusk formula of 1968 needed to be worked out. The US would
have to exercise its influence to reach agreement with Israel on a
common interpretation of 242.
Not until an established basis for a settlement is reached that defines
the heads of a possible agreement will it be possible to decide on
whether progress should be made through proximity talks or some
other kind of negotiating devide. Egypt's problem in the past has
been that the US has presented specific points to Egypt, Egypt has
re-adjusted its position and in the process made a concession here
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- 6 -
and there and then Israel has accepted those concessions and
started a new bargaining process.
Dr. Kissinger acknowledged the Egyptian dilemma. On the one
hand, it is important for Egypt to convince Israel that it is serious;
on the other hand, he could understand Egypt's not wanting to give
away any concessions without an understanding on the ultimate
results.
Mr. Ismail returned to his point that the fundamental issue is to
know whether Israel is willing to have a final, complete settlement.
He said that Egypt could not negotiate as long as Israel is on
Egyptian land; if Israel withdraws, Egypt will negotiate about
anything. Dr. Kissinger asked whether Egypt would negotiate if
Israel "withdrew" or if Israel "agreed to withdraw". Mr. Ismail
responded hesitantly but indicated that Egypt might consider nego-
tiating if Israel were "committed to something".
Dr. Kissinger returned to the fundamental problem for the US --
that US pursuasiveness with Israel depends very heavily on the
positions that Egypt advances. It depends on the degree to which
there can be even greater concreteness or changes in the Arab
position, especially the Egyptian position.
[At this point there was a break in the conversation.
Mr. Ismail resumed the conversation by reiterating his feeling that
the US can exercise its influence with Israel. He described again
the problem Egypt faced in the past when, Egyptians felt, Egypt
had agreed to certain points which had then been taken to Israel,
and when the Israelis objected the US backed down. When Israel
objected to any proposal, the whole exercise broke down, he said.
Turning again to the question of an Egypt-Israel solution within
the general context of a Middle East settlement, he felt there are
two basic questions: (1) sovereignty to be reconciled with the legitimate
and reasonable concerns of Israel with respect to security; (2) because
of Egypt's moral attachment to the people in Gaza, Egypt feels those
people should have the right of self-determination under the auspices
of the UN. This point could be part of an Egypt-Israel agreement or
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- 7 8
a separate agreement. Egypt recognizes that, as the Gazans
think about their future, the problem could become linked with
developments in the Jordanian sector. Also, there are the
1948 refugees in Gaza; there would have to be some obligation
expressed that the refugee problem would be solved according
to the UN resolutions. He felt that the UN would probably be
the organization to look after the solution of that problem, but
Egypt does have some obligation to see the principle expressed.
As far as Jordan is concerned, King Hussein can make his own
arrangements on borders. Egypt may object to any breach in the
principle of total Israeli withdrawal, but whatever Hussein decides
to do is up to him. Jerusalem, however, is quite a different
question; Egypt's basic position is that the Arab part of Jerusalem
is Arab, and there is no wavering on that. Whether Hussein is in
a position to offer self-determination to the West Bank might be
considered an internal question for him, a question he will have
to settle with the Palestinians. Egypt has no fixed views.
The question of Syria is much more serious from the Egyptian
viewpoint because Syria is a partner in the confederation with
Egypt. It is important to Egypt that Syria get a settlement based
on principles similar to those in an Egyptian settlement.
More generally, Mr. Ismail continued, these are the Egyptian views
on the inter-relationship between the different settlements: Egypt
would like to see its problem settled before the end of the year.
Tentatively, if Egypt were to reach some understanding on the
principles of an agreement between Egypt and Israel, then perhaps
discussions on Jordanian and Syrian settlements could take place.
That means they might be a step behind in any settlement process.
He emphasized, however, that these were very tentative personal
thoughts.
Returning to the Egypt-Israel agreement, he thought the first task-
to be achieved was agreement on the general principles of a settle-
ment, as he had mentioned earlier. Then, it would be necessary to
work out detailed provisions to put those general principles into
effect. Finally, there would be a period for the implementation
of the provisions in the agreement. Egypt hoped for some movement
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before the first of September, when there would be a referendum
about Egypt's union with Libya. In any early phase, there could
be such gestures as the release of prisoners or of Palestinians
who are interned for no reason.
Mr. Ismail, returning to another point from earlier in conversa-
tion, said he felt that the end of the state of war would come with
final withdrawal of Israel from Egyptian territory. Egypt would
acknowledge respect for the sovereignty, political independence
and territorial integrity of Israel and the right to live in peace.
Egypt would acknowledge all those commitments with the final
withdrawal. These obligations would alão mean an Egyptian obli-
gation to see that Egyptian soil is not a base for acts by any organi-
zation against the people or property of Israel.
Dr. Kissinger, returning to Mr. Ismail's view of the process of
reaching a settlement, asked how some steps like opening the
Canal might fit in to that process. Mr. Ismail indicated that it
could be an "opening phase" to indicate a starting of the process.
Dr. Kissinger then confirmed his understanding of the commitments
that Egypt would be prepared to make to Israel in a state of peace.
Mr. Ismail recalled not only those that he had earlier referred to
and those in Resolution 242 but also those commitments to peace
which had been given to Ambassador Jarring.
Dr. Kissinger asked whether Mr. Ismail cared to elaborate further
on Egypt's views on Gaza. Mr. Ismail replied that Egypt would like
to see the Gaza population under UN supervision. He felt that would
exclude the military occupation of Gaza by Israel so that there
would be a genuine opportunity for the population to exercise its
right of self-determination freely. A certain amount of time would
be required for it to be ready for self-determination. During that
period, Egypt might provide civil administration, but one could see
how the situation develops. The three major points are Israeli
withdrawal, UN supervision, and exercise of the right of self-determination.
