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TELECON
The President
Mr. Kissinger
4:40 p. m. , September 27
Mr. Kissinger said he was just going to call the President when
this call came in. He said he had an interesting conversation with
Dobrynin. He came in with two stupid questions: (1) whether we
want to have the Berlin talks to be quadripartite or bilateral, and
President
(2) he wanted us to use our influence to see that Gromyko and the
get together
before Gromyko leaves on Wednesday (K interjected
here he thinks the State people have practically given away our
position). K told D his call was providential as far as the White
House is concerned, we have no great incentives; D owes us an answer
to the question given him in May and another in the conversation K
had with him in April. As far as we are concerned, the train has
left the station. The Soviets have a choice of believing the President
or the New York Times and K, if he could advise him, would recom-
mend that they believe the President.
D said one other thing -- he knew of K's meeting in Paris. K asked
him what he knew. D said Hanoi told them this was the best conversa-
tion they had had and they thought something might come of it. K
said if it does, they will have to make the move. We are not going to
make the move, to which D didn't really respond. D said there are a
lot of arguments in the Soviet Union, and they feel we are not willing
to move very fast on Soviet-American relations in general. D did
not mention SALT, but mentioned trade, for example. K told him
that the President had told D, and K had told D, that we are going
very far on trade, but we aren't going to let Communist countries
supported by the Soviet Union chop us out. K said he had been very
tough with D -- he didn't given an inch.
K told the President he didn't think we should move very fast on the
Middle East. P said the point is we can't deliver. K said that is
not what they are asking. They want us to agree to a piece of paper
for Yarring (?) to deliver. K said they aren't anxious to get something
in the Middle East their problems with the Egyptians must be
very serious. He wanted us to be very forthcoming.
P wanted to know D's attitude. K said they want major improvements
in relations with us. He said they always run into trouble. He was
asked in Moscow what advance has been made, and he couldn't answer.
K told him he could have said "the SALT talks. 11 D said there will be
a positive answer pretty soon, but he didn't say any more about it.
K said he doesn't believe the U.S. should be in a pleading position
on it. He thinks we could play it the other way. If we go the hard
route, and can keep them quiet, that is what we want. P said he is
Reproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library
DECLASSIFIED
This document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.
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"ocrText": "TELECON\nThe President\nMr. Kissinger\n4:40 p. m. , September 27\nMr. Kissinger said he was just going to call the President when\nthis call came in. He said he had an interesting conversation with\nDobrynin. He came in with two stupid questions: (1) whether we\nwant to have the Berlin talks to be quadripartite or bilateral, and\nPresident\n(2) he wanted us to use our influence to see that Gromyko and the\nget together\nbefore Gromyko leaves on Wednesday (K interjected\nhere he thinks the State people have practically given away our\nposition). K told D his call was providential as far as the White\nHouse is concerned, we have no great incentives; D owes us an answer\nto the question given him in May and another in the conversation K\nhad with him in April. As far as we are concerned, the train has\nleft the station. The Soviets have a choice of believing the President\nor the New York Times and K, if he could advise him, would recom-\nmend that they believe the President.\nD said one other thing -- he knew of K's meeting in Paris. K asked\nhim what he knew. D said Hanoi told them this was the best conversa-\ntion they had had and they thought something might come of it. K\nsaid if it does, they will have to make the move. We are not going to\nmake the move, to which D didn't really respond. D said there are a\nlot of arguments in the Soviet Union, and they feel we are not willing\nto move very fast on Soviet-American relations in general. D did\nnot mention SALT, but mentioned trade, for example. K told him\nthat the President had told D, and K had told D, that we are going\nvery far on trade, but we aren't going to let Communist countries\nsupported by the Soviet Union chop us out. K said he had been very\ntough with D -- he didn't given an inch.\nK told the President he didn't think we should move very fast on the\nMiddle East. P said the point is we can't deliver. K said that is\nnot what they are asking. They want us to agree to a piece of paper\nfor Yarring (?) to deliver. K said they aren't anxious to get something\nin the Middle East their problems with the Egyptians must be\nvery serious. He wanted us to be very forthcoming.\nP wanted to know D's attitude. K said they want major improvements\nin relations with us. He said they always run into trouble. He was\nasked in Moscow what advance has been made, and he couldn't answer.\nK told him he could have said \"the SALT talks. 11 D said there will be\na positive answer pretty soon, but he didn't say any more about it.\nK said he doesn't believe the U.S. should be in a pleading position\non it. He thinks we could play it the other way. If we go the hard\nroute, and can keep them quiet, that is what we want. P said he is\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified."
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