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Rabin/Kissinger (Dinitz) January-July 1973 [2 of 3]
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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Israeli Ambassador Simcha Dinitz
Minister Avner Idan
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Peter Rodman, NSC Staff pm
DATE AND TIME:
Friday, March 30, 1973
12:00 -12:40 p.m.
PLACE:
Military Aide's Office
East Wing, White House
Amb. Dinitz: I appreciate very much that you can see me so soon. I just
arrived last night.
Dr. Kissinger: We are going to California this afternoon.
Amb. Dinitz: Mrs. Meir sends her regards to you. I saw her last night
before I left.
Dr. Kissinger: You can be sure we will work with you with the same open-
ness that we had with your predecessor.
Rmb. Dinitz: I appreciate that, I will do as little as possible to disturb
you.
Dr. Kissinger: No, you should do whatever is necessary.
Amb. Dinitz: I have a few items to raise with you. First, about the
meetings with Primakov. This was the third time we met him. He was in
Israel three years ago, when he met with the Prime Minister, the Minister
of Defense and also myself. He said nothing of substance at that time.
He just said that it was good for us to have an exchange of views. Then
there was a more elaborate meeting that he had in Europe with Gazit
in 1971. We told you about that. This time he asked for ameeting on his
own initiative, not on ours. I should be more correct. Four months
ago we wrote a letter responding to their letter after the 1971 meeting.
They had said that it was a good meeting and they raised the possibility
of other meetings. So we said we would be prepared if they were interested.
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Two weeks ago, they replied.
The meeting took place in Vienna. It lasted eight hours, over three different
sessions. The instructions that the Prime Minister issued to Gazit were
that it was important to keep the pace of these meetings such as not to
disturb the efforts of Dr. Kissinger.
Dr. Kissinger: She is so eager that I succeed!
Amb. Dinitz: We didn't value so much the contact but we couldn't say no.
Dr. Kissinger: No, you did the right thing.
Amb. Dinitz: He came with Kotov, who had been Second Secretary in their
Embassy in Israel. The main point of the conversation was that they were
trying to tell our representative that we had to enter detailed negotiations
with them. "The time is past for general remarks. We put forth proposals
in 1969 and you didn't negotiate. " They wanted a mandate from us for the
Soviets to play a role in the Middle East. "Don't assume that things can
move without us. " They were particularly disturbed that we were working
only with the Americans. "Don't overestimate the events of July, 1972.
It is not so important; we are still there, with friends and arms. "
Throughout this discussion there was this veil of threats.
They said, "Frankly our position is in support of the Arab case, but we are
different in that we support the survival and existence of Israel. Therefore,
we don't support the lelements in the Middle East that want your destruction. "
They wanted ourppositions and they wanted negotiations. They said they
were prepared to talk without prior conditions. They were SO anxious for
talks that they said--in the unofficial conversation-- that they were prepared
to send an official to Israel in a secret manner. We asked about the
idea of sending an Israeli representative to Moscow. They were not
particularly anxious for this. They said that an Israeli presence in
Moscow would be an attraction to Soviet Jews.
On the question of Soviet Jews, he said that they were letting people out
and no ransom was being collected. He did not think the number of Jews
leaving would increase. He was quite reluctant to discuss the whole
subject.
This covers the discussions. You may remember that they asked Ismail when
he was in Moscow how the Arabs would look on it if the Soviets opened a
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dialogue with Israel. The Soviets explained it to him as something that
would be good for the Arabs, as a form of pressure on Israel. That is
how we see to embarrass the efforts we are taking with the United
States.
Dr. Kissinger: I don't think they know where they are going either. We have
no objection to your talking, as long as we keep each other informed.
We are following the strategy I explained to your Prime Minister. We are
pushing nothing, we are wasting time. We are using the Egyptians to
kill off talks with the Russians. The Egyptians also told them to stay
out, so we are not under great pressure from them at the moment.
Here was a message I received from Ismail. [Tab A] I sent him a message
about the Khartoum incident and this was his reply. I told you we might
meet again with them around April 10. This is now impossible. If they
behave stupidly, we can put it off until May.
Amb. Dinitz: Is there a new date?
Dr. Kissinger: No, I am waiting for their proposal. It is now impossible
before early May, just as a matter of logistics. They may get in touch
with us by next week, say April 5 or 6. I think it will take two or three
weeks. Then I have to reply. Then, if I know them, they will make some
conditions.
This is their dilemma. I told them I won't talk to them unless they have
something new and different from the public position. You saw that even in
the Sadat speech. If they give me something new that doesn't lead any-
where - That they have to resolve first.
Amb. Dinitz: Did the Russians raise it?
Dr. Kissinger: They raised it, but I told them what I told you. I told Ismail
that he had to press the Russians not to press us on details but only on
principles. Apparently he did it, because the Russians have not been
pressing us since then. So with the Russians there is practically nothing
going on.
As for the summit, a date has not yet been set, but it will probably be this
summer.
It looks like a real dilemma for them.
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Amb. Dinitz: Yes, and part of this dilemma is shared by the Russians.
Dr. Kissinger: I will take no initiatives. I will react in a slow-moving way
to their proposals. If it moves slowly and drags through the summit, that
is their problem. I am not aiming at a Nobel Prize on the Middle East.
Amb. Dinitz: Those who aim for it don't get it!
Dr. Kissinger: But I still think you should be intellectually prepared
As
your predecessor and Mr. Idan can tell you, you have been saved by an
accidental combination of circumstances. But at any moment it could
Amb. Dinitz: Explode.
Dr. Kissinger: The Russians and now the Egyptians have been behaving
stupidly, and our domestic situation has not crystalized. But you have
to be prepared for a sudden purposeful and intelligent push. When
your Prime Minister was here I thought it would crestalize before the
summit. I was wrong then; I may be wrong now.
I will wait for them. I will make a non-substantive reply. I am not going
to propose a meeting. They will have to propose a date. We won't accept
the date they propose. And Brezhnev is going to Germany. That will
take his time.
I must repeat what I told your Prime Minister and your Ambassador. You
should think about eventual negotiations.
One other matter, the Most Favored Nation business. You will really lose
the President if the Jewish community continues its behavior here on the
MFN. I know your influence is not complete. We are talking to the
Russians about the exit tax, and I hope that before I return from San
Clemente I can get authorization to tell you the assuranced they have
given, but have not authorized me to tell you. We can't get a formal
written commitment.
But I talked to teh President this morning and he is really determined on
this. He will not let one segment of the American public hold up American
foreign policy.
Amb. Dinitz: You are right that we do not have great influence. Especially
on an issue as emotional as this. Israel cannot go to American Jews and
tell them not to be concerned.
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Dr. Kissinger: I talked with Dobrynin today and that is when he gave
me these assurances. There is no dispute over the merits; I am totally
out of sympathy with them. The issue for American Jews is whether a
major American foreign policy can be wrecked. What if the President went
on television and spoke against Jewish pressure?
There is a second problem. I read in the paper today that some of these
groups are planning domonstrations against Brezhnev when he comes
here. When Pompidou was here and this happened, it produced an
outburst by the President.
But this is all in the future.
Amb. Dinitz: Maybe by the time Brezhnev comes it will have changed.
They are anxious too.
Dr. Kissinger: Believe me, we are pressing them. But if we did it in a
formal note they would have to reject it. But we are raising it in
my channel. I raise it on every occasion.
Amb. Dinitz: Yes, we appreciate it, and the President raised it too.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes.
Amb. Dinitz: May I remind you about Houphouet-Boigny. It would be
good if he could come here.
Dr. Kissinger: He will definitely be invited certainly this year, in the
second half of the year. He is on the list.
Amb. Dinitz: My people say that there has been no advnace on the aircraft.
Dr. Kissinger: On production?
Amb. Dinitz: On production it is fine.
Minister Idan: Its all O. K.
Amb. Dinitz: But on the purchase there has been no movement.
Minister Idan: I inquired several times and our Military Attache has
inquired several times.
Dr. Kissinger:
I don't know why our military think that you will make
only a hundred planes!
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Minister Idan: Your people tell us they are working on a long-range
plan for 4 years.
Dr. Kissinger: The instruction I gave was for a substantial number. I
couldn't give a number. You are better off with a four-year program,
aren't you?
Minister Idan: Yes, but I think they are thinking of stretching the same
number over a longer period.
Dr. Kissinger: I will check it.
Amb. Dinitz: I have one last point. Foreign Minister Eban is coming to
the United States on the 9th or 10th of May. He has a meeting with the
Secretary of State on May 9. Last time he came he missed you. He had a cold.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, he lost his voice, and for Eban to lose his voice is
an affliction of God, not a disease!
Amb. Dinitz: He asked me to see if you would be able to see him.
Dr. Kissinger: Sure. Call my office and arrange it.
Amb. Dinitz: How about breakfast on the 9th?
Dr. Kissinger: Fine. The Shoreham is slightly more convenient.
Have you presented your credentials yet?
Amb. Dinitz: No,and I was not sure if it was proper for me to come here.
Dr. Kissinger: It makes no difference at all to our relationship.
Amb. Dinitz: We appreciate it. We will have for you the protocols of
the meetings with the Russian.
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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
ACTION
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
May 11, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
PETER W. RODMAN June
SUBJECT:
Your Meeting with Abba Eban
Saturday, May 12, 1973
Dinitz just called me to let you know that Eban knows of your Ismail contacts
only in the most general terms. Eban is not clued in on the communications
between the White House and the Prime Minister on the subject, nor has
he been informed of the date of your next meeting with Ismail. Similarly,
he is not privy to the recent exchanges of military intelligence, including
the communications from Hussein.
Dinitz thus urges that if you raise any of this in your meeting, you should
not imply that Dinitz has had foreknowledge.
If you want more detailed consultation with the Israelis in advance of
your Paris trip, you might want a separate meeting with Dinitz next
Monday or Tuesday. Should Campbell set aside some time for this?
Yes
No
Dinitz also suggested that Eban would prefer that his meeting with you be
publicly announced. Eban had said a few times before coming over that
he looked forward to seeing Kissinger.
If you approve, I can tell Dinitz now that it is okay for them to confirm,
after the fact, that a meeting has taken place.
Yes
No
Also, we can then have the meeting in your office instead of the Map Room.
Yes
No
CC: Scowcroft
Campbell
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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
INFO
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
June 4, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM:
Peter W. Rodman MR
SUBJECT: Dinitz Presentation to Sisco on Phantoms to Saudi Arabia
Saturday Dinitz promised you a paper setting out the presentation he made
to Sisco protesting the U.S. sale of Phantoms to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
He delivered it today. (Tab A)
HK
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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Minister Mordechai Shalev of Israel
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
DATE AND TIME:
Wednesday, July 25, 1973
10:30 - 11:00 a. m.
