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OCR Page 1 of 67Telcon
The President
March 11, 1972; 11:10 a.m.
P: Hello, how are you? What is the situation with regard to that Vietnam
thing? You say Moorer believes no extensive strikes are necessary?
K: No. Morroer would like to make extensive strikes, but I think it would
be a mistake. If they are going to attack they have moved supplies into
position now. We don't have to attack North Vietnam to knock out supplies
for whatever offensive they do next week.
P: I am not talking about North Vietnam. I am talking about attacks in
South Vietnam.
K: In South Vietnam they are going full blast.
P: Are we trying to concentrate in B-3 area, or just dazzling around as usual.?
K: I will have to check.
P: I understand they can't hit everything but if they will just hit something
instead of just sporadically.
K: They are doing 50% more now than before the NSC meeting. I will give
Moorer a call.
P: Pound him in terms of hitting the South -- that is where supplies and
personnel are. Get in there and do something about it.
K: If they find military things in the DMZ north of the line that is technically
North Vietnam but it is a violation of the DMZ.
P: Yes. I think the North Vietnamese strikes can come. I don't think they
are going to do a lot of good but if they come have them come after the offensive
breaks.
K:
I think so, because then we can put it on the basis that they tricked us.
We made every effort to talk to them. We told them there would be no escala-
tion and nevertheless they hit us.
P: How do you go about that?
K: We would have to decide whether we want them to blow the channel again
but we could gear that to the intensity of the attacks. But we could just hit
them. We told the Chinese and the Russians we would do it.