Israel would have to withdraw from Gaza before an Israel-Egyptian
settlement is possible.
Dr. Kissinger said that he had not been clear in listening to Mr. Ismail's
comments about the relationship of Jordan-Israel settlement to a
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- 9 -
Palestinian settlement. Would Egypt consider whatever settlement
King Hussein makes with Israel as a settlement of the Palestinian
question? For instance, supposing hypothetically that settlements
were reached between Israel and Syria, Israel and Jordan, and
Israel and Egypt, would Egypt then consider the Palestinian issue
settled even if King Hussein is unable to reach a completely satisfactory
agreement with the Palestinians within Jordan? Is it possible that
the failure of Jordan to resolve its internal arrangements with the
Palestinians to the satisfaction of other Arab governments would
block final recognition and peace with Israel?
Dr. Kissinger, turning back to Mr. Ismail's earlier comments about
US efforts to change Israel's position, noted that Mr. Ismail's talks
in Washington would not have taken place had the US not been willing
to explore seriously an active role in trying to move the Middle East
situation toward a peace settlement. However, the US still has the
problem of proving that there has been significant movement in the
Egyptian position. Whatever the US may do, it must be in a position
to answer the question: What is Israel getting out of a proposed
agreement? Israel would find it very difficult to change its present
position.
Dr. Kissinger, picking up on the comment about the interim settle-
ment, asked Mr. Ismail again for Egypt's present position on it.
Mr. Ismail responded that he felt that more precise linkage than
had been proposed so far was required between an interim and a
final settlement. Dr. Kissinger asked whether it would be possible
to start proximity talks between Israel and Egypt with the idea that
talks about a final settlement would begin as soon as the execution
of the interim agreement begins. Mr. Ismail said that he had rejected,
in his talks in the State Department, any idea that he had heard so
far, but he would be prepared to discuss any reasonable proposal. It
would certainly be possible theoretically for movement on an interim
settlement to serve as an opening phase in an overall agreement.
Dr. Kissinger said that there is no question that it would be easier
to have an interim agreement first. Mr. Ismail said that it would also
be important to have some movement toward agreement on the fundamental
principles of an overall settlement, as he had mentioned earlier.
Dr. Kissinger noted that one of the issues the two had not had a chance
to discuss is the relationship between Egyptian sovereignty and Israeli
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- 10 -
security which the President had mentioned. He asked Mr. Ismail
what his idea of security is. Mr. Ismail replied that in principle
there should be no strategic advantage for either side. He alluded
to demilitarization on both sides of the borders. Dr. Kissinger
noted the difficulty of even a symbolic extension of a demilitarized
zone on the Israeli side of the border.
Mr. Ismail continued that demilitarized zones could be observed
by an international force of some sort. It is also possible that an
international force could be stationed in certain areas of strategic
importance. There would also be a question of guarantees given
by the big powers in the UN Security Council. Dr. Kissinger said
he felt that this question of providing for security, along with the
recognition of the legitimacy of Israel, would be the two areas of
greatest difficulty in dealing with Israel.
Mr. Ismail said that if negotiations were going on, one could think
flexibly about different ideas or application of principles. It is
impossible to say in the abstract wheret the demilitarized zones should
be and how wide they should be. There would certainly have to be
some sort of special Egyptian military force -- he alluded to the
"frontier troops" which Egypt used before 1967 -- in the Sinai,
perhaps with machine guns and mortars and helicopters.
Dr. Kissinger noted that there are many ways of looking at demilitar-
ization. One way is in the totally abstract sense. Another is in the
sense of restricted armaments. He felt this is one advantage of
discussing the issue of sovereignty. There might be some way of
separating the question of sovereignty from the question of military
withdrawal. If Egyp tian sovereignty were sestored, then Egyptian
frontier police and guard functions might well be resumed as a part
of that step. Dr. Kissinger said that his only reason for raising the
question in this way was to see whether there was some possible
approach which would separate the question of borders from the
security issue for a limited period of time. If by any remote chance
Egypt were able to achieve legal recognition of sovereignty up to the
'67 borders, then whatever negotiations took place on the question of
security measures would be in a quite different context. Might it
be possible for special security arrangements to exist between the
end of the state of war and the establishment of full peace when they
might be eliminated? He reiterated, however, that he had absolutely
no evidence that Israel was prepared to consider going back to its
pre-war boundaries.
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Dr. Kissinger asked Mr. Ismail if he would elaborate on Egypt's
position on the 1949 refugees. Mr. Ismail said that there might
be a commitment on the part of Israel respecting the UN resolu-
tions on the refugees. The UN might be called on to conduct a
process for fixing the wishes of the refugees -- those who want
repatriation and those who prefer compensation. The UNRWA
might be a useful vehicle in that respect. But he said he had
no fixed idea about how it might be done except to say generally
that it might best be done by the UN.
At the conclusion of the meeting, Dr. Kissinger again expressed
his appreciation for Mr. Ismail's coming. He noted that the US
would new have to consider whether it is possible to find a frame-
work in which movement toward peace could take place. It was
agreed that Mr. Ismail would inform the Soviets in general terms
of his Washington discussions. Dr. Kissinger said the US recognized
that Egypt would continue to conduct its relations with the USSR in
accordance with its own interests.
Mr. Ismail expressed his appreciation for the discussions he had
had here.
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
HHSaunders:imp:4/13/73
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
May 11, 1973
Henry:
Here is the Summary I
mentioned to you this morning.
