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    "title": "September 19-30, 1969 [2 of 2]",
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    "ocrText": "Telecon\nSecretary Laird\n7:25 pm 9/25/69\nWhen L and K discussed the meau, L was under the impression that\nthe President agreed to do about 3 a week. K said 3 or 4 but the\n4th would be discussed.\nL was suggesting that we do four next week and was sending over\nthe list.\nK said he talked to the President about their latest discussion\nregarding conversastion with Resor. The President and Mitchell\nagree that it would be o.k. if Laird did it Monday morning.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nHarry Dent\n7:35 p.m.\n9/25/69\nDent was C alling about John King's request to see Golda Meir.\nK said he should know that we can't ask her to see him. The President\nwas willing to invite him to the dinner tonight but King thought that\nwould be too obvious. If Dent wanted to raise it with the Pres. K\nsaid he would be happy to followix instructions but Dent said he wouldn't\ndo that. He would just tell King we couldn't do it.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nSecretary Packard\n8:30 a. m.\n9/26/69\nP had two items on cost reduction program. He indicated that the Chief\nof Staff had discussed this with the President about the reductions of\nB-52 sorties and tack air.\nK said he was there and didn't remember the discussion. K was sure\nthe President wouldn't agree to the reduction of B-52 sorties, in fact,\nhe had asked K to see that they were increased. K hadn't done anything\nyet because he found this was dependent upon the number of planes\navailable.\nP said thismay be so. Someone had suggested that an announcement be\nput out boxthe but he didn't agree with that. If the sorties were going to\nbe reduced it should just be done without an announcement.\nK indicated that the President didn't have any particular feeling about\nthe tac air and probably wouldn't get involved in that.\nP was worried the President might say something about this at the\npress conference but K assured him that he wasn't aware of the suggestion\nand he didn't like to bother him before press conferences so there would\nbe no chance of the President mentioning it.\nK wanted him to be sure that no instructions want out until he had a chance\nto talk to the President about this. P said this would be fine. He was\njust in the process of working out how to do this so it really hasn't been\nformulated yet.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nThe President\n10:35 a. m.\n9/26/69\nK called the President with the following information tx as background\nfor the press conference.\nThe Thai troop withdrawals. They will not be announced until Tuesday.\nK thought the President shouldn't make it that specific. (?)\nThere had was a coup in Bolivia. The President shouldn't comment\non this.\nThe North Vietnamese weremoving troops into Norther Laos. When\nasked to comment, K suggested the president point out the pressures\nare constant and not give the impression that we are not concerned.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nSenator Tower\nMr. Kissinger\n11:27 a. m., September 26, 1969\nSenator Tower said the press man at the Soviet Embassy had asked\nhim to see George Rockiani (?), the American editor for Pravda\nthis afternoon. The Senator tentatively accepted but wanted to check\nwith Mr. Kissinger to see if there were any reason why he shouldn't\nsee him, or if there were any line K wanted him to use.\nK said Tower couldn't talk to enough Soviet people for his tastes.\nHe would appreciate the Senator's getting across to the Soviet that\nthey shouldn't let the doves fool them -- the vast majority of the\nAmerican people are on the other side. If they push us too far, we\nmight get out of hand on Vietnam -- our tempers are getting short.\nThis country is not going to be humiliated. K asked Senator Tower\nto let him know how the XXXXXXX interview went.\nlds\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nRudolph Peterson\n12:45 p.m. 9/26/69\nK apologized for not getting to see Peterson when he was here but\nexplained that because of the Meir visit and the press conference,\nit would have been impossible anyway. He said he had a problem\nwith Bergsten being a little too eager. Peterson said he would be\nback on October 15. The members of the committee have an advance\ncopy of the Pierson report. Doug Dillon and the Asst. Director will\nbe at the meeting to see how they arrived at certain recommendations\nin the report. Invited K to attend part of their meetings and K said\nhe would for sure.\nPeterson mentioned the two rejections Shelling and Lewis. They(\n( the committee) has discussed possible alternatives and have come up\nwith Tony Sullivan. K said he had no objections to Sullivan. The\ncommittees second choice was Ed Freed who was on the NSC for a time.\nK said he couldn't go wrong with Freed.\nP said the committee will have to sift XXX through the available\ninformation as well as try to distribution it to some of the other\nmembers. He feels most of the information must be availabe some where.\nK said he was entirely free to do it the way he wanted. K didn't think\nalot of fact finding would be necessary.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nSecretary Kennedy\n3:05 p.m.\n9/26/69\nSecretary Kennedy wanted to discuss administrative procedures.