PLACE:
Israeli Embassy
Washington, D. C.
Minister Shalev: As you know, there is a Security Council debate, and the
last time the Ambassador told Dr. Kissinger our view on the subject of the
passage on the Palestinians in the [U. S. -Soviet] Joint Communique and its
possible detrimental effect on the UN Security Council resolution and on
other aspects.
We saw Sisco on Thursday and the subject was the Security Council debate.
We stressed also that any changes in 242 -- any additions, subtractions or
interpretations -- might result in our withdrawing our acceptance of 242.
Also, that it would put into question the possible visit by the UN Secretary-
General to Israel. I must say in our discussion with Sisco we were quite
satisfied with his responses. He said "If they [Egyptians] want a resolution,
we don't want to get involved in the exercise. " So we were fairly sanguine
about the American position -- which was that (1) no resolution was neces-
sary, (2) "a consensus" was sufficient, and (3) all that was needed was
something for the Secretary-General's trip.
To our dismay, the USUN delegation took two steps, neither of which we
had any information about until the last minute:
-- They drafted a text of a consensus, which went a little beyond
what we thought the Americans thought was necessary. But that
wasn't the worst.
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Then the new American step, only yesterday, which amounts to a
series of U.S. amendments to the draft resolution of the nonaligned.
In other words, they got involved in the exercise of drafting a reso-
lution.
They didn't say they would vote for it; they said this would enable them to
abstain. But a U.S. abstention in these circumstances now means tacit
American help. The U.S. amendments include two references to the Pales-
tinians, which -- as you know we regard with great apprehension. The
main thing is the American delegation has been involved in drafting a reso-
lution, which even with American amendments may very well mean we will
withdraw our support for 242. The Government of Israel is greatly concerned
about this, and if it is not vetoed by the U.S. there is a possibility we will
withdraw from 242 and there will be doubt about the Secretary-General's
visit.
We are greatly concerned on two counts:
We feel we have been led astray. This is not the way we have been
keeping our contacts the last two years, without springing surprises
on each other. This worries us about our bilateral relations with
the United States and the Department of State.
Second, it has given the Arabs a great boost. They won't agree with
the American changes but they will use them. Zayyat is already
saying in the UN corridors that they have moved the Americans
and that there will be more of this.
So, our problem is with (a) going back on the assurances and (b) American
participation in drafting the resolution, which will have harmful consequences.
Mr. Rodman: Even with the U.S. changes the resolution will have these
consequences?
Minister Shalev: Even with the American changes. Even the U.S. UN
delegation says the U.S. would only abstain if the changes were accepted.
"Nonaligned" of course means in effect "Egyptian." It is their resolution
but they do it indirectly.
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There are two things -- the method, which fills us with concern, and the
resolution itself.
Mr. Rodman: What are the references to the Palestinians in the U.S. amend-
ments?
Minister Shalev: There are two references. In the preamble, it says: "Con-
scious that the legitimate interests of the Palestinians have to be taken into
account. " And in the text it says: "a just and peaceful solution should
take into due account the interests of the Palestinian people. 11
Also the resolution talks about "no action should be taken in the occupied
territory which prejudices a just settlement. " And it "expresses apprecia-
tion for the report of the Secretary-General and the efforts since 1967. 11
Of course "the report¹ includes all the Jarring memoranda and so forth.
There might be a vote today or tomorrow on this. What we would like is no
further American initiative or action. Let the thing go through its motions,
and cast the veto.
One more aspect: The U.S. position as described by Sisco was in fact the
U.S. position last week, and it was given to the other UN delegations. Now
the U.S. has given in to pressure and therefore casts doubt on its own
position. They have started budging from it. I understand it isn't an easy
thing to cast a veto. But in this case the veto will have a beneficial effect
of making the U.S. position clear, so the Arabs know they can't budge us
and have no alternative but negotiations. Second, it will save 242, which we
have been living with and which is the only basis for a settlement.
The Ambassador is out of town. I will see Atherton this afternoon. The
Ambassador will try to see the Secretary, possibly tomorrow.
It was presented to us as a fait accompli. This is not the local tactical
decision of Scali, but comes from Washington. Scali said so himself to
Tekoah.
I want to add one little remark on the issue of the Palestinians. Before
Jarring came up with his memorandum he was once asked, "Why don't you
talk to the Palestinians? He said he couldn't because the Palestinians are
not mentioned in 242. This is what the Ambassador had in mind when he
spoke to Dr. Kissinger about the Communique.
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The American effort to amend the resolution will not eventually amend
the resolution but it has made it easier for countries like Britain and
Austria to vote for the resolution. The consensus idea is now dead, be-
cause of the American effort. And this comes three days after an abusive
anti-American statement by Sadat. Three days after such a speech, the
U.S. allies vote for a resolution which America has to veto.
Mr. Rodman: I will see to it that Dr. Kissinger gets this right away. He
has been following this.
Minister Shalev: The main point is this: Scali should stop cooperating in
trying to amend the nonaligned resolution and should return to his basic
position: That no resolution is necessary, that no change in 242 is accept-
able, and that anything that goes beyond 242 will be vetoed by the United
States.
Scali talked about his amendments with the Indian delegation before telling
the Israelis. In effect, he submitted it before telling the Israelis.
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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ACTION
July 31, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
3'00 pm
FROM:
PETER RODMAN
OUR
SUBJECT:
Dinitz and Eban Would Like to See You
Friday
Minister Shalev called me at 4:00 p.m. to make two requests:
1. Dinitz had lunch with Sisco today and would like
to talk to you about their conversation.
2. Abba Eban will be passing through the U.S. the
weekend of August 17-19, on his way to Latin
America, and wonders if it would be possible to
see you. Shalev says that in your last conversa-
tion you said you'd be glad to see Eban if he came
by again. (I have no record of this!)
You will probably be in San Clemente then. I didn't volunteer
this to Shalev because they might start angling for a San
Clemente invitation.
RECOMMENDATION:
That you set up an appointment for Dinitz for some time
this week, and that you give your answer on Eban then.
Approve He
Disapprove
Or, if you can't see Dinitz this week, that I tell Shalev now
that you regret you will have to miss Eban because you will
be with the President on the West Coast.
Approve
Disapprove
SECRET - XGDS (3)
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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL
ACTION
JOBE
25 July 1973
FORT
HK
MEMORANDUM FOR:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
FR OM:
PETER W. RODMAN PUR
Israeli Minister Shalev made the following presentation to me today of
Israeli "dismay" at a change in the USUN position on the question of a
Security Council resolution. Shalev will see Atherton today, and Dinitz
(who is out of town until tomorrow) is seeking an appointment with Rogers.
The Israelis were satisfied last week with Sisco's assurances that, in
the US view, (1) no resolution was necessary, (2) a "consensus" was suf-
ficient, to launch Waldheim on his trip, (3) no changes in 242 were
acceptable. Shalev says that USUN has now taken two steps which violate
these assurances and which were presented to the Israelis as a fait
accompli:
- They first drafted the text of a "consensus" which the Israelis
think was unnecessary.
They have in effect drafted a series of amendments to the non-
aligned resolution, which include two references to "the legiti-
mate interests of the Palestinians. 11 Dinitz has told you of their
great apprehension about this phraseology.
The Israelis are concerned about the way they have been led astray by the
USG. (Scali apparently discussed his amendments with the Indians before
telling Tekoah anything.) They also point to the negative consequences of
the American action:
- - The US has now involved itself in the resolution-drafting exercise.
USUN has said that its draft amendments would only enable the US
to abstain--but this is enough to kill the "consensus" idea and make
it easier for other countries to vote for a resolution.
- - Even with the American amendments, passage of the resolution "may
very well" force Israel to withdraw its acceptance of 242 and discourage
Waldheim's visit.
- It has given the Arabs a great boost. Zayyat is saying in the corridors
that they have moved the Americans and will do SO again.
CONFIDENTIAL
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
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CONFIDENTIAL
-2-
The Israelis want Scali to return to the original US position. There should
be no further US initiative or action. We should let the thing go through
its motions, and then veto it if there are any changes in 242.
This may come to a head this afternoon or tomorrow. Should Brent call
Rush to turn Scali off immediately?
YES
NO
CONFIDENTIAL
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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Ambassador Simcha Dinitz of Israel
Minister Mordechai Shalev
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
Pher
DATE AND TIME:
Friday, July 20, 1973
5:10 - 5:50 p.m.
PLACE:
The Map Room
The White House
Dr. Kissinger: I can see the Bahamas agreed with you! [A reference to
Ambassador Dinitz's designation as Israeli Ambassador to the Bahamas
and his attendance at their recent independence festivities. ]
Ambassador Dinitz: Already I forgot about it. A week of talks in the State
Department made me forget about it.
Dr. Kissinger: Talks on what?
Ambassador Dinitz: On the UN Security Council debate. Spiers [the new
U.S. Ambassador to the Bahamas] told me you thought he was a good man.
Dr. Kissinger: How did he put it?
Ambassador Dinitz: He said, "Dr. Kissinger thinks I am a good man. 11
Dr. Kissinger: [Laughing] It happens to be true! But it is unusual to say it.
It is a waste of talent to have him in the Bahamas with his European experience.
Ambassador Dinitz: I saw your friend Sisco on the UN Security Council.
I told him we are concerned about the Palestinian question, and about whether
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State would allow something to be said in a resolution on the Palestinians.
We had bad results from what your communique said.
Dr. Kissinger: I told you the origin of it.
Ambassador Dinitz: Not from our Government, but the Palestinian terror-
ists reaction to it. There were bad results from our point of view.
Dr. Kissinger: I have sent a nonsubstantive message to the Egyptians. I
can let you read it. And here is their reply. It is calmer than the earlier
ones. Lets them read messages at Tab A.]
Ambassador Dinitz: July 11. Before his trip.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes. I haven't answered it. I will in a few days. It won't
happen quickly.
Ambassador Dinitz: It doesn't have a date.
Dr. Kissinger: I am supposed to propose a date.
Ambassador Dinitz: "We did not seek to avoid the approach at the UN. 11
What is that?
Dr. Kissinger: That is what I wanted to know. Scali said to Zayyat publicly
what we said privately. I think he put it in there to show they didn't initiate
the Scali conversation and weren't trying to substitute channels.
Ambassador Dinitz: I notice an absence of the State Department among the
agencies they work with! "The White House, the United Nations, and other
countries. 11 Maybe State is another country.
