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TELCON The President Mr. Kissinger 7-18-69 12:30 PM K said he was gx calling about Chinese thing and would be useful if we could announce tomorrow. E Richardson has now recommended three things - tourist purchases, easing travel restrictions for certain categories and grain sales. K said he has checked with Mundt who agrees to first two but not third. Pres said first two were o.k. but not the third. Pres said he wanted K to call Mansfield personally on that. K said he would do so. K said secondly, a private meeting took pl ace today which indicated that perhaps the last private meeting of six weeks ago may have been a response to note to Dobrynin as K suspected it might have been. They were very specific and asked 12 questions about P's speech of May 14. K told P the questions. K said he has taxx talked to some people and mood in Congress has shifted very much in favor of P. P and K discussed Rogers' appearance on hill. K said he talked to someone who accompanied Rogers and they were surposed by degree to which FAC took position in P's favor. P said theyx work it could be they have gone too far. K said they propse establishment of working group and what we will have to watch now is to make sure State will not run with this enterprise. K said message P sent this week was very well timed. P asked if he would deliver it Monday and K said he told him he would call him tonight to let him know whether he could go ahead. P said in K's backgrounder if question comes up, be sure to say we have been disappointed in Russians insofar as ME and VN are concerned. K filled President in on Borman-Keldish exchange. Pres asked if Shakespeare called on K. K said not yet, he will see him this afternoon. P filled in K on what Shakespeare had told him. Discussed ABM and K said it may be that opponents of ABM are getting worried. Mathias called for appt with K and is coming in today - said he had to see him today. P said he heard Jackson was superb in private session - demoralized Symington. P and K agreed Senators are getting scared after hearing intelligence briefgins. Opponents have shifted line on SS9. P said he thinks intelligence community is shaping up - K agreed, saying we have them scared. K said both IN he and Mitchell have refused to go over drafts - we do not want them to accept our dictates. P said for K to call Mansfield and say Pres personally asked him to call and say wwhen we return P will fill M in on conversation with Yaya. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. -2- P and K discussed China thing again and P said to go along on first two but not the wheat. Tell Richardson this would pose Congressional problems. K said R will go along with whatever P decides. P and K discussed trip. K said he talked to Romanian Amb and Sunday morning program is now locked in. P said in K's backgrounder one thing that P expects to say in his if asked about one-day visit and whether it means anything. P said his answer is and has been for years - you learn as much in one day as you do in one month. Ohly if you are going to stay a year, do you learn more than you do in one day. K might point out that P has been to all these countries and most important thing is serious substantive talks. Another thing the P has knocked off is time spent with American Community - have to be priorities. American side will be done by SecState and others. Most important thing is face-to-face talk to leaders. K brought up P's arrival back here - everyone thinks should be 10:00 at Andrews. P agreed. K said he is tentatively planning subject to P's approval to meet with some intellectuals in P's name. This would be done in order to conserve Presidents time and energy. P agreed. P said finally, re VN they have now come in with plan to visit three different military units within 10 minutes of palace - in same base area and security is adequate. P said fine, let's do it. P asked how long and K said 1 and 1/2 hrs. P asked about announcement and K said we will not announce it at all. P and K talked about thexnesse what themes of trip should be jm Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telecon The President 5:45 p.m 7/18/69 The President was asking about the press briefing. K said he mentioned all the things they discusseed. K said there were about 200 people there and it was held in the East Room. The President asked if there were any questions regarding Soviet security in ? o They asked if we were going to try to prevent that. K told them we were/going not to participate in that. The Pres. suggested we might get into the idea toxxxxx of developing policies now for so we don't get bogged down in another Vietnam. In every one of these countries, there is the potential. K thought that was a very effective point. K told Richardson to proceed and now but there was word that the Chinese may have captured an American yacht. K thought we should wait until we have determined the status of this. The President thought we might put it out anyway since the yacht story hadn't hit the papers yet. We would come out with ours first. The P wanted to know if K had talked to Mansfield about this. K wanted to wait also until the yacht status was cleared. The P thought K should explain it to Mansfield. K mentioned his meeting with Mitchell. p The P wanted to know how he felt about the reaction to Dobrynin move. K said State got hung up. When K read the telephone report, they still asked for colition government and unconditional withdrawal. K said they have asked us certain questions that they would have to akk if they wanted to settle. It is more precise than anything they have asked befodre. The President was happy with what Rogers said on Hanoi. It was the fiarst time he has said anything hard. He liked K's point that some of these Senators may begin to realize that the other side is being intransigent. We have to look and talk very peaceful. K said to them, you (the P) is a terribly frustrating phenomen; they can't set you up. The P has stayed ahead of the public opinion curve. The people are now being more rdasonable, they can't think of things anymore that we should be doing that we are not doing. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. - 2 - K told him of his visit with Katzenbach today. Even Katz. couldn't think of anything more we should be doing. On the tripp books, the P said he wasn't going to go into them as much as he did in Europe since he will only be spending a very short time in each place. K suggested that if he reads the cover memo that should be sufficient. If he wants anymore information, the backup will be there. The President asked if K thought the Soviets were really reaching for something. K said they may not know what to do, in fairness, with Hanoi. They can't get caught up in it. The P said he thought they needed good relations with us this time. We have done enought to give them a good reason and they haven't kicked us around. They haven't even said anything unkind. K said they want good relations with us for the appearance. P agreed saying the appearances to help them with their other enemies. K said they want to keep things quite so they can concentrate on isolating China. It would be in our interest so long as we don't do it together with them. The P said by the time we get through with this trip, they are going to be out of their minds, that we are playing a Chinese game. The President mentioned again for K to call Mansfield Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Senator Mansfield Mr. Kissinger 7-18-69 5:45 PM K said Pres wanted him to call M about some of the moves we are thinking of making toward Communist China in next day or ****X two. K said we would have made them today but some problem about ship they may have picked up. K said measures themselves are not of spectacular significance but we are looking for things we can do unilaterally which they cannot reject. K said we are lifting tourist purchases of Communist chinese goods, lifting travel restrictions for specified groups (journalists, students, etc), and we will tell them we would be glad to give visas to similar category of people. K said Pres was eager for M to know this. K said it is signal to them of our intention and there are a number of other things in the works which we will develop during the course of the year - inching toward a different relationship but not giving them a chance to blast us. K said he did not know if M agreed with this approach. M said he does. M said you are removing second boycott what about first boycott. M said there is also unilaterial boycot against trade with China - maybe that is later move. K said for M's personal info, this is move that will be made before too much time is out. M said he has not heard a thing. M said he is delighted - good first move jm Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telecon Indian Ambassador 6:35 p.m. 7/18/69 The Ambassador said he was informed by Roscosa of the talk you(K) had. Both he and I sent a telegram. It is now ok about the State visit part. I will be back tomorrow and I will get more details when I return. A copy of the telegram was sent to Washington. Roscosa will let you know too. K thought it was a good idea to deal here rather than theough the advance man. The Amb said he was able to press it and discussed it with Foreign Minister. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON Cmdr. Larson Mr. Kissinger 7/18/69, 6:55 p.m. K called for the President and L said he was eating. K said not to bother him. L said he delivered all the briefing books to the President and the three messages -- Vietnam developments, etc. K said fine, and just tell the President that I have an answer for him on the two problems they discussed. K said none of them were urgent and just tell the President I called. K said he would be in his office all evening. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON President Mr. Kissinger 7-18-69 7:25 PM K said he has talked to Mansfield and he is delighted and asked K to tell Pres personally how much he appreciates policy P is following. P asked if K had told him about boat and fact P has said the hell with it. K said he had and Mansfield agreed. K said now it will have to go until Monday. K aaid PM Sato sent personal representative to see K with message for P on Okinawa question. In effect if P would be willing to use that sort of channel on big policy issues involved and keep technical issues in diplomatic channel. K said in other words he would come with proposition which goes beyond what P has already approved - would like to come to understanding with P in principle first. K said if P is willing to do this, he will keep man here until Monday. P said lets try to get it done and not fool around with State Dept . K said then with P's permission he will keep the man here until he has a chance to present to P on Monday. K said he has Mathias with him and he may switch omer to us on ABM. P said he could not believe it - keep after him. P said if he could move that could have a dramatic effect - let him be a hero. P said K is authorized to tell himwe will work out whatever he wants. K said he would let P know if it turns out favorably. jm Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telecon Secretary Laird 8:00 p.m. 7/18/69 K apologized for not getting back to L sooner but said that he was doing his work for him. He just was talking to Mathias and he might come over. K said he had to promise him an ABM site in his state. K asked what L was going to do on the guy who put the hdle in the canisters? Laidd said that was why he was calling. L said, as K probably knows, there is alot of sentiment that the DOD should announce where we have gas stored. K didn't think there was any advantage in that. Laird agreed but he wanted to inform K that he had taken the position that until we had completed the study, we shouldn't announce anything. K wanted to know if we should store the gas in Okinawa. L said we could put in on Guam. It was a mistake to put it on Ok in the first place. K mentioned that it was McNamara's move. Laird said if we put it on Guam W there would be a military requirement of construction for storage facilities which will take some time. We could also dump it in the ocean but the National Academy of Scientists object to that. We could burn it, but that would cost a million to build the facilities. K said we shoudl consider an announcement along the lines that it will be removed from Oki as soonas alternative storage facilities have been constructed elsewhere. L said it would take at least a year and that they would have to go to Congress for the money. K asked if L minded if he took this up with the President. L said no. L said for now we are saying that we prefer not to comment. If they push, we can say hxx who put it there. The JC feels they need storage some place because of the quantity that is in the hands of the Soviets. They both agreed to wait until Monday to do anything. L said State wanted to put something out xxxing today. K said that was panicking. He said the President appreciated aklxek L's careful and maticulous way in which he checked out everything. K said he would mention this to the President tomorrow. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELECON The President Mr. Kissinger 7/18/69, 10:15 p.m. P asked what happened to that Biafra thing. K said it was supposed to have been released this morning and that he approved the release. P said it is a very important release and he wanted to be sure they understood that we are shifting from State, and writing letters to both parties. K said re P's question of how letter was delivered to Biafra, it was delivered to the President of the Ivory Coast. K said we announced that letters were sent to both parties. P said tell Harlow that he oughtto call Buzz and Goodell (?) telling them we are doing this. K said he would make sure that they got all of this information. P said tell Flanigan to get to the Pope and a few other people. K said we have included a letter to the Pope informing him of some of these actions. The President said if it comes up tomorrow, tell them Haile Selassie urged him to do this when he was here. P said Selassie said this is the time for American intervention. P said we have to use everything we have to get this over with and asked K if he agreed. K said these tribal hatreds run so deep. It is the same as Chinese for Southeast Asians. K said the trouble is that Nigeria can't win but whether they are ready to settle is a real question. P said we have to do more than State does. P said we have to stop all support of Nigerian Government. P said it won't work they can't win. P said we have to talk cold turkey to Wilson. K said that it is important and then he would see Pompidou. P said that's what I think we should do. Pompidou should step up support for Biafra. P said he would run herd on Wilson and tell Palmer to keep his mouth shut. K said the Indian Ambassador called to say he had a message from Delhi assuring us it is going to be very warm welcome. P said good. K said he has read transcript of private talk and he thinks our boys were a little optimistic. They asked a number of serious questions. K said Lodge did make your speech finally and of course there was no occasion for rebuttal and K said he thought it was a good thing to have it done. P said especially since they are going to get message from Saintenny (?). K said if we can keep agencies from leaking and giving away all capital we have earned we might still make it. P asked about number of casualties and asked if they were down. K said about 150. P said not enough and then asked about summer offensive. K said he didn't know anything about it but said they are going to get into a box. K said P has positioned himself now very well as moderate. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. -2- P said too moderate. K said as long as we know where we are heading, it is okay to be moderate. As long as we don't push Saigon off the brink. P said the visit will help a lot. P said he was glad that Mansfield was pleased. K said Mansfield wanted to make sure that K expressed that personally and immediately to P. K said Mansfield said that is exactly the right attitude to have. K said he talked to Mathias and he thinks with the Stennis letter we will get him.. President said really! ! K said he got the impression that Mathias came in aching to get off the hook. K said Mathias wanted to know difference between sentinnel and safeguard. Mathias said he opposed sentinnel and now wondered how he could support safeguard. K said he explained the differences and K said he didn't want to be optimistic but he thinks we may get to him. P said we have to move. We are not going to compromise. P said we are going to use Stennis letter only if we get votes out of it. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Ambassador Green Mr. Kissinger 9:10 a. m., July 19, 1969 HAK said Marshall, they did not get you out of bed did they? G said no, I have been at work for 2 hours. HAK said two things Marshall - (1) I noticed in the digest of State Department reports that Bill told DM yesterday that we were not much in favor of expanding Vietnamese military security forces. The President when he talked to Thieu at Midway certainly talked as if that was not excluded. In fact, if Thieu came away with the impression that we would help, he would not be stretching realities. HAK said, secondly, on this nerve gas business - Laird called yesterday and he feels very strongly that we should not do anything precipitous. What he is willing to go along with is that we say on Monday that orders have been given to move this gas as soon as alternative storage has been constructed elsewhere. G said I think that is alright. That is about half-way between position A and position B in my letter. HAK said but Laird thinks it will take about a year to get this done. HAK said my own position would be to nail him to the idea of this first. If we start arguing now whether they can do it in six months we may run into problems. G said can't we speed that up. One way I was thinking we could stay out of Okinawa indefinitely. HAK said I think we should say on Monday that this equipment was (1) put there in 1963 and 1964 and (2) this Administration had ordered a complete review of chemical and biological warfare equipment and (3) this was part of the review and will be moved as soon as alternative storage is available. G said we will certainly buy that. HAK said this is what I will present to the President. G said my point is one of the catalysts would be to draft a wire to Tokyo telling them to inform the Japanese this is what we will do. HAK said after I talk to Laird, I am going to suggest to the President that you will draft a cable to Japan. G said this is one of those issues where it is best to start out as critical issues of the government. HAK said your judgment is like mine. We can't possibly keep that stuff there now. G said that is right - I realize getting it out is difficult. What I will do is draft something and then just wait to hear from you. HAK said that is fine. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Ambassador Green (contd) -2- G said did you get my letter on ADB? HAK said yes but I don't know how we will do it. G said the point is to make that bow. I am worried about these Philippine newsmen's pundits. Anything we can do to focus on something positive would be good. HAK asked if the Secretary was going there. G said yes. G said if the President could somehow see Watanabi it would be a good idea. HAK said if there was a function there that we could be sure Watanabi is invited to - if you can get Watanabi within reach of the President, I will undertake to get the President to Watanabi. G said I will go out with a personal wire and see if Watanabi will be there. HAK said one final thing on these private talks - what is your idea of how they will be continued in the next two weeks. G said I think we have an opening. The order of questions was very interesting. I have not talked to Bill but I think Lodge will be coming in with re- commendations. HAK said I don't think he should have said we are willing to shorten the period of the pullout. I don't mind shortening it after the twelfth month but if they steamroller us out, the whole thing might collapse. Twelve months is not an unreasonable period to get 500, 000 men out of the country. HAK said we don't want to collapse the whole thing by the speed of our withdrawal. G said I think the withdrawal is a measured one. I would hope that our next announcement would be sooner than we thought. HAK said there is a chance of doing it the middle of August. mlh Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Bryce Harlow 9:25 a. m., 7-19-69 H said I am calling to check on your meeting with Mathias. HAK said I devoted an hour of my time to him. H said which way did he choose? HAK said "he said I will be the man I am". HAK said I had the impression he will go along with the Stennis thing. HAK said Mathias said what compromise can you make. HAK said we cannot make any. HAK said I am not authorized to give you any hint and if you say I did, I will disavow it but if you say no missiles will be deployed next year that will be consistent with the national interest. HAK said Mathias said that is all I want. HAK asked H if he had done it wrong. H said you did it just right. You almost converted him into a guided missile. HAK said I had the impression he