\nDrl Burns wanted to be present also. He mentioneda letter that\nhad been submitted for the President which the President evidently\nnever received. Maurice Stans had the same complaint. K said\nhe was aware of the problem but wanted Kennedy to know that there\nis an absolute rule that any paper submitted by a Cabinet member\ngoes to the President within 36 hours. He indicated that these\npapers were staffed but that there was a definite time limits on it.\nThey both agreed that they should get together and discuss this.\nat an early date. K said he would like to very much.\n(call was interrupted did not get the rest of the conversation)\n(J. HOWE FYI: Kennedy's office called suggesting Monday, Oct. 13\nat 3:00. Kennedy will be leave on Wednesday(?) and will be out of\ntown.) I said we would confirm it today if possible since the whole\noffice is moving to New York for the IMF meetings on Monday)\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nAmbassador Bunker\n3:25 p.m.\n9/26/69\nBunker saw the President's press conference and thought it went over\nvery good, especially the Vietnam portion.\nBunker said he would be coming in the first of the week and wanted\nto know if he could squeeze the rest in. K said of course. and\nasked if he would plan to spend some time with him. Bunker\nagreed.\nBunker asked if K could set up a plane for him a week from Sunday\n(Oct. 5). K said he would.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nJos Sisco\n3:45 p.m. 9/26/69\nSisco was calling from the airport in New York. He asked Hal\nSaunders to get a paragraph or two to K as to what Golda Meir\nought to say on Meet the Press on Sunday. The Israelis should\naccept the principle of withdrawals within the context of the\nresolution.\nSisco said he hoped that when K was in the meeting, that it is\nmade very clear that we are going to have to go ahead and take\nsome positionstxx they might not be happy with. It is important\nthey know this so they don't come away thinking everything is\ngoing to stand still. He thought this would be helpful in terms\nof the efforts at the UN.\nK said he would do his best. K started to discuss his paper\nnotes and they were cut off. Sisco didn't call back.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nThe President\nMr. Kissinger\n3:15 p. m., September 27, 1969\nThe President -- said he had been thinking. It is very important\nto leave no illusions on the decision he made on the whole Southeast\nAsian area. It is very important that everybody realize the whole\nsituation is changed. We would be delighted to have nice personal\nrelations, but the boat has gone by now, and that is that. He wants\nto be sure that is understood; and we reached this conclusion\nreluctantly.\nK said he understood.\nlds\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nThe President\nMr. Kissinger\n4:40 p. m., September 27\nMr. Kissinger said he was just going to call the President when\nthis call came in. He said he had an interesting conversation with\nDobrynin. He came in with two stupid questions: (1) whether we\nwant to have the Berlin talks to be quadripartite or bilateral, and\nPresident\n(2) he wanted us to use our influence to see that Gromyko and the\nget together\nbefore Gromyko leavew on Wednesday (K interjected\nhere he thinks the State people have practically given away our\nposition). K told D his call was providential as far as the White\nHouse is concerned, we have no great incentives; D owes us an answer\nto the question given him in May and another in the conversation K\nhad with him in April. As far as we are concerned, the train has\nleft the station. The Soviets have a choice of believing the President\nor the New York Times and K, if he could advise him, would recom-\nmend that they believe the President.\nD said one other thing he knew of K's meeting in Paris. K asked\nhim what he knew. D said Hanoi told them this was the best conversa-\ntion they had had and they thought something might come of it. K\nsaid if it does, they will have to make the move. We are not going to\nmake the move, to which D didn't really respond. D said there are a\nlot of arguments in the Soviet Union, and they feel we are not willing\nto move very fast on Soviet-American relations in general. D did\nnot mention SALT, but mentioned trade, for example. K told him\nthat the President had told D, and K had told D, that we are going\nvery far on trade, but we aren't going to let Communist countries\nsupported by the Soviet Union chop us out. K said he had been very\ntough with D -- he didn't given an inch.\nK told the President he didn't think we should move very fast on the\nMiddle East. P said the point is we can't deliver. K said that is\nnot what they are asking. They want us to agree to a piece of paper\nfor Yarring (?) to deliver. K said they aren't anxious to get something\nin the Middle East their problems with the Egyptians must be\nvery serious. He wanted us to be very forthcoming.\nP wanted to know D's attitude. K said they want major improvements\nin relations with us. He said they always run into trouble. He was\nasked in Moscow what advance has been made, and he couldn't answer.\nK told him he could have said \"the SALT talks. 11 D said there will be\na positive answer pretty soon, but he didn't say any more about it.