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    "title": "September 19-30, 1969 [2 of 2]",
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    "ocrText": "- 3 -\nto the President\nK said/ on the Middle East, it would help us if we didn't do anything\nright now it could be done in about 10 days to 2 weeks between\nSisco and Dobrynin. K said he didn't know whether Rogers will make\na formal proposition -- he hadn't been in touch with K. P said waiting\nmakes sense.\nP said the papers had made a big thing about Gromyko getting a warmer\nreceiption than he. The reason is obvious all the Middle East had\nto be silent to him; we have nothing to offer the Africans; and we didn't\nmention Latin America. He said he felt it was foolish to go up there.\nK said he didn't think the President got a cool reception; he couldn't\ncount on the newspapers giving such a distorted picture. The President\nsaid we said things not calculated to get a warm reception.\nGetting back to D and Vietnam, P asked K whether he saw much movement.\nK's response was that the fact that\nD told him about his Paris\nconversation, and that Hanoi considers that the most useful conversation\nthey have had, he (K) considers positive. D had said in watching\nthe\nPresident's news conference, it was clear XXIX the President\nisn't\ngoing to make any major concessions, and that it was useful to get this\non the table. K thinks we will get a move within the next month.\nP mentioned the demonstrations coming up on October 15. He said\nthe Democratic National Chairman had been meeting with the doves,\nat the same time of his press conference, to make Vietnam a political\nissue. P said he didn't hit this hard with Haldeman, but he feels\nthe real attack should be on them. K agreed, saying they got us into\nthe war. P said our people have to start fighting harder. K said the\npress conference was essential and extremely helpful. He thinks\nevents of the last two or three weeks show the long route cannot\npossibly work. The President agreed, especially with our 60, 00-man\nwithdrawal, reduction of the draft by 50, 000, and Ho Chi Minh's death.\nThe doves and the public are making it impossible to happen. He\nasked K, if in his planning, he could pick this up SO that we make the\ntough move before the 15th of October. K said yes. P said he had\nbeen wondering if we shouldn't he doesn't want to appear to be\nmaking the tough move after the 15th just because of the rioting at\nhome. K said there is a problem, however -- if Hanoi takes us\nseriously, and they wouldn't have told Moscow if they weren't taking\nit seriously, we shouldn't confuse them. If we want them to make\nthe move, we should give them time two weeks. His only worry\nis that if we went ahead with the tough move before the 15th and\nthere is a 10% chance Hanoi might want to move, if we hit them\nbefore they have a chance to make the move, it will look as if we\ntricked them. He said the President might want to consider another\npress conference before the 15th XfX or a television report, saying\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified."
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