was looking for a way out. He certainly was agonizing. He ran through questions on what do the Allies think. HAK told H I said they are totally confused - I am telling you it is right and that if you were the President you would do nothing else. HAK said then we went then we went through: will it work - and I gave him all the arguments there; and that Soviets cannot know whether it will work or not. He was really looking for confirmation. H said OK, I was just taking a test. mlh Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Secretary Packard Mr. Kissinger 9:35 a. m., 7-19-69 HAK said on that nerve gas business, I hope you are promoting the General that decided to paint those things. I wonder if he went through the National War College? I think that this thing is kniding going to build. P said we got together yesterday and we are preparing a program that includes the fact that this gas is going to be removed. We want to do this. If you have any other ideas, I would like to have them. HAK said I was going to call the President on this and I wondered if the following would be agreeable to you. If said (1) that this gas was moved there in 1963 and 1964, (2) this Administration had ordered a full NSC of this whole range of problems and (3) the Administration had decided to move this equipment from Okinawa as soon as other storage facilities can be built and in accordance with Scientific Adviser's recommendations, as to safe disposal. Would that be agreeable with you? P said Dan Henkin was supposed to have something on that this morning. Why don't I find out about it and call you back? K said would you do that? mlh Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON John Whitaker Mr. Kissinger 10:00 a. m., 7-19-69 W said in Bangkok when the President meets with Vargas the President will be in his residence. W said the advance man has asked if the President should come downstairs and meet Vargas. W said here is what I favor - Vargas comes into the room and we allow a photograph opportunity. Question is whether President should come downstairs to meet Vargas. W said if he comes down, it opens him to press conference. W said I favor having Vargas go up to the residence and allowing a photo opportunity. W asked HAK if he thought Vargas would be offended. HAK said no, I will meet him downstairs and go up with him. W said OK. HAK said President had agreed we should have a reception at Andrews and at 10:00 a. m. W said yes, but Dwight still thinks that is going to cancel. W said, however, that he would write the scenario that way. HAK said, actually that way he would get two shots. Anyway, he is willing to leave at 3:30. mlh Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Ambassador Sullivan Mr. Kissinger 10:07 a. m., 7-19-69 HAK said, hello Bill, how are you? Since my initial call to you I have talked to Marshall about my problem. S said, yes, he talked to me about the phone conversation you had. HAK said - one point is that I don't think we should give too quickly on that 12 month with- drawal thing. I don't think that should them SO much as to withdraw afterward. We should not give that away too quickly. And the other question was the working group thing. S said Phil Habib talked to me on the phone yesterday about that. Ed Walsh was down here yesterday on these things and Lodge's intention is to put Phil in charge of that. It could cause some jurisdictional problem. I think Phil would be better man to do it. HAK said I do too. S said I am not too sure what real interest Ed may have in doing it. HAK said do you mean that you think they are willing to move toward Paris talks. S said yes but I don't think we should believe that any desire for talks means anything significant on their part. The one thing Phil said was that they would be sending in some recommenda- tions today and would involve the idea of a second meeting some time next week. This will involve a turnaround with Ellsworth and (?). The other interesting thing that I discussed with him was that I was fascinated by the order of the 12 points in which he put ceasefire so high - whether it is chronological thing or whether things are highest in his mind at the moment. That is a bit of a reverse since last discussion with us. I don't know whether that is significant or not. HAK said we could try to suggest another order and see if they put it back in. S said I would assume the order is their proposed agenda. S said I will be in touch with you Monday about what the recommendations are. HAK said I think we should have a talk before we all scatter. Why don't we aim for a talk on Monday morning. S said, good, I will see you. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Secretary Packard Mr. Kissinger 10:20 a. m., 7-19-69 HAK asked Secy Packard if he had had a chance to look at gas thing. P said we are right in the middle of looking at this thing now. HAK said I don't need the statement now but I want to know if you agree in principle. P said let me tell you some of the problems. (P read proposed statement). P said as far as the operating situation, we would not have any problem in implementing a program in accordance with the statement but it raises a lot of questions. For example, how many tons do we have in Okinawa? Where are you going to take the stuff and there we do not have an answer. Where else do you have nerve gas positioned. P said we have not faced up to how much information we will give out. How much is stored overseas? HAK said wherever we have it we have it with the approval of the government. I would avoid saying these things. P said we would like to but the press is very pressing on these things. Our people think we should stand where we are and not come out with a statement of any kind. We are going to go ahead and implement a program in due course. P said it is just a question of whether we make a public statement or sit tight on the thing. It is a public relations problem now. HAK said they will probably want to say something in Japan. P said I think so too. P said I have reviewed this carefully this morning and I would be inclined to say we should make a statement along this line but the questions will be tough. If you make a statement like this, you lead into a whole lot of statements. HAK said maybe you should not make a statement but permit State Department to inform Japanese and let it leak out that way. P said let me try that one out (went off the line to talk to his people in office). P said we have given the statement to the State Department which authorizes them to notify Japanese Government that we have gas there and that it is not lethal in its bulk quantities but not to say anything about removal. HAK said my problem is that I should say to the President that it is your position that you are opposed to such a statement. P said after looking at all possible problems, we think such a statement would open up SO many questions we believe on balance we should not make such a statement. HAK said how much anguish would it cause you if we notify the Japanese along the lines of the statement? P said we essentially agreed with what they recommended, that there is lethal gas there but not to say anything about removal. I think we should be careful and not say anything until we see how far we have to go. mlh Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Secy Laird Mr. Kissinger 7-21-69 12:55 PM L said there are a couple of things he should discuss with President before he leaves. One, possible change of orders. L said we have some language. K said Pres wants to see Wheeler and should not see him alone in any event. K will make it a joint meeting. L said o. k. but he should see Pres before he sees Wheeler. There are a few changes to be made and Pres should understand those before he runs into them cold. K said it will certainly be arranged - only question is when. L a sked when Pres would be seeing Wheeler and K said it would not be before tomorrow afternoon. L said he should talk to Pres before he sees Wheeler or go over it with K so he understands it. L said maybe K does not want to make those changes yet. K said he is seeing Pres at 3:00 on internal business and will take matter up re Laird being in on Wheeler meeting and also find out if Pres wants L to see K. L said the next thing he wanted to discuss is mining problem. L said he did not think it was imminent but asked if K would like to take the contingency plans with him. K said he should look at them. L said he had two copies and would send one over to K this after- noon and hold the bther copy. L said last problem is manner in which we respond as far as gas problem. K said he tried to reach L on Saturday and when he could not talked with Packard. L said he did not understand why he could not be reached - he, Mitchell and Rogers played golf at 9:00 AM. His office knew where he was but the WH kept calling his home/ L went on to say he thought it would present some problem particularly if we put it on the back of Dubridge. L said the wire to Japan indicates this, according to procedures laid out by the Science Adviser. L read K an AP story. L said he thinks we should try to keep the President out of it as much as we can and L thinks we put Presiden t in it by using President's scientific adviser. K said he agrees. L said Defense should take the rap for it rather than the White House. K and L agreed to meet for breakfast tomorrow morning at the Pentagon ab at 7:30 in order to discuss various things. L also brought up rebuilding of Situation Room - first request was for 2, 340, 000 and another request for 2, 461, 000. L said on these WH requests, Senators have asked for personael limits. L said they do have to give transfers used out of Defense Budget and there is request for 36 more personnel spaces. L said he thought he and K should Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. -2- go over this and K asked he if he would like to do it at breakfast in the mornin g. L said he supposed money would have to be transferred soon on computerized communications equipment. K said they should look it over. L said he would get contingency plans to K later on this afternoon and also send over a memo on VN thing so K would have in advance of their breakfast. K said he would let L know about meeting with Wheeler and L asked if it could be as late as possible - he has problems before 4:00 and would have to know today if meeting is scheduled before then. K said we would try to let L know before the end of the day. jm Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telecon Jose Sisco 2:55 p.m. 7/21/69 S called to say he was transmitting an information memo for HAK, the President and the Secretary, summarizing the whole Moscow talk business and where he tought we stood. He thought K might like to take it on the trip just to read. K said from the cables it went rather well. S said it came out just as he thought it woud. The ball is in their court and we have to stay cool. K thought the Russians were very businesslike. He asked if Dobrynin was there. S said no, he was in a hastip hospital somewhere so he sent him XX a note wishing him a speedy recovery. K complimented S on the Moscow proposals. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telecon The President 3:00 p.m. 7/21/69 The President called on the matter of Senatorial support for Thieu's statement. He thought that if 75 or 80 senators would come out jointly, it would help tremendously. K said he would call Harlow right away. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Mr. Elliot Richardson Mr. Kissinger 7-21-69 5:10 PM K said he was calling about Verification Panel scheduled for tomorrow. K does not anticipate that it will be a very long meeting but K said he did not think R had worked with this intelligence stuff as much as he had. One of problems K has had is he has never gone into it without finding extraordinary ambiguities. K said Pres asked him to chair this panel and in K's absence he wondered if R C ould keep a benevolent eye on the operation - or a rigorous eye. R said he would be glad to. K said he does not think the President can be asked to make a decision on basis of "you must take a chance for peace, 11 etc. K said he thinks we should tell him what an intelligent evader would do and then let him decide. K said also, what you can do with the information politically if you get some. K cited example of someone coming in today re upgrading of some of our air defense for missile defense with very minor changes. K said if you dex can do it on our side you have to assume same may be possible on the other. K said his recommendation tomorrow is going to be that we get a working group together to make a report in a week or so of what the state of our intelligence is, what the manueuvering ? capabilities are with respect to major elements of retaliatory forces, and thexax then, with particular reference to MIRV and AMX ABM, what verification capabilities are and where the disagreements are. R said he also thinks we should be sure that there are not any devices for dealing with - in MIRV question particularly - are there techniques without opening up the warhead that could tell us what is in there. K asked R what he would think of Larry Lynn chairing the working group for K's staff. R said he did not know him well but think highly of him from what he has heard of him and it's O. k. with him. K said in his absence, he would ask Larry to deal with R as chairman. R said he takes it that the evolution of this is such that Gerry should not be chairman. K said right - besides Pres has put into NSC in such a way. K and R discussed Smith and K said he gathered R had had a word with him. K said Pres was more forthcoming that he would ever have been otherwise. at their meeting today. R referred to Israeli thing and whether XX he and Packard should do anything along the lines of their previous conversation, K said he has Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. -2- - tentative decision but it is sort of thing he wants Pres to be sure about SO would like to see him again about it. K said he thinks they should certainly do step one while we are gone but he does n ot think Pres is prepared to authorize step two right away. K said he would get word to R on this tomorrow morning. jm Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Gov Rockefeller Mr. Kissinger 7-22-69 12:25 PM R said he just wanted to touch base with K before his departure. K said he is looking forward to receiving R's report. R said he will have some more of those individual memos for K and asked whether he should send them in K's absence. K said yes, they can be staffed during his absence. R said on the indivual country reports, he is sure Pres does not want to take anything like that on his trip. R will just have them in California for him when he is there. R asked if K had gotten any reaction on participation in Caribbean Regional Bank conference. K said no - he would look into it. R said the meeting is today and all that is needed is just statement at the meeting that the US will give consideration to participation. R said George Woods is one who stopped it but he has now changed his mind. R said it is absolutely sound. R said he did not know if we had a representative at that meeting today or not. K said he would look into it immediately. K said he would not break his back on the report - what we are shooting for is early October for Presidential speech; put before NSC early September. K brought up FIAB matter and asked if R wanted K to tell Taylor R wanted some staff person to be cleared for that. R asked whether anyone else had assistants and K said no. K said the asst may have to come down here to review papers. R said Nancy would be tremendous if she would consider it. K said he might tell Taylor to start clearing her so that there will be no time lag XSXX if she decides to do it. R asked when K was returning and K said no later than the fifth - then will go to Calif with the President on the 9th or 10th. K said Haig will always know where to get him if R wants him. jm Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON The Vice President Mr. Kissinger. 7-22-69 2:40 PM K said President returned to him the memo VP wrote about peace activists some days ago. VP said only point he wanted to get over was this thought about possible effect on morale of other POWs. K said that is sentence the Pres underlined and said he agreed completely and VP should raise directly with Rogers and Laird. VP said he would do so. K said he could tell them he is not speaking alone on this. VP said he would follow through on it. jm Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Gerard Smith Mr. Kissinger 7-22-69 2:55 PM S said he has letter from K's principal and asked if K could give him any guidance on to whom he could show it - whether copies had been send to anyone. K said copies were not sent to anyone. K said he txx thought it could certainly be shown to the Secretary and the Under Secretary of State. S asked about other members of the SALT, as well as Packard, Laird and Wheeler. S said letter is very illuminating and would help them in approaching their problems if they had a copy. K said he would check with the President, K asked S what he thought of it and S said it was first-rate - he is delighted. K said he would check with President and let S know by end of day what circulation could be given to it. K said he hopes S feels we have not treated him too badly and S said no, it is responsive to his concerns. jm Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Prof Milton Katz Mr. Kissinger 7-22-69 4:05 PM K said he just wanted to tell Katz he would love to get together with him some- time and wished Katz would take the initiative - one day is as bad as another for K. K said he has nothing in particular to talk about but misses talking to Katz in general. Katz asked when K expected to be back - K said Aug 4 or 5. Katz said he would be in Cambridge the first part of Aug and if K wants to see him, to call. Otherwise, they agreed to get together in September. jm Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON Dr. Dirge Mr. Kissinger 7-22-69 4:15 PM xxxxxxxxxx questions K said he has gone ofer *********** and has a few changes. In #7B, K suggested leaving out hea vy bombing and focus on blockade side - something to effect "as last ***** resort selective bombing.' " On 10B, K asked if that was necessary - D csaid it can come out but helps in sense that we compare xxx the reaction of this with A thru H. K suggested adding "If necessary against the siwix wishes of the existing Government." K said only other problem he has is first part of 14. First question Xxxxxxxixogx "accept a coalition govt including communists against the wishes" K said or if D wanted to say "impose a coalition govt including Communists. 11 D said he would ask the second part only if they got no opinion. K said he understood that. K said questions are dam good and very helpful - very pleased with them. D said they will get out and have report to K by Aug 15 at latest - perhaps sooner. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. TELCON David Nevin Mr. Kissinger 7-22-69 4:35 PM K said the quotes are o.k. and that he appreciated the way N was handling everything. N said the story will be out the end of Aug or the beginning of September. N said they have a space problem at LIFE and the story is not as long as N had hoped but he is happy with the way it reads in general. N said the pictures also look great and will send copies to K soon. N said when he comes to Washington gain, he will come in to call on K. K said he would like that. jm Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified. Telecon Minister Tompkins (British Embassy) 5:20 p.m. 7/22/69 K said he wanted to mention the agenda at Mildenhall. You have an intensive discussion of SALT, MIRV AND ABM. This was scheduled as a courtesy visit. I am not saying it is discourteous to discuss these things. It is just that it is the end of a long and exhausting trip for the President He appreciated the Prime Minister coming there. We would like to tell you about our impressions of the trip and handle SALT some other way. Tompkins said between you and me, what has happend is that after our (W U.S.) presentation in Brussels, they realize that there are certain problems implied which they have not faced clearly before. K said it is hard to come to decisions in bne hour. The President will have had a three-hour time change and it will be a long day for him. I wonder if this is the best occasion. Tompkins said he didn't think the Prime Minister wanted any decisions reached. He wanted to tell the President of the concerns he had so he will be aware firsthand before decisions are taken. K said the two principles know and respect each other. If we could make this a low key session in which each side is free to express concerns. This was a personal communication and would not be for publication. Tompkins understood. Tompkins also understood that the President didn't want any sendoff at Andrews because of the flexible depakma departure. Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library DECLASSIFIED This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.