\nK said he doesn't believe the U.S. should be in a pleading position\non it. He thinks we could play it the other way. If we go the hard\nroute, and can keep them quiet, that is what we want. P said he is\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 2 -\nkeenly aware that we don't want to take the hard route and make\nthem mad. He asked K, \"You have no doubt but that he is reminded\nof the fact we are going the hard route?' K said yes; he had been\nvery tough on him. D had asked what K thought of the Sino-Soviet\nproblem. K had said the Soviets have a big geopolitical problem\nthat no death is going to solve. D had asked K whether he thought\nthey (the Soviets) were going to attack the Chinese. K had replied\nthat, as a historian, he thought the Soviets were considering it.\nD\nhad\nsaid something about Romania -- he asked who thought\nof it. K had replied that every fundamental decision here is made\nby the President, and he waan't going to give D a checklist of who\nmade the various proposals.\nD had asked whether we had any response from the Chinese on the\nchange in travel restrictions. K had replied that D knew as well as\nhe that the Chinese move in very complicated ways (which didn't\nreally give an answer to his question). K said he had been personally\nmuch more aloof with D than before.\nP asked what had been said about Vietnam. K told him D had said\nwe may not believe it, but the Soviets have a real interest in ending\nthis war, but for different reasons than ours. K told him we have no\nevidence of this. K said D had said they had been helpful on the shape\nof the table, to which K replied that they were helpful to Hanoi on that.\nK gave no encouragement here, and wasn't really very pleasant. He\nhad reminded D that we have a problem -- there can be no movement\nuntil they show us.\nThe President said, \"The summit and trade they can have, but I'll\nbe damned if they can get the Middle East, etc. 11 K said he doesn't\nsee what we gain by going to a fall-back position on the Middle East.\nHis instinct for handling this, would be fore Rogers to tell Gromyko\nwe will give our answer to Dobrynin in about two weeks.\nK said he thinks D came to see him to let him know they knew about\nK's Paris meeting, and to fix an invitation for Gromyko to see the\nPresident. D had said in all previous administrations Gromyko had\nbeen received by the President. K told D that Gromyko hadn't asked\nfor a meeting. K told the President if Gromyko asks for a meeting,\nformally, the President will have to see him, but if he doesn't, K\ndoesn't think we should invite him. K said D came back to this two\nor three times (Gromyko would love to have an invitation). K further\ndoesn't think we should encourage him to ask for an\nappointment.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 3 -\nto the President\nK said/, on the Middle East, it would help us if we didn't do anything\nright now -- it could be done in about 10 days to 2 weeks between\nSisco and Dobrynin. K said he didn't know whether Rogers will make\na formal proposition he hadn't been in touch with K. P said waiting\nmakes sense.\nP said the papers had made a big thing about Gromyko getting a warmer\nreceiption than he. The reason is obvious all the Middle East had\nto be silent to him; we have nothing to offer the Africans; and we didn't\nmention Latin America. He said he felt it was foolish to go up there.\nK said he didn't think the President got a cool reception; he couldn't\ncount on the newspapers giving such a distorted picture. The President\nsaid we said things not calculated to get a warm reception.\nGetting back to D and Vietnam, P asked K whether he saw much movement.\nK's response was that the fact that D told him about his Paris\nconversation, and that Hanoi considers that the most useful conversation\nthey have had, he (K) considers positive. D had said in watching the\nPresident's news conference, it was clear XXX the President isn't\ngoing to make any major concessions, and that it was useful to get this\non the table. K thinks we will get a move within the next month.\nP mentioned the demonstrations coming up on October 15. He said\nthe Democratic National Chairman had been meeting with the doves,\nat the same time of his press conference, to make Vietnam a political\nissue. P said he didn't hit this hard with Haldeman, but he feels\nthe real attack should be on them. K agreed, saying they got us into\nthe war. P said our people have to start fighting harder. K said the\npress conference was essential and extremely helpful. He thinks\nevents of the last two or three weeks show the long route cannot\npossibly work. The President agreed, especially with our 60, 000-man\nwithdrawal, reduction of the draft by 50, 000, and Ho Chi Minh's death.\nThe doves and the public are making it impossible to happen. He\nasked K, if in his planning, he could pick this up so that we make the\ntough move before the 15th of October. K said yes. P said he had\nbeen wondering if we shouldn't he doesn't want to appear to be\nmaking the tough move after the 15th just because of the rioting at\nhome. K said there is a problem, however -- if Hanoi takes us\nseriously, and they wouldn't have told Moscow if they weren't taking\nit seriously, we shouldn't confuse them. If we want them to make\nthe move, we should give them time -- two weeks. His only worry\nis that if we went ahead with the tough move before the 15th -- and\nthere is a 10% chance Hanoi might want to move, if we hit them\nbefore they have a chance to make the move, it will look as if we\ntricked them. He said the President might want to consider another\npress conference before the 15th XIX or a television report, saying\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 4 -\n'these people (demonstrators, etc.) are dividing the country and\nmaking it impossible to settle the problem on a reasonable basis.