Dr. Kissinger: Now it will take us a month to set up a meeting. You under-
stand the strategy. He has no reason to expect a quick proposal.
Here is the Russian note to us on their conversations with Ismail. I can let you
read it on a very confidential basis. I can't let you have this. They read
Tab B.]
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Ambassador Dinitz: [Reads it] They are telling you that the Egyptians think
a settlement is impossible without the participation of the Soviet Union. The
Russians think it is important to let you know the Egyptians think that!
Dr. Kissinger: I wouldn't assume everything was said that they say was
said.
Ambassador Dinitz: If we get any further information on this, we will let
you know.
Dr. Kissinger: We appreciate it. It will be a useful check. What is your
impression.
Ambassador Dinitz: There is nothing new there. It is a restatement of their
position, fairly I think.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes.
Ambassador Dinitz: They say "we and the Egyptians think alike. 11 But then they
criticize you for being pro-Israeli! The tone seems very mild. "Great con-
cern, 11 not "powder keg" or "blowing up. " Which incidentally coincides with
what we heard. But it was from secondary sources, so we didn't bother to
give it to you. There is a greater and greater interest of the Soviet Union in
Iraq and Syria, not in Egypt.
Dr. Kissinger: I am told by our intelligence people they are slipping in Iraq,
too.
Ambassador Dinitz: We have noticedfrom various outside sources that Iraq
is looking for alternatives. They seem interested in some Western presence,
looking to even the United States. Their Minister's interview lastweek
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, I saw it.
Ambassador Dinitz: Also Egypt is now trying to bridge the gap to the Saudis.
This has an impact on Soviet judgment.
Dr. Kissinger: Here is something I got from the Soviets on the Jewish
question. [Tab C]
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Ambassador Dinitz: I saw this through the Jewish leaders.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes, I gave it to them. I think they are now on a reason-
able course. If they agree to what they call a reformulation of the Jackson
Amendment, and if MFN passes
Ambassador Dinitz: They are the better ones. Let me say, it is not an
impressive list.
Dr. Kissinger: That I can't judge.
Ambassador Dinitz: It is the same as Brezhnev presented. I have asked for
a detailed study from Israel and will give it to you. There is very little
movement in turning the release into reality. I have also asked my Jewish
friends to voice their complaints very strongly with Dobrynin. If that is all
right.
Dr. Kissinger: That I have no problem with. I have no objection to your
raising it with Dobrynin.
Ambassador Dinitz: I have also told them what you told me -- that the level
would remain the same. But our figures show there has been a decline:
2,000 in April; 2, 100 in May, and 1, 900 in June. If it remains so, the total
will be 24, 000, not 36, 000. The corresponding figures last year are higher.
Let me raise a few other points. On the Sisco initiative.
Dr. Kissinger: That is killed.
Ambassador Dinitz: That is killed. Good.
Dr. Kissinger: By that I mean it is not likely to emerge.
Ambassador Dinitz: Our research people found this in the Rogers speech
in December, 1969: "The Security Council resolution neither endorses nor
precludes the armistice lines as exact boundaries. 11 It shows the new Sisco
initiative is a restatement of the Rogers Plan.
Dr. Kissinger: It is not likely to be done now.
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Ambassador Dinitz: On the paper you gave to Dobrynin [on General Work-
ing Principles], we won't comment because it is a dead document. We will
comment if it becomes live.
Dr. Kissinger: It served its purpose. There is no agreed document now.
Ambassador Dinitz: The Ismail paper seems plausible.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes. There is no ring of great intimacy. I don't have the
sense that they are very close.
Ambassador Dinitz: I have a few very small subjects. On the Palestinians,
you know we weren't happy with the paragraph in the [U. S. - Soviet] joint
communique -- "legitimate interests of the Palestinians. 11 There was
excitement about this in Israel, so I went to Sisco. He told me that the
phrase' 'legitimate interests" was meant as a limitation. But the Arabs see
it as just the opposite.
But the Arabs see now they have an opening and are trying to get it in the
resolution. We see the danger. It is one thing if it is in the President's
State of the World message, and another if it is in the U.S. -Soviet docu-
ment, and it is a third thing if it is in a UN Security Council resolution.
We see it as an incitement to terrorism. You heard Arafat say, "This is
a victory. We got this because of our armed struggle. 11 We must say in all
frankness you are undermining your friends.
Dr. Kissinger: How?
Ambassador Dinitz: By antagonizing Jordan. By encouraging Bourguiba to
make his overture. Because the Palestinians are now the thing.
Dr. Kissinger: It is not our policy. We are going to strengthen Jordan.
We are going to make them spokesmen for the Palestinian people.
Why don't you tell State?
Ambassador Dinitz: We did.
Minister Shalev: Twice.
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6
Ambassador Dinitz: One other point. When Brandt was in Israel, he said
he would be happy if contact was established between Israel and Egypt. So
he sent Lahn to Egypt to see Ismail, and then reported to us. Hafez answered
that he took note of this and was not surprised because it was always Israeli
policy Ismail said there was no sense in such conversations with the Israelis
unless they knew in advance what the results would be and unless they knew
Israel was prepared to withdraw to the 1967 lines. Otherwise it only en-
hances the status quo. When Lahn said that Golda said Israel was prepared
for compromises, Ismail said, "What compromises? The very existence
of the meeting is a compromise on the part of the Egyptians. Lahn said that
Germany was not involved in the dispute, but was concerned because any
conflict endangers German interests. Hafez said the whole world wants a
deal with the Middle East only on the basis of the status quo. Hafez men-
tioned the Soviet Union among them. He said, "The future of the Arabs is
in our own hands. "
This confirms what we said earlier about the lack of intimacy that was
apparent in the conversations in Moscow.
The last point I have: The Persian Shah is coming to the United States on
July 24.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes.
Ambassador Dinitz: We got a long paper from Israel. One operative thing
we are asking is this: Since we have further increased our cooperation --
on oil, technology, etc. -- if the Shah can hear from you or the President
that you look with favor on this
Dr. Kissinger: You can count on it.
I would like to talk with the Ambassador alone for five minutes.
[The Ambassador and Dr. Kissinger conferred alone for about ten minutes. ]
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Shown to Dinitz
Tab A
July 20, 1973
July 11, 1973
A.
Mr. Ismail has received with thanks Dr. Kissinger's message
passed 9 July.
B.
Mr. Ismail would like to express the Egyptian side's welcome to
meet Dr. Kissinger to review the situation and evaluate the pro-
spects of achieving progress toward peace in the Middle East.
While agreeing to arrange a meeting in Madrid, the Egyptian side
will provide their own transportation and would like to thank the
U.S. Government for their kind offer.
C.
Mr. Ismail is visiting the Soviet Union, returning to Egypt on
14 July. He hopes to receive from Dr. Kissinger by then his
proposals about alternate timings for the meeting and any other
arrangements.
Orally:
A.
We welcomed and did not seek to avoid the approach of the U.S.
Government representative in the recent UN Security Council
Debate on the Middle East, just as we welcomed the views of the
other countries' representatives.
B.
We do not want to change Resolution 242, but we do back any
measures that would advance this Resolution. Meanwhile,
concerning what happened before that led to stalling Jarring's attempts
was not Jarring's fault. It was due to the Israelis.
C.
Egypt is working in all open ways in the political field -- through
the White House, the United Nations, and with other countries.
Our aim at the end of this process is to achieve the objective of
a just peace in the area.
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July 20, 1973
July 7, 1973
Dr. Kissinger extends his greetings and best wishes to
Mr. Ismail.
Now that the US-Soviet summit conference has been com-
pleted, the US side wonders whether it might be useful for
Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Ismail to meet again to review the
situation. If the Egyptian side agrees that such a review would
be of value, Dr. Kissinger would be happy to meet with
Mr. Ismail in Spain or at some other mutually convenient loca-
tion. The U.S. side would be pleased to arrange secure transpor-
tation for Mr. Ismail to a meeting site, as discussed between
Mr. Ismail and Mr. Trone in Paris.
The US side will await the views of the Egyptian side on
this matter.
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B
Dinitz
Oral Note
(in the name of the Ambassador)
July 20, 1973
July 19, 1973
I am instructed to forward the information for President
Nixon on the conversation between Leonid Brezhnev and Hafiz
Ismail, National Security Advisor to the President of Egypt which
took place on July 13, 1973. This is being done in accordance
with established practice of confidential exchange of views between
the USSR and the United States at the Summit level on major
international issues and, among them, on the Middle East problem.
As Mr. Ismail stated, he was instructed by President Sadat to visit
Moscow to obtain first-hand information for the President about
the substance of the recent Soviet/American negotiations at the
summit level on the problem of the Middle East.
In the course of the talks, Leonid Brezhnev informed
Hafiz Ismail in general terms without going into details about the
basic points of the exchanges with President Nixon on the Middle
East problem. Referring to the words of the President and the
respective part of the Joint Communique, Leonid Brezhnev noted
that the American side considered the problem of the Middle East
as a very important one. However, the statements about the
importance of the Middle East problem had not been accompanied
in the negotiations by putting forward on the part of the United
States of concrete considerations aimed at achieving a mutually
acceptable solution of the Arab/Israeli conflict.
Mr. Ismail was told that we didn't hear from the American
side a firm statement to the effect that the United States supported
the demand for total withdrawal of the Israeli forces from all the
Arab territories occupied in 1967. In respect to the method of
negotiation, we informed Mr. Ismail that the United States, while
supporting negotiations, were more inclined toward direct negotia-
tions though, in principle, they did not rule out other forums of
contact between Israel and the Arab countries. They mentioned
in this connection a so-called Rhodes Formula.
On the question of an overall or a partial settlement in the
Middle East, it was stated that as far as we understood, the American
side, while admitting in principle the necessity of working out an
agreement on the entire complex of the settlement, did envisage
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the possibility of finding isolated solutions to the individual aspects
of the settlement on the basis of priorities -- that is, in effect,
separately from the overall settlement.
Leonid Brezhnev told Mr. Ismail that during negotiations
in the United States, the Soviet side proceeded from its known position
on the questions of settlement. The emphasis was made on the great
importance of recognizing the principle of inadmissibility of acquiring
territories through the use of force which implies the necessity for
the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from all the Arab territories
occupied in 1967. And it was noted that the solution of the problem
of the withdrawal would facilitate reaching agreement on all other
aspects of the settlement.