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    "ocrText": "TELCON\nThe President\nMr. Kissinger\n7-18-69\n12:30 PM\nK said he was gx calling about Chinese thing and would be useful if\nwe could announce tomorrow. E Richardson has now recommended three\nthings - tourist purchases, easing travel restrictions for certain categories\nand grain sales. K said he has checked with Mundt who agrees to first\ntwo but not third. Pres said first two were o.k. but not the third.\nPres said he wanted K to call Mansfield personally on that. K said he would\ndo so.\nK said secondly, a private meeting took pl ace today which indicated that\nperhaps the last private meeting of six weeks ago may have been a response\nto note to Dobrynin as K suspected it might have been. They were very\nspecific and asked 12 questions about P's speech of May 14. K told P the\nquestions. K said he has taxx talked to some people and mood in Congress\nhas shifted very much in favor of P. P and K discussed Rogers' appearance\non hill. K said he talked to someone who accompanied Rogers and\nthey were surposed by degree to which FAC took position in P's favor.\nP said theyx work it could be they have gone too far. K said they propse\nestablishment of working group and what we will have to watch now is\nto make sure State will not run with this enterprise. K said message\nP sent this week was very well timed. P asked if he would deliver it Monday\nand K said he told him he would call him tonight to let him know whether\nhe could go ahead.\nP said in K's backgrounder if question comes up, be sure to say we have been\ndisappointed in Russians insofar as ME and VN are concerned. K filled\nPresident in on Borman-Keldish exchange.\nPres asked if Shakespeare called on K. K said not yet, he will see him this\nafternoon. P filled in K on what Shakespeare had told him. Discussed\nABM and K said it may be that opponents of ABM are getting worried.\nMathias called for appt with K and is coming in today - said he had to see\nhim today. P said he heard Jackson was superb in private session -\ndemoralized Symington. P and K agreed Senators are getting scared\nafter hearing intelligence briefgins. Opponents have shifted line on SS9.\nP said he thinks intelligence community is shaping up - K agreed, saying\nwe have them scared. K said both IN he and Mitchell have refused to go\nover drafts - we do not want them to accept our dictates.\nP said for K to call Mansfield and say Pres personally asked him to call and\nsay wwhen we return P will fill M in on conversation with Yaya.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-2-\nP and K discussed China thing again and P said to go along on first two\nbut not the wheat. Tell Richardson this would pose Congressional problems.\nK said R will go along with whatever P decides.\nP and K discussed trip. K said he talked to Romanian Amb and Sunday\nmorning program is now locked in. P said in K's backgrounder\none thing that P expects to say in his if asked about one-day visit\nand whether it means anything. P said his answer is and has been for\nyears - you learn as much in one day as you do in one month. Ohly if\nyou are going to stay a year, do you learn more than you do in one day.\nK might point out that P has been to all these countries and most important\nthing is serious substantive talks. Another thing the P has knocked off\nis time spent with American Community - have to be priorities.\nAmerican side will be done by SecState and others. Most important\nthing is face-to-face talk to leaders. K brought up P's arrival back\nhere - everyone thinks should be 10:00 at Andrews. P agreed.\nK said he is tentatively planning subject to P's approval to meet with some\nintellectuals in P's name. This would be done in order to conserve Presidents\ntime and energy. P agreed. P said finally, re VN they have now come in\nwith plan to visit three different military units within 10 minutes of palace -\nin same base area and security is adequate. P said fine, let's do it.\nP asked how long and K said 1 and 1/2 hrs. P asked about announcement\nand K said we will not announce it at all. P and K talked about thexnesse\nwhat themes of trip should be\njm\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nThe President\n5:45\np.m\n7/18/69\nThe President was asking about the press briefing. K said he mentioned\nall the things they discusseed. K said there were about 200 people there\nand it was held in the East Room. The President asked if there were\nany questions regarding Soviet security in\n?\no\nThey asked if\nwe were going to try to prevent that. K told them we were/going not to\nparticipate in that. The Pres. suggested we might get into the idea\ntoxxxxx of developing policies now for so we don't get bogged down in\nanother Vietnam. In every one of these countries, there is the\npotential. K thought that was a very effective point.\nK told Richardson to proceed and now but there was word that the\nChinese may have captured an American yacht. K thought we should\nwait until we have determined the status of this. The President thought\nwe might put it out anyway since the yacht story hadn't hit the papers\nyet. We would come out with ours first.\nThe P wanted to know if K had talked to Mansfield about this. K wanted\nto wait also until the yacht status was cleared. The P thought K should\nexplain it to Mansfield.\nK mentioned his meeting with Mitchell. p The P wanted to know how he\nfelt about the reaction to Dobrynin move. K said State got hung up.\nWhen K read the telephone report, they still asked for colition government\nand unconditional withdrawal. K said they have asked us certain questions\nthat they would have to akk if they wanted to settle. It is more precise\nthan anything they have asked befodre.\nThe President was happy with what Rogers said on Hanoi. It was the\nfiarst time he has said anything hard. He liked K's point that some of\nthese Senators may begin to realize that the other side is being\nintransigent. We have to look and talk very peaceful. K said to them,\nyou (the P) is a terribly frustrating phenomen; they can't set you up.\nThe P has stayed ahead of the public opinion curve. The people are\nnow being more rdasonable, they can't think of things anymore that we\nshould be doing that we are not doing.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 2 -\nK told him of his visit with Katzenbach today. Even Katz. couldn't\nthink of anything more we should be doing.\nOn the tripp books, the P said he wasn't going to go into them as\nmuch as he did in Europe since he will only be spending a very short\ntime in each place. K suggested that if he reads the cover memo\nthat should be sufficient. If he wants anymore information, the\nbackup will be there.\nThe President asked if K thought the Soviets were really reaching\nfor something. K said they may not know what to do, in fairness,\nwith Hanoi. They can't get caught up in it. The P said he thought\nthey needed good relations with us this time. We have done enought\nto give them a good reason and they haven't kicked us around. They\nhaven't even said anything unkind. K said they want good relations\nwith us for the appearance. P agreed saying the appearances to help\nthem with their other enemies. K said they want to keep things\nquite so they can concentrate on isolating China. It would be in our\ninterest so long as we don't do it together with them. The P said\nby the time we get through with this trip, they are going to be out\nof their minds, that we are playing a Chinese game.\nThe President mentioned again for K to call Mansfield\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nSenator Mansfield\nMr. Kissinger\n7-18-69\n5:45 PM\nK said Pres wanted him to call M about some of the moves we are\nthinking of making toward Communist China in next day or ****X two.\nK said we would have made them today but some problem about ship\nthey may have picked up. K said measures themselves are not\nof spectacular significance but we are looking for things we can do\nunilaterally which they cannot reject. K said we are lifting\ntourist purchases of Communist chinese goods, lifting travel restrictions\nfor specified groups (journalists, students, etc), and we will tell them\nwe would be glad to give visas to similar category of people.\nK said Pres was eager for M to know this. K said it is signal to them\nof our intention and there are a number of other things in the works which\nwe will develop during the course of the year - inching toward a different\nrelationship but not giving them a chance to blast us. K said he did\nnot know if M agreed with this approach. M said he does. M said\nyou are removing second boycott what about first boycott. M said\nthere is also unilaterial boycot against trade with China - maybe that\nis later move. K said for M's personal info, this is move that will be\nmade before too much time is out. M said he has not heard a thing.\nM said he is delighted - good first move\njm\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nIndian Ambassador\n6:35 p.m.\n7/18/69\nThe Ambassador said he was informed by Roscosa of the talk\nyou(K) had. Both he and I sent a telegram. It is now ok about\nthe State visit part. I will be back tomorrow and I will get\nmore details when I return. A copy of the telegram was sent\nto Washington. Roscosa will let you know too.\nK thought it was a good idea to deal here rather than theough\nthe advance man. The Amb said he was able to press it and\ndiscussed it with Foreign Minister.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nCmdr. Larson\nMr. Kissinger\n7/18/69, 6:55 p.m.\nK called for the President and L said he was eating. K said not to\nbother him. L said he delivered all the briefing books to the President\nand the three messages -- Vietnam developments, etc. K said fine,\nand just tell the President that I have an answer for him on the two\nproblems they discussed. K said none of them were urgent and just\ntell the President I called. K said he would be in his office all evening.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nPresident\nMr. Kissinger\n7-18-69 7:25 PM\nK said he has talked to Mansfield and he is delighted and asked K to\ntell Pres personally how much he appreciates policy P is following.\nP asked if K had told him about boat and fact P has said the hell with\nit. K said he had and Mansfield agreed. K said now it will have to\ngo until Monday.\nK aaid PM Sato sent personal representative to see K with message\nfor P on Okinawa question. In effect if P would be willing to use that\nsort of channel on big policy issues involved and keep technical\nissues in diplomatic channel. K said in other words he would come\nwith proposition which goes beyond what P has already approved -\nwould like to come to understanding with P in principle first. K said\nif P is willing to do this, he will keep man here until Monday. P said\nlets try to get it done and not fool around with State Dept . K said\nthen with P's permission he will keep the man here until he has a\nchance to present to P on Monday.