\nI\nP said he would just as soon have them demonstrate against the\nplan. If we went ahead and moved, the country is going to take\na dimmer view after the move than before. P would like to nip\nit before the first demonstration, because there will be another\none on November 15. P reminded that Laird had said for three\nmonths after we do this, it will have XXXXX relatively high public\nsupport. K said as an assistant, he had to give P the dark side.\nHe suggested again the possibility XgX of P going on television before\nthe demonstration -- possibly around Oct 10.\nP said okay; they had had an interesting day; and he would see K on\nMonday. If Rogers calls, P will try to cool off that thing. K said\nRogers can be generally positive but defer an answer for two weeks.\nlds\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nAmbassador Jung\nMr. Kissinger\n5:10 p. m., September 27, 1969\nJ said F.M. Singh\nwas coming to Washington for lunch\non Sunday [I turned from the phone to answer a question and missed\nthe name; it was not mentioned again] and wondered if HAK could\njoin them. K said F.M. Singh had been in Hanoi, hadn't he. He\nwould have enjoyed talking with him, but he will be in New York\non Sunday. F.M. Singh is returning to New York right after\nlunch and will be leaving the States on Oct 4. Mr. Kissinger asked\nwhere he was staying. Jung said the Carlisle, Room 7F. K said\nhe would call him while he was in New York.\nlds\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nGolda Meir\nMr. Kissinger\n5:20 p.m., September 27, 1969\nK said he was sorry he would not be able to see her again, but that\nThursday evening had been the private conversation that had been\nplanned.\nM said she was much disturbed and wanted to speak w/K about it.\nShe referred to the Star article of 9/26, and said her Israeli newspaper\npeople tell her that there is news and rumors that actually there was\npressure on her to change her attitude and that of the Israeli government\nto the discussion of the \"2 and 4. 11 K said he could assure her that\nnothing like this came from the White House. M said she was assured\nthat it had not come from our President or K; that K did not have to\nassure her of this. She said the newspaper people say their source\nis \"high officials; 11 some say State; some say the White House. She\nwould most grateful to K if he would do something about it. If it had\nonly been one newspaper, she wouldn't worry. The Israeli newspaper-\nman tried to press her on whether there had been pressure applied on\nher. She had denied any pressure. But she said what worried her\nwas this formula hardware which was mentioned by the newspaper-\nman. K said he now had an idea where it came from, and asked her\nif she were sure this precise phrase had been used. M said exactly.\nK said he thought this was an outrage. It is true the formula was\nused but in the strictest confidence only two people knew about it.\nM said she wouldn't accept this formula if it meant a deal whereby\nthey get arms if they give up their stance on the 2 and 4. She said\nshe hadn't been so disturbed in a long, long time she doesn't know\nwhat she is going home with.\nK said we would never do anything like this the President or he.\nWe told her our view and she told us hers. There was no intention of\nembarrassing her or putting her into a difficult position by using\ncheap newspaper stories to pressure her. He said if the formula\nwas used, it helps identify where it must have come from, and he\nregrets it very much.\nM asked if she were right in saying there has been no condition put on\nthe question of the President's consideration of their request for planes.\nK said there has been no condition put on it. The President had asked\nfor consideration of his particular problems, but that was XX the\nreason for the meeting. The two were not made conditional. M said\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 2 -\nthere is no hope of their getting out. She said yesterday, she said\nto the President, 'what shall I tell my government?\" He told her\nthe first shipment of Phantoms will go on. As to the other request,\nthe President is considering it and he has an understanding for it.\nShe asked K if this were not right. K said it was absolutely correct.\nM said the President didn't ask her to give up their stance in order\nto get arms. She said she is glad there is no difference between her\nand K on what happened. She couldn't see herself leaving Washington\nwithout speaking to K about it -- (1) that there is no difference as to\nfacts, and (2) to aske him to please use his good services to see\nthat the rumors are stopped -- whatever source they come from.\nK said, if it was any consolation to her, they do it to us, too.\nM asked K to give the President her very best regards and appreciation\nfor his understanding.\nK asked M to send her Ambassador to see him on Monday or Tuesday\nfor 5 minutes -- he had wanted to talk to him anyway.\nlds\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nSecretary Volpe\nMr. Kissinger\n5:30 p. m., September 27, 1969\nV asked if K knew a gentleman by the name of Pierre Tolente (?).