Presenting the views of the Egyptian side, Mr. Ismail said
that they evaluated the situation in the Middle East as very compli-
cated and fraught with danger of serious explosion, and a situation
of the kind which demands in the opinion of the Egyptian Government
the implementation of urgent measures for the prompt achievement
of a just settlement of the conflict. Mr. Ismail stressed that on
the basis of the information coming to Cairo from different sources,
they came to the conclusion that Israel and the United States do not
intend to modify their long-held position on the settlement and
specifically so with respect to the troop withdrawal. He emphasized
also that the United States Government would not move ahead in its
approach to the problem of Middle East settlement and continued
to pursue a one-sided pro-Israeli position which, to a great extent,
prevents a settlement of the Arab/Israeli conflict on a just basis.
Mr. Ismail referred once again to the invariability of the
Egyptian course aimed at streng thening the Soviet/Egyptian relations
in all fields. Having expressed satisfaction with the Soviet Union's
stand on the problem of the Middle East settlement directed at pro-
moting a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, Mr. Ismail
stressed that the establishment of that kind of peace was, in the
opinion of the Egyptian leadership, unthinkable without active
participation of the Soviet Union. Mr. Ismail expressed a bewilder-
ment on the Egyptian side of the fact that the United States considered
the US formula of 2-4-2 as the basis for the settlement in the Middle
East and support of the Jarring mission, and at the same time do not
accept his known memorandum of February 8, 1971. Mr. Ismail
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- 3 -
recalled in this connection that the United States representatives
used to express earlier during the four-power consultations in New
York their support to the said memorandum.
During the conversation, Mr. Ismail expressed specifically
that the tolerance of the Arabs was not limitless and stressed the
determination of the Egyptians to put an end to the Israeli occupation
of the Arab territories. Mr. Ismail pointed out that, though the
Egyptians are losing their confidence in getting the settlement of
the crisis through political means, they continued to count to a
certain extent upon assistance in the settlement from the United
Nations and the Security Council. Particularly, they expect that
during the second part of the discussions on the Middle East
problems in the Security Council, a resolution will be adopted
which will move the settlement off dead-center, and they expect
to see in this respect a more balanced attitude on the part of the
United States.
The conversation with Mr. Ismail demonstrated once again
that both the Soviet Union and Egypt consistently favored a Middle
East settlement on the basis of the known decisions of the United
Nations Security Council and the General Assembly. They are of
the opinion that lasting and just peace in this area can be achieved
only on an indispensable condition of withdrawal of the Israeli
forces from all the Arab territories occupied in 1967 and on
condition of respect of all the lawful rights of the state and people
in this area, including those of the Arab people of Palestine.
In informing the President about his conversation with
Mr. Ismail, Leonid Brezhnev would like to stress once again,
as in the past, there exists in Moscow a serious concern in respect
to the situation in the Middle East. Continuing presence there of
the hotbed of military tension can at any moment bring forth serious
new aggravation of the situation in this region and result in the
worsening of the international climate in general which would accord
States. neither with the interests of the USSR nor with those of the United
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145 7/11/13
Shown to Dinitz Tab C
July 20, 1973
July10,1973 1973
Concerning the list transmitted by Dr. Kissinger
- 742 names (four names are mentioned twice), so actually
then are 738 names in the list
- 258 - out of that number, received permission to leave.
- 177 - have not applied.
- 30 - do not reside in the USSR.
- 149 - have been denied exit permission for security
reasons.
- By now 10 more persons out of the list received permission
to leave (Vasilevski, Gutman, Kamenezskaya, Levitin,
Mandelzveig, Moiseev, Baron, Brown, Perelman and Schpilberg).
- Previously rejected applications are under additional
consideration.
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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Simcha Dinitz, Ambassador of Israel
Mordechai Shalev, Minister
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff one
DATE AND TIME:
Monday, September 10, 1973
6:03 - 6:45 p.m.
PLACE:
Military Aide's Office
The White House
Dinitz: I just finished an hour-long talk with Secretary Rush. It was just a
general review of the situation.
Kissinger: Who was there? Sisco?
Dinitz: Yes. Also his aide, Samuels.
Kissinger: He's good.
Shalev: Also Stackhouse, of the Israel-Arab desk.
Dinitz: I reviewed the question of terror, particularly our concern with these
missiles in Rome [rockets discovered by Italian police in the hands of Arab
terrorists]. We know they' re serialized, not so the Russians must have an accounting
of where they are located. It would / be difficult for them to trace if they wanted
to.
I asked Secretary Rush that you find a way to convey this concern to the Russians,
and secondly, that in the ICAO in Rome now you will put gravity of the situation
on record and help draft legislation to deal with this situation.
Kissinger: What did he say?
Dinitz: He said you [ the USG] had been in communication with the Russians on
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advice
this and that he would take our/in the ICAO into consideration, and you were
with us on this.
Kissinger: Can you give me the serial numbers?
Dinitz: Yes, I didn't give them to him but I can give them to you.
Kissinger: I am seeing Dobrynin on Thursday.
Dinitz: Then we talked about oil and diplomacy.
Kissinger: You noticed what the President said Saturday. It is going in the
direction I have pointed out.
Dinitz: I noted to Rush that much of it- -on energy- is helpful to our relations,
but much of the press interpretation frankly is not. He agreed. Then I called
attention to the Sisco interview in the Jordanian paper.
Kissinger: What did Sisco say?
Dinitz: Nothing at all during this conversation. Sisco had said--spoken in terms
-Palestinian "rights", not "interests". He called for some movement in ad-
vance of negotiations, and third, that an initiative was coming. I asked for
Rush's cooperation on muting this sort of thing, because it just means a debate
through the press, and nothing but harm to our relations could come of this.
He said he was very much in accord with me. He said the U.S.' and Israel's
strategic interests are the same. He said the U.S. is not pro-Israel, or pro-
Arab but pro-peace. (Theard this before.) But then he said the status quo was
no good; and we had to get the negotiations off dead center.
I said that we agreed completely; Israel wanted to convert the status quo into
peace and security. I then went into a long discourse about how whenever
we came forward with a new proposal, it just postponed negotiations. I pointed
out that the Arabs were now linking everything with Palestine. He said he
wasn't asking us to take a unilateral step or to negotiate from a point of weak-
ness. He said he knew from his negotiations on Berlin that the only way to deal
was through a position of strength. He ended by asking us what our government
could do, in concert with to get talks moving.
Kissinger: First--let me make clear I am not talking now in my official capacity.
We should still meet in this restricted channel.
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Dinitz: Separate it.
Kissinger: Yes. It is important for the Prime Minister to understand my
judgment on this. All of these are just phrases the ones that assure you and
also those that disquiet you. You shouldn't attach too much importance to it.
Dinitz: I know, I was just reporting.
Kissinger: As I told your Prime Minister, and as I have told you before, the trend
here to do something is getting overwhelming. It can be delayed but it cannot
be arrested. If you look at the balance of individuals, and the influence of the
companies
Two years ago I suggested to Ambassador Rabin and the Prime
Minister that we should do something in the area of an interim settlement. You
didn't do too badly in following that advice.
The trouble is, the U.S. public doesn't understand what it really is that the Arabs
are proposing. -- that as a precondition for a negotiation you give up all the
territory in exchange for an "end to the state of belligerency, 11 which is indis-
tinguishable from the ceasefire that exists. They think the issue is Israeli
intransigence. Most people don't understand. So an Israeli initiative would at
least have the advantage that one could dramatize what the Arabs are asking. I
have no concrete proposal. But I exhausted Le Duc Tho last year by giving him
in rapid succession five different proposals which were all plausible but none of whi
which gave up our key position- that we would not overthrow Thieu. In case the
negotiations broke down, we could show he ha d rejected, not our maximum
position, but all these successive proposals.
I must say our troulbes with the South Vietnamese started when we did this
because they thought we were giving up something. But we weren't. Every
concession was at the periphery, not on the main issue. And this would keep
the initiative with you.
My second strategic concern is that we have to find a way of splitting the Arabs
and also of splitting the pressures in this country. We can't have all the pres-
sures here together-- the oil companies, the Arabists --against the Jews. We
could try to split off the Saudis. Three years ago, the oil company leaders came
in here. The issue then was to do something about Jerusalem. They wanted a to
to be a neutral city, and I know this is unacceptable to you. But I wonder why
there can't be some formula for some extraterritoriality, plus some access
route
This won't be made as an American proposal; you can count on that. But it would
help with the Saudis; this is the only thing they express themselves on. It would
help domestically. What the President said--even with what I told you--you
should not believe it might not return.
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should not believe it might not return.
Now I can use the discussions with Ismail; nothing will happen until after your
election. So there is no immediate pressure. I have not even discussed this
Jerusalem proposal with the President. There won't be a big initiative when I
come in.
Maybe a settlement first with Jordan would do it. Maybe you have some other
cleverer idea.
Dinitz: I noted before that your mind was moving on Jerusalem, first when you
asked Eban about it, and second when you said before that what concerned you was
to remove Faisal from the picture and to isolate Sadat. Incidentally, I thought
your sending Phantoms to Faisal would do the opposite; and only attract Sadat
to him.
Jerusalem is of course the mos t sensitive issue with us. This is just off the
cuff. I will of course report all of this to the Prime Minis ter.
Kissinger: Maybe she has a better idea.
Dinitz: But usually when you try to defuse an issue you try a less sensitive, less
emotionally-laden issue. Jerusalem will be the hardest with Jordan. We have
tried some phrases before, like "some extra-territorial status" for the Holy
Places.
Kissinger: Please don't interpret this in legalistic terms, but in strategic terms.
Dinitz: I see the strategy.
Kissinger: I think the borders will be the most sensitive.
Dinitz: No, I think it will be easier to decide with Sadat, where the final borders
will be than to agree to a split in Jerusalem's sovereignty. Anyone in Israel
who suggested it would be shot out of office, not run out. We could agree to
a passage for the Jordanians to go to the Mosque of Omar without going through
Israeli checkpoints.
Let me ask two questions, Dr. Kissinger. Do you mean something that Israel
should think of independently of a course of negotiations commencing?
Kissinger: There are many ways of doing it. We could tell the Saudis that we
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heard this from you and you are willing to discuss it. Or you could make it as
a public offer. Or as a private offer, and then publicize it if it doesn't work.
Dinitz: My second question is, do you mean to say that you believe something
like this could move the Saudis?
Kissinger: I have no feel for the Saudis, quite honestly. I met only Yamani, when
he was here. And fifteen months ago I met with their prince.
We have informally asked Prince Fahd to come over. We did this in order to abo-t
avoid having too many of our delegations going over there. It has nothing to do
with Israel. He's available to come in late November or early December. That
would be a good occasion.
My strategy is to keep the Saudis out of the Arab-Israeli dispute, because any
settlement achievable wouldn't be satisfactory to Arabs, and it would only weaken
the regime to have to take responsibility for it. It might help to take some action
on the one area of their religious concern.
