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Kraft Telcon -4- Xuan Thuy were both there. And until we had assessed the Cambodian situation. study on Kraft: You had to do the ceasefire. K: That we have been doing since last December. The security situation. ThenCambodia set all of this back 2 months. Kraft: Do you think the other side is alert to ? Another ambiguity is what kind of political actions would be allowed them under the ceasefire? K: On that we would be very permissive. If it is the execution of political opponents we would draw the line. Kraft: Yes. OK, well. K: What is your personal reaction? Kraft: My personal reaction is that it is not political. K: That is clearly right. Kraft: Well, I am not sure. But, to the best of my knowledge. Two, there are a lot of things in there that they put privately and that Have induced interest on the other side. Three, a lot of thingsin there that to publicly state make it tough for the other side. Like inspection. You needed that publicly? Things like infiltration. I guess I come to the conclusion that if the other side buys it, really good. The terms look to me quite stiff, especially with respect to Saigon. The Saigon regime gets reinforced. K: I don't expect them to accept every line of it. it's not put on a take it or leave it basis. We have made extensive studies on this. Kraft: But are they capable of this kind of analysis? K: I don't know. Kraft: This kind of analysis may be beyond them. They tend to think in terms of the dynamics of their own movement. K: ] This is just for you. In contrast to the Middle East ceasefire, here we know what we are talking about. On the political dynamics it generates, they are more subtle than we are, I am sure.

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    "ocrText": "Kraft Telcon\n-4-\nXuan Thuy were both there. And until we had assessed the\nCambodian situation.\nstudy on\nKraft: You had to do the ceasefire.\nK:\nThat we have been doing since last December. The security\nsituation. ThenCambodia set all of this back 2 months.\nKraft: Do you think the other side is alert to\n?\nAnother ambiguity\nis what kind of political actions would be allowed them under the\nceasefire?\nK:\nOn that we would be very permissive. If it is the execution\nof\npolitical opponents we would draw the line.\nKraft: Yes. OK, well.\nK:\nWhat is your personal reaction?\nKraft: My personal reaction is that it is not political.\nK:\nThat is clearly right.\nKraft: Well, I am not sure. But, to the best of my knowledge.\nTwo, there are a lot of things in there that they put privately and that\nHave induced interest on the other side. Three, a lot of thingsin there\nthat to publicly state make it tough for the other side. Like inspection.\nYou needed that publicly? Things like infiltration. I guess I come\nto the conclusion that if the other side buys it, really good. The terms\nlook to me quite stiff, especially with respect to Saigon. The Saigon\nregime gets reinforced.\nK:\nI don't expect them to accept every line of it.\nit's not put on a\ntake it or leave it basis. We have made extensive studies on this.\nKraft: But are they capable of this kind of analysis?\nK:\nI don't know.\nKraft: This kind of analysis may be beyond them. They tend to think\nin terms of the dynamics of their own movement.\nK: ]\nThis is just for you. In contrast to the Middle East ceasefire,\nhere we know what we are talking about. On the political dynamics it\ngenerates, they are more subtle than we are, I am sure."
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