\nHerb Klein had called V's office and wanted desperately for V to\nsee Tolente who is an Italian builder. Herb indicated Tolente was\nhis man in Italy. V wondered if K knew anything about T that he\nshould know. K said he recalls he couldn't see Tolente but that was\nall. This is the suggestion Tolente made. He suggested in order\nto keep pressure on the Christian Democrats, Saragat is the man who\ncan save Italy. Tolente feels it would serve the Italian nation's\ninterest, as well as the U.S. interest, if Saragat were invited to\nsee the President first. After he goes back, then Rumor could be\ninvited later.\nK said he wouldn't be able to settle this until Monday or Tuesday.\nV said he is leaving Monday morning. He will be in Spain Monday\nnight and Tuesday, and arrives in Rome on Wednesday. Tolente's\npoint was that if President Saragat were invited first, it would give\nhim leverage. V said he will be staying at Ambassador Hill's\nresidence Monday night and on Tuesday will be seeing the Minister\nof transportation. When he gets to Rome he will be talking to both\nSaragat and Rumor.\nA second item from V concerned a heritage group of the Republican\nNational Committee, composed of all nationalities with whom he\n(V) worked during the campaign. They are coming to Washington\nat his urging and the urging of others. They haven't heardfrom the\nPresident.\nwill be in Washington on October 30 and 31, and V recommended\nMr. Kissinger as a good speaker XXXXXXX on the evening of Oct 30.\nK said if it is public, he can't consider it because he doesn't give\npublic speaches. V said he understood K's not being able to speak\npublicly. He will check with the group -- if it can be a closed session,\nhe will write a note to K giving the details. If it is to be Ipublic, he\nwill drop it.\nlds\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nThe President\nMr. Kissinger\n5:45 p.m., September 27, 1969\nto\nK said he was, disturb the President, but just in case Rogers calls\nhim on the Middle East, Golda Meir had just called K concerning\nthe story in Friday's Star that we were squeezing her about withdrawal.\nP said she knows that is not true. K said he mentioned to Joe Sisco\nthe President's conversation, using the President's hardware and\nsoftware formula. That has been leaked to a newspaperman. P said\nwho in God's name would do that! K said there had been only 3 people\nwho knew this. P said that is terrible. He told them not to put this\non the diplomatic wire, so they tell some newspaperman! K said\nit's the sort of thing one knows is true they couldn't have picked\nit up anywhere else. He told P an Israeli newspaper man knows it\nnow. K said he had XX told Mrs. Meir the President would look at\nXXXXX her request sympathetically, and he XXXX wanted her\nto look at his. P said he had said, in order to do better on hardware,\nthey must do better on software.\nK told P Mrs. Meir had said she knew it didn't come from him or K.\nBut she was very upset. K said he had apologized to her on behalf\nof the President for any embarrassment such a leak might have caused\nher. P said he is convinced these State people are always around for\nthis purpose. He said he didn't think we would tell them any more.\nThey have talked themselves out of the ballgame. They can't wait\nuntil they rush to a newsman. K agreed. K said his feeling now is\nthe new Sisco formula isn't so bad except that to spring it within 48\nhours of the President's seeing her, and while she is still in the\ncountry, is not the time to do.it. P asked K if there were any way\nhe could tell Sisco all hell is breaking loose because they leaked it.\nK should tell him it is not a bad formula but not to do it while she\nis in the country wait until she leaves. Spring it when she goes\nback. K said he would call Sisco right away.\nlds\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nMr. Kissinger\nJoe Sisco\n5:54 p.m., September 27, 1969\nK said there were 2 things: (1) Dobrynin was in town and came by\nhalf fishing for a Gromyko invitation, but we don't want an appointment\nunless he formally requests it. In connection with that, D said he\nwas making great progress with Sisco and yesterday S was practically\nagreeing.\nS said they did a report which was dispatched at noon today and slugged\nfor the White House. The Secretary had a good talk with Gromyko in\nwhich he outlined in general terms how we think this could come out\nin common ground. K asked if this included the fallback and said\nDobrynin thinks it is practically agreed to. K had told him it was\nbeing handled by Rogers and Sisco.\nS said Golda Meir leaves a week from MX Sunday and he thinks we\ncan do it in such a way no damage will be caused. He said they had\nagreed today they were going to float all this XXX stuff with the\nunderstanding we don't put anything to the Israeli's before the election.\nK said Dobrynin had told him he wants a joint piece of paper between\nS and the Russians before Gromyko leaves. S said that doesn't mean\nthey will take it to the parties. S said both he and the Secretary\nunless somebody can convince them otherwise -- feel whatever is\nagreed to can be played in such a way that you can hold off on the\nfinal answer.\nK asked if the WH were going to get a crack at it. S said there is\none more meeting with Gromyko and he doesn't think they will be\nin a position by Tuesday night to button anything down with Gromyko.\nIt will be put on an \"if\" basis. It doesn't mean they are going to the\nparties this week. It means they and the Russians can come up with\na document. There are 2 kinds of commitment: (1) refer to govern-\nment, and (2) if that is agreeable, commitment would only be to try\nit out on the parties.