Dinitz: I'll pass on your thinking to the Prime Minister.
Kissinger: I have no idea what Rush has in mind when he says off dead center.
Dinitz: Nor has he.
Kissinger: It is absolutely necessary that you don't let yourself be put into the
position of looking like the obstacle to peace. You must keep the Arabs on the
defensive. The British have told us they want to talk to us about it, and the
French too.
I'm not interested in the Nobel Peace Prize.
Dinitz: I wouldh! mind seeing you win it, Dr. Kissinger. Nothing would give me
greater pleasure.
Kissinger: But there is no way for us to do it without brutalizing everybody. It
would be moved into special channels.
Dinitz: What do you mean?
Kissinger: Some special envoy will be appointed by the President.
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Dinitz: To solve the Middle East crisis?
Kissinger: Yes. I really have no specific ideas.
[to Rodman:] Have we heard from Zahedi [on his talks with Ismail in Geneva]
Rodman: Not yet.
Kissinger: Check on it.
Dinitz: Do you think you can get the Arabs off their position of demanding a
commitment to total withdrawal as a precondition to negotiations?
Kissinger: My strategy is to exhaust the Arabs. We have been doing it, but
every time, some one of our people pops off. But cannI do it? It's extraordinary
that the Egyptians haven't leaked my negotiations with Ismail. It shows they
haven't given up yet on my approach.
Dinitz: Our sources say they now think that oil will do it for them.
Kissinger: If we can figure out some way to split the Saudis off. Jordan
is
already split off. The Syrians won't be. But Egypt is already willing to make
a separate peace.
Dinitz: I think the pivot of it is their oil strategy. You have today the first
visit by Hussein to Egypt. You could tell the King it ismot a good idea.
Kissinger: I will do that. [to Rodman: ] Is Rifai coming to the UNGA?
Rodman: I'll check.
Dinitz: When the Shah was here, did you talk to him about his con tibuting to
Jordan?
Kissinger: Yes, at great length. But he said that, while from his selfish point of
vie W and strategically he's with you, from the tactical point of view he'd like
some movement.
Dinitz: But he has no idea what it should be.
Kissinger: Right.
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Dinitz: I don't have as pessimistic reading of consensus in this country as you
do. What you describe is a feeling in this Administration, but not the country.
It is not just the Jews, but Congress.
Kissinger: The Congress is against whatever the Administration is for!
Dinitz: But the labor movement, and the media, and editorial pressures.
Kissinger: That I wouldn't attach too much importance to. That we can easily
h andle if we have a platform on which to stand. We are not asking you to give
up essential positions.
Dinitz: Yes.
Kissinger: One amazing thing about my hearings is to see the liberals attacking
me for being too soft on the Russians! For 5 years they attacked us for being hard.
But in a crisis they will run.
Dinitz: Yes. They think goodwill is the solution.
Kissinger: You remember the Jordanian crisis. I've never see so effective an
example of crisis management. We worked well together.
Dinitz: Yes, I was on the other end.
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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
INFORMATION
August 16, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
HK
FROM:
PETER W. RODMA The
SUBJECT:
Dinitz' Final Report on Hijacking Incident
Dinitz called again at 3:45 p.m. to give us the final wrap-up on the latest
hijacking incident.
The plane was hijacked over Cyprus by a Libyan citizen, carrying a Libyan
passport and two guns. He demanded that the pilot land at Lydda. The
Israeli airforce escorted the plane down.
Immediately after the landing, the hijacker stepped out of the airplane, pre-
sumably to start negotiating. At that instant the Israeli security boys broke
into the plane through another entrance and then captured him.
All the passports were taken to the airport restaurant. One passenger slipped
on the steps and injured an ankle and was given first aid. The plane and all
the passengers except the hijacker were ready to take off about an hour ago.
The injured passenger was to decide himself whether to go with the plane or
stay overnight. The hijacker will remain in jail. The captain has given a
press conference in Israel and the hijacker is being brought before the press.
The airport has returned to normal.
Among the passengers was the Libyan Ambassador to Baghdad. [He t.bought
will return to his duties, so that next time he can raise his hand in the UN and
vote to condemn Israel for international terrorism. (This is Dinitz' editorial
commenta) ]
Dinitz added the following vignette. While he was peacefully eating lunch today,
he got an urgent call from Sisco, who said: "You have done it again. You took
another plane with four terrorists. This can't go on. There will be another
UN meeting in an hour and we will have to vote to condemn you again. 11 Dinitz
told Sisco to relax.
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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
ACTION
16 August 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM:
PETER W. RODMAN PIMP
SUBJECT:
Eban Visit
Dinitz called me this morning to plead for reinstatement of the
Eban meeting. The cancellation was a mistake on Dinitz' part and he will
be in serious hot water if the meeting doesn't come off.
As he told you, he recieved a message yesterday from Eban in
La Paz saying he was heading directly back to Israel. But it turns out that
this message crossed with Dinitz' message to Eban informing him of the
breakfast. Eban has now sent a second message saying he is delighted to
come to breakfast. Eban is not aware of any mixup and is heading here to
see you.
If your breakfast with Schlesinger cannot be changed, a meeting
some time in the morning would be OK. Shall we schedule Eban for 10:30?
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MEMORANDUM
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Simcha Dinitz, Israeli Ambassador
Avner Idan, Minister
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff your
DATE AND TIME:
Tuesday, June 19, 1973
2:00 2:40 p.m.
PLACE:
Ambassador's Office
Israeli Embassy
Washington, D. C.
[The Ambassador made the following presentation, on the basis of a cable
he had just received from the Prime Minister. ]
Dinitz: First a couple of general remarks, then some specific remarks.
These are from the Prime Minister. We have succeeded in communicating
with her, and these are her remarks, after consultation with us. We
offered some of our own ideas.
She is now stronger in her opinion that our original request was the correct
one, that is, that every effort should be made that there should not be a
joint document. The effort of Dr. Kissinger to draft such a new paper only
points out the dangers that exist in such an exercise.
Secondly, we continue to negate the necessity
...
we continue to believe
in the lack of necessity for a joint document between the two superpowers
in a documented form as a contribution to the solution to our problem --
which we continue to see as only through negotiations between the parties.
The third general remark is that all the reservations we have stated to
Dr. Kissinger in our last meeting of June 15 are valid also for any subse-
quent remarks, and in fact they were strengthened by this development.
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2
The fourth point: We want to reemphasize that in our response to your
request to give our remarks, we are not either partners to the prepara-
tion of the document nor are we obligated in any way or form to its content.
Now I want to add my own personal point, as number five, to relay to Dr.
Kissinger. I know it was a difficult decision for the Prime Minister to go
ahead with commenting on the matter, and I know she was guided by two
considerations: She trusts Dr. Kissinger, and she didn't want to make
his already difficult work more difficult. And second, she did not want the
impression to be created that by not reacting we are in acquiescence with
some of the serious points we see in it.
So far for general remarks. Now, the particular remarks to some of the
most important points. We don't say that if we sat down with legalistic
eyes we wouldn't draft it differently on other points, but these are the most
important. I will cover these in order of the paragraphs, not the order
of importance.
[The paper to which these comments are addressed is at Tab A.]
In paragraph four, the word "agreement" does appear, but to make it clearer
we think it must be supplemented by "between the parties. 11 So it wouldn't
be thought it meant agreement among the superpowers or someone else.
This goes to our original philosophy that security arrangements and guaran-
tees cannot be instead of secure borders but at best in addition to them, with
the agreement of the parties concerned. I would add orally that there
couldn't be a situation where the Soviet Union and the U.S. come to us and
say "we have decided to guarantee you. 11 Security must result from secure
borders that we will achieve in agreement with our neighbors. If there are
any additional guarantees, it will be in addition and after agreement between
parties.
Second, in the same paragraph 4 -- I told you earlier that the Prime
Minister was concerned about a Soviet foothold in the area. A physical Soviet
presence. You have corrected it somewhat. But the word "participation"
can have a dual meaning. You probably meant participation in the interna-
tional negotiation, but it could mean physical presence. We suggest saying:
"International guarantees could include the Soviet Union and the United States. "
In other words, take away "appropriate participation. 11 We don't want them
there.
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In paragraph six, our remarks are very simple. We kindly request you
omit the whole paragraph. Because the problematics of it are clear.
You're talking about the specific status of the Suez Canal. But you're not
talking about the specific status of Sharm el-Sheikh except in terms of
freedom of navigation. We don't think you will get a phrase about con-
tinued Israeli control of Sharm el-Sheikh, so we are better off without it.
If your friends ask, "what about freedom of navigation? 11 you can say it's
covered by Resolution 242 and there is no need to restate it.
The most serious problem is paragraph seven. This is crucial. This is
for us very serious. I presume you didn't even realize what a serious
word you introduced into it. In 1972 you succeeded in preventing inclusion
of this item because there was a reference to UN decisions, UN resolutions.
That was very good, very clever. But now you're taking from these UN
resolutions the most bitter pill for us -- free choice and incorporate it
in the document by saying in paragraph seven "implementing the choices
it bitterly ever since 1949.
of the refugees. 11 This is absolutely unacceptable for us. We have opposed
And this is in spite of the fact that you did incorporate the sentence "con-
guard. sistent with national sovereignty. 11 We don't think this is enough of a safe-
So we repeat our request to deal with the refugee problem in the manner that
Resolution 242 dealt with it: "the necessity
ment of the refugee problem. 11 Period.
for achieving a just settle-
It would have been desirable to add that sentence which I gave you earlier
[about sovereignty] -- I feel it's a good thing for both parties. But if Dr.
Kissinger has any difficulties with this, it would suffice to have only the
of choice.
reference to Resolution 242. But by no means can we accept this question
Regarding paragraph eight, we really feel that such a paragraph should be
included in the peace treaty and not in a general document of principles.
So we feel it's premature and not necessary. This is not so much a remark
of substance but rather an observation.
[This was the end of the Ambassador's comments on the paper at Tab A.
He then raised a few other matters. ]
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Other Matters:
1. Qadhafi: You had asked if they had any information on Qadhafi's
medical and psychological condition. Dinitz gave me the paper at Tab B,
for which I thanked him.
Should I pass this on to CIA through Tom Latimer? OK
No
2. Jordan/West Germany: Dinitz raised a matter which he said was not
urgent and which he had thought of saving for his next meeting with you.