Hal
Hal
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
as been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined t
A
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DECLASSIFIED
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MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)
February 26, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT:
Conversations Between Dr. Henry Kissinger
and Mr. Muhammad Hafiz Ismail
Dr. Kissinger opened the meeting by proposing a very frank
exchange. He said he had no proposals to make but hoped that
each side could tell the other as candidly as possible what it
thinks and feels. The US wants most seriously to have a solution
to the logjam in the Middle East, but there is no sense in the US
promising anything that it cannot deliver. Thus, the purpose of
the discussion is to talk in a general way about what the problems
are and what approaches might be used to resolve them.
Mr. Ismail thanked Dr. Kissinger for his very sincere offer to
have serious discussions about the question and about how solutions
might be devised. He noted that the discussions do not start from
scratch. There have been Four Power talks, Two Power talks and
a number of contacts between our two governments as well as
policy statements made by the US government over the past four
years.
Mr. Ismail said that he would speak only for Egypt, but he said
frankly that Egypt could not think in terms of a separate Egyptian
settlement unless it is in the context of a general framework of
a Middle East settlement.
Mr. Ismail reaffirmed that Egypt is not a satellite of any nation.
Egypt had asked the Soviets to leave for the sake of Egypt's independence
and for the sake of lessening the possibility of a US-USSR confrontation.
Egypt knows that the US wants peace in the Middle East and that without
US help there can be no peace in the Middle East. Egypt feels that
progress requires a certain measure of shift in American policy toward
the countries in the area. Egypt sees the present US policy of main-
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taining a balance of power as working in the interests of continued
occupation of Arab land and in opposition to any genuine effort to
reach peace. This is the same position, he noted, which he had
elaborated during his lunch at the State Department.
Mr. Ismail said he might take a moment to address the question,
"How do we see the Middle East in ten years time ?" It is
important to have an objective -- a sense of direction. As Egypt
sees it, the Middle East will in five to ten years, he hopes,
include a number of political units, strong, healthy, independent,
cooperating among themselves, freed from external influences as
much as possible, and free to cooperate with foreign political
units outside the area. Egypt wants an independent Middle East.
Egypt has lived for years with Jewish communities and they have
offered something to the Egyptian way of life. Therefore, Egyp tians
can see a day when all countries in the area may have a common
understanding.
Reaching such a state of understanding will be difficult, however,
because of high emotions in the area and because of external
influence. Also, as long as Israel does not recognize itself as a
Middle Eastern country, how can Egypt SO recognize it?
Now, if the foregoing statement defines a broad objective that all
parties could reach for, Egypt sees the starting point as a settle
ment of the present armed conflict in the area. This would lay
a good basis for the development of normalization in the area, so
this must be our immediate objective -- to get a settlement based
on all the resolutions of the United Nations, and based on existing
international agreements related to the area such as the 1888 Con-
stanople Convention on the Suez Canal.
Those UN resolutions as interpreted by the Big Powers, he said,
recognize two things: the international borders and the human
rights of the Palestinians. Those are the two pillars of a settle
ment. Because of the history of international involvement in the
creation of Israel, the big powers must now say how they envisaged
the new state which has been created. They must state not only
that but also guarantee in the future that this presence (Israel) does
not overflow its limits.
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Egypt thinks the problem lends itself to a settlement in several
stages in an overall framework. Progress might be made on
different fronts within each sector, but Egypt also believes that
those phases and stages must be interrelated so they can lead
to a defined goal. A settlement must include Egypt, Jordan and
Syria. Probably Lebanon must come in later on. It must be
a final settlement, and it must be just. It must be immediate.
Egypt believes the most logical approach to the problem is to
reduce the problem to its exact size: the conflict between the
communities living within Palestine. That conflict has overflowed
its borders, and we should bring it back to its original size and
find how Jews and Palestinian Arabs can live together within
Palestine -- or live apart, whichever they choose. If and when
they agree, they can negotiate a political settlement. To help
reach that objective, we have to eliminate the other aspects of
the conflict outside Palestine and to achieve complete disengage-
ment on the Arab-Israeli front. Mr. Ismail said he did not want
to get into how the Palestinian problem should be solved. He
would say that if it were not possible for Palestinians and Israelis
to work out a way of having a democratic state including both of
them, then maybe they may agree on ways to divide the country.
On the Egyptian side, he said, the objective of an agreement would
be to bring about a state of peace and an end to the state of war.
The major problem is the question of sovereignty the recognition
of Egypt's international borders and the control of its own land.
Egypt can take into consideration the legitimate concerns of Israel
about security. If a formula can be found that recognizes complete
Egyptian sovereignty and meets the legitimate concerns of Israel
with respect to its security, Egyptians realize that the main knot
will be broken on the Egyptian-Israeli front. Then the question of
staging could be worked out.
Finally, Mr. Ismail spoke of the need to move promptly. Disengage-
ment will have to be quick because Egypt is not prepared to accept
the withdrawal that is going to hang on for years. Egypt sees a dis-
engagement that can be realized before the end of this year. Israeli
elections should not be a cause for further delay. The whole situation
in the area is dangerous.
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Dr. Kissinger expressed appreciation for Mr. Ismail's presentation
and wanted to ask some questions about it. He asked whether he
was correct in summarizing one of Mr. Ismail's points by saying
that there are really two basic settlements: One is the settlement
among all the countries in the area, including Israel, with respect
to the military issues produced by the 1967 war. On this issue,
Egypt defines the essential element as a return to the mandated
borders of Palestine.
Mr. Ismail interrupted to refine his comment by saying that this
referred principally to the Egyptian front. He would not speak for
Jordan or Syria; as for Gaza, Egypt felt that Gaza should have the
right of self-determination under UN auspices within the lines of
1949.