\nK said he has Mathias with him and he may switch omer to us on ABM.\nP said he could not believe it - keep after him. P said if he could\nmove that could have a dramatic effect - let him be a hero. P said K\nis authorized to tell himwe will work out whatever he wants. K said\nhe would let P know if it turns out favorably.\njm\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nSecretary Laird\n8:00 p.m.\n7/18/69\nK apologized for not getting back to L sooner but said that he was doing his\nwork for him. He just was talking to Mathias and he might come over. K\nsaid he had to promise him an ABM site in his state.\nK asked what L was going to do on the guy who put the hdle in the canisters?\nLaidd said that was why he was calling. L said, as K probably knows, there\nis alot of sentiment that the DOD should announce where we have gas stored.\nK didn't think there was any advantage in that. Laird agreed but he wanted\nto inform K that he had taken the position that until we had completed the\nstudy, we shouldn't announce anything. K wanted to know if we should\nstore the gas in Okinawa. L said we could put in on Guam. It was a mistake\nto put it on Ok in the first place. K mentioned that it was McNamara's\nmove. Laird said if we put it on Guam W there would be a military\nrequirement of construction for storage facilities which will take some time.\nWe could also dump it in the ocean but the National Academy of Scientists\nobject to that. We could burn it, but that would cost a million to build the\nfacilities. K said we shoudl consider an announcement along the lines that\nit will be removed from Oki as soonas alternative storage facilities have\nbeen constructed elsewhere. L said it would take at least a year and that\nthey would have to go to Congress for the money. K asked if L minded if\nhe took this up with the President. L said no. L said for now we are saying\nthat we prefer not to comment. If they push, we can say hxx who put it there.\nThe JC feels they need storage some place because of the quantity that is in\nthe hands of the Soviets. They both agreed to wait until Monday to do anything.\nL said State wanted to put something out xxxing today. K said that was\npanicking. He said the President appreciated aklxek L's careful and\nmaticulous way in which he checked out everything.\nK said he would mention this to the President tomorrow.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nThe President\nMr. Kissinger\n7/18/69, 10:15 p.m.\nP asked what happened to that Biafra thing. K said it was supposed\nto have been released this morning and that he approved the release.\nP said it is a very important release and he wanted to be sure they\nunderstood that we are shifting from State, and writing letters to\nboth parties. K said re P's question of how letter was delivered to\nBiafra, it was delivered to the President of the Ivory Coast. K said\nwe announced that letters were sent to both parties. P said tell\nHarlow that he oughtto call Buzz and Goodell (?) telling them we are\ndoing this. K said he would make sure that they got all of this\ninformation. P said tell Flanigan to get to the Pope and a few other\npeople. K said we have included a letter to the Pope informing him\nof some of these actions. The President said if it comes up tomorrow,\ntell them Haile Selassie urged him to do this when he was here. P\nsaid Selassie said this is the time for American intervention. P said\nwe have to use everything we have to get this over with and asked K\nif he agreed. K said these tribal hatreds run so deep. It is the same\nas Chinese for Southeast Asians. K said the trouble is that Nigeria\ncan't win but whether they are ready to settle is a real question.\nP said we have to do more than State does. P said\nwe have to stop all support of Nigerian Government. P said it won't\nwork they can't win. P said we have to talk cold turkey to Wilson.\nK said that it is important and then he would see Pompidou. P said\nthat's what I think we should do. Pompidou should step up support\nfor Biafra. P said he would run herd on Wilson and tell Palmer to\nkeep his mouth shut.\nK said the Indian Ambassador called to say he had a message from\nDelhi assuring us it is going to be very warm welcome. P said good.\nK said he has read transcript of private talk and he thinks our boys\nwere a little optimistic. They asked a number of serious questions.\nK said Lodge did make your speech finally and of course there was no\noccasion for rebuttal and K said he thought it was a good thing to have\nit done. P said especially since they are going to get message from\nSaintenny (?). K said if we can keep agencies from leaking and giving\naway all capital we have earned we might still make it.\nP asked about number of casualties and asked if they were down. K\nsaid about 150. P said not enough and then asked about summer offensive.\nK said he didn't know anything about it but said they are going to get into\na box. K said P has positioned himself now very well as moderate.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-2-\nP said too moderate. K said as long as we know where we are heading,\nit is okay to be moderate. As long as we don't push Saigon off the brink.\nP said the visit will help a lot.\nP said he was glad that Mansfield was pleased. K said Mansfield wanted\nto make sure that K expressed that personally and immediately to P. K\nsaid Mansfield said that is exactly the right attitude to have.\nK said he talked to Mathias and he thinks with the Stennis letter we will\nget him.. President said really! ! K said he got the impression that\nMathias came in aching to get off the hook. K said Mathias wanted to\nknow difference between sentinnel and safeguard. Mathias said he\nopposed sentinnel and now wondered how he could support safeguard.\nK said he explained the differences and K said he didn't want to be\noptimistic but he thinks we may get to him. P said we have to move.\nWe are not going to compromise. P said we are going to use Stennis\nletter only if we get votes out of it.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nAmbassador Green\nMr. Kissinger\n9:10 a. m., July 19, 1969\nHAK said Marshall, they did not get you out of bed did they? G\nsaid no, I have been at work for 2 hours.\nHAK said two things Marshall - (1) I noticed in the digest of State\nDepartment reports that Bill told DM yesterday that we were not\nmuch in favor of expanding Vietnamese military security forces.\nThe President when he talked to Thieu at Midway certainly talked\nas if that was not excluded. In fact, if Thieu came away with the\nimpression that we would help, he would not be stretching realities.\nHAK said, secondly, on this nerve gas business - Laird called\nyesterday and he feels very strongly that we should not do anything\nprecipitous. What he is willing to go along with is that we say on\nMonday that orders have been given to move this gas as soon as\nalternative storage has been constructed elsewhere.\nG said I think that is alright. That is about half-way between\nposition A and position B in my letter. HAK said but Laird thinks\nit will take about a year to get this done. HAK said my own position\nwould be to nail him to the idea of this first. If we start arguing\nnow whether they can do it in six months we may run into problems.\nG said can't we speed that up. One way I was thinking we could stay\nout of Okinawa indefinitely.\nHAK said I think we should say on Monday that this equipment was (1)\nput there in 1963 and 1964 and (2) this Administration had ordered\na complete review of chemical and biological warfare equipment and\n(3) this was part of the review and will be moved as soon as alternative\nstorage is available. G said we will certainly buy that. HAK said\nthis is what I will present to the President. G said my point is one\nof the catalysts would be to draft a wire to Tokyo telling them to\ninform the Japanese this is what we will do. HAK said after I talk\nto Laird, I am going to suggest to the President that you will draft a\ncable to Japan. G said this is one of those issues where it is best\nto start out as critical issues of the government. HAK said your\njudgment is like mine. We can't possibly keep that stuff there now.\nG said that is right - I realize getting it out is difficult. What I will\ndo is draft something and then just wait to hear from you. HAK said\nthat is fine.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nAmbassador Green (contd)\n-2-\nG said did you get my letter on ADB? HAK said yes but I don't know\nhow we will do it. G said the point is to make that bow. I am worried\nabout these Philippine newsmen's pundits. Anything we can do to\nfocus on something positive would be good. HAK asked if the\nSecretary was going there. G said yes. G said if the President\ncould somehow see Watanabi it would be a good idea. HAK said\nif there was a function there that we could be sure Watanabi is\ninvited to - if you can get Watanabi within reach of the President,\nI will undertake to get the President to Watanabi. G said I will go\nout with a personal wire and see if Watanabi will be there.\nHAK said one final thing on these private talks - what is your idea\nof how they will be continued in the next two weeks. G said I think\nwe have an opening. The order of questions was very interesting.\nI have not talked to Bill but I think Lodge will be coming in with re-\ncommendations. HAK said I don't think he should have said we are\nwilling to shorten the period of the pullout. I don't mind shortening\nit after the twelfth month but if they steamroller us out, the whole\nthing might collapse. Twelve months is not an unreasonable period\nto get 500, 000 men out of the country. HAK said we don't want to\ncollapse the whole thing by the speed of our withdrawal. G said I\nthink the withdrawal is a measured one. I would hope that our\nnext announcement would be sooner than we thought. HAK said\nthere is a chance of doing it the middle of August.\nmlh\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nBryce Harlow\n9:25 a. m., 7-19-69\nH said I am calling to check on your meeting with Mathias. HAK\nsaid I devoted an hour of my time to him. H said which way did\nhe choose? HAK said \"he said I will be the man I am\". HAK\nsaid I had the impression he will go along with the Stennis thing.\nHAK said Mathias said what compromise can you make. HAK\nsaid we cannot make any. HAK said I am not authorized to give\nyou any hint and if you say I did, I will disavow it but if you say no\nmissiles will be deployed next year that will be consistent with the\nnational interest. HAK said Mathias said that is all I want. HAK\nasked H if he had done it wrong.\nH said you did it just right. You almost converted him into a\nguided missile. HAK said I had the impression he was looking for\na way out. He certainly was agonizing. He ran through questions\non what do the Allies think. HAK told H I said they are totally\nconfused - I am telling you it is right and that if you were the\nPresident you would do nothing else. HAK said then we went then\nwe went through: will it work - and I gave him all the arguments\nthere; and that Soviets cannot know whether it will work or not.\nHe was really looking for confirmation.\nH said OK, I was just taking a test.\nmlh\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nSecretary Packard\nMr. Kissinger\n9:35 a. m., 7-19-69\nHAK said on that nerve gas business, I hope you are promoting\nthe General that decided to paint those things. I wonder if he went\nthrough the National War College? I think that this thing is kniding\ngoing to build.\nP said we got together yesterday and we are preparing a program\nthat includes the fact that this gas is going to be removed. We\nwant to do this. If you have any other ideas, I would like to have\nthem. HAK said I was going to call the President on this and I\nwondered if the following would be agreeable to you. If said (1)\nthat this gas was moved there in 1963 and 1964, (2) this Administration\nhad ordered a full NSC of this whole range of problems and (3) the\nAdministration had decided to move this equipment from Okinawa\nas soon as other storage facilities can be built and in accordance\nwith Scientific Adviser's recommendations, as to safe disposal.\nWould that be agreeable with you?\nP said Dan Henkin was supposed to have something on that this morning.\nWhy don't I find out about it and call you back? K said would you do\nthat?\nmlh\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nJohn Whitaker\nMr. Kissinger\n10:00 a. m., 7-19-69\nW said in Bangkok when the President meets with Vargas the President\nwill be in his residence. W said the advance man has asked if the\nPresident should come downstairs and meet Vargas. W said here is\nwhat I favor - Vargas comes into the room and we allow a photograph\nopportunity. Question is whether President should come downstairs\nto meet Vargas. W said if he comes down, it opens him to press\nconference. W said I favor having Vargas go up to the residence\nand allowing a photo opportunity. W asked HAK if he thought Vargas\nwould be offended. HAK said no, I will meet him downstairs and\ngo up with him.\nW said OK. HAK said President had agreed we should have a reception\nat Andrews and at 10:00 a. m. W said yes, but Dwight still thinks that\nis going to cancel. W said, however, that he would write the scenario\nthat way. HAK said, actually that way he would get two shots. Anyway,\nhe is willing to leave at 3:30.\nmlh\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nAmbassador Sullivan\nMr. Kissinger\n10:07 a. m., 7-19-69\nHAK said, hello Bill, how are you? Since my initial call to you\nI have talked to Marshall about my problem. S said, yes, he talked\nto me about the phone conversation you had. HAK said - one point is\nthat I don't think we should give too quickly on that 12 month with-\ndrawal thing. I don't think that should them SO much as to withdraw\nafterward. We should not give that away too quickly. And the\nother question was the working group thing.\nS said Phil Habib talked to me on the phone yesterday about that.\nEd Walsh was down here yesterday on these things and Lodge's\nintention is to put Phil in charge of that. It could cause some\njurisdictional problem. I think Phil would be better man to do it.\nHAK said I do too. S said I am not too sure what real interest Ed\nmay have in doing it.\nHAK said do you mean that you think they are willing to move toward\nParis talks. S said yes but I don't think we should believe that any\ndesire for talks means anything significant on their part. The one\nthing Phil said was that they would be sending in some recommenda-\ntions today and would involve the idea of a second meeting some time\nnext week. This will involve a turnaround with Ellsworth and (?).\nThe other interesting thing that I discussed with him was that I was\nfascinated by the order of the 12 points in which he put ceasefire so\nhigh - whether it is chronological thing or whether things are highest\nin his mind at the moment. That is a bit of a reverse since last\ndiscussion with us. I don't know whether that is significant or not.\nHAK said we could try to suggest another order and see if they put\nit back in.\nS said I would assume the order is their proposed agenda. S said\nI will be in touch with you Monday about what the recommendations\nare. HAK said I think we should have a talk before we all scatter.\nWhy don't we aim for a talk on Monday morning.\nS said, good, I will see you.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nSecretary Packard\nMr. Kissinger\n10:20 a. m., 7-19-69\nHAK asked Secy Packard if he had had a chance to look at gas\nthing. P said we are right in the middle of looking at this thing\nnow. HAK said I don't need the statement now but I want to know\nif you agree in principle. P said let me tell you some of the\nproblems. (P read proposed statement). P said as far as the\noperating situation, we would not have any problem in implementing\na program in accordance with the statement but it raises a lot of\nquestions. For example, how many tons do we have in Okinawa?\nWhere are you going to take the stuff and there we do not have an\nanswer. Where else do you have nerve gas positioned. P said\nwe have not faced up to how much information we will give out. How\nmuch is stored overseas?\nHAK said wherever we have it we have it with the approval of the\ngovernment. I would avoid saying these things. P said we would\nlike to but the press is very pressing on these things. Our people\nthink we should stand where we are and not come out with a statement\nof any kind. We are going to go ahead and implement a program in\ndue course. P said it is just a question of whether we make a public\nstatement or sit tight on the thing. It is a public relations problem\nnow. HAK said they will probably want to say something in Japan.\nP said I think so too. P said I have reviewed this carefully this\nmorning and I would be inclined to say we should make a statement\nalong this line but the questions will be tough. If you make a statement\nlike this, you lead into a whole lot of statements. HAK said maybe\nyou should not make a statement but permit State Department to\ninform Japanese and let it leak out that way. P said let me try that\none out (went off the line to talk to his people in office). P said we\nhave given the statement to the State Department which authorizes\nthem to notify Japanese Government that we have gas there and that\nit is not lethal in its bulk quantities but not to say anything about removal.\nHAK said my problem is that I should say to the President that it is\nyour position that you are opposed to such a statement. P said after\nlooking at all possible problems, we think such a statement would open\nup SO many questions we believe on balance we should not make such a\nstatement. HAK said how much anguish would it cause you if we notify\nthe Japanese along the lines of the statement? P said we essentially\nagreed with what they recommended, that there is lethal gas there but\nnot to say anything about removal. I think we should be careful and\nnot say anything until we see how far we have to go.\nmlh\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nSecy Laird\nMr. Kissinger\n7-21-69 12:55 PM\nL said there are a couple of things he should discuss with President\nbefore he leaves. One, possible change of orders. L said we have some\nlanguage. K said Pres wants to see Wheeler and should not see him\nalone in any event. K will make it a joint meeting. L said o. k. but\nhe should see Pres before he sees Wheeler. There are a few changes\nto be made and Pres should understand those before he runs into them\ncold. K said it will certainly be arranged - only question is when.\nL a sked when Pres would be seeing Wheeler and K said it would not\nbe before tomorrow afternoon. L said he should talk to Pres before\nhe sees Wheeler or go over it with K so he understands it.\nL said maybe K does not want to make those changes yet. K said\nhe is seeing Pres at 3:00 on internal business and will take matter\nup re Laird being in on Wheeler meeting and also find out if Pres\nwants L to see K.\nL said the next thing he wanted to discuss is mining problem.\nL said he did not think it was imminent but asked if K would like to\ntake the contingency plans with him. K said he should look at them.\nL said he had two copies and would send one over to K this after-\nnoon and hold the bther copy.\nL said last problem is manner in which we respond as far as gas problem.\nK said he tried to reach L on Saturday and when he could not\ntalked with Packard. L said he did not understand why he could not\nbe reached - he, Mitchell and Rogers played golf at 9:00 AM. His\noffice knew where he was but the WH kept calling his home/\nL went on to say he thought it would present some problem particularly\nif we put it on the back of Dubridge. L said the wire to Japan indicates\nthis, according to procedures laid out by the Science Adviser.\nL read K an AP story. L said he thinks we should try to keep the\nPresident out of it as much as we can and L thinks we put Presiden t\nin it by using President's scientific adviser. K said he agrees.\nL said Defense should take the rap for it rather than the White House.\nK and L agreed to meet for breakfast tomorrow morning at the\nPentagon ab at 7:30 in order to discuss various things.\nL also brought up rebuilding of Situation Room - first request was for\n2, 340, 000 and another request for 2, 461, 000. L said on these\nWH requests, Senators have asked for personael limits. L said they\ndo have to give transfers used out of Defense Budget and there is\nrequest for 36 more personnel spaces. L said he thought he and K should\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-2-\ngo over this and K asked he if he would like to do it at breakfast\nin the mornin g. L said he supposed money would have to be\ntransferred soon on computerized communications\nequipment. K said they should look it over. L said he would get\ncontingency plans to K later on this afternoon and also send over\na memo on VN thing so K would have in advance of their breakfast.\nK said he would let L know about meeting with Wheeler and L asked\nif it could be as late as possible - he has problems before 4:00\nand would have to know today if meeting is scheduled before then.\nK said we would try to let L know before the end of the day.\njm\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nJose Sisco\n2:55 p.m.