Israel is interested in helping Jordan with its economic problems in the
interest of stability. Dinitz asked how you would view financial assistance
from West Germany to Jordan. Israel was contemplating whether to offer
Jordan help in mobilizing and obtaining funds secretly in West Germany
through banks, government, whatever, but secretly -- but the Prime Minis-
ter first wanted to know your thoughts on the matter. I will remind you of
this question before you see Dinitz next.
3. Ambassador Dinitz will be in Atlanta at the Governor's residence Tues-
day night and Wednesday. He will be back in Washington Thursday morning.
He will come back immediately if you want to see him. Or you can reach
him through his office, or contact Minister Idan.
4. Minister Idan would like to invite you to dinner or lunch the week of
July 8th. He leaves his post here on July 12th. He wonders if you could
make it the evening of the 8th
, 9th
, or 10th
for
dinner, or the 8th
or 11th
for lunch. Can we set a date
tentatively?
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T A
General Working Principles
1. The political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict should be
embodied in a set of agreements between Israel and each of the
neighboring Arab countries directly involved in the conflict. They
should be based on Resolution 242 in order to achieve a final peace.
The completion of the agreements should at some stage involve
negotiation between the signatories. Separate agreements on
specific issues are not precluded.
2. The agreements should contain provisions for withdrawal of Israeli
armed forces from territories occupied in 1967 to secure and
recognized boundaries.
3. Any border changes, which may take place, should result from voluntary
agreement between the parties concerned.
4. Arrangements for mutual security could by agreement include
demilitarized and other security zones; establishment of an international
force including participation of the signatory nations; stationing of such
a force at strategic points; and the most effective international guaran-
tees with the appropriate participation of the Soviet Union and the
United States.
5. Recognition of the independence and sovereignty of all states in the
Middle East, including Israel, is one of the basic principles on which
the peace treaties must be based.
6. Freedom of navigation through the international waterways in the
area should be assured to all nations including Israel. This is fully
consistent with Egyptian sovereignty over the Suez Canal.
7. The problem of the Palestinian refugees should be solved on a just
basis which provides for registering and implementing the choices of
the refugees in ways consistent with national sovereignty and for
compensation.
8. A material breach of the agreement by one of the parties shall entitle
the other to invoke the breach as a ground for suspending its perfor-
mance in whole or in part until the breach is rectified.
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3.3(b)(1), 3.3(b)(6)
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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
CONFIDENTIAL
ACTION
July 16, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY KISSINGER
FROM:
PETER W. RODMAN PMR
SUBJECT:
Golda's Message to President on Watergate
Dinitz told you on June 2 that he had passed to Len Garment an
oral personal message from Mrs. Meir offering the President her
sympathy and understanding in his current difficulties. She hoped
he would be soon free to devote his time and energies to his goal
of building peace.
It turns out that Len Garment's memo to the President passing on
this message (Tab I) was not forwarded to the President. It was
apparently treated as too routine. (apponently either 6 Kehrli decision) aa Hang
It occurred to me that you might want this to go forward. We could
send it up again, if you like.
Send it forward
Forget it
HE
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 31, 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR:
THE PRESIDENT
FROM:
LEONARD GARMENT
Israeli Ambassador Dinitz called on me today and delivered the
enclosed letter to you from the Prime Minister (Tab A). He
added. that he was instructed by the Prime Minister to convey to
you the following personal message:
That she is saddened by the difficulties that
beset you and wants you and Mrs. Nixon to
know you have her sympathy and understanding.
She prays for a satisfactory resolution that will
soon enable you to address your time and energies.
fully to the task of building a more peaceful world.
This she knows is the goal which is closest to your
heart.
I thanked the Ambassador and told him I would convey to you the
letter and personal message.
Attachment
4
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EMBASSY OF ISRAEL
benes
WASHINGTON, D.C.
29 May 1973
My dear Mr. President:
I have been instructed by the Prime Minister
of Israel to transmit to you the enclosed letter.
With best wishes,
Sincerely,
Sinacha Simcha Dinitz Dinitz
Ambassador
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
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VN7
THE PRIME MINISTER
Jerusalem, 22 May 1973
Dear Mr. President,
May I say how moved I was to receive from Mrs. Nixon
and yourself such kind birthday greetings.
Your warm remarks addressed to me on the occasion of
our 25th anniversary and on my own 75th birthday are deeply
appreciated. They echo in our hearts the feelings of friend-
ship and gratitude which our people cherish with respect to
you, Mr. President, personally and to all the people of
your great country.
Please accept at this time my sincere expressions of
goodwill coupled with the prayer, which all Israel shares,
that your historic efforts in support of peace everywhere will
speedily be realized.
With warm personal regards,
Sincerely,
Holda Meir
Golda Meir
H.E. Mr. Richard Nixon
President of the United States
The White House
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Message from Dr. Kissinger sent 5 June and delivered to
Mr. Hafiz Ismail on 6 June:
Dr. Kissinger thanks Mr. Ismail for his message of
June 2.
The US side would appreciate it if Mr. Ismail could
clarify whether the US side can discuss with the Soviet Union
the principles for a settlement along the lines outlined by
Dr. Kissinger in his meeting with Mr. Ismail, that is, principles
of a general nature which would permit the parties to start a
process of negotiation.
The US side would appreciate clarification by the Egypt-
ian side of this point in order to plan its course for its
forthcoming discussions with the Soviet Union.
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Tab B
May 28, 1972
General Working Principles
1. The agreement should be comprehensive, covering all parties
and issues. This does not preclude that the implementation occurs in
stages or that some issues are resolved on a priority basis.
2. The agreement should contain provisions for the withdrawal of
Israeli forces from Arab territories occupied in 1967.
3. Any border rectifications, which may take place, should result
from voluntary agreement among the parties concerned.
4. Mutual arrangements for security could include demilitarized
zones, the temporary stationing of UN personnel at Sharm el-Sheikh,
and the most effective international guarantees with the appropriate
participation of the Soviet Union and the United States.
5. The agreements should lead to an end of a state of belligerency
and the establishment of peace.
6. Freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran and the Suez
Canal should be assured. This is fully consistent with Egyptian
sovereignty over the Canal.
7. Recognition of the independence and sovereignty of all states in
the Middle East, including Israel, is one of the basic principles on
which the settlement must be based.
8. The problem of the Palestinian refugees should be solved on a
just basis and in accordance with the appropriate UN decisions.
(Reserved by the US side)
The US position is that completion of the agreements should at some
stage involve negotiations among the signatories.
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TabC
TelCon
Amb. Dinitz/Mr. Kissinger
9:20 am, June 14, 1973
K:
Hello.
D:
Good morning, Dr. Kissinger, and welcome back.
K:
Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
D:
How are you?
K:
Now I can take my old time to settle the Arab/Israeli dispute.
Can you start by going back to your 1967 borders. We'll have
another settlement. And then settle with the Palestinians.
D:
And then '47. I called these days the 47 geography and 48
genography.
K:
That's about right.
D:
How've you been Dr. Kissinger?
Yigal Allon
K:
I've been fine. I'm so sorry I missed Ilam (sp). Is
he anywhere around. My idiots here didn't tell you you asked
him to stay.
D:
Well, I did not know when you will be coming althojgh I had a hint
that you are going to be back. He left yesterday morning at 10:00.
I told him - he understood it completely--but he would have pro-
bably waited. He went to London you see, and he thought that maybe
he could see you in Europe.
K:
I'm just mortified. I wanted to ask my people to ask him to wait,
and I thought they knew he was an old friend of mine. I take it
Rabin has also left.
D:
Rabin has also left, yes, he was in Washington for another day.
Last night he had a dinner with Joe Alsop and he thought that--
spending another night here. Is it possible Dr. Kissinger that
some time we have a few minutes together.
K:
I'll do my best.
D:
I will tell you why I say this. I got some reaction from home with
regard to the big meetings that you are having. In essence, if I
may say it has nothing of relation of you, Prime Minister
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2
repeats some of our basic points, but if you could come by and
see me before the
K:
Yes, now that I will do. I cant' do it today, I'll do it tomorrow.
D:
That's fine.
K:
But until tomorrow, could you think about the following problems--
you know the strategy that I've been pursuing, and so far it has not
been totally unsuccessful. But you will now face this problem--
should I discuss it within the framework which you know with
Gromyko.
D:
Yeah.
K:
Or should it be left to Brezhnev and the President. In that case,
the consequences are somewhat more unpredictable. On the other
hand, in my case, the consequences are more certain though you
may not like them. You see what I mean.
D:
Of course.
K:
But this is the choice you have to make. If I talk to Gromyko
it will be in the framewark of what you know, perhaps slightely
improved. But you may not be wild about them. If it goes into
the other forum, well you--so, can you think about that, and
maybe ask the Prime Minister before tomorrow.
D:
Can I ask you a clarification question? I was thinking along
exactly this line, that this is really the choice that is confronting
us.
K:
Because you have no other choice if I can be honest with you.
D:
Well, at least I knew what I think will be that either it's continuous
on the 172 paper, on the lines of the '72 paper between the two of
you, and it goes up. And that is like a gamble. It can be either
better in the sense that the paper that we don't like, as you know,
will disappear, or something else worse--
K:
It will not disappear. What could happen is something worse, or
maybe they can't agree.
D:
Yes, I understand.
K:
But it's a chancey proposition. I have to be honest with you.
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3
K:
Particularly if there's a spirit of comraderie.
D:
Let me ask you then, you know to inform my Prime Minister
more intelligently, can I tell her that if you negotiate with
Gromyko on the basis of the '72, is there a chance for improve-
ment of the text, especially those particularly irritating points
that we have.
K:
That is what I would put my major effort on.
D:
Yes. As you recall, there was one point in which they did not
accept your position.
K:
Yeah, there was two disagreed points. One had to do with
refugees, and one had to do with direct negotiations.
D:
That is correct. And
K:
Now, we will certainly--we will insist on direct negotiations.
We will rewrite the refugee point. In fact, when I see you
tomorrow I will show you some playing I have done with these
things which I have never shown to the other side.
D:
I understand.
K:
But it really comes down to that. In my view.
D:
Yes. I understand. And of course the question of stationing
of UIN forces in Sharm
, which is something that the
Prime Minister, even in our previous meeting, particularly
was concerned about because it sort of goes even beyond any
formal proposal that we had on the
. Negates
the control of
Sharm el-Shaikh
/
-
K:
I'll tell you, Mr. Ambassador, if the meeting ends next week
without a reference I will not feel that I need to apologiee to
anybody. So you do not face the problem of my seeking oppor-
tunities to raise this issue.
D:
I understand, I understand.