\nK told S of the latest problem with Golda Meir. S said they had not\nbeen talking -- K told S about the hardware and software last night\nat 8:00. He hasn't talked to an Israeli or a newsman. S said no one\nknows what is happening in these meetings. Anybody would be a fool\nThe Secretary, Richardson and he didn't know they have only had\noral briefings. K said he could only tell him what the situation is.\nHe mentioned it to the President. He said we\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\n- 2 -\nshould be especially careful this week. K also mentioned to P Sisco's\nscheme -- K thinks it is ingenious. The President feels in light of\nthis latest, he would like to tell Dobrynin two weeks from now.\nS said the Secretary had said to Gromyko, XXXXXX what do you\nthink the possibilities are of trying to work something out on the\nbasis of a commitment to peace and on the basis we would try to\nwork all points out but leave 3 critical points for the parties to work\nout. The Secretary sketched it generally for Gromyko, but they\nhaven't seen any of the language. K said it would be better to leave\nthe commitments to Sisco and Dobrynin. The President had asked\nK to put this to S on a personal basis -- to call him and say he\ndidn't want to have to be in a position of Rogers coming to him, and\nthe President having to say \"no. 11 K asked if Sisco could engineer\nthat. Sisco said he would try to work XrX it in this way; so that he\nwill put forward no language on that critical paragraph that could be\nattributed to us before Golda Meir leaves the country. K said if\nthey could string this out for two weeks, they would have a grateful\nPresident. K said Mrs. Meir should be allowed to report to her\ncabinet before it is done. Sisco thought K was more worried than\nhe needed to be. K said the President wants to avoid a confrontation\non this. K said he thought he was sympathetic to Sisco's view and\nit could move in that direction. Sisco said in case he can't manage\nit, he will let K know.\nlds\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTeleCon\nHenry Kissinger\nSeptember 29, 1969\nSecretary Laird\n2:50 p.m.\nSecretary Laird called to tell HAK that \"It's been done; it's announced. \"\nHe wanted HAK to tell Elliot (Richardson) to get word over to State to\n\"not show shock. \" (They are showing shock -- should keep mouths shut\nand not show alarm.)\nHAK asked if he had gotten with Helms. He asked if we have to do anything\nfrom the WH. Referring to Helms, HAK asked if he understands that he\ncan't pull back. Laird said he had gotten together with Helms, and that\nhe had made it clear that we have got to stick with it.\nLaird repeated that it was important that Elliot talk to State.\nNote:\nAbove refers to Green Beret announcement made today.\n/\ndn\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nSir Edward Tompkins (British Embassy)\n11:50 a.m.\n9/30/69\nTompkins said the Ambassador was off for California. They have just\nreceived a telegram from Youde about the matter that was discussed\nlast week. Tompkins was wondering if he could come buy with it.\nK said no time was good for him today but ask him to come in about\n5:30. Tompkins said he would be here.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nAmbassador Annenberg - London\n11:55 a.m.\n9/30/69\nAnnenberg said he just received K's communication dated Sept. 23. He\nwould have called earlier but it just came in. K indicated that there was\nno urgency but Annenberg said anything from K he considered urgent.\nThe President had asked K to call to tell him, for his information, that\nTom Hughes was coming there. Annenberg said he has been for four\nweeks. K wanted A to know that Hughes hasn't always expressed himself\nwith full approval of the President and that A should keep that in mind.\nA said he ha the message but would like to say that his relationship\nwith Hughes thus far has been extremely complimentary to the President.\nIf A hears ahything that he believes would indicate an attitude that is\nnot enthusiastic, K will hear from him forthwith. A mentioned that K\ncould relay that message to the President. K said if A had matters of\nparticular confidence, he might decide from case to case whx how widely\nhe would want to spead it. A understood.\nOn another matter, A thought someone should talk to Walter Thayer who\nis doing work with Ash to see if Thayer C an't be more\neffective with the management of the Harold Trib. Day after day the\neditorials, etc. anything of a negative nature is highlighted. When Jock\nWhitney visited A in June, A complained to him strongly. Whitney said\nhe sold 1/3 to the New York Times and 1/3 to the Post. When A asked\nhim if he couldn't do something assert his authority Whitney said\nthey could outvote him. Since this is the only paper that Americans abroad\ncan read, A felt that it was extremely important that Herb Klein or\nsomeone do something about Thayer. A suggested that either K or himself\nshould call Klein. K thought that was a excellent idea and suggested that\nthey both call him. K said he appreciated A's suggestion on this matter.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nSecretary Rogers\n3:10 p.m.\n9/30/69\nK asked Rogers how everything was going in New York. Rogers said by\nthe end of tomorrow he will have seen 75 Foreign Ministers. K thought\nR had been very effective.