Dr. Kissinger returned to his effort to understand the broader frame-
work of Mr. Ismail's presentation. He characterized the second
element in a settlement, as Mr. Ismail had described it as a settle-
ment between the Palestinians and Israel about the future of mandated
Palestine.
Dr. Kissinger then asked who would speak for the Palestinians, and
Mr. Ismail replied that Egypt would not raise any obstacles for
King Hussein in settling this question.
Dr. Kissinger, still attempting to clarify the basic concept Mr. Ismail
had presented, suggested there are two problems: First, how does
one get peace in the Middle East? Second, how does one get peace in
the Hashemite Kingdom? Is Mr. Ismail saying that a settlement
between Egypt and Israel will produce progress towards peace but
not final peace until the Palestine problem is solved?, Mr. Ismail
agreed.
Dr. Kissinger said it is one thing to say that a negotiation - - for
instance between Egypt and Israel -- will produce peace. It is another
thing to say that one negotiation will produce something between a
cease-fire and peace, which is then dependent on yet another negotiation.
Dr. Kissinger asked what would be the precise result of the Egypt-Israel
negotiation other than that Israel would withdraw. Mr. Ismail replied
that a commitment to full withdrawal could be accompanied by certain
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peace commitments on the part of Egypt toward Israel. It would
mean an end to the state of war, but not full peace. Such steps
as exchanging ambassadors or trade agreements would be excluded
at that point. Included would be free passage in international
waterways, non-intervention in each other's affairs, restriction
on any subversive activities against Israel. There could also be
security measures of an international character such as observers
or an international force in one or two strategic points. Egypt
has accepted these things. Full normalization of relations is
something that Egypt wants but that takes time.
In response to Dr. Kissinger's question, Mr. Ismail said that the
difference between conditions in 1966 and those that would be
created by this agreement would include passage in the Suez Canal,
an end of the boycott on third-party goods, an end to Egypt's
reservation clause on international agreements -- that kind of
recognition of Israel. Egypt already acknowledges the existence
of Israel. He quoted from Resolution 242 and Egypt's acceptance
of it. The only issue is the question of normalization of relations --
not recognition. He was quite firm in denying that there was any
vagueness in Egypt's position on this point.
Dr. Kissinger turned to another question: He asked Mr. Ismail what
he felt the US could do at this point since Mr. Ismail had earlier
stated that he felt the big powers should say how they envisage the
boundaries of Israel.
Mr. Ismail responded that the reason talks have not succeeded to
date is that agreement could not be reached on an interpretation of
Resolution 242. He felt that, as a first step, omething like the
Dean Rusk formula of 1968 needed to be worked out. The US would
have to exercise its influence to reach agreement with Israel on a
common interpretation of 242.
Not until an established basis for a settlement is reached that defines
the heads of a possible agreement will it be possible to decide on
whether progress should be made through proximity talks or some
other kind of negotiating device. Egypt's problem in the past has
been that the US has presented specific points to Egypt, Egypt has
re-adjusted its position and in the process made a concession here
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and there and then Israel has accepted those concessions and
started a new bargaining process.
Dr. Kissinger acknowledged the Egyptian dilemma. On the one
hand, it is important for Egypt to convince Israel that it is serious;
on the other hand, he could understand Egypt's not wanting to give
away any concessions without an understanding on the ultimate
results.
Mr. Ismail returned to his point that the fundamental issue is to
know whether Israel is willing to have a final, complete settlement.
He said that Egypt could not negotiate as long as Israel is on
Egyptian land; if Israel withdraws, Egypt will negotiate about
anything. Dr. Kissinger asked whether Egypt would negotiate if
Israel "withdrew" or if Israel "agreed to withdraw". Mr. Ismail
responded hesitantly but indicated that Egypt might consider nego-
tiating if Israel were "committed to something".
Dr. Kissinger returned to the fundamental problem for the US --
that US pursuasiveness with Israel depends very heavily on the
positions that Egypt advances. It depends on the degree to which
there can be even greater concreteness or changes in the Arab
position, especially the Egyptian position.
[At this point there was a break in the conversation.
Mr. Ismail resumed the conversation by reiterating his feeling that
the US can exercise its influence with Israel. He described again
the problem Egypt faced in the past when, Egyptians felt, Egypt
had agreed to certain points which had then been taken to Israel,
and when the Israelis objected the US backed down. When Israel
objected to any proposal, the whole exercise broke down, he said.
Turning again to the question of an Egypt-Israel solution within
the general context of a Middle East settlement, he felt there are
two basic questions: (1) sovereignty to be reconciled with the legitimate
and reasonable concerns of Israel with respect to security; (2) because
of Egypt's moral attachment to the people in Gaza, Egypt feels those
people should have the right of self-determination under the auspices
of the UN. This point could be part of an Egypt-Israel agreement or
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a separate agreement. Egypt recognizes that, as the Gazans
think about their future, the problem could become linked with
developments in the Jordanian sector. Also, there are the
1948 refugees in Gaza; there would have to be some obligation
expressed that the refugee problem would be solved according
to the UN resolutions. He felt that the UN would probably be
the organization to look after the solution of that problem, but
Egypt does have some obligation to see the principle expressed.
As far as Jordan is concerned, King Hussein can make his own
arrangements on borders. Egypt may object to any breach in the
principle of total Israeli withdrawal, but whatever Hussein decides
to do is up to him. Jerusalem, however, is quite a different
question; Egypt's basic position is that the Arab part of Jerusalem
is Arab, and there is no wavering on that. Whether Hussein is in
a position to offer self-determination to the West Bank might be
considered an internal question for him, a question he will have
to settle with the Palestinians. Egypt has no fixed views.