K:
But I think, if you want to be realistic, now I have--look we'd
better talk--but if you are going to consult with the Prime Minister
again, another think you ought to know--I have no reason to believe
that the Egyptians will accept anything like this. In all their
messages to me I've asked them what their reaction would be to
some general principles, and they are dancing all over the lot.
They don't say no, but they certainly stay far away from saying
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D:
One more question. If this is accepted, would
K:
You don't have to accept it, you just have to accept the process.
D:
I understand, I mean, I want to know what the next step is. The
next step is simultaneous negotiation that is also of
K:
Well, if the President and Brezhnev agree on something that you
and we can live with, and I understand that you can live only with
something that leaves you margins for negotiation. Then the next
step would be negotiation between you and the Egyptians.
D:
But not necessarily simultaneous ones which particularly upset
my prime Minister.
K:
I now have the impression that they are not at all interested in
the partial settlement, SO that what it would lead to would be a
general negotiation.
D:
That was my impression.
K:
And I you don't have the impression that your military are insisting
that we withdraw the canal.
D:
No, we don't put it as precondition for the negotiation.
K:
Not a precondition for your negotiation, but you first withdraw
from the canal.
D:
Right, that's correct.
K:
Now, my impression, and again from exchanges with the Egyptians,
is that linkage which you proposed to me, they are not interested in.
So that the only result--I mean, the result of this would not be an
interim and general negotiation but only a general negotiation.
D:
Right. Okay, I will communicate this today, and I will ask for
reaction before tomorrow.
K:
Good, and I'll meet you tomorrow.
D:
Right.
K:
And think about it in terms that I sent to you.
D:
I will tell you, Dr. Kissinger,
K:
There is no way to avoid a discussion from all the communications
we've had.
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D:
Yesterday I cabled home hoping for a meeting between us and I
wanted some instruction. And I said in my cable that basically
what I see is that pivot question now is exactly what you stated.
Either they use negotiation on the paper, or leaving it to them.
K:
You see, I had made some changes in the '72 text. I don't want
to change it too radically because I don't them to change it too
radically. But where it says "agreement", I'm trying to put
in plural, "agreements".
D:
But you recall, of course, Dr. Kissinger that have given you
another paper.
K:
That I've already rejected.
D:
I know, but, in other words, they did try to change it very radically
in their favor.
K:
Yeah, but when I totally rejected that--
D:
It doesn't become an instrument for negotiation.
K:
That will not be discussed. That I can assure you flatly. But
'73 paper will not be the object for discussion. The point of
departure will be the '72 plus those changes I can make with it
without triguring them into tabling the '73 paper. You see what
I mean.
D:
Yes. I see what you mean exactly.
K:
I will show you the changes that I have in mind.
D:
And maybe by then I will have some instructions, I'm sure I will,
as to the approach in general and in particular.
Allon
K:
Good. And can you tell both and Rabin how distraught I am
A
that I missed them.
D:
I will do this. I will send a cable to Israel and tell them.
K:
Good. Thank you.
D:
Thank you very much, and we'll see you tomorrow. Bye bye.
K:
Bye.
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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Simcha Dinitz, Israeli Ambassador
Avner Idan, Israeli Minister
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
one
DATE AND TIME:
Friday, June 15, 1973
11:05 a. m. - 12:10 p.m.
PLACE:
Map Room
The White House
Dinitz: I communicated to Yigal Allon and Rabin that you were unable to
see them. I have the original of the letter from the Prime Minister on
your birthday. [Hands over Tab A]
Dr. Kissinger: Thank you.
We have received a letter from Heath which I wanted to discuss with you
because it brings great British pressure on you to return to the interna-
tional lines. This is part of the international situation now.
Dinitz: I communicated with the Prime Minister yesterday, after I talked
with you, on the points we discussed. I just heard from her 20 minutes
ago, so my presentation is not too well prepared.
Dr. Kissinger: Is the Foreign Minister in on this act?
Dinitz: No, not at all. Just the Prime Minister. Maybe on some aspects
of defense she brings Dayan in, and Allon on general matters.
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2
Let me give you some idea of our idea of the Soviet position in the
Middle East. In our view, indications show the Soviet Union to be
in a better position in the Middle East than it really is. From all the
evidence we have they are in quite a tough spot, with respect to Egypt
and even with respect to the United States in the Middle East.
Brandt said to the Prime Minister that Brezhnev doesn't put importance
on Watergate. He sees it as an anti-Communist plot
Dr. Kissinger: We will disillusion him next week, when all the star
witnesses appear! It is very patriotic.
Dinitz: Brandt says he didn't find Brezhnev concerned about Watergate.
He thought it was a plot of certain circles in America working against
detente. There is no sign that Brezhnev has the assumption he is meet-
ing a weakened President. Mrs. Meir wanted me to pass this on.
We have another visitor in Israel, Victor Louis.
Dr. Kissinger: Of the KGB.
Dinitz: Yes. He is seeing Gazit, my successor. He didn't see any
Cabinet level people. He related a few things. In view of his position we
usually listen to him.
Dr. Kissinger: Is he Jewish?
Dinitz: Yes. He said that relations between the Soviet Union and Arab
countries are extremely complicated and are worsening from day to day.
The Soviet Union is grabbing, as he puts it, to maintain its hold in the
Arab world, and Qaddafi is looking for excuses to show that the Soviet
Union is committing treason against the Arabs.
Dr. Kissinger: Do you know anything about Qaddafi?
Dinitz: I can get you some information. The last reports I saw about
him said he really has clinical problems. Not just that his views are
crazy but that he really has a medical problem.
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Dr. Kissinger: Can you give us something?
Dinitz: Yes. Louis says there is a tendency of sobriety in the upper
echelons of the Soviet Union regarding the Arab's military capacity. They
recognize Israeli military superiority for many years to come, and they
are warning against any military adventures. The Arabs are increasingly
angry over this.
In our own estimate the Soviet position on the Middle East has not in-
creased since last summer; on the contrary it has declined. This has
more to do with balance of power considerations not Watergate.
Dr. Kissinger: Let me say something about Watergate. You have your
own estimate of its domestic effect; let's not kid ourselves. But we don't
conduct foreign policy on this basis. If we admit that, we are lost.
Dinitz: I am saying we don't see any weakening of the President's position.
Dr. Kissinger: The point I've taken in negotiations with Communists is
that we would welcome a foreign policy crisis, which would divertattention
from it! It worked with Le Duc Tho.
Dinitz: On the paper of 1972 [Tab B], I discussed it with the Prime
Minister.
Dr. Kissinger: I was amazed. Our conclusions were almost identical.
We focussed on that too. [Dinitz-Kissinger telcon of June 14 at Tab C.]
Dinitz: The Prime Minister's feeling about this dilemma is, she wants
to reiterate that we negate the document of 1972 as we've seen it. We
see great harm if it receives official sanction or approval. She asks the
United States to do everything in its power to dissociate from the 1972
document. We have serious doubts whether there is any document the
U.S. could reach with the USSR that we could live with.
The 1972 document is worse than 242, for several reasons. The phrase
on withdrawal is in a harder manner, and is outside of the principle of
general agreement. It also omits "the right to live in peace within secure
and recognized boundaries. 11
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Also the phrases on refugees and on international forces at Sharm el-
Sheikh weren't in 242. 242 also doesn't talk about stages but about
agreement.
We don't understand why the United States at any point should agree to
a document that is worse than 242. We don't accept it at all. But out
of a general desire to make remarks in the case a negotiation takes
place, we can give you the following remarks -- but not as coming from
us and not in our name.
Dr. Kissinger: I understand.
Before you do that, can I interpret what you are saying? My understand-
ing of your position is this: it is clear that no Israeli Government can
authorize us to negotiate for it on anything. Second, no Israeli Govern-
ment will want to commit itself to principles that don't endorse its
position. So I construe this as saying you don't commit yourself to it
in advance or afterward. But if your comments are taken into account,
you might understand the strategic necessities that brought us into the
negotiations, but you wouldn't commit yourself.
Dinitz: Yes, but I would add to that one sentence that the Prime
Minister believes it is better that the U.S. dissociate itself from the
1972 documents. So we ask first that you dissocate yourself. But
because we understand your position, we say that should you find yourself
in a negotiation, you should have our observations -- not labelled as our
observations.
Dr. Kissinger: If it becomes unavoidable that we have a discussion,
you give us your personal observations. If anything should emerge, we
will present it to you as a new document.
Dinitz: Our observations are as follows:
On paragraph one of the document, the paper of May 28, 1972, we feel
that the paragraph should emphasize that we are speaking here about an
agreement between the parties based on Resolution 242, or in the frame-
work of 242, in order to achieve a final peace. We feel that the need for
direct negotiations at some stage between the parties should already be
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mentioned in the first paragraph. Because we see it as the core of the
issue. You said it was a defect in the 1972 document that the Soviets
didn't accept the U.S. position about direct negotiations between the
parties. But we see it as the basis for any agreement that evolves.
Dr. Kissinger: As we have played with these things, we think it should
be plural --
'agreements'' rather than "agreement."
Dinitz: Yes. I am coming to that. We are not quite clear in our mind
when you talk about "stages and priorities" because we don't know what will
happen between the stages and between the priorities. So we would prefer
no reference to stages and priorities. We should stick to the reference to
242 and final peace.
Dr. Kissinger: We meant to allow for an interim settlement.
Dinitz: So you can say, "an interim settlement is not precluded. " Just
say it explicitly. We didn't like what you had because it reminded us of
the timetables in the Russian plan.
In Paragraph 2, the provisions for withdrawal, I already said we would
rather have the exact phrasing of Resolution 242. Also, the phrase "Arab
territories" doesn't appear in 242; it says "territories." Once you identify
it as Arab, you are already prejudging it. Why go beyond 242 on this?
But the main thing in this paragraph is that it should not be separate from
the element of agreement and the element of secure and recognized
boundaries in 242. Many people in 1967 accepted our opinion that "secure
and recognized" means withdrawal to new boundaries that will not be the
1967 boundaries. The 1967 boundaries certainly weren't secure and
recognized.
Dr. Kissinger: They certainly weren't recognized. But it is rather hard
to maintain from the outcome of the 1967 war that they weren't secure.
Dinitz: Our army was secure! But the borders invited trouble.
Dr. Kissinger: I understand your position. There is no need to debate
this.
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Dinitz: Paragraph 3 is maintained by us, with the possibility of one
small change. Where it says "any border rectifications" we would prefer
"changes", because "recitifications" can have the connotation of small
size. This is a very important paragraph. "Changes" has no connota-
tion of size.
Dr. Kissinger: That raises a tactical question. To get the key changes,
we may have to keep the changes in the other paragraphs to a minimum.