\nRogers was concerned about Mexican situation. Sometimes the wait at the\nborder is up to six hours and this has caused difficulties with the Mexican\nGovernment. Rogers told the F.M. that he could go back and say that the\nmatter was discussed and we would enter discussions to see if there was\na way to alleviate some of the difficulties that have been created. R and K\nagreed that the problem was not a simple one and K said some of the stories\nare awful. K said he wouldn't be able to get to the President but that the\ntwo of them should be able to decide. If R just wants to say that we would\ndiscuss the problem to see if there could be a solution, that would be O. k.\nK said he would take the responsibility of calling Metchell to tell him what\nwe are going to do. Rogers asked if K noticed that the President was on\nnational TV. K said yes, and he made it very clear that he was unhappy.\nRogers didn't think it was worth it.\nK asked how it went with Golda. Rogers thought it went fine. They didn't\ncome up with any conclusions but the discussions have been very friendly'\nand frank. People say they have enjoyed the discussions even though\nthey don't always agree. On the withdrawal point, R asked if the secure\nboundaries were not going to be exact, why did they object to using the\nterm withdrawal to recognized and secure boundaries. Golda said she\nthought THEY were being very logical. Rogers asked her if she understood\nand she said yes, we were just being illogical.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nSecretary Laird\n5:05 p.m. 9/30/69\nK said he talked to the President about their meeting and also about Laird's\nconcern about dangers of a direct confrontation. He is now leaning to have\nthe heads of the agencies testify but not permitting any subordinates. It\nwill still produce some confrontation. Laird said they would have to call\nthe crytologist and didn't feel they should get too much into the committe\nanyway. K said the President was going to make a public statement\nsometime early tomorrow. The second thing was the President is going to\nKey Biscayne on Thursday evening and would like to meet with the Joint\nChiefs XXX and Laird on Saturday afternoon. Laird indicated that he would\nbe going to NORAD but could cancel that. K said the President would like\nto review, so he knows, what he is up against. He will want to discuss the\nplan they discussed in his office briefly with Mitchell.\nLaird's problem was that he wasn't expecting the report until Thursday,\nit would take him some time to go over it and Wheeler would not be here.\nWheeler will be back on Monday or Tuesday. Laird didn't think he could get\nWheeler back. K said the President was more interested in the concept\nrather than the details and would really like to do it this weekend. If Laird\ncould get the report tomorrow, they could take it Thursday night. Laird said\nit would be raw since he will not have all of the inputs. i.e. Wheeler's\nmeeting with Abrams. They will think the President is trying to bypass their\nconference. K indicated that he told Robinson they couldn't work so slowly\nespecially when the President is so anxious for this. K was under the impression\nthat Wheeler would be sending in some of the stuff on Mon. or Tues. Laird siad\nhe sent the first raw material over. K said he would be reviewing it at 6:00.\nLaird wanted K to know that he hadn't reviewed it nor had the Joint Chiefs.\nK sa id the President wants to get a feel of this. He will understand that it is\nraw. He doesn't care if there are 25 planes more or less. Laird the material\nthat would not be complete would be the targeting. They can't do it overnight.\nSince the President has a foreign policy reason for wanting to do this, K thought\nthat Laird should count on doing it, K will point out to the President Laird's\nconcerns. Certainly there will be a full review of the finished product and NNK no\ndecision will be made at this meeting at K. B. They will have weeks to polish it\nup. K said he would like to sit down with Laird and the Joint Chiefs at a separate\nsession and discuss this also. K said, pending the President changing his mind,\nwe should lay it on. K indicated that the President can focus better on it in this\natmosphere also and it helps for diplomatic reasons. Laird said he would then\nbring the four Chiefs minus Wheeler. K asked if he could have the report by\nThursday night then and Laird said he thought he could get something but it will\ncertainly be raw. K said he understodo that.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTelecon\nSecretary Laird\n5:30 p.m.\n9/30/69\nLaird had two things: He checked this out as far as the Chiefs. If there is a\ndiplomatic reason for the meeting he would agree. As far as the program\nand plan, the messages that have been sent over already are very raw. The\nChiefs tell Laird that they are not going to support the program as presently\nsent. They are revising them considerably. They have to get in touch with\nthe group out there and General Wheeler. They have had only six days of\nstudys and it hasn't even come to Laird officially yet. The reports will be\nin Laird's hands on Thursday. The Chiefs will reject the work that has been\ndone so far. Laird said they would go down and be there but thinks he ought\nto warn the President a little about this. Laird understood that the President\ndidn't want these warmed over contingency plans he wanted a fresh sta rt.