The question of Syria is much more serious from the Egyptian
viewpoint because Syria is a partner in the confederation with
Egypt. It is important to Egypt that Syria get a settlement based
on principles similar to those in an Egyptian settlement.
More generally, Mr. Ismail continued, these are the Egyptian views
on the inter-relationship between the different settlements: Egypt
would like to see its problem settled before the end of the year.
Tentatively, if Egypt were to reach some understanding on the
principles of an agreement between Egypt and Israel, then perhaps
discussions on Jordanian and Syrian settlements could take place.
That means they might be a step behind in any settlement process.
He emphasized, however, that these were very tentative personal
thoughts.
Returning to the Egypt=Israel agreement, he thought the first task
to be achieved was agreement on the general principles of a settle-
ment, as he had mentioned earlier. Then, it would be necessary to
work out detailed provisions to put those general principles into
effect. Finally, there would be a period for the implementation
of the provisions in the agreement. Egypt hoped for some movement
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before the first of September, when there would be a referendum
about Egypt's union with Libya. In any early phase, there could
be such gestures as the release of prisoners or of Palestinians
who are interned for no reason.
Mr. Ismail, returning to another point from earlier in conversa-
tion, said he felt that the end of the state of war would come with
final withdrawal of Israel from Egyptian territory. Egypt would
acknowledge respect for the sovereignty, political independence
and territorial integrity of Israel and the right to live in peace.
Egypt would acknowledge all those commitments with the final
withdrawal. These obligations would also mean an Egyptian obli-
gation to see that Egyptian soil is not a base for acts by any organi-
zation against the people or property of Israel.
Dr. Kissinger, returning to Mr. Ismail's view of the process of
reaching a settlement, asked how some steps like opening the
Canal might fit in to that process. Mr. Ismail indicated that it
could be an "opening phase" to indicate a starting of the process.
Dr. Kissinger then confirmed his understanding of the commitments
that Egypt would be prepared to make to Israel in a state of peace.
Mr. Ismail recalled not only those that he had earlier referred to
and those in Resolution 242 but also those commitments to peace
which had been given to Ambassador Jarring.
Dr. Kissinger asked whether Mr. Ismail cared to elaborate further
on Egypt's views on Gaza. Mr. Ismail replied that Egypt would like
to see the Gaza population under UN supervision. He felt that would
exclude the military occupation of Gaza by Israel so that there
would be a genuine opportunity for the population to exercise its
right of self-determination freely. A certain amount of time would
be required for it to be ready for self-determination. During that
period, Egypt might provide civil administration, but one could see
how the situation develops. The three major points are Israeli
withdrawal, UN supervision, and exercise of the right of self-determination.
Israel would have to withdraw from Gaza before an Israel-Egyptian
settlement is possible.
Dr. Kissinger said that he had not been clear in listening to Mr. Ismail's
comments about the relationship of Jordan-Israel settlement to a
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Palestinian settlement. Would Egypt consider whatever settlement
King Hussein makes with Israel as a settlement of the Palestinian
question? For instance, supposing hypothetically that settlements
were reached between Israel and Syria, Israel and Jordan, and
Israel and Egypt, would Egypt then consider the Palestinian issue
settled even if King Hussein is unable to reach a completely satisfactory
agreement with the Palestinians within Jordan? Is it possible that
the failure of Jordan to resolve its internal arrangements with the
Palestinians to the satisfaction of other Arab governments would
block final recognition and peace with Israel?
Dr. Kissinger, turning back to Mr. Ismail's earlier comments about
US efforts to change Israel's position, noted that Mr. Ismail's talks
in Washington would not have taken place had the US not been willing
to explore seriously an active role in trying to move the Middle East
situation toward a peace settlement. However, the US still has the
problem of proving that there has been significant movement in the
Egyptian position. Whatever the US may do, it must be in a position
to answer the question: What is Israel getting out of a proposed
agreement? Israel would find it very difficult to change its present
position.
Dr. Kissinger, picking up on the comment about the interim settle-
ment, asked Mr. Ismail again for Egypt's present position on it.
Mr. Ismail responded that he felt that more precise linkage than
had been proposed so far was required between an interim and a
final settlement. Dr. Kissinger asked whether it would be possible
to start proximity talks between Israel and Egypt with the idea that
talks about a final settlement would begin as soon as the execution
of the interim agreement begins. Mr. Ismail said that he had rejected,
in his talks in the State Department, any idea that he had heard so
far, but he would be prepared to discuss any reasonable proposal. It
would certainly be possible theoretically for movement on an interim
settlement to serve as an opening phase in an overall agreement.
Dr. Kissinger said that there is no question that it would be easier
to have an interim agreement first. Mr. Ismail said that it would also
be important to have some movement toward agreement on the fundamental
principles of an overall settlement, as he had mentioned earlier.
Dr. Kissinger noted that one of the issues the two had not had a chance
to discuss is the relationship between Egyptian sovereignty and Israeli
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security which the President had mentioned. He asked Mr. Ismail
what his idea of security is. Mr. Ismail replied that in principle
there should be no strategic advantage for either side. He alluded
to demilitarization on both sides of the borders. Dr. Kissinger
noted the difficulty of even a symbolic extension of a demilitarized
zone on the Israeli side of the border.
Mr. Ismail continued that demilitarized zones could be observed
by an international force of some sort. It is also possible that an
international force could be stationed in certain areas of strategic
importance. There would also be a question of guarantees given
by the big powers in the UN Security Council. Dr. Kissinger said
he felt that this question of providing for security, along with the
recognition of the legitimacy of Israel, would be the two areas of
greatest difficulty in dealing with Israel.
Mr. Ismail said that if negotiations were going on, one could think
flexibly about different ideas or application of principles. It is
impossible to say in the abstract where the demilitarized zones should
be and how wide they should be. There would certainly have to be
some sort of special Egyptian military force he alluded to
the
"frontier troops" which Egypt used before 1967 -- in the Sinai,
perhaps with machine guns and mortars and helicopters.
Dr. Kissinger noted that there are many ways of looking at demilitare
ization. One way is in the totally abstract sense. Another is in the
sense of restricted armaments. He felt this is one advantage of
discussing the issue of sovereignty. There might be some way of
separating the question of sovereignty from the question of military
withdrawal. If Egyp tian sovereignty were restored, then Egyptian
frontier police and guard functions might well be resumed as a part
of that step. Dr. Kissinger said that his only reason for raising the
question in this way was to see whether there was some possible
approach which would separate the question of borders from the
security issue for a limited period of time. If by any remote chance
Egypt were able to achieve legal recognition of sovereignty up to the
167 borders, then whatever negotiations took place on the question of
security measures would be in a quite different context. Might it
be possible for special security arrangements to exist between the
end of the state of war and the establishment of full peace when they
might be eliminated? He reiterated, however, that he had absolutely
no evidence that Israel was prepared to consider going back to its
pre-war boundaries.
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Dr. Kissinger asked Mr. Ismail if he would elaborate on Egypt's
position on the 1949 refugees. Mr. Ismail said that there might
be a commitment on the part of Israel respecting the UN resolu-
tions on the refugees. The UN might be called on to conduct a
process for fixing the wishes of the refugees -- those who want
repatriation and those who prefer compensation. The UNRWA
might be a useful vehicle in that respect. But he said he had
no fixed idea about how it might be done except to say generally
that it might best be done by the UN.
At the conclusion of the meeting, Dr. Kissinger again expressed
his appreciation for Mr. Ismail's coming. He noted that the US
would now have to consider whether it is possible to find a frame-
work in which movement toward peace could take place. It was
agreed that Mr. Ismail would inform the Soviets in general terms
of his Washington discussions. Dr. Kissinger said the US recognized
that Egypt would continue to conduct its relations with the USSR in
accordance with its own interests.
Mr. Ismail expressed his appreciation for the discussions he had
had here.
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7306732
department OF STATE
Washington, D.C. 20520
CONFIDENTIAL
April 11, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: Memoranda of Conversations with
Hafez Ismail
The Secretary has asked me to request that
he be provided with copies of the memoranda con-
cerning the President's and your conversations
with Hafez Ismail.
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
Executive Secretary
CONFIDENTIAL
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MEMORANDUM
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ACTION
(Outside System)
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May 10, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
DR. KISSINGER-
FROM:
HAROLD H. SAUNDERS
SUBJECT:
Second Meeting with Ismail
Recapitulation
At the end of the last meeting, it was agreed that the Egyptians would
give special attention to the following issues which will presumably be
the first subjects for discussion at this second meeting. How these might
be discussed is dealt with later in this memo.
- Definition and timing of the state of peace. The Egyptians had a
fairly full list of exactly what would constitute their obligations in
a state of peace. You asked that they give attention to making this
as full and attractive as possible. The more difficult question is
when the state of peace would come into effect. Ismail commented
privately that he would have his lawyers look at whether one could
make a distinction between a de facto and a de jure state of peace,
the first coming into effect when the agreement is signed and the
second when withdrawal is completed.
Timing of recognition. The issue is how to meet Israel's need
for recognition as a legal entity as early as possible. Ismail in the
first meeting linked this tentatively to the resolution of other Arab-
Israeli issues such as the refugee problem, Gaza, and settlements
on the Syrian and Jordanian fronts. In a message since, he has said
that the question of Israel's legitimacy is linked to settlement of the
Palestine issue and to Israel's relationship to the world Zionist
movement and to foreign states.
Transitional security arrangements between Israel and Egypt.
This has been addressed by Ismail in conventional terms as the
question of how to assure a demilitarized zone between Egypt and
Israel. You suggested a broader concept which would involve the
question of whether a sovereign Egypt would agree to special security
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arrangements through a long transitional period between the
end of a state of war and the normalization of relations.
Egypt would consider who would talk to the Syrians at what
stage. The US parallel to this procedural issue was to
recommend when Israel would be brought into these discussions.
The following issues should be included in any recapitulation of the
last meeting, but they would seem to require less detailed attention
at this second meeting:
The three-stage process (heads of agreement, provisions of
agreement, execution) which Ismail described probably needs
little more elaboration at this point.
The timing of this process might warrant some discussion.
Ismail stressed the urgency of agreement in 1973 but carrying
through his process might take more time. At the same time,
Sadat is talking about resuming hostilities. That will not give
quiet diplomacy time to work.
- -Ismail describes the long-term objective as seeing developed
a Middle East of strong, healthy, cooperative, independent states.
He spoke of a peace settlement that could be the basis for normali-
zation of relations, although normalization would take a long time.
It would seem worth while to concentrate on this notion of normali-
zation, but it is probably not desirable to press too hard on that now.
It was generally agreed that the Arab-Israeli problem could be
addressed by stages and by sectors with progress on the Egypt-
Israel front staying a step ahead of progress on the Israel-Jordan
or Israel-Syria fronts. The issue at the moment, however, is to
see what can be done on the Egypt-Israel front.
- An agreement on a first stage of withdrawal from the Suez Canal
along the lines of the interim agreement concept could run con-
currently with discussions of an overall agreement.
If there is progress at the second meeting on the issues outlined in the
first paragraph above, then in addition to any further work on those, it
might be desirable to suggest subjects for consideration at a third meeting.