\n7/21/69\nS called to say he was transmitting an information memo for HAK,\nthe President and the Secretary, summarizing the whole Moscow\ntalk business and where he tought we stood. He thought K might\nlike to take it on the trip just to read.\nK said from the cables it went rather well. S said it came out\njust as he thought it woud. The ball is in their court and we have\nto stay cool. K thought the Russians were very businesslike.\nHe asked if Dobrynin was there. S said no, he was in a hastip\nhospital somewhere so he sent him XX a note wishing him a speedy\nrecovery. K complimented S on the Moscow proposals.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nThe President\n3:00 p.m.\n7/21/69\nThe President called on the matter of Senatorial support for\nThieu's statement. He thought that if 75 or 80 senators would\ncome out jointly, it would help tremendously.\nK said he would call Harlow right away.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nMr. Elliot Richardson\nMr. Kissinger\n7-21-69 5:10 PM\nK said he was calling about Verification Panel scheduled for\ntomorrow. K does not anticipate that it will be a very long\nmeeting but K said he did not think R had worked with this intelligence\nstuff as much as he had. One of problems K has had is he has never\ngone into it without finding extraordinary ambiguities. K said\nPres asked him to chair this panel and in K's absence he wondered\nif R C ould keep a benevolent eye on the operation - or a\nrigorous eye. R said he would be glad to. K said he does not think\nthe President can be asked to make a decision on basis of\n\"you must take a chance for peace, 11 etc. K said he thinks we should\ntell him what an intelligent evader would do and then let him decide.\nK said also, what you can do with the information politically if you\nget some. K cited example of someone coming in today re\nupgrading of some of our air defense for missile defense with very\nminor changes. K said if you dex can do it on our side you have to\nassume same may be possible on the other.\nK said his recommendation tomorrow is going to be that we get a working\ngroup together to make a report in a week or so of what\nthe state of our intelligence is, what the manueuvering ? capabilities\nare with respect to major elements of retaliatory forces, and thexax\nthen, with particular reference to MIRV and AMX ABM, what\nverification capabilities are and where the disagreements are.\nR said he also thinks we should be sure that there are not any\ndevices for dealing with - in MIRV question particularly -\nare there techniques without opening up the warhead that could\ntell us what is in there.\nK asked R what he would think of Larry Lynn chairing the working\ngroup for K's staff. R said he did not know him well but think\nhighly of him from what he has heard of him and it's O. k. with him.\nK said in his absence, he would ask Larry to deal with R as\nchairman. R said he takes it that the evolution of this is such that\nGerry should not be chairman. K said right - besides Pres has\nput into NSC in such a way. K and R discussed Smith and K said he\ngathered R had had a word with him. K said Pres was more forthcoming\nthat he would ever have been otherwise. at their meeting today.\nR referred to Israeli thing and whether XX he and Packard should do\nanything along the lines of their previous conversation, K said he has\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n-2- -\ntentative decision but it is sort of thing he wants Pres to be sure\nabout SO would like to see him again about it. K said he thinks\nthey should certainly do step one while we are gone but he does\nn ot think Pres is prepared to authorize step two right away. K said\nhe would get word to R on this tomorrow morning.\njm\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nGov Rockefeller\nMr. Kissinger\n7-22-69\n12:25 PM\nR said he just wanted to touch base with K before his departure. K said\nhe is looking forward to receiving R's report. R said he will have some\nmore of those individual memos for K and asked whether he should send\nthem in K's absence. K said yes, they can be staffed during his absence.\nR said on the indivual country reports, he is sure Pres does not want to\ntake anything like that on his trip. R will just have them in California\nfor him when he is there. R asked if K had gotten any reaction on participation\nin Caribbean Regional Bank conference. K said no - he would look into it.\nR said the meeting is today and all that is needed is just statement at\nthe meeting that the US will give consideration to participation.\nR said George Woods is one who stopped it but he has now changed his mind.\nR said it is absolutely sound. R said he did not know if we had a representative\nat that meeting today or not. K said he would look into it immediately.\nK said he would not break his back on the report - what we are shooting for\nis early October for Presidential speech; put before NSC early September.\nK brought up FIAB matter and asked if R wanted K to tell Taylor R wanted\nsome staff person to be cleared for that. R asked whether anyone else\nhad assistants and K said no. K said the asst may have to come down here to\nreview papers. R said Nancy would be tremendous if she would consider it.\nK said he might tell Taylor to start clearing her so that there will be no time\nlag XSXX if she decides to do it.\nR asked when K was returning and K said no later than the fifth - then\nwill go to Calif with the President on the 9th or 10th. K said Haig will always\nknow where to get him if R wants him.\njm\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nThe Vice President\nMr. Kissinger.\n7-22-69 2:40 PM\nK said President returned to him the memo VP wrote about peace\nactivists some days ago. VP said only point he wanted to get\nover was this thought about possible effect on morale of other POWs.\nK said that is sentence the Pres underlined and said he agreed completely\nand VP should raise directly with Rogers and Laird. VP said he would do\nso. K said he could tell them he is not speaking alone on this. VP\nsaid he would follow through on it.\njm\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nGerard Smith\nMr. Kissinger\n7-22-69 2:55 PM\nS said he has letter from K's principal and asked if K could give him any guidance on\nto whom he could show it - whether copies had been send to anyone. K said\ncopies were not sent to anyone. K said he txx thought it could certainly\nbe shown to the Secretary and the Under Secretary of State. S asked about\nother members of the SALT, as well as Packard, Laird and Wheeler.\nS said letter is very illuminating and would help them in approaching their\nproblems if they had a copy. K said he would check with the President,\nK asked S what he thought of it and S said it was first-rate - he is delighted.\nK said he would check with President and let S know by end of day what\ncirculation could be given to it.\nK said he hopes S feels we have not treated\nhim too badly and S said no, it is responsive to his concerns.\njm\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nProf Milton Katz\nMr. Kissinger\n7-22-69 4:05 PM\nK said he just wanted to tell Katz he would love to get together with him some-\ntime and wished Katz would take the initiative - one day is as bad as another\nfor K. K said he has nothing in particular to talk about but misses talking\nto Katz in general. Katz asked when K expected to be back - K said Aug 4\nor 5. Katz said he would be in Cambridge the first part of Aug and if K\nwants to see him, to call. Otherwise, they agreed to get together in\nSeptember.\njm\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nDr. Dirge\nMr. Kissinger\n7-22-69 4:15 PM\nxxxxxxxxxx questions\nK said he has gone ofer *********** and has a few changes.\nIn #7B, K suggested leaving out hea vy bombing and focus on blockade\nside - something to effect \"as last ***** resort selective bombing.' \"\nOn 10B, K asked if that was necessary - D csaid it can come out\nbut helps in sense that we compare xxx the reaction of this\nwith A thru H. K suggested adding \"If necessary against the siwix\nwishes of the existing Government.\"\nK said only other problem he has is first part of 14. First question\nXxxxxxxixogx \"accept a coalition govt including communists against the wishes\"\nK said or if D wanted to say \"impose a coalition govt including Communists. 11\nD said he would ask the second part only if they got no opinion. K said\nhe understood that.\nK said questions are dam good and very helpful - very pleased with them.\nD said they will get out and have report to K by Aug 15 at latest - perhaps\nsooner.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nDavid Nevin\nMr. Kissinger\n7-22-69\n4:35 PM\nK said the quotes are o.k. and that he appreciated the way N was handling\neverything. N said the story will be out the end of Aug or the beginning\nof September. N said they have a space problem at LIFE and the story\nis not as long as N had hoped but he is happy with the way it reads in\ngeneral. N said the pictures also look great and will send copies to K\nsoon.\nN said when he comes to Washington gain, he will come in to call on K.\nK said he would like that.\njm\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nMinister Tompkins (British Embassy)\n5:20 p.m.\n7/22/69\nK said he wanted to mention the agenda at Mildenhall. You have\nan intensive discussion of SALT, MIRV AND ABM. This was\nscheduled as a courtesy visit. I am not saying it is discourteous\nto discuss these things. It is just that it is the end of a long and\nexhausting trip for the President He appreciated the Prime\nMinister coming there. We would like to tell you about our\nimpressions of the trip and handle SALT some other way.\nTompkins said between you and me, what has happend is that\nafter our (W U.S.) presentation in Brussels, they realize that\nthere are certain problems implied which they have not faced\nclearly before.\nK said it is hard to come to decisions in bne hour. The President\nwill have had a three-hour time change and it will be a long day\nfor him. I wonder if this is the best occasion. Tompkins said\nhe didn't think the Prime Minister wanted any decisions reached.\nHe wanted to tell the President of the concerns he had so he will\nbe aware firsthand before decisions are taken. K said the two\nprinciples know and respect each other. If we could make this a\nlow key session in which each side is free to express concerns.\nThis was a personal communication and would not be for publication.\nTompkins understood.\nTompkins also understood that the President didn't want any\nsendoff at Andrews because of the flexible depakma departure.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified."
}