\nK said yes but fairly quickly. Laird understood that K wanted this within two\nor three weeks. and said that he could give K the olds plans. K said there\nwould be no sixixcex sense in that. Laird thought there should be a restudy\nbased upon whats happened since the bombing half. K said his instructions\nwere what he gave Laird. He would point out to the President Laird's\nconcerns. Laird said he could have the full report by Wednesday.. K wanted\nto discuss this with the President and see what he intends to do. Laird skarck\nsaid he probably wouldn't have sent Wheeler if he knew there was going to be\na meeting this weekend. K indicated that he just found out about it late\nyesterday.\nLaird told the Chiefs he wanted the first three reports analyzed and their\nrecommendations by Thursday. All they are doing on the program is analyzing\nthe first three reports. Laird indicated that x the report would have to be\nredone. Since K hadn't looked at it yet, he couldn't judge. Laird said they\nhave thrown together the old things and he is not satisfied with this. When he\nchecked with the Joint Chiefs, he is sure they are going in a different direction.\nThis concerned Laird. K again said that no decision would be made but the\nPresident needs the input to think about it.\nOn the hearings, Laird understood that the President was going ahead with the\nidea that the three Directors would appear. K said that was the decision.\nd Laird said this makes some difference. We shouldn't start the other way if\nthat is thecase. Laird would recommend that the President see Symington before\nthe statement is made public. K said that was hsi recommendation also.\nLaird said it seems that Max Frankel is playing tricks. He said that tthe WH\nindicated their concern and this is the reason for the change. K wanted to impress\nupon La ird that everyone has instructions not to talk abouts this. The thing turned\nout exactly as we wanted it.\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELCON\nSecretary Laird\nMr. Kissinger\n5:50 p.m., 9-30-69\nL said Henry there was one thing you were going to let me know\nabout on this morning. Did you talk to the President about the\nsorties?\nK said I did but did not get clear answer. K said I will let you know\nin the morning. L said we have the capability to do it. It is not\ngoing to reduce our capability. There will be no reduction in\nthe capability of the B-52s.\nK said I raised it with the President and he said he wanted to think\nabout it. L said my problem is every day we do this it costs\n$300, 000. L said I am getting money short over here you know.\nI hate to be in that position but I am going to be very money hungry.\nK said I will get you an answer tomorrow. L said all I am talking\nabout if $300, 000 for ammunition. K said I understand and I will\nget back to you tomorrow morning.\nmlh\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nSecretary Laird\nMr. Kissinger\n6:58 p.m., September 30, 1969\nK told L that the meeting had been called of for Saturday (he had had\nno authority to do it on his own. L wondered if K had talked to\nADM Moorer. K said not about this -- just Robinson's connection\nwith it. He hadn't even discussed the possibility of a JCS meeting.\nL said he had alerted Moorer to the possibility, but will now call\nit off.\nK said he had promised the President the plan would be ready by\nbeginning of business on Wednesday. L said this would work out much\nbetter; it will be much more meaningful for the President.\nK said he told the President about the sorties; he wants to mull it over.\nK told L that by Thursday morning at the latest, he would know. L\nsaid sometimes he thinks his friends in the White House and at State\ndon't think he has financial problems. K said he understood.\nK said he had sent via LDX the Executive Privilege statement over\nto him. L said he had it already and said it was very good it is\ncertainly alright as it is. K said the only change made by the President\nwas in paragraph 4 he made a change here to say 'I have directed\nthat the Directors of these agencies testify, but no one else in their\nagencies. 1 In this connection, L said they have a 'bad' guy testifying\ntomorrow an OSI investigator from Clark Air Force Base. He\nknows about some secret stealing from the local police chief. In\nresponse to a query by K, L said the legislative purpose to be served\nis to show that military involvement around these particular bases has\ncorrupt governments in this case they are trying to show the\nPhilippine Government is corrupt. L said this will be leaking out from\nup there. He said, of course, there is corruption in the Philippine\nGovernment, to which K said that is putting it mildly.\nlds\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified.\nTELECON\nThe President\nMr. Kissinger\n7:10 p. m., September 30, 1969\nThe President asked K if he had plans to go out to dinner. K said\nhe was going to the David Bruce's but would be glad to change it.\nThe President said he was going to ask K to come over for dinner.\nBut the President felt this would be good -- he could feel Bruce out\nand ask his advice. K said he thinks Bruce is on the very cautious\nside. He thanked the President for the invitation.\nlds\nReproduced at the Richard Nixon Presidential Library\nDECLASSIFIED\nThis document has been reviewed pursuant to Executive Order 13526 and has been determined to be declassified."
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