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These will mainly emerge from the discussion, but one that seems
already to suggest itself is this: Could Israel and Egypt agree on some
general procedures for resolving the Palestinian issues and could
Egypt then accept that as a basis for its action?
The record of the first meeting is at Tab D.
Egyptian Reflection and Reaction Following First Meeting
Egyptian reflections on the issues raised at the first meeting have
been contained in three Sadat statements and one substantive comment
by Ismail. [Summaries are at Tab E.] As public statements, the Sadat
comments do not have to be read at face value, but there is some value
in noting how he seems to have digested and played some of the concepts
from the first meeting. Following are the main points which Sadat has
made insofar as they relate to Egypt-Israel negotiation:
- On the present US strategy as it appears to him:
The US objective in trying to maintain the ceasefire is to
allow Israel to strengthen its presence in the occupied areas,
to force Egypt to make concessions, and to weaken Arab
solidarity.
The US is waging psychological warfare against the Egyptians
trying to force an Egyptian surrender. Releasing news of new
aircraft shipments on the heels of Ismail's visit to Washington
was an indication of this.
The Soviets should not be dissuaded from raising the
Middle East at the Summit. The peaceful solution which the
US has been talking about is "a deception and a mirage. 11
- On US tactics for getting talks started:
The US position that Egypt must recognize Israel's legitimacy
at the beginning of a peacemaking process would require a
concession of Egypt "just to reactivate the issue, not to solve
it. " Ismail's visit to Washington indicated one thing: That
Egypt must make concessions SO that the process can get
moving rather than be solved.
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- - On specific elements of the US position:
President Nixon took a positive position when he told
Ismail that the problem was one of how to reconcile
"complete" Egyptian sovereignty over Egyptian territory
and the requirements of Israeli security. It remains a
difficult question how this can be done.
Sadat hopes the US will revert to his interpretation of the
"Rogers Plan" but instead sees a new US position emerging
that substitutes the concept of sovereignty for withdrawal.
This is a step backward from what he has hoped for but might
seem better than an indefinite continuation of the status quo.
"Washington is talking about nominal Egyptian sovereignty
over Sinai. 11 Giving Israel any right on Egyptian land in any
form or under the guise of superficial sovereignty is un-
acceptable. Egypt will not be "lured by the title of super-
ficial sovereignty while tricks are being played underneath. 11
Egypt's sovereignty over its territory must be total.
Discussion of "secure borders" is a cover for Israel's
taking the land which it feels will secure its borders.
On the Egyptian position:
The two key points in the position which Ismail brought to
Washington were that Egypt would not cede an inch of land
and would not bargain with the rights of the Palestinian people.
Sadat talks quite openly (as Ismail did) about willingness to
make peace with Israel--about "a complete solution and a
vision of the future for the area for decades to come. 11 This
is on the assumption that full-not just nominal- - Egyptian
sovereignty is restored in the Sinai.
Egypt does not accept any partial solution.
On Sharm al-Sheikh, he is willing to consider "any formula"
which the international community thinks desirable, except
Israeli occupation.
--It - is necessary for the Egyptians to prepare for a military
liberation of their territory.
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Privately, Ismail has made the following more detailed comments:
The position presented by the Egyptian side in the first talks
was sufficiently concrete for the USG to take a final decision
with respect to its involvement in getting talks started.
Security measures must not give advantage to one side. [The
concern seems to be that Egypt's forces in the Sinai not be
neutralized while Israeli forces retain wide freedom of maneuver
in the Sinai. ]
- Security arrangements should be "transitional" and "international. "
The state of war will be terminated with the final withdrawal of
Israeli troops from Egyptian territory. This, along with the
peace commitments in any agreement and big power or UN
guarantees, would add weight to whatever security measures are
agreed.
The question of Israel's legitimacy depends on realization of
the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. The question of legiti-
macy does not seem properly related to security considerations.
Ismail's point is unclear: He sees some relationship between
thinking of legitimacy among security considerations and the
continuation of Israeli ties with the World Zionist movement and
Israel's special relations with many foreign countries. This
should be discussed further.
Issues To Be Developed In This Meeting
The following is a discussion of some of the issues which will be dealt
with in detail in this meeting. The purpose here is to identify points on
which it might be useful to press the Egyptians in order to expand our
working framework. For working purposes a draft of possible Heads of
Agreement is at Tab B.
1. Sovereignty.
- -Sadat has quite openly said that our present notion of
sovereignty is only "nominal sovereignty. " He sees it as a
cloak under which Israeli control of the Sinai would be per-
petuated.
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The US suggestion is to distinguish between restoration
of sovereignty and the transitional security arrangements
which a sovereign nation may agree to on its own soil or
elsewhere. One way to handte this might be to talk about
concrete steps that would be involved in "restoring sovereignty. 11
These would include restoration of civil authority and police
functions which might be accomplished quickly. These would
be accompanied by some withdrawal and regrouping of Israeli
roops to conform to new security arrangements which would
involve Israeli troops under an international umbrella and
which might go on for some time.
The key question is whether Egypt, if its sovereignty in
the Sinai were restored, would agree to an Israeli military
presence at key points under an international umbrella through
a (long) transitional period. This question leads to the questions
dealt with below on the concept of a "transitional period" and
the kinds of security arrangements one might envision.
2. Effective Date of Peace Obligations. Our problem here is to
make the Egyptian commitment to concrete obligations effective as
early as possible in the peacemaking process. This has been the
subject of extensive debate in the US-USSR talks. The compromise
offered by the Russians in 1970 was that the state of peace would
come into effect after the first phase of withdrawal is completed.
Ismail indicated at the last meeting that the Soviets had gone beyond
the Egyptian position.
-Ismail at the last meeting was still talking about making a
legal distinction between de facto and de jure peace.
For US purposes there are two other possibilities to be
considered:
The preferable one for us would be to say that the state
of war ends with the signature of the agreement (rather
than with any part of its execution). This has been the
US position all along, and the Egyptians have not bought it.
But we might repeat the argument that the parties must
know that they are indeed at peace before they begin making
concrete concessions on the ground. One could simply use
the concept in Resolution 242 [copy at Tab F] which Egypt
accepts that the establishment of peace should include the
application of two principles: "withdrawal" and "termination
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of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for
and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial
integrity and political independence of every state in
the area and their right to live in peace within secure
and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of
force. " If both sides accepted those principles and
gave them concreteness in a signed agreement, peace
would be in effect. Then we might press the distinction
between the state of peace and the normalization of
relations.
A fallback position could be developed from the idea
that restoration of Egyptian sovereignty in the Sinai is
the key step. One might define the point at which the
Egyptians had resumed civil authority and police functions
throughout the Sinai and make that the point at which the
full agreement comes into effect. Under that concept,
Israeli troops in parallel steps would have pulled back or
regrouped under an international umbrella.
Key questions include: (a) Can we establish the concept that
the juridical state of peace and its obligations comes into effect
when the agreement is signed while normalization of relations
is a separate and much longer process? (b) Could we establish
the idea that the beginning of each new phase of implementation
is a point of review and it is this review process which constitutes
the effective check on execution and not some delay in making
the state of peace effective?
3. Recognition. The issue is at what point Israel's legitimacy
becomes accepted.
--Ismail has said that the issue of Israel's legitimacy is linked
with the settlement of the Palestine problem. In the last meeting
he separately defined that settlement as Israel's conclusion of
agreements with Jordan and Syria and Jordan's conclusion of an
agreement with the Palestinians along with a refugee settlement.
Presumably, he would also include a Gaza settlement.
--It may be wise to steer away from too theoretical a discussion
of legitimacy. If Egypt is willing to negotiate and sign a peace
agreement with Israel recognizing Israel's sovereignty, integrity
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and independence, that in itself should constitute a recog-
nition of Israel's legitimate existence. The broader issue
is whether execution of an Israel-Egypt agreement is
contingent on settlements with Jordan and Syria and an
agreement on the Palestinian issues. One way to handle
this might be to have Egypt and Israel reach agreement
on general principles of a Palestinian settlement; Ismail tossed
out this idea at the last meeting. These might include such
simple statements as: (a) the political aspects of the Palestine
problem should be worked out primarily among Israel, Jordan
and the Palestinians; (b) a refugee settlement would be based
on the principle of some settlement of Palestinians in Israel
and compensation for those refugees who choose to settle
elsewhere with the arrangements to be worked out under UN
or other specified auspices.
4. Security.
--Ismail has stated the principle that security arrangements
like demilitarization should not work to the disadvantage of
either side. On the other hand, a fact of life for the past
fifteen years has been that the Sinai has essentially served
as a buffer between the Israeli and Egyptian heartlands.
Ismail himself at the last meeting spoke of "frontier forces"
in the Sinai.
The US has stated its view that demilitarization should not
be attempted on the Israeli side of the border. This might
be a time to introduce the concept of mutual early warning
systems on each side of the Sinai to preserve the notion that
each side would be protected from attack. There is a more
detailed paper on how this might be developed at Tab C.
General Points for Discussion
1. The threat of hostilities. As you know Sadat has pulled out a number
of stops to try to make everyone believe that he plans to resume fighting
whatever the outcome. It might be worth pointing out at least in conver-
sation what the consequences of this would be:
The very process of diplomacy Sadat talks about starting by
going to war would be set back. It would weaken rather than
strengthen our ability to help toward a settlement.
The US and USSR can avoid the conflict as they did in 1967.
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2. The US objective. The US objective is peace, not just a perpetuation
of the present situation. Peace requires compromise, and defining
possible areas for compromise is one of the purposes of these talks.
Background Papers
At the following tabs are these background papers for your use in
preparing for the talks:
Tab A: Talking points, concentrating on an introductory
statement.
Tab B: Possible Heads of Agreement, just as a point of reference
for you not to be given to the Egyptians.
Tab C: A paper which you have seen before on possible security
arrangements in the Sinai. The purpose is to give the
Egyptians a feeling of mutual protection, not just catering
to Israeli security.
Tab D: The record of the first meeting with a summary of main
points on top.
Tab E: Egyptian statements since the first meeting.
1. Sadat speech, March 26.
2. Sadat interview, Newsweek, April 9
3. Sadat speech, May 1.
4. Ismail: private message.
Tab F: Resolution 242 for reference.
Tab G: US-USSR papers exchanged before last summit, for reference.
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A. Talking Points
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2/26/73
Checklist for Monday
Substance
have concrete diseassion of :
-- - Egyptian fovereignty + Ismeli security
:- Phases / stages
-- Relation of Egyptan Settlement to
other settlements (Landan, Syria, Palestminas)
political vs. military
.
timing
-- Gaza Dettlement specifically
-- Basic elements of Egyptian position
(that settlement should be overall,
final, just, & immediate)
Procedure
What can be disclosed about the talks to
other parties (Isrel, UJSR, other
Arubs)
- - Relation of these talks to possible
bilatival US- Soviet talks
Relation of ths talks to US- Ismeli
talks
: Disclosure 1 this meeting
:- Time + place of next meetings
... fet of # questions for him to
take back
:- US will send observations on Ismeli
position after Meir VISIT
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