Dinitz: Paragraph 4 we have problems with. We would like to remove
completely the mention of UN personnel at Sharm el-Sheikh and remove
any reference to Sharm. Because the context of the paragraph is of
security arrangements. We believe Sharm should be controlled by us --
I am not talking about sovereignty.
Dr. Kissinger: No reference to Sharm.
Dinitz: Yes.
Dr. Kissinger: The Egyptians won't fight over that.
Dinitz: If there is no mention of Sharm, they will interpret it their way.
The Prime Minister says it is imperative not to give the Soviets any hold
there at all. There should be no physical Soviet presence there, in the
context of big-power guarantees.
Paragraph 4, still, on big-power guarantees, is something the Prime
Minister negates, except when it is a function of agreement between
parties and not something instead of secure borders.
Dr. Kissinger: Are these typed up? Can you give us a copy?
Dinitz: I will get hell in Israel if I do that. I fought to get any remarks
at all.
Dr. Kissinger: I understand. It is a daring course.
Dinitz: Paragraph 5 we feel would be unnecessary, not needed at all.
It is not that we object, but if our approach is taken with respect to
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7
paragraph 1 - "agreement between the parties under 242 to achieve a final
peace" - then there is no need in paragraph 5 to refer also to the end
to a state of belligerency.
Paragraph 6: again, on Sharm el-Sheikh, we don't want to mix the
Suez Canal and Sharm -- or the Straits of Tiran, as it is referred to
here. Because while the Suez Canal is an international waterway and
we don't dispute Egyptian sovereignty -- though it should be open to all,
and we want Israel mentioned explicitly -- but Sharm we want to insure
through our own control. We don't dispute Egyptian sovereignty of the
Canal, or control over it. But the physical control is different in the
two waterways. Mention of Egyptian sovereignty over the Canal is not
necessary because no one disputes it, and we don't want it mixed up
with Sharm.
On Paragraph 7 we have no remarks of substance but we would rather
have "peace treaties" rather than "settlement".
In Paragraph 8, we suggest a return to the language of Resolution 242,
which just says "a just settlement of the refugee problem". And we would
prefer the followi ng sentence to be incorporated after every reference
to refugees: "In reaching an agreement containing provisions laying
down the obligations accepted by the parties towards a settlement of the
refugee problem, neither party shall be under claims from the other
inconsistent with its sovereignty."
I have two general remarks to add: One reason I was able to get such
remarks was that you said on the phone we can only live with a paper
that leaves us room enough for negotiations. I saw this as a key remark,
and I told the Prime Minister about it. She said you should know that
Israel can live only with a paper that leaves us room for negotiations on
su bstantial changes in borders -- not on the basis of no changes or only
minor rectifications.
The second remark is that it is the request of the Prime Minister that
the United States do everything possible to dissociate from the document.
Dr. Kissinger: I understand. Peter will check with Idan on the language
to make sure we have it.
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8
We have to navigate between something that is SO new that the Russians
will introduce new points, and something that we can use. We will put
together a new set of principles. You will be making suggestions as
our adviser, not as the Israeli Ambassador. We understand -- it is your
second choice. You would prefer no document, and the only document
we can use is something you will be against. I just want your prime
Minister to understand that I understand.
Here is a long letter from Heath, that you can read. [Tab D]
Dinitz: [Reads it. ] In the third page, the screwdriver came out of the
back.
The operative part is the same as the British delegate said at the
United Nations. The reasoning, on the need for oil, is secret of course.
But on the need to go to the '67 lines, it was said at the United Nations
the day before yesterday. And it goes back to the Harrogate speech,
the original British position. [Dinitz hands back the letter. ]
Dr. Kissinger: Here is the message from the Egyptians. I sent them
two messages, one telling them there would be aircraft deliveries to
Israel, and the second message, to which this is a reply. [Tab E]
You can see I told him that we would maintain a military balance.
Dinitz: You didn't tell him how much.
Dr. Kissinger: No, I wouldn't tell him that much.
You know that was the formula you gave me [about linkage].
Dinitz: But there was no Israeli statement about linkage. It always
has been our position that the interim settlement is not the final border,
but no Israeli made a statement about the linkage formula.
Dr. Kissinger: I have never replied to that.
Dinitz: What is this about "the understanding on which the present
Egyptian-American discussion is based" and the "objective" of "final
withdrawal of Israeli forces to Egypt's international boundaries?"
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9
Dr. Kissinger: The only understanding that we have is on 242. That
is their point of view, not ours.
What I will do is redraft the principles, to keep it as close as possible
to last year's.
Dinitz: I have two more points the Prime Minister asked me to raise.
With respect to Soviet Jewry, we would appreciate it if the President
could raise with Brezhnev, first, the level of emigration, and secondly,
the hardship cases. On the first, there has been a decline, not an
increase, in recent months.
Then I was asked to mention the Phantoms to Saudi Arabia and to Kuwait.
Dr. Kissinger: I have stopped the Kuwaiti one for the time being.
Dinitz: Anything on the Saudis?
Dr. Kissinger: I think it's going to be tough.
Dinitz: One more question. We are very much concerned with Ethiopia,
as you know. The Emperor was here, and he tells our people he got
completely a cold shoulder from State.
Dr. Kissinger: The trouble with State is that they dislike America so
much that they think anyone who is friendly to us is defective. [Laughter]
I will look into that and let you know.
[Dr. Kissinger and the Ambassador then conferred alone for ten minutes. ]
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MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS:
Ambassador Rabin
Henry A. Kissinger
Peter W. Rodman 1 m
TIME & PLACE:
January 24, 1973
The Map Room, The White House
6:05 to 6:22 p.m.
Ambassador Rabin: Congratulations on the Vietnam settlement.
Dr. Kissinger: It was the best obtainable under the circumstances. In
fact, it is better than the situation warranted. They could have held
out another two months and we would have been in serious difficulty.
Ambassador Rabin: It is a tremendous achievement.
Mr. Kissinger: I wanted to see you before your meeting with the President.
Ambassador Rabin: I believe it will be a short meeting.
Dr. Kissinger: I guess a half an hour. He has nothing particular in mind.
He likes you. You and Freeman are the only two Ambassadors he has
developed a personal feeling for.
Ambassador Rabin: I will make three points. First I will thank him for
allowing Israel to get arms.
Dr. Kissinger: May I suggest something? Spend the first few minutes
about some other subjects, such as his courage and strength.
Ambassador Rabin: I'll tell him that I came here in 1968. The difference
between what I found here in '68 and what I see when I leave is a dramatic
change. People don't realize this, but I do as a foreigner. Believe me, I
thought America was falling apart. Secondly, I will talk about arms, and
thank him. Then I will thank him for the American posture and strength
as translated to the Middle East, and its importance.
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Dr. Kissinger: Such as the Jordanian crisis.
Ambassador Rabin: Such as the Jordanian crisis and so on. And my
opinion is that the Egyptians asked the Russians out because the Russians
were not ready to give them what they wanted. This is partly because of
Israel's strength, but it is also because of the change of posture between
the major powers.
Dr. Kissinger: I have learned that when you use force it is better to use
30 percent more than is necessary than five percent less than necessary.
Ambassador Rabin: Not gradual involvement.
Dr. Kissinger: Right. Therefore whenever we use force we have to do
it slightly hysterically. Even the Indian/Pakistani crisis.
Ambassador Rabin: Even Sadat has said this.
Dr. Kissinger: The Russians told Sadat that we would not stand for war.
Ambassador Rabin: And third, that all these political solutions have come
up mainly when there is no option for war. Only then will there be change
and a more realistic chance for a political settlement in the Middle East.
I will stress therefore the need to leave more to the parties to do more.
Dr. Kissinger: This he will not agree with.
Ambassador Rabin: I know, I will do it a different way.
Dr. Kissinger: Fine.
Ambassador Rabin: I will end with the hope that he will continue his present
policy, particularly the first two elements, because this is responsible for
the situation today.
Dr. Kissinger: He has enormous respect for you. And the more you can
talk as a man leaving the diplomatic service, as a man he asked to see
Let me tell you what I have been doing, which I may not be able to do. The
Egyptians, as I've told you, have been bombarding me with requests for a
meeting. I tentatively proposed February 22nd in London. I may not be
able to do this.
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Ambassador Rabin: Ismail.
Dr. Kissinger: Yes. My strategy would be to get some degree of control
over it. Second, to see what they have in mind, if anything. And third,
to do this before Mrs. Meir comes, so we can all discuss it. Is she
coming the 27th?
Ambassador Rabin: Yes.
Dr. Kissinger: I could shift this to the 26th with Ismail.
Ambassador Rabin: On the matter of aircraft production, let me tell you.
This mission from your Defense Department came to Israel. They had
thought we wanted technical knowhow because we had nothing. They were
shocked. They now realize we will do it either with them or without them.
They finished by saying they would recommend everything. We will see.
They started to calculate everything for us. We said we could do the
calculation ourselves.
Dr. Kissinger: You should crystallize it into a decision so I can act. Put
it in a formal proposal.
Ambassador Rabin: We have.
Dr. Kissinger: Where is it?
Ambassador Rabin: They had a mission, they had to put it ino a report,
but they had no one to report to because the new Secretary was not in yet.
The Prime Minister will raise here first the question of arms, second
the question of political settlement- where we go.
Dr. Kissinger: Warn her not to get too specific.
Ambassador Rabin: I will be going to Israel and will get back on the 5th.
Dr. Kissinger: I may go on vacation on the 7th. Let's meet again on
the 5th or 6th, because I may go on vacation and not be back until the 18th
of February.
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-4-
Ambassador Rabin: We've got to know where to go. We have enough
from Jordan to know now.
Dr. Kissinger: He has not proposed anything.
Ambassador Rabin: She would be satisfied with the line agreed in
December 1971 if it can be worked out for the future. After all, there is
no need for any activity. Even the Secretary of State, when he talked about
activity, did not propose anything new.
Dr. Kissinger: But as you told me, every time I do anything you pay for it.
Ambassador Rabin: They are behaving now.
The third point she might raise is Soviet Jewry. At present in terms of
numbers, it's good. In terms of ransom
Dr. Kissinger: I must tell you the President is extremely sensitive about
the idea of American Jewish community holding up American foreign policy
on an issue he considers a Soviet internal matter.
Ambassador Rabin: Jackson isn't Jewish.
Dr. Kissinger: The President thinks he responds to the Jewish community.
It is an extraordinary sensitivity of the President. And the Russians
basically have no feelings. They do what they have to do.
[Kissinger and Rabin conferred privately from 6:22 to 6:30 p.m.]
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DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified